Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books written by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Area Handbook Program. Its title, format, and substance reflect modifi­cations introduced into the series in 1978. The last page of this book provides a listing of other country studies published. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describ­ing and analyzing its economic, military, political, and social sys­tems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeco­nomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involve­ment with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the work of Foreign Area Studies and are not set forth as the official view of the United States Government. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted stan­dards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.

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Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to various individuals who gave of their time, research materials, and special knowledge to provide data and perspective. In particular they wish to thank Charles Ebinger, vice president of the energy consulting firm Conant and Associ­ates in Washington D.C. and a frequent writer on African affairs.

The authors also wish to express their gratitude to members of the Foreign Area Studies staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These persons include Frederica M. Bunge who, in her capacity as assistant director for research, reviewed all the textual material; Sheila L. Ross who edited the manuscript; and Harriett R. Blood who prepared the graphics. The team appreciates as well the assistance provided by Gilda V. Nimer, librarian, and Ernest Will, publications manager.

Special thanks are owed to Shannon Swett who, under the direc­tion of Michael T. Graham of The American University Depart­ment of Art, designed the cover for this volume as well as the illustrations on the title page of each chapter. The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. We acknowl­edge our indebtedness especially to those persons who con­tributed original work not previously published.

Preface

When research and writing were completed for the 1967 edi­tion of *the Area Handbook for Angola,* the territory was still under Portuguese colonial domination. Its independence in November 1975—after the regime in Portugal itself had been overthrown— was followed immediately by civil war involving the three major anticolonial movements. By 1978 one of these, the Popular Move­ment for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- taQao de Angola—MPLA) had to one degree or another estab­lished control over most of Angola, and its government had been recognized as legitimate by most of the world’s states. The regime was, however, still confronted by a range of economic and interna­tional problems and at least residual opposition from the other movements, and it had also suffered internal dissension.

This study is based on a variety of published and unpublished sources. Some lacunae in information were filled and ambiguities clarified through direct consultation with individuals having firsthand knowledge of Angola. Substantial gaps and resulting problems of analysis remain, however, particularly with respect to the structure and dynamics of Angolan society at both local and national levels. These have been noted in the text. Given the limits on time and space, some aspects of Angolan society have been treated briefly or not at all. Where available books and articles provide amplification of details and interpretation presented in a chapter, the author has noted them in a paragraph at the end.

The authors have tried to limit the use of foreign and technical terms. These are briefly defined where they first appear in any chapter or reference is made to the Glossary.

Most ethnic and language names (and some place-names) in Angola originate in Bantu languages characterized by the use of class prefixes that vary with the language (thus Ovimbundu for the people, Ochimbundu for an individual, and uMbundu for the lan­guage; Bakongo for the people, Mukongo for an individual, and kiKongo for the language). Most prefixes are omitted in the coun­try study, but in order to distinguish between the people called Mbundu (no prefix) and the Ovimbundu (who without the prefix would also be Mbundu) the prefix for the latter is retained as are the prefixes for the major Bantu languages (kiMbundu—spoken by the Mbundu, Umbundu, and Kikongo).

All measures are given in the metric system. Place-names con­form to the usage in the publications of the United States Board of Geographic Names except for those names that were changed by the Angolan government after independence. Some of these changes have been accepted by the board but not formally pub­lished in the gazeteer. The more important of these are noted in table A. It may be noted that in 1978 the government of Angola had begun to alter the Portuguese spelling of certain names to a

Table A. Selected Place-Name Changes

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Former Name** | **New Name** | **New Name** | **Former Name** |
| **Ambrizete** | **Nzeto** | **Bailundo. . . .** | **Teixeira da Silva** |
| **Carmona** | **Uige** | **Bid** | **Silva Porto** |
| **Cassinga** | **Kassinga** | **Chibia** | **Jo3o de Almeida** |
| **Henrique de Carvalho** | **Saurimo** | **Huambo....** | **Nova Lisboa** |
| **JoSo de Almeida. . . .** | **Chibia** | **Kassinga ....** | **Cassinga** |
| **Luso** | **Luena** | **Luachimo . . .** | **Portugalia** |
| **Malanje** | **Malange** | **Luao** | **Teixeira de Sousa** |
| **Nova Lisboa** | **Huambo** | **Lubango....** | **Sa da Bendeira** |
| **Novo Redondo** | **Ngunza** | **Luena** | **Luso** |
| **Pereira de Ega** | **Ngiva** | **Malange ....** | **Malanje** |
| **Portugalia** | **Luachimo** | **Mbanza Kongo** | **S3o Salvador** |
| **Sa da Bendeira** | **Lubango** | **Menongue. . .** | **do Congo**  **Serpa Pinto** |
| **S5o Salvador do Congo** | **Mbanza Kongo** | **Ngiva** | **Pereira de E^a** |
| **Serpa Pinto** | **Menongue** | **Ngunza** | **Novo Redondo** |
| **Silva Porto** | **Bie** | **Nzeto** | **Ambrizete** |
| **Teixeira da Silva. . . .** | **Bailundo** | **Saurimo ....** | **Henrique de** |
| **Teixeira de Sousa . . .** | **Luao** | **Uige** | **Carvalho**  **Carmona** |

more widely used African orthography; the most common change was that from *cu* to *kw* before vowels and from *cu* to *ku* before consonants: thus the Cuango River becomes the Kwango and the Cunene River becomes the Kunene. Because these changes had just been introduced at the time of writing and were not always followed, the older Portuguese spelling has been employed in this book.

Under Portuguese rule, the major internal divisions of Angola were called districts. After independence the same units became provinces. In this book they are referred to as districts in certain historical contexts, as provinces otherwise (e.g., Benguela District, Benguela Province).

The 1967 edition of the *Area Handbook for Angola* was pre­pared by Alexander J. Bastos, Frederick R. Eisele, Sidney A. Harri­son, Howard J. John, and Tura K. Wieland under the chairmanship of Allison Butler Herrick. Because of the many changes since it was originally written, little material from the original volume has been incorporated in the present study.

In the nearly six months since the research and writing for *Angola: A Country Study* were completed, a number of problems confronting the regime persisted, and some anticipated develop­ments failed to occur. Moreover, several shifts in governmental structure and in party policy, of uncertain import, took place.

Three of the persisting problems, in part interrelated, may be noted. First, except for the continuing production of Cabindan oil, the economic situation remained difficult. The availability of food in late 1978 and early 1979 fell far below expectations, in good

part because of failure to rebuild the system of distribution left in ruins by the departure of the Portuguese. Second, the Benguela railroad, important as a potential source of income, was still not functioning as of early 1979 despite announcements in late 1978 of its imminent opening. Finally the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA), opposed to the regime, retained at least some of its effectiveness, manifested especially in its apparent ability to prevent the opening of the Benguela railroad and, ac­cording to some accounts, in its obstruction of the movement of foodstuffs from Huambo to the coastal cities. UNITA’s effective­ness depended in good part on help from South Africa (and to a lesser extent from some others). For that reason the MPLA-Labor Party would like to see the issue of Namibia settled (with the involvement of the South-West African People’s Organization— SWAPO—which it supports) on the assumption that South Africa’s interest in UNITA would then fade away.

Angola’s economic situation seems to have contributed to sev­eral developments in the regime’s policies and in its internal and external politics. In November 1978 United States Assistant Secre­tary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose visited Luanda and held conversations with several important Angolan officials. In December 1978 Senator George McGovern met with President Agostinho Neto in Angola. The visits of Moose and McGovern had no immediate or definite outcomes but, among other things, they seemed to reflect Neto’s interest in establishing relations with the United States. He did not, however, see the Cuban presence as a barrier to United States-Angolan relations and would not accede to the departure of the Cubans as a condition of United States recognition.

Just before McGovern’s visit a change in Angola’s government took place, the significance of which is not clear. The prime minis­ter and two vice prime ministers were dismissed, as were the ministers of housing and interior commerce and the vice minister of interior commerce. The third vice prime minister resigned under fire. The positions of the prime minister and vice prime ministers were abolished. The former prime minister, Lopo do Nascimento, however, retained his membership in the Central Committee of the party, and former vice prime minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos was appointed minister of national planning, an important post. President Neto’s official explanation was that the government had become too cumbersome and that the aboli­tion of the four top ministerial posts would permit more direct and efficient communication between the president and the heads of the substantive ministries. An effort was also made to include representatives of ethnic groups other than Mbundu and *mestizo* in the party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee.

In the view of observers the abolition of the posts was simply a convenient way of dealing with at least some of the incumbents who differed with Neto on the issue of distancing Angola from the

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communist states and approaching the West more closely. Ap­proaches to the West were less a matter of ideological reorienta­tion than response to the inability or unwillingness of ideologically closer states to be of greater help economically. For example, Neto found it necessary to turn to Western oil companies for exploration along the Angolan coast, and there were other cases when aid or advice from communist states bore little fruit. The dismissal of the ministers of housing and interior commerce may be traced to their failure to cope with the difficult problems within their jurisdic­tions, but ideology may have been involved. In late 1978 President Neto had decided that private entrepreneurs were to be given some freedom to see what they could do, particularly in transport and trade, although he made a point of insisting on the ultimately socialist orientation of his regime. That shift may have met with internal opposition.

These observations notwithstanding, a clear tendency in Ango­lan policy cannot be discerned, and much probably depends upon the satisfactory settlement of the complex of issues connected with UNITA, South Africa, and Namibia. If these constraints can be dealt with, and the military support of the Cubans and the Soviet Union become less important, other changes may be possible.


♦ ♦ ♦

President Neto died in Moscow on September 10, 1979, after surgery for cancer. Shortly thereafter dos Santos was chosen as head of state by the Centrad Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party and party chairman. At the time of Neto’s death the economic and political problems noted earlier had not yet been resolved.

At least some of the intra-MPLA-Labor Party conflict that had resulted in an attempted coup shortly after independence in 1975 apparently continued. In part that conflict may be attributed to personal quests for power, but some of it reflected ideological and practical differences over the role of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Also affecting intraparty and intragovernmental relations and decisions are the ways in which Africans and *mestizos* see each other and interact. It may be noted that the new president is, like Neto, a black African in a party in which *mestizos* continue to play an important role. Although he received his higher education in the Soviet Union, there are conflicting reports on his political orientation. In any case, some observers have suggested that he was chosen quickly in an effort to forestall overt strife over the succession issue.

The actual consequences of the changes were, in early October 1979, impossible to foresee. There was some speculation that Neto’s death might permit a rapprochement between the MPLA- Labor Party and UNITA, but there was no immediate public sign of it. Despite dos Santos’ background as a student in the Soviet Union, the direction of Angola’s foreign policy in the immediate future was also not clear.

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: People’s Republic of Angola.

Short Form: Angola.

Term for Nationals: Angolans.

Capital: Luanda.

