Proof Techniques for a Quantum World

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Rules of the Game

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- 2 Enter Compressed Oracles
- 3 From Databases to Q2 Proofs
- 4 The World of Q1

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The game of Penultima

- ► A game of chess involving 'spectators'
- Spectators create secret custom rules modifying how pieces move and capture
- ▶ Players find out which moves are legal through trial and error
- ► The goal is to figure out the rules (but also to win!)

Navigating a Quantum World

Enter Compressed Oracles

- ► Imagine that you are a symmetric cryptographer used to doing classical proofs
- ► The problem of writing proofs in the quantum world looks deceptively familiar
- ▶ But soon you learn about the new rules nobody told you about
- ► From then on it is a struggle to complete the proofs while respecting rules you do not fully know or understand

Symmetric, yet Post-Quantum?

Enter Compressed Oracles

- ► Natural question: what about the quantum experts well-versed in those new rules?
- ► Short answer: they don't really care about security proofs in symmetric cryptography
- ► It is a persistent myth that symmetric cryptography has nothing to fear from quantum adversaries
- ➤ Symmetric cryptographers are left to figure things out for themselves by floundering in the confusing quantum world

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The Recording Conundrum

- ► Classical reduction proofs frequently rely on 'transcripts'
- ► Transcripts save a record of all the gueries and responses exchanged in the course of a game
- ► Such transcripts don't work for a game involving quantum queries, as quantum states cannot be 'cloned'
- ▶ This presents an immediate hurdle for translating classical proofs to post-quantum proofs

Standard Oracle

Standard trick of implementing a classical function f on a quantum channel so the operation is unitary:

$$stO_f |x\rangle |y\rangle = |x\rangle |y \oplus f(x)\rangle$$

x: query register

v: response register

Equivalent formulation using truth tables:

$$\mathsf{stO}\ket{x}\ket{y}\ket{T_f} = \ket{x}\ket{y \oplus T_f[x]}\ket{T_f}$$

 T_f : complete truth table of f (ignore efficiency)

Fourier Basis

Computational basis:

$$|0\rangle, |1\rangle, \ldots, |2^n-1\rangle$$

(conventionally mapped to a canonical basis of \mathbb{C}^{2^n})

Hadamard transform (ignore normalisation):

$$H_n|x\rangle = \sum_{z=0}^{2^n-1} (-1)^{x\cdot z} |z\rangle$$

Fourier basis:

$$H_n |0\rangle, H_n |1\rangle, \ldots, H_n |2^n - 1\rangle$$

Turning the Tables

$$U |y\rangle |z\rangle := |y \oplus z\rangle |z\rangle,$$

$$U |\hat{y}\rangle |\hat{z}\rangle = \sum_{u,v=0}^{2^{n}-1} (-1)^{y \cdot u \oplus z \cdot v} U |u\rangle |v\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{u,v=0}^{2^{n}-1} (-1)^{y \cdot u \oplus z \cdot v} |u \oplus v\rangle |v\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{u,v=0}^{2^{n}-1} (-1)^{y \cdot (u \oplus v) \oplus (z \oplus y) \cdot v} |u \oplus v\rangle |v\rangle$$

$$= |\hat{y}\rangle |\widehat{z \oplus y}\rangle$$

Wherein lies the Magic (or so I think)

Now observe how the standard oracle acts on the Fourier basis:

$$\mathsf{stO}\ket{x}\ket{\hat{y}}\ket{\widehat{T_f}} = \ket{x}\ket{\hat{y}}\ket{\widehat{T_{f \oplus \delta_{xy}}}}$$

where

$$\delta_{xy}(z) = y$$
 when $z = x$,
= 0 elsewhere

For all intents and purposes, it looks like the standard oracle modifies one cell in the truth table!

- ► The truth table of a partial function defined at *q* points = a database with q entries
- ▶ A partial function defined at q points = a lazily sampled function queries q times
- ► Database = fancy rebranding of our old friend Transcript
- lacktriangle Modifying an empty cell of a truth table pprox adding a new entry to the database
- ▶ With this shift in perspective, we can now leave the game untouched and still pretend that queries are being recorded!

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Transition Capacity Formalism

- ▶ Properties are predicates satisfied by certain databases
- ► Examples include containing a collision pair or a zero-preimage
- ► Transition capacity is (loosely) the square root of the probability of acquiring a (new) property after the next query
- ► Example of a transition into a property could be a collision-free database gaining a collision on the next query

Limiting 'Bad' Transitions


- ► Consider a certain 'bad' property *P* (e.g., having a collision) and a database *D* not satisfying *P*
- ▶ Identify a set *S* of possible responses on the next query which can lead to *D* transitioning into *P*
- ► For the collision example, S would be the range of the partial function already sampled and stored in the database
- ► Then we can show that for the transition of D into P,

transition capacity
$$\leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{|S|}{2^n}}\right)$$

