Provable security from a cryptanalysis perspective

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Information-theoretical

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Three questions about provable security

- ► How to define security?
- ► How to model primitives?
- ▶ What are the limits of information-theoretical security?

Answers from the point of view of cryptanalysis.

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 \dots or maybe cryptanalysis can learn something too \dots

How to define security?

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Cryptanalysis

- ► Key-recovery, message-recovery, forgery, collision, preimage, ...
- Attacks are often based on *distinguishers* (i.e. use the 'last round trick')
 ... but lines between key-recovery and distinguisher are blurring and will disappear

How to define security?

Cryptanalysis

- ► Key-recovery, message-recovery, forgery, collision, preimage, ...
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 ... but lines between key-recovery and distinguisher are blurring and will disappear

Information-theoretical security


Indistinguishability as worst case security



End users don't care about indistinguishability from an idealized construction


Subtle difference in meaning of 'distinguisher'

Indistinguishability



- ▶ Uniform random permutation π
- ▶ Public uniform random permutation *P*

Indistinguishability a.k.a. simple hypothesis testing



- ► Transcript set *T*
- ▶ Probability distributions P and $Q: 2^T \rightarrow [0,1]$

Indistinguishability

How to measure the power of adversaries?


Provable security approach: statistical distance or total variation distance

$$\Delta(P,Q) = \max_{E \subset T} P(E) - Q(E)$$

- Statistical distance is usually not used in cryptanalysis (for good reasons)
- ▶ Neyman and Pearson (1930s):
 - False-positive (probability α) and false-negative (probability β) results
 - Minimize the overall cost of errors $C(\alpha, \beta)$

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
Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing



- ▶ If transcript is in R, reject the null hypothesis (**1** R is the adversary)
- ▶ False positive probability $\alpha = P(R)$ and false negative probability $\beta = 1 Q(R)$

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Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing Receiver operating characteristic curve



Q

Indistinguishability

How to measure the power of adversaries?

▶ Advantage bound for an advesary (i.e. a rejection region R) is

$$1 - \alpha - \beta = Q(R) - P(R) \le \Delta(P, Q)$$

▶ Bounds cost function $C(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha + \beta$ from below

Indistinguishability

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
$$1 - \alpha - \beta = Q(R) - P(R) \le \Delta(P, Q)$$

- ▶ Bounds cost function $C(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha + \beta$ from below
- Power bound (with YL Chen, Crypto 2024):

$$1 - \beta \le f(\alpha)$$

> Bounds any increasing cost function $C(\alpha, \beta)$ from below

Example: block cipher in counter mode



- Assume P is the ideal world and Q is the real world ($\mathbf{0}$ this matters)
- Proof comes down to prp-prf switching lemma

Example: block cipher in counter mode

ightharpoonup Conditional probability distribution (for event $E \subset T$):

$$P_E(R) = \frac{P(R \cap E)}{P(E)}$$

Excluding a 'bad event' B of probability $\varepsilon = P(B)$:

$$P_{T\setminus B}(R) \leq \frac{P(R)}{1-\varepsilon}$$

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
Excluding a 'bad event' B of probability $\varepsilon = P(B)$:

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▶ Since $Q = P_{T \setminus B}$ and $\varepsilon \leq \frac{1}{N} {\sigma \choose 2}$ for $\sigma \leq \sqrt{2N}$ blocks,

$$1 - \beta \le \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2N}}$$

Example: block cipher in counter mode



- Advantages and statistical distance are arbitrary
- ► Why is this a problem?

- Advantages and statistical distance are arbitrary
- Why is this a problem?
- Examples of misconceptions about attacks:
 - 'Attacks are symmetric'
 - 'Reductions to indistinguishability are tight'
- ▶ See paper for applications such as multi-user security
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/658

#1. 'Attacks are symmetric'

- lacktriangle Distinguishing P from Q is not the same as distinguishing Q from P
- $C(\alpha,\beta) \neq C(\beta,\alpha)$

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- $ightharpoonup C(\alpha, \beta) \neq C(\beta, \alpha)$
- Example: counter mode

$$1-\beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1-\frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}} \quad \text{versus} \quad 1-\beta \leq \underbrace{\left(\frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}\right)} + \left(1-\frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}\right) \alpha$$

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#2. 'Reductions to indistinguishability are tight'

- Example: full recovery of a b-bit message in counter mode
- \triangleright Success probability P_S