Preindependence Political Status: Parts of coastal region a col­ony of Portugal since fifteenth century. De jure control over entire territory awarded at Berlin Conference of 1884-85. De facto con­trol not until 1920s. Status changed to Overseas Province in July 1953. Liberation movements began forming in late 1950s. Three of them, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de LibertaQao de Angola—MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente National de LibertaQao de An­gola—FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola

—UNITA), embroiled in bitter fighting not only with colonial power but also with each other at time of 1974 coup in Portugal. Civil war, continued after independence on November 11, 1975, won by MPLA with Soviet and Cuban help.

Geography

Size: Total area, 1,246,700 square kilometers of which Cabinda Enclave 7,270 square kilometers.

Topography and Drainage: Most of country is plateau descend­ing in west to coastal fringe of varying width, in north gradually, farther south more precipitously. Parts of western section of pla­teau (Benguela-Bie Plateau in center, Humpata Highland in south) reach 2,500 meters or more. Eastern half of country mostly flat, open plateau at somewhat lower altitudes. Mayombe Hills of Cabinda Enclave still have some rain forest cover, but forest else­where minimal except along rivers. Most rivers originate in cen­tral Angola. Some flow directly west to Atlantic. Two important rivers have more indirect route to Atlantic: the Cuanza, first flowing north, then west; the Cunene, first flowing south. Rivers in northwest flow north to join Congo River, thence to Atlantic. Rivers running through southeast quadrant join either Zambezi River flowing to Indian Ocean or Cubango River (in Botswana, the Okavango) to Okavango Swamp. Tributaries of Okavango and several southern rivers flowing to Atlantic are dry much of year. Climate: Clearly defined wet and dry seasons; in north rainy season for up to seven months, from as early as September to as late as May; in south about four months, November through Feb­ruary. Generally precipitation higher in north and in interior. Coast south of Benguela is desert. Southern interior largely semia- rid. Temperatures decrease with distance from equator and with altitude. Coolest months July and August.

Society

Population: Census of 1970 gave (provisional) 5,646,166 but ob­stacles to accurate count. Estimated population for mid-1977 of about 6.3 million does not take into account perhaps 500,000 re­fugees and others outside the country. Annual growth rate in mid-1970s about 2.4 percent. Most densely settled areas are high­lands and parts of coastal zone including cities and towns of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, and Mo^amedes. Most of east Angola very sparsely populated as is far northwest. By 1970 urban popula­tion had grown to more than 15 percent, but departure of Por­tuguese (largely urban) and return of Africans to villages during period of civil strife brought urban growth to a (presumably tem­porary) halt. ***<r***

Languages: Official language Portuguese, but a number of lan­guages and dialects (almost all of Bantu group) corresponding to

ethnolinguistic categories and sections into which they are di­vided are spoken. Some tongues, e.g., western dialect of kiM- bundu, serve as lingua francas for part of country. Government interested in developing orthography for local languages for edu­cational purposes.

Ethnic Groups: Portuguese and others have lumped Angola’s African communities into limited number of ethnolinguistic cate­gories presumably exhibiting considerable linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Most, however, are internally varied, and communi­ties at margins between any two categories are often mixed. De­gree of ethnic identity is also fairly recent and variable. Last count in terms of these categories in 1960 showed Ovimbundu at about 37 percent, Mbundu at about 23 percent (these two are categories wholly within country), and Kongo at nearly 14 percent of popula­tion. Lunda-Chokwe (quite heterogeneous) range between 8 and 9 percent. Nganguela (perhaps even more varied) come to about 7 percent. Others, mainly in far south, much smaller. *Mestizos* (of Euro-African ancestry) perhaps 2 to 3 percent in mid-1970s, but significant because of role in ruling party and educational level.

Religion: Estimates of religious affiliation unreliable, and situa­tion after independence uncertain. Estimates since 1960 of num­ber of Roman Catholics have put them at from roughly 40 percent to more than 50 percent of population, Protestants from 14 to 18 percent, maybe only 10 percent. At least 30 percent are adherents of indigenous religions, and many others formally attached to Christian churches continue to accept religious belief and practice of indigenous origin.

Education and Literacy: Educational facilities for Africans very limited in Portuguese era. Some schooling carried on by missions. All education nationalized after independence. Great shortage of facilities and teachers (Cubans and others filling in to some extent). Ideological training and economic development heavily empha­sized. Universal primary education hoped for by 1980. In 1977 about 1 million in primary schools, about 100,000 in secondary schools, but quality of education suffers from shortages. At inde­pendence literacy rate estimated at 15 percent. Later estimates put it at 20 percent; government stresses adult literacy programs and claims some success.

Health: Preindependence data on health personnel irrelevant given departure of Portuguese and concentration of most person­nel and facilities in urban areas. Regime’s health program stresses education and health maintenance; extension of maintenance and care to rural areas. Health described as right of the people. Pend­ing training of adequate numbers of African health personnel, Cubans and others provide substantial technical aid and man­power. Data on disease from preindependence period weak be­cause based only on those seeking help in modem facilities or reporting illness to health authorities. Nevertheless indicate that Angola affected by full range of tropical diseases and others. Tu­berculosis and typhoid reported; tetanus, especially tetanus affect­ing infants, fairly frequent but rarely reported; variety of child­hood diseases of which measles most frequently noted. Of diseases affecting persons of all ages, incidence of malaria is high. Figures for influenza and venereal disease also fairly high. Not reported but known to affect many Africans, schistosomiasis; helminthiasis. Deficiencies in nutrition and sanitation contribute to susceptibility to disease.

Government and Politics

Form: Republic with power centered in president; 1975 Consti­tution amended in 1978, projects People’s Assembly. Meanwhile Council of the Revolution, comprising high officials of govern­ment, party, and military, supreme organ. Council of Ministers is government executive organ, comprising president, prime minis­ter, three deputy prime ministers, ministers, and directors of vari­ous state secretariats.

Administrative Divisions: National territory divided into seven­teen provinces, each headed by an appointed commissioner re­sponsible to prime minister (see fig. 1). Country divided into prov­inces, districts *(municipios),* and *communas.* Urban communes are divided into wards *(barrios)* and rural communes into settle­ments *(povocaoes).*

Politics: Internal politics dominated by division between small ruling elite committed to Marxism-Leninism and vast majority— most of them rural—struggling to survive under difficult economic conditions, and by continuing fight against FNLA and UNITA. A single party, MPLA-Labor Party, successor since December 1977 to the MPLA, defines the regime’s official policies. Although party and government structures are separate, party’s highest organ, Political Bureau, is de facto supreme executive organ of nation.

Judicial System: Stated goal is establishment of People’s Courts under professional and lay judges at all levels. By mid-1978 a beginning had been made to train lay judges, but no comprehen­sive court system had yet been established. People’s Revolution­ary Courts to deal with matters affecting security had, however, been instituted.

Foreign Relations: Official policy of nonalignment, but close de­pendency on Soviet Union and Cuba. Efforts made in mid-1978 to ameliorate formerly hostile relations with Zaire and South Africa and to establish more cordial ties with Western states.

Economy

Salient Features: In 1978 economy in midst of structural changes designed eventually to replace former system by centrally planned socialist one. Nationalizations and establishment of agri­cultural and other cooperatives were part of process, but great shortage of trained indigenous personnel to take over from de­parted Portuguese, as well as political cadres to promote economic objectives, had led to acceptance for time being of large private sector and participation by foreign interests. Lack of information prevented assessment of economy’s effectiveness, but earnings from petroleum exports, supplemented by those from coffee, appeared roughly sufficient in late 1970s to offset great drop in production in almost all economic sectors that occurred after 1974.

Agriculture: So-called traditional subsector—which cultivates food crops mainly for home consumption, including cassava, maize, beans, oil palm, peanuts, and potatoes, and a few cash crops, such as cotton and coffee—has been little affected by postin­dependence socialization of economy. In contrast formerly almost completely Portuguese commercial subsector—which produced essentially same food crops, except cassava, and also sugarcane, sisal, sunflower seeds, citrus fruits, bananas, pineapples, and to­bacco—has undergone radical changes with many large planta­tions and farms transformed into state farms and smaller units into cooperatives.

Forestry, Fisheries, and Livestock: Forests cover about three- fifths of country but consist mostly of savanna growth of value principally to domestic economy. Abundance of marine life along coast and offshore formed basis for major industry during Por­tuguese period. In 1978 Angolan government, plagued by short­age of equipment and qualified personnel, still far short of re­storing operations to earlier levels. Cattle mainly restricted to central and southwestern areas, free of tsetse fly. Considerable damage reported during civil conflicts, and condition of industry largely unknown in 1978.

Mining and Industry: Rich deposits of petroleum, diamonds, and iron ore; in 1978 only petroleum under intensive exploitation. Manufacturing sector capable of producing wide range of con­sumer goods and some intermediate products, but output well below potential because of lack of spare parts and raw materials and in particular of trained technicians and managers. An un­known number of manufacturing establishments nationalized, principally enterprises abandoned by owners.

Electric Power: Installed capacity over 580,000 kilowatts in 1974, of which about three-quarters hydroelectric. Main genera­ting plants in western part of country serving northern, central, and southern areas through three separate producing and dis­tributing systems. During Portuguese period household use confined chiefly to Portuguese residential sections of cities and towns. Consumption pattern unknown in 1978.

Foreign Trade: Information on foreign trade since indepen­dence dependent on data provided by trading partners. Principal export in late 1970s petroleum, accounting for estimated four- fifths of export values in 1978; coffee and diamonds other impor­tant items. Food and consumer goods apparently constituted most of imports, probably followed by transport equipment. Principal trading partners (1977): main suppliers Federal Republic of Ger­many (West Germany), Portugal, United States, Japan, members of the European Economic Community; main purchasers United States (petroleum, coffee), Portugal, Netherlands, West Germany, Japan.

Transport and Communications

Railroads: About 2,900 route kilometers comprising three sepa­rate main lines running inland from ports of Luanda, Lobito, and Mo^amedes, and one small local line serving Porto Amboim area. Benguela railroad from Lobito transverses country to connect with line in Zaire; civil strife in 1975 halted international traffic, not resumed through late 1978.

Roads: Good all-weather system of some 35,800 kilometers in 1975 (situation uncertain in late 1978) and additional 36,500 kilo­meters of rough dirt roads. Most provincial capitals connected by paved roads.

Air Service: Domestic services provided by government air line Transposes Aereos de Angola (TAAG) to most provincial capitals and a few other important towns. TAAG also flew to several Euro­pean and African capitals, and a number of international air lines had flights to Belas International Airport at Luanda.

Ports and Shipping: Major ports at Luanda, Lobito, and Moca- medes; Cabinda also in this category because of volume of petro­leum exports. Minor ports of Porto Amboim and Ngunza handled coffee exports; Porto Alexandre and Bahia dos Tigres important smaller fishing ports. National merchant marine established early 1978.

Telecommunications: Telephone (over 30,000 subscribers regis­tered in 1972), telegraph, and telex services connect principal cities and towns; ground satellite station at Cacuaco near Luanda used in international service. Main radio station at Luanda, with regional stations (twelve in operation in 1977) located at various points throughout country. Radio receivers estimated at 116,000 in mid-1970s; no television service as of 1978.