Two-Domain Distance Bounds


- ► Consider a distinguishing game between a real world and an ideal world (defined on different domains)
- ► Each world records all intermediate primitive queries into corresponding databases
- ➤ Suppose we identify bad properties for both worlds and show that as long as the databases in neither world transitions into bad, they continue to evolve identically
- ► Then the Q2 distinguishing advantage between the two worlds can be upper bounded by a sum transition capacities corresponding to bad transitions in either world in different stages of the game

Example: TNT



- ▶ Bad property: a collision at u_3 , i.e., an entry (u_3, v_3) in the database of f_3 which 'corresponds' to two distinct queries (x_1, x_2) and (x'_1, x'_2)
- ► Transition to bad can occur when adding an entry (u_2, v_2) to f_2 for certain values of v_2


Example: TNT (cont'd)



- ▶ Note that we don't have a way of recording which entries in other databases led to a particular entry (u_3, v_3)
- ▶ Thus for bounding bad transition capacities all possible cross-combinations need to be checked
- ▶ This leads to an unfortunate quadratic blowup which we currently don't know how to avoid

The Gap

- Consider 3-round Feistel, where we believe the right half of the output should behave like a qPRF output
- ➤ To apply the Two-Domain Distance Technique, we would need to classify collisions in x₃ (the input of f₃) as bad
- ▶ Now, $x_3 = x_1 \oplus f_2(x_2)$
- ▶ Because of the blowup, we need to consider the combination of all x₁ with all entries of the database for f₂
- ► But future values of *x*₁ come directly from the adversary :(



Verdict on Q2

- ► We have begun taking baby steps in understanding how symmetric provable security in the Q2 model should look like
- ► Numerous serious obstacles still lying ahead, e.g., we don't yet know how to lazily sample random permutations
- ▶ Bounds are also terrible, owing to the quadratic blowup from the previous slide and other factors
- ➤ Silver lining: proofs of a classical counting flavour finally beginning to take shape

Enter Compressed Oracles

Outline

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Dialling it Down a Notch?

- Now let's return to a less ambitious but more practically useful security model
- ▶ In the Q1 model, the adversary has a quantum computer at home, so can make superposition queries to public primitives
- ► The communication channel is still classical, so superposition queries cannot be made to the keyed construction
- ▶ Question: how far can classical public-primitive proofs be lifted to the Q1 model?

Constructing Hybrids

- ► We divide the game into *epochs*—each (classical) construction query ends the current epoch and begins the next one
- ➤ The adversary is trying to distinguish between the real world and the ideal world, which differ only in the construction oracle
- ▶ What we would like to do: define hybrid games where the first i epochs take place in the ideal world and the remaining in the real world
- ➤ The problem: previous responses in the ideal world are not consistent with the primitive, and this may be detected in a later epoch while making quantum queries to the primitive

Reprogramming and Resampling

- ► Reprogramming an oracle is to modify it at certain points to output a pre-determined value
- ▶ Reprogramming F with a pair (x, y) sets F(x) = y and leaves F unchanged at all other points
- ► Resampling F at a point x discards F(x), freshly samples a value y, and sets F(x) = y
- ▶ Usually in resampling x is also chosen at random, so it is equivalent to reprogramming F with a random pair (x, y)
- ► There are results showing that reprogramming or resampling *F* at a small number of points is difficult to detect for an adversary even with superposition access

How Reprogramming Helps


Enter Compressed Oracles

- ▶ Going back to our hybrids, when switching from the ideal world to the real world, we can reprogram the primitive retroactively to be consistent with the ideal oracle responses
- ► This ensures that the construction oracle switch will not be detected in the future
- ► The results on reprogramming ensure that the primitive switch is itself is also likely to never be detected
- ► This result can be repeatedly invoked to bound the distance between the real and the ideal world
- ► (An additional step involving resampling is also needed to complete the reduction for each hybrid)

From Databases to Q2 Proofs

Illustration: Key-Alternating Feistel

- ► Suppose the random permutation (in the ideal world) outputs (x_3, x_4) on query (x_0, x_1)
- ▶ We can reprogram $f = (f_1, f_2, f_3)$ to be consistent with this output
- ▶ We first sample a random z and reprogram f_1 at $(x_1 \oplus k_1, z)$
- \blacktriangleright Then we reprogram f_2 at $(x_0 \oplus z \oplus k_2, x_1 \oplus x_3)$
- \blacktriangleright Finally we reprogram f_3 at $(x_3 \oplus k_3, x_0 \oplus z \oplus x_4)$



From Databases to Q2 Proofs

How Things Look at Present

- ▶ So far we have reproduced several classical security results for 3-round and 4-round Function-based Key-Alternating Feistel
- ▶ We are trying to extend this to Permutation-based KAF (reprogramming a permutation is trickier, as it involves swapping two points)
- ▶ Once some basic hurdles are cleared and some creases ironed out, our technique should be applicable to many results from classical provable security
- ▶ The Q1 situation looks more optimistic than the Q2 situation
- ► More advanced aspects like beyond-birthday-bound security proofs still to be explored

Thank You for Listening!

If you're still awake, I am happy to take some (easy) questions.