Advantage bound

$$P_S \leq \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N} + 2^{-b}$$

Power bound

$$P_{S} \le \frac{2^{-b}}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma - 1)}{2N}}$$

#2. 'Reductions to indistinguishability are tight'



Cryptanalysis

- ▶ Only model part of the primitive, using trails $(V_1, V_2, ..., V_{r+1})$
- ▶ Used to be probabilistic, but not anymore (for good reasons)

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Information-theoretical security

Standard model:

Block cipher \approx Uniform random permutation (prp-security)

Ideal model:

Block cipher \approx Ideal cipher (idealization) Permutation \approx Uniform random permutation

How to model primitives? Standard model

- ► In practice:
 - Replace PRP with uniform random permutation
 - Just another ideal model?
- ► Ignore the PRP term
 - Maybe cryptanalysts know what it is?

How to model primitives? Standard model

- ► In practice:
 - Replace PRP with uniform random permutation
 - Just another ideal model? Yes
- ▶ Ignore the PRP term
 - Maybe cryptanalysts know what it is?
 - No, and actually ...

How to model primitives? Standard model



► See Koblitz and Menezes, Bernstein and Lange

How to model primitives? Standard model meets linear cryptanalysis

ightharpoonup Block cipher E_k and a mask v

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{k}}[\mathbf{v}^T E_{\mathbf{k}}(00\cdots 0) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$$

▶ For an *n* bit key, typically $\varepsilon \approx 2^{-n/2}$ (cf. zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis)

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
$$\Pr_{\mathbf{k}}[\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{E}_{\mathbf{k}}(00\cdots 0) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$$

- ▶ For an *n* bit key, typically $\varepsilon \approx 2^{-n/2}$ (cf. zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis)
- ▶ Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis: with M memory and T time, for $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$:

$$1 - \beta = \frac{1}{2} + \Omega \left(\sqrt{\frac{T \times M}{2^n}} \right)$$

Actual block ciphers are not good PRPs

Commercial break



- ▶ Ideal model allows making p queries to the ideal cipher
- ▶ In practice, the ideal model is stronger than the standard model
 - Set p = 0 to recover standard model bound (without PRP term)
 - Primitive queries are important (capture real generic attacks)
- ⚠ Widespread confusion between *primitive model* and *access model*

What are the limits of information-theoretical security?

What are the limits of information-theoretical security?

- ▶ Information-theoretical security of real block ciphers \approx none
- Weaker security notions?
- Randomess trap
 - Don't expect too much (often results in ignoring important aspects)
 - Not every idealization must be based on randomness (examples in cryptanalysis)

What are the limits of information-theoretical security? Pointwise decorrelation

Pointwise independence: for all x and y,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{k}}[E_{\mathbf{k}}(x) = y] = \frac{1}{N}$$

- ightharpoonup Example: $x \mapsto x + k$
- Nonetheless, does not hold for most block ciphers (barely enough randomness) cf. issues with definition of prp security

What are the limits of information-theoretical security? Pairwise decorrelation (a.k.a. pairwise independence)

▶ Pairwise independence: for all $(x_1, x_2), (y_1, y_2)$ with $x_1 \neq x_2$ and $y_1 \neq y_2$,

$$\Pr_{k}[(E_{k}(x_{1}), E_{k}(x_{2})) = (y_{1}, y_{2})] = \frac{1}{N} \times \frac{1}{N-1}$$

- ▶ Example: $x \mapsto k_1 \cdot x + k_2$ (exclude zero)
- Most block ciphers are not pairwise independent (not enough randomness)

• ε -pairwise independence: for all (x_1, x_2) with $x_1 \neq x_2$,

$$\frac{1}{2}\sum_{y_1\neq y_2}\left|\Pr_{\boldsymbol{k}}\left[\left(E_{\boldsymbol{k}}(x_1),E_{\boldsymbol{k}}(x_2)\right)=(y_1,y_2)\right]-\frac{1}{N}\times\frac{1}{N-1}\right|\leq \varepsilon$$

- **Example**: $x\mapsto k_1\cdot x+k_3$ is ε -pairwise independent with $\varepsilon=1/2N$
- lacktriangleright arepsilon is large for most block ciphers (barely enough randomness)
- Key-alternating block ciphers with independent and uniform random rounds keys

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- ► So, what is the point?