National Security

Armed Forces: People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of An­gola (Forcas Armadas Populares LibertaQao de Angola—FAPLA) includes army of 30,000, navy of 700, and air force of 800. Con­scription inaugurated in 1978.

Units: Army has brigades and battalions of flexible organizations and manning levels.

Equipment: Mostly of Soviet origin including MiG aircraft, T-54 tanks, and truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers.

Police: National police force—People’s Police Corps of Angola (Corpo de Policia Popular de Angola—CPPA) and secret police— Directorate of Information and Security of Angola (DireQao de InformaQao a Seguran^a de Angola—DISA).

Militia: People’s Defense Organization (OrganizaQao de Defesa Popular—ODP).

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*Figure 1. Major Administrative Divisions*



IN NOVEMBER 1975 THE Portuguese colonial authorities (preceded or followed by the great bulk of Portuguese nationals) left Angola after a presence of some kind of nearly five centuries. For most of that period that presence was restricted to a few ports on the coast, except for those soldiers and traders who from time to time penetrated farther inland (rarely very far). Soldiers went into the interior to attempt to control an important trade route, to look for precious metals, or to limit the power of one or another African state. Aside from their fruitless search for valuable mining properties, the major Portuguese interest before the latter half of the nineteenth century lay in trade. White traders and their *mes­tizo* (see Glossary) and African representatives acted as purchasers or middlemen in the slave, ivory, beeswax, and other trade that at various times and for periods of greater or lesser duration were profitable. In particular, until well into the nineteenth century, the slave trade was the chief focus of Portuguese interest. It was not until the 1920s, well after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 allocated Portugal the area constituting present-day Angola, that the Portuguese were able to establish their rule, against the resist­ance of many African communities.

The ancestors of most of the peoples represented in the present- day population had arrived within Angola’s borders long before the coming of the Portuguese in the late fifteenth and early six­teenth centuries, although a good deal of movement and mixture was yet to take place before various elements were settled where they were to be found in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The development of indigenous states (e.g., that of the Kongo) was also well under way before the fifteenth century, but a good deal of state formation and change in already existing states took place afterward. Most of it is attributable to the internal dynamics of African societies but some to shifts in the nature and direction of trade brought about by the availability of the Portuguese as trading partners. The impact of the Portuguese in most of Angola was thus largely indirect until the late nineteenth century. They dealt with African communities in a direct political or military way only in order to facilitate their effective exploitation of economic opportunities, as when they considered the king of an African state obstreperous and sought to replace him with a puppet.

In some cases African chiefs or kings controlled the trade routes and obtained tribute from those using them; not infrequently the heads of African states and others were directly engaged as mid­dlemen or as procurers of slaves, ivory, and other trade goods. In either case the Portuguese presence had the effect of directing trade toward the coast rather than inland and of permitting Afri­cans to accumulate the wealth and following to strengthen their positions if they already held political authority or to challenge traditional chieftains.

The African peoples of modern Angola (and at the time the Portuguese first touched on the coast) consist of communities speaking a number of Bantu languages each of which is closely or more remotely related to that of adjacent peoples in Angola or in neighboring states. Except for the Kongo, however, none of the linguistically and culturally similar communities were organized into a single polity, and by the eighteenth century even the Kongo state had disintegrated. For example, in the nineteenth century the Ovimbundu, constituting in modem times the largest single ethnolinguistic category at under 2 million persons, were orga­nized into as many as twenty-two kingdoms.

Apart from Kongo, the capital of which (but not the bulk of its people) lay in what is now Angola, a partial exception to the pat­tern of comparatively small-scale states was the so-called Lunda Empire, its center in what is now Shaba Region in Zaire. Growing to its widest compass in the eighteenth century, it included some communities in northeastern Angola. Like most large-scale Afri­can states, it was ethnically heterogeneous, although many of the peoples it encompassed were remotely related to the ruling Ruund group.

The sense of ethnic identity that seemed to prevail in the twen­tieth century, and became politically relevant in the 1950s and remained so in the 1970s, was not salient in the earlier periods. Not only were ethnolinguistic categories divided into a number of polities, but these were often in conflict with one another. More­over the continuous movement characteristic of many groups into the nineteenth and even the early twentieth centuries and the expansion and contraction of politically organized groups meant that groups speaking one language and characterized by a specific culture could shift to the language and acquire all or part of the culture of an adjacent people, although they might retain a tradi­tion of their origins. The development of ethnic identities in the modern period reflected competitive situations generated by modem political circumstances and the insistence of the Por­tuguese on categorizing communities under a limited number of ethnolinguistic rubrics.

As of 1845 there were fewer than 2,000 Portuguese in the terri­tory, many of them *degredados* (exiled convicts) or others seeking a fortune and hoping to return to Portugal as soon as possible. Because there were very few women among them, unions be­tween white males and African women generated a population of *mestizos* who played a significant role in the administration and trade of Angola. Increased colonization by Portuguese immi­grants, including a higher proportion of women, toward the end of the nineteenth century led in law and in fact to a degradation of *mestizo* status.

The growth of Portuguese settlement was in response to the

requirement of the Berlin conference that the territory allotted to a colonial power be adequately administered. A more important reason for the arrival of Portuguese was the poverty of metropoli­tan Portugal. With or without government encouragement, Por­tuguese left the home country. Most, however, migrated to the New World: Angola’s reputation (insect-ridden, inhabited by wild animals and hostile Africans, a place to which *degredados* were sent) discouraged immigrants.

Nevertheless some came, chiefly the urban and rural poor (the somewhat better off Portuguese went to the Americas). The Por­tuguese government, seeking to establish a Portuguese presence throughout the territory and to find a place for Portugal’s own poverty-striken peasants, officially encouraged settlement in the rural areas. In fact the poor peasant tended to establish himself in Angolan towns, looking for a means of livelihood other than agri­culture and, in the process, squeezing out the *mestizos* and urban Africans who had hitherto played a part in the urban economy. Those who attempted agriculture were often the urban poor of Portugal, lacking knowledge of farming, let alone of cultivation in the tropics.

Like their predecessors, the Portuguese who went to urban and rural sites in the last decades of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries did not expect to stay. “Unfortunately,” as the historian Gerald Bender puts it, “agriculture not only re­quired more energy and capital than commerce, it also required a strong commitment of permanence.” That it did not get, and by 1950 less than 10 percent of active white males (2,746 men) were engaged in agriculture.

In addition to the settlers’ lack of capital, knowledge, and com­mitment, the government, despite its emphasis on rural settle­ment, was generally unhelpful, putting obstacles in the way of Portuguese entry into Angola and failing to perform the necessary studies and provide the aid that would maximize the chances of the Portuguese succeeding in agriculture. To the extent that aid was given it took the form of subsidies that undermined the farmer’s interest in working. The subsidies permitted the employ­ment of African workers, made available at very low wages by the institution of forced labor. In the view of a high Portuguese official of the first decades of the twentieth century (quoted in Bender) “as soon as the colono [Portuguese farmer] had blacks in his ser­vice, he stops working and becomes an employer, foreman or overseer and moves down from producer to parasite.”

When in the early 1930s Antonio de Oliveira Salazar established the New State (Estado Novo) in Portugal, a major goal of which was to stabilize the Portuguese economy, Angola was expected to survive on its own. The kind of social and economic infrastructure that might have been of some help to the Portuguese farmer, let alone the African, was not forthcoming. Whatever was con­structed was a response to immediate need and with the hope of

quick return. There was no investment directed to long-term de­velopment.

The Portuguese had made an ideological point that increasing the density of white rural settlement in Angola was a means of “civilizing” the African. They justified the policy of forced labor on the same grounds the African could become civilized only if he engaged in steady labor. Whatever the ideological arguments offered, however, the African was, for practical purposes, re­garded as less than human by most colonists and officials. The effect of forced labor was to provide Portuguese colonists and government alike with workers at wages lower than those availa­ble to Africans in neighboring countries (many therefore left to work elsewhere—Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa in particular).

In effect Africans were not encouraged to develop either in terms of their own cultures or in response to the market, nor were they introduced in any numbers to the putative benefits of the Portuguese version of civilization. In theory Africans who ac­quired a certain level of education and a mode of life similar to that of Europeans were entitled to become citizens of Portugal— these were the people called *assimilados.* In fact very few were given the opportunity to do so. Moreover, regardless of the formal protestations of the Portuguese that culture and not race deter­mined status, the race of the *assimilados* told against them in most matters—political, social, and economic. Those Portuguese offi­cials and others who called attention to the ways in which Africans were treated were largely ignored by the Salazar government and the governments that preceded it. Even those in and outside of Angola who acknowledged the iniquities of forced labor accepted it as “necessary” to Angolan development.

As early as the late nineteenth century a few non-Europeans, particularly *mestizos,* expressed their resentment of aspects of Portuguese policy and practice. (That resentment may be distin­guished from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century resistance to the imposition of Portuguese domination by Africans, although even here there were signs of the burgeoning of an African rather than a local identity.) With few exceptions, how­ever, *mestizos* were asking not for independence for themselves and/or Africans but for the right, by virtue of their status, knowl­edge of Portuguese, and level of education, to better treatment. Here and there a few called attention to the plight of Africans and insisted on its amelioration, but most were attached to Portuguese culture if not to the Portuguese, and despite signs of ambivalence, few identified with the great bulk of Africans living in terms of the then-current variants of indigenous cultures.

By the 1950s, however, anticolonial movements had emerged in adjacent states, and some *mestizos* and *assimilados* had been given the opportunity to go to Portugal (a few managed to get to other European states). With these stimuli African- or *mesti^oAed* associations with explicitly political goals began to spring up. The

were not prepared to countenance the change in the social and economic order implied in even the more moderate anticolonial movements. Because of the active suppression of manifestations of anti-Portuguese sentiment and activity, therefore, anticolonial movements typically had their centers and leaders outside the

Salazar regime, authoritarian at home, was no less so in Portugal’s colonial territories. Moreover the increasing numbers of settlers

Reforms initiated by the Portuguese in the early 1960s in re­sponse to these manifestations of discontent, e.g., the abolition of the distinction between *assimilado* and *indigene* (native, uncivil­ized) and of forced labor were too late and too little. In any case they had little practical effect.

territory.

By the early 1960s political groups were sufficiently well orga­nized, if divided by ethnic loyalties and personal animosities, to try to take advantage of opportunities to begin their drives for inde­pendence. Moreover at least some sections of the African popula­tion had been so strongly affected by the loss of land, the forced labor policy, and the stresses produced by a declining coffee econ­omy that they were ready to rebel on their own. The result was a series of violent events in both urban and rural areas.

The African initiatives of 1961, although put down by the Por­tuguese military, marked the beginning of long-drawn-out, often ineffective efforts to gain independence. That ineffectiveness was attributable in part to the efforts of anticolonial movements to carry on a revolution from exile, in part to the strenuous insistence of the Portuguese, by now alone among colonial powers, on retain­ing control over their colonial territories, which they persisted in considering overseas provinces of Portugal. The most significant obstacle to effective anticolonial activity, however, was the inabil­ity of the various movements to form a lasting coalition.

