# Jon Jepma



HOME CTF WRITE-UPS BLOG ▼

MITRE TryHackMe Write-up


Posted on 🛗 January 11, 2021 by Jon Jepma



This is a Write up for the MITRE Room Created by heavenraiza

TASK 1 & 2 are simple click and complete tasks

TASK 3



T1566

### Question 3: is found under the Mitigations section on the Phishing page

### Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Antivirus/Antimalware	Anti-virus can automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Network Intrusion Prevention	Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments or links can be used to bloom
Restrict Web-Based Content	Determine if certain websites or attachment types (ex: .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc.) that can be used for phishing are necessary for business op
User Training	Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and phishing emails.

### Question 4: can be found under the Detection section of this same page

Detection

Network infusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

Because most common third party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection in generally required to detect the initial communication delevery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware.

Antivirus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downtoaded on the user's computer. Many possible districtions of follow on behavior may kine gives note their Execution occurs.

There are other possible areas for detection for this technique, which occurs after what other technique?

User Execution

### Question 5: Is located on the same page near the top

### **Procedure Examples**

Name	Description			
Dragonfly	Dragonfly has used spearphising camp	aigns to gain access to victims. <sup>[1]</sup>		
GOLD SOUTHFIELD	GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted mal	GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines. <sup>[2]</sup>		
What group has used spear phishing in	their campaigns?			
Dragonfly		Correct Answer		

Question 6: click on the Groups link to learn more about them and the information is located under

## **Associated Group Descriptions**

Based on the information for this group, what are their associated groups?

TG-4192, Crouching Yeti, IRON LIBERTY, Energetic Bear

Correct Answer

### **Question 7:** is located under the Software Section

### Software

ID	Name	References	Techniques
S0093	Backdoor.Oldrea	[1]	Account Discovery: Email Account, Archive Collected Data, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Cred Discovery, Process Injection, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery
S0002	Mimikatz	[2]	Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Account Manipulation, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, DCSync, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Rogue Domain Controller, Steal or Fc Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
S0029	PsExec	2	Lateral Tool Transfer, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, System Services: Service Execution
S0094	Trojan.Karagany	[1][7]	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Window Discovery, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Starl Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Trans Thread Execution Hijacking, Screen Capture, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network

What tool is attributed to this group to transfer tools or files from one host to another within a compromised environment?

PsExec Correct Answer

**Question 8:** is found when we click the hyperlink for PsExec we are led to a page about the tool and who has been known to use it and this will help us answer this question.

FIN5

Correct Answe

### **Question 9:** Click on the FIN5 Group hyperlink to be taken to their page to find the next answers

### FIN5

FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries.

The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. [1] [2] [3]

This group has been active since what year?


2008

Correct Answe

OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

# **Question 10:** This located under the software section where we learn that the Windows Credential Editor is used by FIN5

### Software



Windows Credential Editor

Windows Credential Editor

Correct Answer

### And here is our TASK 3 Recap

Only blue teamers will use the ATT&CK Matrix? (Yay/Nay) What is the ID for this technique? Correct Answer T1566 Based on this technique, what mitigation covers identifying social engineering techniques? User Training There are other possible areas for detection for this technique, which occurs after what other technique? User Execution What group has used spear phishing in their campaigns? Dragonfly Based on the information for this group, what are their associated groups? TG-4192, Crouching Yeti, IRON LIBERTY, Energetic Bear What tool is attributed to this group to transfer tools or files from one host to another within a compromised environment? PsExec Based on the information about this tool, what group used a customized version of it? FIN5 This group has been active since what year? 2008 Instead of Mimikatz, what OS Credential Dumping tool is does this group use? Windows Credential Editor

### Task 4

### Question 1: Splunk search is pseudo

We're also provided with Pseudocode and a query on how to search for this specific analytic within Splunk. A pseudocode is a plain, human-readable way to describe a set of instructions or algorithms that a program or system will perform.

Splunk search - Windows task file creation (Splunk, Sysmon native)

This Splunk search looks for any files created under the Windows tasks directories.

index=\_\_your\_sysmon\_index\_\_ EventCode=11 Image!="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe" (TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\
\*" OR TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\\*")

**Question 2:** Head to https://attack.mitre.org/ and click on the search icon on the top right and enter TA0003, if we click on the first link we are then taken to What type of Tactic this is.



### Question 3: Head to https://car.mitre.org/ and I searched for Zeek

### **Analytic Source Code Libraries**

Some analytics are built as source code for specific products. In these cases, code might support a broad set of detections in a way that makes it hard to describe a set of distinct analytics. For these types of analytics, rather than integrating them into the main CAR site, we've collected them under a library of implementations. Currently, the only library is BZAR, a collection of Zeek (Bro) scripts looking primarily at SMB and RPC traffic.