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- ► So, what is the point?
- Actually, we don't even need keys for pairwise independence to be meaningful
- Pairwise independence rules out some cryptanalytic techniques
 - Differential cryptanalysis if quasidifferential trails with nonzero masks are ignored
 - Class of techiques can be defined in terms of trails (geometric approach)

AES with independent round keys

- ▶ Variant of the AES with *r* rounds and independent round keys
- Liu, Tessaro and Vaikuntanathan:

$$\varepsilon = (0.924)^r$$

Need $r \ge 9168$ to get $\varepsilon \le 2^{-128}$

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- ▶ Need $r \ge 9168$ to get $\varepsilon \le 2^{-128}$
- ▶ Recent joint work with Gregor Leander and Immo Schütt (ePrint 2025/1495):

$$\varepsilon = 2^{44} \cdot 2^{-30\left\lfloor \frac{r}{4} \right\rfloor}$$

- ▶ Need $r \ge 24$ to get $\varepsilon \le 2^{-128}$
- ▶ These are preliminary results (large improvement in exponent still unpublished)

Pairwise independence AES with independent round keys

- ▶ Proof: see ePrint 2025/1495 (only 5 pages !)
- ▶ Idea developed in 2021 to address a question from Rønjom (ePrint 2019/622)
- Application to pairwise independence:
 Master's thesis of Immo Schütt (Ruhr University Bochum, March 2025)
- ► Techniques used:
 - Essentially an application of the geometric approach to cryptanalysis
 - Truncated differentials and singular values of the difference-distribution matrix

Pairwise independence AES with independent round keys

 \triangleright Let D be the difference-distribution matrix of a random cipher E_k with whitening

$$D_{b,a} = \Pr_{\mathbf{k},\mathbf{x}} \big[E_{\mathbf{k}}(\mathbf{x} + a) = E_{\mathbf{k}}(\mathbf{x}) + b \big]$$

(it doesn't matter what x is, you can take it either random or fixed)

- ▶ $E_{\pmb{k}}$ is pairwise independent if and only if $\|D U\|_{\infty} \leq 2\varepsilon$
- lacktriangle We show that $\|D-U\|_2 \leq 2^{-30}$ for four-round AES with independent round keys
- ▶ In several ways, $\|\cdot\|_2$ is actually better motivated than $\|\cdot\|_\infty$ (cf. power bounds)

AES with independent round keys

Activity patterns

- ► Familiar concept from cryptanalysis
- lacksquare For $z\in\{0,1\}^n$, define $[z]=[z_1] imes[z_2] imes\cdots imes[z_n]$ with $[0]=\{0\}$ and $[1]=\mathbb{F}_q$
- lacksquare Let $V=\mathsf{Span}\Big\{\delta_{[z]}\ ig|\ z\in\{0,1\}^n\Big\}\subset\mathbb{R}[\mathbb{F}_q^n]$, with $\delta_{[z]}$ the indicator of [z]

Trails and approximation maps

- ▶ Basis-free geometric approach for inner product spaces (Crypto 2021)
- ▶ Approximation maps $\pi_V D i_V$, $\pi_{V^{\perp}} D i_V$, $\pi_V D i_{V^{\perp}}$ and $\pi_{V^{\perp}} D i_{V^{\perp}}$

AES with independent round keys

lacktriangle Trails determined by the decomposition $\mathbb{R}=V\oplus V^\perp$ give

$$||D - U||_{2} \leq ||\left[||\pi_{V}(D - U)i_{V}||_{2} \quad ||\pi_{V}(D - U)i_{V}||_{2} \right] ||\pi_{V^{\perp}}(D - U)i_{V^{\perp}}||_{2} ||_{2}.$$

- ▶ Term $\pi_V(D-U)i_V$: truncated differentials defined by activity patterns
 - Compute it numerically $(2^n \times 2^n \text{ matrix})$
 - Closed-form formula based on Frobenius norm: $\|\pi_V(D-U)i_V\|_2 \leq (2/(\sqrt{q}-1))^n$
- ▶ Other terms: bound using $\sigma_3(D^S)$, easiest approach is Frobenius norm

Three questions about provable security

- How to define security?
 Indistinguishability as a basis, but don't forget what the end user needs
 Consider alternatives to advantage bounds (such as power bounds)
- How to model primitives?
 Prefer the ideal model over the standard model (primitive queries are important)
 In practice, the standard model is just another ideal model
- What are the limits of information-theoretical security?
 Don't fall into the randomness trap
 Not every idealization must be based on randomness (trails in cryptanalysis !)