In pursuit of continued political control, the Portuguese were prepared to use whatever military means were necessary. In the end the metropolitan regime was overturned by its own army, wearied (not so much by warfare in Angola as by continuing guer­rilla operations in the far-flung Portuguese territories) and alien­ated from the perspectives of the Portuguese government and the colonists. The new regime in Portugal, marked by an ideology different from that of Salazar and his successors and confronted by a range of problems at home, lacked the wherewithal to continue the struggle in any case and abandoned Angola to its own devices, which, in effect, meant abandoning it to the three major an­ticolonial movement groups to fight it out.

Both before and immediately after the departure of the Por­tuguese, various African states tried to bring these groups to­gether, but their efforts had, at best, ephemeral success. Indepen­dence therefore was immediately followed by civil war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liberta^ao de Angola—MPLA) on the one hand and

the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente National de Libertacao de Angola—FNLA) on the other. That the FNLA and UNITA opposed the MPLA did not, however, mean that they cooperated effectively and shared a common perspective or that their leaders were capable of friendly or mutually respectful in­teraction.

The MPLA was strongly *mestizo* and Mbundu (at more than one-fifth of the African population, the second largest ethnolin- guistic category) in leadership and composition. It was in principle oriented to a nonethnic, nonracial, and Marxist-Leninist concept of Angola as an independent state. The important leadership role of *mestizos* (and a few Portuguese) in the movement gave rise to some resentment on the part of some of the leaders and followers in the MPLA, manifested in an attempted coup after indepen­dence.

UNITA had its chief base among the Ovimbundu, the largest (more than one-third) ethnolinguistic category. Several smaller eastern and southern groups were also attracted to the movement, however. Its leader, Jonas Savimbi, occasionally seemed to es­pouse a socialist orientation, but UNITA was essentially an ethnic­populist movement in the words of John A. Marcum, a close stu­dent of Angolan affairs. Again, like FNLA, it was antipathetic to *mestizos,* a position that had its roots in the history of *mestizo* alignment with the Portuguese and the tendency of many of them —the anticolonial credentials of others notwithstanding—to look down on ordinary Africans.

The FNLA had its base among the Kongo, and the organization that preceded it had gone so far as to think in terms of an all-Kongo movement embracing those of the same ethnic group in Zaire and Congo. Although active in the uprisings of 1961, the FNLA was largely ineffectual for much of the 1960s and early 1970s. Its leader, Holden Roberto, despite the ostensible change to an all­Angolan movement, retained a narrow perspective, spent most of his time in Zaire, and when he attempted to act as a guerrilla leader was a failure.

When the Portuguese left, each of the movements turned to its foreign friends for increased aid. The MPLA had already received some aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the FNLA turned to the United States, which had given it intermittent support over the years but whose capacity to give aid was limited by congres­sional resolve not to permit extensive American involvement. UNITA had received only nominal support from the People’s Re­public of China (PRC). Its few African supporters, e.g., neighbor­ing Zambia, could give it little but refuge. In desperation UNITA turned to South Africa. Disliking the prospect of a hostile state north of Namibia with which it had its own difficulties, South Africa responded, moving quickly into Angola. The Soviet and

Cuban reaction was swift, the former providing the logistical sup­port and the Cubans providing the fighting men.

By the end of 1976 the MPLA with Soviet and Cuban support had prevailed, and its regime had been recognized by most Afri­can states, including some that had been initially hostile to it. In 1978, however, UNITA continued to offer resistance to MPLA domination, but its strength was difficult to assess. The FNLA was less effective from the north, and the rapprochement under way in mid-1978 between Angola and Zaire may well make continued FNLA activity unlikely if it takes full effect.

The MPLA (in 1978 renamed the MPLA-Labor Party to under­line its transition from a movement to a party and its socialist orientation) more or less ruled a country with considerable poten­tial for development but one that was still struggling to achieve levels of production reached under the Portuguese in 1973 and 1974. Aid in the form of technicians, teachers, and the like was forthcoming from Cuba and other communist states, but Angola lacked trained cadres of its own. The agriculturally productive lands had been given over to individual Africans, cooperatives and, in a few cases, state farms, but the process of organizing production and distribution, much talked about, still had a long way to go. In particular, Africans showed few signs of eagerness to become involved with producers’ cooperatives (they had little or no experience of cooperatives of any kind under Portuguese rule). Although some Africans had been engaged in cash cropping in the colonial era, most had been wage laborers, often reluctantly so, rather than peasant smallholders with extensive experience of managing their own enterprises, and those that had such experi­ence apparently preferred to continue to do so.

Other sources of income from the wide variety of natural re­sources were being only partly realized in the late 1970s. Chief among these was petroleum, still produced by foreign firms (e.g., Gulf Oil Corporation in Cabinda) but providing an important source of foreign exchange. Diamond mining, important since the 1920s, was furnishing a much diminished source of income in the mid- and late 1970s for a variety of reasons, but its potential re­mained great as did that of iron mining, also suffering from the precipitous changes in personnel and politics since independence (see Mining, ch. 5).

Despite the avowed socialist orientation of the MPLA-Labor Party regime, it was not acting precipitately to institute socialist forms. For example, although in some disagreement with foreign firms working in Angola over aspects of control and operation of various enterprises, it had refrained (as of late 1978) from insisting on expropriation and complete state ownership. Further, Presi­dent Agostinho Neto and others, recognizing that the departure of the Portuguese had left Angola with a weak to nonexistent structure of distribution and skilled craftsmanship, were not ready to alienate Africans and others with entrepreneurial and industrial

skills. The regime was therefore willing to permit continued pri­vate involvement in commercial and small-scale industrial activity as long as those involved did not prove to be politically obstreper­ous. There were also signs that the Angolan government was pre­pared to make adjustments in its relations with certain African and Western countries in order to diminish its dependence on the Soviet Union and states associated with it. In fact Angola’s eco­nomic relations with Western states were already important: sev­eral Western states and Japan remained its chief customers and sources of supply.

Precolonial Angola and the

Coming of the Portuguese

The history of Angola is riddled with gaps, in part because it so long remained a colony of Portugal. On the whole Portuguese archaeologists and anthropologists did not investigate the colony as thoroughly as British, French, or German scholars investigated their colonial empires, and Portuguese historians were more con­cerned with the history of their countrymen in Angola than with the history of the African population.

The original inhabitants of present-day Angola apparently were speakers of the so-called Click family of languages. Their descend­ants, once called Bushmen by Europeans, still inhabit portions of southern Africa, and very small numbers of them may still be found in southern Angola (see Ethnolinguistic Categories, ch. 2). Primarily a hunting and gathering people, the Khoisan speakers lost their predominance in southern Africa as a result of the expan­sion of the Bantu-speaking peoples during the first millennium A.D.

The ancestors of the Bantu speakers were a Negroid people who, it appears, began their expansion from a nuclear area in the rain forest near the present-day Nigeria-Cameroon border. The exact phases of their expansion are still a matter of scholarly dis­pute, but it seems certain that one of the factors that contributed to their success was their involvement in vegeculture, although many of them continued to rely heavily on hunting and gathering. Vegeculture produced a more reliable supply of food than did hunting and gathering and so accorded the Bantu speakers a major advantage that the Click speakers lacked.

The Bantu expansion used to be pictured as one of violent con­quest of neighboring peoples, but later work suggests that it was carried out by small groups who for the most part relocated only over short distances in response to economic or political stimuli. Rather than conquering or evicting the Click speakers, the Bantu seem to have attracted and absorbed them. As hunters and gather­ers moved into the Bantu agricultural society, they tended to adopt the Bantu language. Arriving from the north and east, the Bantu settled in Angola between 1300 and 1600 A.D., and some may have been there even earlier. There is evidence that they introduced iron technology to the area. The previous inhabitants were users of stone.

The Bantu in time formed a number of historically important kingdoms. The earliest and perhaps most important of these was the Kongo kingdom, which arose during the period between the middle of the fourteenth and the middle of the fifteenth centuries in an area that overlapped the present Angolan-Zairian border. Farther east, in the grasslands of the upper Cassai River, the Lunda kingdom developed in the late sixteenth century (see fig. 2).

South-southeast of the Kongo kingdom but farther inland and lying between the upper reaches of the Dande and Cuanza rivers was a kingdom ruled by the *ngola a kiluanje,* peopled by the Ndongo subgroup of the Mbundu ethnolinguistic group. By the early sixteenth century a strong centralized kingship, based in part on its control over sources of iron and salt, had developed there.


The boundaries and composition of these Bantu kingdoms, as well as those of other less centralized or less extensive polities, were continually changing. Not only did the territories under any king’s control change in response to political or economic factors, but as they changed, the kingdom’s customs and institutions were often modified because of the absorption of new peoples or the exigencies of administering a larger area.

Inevitably the establishment of major kingdoms affected their neighbors. Thus a number of states to the east of the Ndongo and on all sides of the Lunda were influenced by both these major kingdoms. Groups of people expanded from this area during the sixteenth century, some of whom eventually established them­selves near the Atlantic.


The Kongo, Lunda, and Ndongo states differed from others in size and extent and in the number of subjects who owed alle­giance, however nominal, to a central authority. The kings them­selves might not directly control more land or people than a lower level chief, but their position was nevertheless generally acknowl­edged to be more elevated than that of chiefs. They were offered tribute and were believed to possess substantial religious power and authority. A king’s actual secular power, however, was deter­mined as much by his own personal abilities as by institutional arrangements.

Although the Kongo and Ndongo states were located on or not far from the Atlantic, their lines of trade and communication, and their interests, were directed toward the interior of the continent. Until the arrival of Europeans, the sea was looked on as a barrier to trade. While it might supply salt or shells that could be used as currency, the interior held the promise of better hunting and farming, of mining, and of trade.

The development of the Kongo and Ndongo states into larger kingdoms has been the subject of much study. Although



*Figure 2. Indigenous Kingdoms and Portuguese Penetration*



Source: Based on information from T. O. Ranger (ed.), *Aspects of Central African History,* Evanston, 1968, p. 274; Douglas L. Wheeler and Ren6 Pelissier, *Angola,* New York, 1971;and Allison Butler Herrick, et al, *Area Handbook for Angola,* Washington, D. C., 1967.

there has not been complete agreement on which were the most important factors in the emergence of these kingdoms generally, Joseph A. Miller, a historian of the Mbundu states, has made a case for factors that affected the evolution of those states, and he has suggested that those factors may have con­tributed to the formation of all of the area’s major kingdoms. Such factors included a state’s control of a scarce, valuable re­source, such as salt or iron, and the enjoyment of a superior military position. The state may also have developed institu­tional innovations (such as specific forms of slavery) that ena­bled it to make extensive use of manpower, or some method to prevent the formation of splinter groups, or it may have devel­oped some ideological innovation that bound a variety of peo­ples to one leader. States may have been able to draw strength either from outside allies or from the possession of a commer­cial monopoly or trade route. States sometimes benefited from an agricultural surplus or technological superiority. Finally the contribution of individual genius toward state development should not be discounted. The point that Miller wished to make was that there was no need to assume, as had been done in the past, that African states were formed only as a result of the introduction of influences from outside. Further he stressed that states may have been formed through a series of steps, each of which may individually have been imperceptible, but the combination and cumulation of which significantly altered the state’s structure.