### Question 4: Head to https://car.mitre.org/analytics/ and I searched for hash (only 3 results)




### **Question 5:** There is a section for Test Cases located on the same page

# Unit Tests Test Case 1 Configurations: Windows 7 • From an admin account, open Windows command prompt (right click, run as administrator). • Execute "at 10:00 calc.exe," substituting a time in the near future for 10:00. • The program should respond with "Added a new job with job ID = 1" where the job ID is dependent on what tasks are scheduled. • The program should execute at the time specified. This is what the analytic should fire on. • To remove the scheduled task, execute "at 1 /delete" where you replace "1" with the job ID output in step 2a above. at 10:00 calc.exe // returns a job number X at X /delete

TASK 4 Recap

Examine CAR-2013-05-004, what additional information is provided to analysts to ensure coverage for this technique?



### TASK 5

**Question 1 & 2:** we need to go tohttps://shield.mitre.org/ > Matrix > this lists all the techniques and we see that Detect has the most.


Which Shield tactic has the most techniques?



**Question 3:** all we need to do is a quick search from the search bar shows that DTE0011 is Decoy Content >

DUC0234

A defender can plant files, registry entries, software, processes, etc. to make a system look like a VM when it is not.




Task 5 Recap



### TASK 6

Question 1: Click the APT3 hyperlink they provided in the room to find this answer

# **APT 3 Emulation Plan**



**Question 2:** This can be located viahttps://attack.mitre.org/docs/APT3\_Adversary\_Emulation\_Plan.pdf > Phase 2 > Persistence | utilize the table of contents to find this easily!

### 3.2.1.3 Persistence




Figure 5 APT3
Persistence ATT&CK
Techniques

APT3 has used multiple methods for persistence: creating a service [23] (T1050 - New Service), creating a scheduled task [2] (T1053 - Scheduled Task), and also by placing scripts in the Startup Folder [7] [T1060 - Registry Run Keys/Start Folder].

APT3 has replaced the Sticky Keys binary
(C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe) with cmd.exe [T1015 Accessibility Features] and enabled Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP) if it is not already enabled [T1076 – Remote Desktop
Protocol]. This specific Persistence technique has an added
benefit of allowing an operator to open a command prompt
when connected over RDP without having to provide valid
credentials [23].

APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, for example "support\_388945a0", and add them to the local admin group [23] [T1136 – Create Account]. Presumably this is done for easier future access.

Recommendation: On new hosts, establish persistence by creating a service or schtasks. On systems where RDP capabilities are desired,

it might also be useful to enable sticky keys and RDP.

**Question 3:** This can be found by reading the First Scenario section viahttps://attackevals.mitre-engenuity.org/APT29/operational-flow

First Scenario

The content to execute this scenario was tested and developed using Pupy, Meterpreter, and other custom/modified scripts and payloads. Pupy and Meterpreter were chosen based on their available functionality and similarities to the adversary's malware within the content of this scenario, but alternative red team tooling could be used to accurately execute these and other APT20 behaviors. More information, including the required resources, setup instructions on how to execute the Day I scenario, is available at ATT8CK Arsenal.

**Question 4:** This can be found by reading the Second Scenario section viahttps://attackevals.mitre-engenuity.org/APT29/operational-flow

### Task 6 Recap



### TASK7


**Question 1 & 2:** We need to head back to MITRE and use the navigation bar to search groups ( or here is a link https://attack.mitre.org/groups/) a search on the page for Aviation reveals that APT33 is the group who may target us in this scenario

APT33 APT33 is a suspected iterain threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the eviation and energy sectors.

Question 3: Go to the APT33 Group page https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064/ > scroll to software



**Question 4:** If we Take a look at what Techniques they use under T1078.004 we find the information below to help us find this answer



Question 5: Further on this page we have a Detection writeup that we can use.

### Detection

Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.

Question 6: On the top right of the page we will find the ID information to finish up this room!

ID: T1078.004

Sub-technique of: T1078

Tactics: Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access

Platforms: AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Office 365, SaaS

Permissions Required: Administrator, User

Data Sources: AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Azure activity logs, Stackdriver logs

Version: 1.1

Created: 13 March 2020

Last Modified: 19 October 2020

### Task 7 Recap

What is a group that targets your sector who has been in operation since at least 2013?

APT33

Correct Answer

Does this group use Stuxnet? (Yay/Nay)

Nay

Correct Answer

As your organization is migrating to the cloud, is there anything attributed to this APT group that you should focus on? If so, what is it?

Cloud Accounts

Correct Answer

What tool is associated with this technique?

Ruler

Correct Answer

Per the detection tip, what should you be detecting?

abnormal or malicious behavior

Correct Answer

What platforms does this affect?

AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Office 365, SaaS

Correct Answer

Thanks for stopping by and I hope this is able to help you complete any tasks/questions that were proving difficult to find!

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