The Kongo Kingdom, ca. 1400-1665

In the middle of the fifteenth century the strongest of the mid­dle Atlantic kingdoms was that of the Kongo. The earliest Euro­pean contact with them came in 1483 when the Portuguese ex­plorer Diogo Cao reached the mouth of the Congo River. Historian Jan Vansina has used Portuguese records and African oral tradition to attempt to reconstruct how the kingdom must have functioned in the sixteenth century, and he has postulated that it was much the same a century earlier.

In the late fourteenth century a group of Kongo, led by the son of a chief from the area of modern Boma (in Zaire), moved south of the Congo River into northern Angola, conquering the people they found there and establishing Mbanza Kongo, the capital of the kingdom. One of the reasons for their success was their willing­ness to absorb the population they conquered rather than trying to remain their overlords. The people of the area thus gradually became one, ruled by chiefs who had religious as well as political authority.

By the middle of the fifteenth century the Kongo king ruled the lands of northern Angola and the north bank of the Congo. By the early sixteenth century the kingdom had become sufficiently large to be divided into six provinces, each under a subchief or governor who like the king had both religious and political powers. Subordi­nate to each of these were district chiefs and subordinate to them, village headmen.

The basic unit of the state was the village, at the core of which were members of a matrilineal descent group (see Glossary). The position of village headman was hereditary. Villages were popu­lated by free people and slaves, the latter captives of war, crimi­nals, or, in some cases, directly purchased.

District officials who also served as judges were appointed either by the king or by a provincial governor, although the king had the power to remove any of them. Provincial governors could also be appointed and removed at the pleasure of the king. Their duties at the provincial level appear to have paralleled those of district officers at district level. Additionally they may have served as councillors to the king.

There were numerous officials at the royal court, some con­cerned with serving the king personally; others were judges spe­cializing in certain kinds of cases. All of these officials as well as the provincial governors carried the designation *mani* as one of their titles. This title had come to be used to distinguish the aristocracy from the rest of society.

The king was originally elected from among the male descend­ants of the conqueror of the area, but after 1540 the king’s ances­try had to be traced to Affonso, the king who probably reigned until 1545 and who was the first Kongo king to remain a convert to Christianity. After 1512 the king had a Portuguese adviser. He also had a military bodyguard, usually made up of Africans who were not Kongo. Other than this there was no standing army. In times of war, manpower needs were met by using the administra­tive chain of command to call on all able-bodied men to rendez­vous at specific locations.

Government income was collected in the form of taxes and labor. In a situation unique among African kingdoms, the currency of Kongo were shells that could only be found in the royal fishery. This meant that the king had absolute control over the kingdom’s currency.

The king was chosen by an electoral college of nine to twelve men, some of whom, at least, were provincial heads. Because the kingship could be claimed by any male descendant of Affonso, rival factions were constantly formed to challenge each other for the kingship.

The Kongo kingdom was the first on the west coast of central Africa to come into contact with Europeans. After his initial land­ing in 1483, Cao traveled back and forth between the Kongo and Portugal several times during the 1480s, the king of Kongo having I asked Portugal for missionaries and technical assistance in ex-^ change for ivory and other desirable goods.

The king who reigned at the time of the first arrival of the Portuguese did not remain a convert to Christianity, but his mother and brother did. It is likely that religion was a factor of some importance in the formation of factions to dispute the suc­cession. The king’s Roman Catholic brother, Alfonso, won the struggle for the throne after his predecessor’s death in 1506. Al­though he executed another brother who challenged him for the kingship, he spared the rest of his brother’s faction and converted them to Christianity. Obviously the Christian Alfonso could no longer base his religious authority on his role in the kingdom’s African religion. He therefore based his Christian religious author­ity on the fact that he was keeper of the holy water. By the 1530s his capital, Mbanza Kongo, had been renamed Sao Salvador.

Alfonso was a dedicated Catholic with considerable admiration for the Europeans. He called on them for support in education, military matters, and conversion of the Kongo. For a while this arrangement was useful to the Portuguese, who received remu­neration in slaves and copperwares. They dreamed of extending their African domain all the way across the continent to the east coast, where they had established contact with the Mwene Mutapa, the ruler of another major African kingdom located in parts of modern Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia.

Nevertheless conflicts with the Portugese soon arose. The peo­ple Portugal had sent to render technical assistance refused to do the work they were supposed to do and began instead to behave like aristocrats, treating the Africans as inferiors. This was one obstacle to the achievement of the theoretical Portuguese goal of turning the Africans into black Lusitanians. In fact such a program was too ambitious to succeed. Alfonso was by no means prepared to throw over all elements of the Kongo system—such as law, emblems, and etiquette—in favor of those of Portugal. Further­more there were too few Portuguese missionaries and technicians to carry out the Portuguese program; their influence therefore was outweighed by the avariciousness of European traders who had come only to exploit the resources of the area.

There was a fundamental split between the Portuguese trading communities on the African west coast. One group of settlers near Sao Tome had been guaranteed certain trading privileges while others worked to establish the Portuguese crown’s monopoly over the Kongo trade. These two groups sought allies from among the political factions that struggled for the Kongo kingship. This com­petition played on and at the same time increased the damaging effects of the kingdom’s major institutional weakness—the lack of certainty in the succession. All Europeans in the Kongo lands were drawn into the conflict.

One of the most destructive aspects of Kongo-Portuguese rela­tions was the spread and growth of the slave trade. The Por­tuguese had begun buying slaves from the Kongo almost as soon as they arrived. These slaves were used first on the sugar planta­tions on nearby Portuguese islands and later were sent to the Americas. But once the country was opened to the slave trade,

early as 1514 about the effects of the trade in his lands, but one of the few ways to pay the technicians the Kongo wanted was with slaves. Twelve years later Affbnso wrote to Portugal that the effects of the trade were disastrous: in addition to the depopula­tion it caused, traders in the interior frequently encouraged local chiefs to rebel against the king. While he could not prevent slaving activities in the interior, Affbnso at least attempted to keep Kongo people from being captured as slaves, but this policy led to a greater number of border raids and increased warfare. However damaging its effects, the slave trade continued, as did the Kongo- Portuguese alliance that necessitated it.

halting or limiting it became impossible. Affbnso complained as

Another problem that caused friction lay in the persistent, though false, Portuguese belief that gold, silver, and copper were to be found in considerable quantities in Kongo. In fact only cop­per was to be found there. But the refusal of Kongo kings to admit to the existence of gold and silver mines created suspicion and mistrust between them and the Portuguese.

The pattern in Kongo-Portuguese relations that was established during the reign of Affbnso continued until the 1640s. The Por­tuguese maintained their trade in slaves and the search for pre­cious metals and continued to squabble among themselves. Simul­taneously they attempted to educate and convert Africans. Inevitably the attempts at conversion had limited success. Mission­aries were few, and Roman Catholic proscriptions, such as that against polygamy, often conflicted with institutions that were es­sential to the functioning of the Kongo social system. Throughout this period, as later, there was squabbling and sometimes outright conflict between Portuguese factions.

The greatest crisis faced by the Kongo in the sixteenth century, leaving aside the pervasive problem of the slave trade, was an upheaval beginning in 1568, long attributed by Portuguese sources and others to the invasion of a group of unknown prove­nance called the Jaga. Miller, examining the origins of what ap­pears to be a European myth, suggests that the attack on the Kongo capital may well have been launched by a section of the Kongo opposed to the king who may have been joined or aided by non-Kongo seeking to capture control over the Kongo slave trade and other trading routes. In any case the assault in Sao Salvador and its environs drove the king from the capital to an island in the middle of the Congo River.

The king, Alvaro I, called on Portugal for aid. The governor of Sao Tome responded and fought the invaders from 1571 through 1573, clearing the country of them and occupying the area until the mid-1570s. In effective control of the countryside and facing no organized Kongo opposition, in 1576 the governor general founded the colony of Angola south of Kongo country.

The devastating effects of the upheaval have been advanced as the central reason for the disruption of the Kongo kingdom, but

there are suggestions that the Kongo had for long been weakened by the continual struggles of various factions for the kingship, which often led to the revolts of subchiefs against chiefs. During the years preceding 1568 much of the kingdom had already been reduced to virtual anarchy.

Once Alvaro was restored to his throne he proceeded to reestab­lish authority by using the Portuguese troops who remained in occupation of the country. With the restoration of Alvaro came more Portuguese traders, ready to collect the debt they felt the Kongo kingdom owed Portugal for saving it from the people the Portuguese called Jaga. The years after 1571 saw the formation of a trading class whose slaving activities reached far inland. The kings became dependent on proceeds from the slave trade, but in turn the traders became dependent on them for security.

During the late years of the sixteenth century and the early ones of the seventeenth Kongo kings were able to provide sought-after security. Alvaro I and his successor Alvaro II brought stability back to the kingdom. They expanded the domain of royal authority while keeping at bay the Portuguese colony of Angola, which at this time remained confined to the area south of them. To counter­balance Portuguese influence they tried to open diplomatic rela­tions with the Vatican. It was during this period that such food crops as maize and cassava were introduced from the Americas, although the slow spread of cassava cultivation did not foreshadow that crop’s use as a staple in the eighteenth century.

After the death of Alvaro II in 1614 the Kongo exhibited less support for the ruling structure that taxed them excessively, brought on inflation, and permitted corruption in the administra­tion of justice. These problems were compounded by the activities of fraders in the interior and by conflicts over succession to the throne. Moreover tensions had been increasing between Kongo and the colony of Angola: there had been conflicts over access to cultivable land claimed by each, and various Kongo actions had reactivated the Portuguese belief that somewhere hidden from them were valuable gold and silver mines.

In 1622 the governor of Angola launched an attack on Kongo. Although not entirely successful from the Portuguese point of view, the war had a number of lasting effects. First, the colony captured quite a number of slaves, demonstrating how rewarding slave raiding could be. Second, the Portuguese came out of the war convinced of the existence of mines in Kongo, and this belief encouraged a series of periodic conflicts between the colony and Kongo for the next half century. The war also created a xeno­phobia among the Kongo of the interior, and, despite the efforts of the king to protect the Portuguese, many were driven out. Since the trading system depended largely on them, commerce was greatly disrupted, with effects on Angola as great as those on the Kongo.

The Dutch traders and explorers who arrived on the African

west coast early in the seventeenth century not only threatened *r* the safety of the Angolan colony but also helped undermine the / Kongo kingdom. They both provided economic competition to ■ the Portuguese and supported various Kongo factions in their challenges to the king, thus contributing to the disintegration of - the kingdom’s central authority. The rate of this disintegration

*I* increased rapidly after the death of Alvaro III in 1622. Through \ 1641 faction after faction made rival claims to the throne. More

v and more sections of Kongo gained substantial degrees of auton­omy and established local control of the trade that had so enriched the monarchy in earlier years.

The last effective years of the Kongo monarchy were from 1641 to 1661, the years of the reign of Garcia II. The Dutch need for slaves had expanded beyond what could be supplied by the Afri­can allies they had won. In 1641 they captured Loanda (later Luanda), for a time relieving the pressure Kongo felt from the Portuguese to the south. During this respite Garcia undertook to reassert the monarchy’s authority (see Slaving, Portuguese Pene­tration of the Interior, and the Dutch Interregnum, 1604-48, this ch.).

Garcia had to face a problem that had existed since the incursion of Europeans, namely how to reconcile the Christian religious beliefs held by many Kongo monarchs (a fact that made some impression on Europeans) with the traditional religion still attrac­tive to their African subjects. Moreover the Angola colony, al­though not as expansionist under the Dutch as it had been under the Portuguese, exerted its influence in Kongo through other ave­nues. In any case on their return to Angola in 1648 the Portuguese continued their previous attempts to subjugate Kongo.

In 1665, four years after Garcia’s death, war broke out again between Angola and Kongo, a war that resulted in the defeat of the Kongo army and the disruption of the interior (see The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo, 1648-83, this ch.). Rather than trying to impose their rule in Kongo the Portuguese were content to permit African factions to fight among themselves while they bought as slaves the captives that any of these factions were willing to sell.

The war of the 1660s broke Kongo military power irreparably. The kingdom lost control of the trade and the monopolies that had enriched it, in part because the monopolistic system once con­trolled by the state had been taken over by African entrepreneurs who avoided where they could the Portuguese influences that had controlled the monarchy. The loss of monarchical military and economic strength brought about a transformation in the eigh­teenth century from a unitary state to a number of smaller chief- doms that recognized the king but were for all practical purposes independent. Although the king might mediate among chiefs, he was no longer recognized as the highest judge. Still, the title of king was coveted for its prestige, a remembrance of its former power.

Ultimately it was the dramatic increase in the slave trade during the eighteenth century that changed the nature of the state. Henceforth power depended on an individual’s ability to gain wealth in the slave trade. The leaders with sufficient followers and slaves had the ability to defy previously potent nobles.

The Ndongo and the Portuguese, 1483-1576

Shortly after Cao made his initial contact with the Kongo king­dom of northern Angola in 1483, he established links with another African state farther south constituted by a section of the Mbundu people known as the Ndongo. Their ruler was called the *ngola a kiluanje,* and it was the first part of the title, its pronunciation changed to Angola, by which the Portuguese referred to the entire state.

Throughout most of the sixteenth century Portuguese relations with the Ndongo were overshadowed in importance by their deal­ings with the Kongo. Not, in fact, until after the founding of Luanda in 1576—an act made possible by the disruption and Por­tuguese occupation of Kongo in response to the so-called Jaga invasions—did exploration in the bulk of modern Angola rival trade and commerce in Kongo, and it was only in the early seven­teenth century that the Angola colony’s importance came to ex­ceed that of Kongo.

The presence in Kongo of a strong African king who was eager to curry favor with Portugal (and who as a result could be used by the Portuguese to further their own interests) had permitted the development there of a system of alliances and the use of influence rather than direct rule. Among the Mbundu there was no single great ruler whose stature approached that of the king of Kongo, and no chief was able to provide security throughout as large a territory for Portuguese slaving interests. The Portuguese there­fore resorted to military action to provide such security for them­selves, an intervention that led to the development of direct Por­tuguese rule in Angola.

Some of the earliest attempts by Portuguese to exploit Angola systematically came when merchants from Sao Tome tried to in­crease their profits beyond what they were making from the Kongo trade, and later when the king of Portugal made Kongo trade a crown monopoly. At this time—the early 1500s—the lands of the *ngola a kiluanje* probably lay as far north as the Dande River and as far south as the Cuanza. There is some question as to how far inland they extended, some arguing that they reached the present-day city of Malange, others that they continued eastward past Malange as far as the Cuango River.

For the most part Angola was ignored by Portugal until the middle of the sixteenth century, but it remained the center of disputes between local Portuguese traders and Africans. Usually these disputes were over slaves and control of the slave trade. By mid-century the attention the *ngola a kiluanje* received from Portuguese trade or missionary groups offended the king of Kongo. The *ngola a kiluanje’s* military forces defeated an army the king sent against him, encouraging him to declare his indepen­dence from Kongo and appeal to Portugal for support and help. In 1560 Lisbon sent to Angola an expedition that was primarily religious. In the interim the *ngola a kiluanje* who had requested Portuguese support had died and been replaced by another who viewed the Portuguese mission with suspicion. He took captive four members of the expedition, including its leader. The mission was recognized in Lisbon to have been a failure and the taking of captives held to be an act of bad faith on the part of the king. It apparently was in response to this that the Portuguese made the decision to employ armed might in dealing with the Ndongo. They felt that they could not afford to abandon their efforts because of the increasing importance of the supply of slaves and the promise of wealth from precious metals.

In 1571 the Portuguese crown introduced to their territory in Angola the same administrative system that had proved successful in their Brazilian colony and that would later be modified and introduced in Mozambique. The king granted Paulo Dias de Novais, long involved in exploration of the West African coast and an associate of Portuguese Jesuits interested in the area, *donataria* (territorial proprietorship) to Angola. He was able to do this in large part because the so-called Jaga wars had temporarily elimi­nated Kongo strength to the north and had resulted in the military occupation of the kingdom by Portuguese traders and soldiers.

The *donataria* system had as its model the medieval feudal organization of Portugal. As lands were reconquered from the Moors, the king would award jurisdiction over them to the lords who had helped him. These lords agreed to pay the costs and take the responsibility of settling and defending their new lands, but they could offset these expenses by culling what they could from their financial and administrative management of the land. Ex­cept for certain commodities over which the crown might reserve a monopoly—slaves in the case of Angola—trade was open, al­though fees of various sorts might have to be paid to the proprie­tor. So that these lands would not be lost to the crown, the grant did not, after one or several generations, or some other designated period of time, remain in the family; instead it would revert to crown control, frequently to be administered from Lisbon through a captain general. In some cases *donatarias* could be granted again, either to the same or to another family.

Wars for Control of Silver Mines, 1576-1604

Dias’ military campaigns after 1576 were carried out at a great cost in lives and helped stir up the Africans against the European intruders. The Africans were militarily superior to the Portuguese in the colony, and it may have been wiser for Dias to have pro­

moted a conciliatory policy, but Portuguese opinion, inflamed by African attacks and brigandage, would not permit this.

Pressure built for Dias to take military action against the *ngola a kiluanje,* and it became even greater when an initial expedition toward the Cuanza River was defeated in 1579. The result was the involvement of Dias and his forces in a campaign that lasted for ten years, a period in which disease took more lives than combat wounds. Dias founded several forts east of Luanda but was not able to gain firm control of the land around them, and when he died in 1579 he had not yet conquered the kingdom of the *ngola a kiluanje.*

Dias’ successors made slow, tortuous progress up the Cuanza River, meeting continually with African resistance. By 1604 they reached the head of navigation at Cambambe where they had expected to find silver mines (they had even brought along an engineering entourage). The mines did not exist.

One of the reasons for the inability of the Portuguese to advance rapidly inland was that they were fighting not only the Ndongo, but another people as well, known in this context as the Imban- gala. According to Miller the Imbangala had left their home in the Lunda country to the east when those lands were marked by major political changes. After passing through Chokwe country, they arrived in eastern Mbundu territory. It was here that they ceased to follow one leader, developed political institutions derived in part from Lunda traditions, in part from Mbundu and Ovimbundu practices, and split up into a number of branches. One branch had made contact with the Portuguese in Luanda even before the arrival of Dias in 1575. Having established com­mercial relations with some of the Portuguese traders in Angola, the Imbangala, like the Mbundu, did not relish potential interfer­ence from the Portuguese crown, as represented by Dias. Both combined to resist the spread of this influence.

Throughout the period of creeping, hesitant Portuguese expan­sion, the most persistent voices advocating the extension of Por­tuguese authority were the Jesuits based in Luanda, some of whom dreamed of establishing a Jesuit-led African theocracy. Even after this dream had ended, they resisted interference with their juris­diction over the African population, of whose welfare they thought themselves to be the guardians.

The Jesuits were only one group with a vested interest in An­gola: at the end of the sixteenth century Angola was a veritable cauldron of such interests. African groups fought among them­selves. Dias had made large grants of land to the lieutenants that had aided him. Soldiers carried on the slave trade. Any interfer­ence by the government, and after 1592 by the governor general, was seen as an infringement of the established rights and practices of the major interests. No single power was sufficiently strong enough to reconcile the opposing interests of different elements of the population, and governors often attempted to maintain peace between the Jesuits and the large landowners simply by refusing to interfere with their prerogatives.

Slaving, Portuguese Penetration of the Interior, and the Dutch Interregnum, 1604-68

The failure of the Portuguese to find silver mines in 1604 changed the nature of their approach to the colony. Slave taking had been a by-product of the quest for the mines: to get to the mines they had to fight, the fights resulted in the taking of cap­tives, and a profit could be turned by selling the captives as slaves. Henceforth, however, slaving became the major economic moti­vation for expansion and extension of Portuguese authority.

In 1611 a former conquistador was appointed governor general, and he pursued a more vigorous policy of expansion than had been practiced in the past. His purpose was to obtain more slaves. The Portuguese pushed farther into Ndongo country establishing and holding a fort a short way above Massangano, on the Lukala River. The fighting that followed from the Mbundu resistance supplied a stream of slaves to the coast. The Portuguese also allied them­selves with the Imbangala, who captured slaves for them.

In an attempt to find an easy route to the interior, the Por­tuguese moved southward. In 1617 they established a settlement at Benguela. This later became an important slave port, but for most of the seventeenth century it remained isolated and rela­tively independent of Luanda.

The highland area east of Benguela was inhabited by the Ovim­bundu who may have moved there from the north and the east. Not until 1700, however, was there some definition of which com­bination of polities constituted the Ovimbundu. There were at that time twenty-two separate kingdoms. Their kings combined political with religious and judicial authority. The king’s council, ordinarily comprising the group’s elders, chose the successor to the throne. The twenty-two states were never unified, but many became powerful on their own. They became highly successful as traders in the late nineteenth century and were not conquered by the Portuguese until the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Benguela settlement was not immediately used as a base from which to launch further explorations until late in the cen­tury, when the Portuguese founded two settlements on the pla­teau east of Benguela. Even then, however, the combination of hostile climate, African opposition, and isolation caused them to abandon the sites.

From 1617 to 1621 the colony was governed by Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos. Vasconcelos originally announced his intention of establishing friendly commercial relations with the Mbundu but found this more difficult than he had envisioned. He soon became persuaded that warfare was necessary if the slave trade was to increase. Shortly thereafter he became embroiled in a war with the new *ngola a kiluanje* over the movement of several Por­

tuguese fortresses without consultation. From 1617 to 1620 Vas- concelos led punitive expeditions against the Ndongo and their allies, accompanied by a group of slave traders. Large numbers of Africans were captured, converted en masse to Christianity, branded, and shipped to the western hemisphere.

The *ngola a kiluanje* attempted to make peace at the end of Vasconcelos’ governorship in 1621. His sister, Nzinga (called Queen Jinga by the Portuguese), headed an embassy from her brother to Luanda. A woman of remarkable ability, she persuaded the governor to recognize the Ndongo kingdom of the *ngola a kiluanje* as an independent monarchy that owed no allegiance to Portugal. She also convinced him to help the Ndongo expel the Imbangala from their territory, but she could not get him to agree to pull down a Portuguese fort at Mbaka, in Mbundu territory.

Nzinga poisoned her brother and succeeded to his throne in 1624, the same year that Femao de Souza became governor gen­eral. After failing to get support from Lisbon for the policy of making the Ndongo a partner in the slave trade, he attempted to expel Nzinga and establish a monarchy that would be subservient to Portugal. The result was continual war with the Ndongo until 1630. After a period of initial success—during which Nzinga was driven out and a puppet king installed in her place—Nzinga’s forces returned from the Mbundu kingdom of Matamba where Nzinga had established her rule. Her reappearance interfered with the network of trade routes and markets (called fairs) the Portuguese had set up in her absence.

Africans who had been drawn to the area between the Por­tuguese and the Ndongo by the lure of commerce and who had populated it rather heavily, were driven away by the constant warfare between the two. Meanwhile the Imbangala, much changed by their long trek from Lunda country through a variety of peoples from whom they acquired new symbols and forms of organization, established themselves as important if volatile ele­ments among various sections of the Mbundu and neighboring peoples. Sometimes they were raiders, sometimes rulers. In some contexts they were allied with Portuguese traders against formal Portuguese authority. Later some sections, especially those in Mbundu country, allied with Portuguese officials while others, farther south, resisted Portuguese attempts to establish dominion. As a consequence of these intricate and shifting alliances and conflicts, patterns of trade and political organization in the interior shifted in the first half of the seventeenth century.

Before 1640 Portuguese territories had been subjected to the raids and harassment of the Dutch, who were enemies of Spain, to which Portugal owed allegiance. The link between Portugal and Spain was broken in 1640. The Portuguese hoped for peace with the Netherlands, but it was to the advantage of the Dutch to avoid peace, for they were the likely candidate to pick up territo­ries that the Portugueses could not properly defend. In August 1641 twenty-one Dutch ships captured Luanda. The Portuguese governor led his fellow refugees inland to Massangano, which they decided to defend along with the forts of Mbaka and Cambambe.

The Portuguese also attempted to keep the Dutch from making alliances with Africans, but the latter, alienated by the Portuguese, were only too glad to have another European power in the area, and many, such as the king of Kongo and Nzinga of Matamba, welcomed them. The Portuguese received support only from their own puppet king of Ndongo, set up to oppose Nzinga, and from an Imbangala leader. Some of these Africans were more eager to eliminate the Portuguese presence than were the Dutch, who realized that Portugal could be a useful partner in the slave trade.

Within a short time, however, the Dutch realized that a con­tinued Portuguese presence was unworkable, even though the status of the Portuguese was equivalent to that of African groups who acted as middlemen in the slave trade. In 1647 and 1648 the Dutch and Nzinga made a final assault on the Portuguese. Al­though they defeated the Portuguese, they were unable to cap­ture Massangano. In 1648 a Portuguese fleet arrived from Brazil and recaptured Luanda.

The Defeat of Kongo and Ndongo, 1648-83

Once again installed in Luanda, the Portuguese set about recon­quering the Ndongo territory they held before the Dutch inter­ruption, with an eye set particularly on punishing those who had helped the Dutch. They won several concessions from the Kongo, including an indemnity and transfer of what the Portuguese be­lieved to be gold mines to their control. Portuguese influence was extended up to the Dande River. Hostilities continued, however, until 1665, when Portuguese forces invaded Kongo territory. At the battle of Mbwila, Portuguese firepower won the day. The Kongo king and many of his lieutenants lay dead, and from that time on the Kongo kingdom was wracked with struggles between competing factions. Whereas the Kongo state had formerly been strong enough to organize slaving raids against their weaker, less organized Mbundu neighbors, they now were unable to prevent the Mbundu from raiding Kongo for slaves (see The Kongo King­dom, ca. 1400-1665, this ch.).

After the defeat of the Kongo there were still three major inde­pendent African kingdoms that had been involved with the Por­tuguese: the Ndongo kingdom of the *ngola a kiluanje,* Kasanje (established by a section of the Imbangala), and Matamba. The puppet *ngola a kiluanje* of the Ndongo died in 1664, and his replacement refused to assume the same role for the Portuguese. He embarked on an expansionist policy of his own, which, in 1671, prompted a Portuguese attack and siege on his capital of Pungu-a- Ndondong (renamed Pungo Andongo). He was killed, many of his followers enslaved, and a Portuguese fort built on the site of the capital. For a long time this fortress was considered Portugal’s deepest settlement in Angola. The state ruled by the *ngola a kiluanje* had been destroyed.

Nzinga, ruler of Matamba, died in 1663. During the last years of her life she had achieved a modus vivendi with the Portuguese, but after her death a struggle again broke out. The ruler who succeeded Nzinga tried to lessen Portuguese influence in Matamba and the Portuguese, following their practice with the Ndongo, appointed their own candidate for the throne, sparking a civil war. The matter was settled with the death of Nzinga’s successor in 1673. A Portuguese candidate, Kanini, became leader of Matamba. Meanwhile the state of Kasanje, peopled by Mbundu and ruled by Imbangala, was developing into a factor of considera­ble importance in the slave trade. The Imbangala served as mid­dlemen and were able to keep Europeans from penetrating inland beyond the Cuango River and Africans of the interior from reach­ing the coast and coming into direct contact with the Europeans. But once Kanini had firmly established himself as *ngola* of Matamba, he decided that he wanted for himself the power and wealth of Kasanje. A succession crisis within Kasanje in 1680 pre­sented him with the opportunity. Turning against his Portuguese benefactors, Kanini supported his own candidate for the Kasanje throne, with whom he attacked the capital, plundering much of the trading goods that were accumulated there.

The Portuguese, anticipating that this success could lead to a rallying of other Mbundu peoples to Kanini, decided to take mili­tary action against him. Kanini was able to defeat the Portuguese expedition, but his death shortly after his victory permitted the Portuguese to save face. After the war, the new Matamba queen sought to renew trade relations with the Portuguese, having found that Matamba had not benefited as much as anticipated from its defeat of Kasanje. Portugal got the better of the negotiations, requiring in 1683 that Matamba halt any further attempts to con­quer Kasanje territory, that it pay Portugal a war indemnity, and that Matamba trade with no one but the Portuguese. This last stipulation was made at a time when the slave trade was growing as a result of the participation of the English, French, and Dutch, all of whom were encroaching on Portugal’s domain.

Consolidation of the Lunda State

Most of the slaves that had been traded by Matamba and Ka­sanje came from the east. The trade grew dramatically in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, being carried on both more intensively and over a wider area. The area between Angola and Mozambique was a major hunting ground for slaves, most of whom were provided by the powerful Lunda Empire ruled by the *mwaant yav.* This state, its center in what' is western Shaba in modem Zaire, developed in the early seventeenth century, in part perhaps under Luba influence, although the basic ingredients were Ruund (the core group of the empire).

The empire extended its control over neighboring groups, their success attributable in part to the fact that they absorbed the chiefs of these groups into their political system, rather than deposing them. The conquered chiefs were no longer supreme, owing tribute to the *mwaant yav,* but they were permitted to retain their prestige and authority among their own people. An­other element that contributed toward Lunda success was the development of an orderly system of succession to the kingship. All the official positions in the Lunda government, from king to court positions to subchiefs, were assumed to belong to a fictional family. Each office carried with it a set of relationships to other offices: one office might be considered the “brother” or “father” or “wife” of another. The holders of these offices, therefore, as­sumed this fictional familial identity, so that one individual, by virtue of his title, was considered the relative of another, whether or not the two were actually related. Successors to an office inher­ited not only their predecessor’s title but his status, name, and kinship relations as well. The effect of this was to divorce the succession of individuals to an office or title from considerations of actual kinship.

The consolidation of the Lunda kingdom was also encouraged by the inflow of goods from the Americas. Since the Lunda core area was about 100 kilometers east of the Cassai River, the access to the wealth of the *mwaant yav* increased by virtue of his control of one end of the major trade routes inland.

The Lunda’s greatest shortage was of people to cultivate the crops that had been introduced from the western hemisphere, so the state assumed a military character that permitted it to capture Africans from the fringes of the empire and move them to the core area where they were used as slaves or serfs. As the area under Lunda control expanded, it required an administrative system capable of handling its affairs. New offices were accordingly added, and royal messengers who were the personal agents of the mon­arch monitored affairs throughout the empire and substantially contributed to the running of the state. The messengers also helped the king control the trade caravans that passed through his lands. While never great traders themselves, the Lunda appar­ently supervised the caravan traffic of others at least into the nineteenth century.

The Portuguese Colpny by the Late 1700s

Angola was closely tied to Brazil, Portugal’s possession across the Atlantic. Offering more attractive economic prospects, Brazil was the colony more favored by the Portuguese. Involved with Iberian affairs, Portugal did not devote more time or resources than abso­lutely necessary to Angola. The Dutch were expelled not by forces from the metropole, but by an expedition from Brazil. During the

third quarter of the seventeenth century, Angola was adminis­tered by Portuguese from Brazil rather than from Lisbon. These men were less concerned with the welfare of the colony than with their own personal profit: indeed, appointment as governor of Angola was intended to be a reward for service in Brazil’s wars against the Dutch, and the expectation was that governors would complete their term far wealthier than they began it. That wealth was to be gained chiefly by participation in the slave trade.

As outsiders, governors were resented by the permanent resi­dents of Angola. Many of these, who held such positions as fortress captains or city council members, or who were owners of large tracts of land, made their domains into bastions of independence from gubernatorial authority. In some instances they took more hostile action; in 1666, for example, Luanda’s colonists revolted at the arrival of a new governor from Brazil. They wished to manipu­late the system in their own way, without interference.

Any central administrative authority in the colony also had to deal with the fact that those Portuguese who immigrated to An­gola were frequently people who had had problems in Portugal. Angola attracted deserters, *degredados,* peasants, and others who had been unable to succeed in Portugal or elsewhere in the Por­tuguese-speaking world. The colony was a dumping ground of Portuguese society, a fact of some interest in light of the later Portuguese claim to have been a civilizing influence on Africans. As the historian Gerald J. Bender notes, “Portugal was... the first and last European nation to use *degredados* in the colonization process.”

The Portuguese attitude toward the African was little different from that of colonists from other European countries, but the form in which that prejudice was expressed was shaped by Angola’s particular circumstances. The arriving Portuguese undesirables were placed in competition with Africans for such jobs as police­man, trader, or skilled worker. As poor whites became successful, they exhibited their success through an ostentatious display of wealth. Having been deprived in Portugal, they now emphasized how much superior they were to those they considered their social inferiors, especially to the Africans.

The foundation of the whole Angolan system was the slave trade. Because the Portuguese had determined that Brazil would yield them greater profits and would therefore be a better candi­date for development, Brazil was to be built with slaves from Angola. The reduction of the African population in Angola would not be missed because there would be no serious effort to develop that colony.

With the Congo, Angola became the largest area of slave supply in Africa, and Luanda became the greatest slave port. From the late sixteenth century until 1836, when Portugal abolished trafficking in slaves, Angola may have been the source of as many as 2 million slaves who reached the New World. More than half of these went to Brazil, nearly a third to the Caribbean, and ten to fifteen percent to the River Plate area south of Brazil. Considering the number of slaves that actually arrived, and taking into account those who died in route, or who died or were killed while being transported from the interior to the coast for shipment, the area may have lost as many as up to 4 million people as a result of the slave trade.

Slaves were Angola’s chief article of commerce. The only other product of some importance before about 1830 was wax. Slaves might be obtained from African chiefs or agents representing the chiefs, who would bring them to Portuguese fortresses in the inte­rior for barter, but often Portuguese merchants would send Afri­can traders into the interior to barter for them directly with the chiefs. Because chiefs acquired many of their slaves through war­fare, it was not unusual for traders to stir up wars so that captives might be taken and then to buy those captives. Additionally Por­tuguese landlords could pay their taxes in slaves.

Slaves were kept by Europeans in Angola. There were require­ments for slaves as porters and soldiers, as agricultural laborers, or as workers at jobs that Portuguese increasingly considered to be beneath them. At no time, however, was domestic slavery more important to the local economy than exporting slaves. The effects of the trade on Angola were enduring and destructive. Not only was the area severely depopulated, but those who died or were taken away were healthy men and women in their prime.

The Struggle for Commercial Domination, 1683-1790

Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese ceased giving priority to penetrating the interior and turned in­stead toward the conquest of what was called the north coast of Angola: that portion of the coast running north from Luanda to a point beyond Cabinda. This was in part in response to the pressure the English, French, and Dutch were exerting there through their presence and competition for African trade. One of the things that prompted Africans to engage in the slave trade was the African desire for European goods. By the end of the seventeenth century Portuguese goods could no longer compete in quality with those of the other major European trading nations, giving them an ad­vantage over Portugal in their dealings with Africans.

While the Portuguese had been engaged in wars against the Mbundu, most of their slaves had come from Mbundu territories; in the meantime other European powers brought the sources of slave supply that lay farther north under their control. This trend was accentuated in the eighteenth century when the English and French became the most important traders around Loango, on the northern coast.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Luanda had been the major slave port of the Portuguese, but toward the end of the seventeenth century, they turned their attention to Benguela.

Although the first efforts at inland expansion from Benguela were abortive, the Portuguese eventually managed to move into Ovim­bundu territories much as they had moved into Mbundu lands farther north. By the end of the eighteenth century Benguela rivaled Luanda as a slave port.

/ From the 1680s through the first third of the eighteenth century S'the Portuguese concentrated more on trade than on military ac- j^tivity in Angola. Nevertheless under the pressure of foreign com- petition their portion of the slave and other trade dropped off during these years. Moreover the Portuguese were unused to deal­ing with Africans on other than their own terms. Some Portuguese traders who chafed under the conditions imposed by the king of Kasanje, therefore, adulterated the goods they offered, resulting in the king’s banning the import of such goods. Furthermore the colony continued to be involved in the intense struggle between officials and traders for control of the same slave supply. Only in 1721 was this problem alleviated by dramatically increasing offi­cials’ salaries—some as much as fivefold—permitting them to withdraw from the slave trade.

To lessen the effects of foreign competition and win back the trade that the colony needed in its primary role as supplier of slaves to Brazil, the Portuguese from 1723 on made plans that would permit them to control African trade at its source. During an ineffective campaign against the Matamba in 1774 a Por­tuguese army achieved the deepest penetration into Angola up to that date. In 1759 they set up a fort and presidio at Nkoje (Encoje), which sat astride a major trade route from the interior to the Kongo coast. It remained their northernmost station until the middle of the nineteenth century. Although temporarily success­ful, within a few years trade again moved northward beyond Por­tuguese control.

The 1760s saw the greatest rise in the power of the Lunda Empire, located far in the interior. Between them and the Por­tuguese near the coast lay Matamba and Kasanje, the states near the Cuango River that had for so long opposed the Portuguese. The Portuguese saw an opportunity to deal directly with the Lunda for slaves rather than continuing to go through the middle­men of Matamba and Kasanje. It was hoped that a by-product of Portuguese-Lunda cooperation would be the destruction of these two Mbundu states.

The Lunda apparently had similar ideas and, in the 1760s, at­tacked Kasanje and Matamba, who appealed to the Portuguese for help but were turned down. The Lunda proved no more success­ful than the Portuguese had been at destroying the two states. Perhaps as a result of their failure, the Lunda opened new trade routes farther north, diminishing the volume of slave trade han­dled by the Portuguese still further.

In 1764 Francisco Sousa Coutinho became governor of Angola. The Marques de Pombal, then virtual dictator of Portugal, had

instituted vigorous reforms in the metropole, and Sousa Coutinho ensured that they reverberated in Angola. Determined and a man of great energy, he recognized that the expediency that had cha­racterized Portugal’s approach to Angolan affairs in the past hardly constituted a colonial policy. Moreover voices speaking out against the slave trade were already being heard: however long that trade might continue it was obvious that it would not go on indefinitely. One of Sousa Coutinho’s major efforts, therefore, was to diversify the Angolan economy. His attempts along these lines, which included the importation of Indian goods, the establish­ment of an iron foundry, a salt monopoly, and a number of agricul­tural schemes, were unsuccessful, however.

To block northward expansion of Dutch colonists near the Cape of Good Hope and to achieve a transcontinental linkup with Por­tuguese colonists in Mozambique, Sousa Coutinho sponsored the establishment of European colonies on the Benguela plateau, a step toward continued inland penetration. He also persuaded Lis­bon to administer the slave trade directly rather than dealing through middlemen. But although his ideas were legion and his actions vigorous, at the end of his governorship in 1772 the Ango­lan economy was no more diverse than it had been before; its ability to extract labor and taxes from Africans was only marginally better; the decline of the slave trade through Luanda was still unarrested; and the Portuguese were no closer to controlling that trade at its source in the interior.

Angola remained faced with continuing challenges from other European powers. Regarding itself as sovereign on the coast, Por­tugal defined the trading of these powers as acts of piracy and the goods they traded as contraband. Unable to control trade at its source, the Portuguese determined to control the coast. In 1783 they sent an expedition against Cabinda, a major slave trading port and the home of the Loango state, probably formed even earlier than the Kongo kingdom. All in all the expedition was a fiasco. The Portuguese succeeded in building a fort at Cabinda, but they soon discovered that the terms of trade imposed by the Loango king were far different from their own terms. If the Por­tuguese would not meet the terms the king would simply suspend trade. He frequently demanded such commodities as rum, gun­powder, or tobacco—items that the Portuguese had not been ac­customed to using in trade and did not always have on hand. Further, the Portuguese garrison was weakened by disease, and it soon became apparent that control of Cabinda Bay did not mean control of trade. It could be moved elsewhere. In 1784 the French forcibly expelled the garrison.

Thus by the end of the eighteenth century the Portuguese had been unable to control either the interior or the coast of Angola and were in no sense able to dominate the slave trade. As a result their own trade was in decline. Traders ruthlessly fought over the limited supply of slaves, driving prices up. The homes and proper­ties of the Europeans in Luanda, once marked by ostentatious display, were neglected and in decay. The missionary effort, which had been one of the justifications for Portuguese colonization, was also in disarray. There were but sixteen churches in the colony, and attendance at these was sporadic. The African members of the clergy were poorly educated, and missionary work was little more than a formality. Only a tiny proportion of the African population had been converted to Christianity, in part because many Chris­tian practices were either distasteful or placed unwanted restric­tions on the Africans, in part because the touted advantages of European civilization were not readily apparent in the actions of the traders, military men, or other Europeans (many of them *degredados)* the Africans encountered.

Attempts at Reform, Expansion, and

Exploration, 1790-1885

The first third of the nineteenth century proved to be a period of transition for Angola. Until 1836 the colony remained basically a commercial and military enterprise, but it was nevertheless affected by political developments in Portugal itself—the Napole­onic invasion of 1807-11 and the twenty-five years of internal political disruption beginning in 1820—as well as by the indepen­dence of Brazil in 1822 and the growing sentiment for the aboli­tion of the slave trade.

As a result of the Napoleonic wars the Portuguese court left Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro, where it remained until 1821. The council of regency that remained in Portugal not only faced the financial and economic consequences of the invasion but also had to try to administer the country while the king lived abroad and while the army was headed by a foreigner. Portugal’s economic difficulties, and the council’s inability to deal with them, provided an atmosphere in which opposition to absolutism could spread. By 1820 support for constitutionalism and limits to monarchical power had spread rapidly through the army. Late that year the regency was overthrown. A conflict between the monarchists and constitutionalists began that did not end until 1834.

The struggle in Portugal affected Africa. One was the simple confusion accompanying changes in forms of government. The Ministry for Marine and Overseas was abolished and reinstituted several successive times between 1821 and 1835; its authority did not remain the same through each change. The uprisings that had helped topple the regency in Portugal were echoed in Angola by uprisings and an army mutiny that overthrew the colony’s gover­nor. Not until the Baron of Santa Comba became governor were Angola’s dissident elements reconciled, however temporarily; but the governor was even more powerless than his predecessors to introduce real change and reform in the colony. With the constitu­tionalist triumph in Portugal in 1834 a provisional junta took charge in Luanda, but disorder prevailed until the arrival of a new governor, Bernardo Vidal.

The metropolitan Portuguese preferred to think of Angola as an integral part of Portugal. They declared the free population of the colony to be citizens of Portugal, with all the rights that implied. It was also assumed that laws and policies that served the mother country would serve its overseas possessions as well, a view that prevented the development of a consistent colonial policy. Much of the liberal legislation handed down to the colony during the 1830s had little discernible effect. Specifically the status of Afri­cans was little changed.

Much of the reform legislation established during the late 1830s was associated with Portugal’s prime minister, the Marques de Sa da Bandeira. The major thrusts of his program were colonization and capital investment. He hoped that honest citizens would be­come colonists, to compensate for the criminal element that had been so heavily represented in the past. He also wanted Angolan ports opened to all foreign shipping.

Bandeira’s most important decision, however, was the abolition in 1836 of the slave trade in Portuguese territories. Although in decline for some time, the trade still had strong support, and its supporters could resort to violence. The trade was not actually suppressed .until the middle of the century and required more force than Portugal alone could muster. Although a later gover­nor, Pedro Alexandre da Cunha, worked effectively to stop it,1 a major share of the credit belongs to the British government and the Royal Navy. The 1836 decree lacked teeth until the Anglo- Portuguese Treaty of July 1842 decreed that slave trading in Por­tuguese ships was an act of piracy that could be dealt with as such by the British navy.

The years that saw the first gradual moves toward the abolition of the slave trade coincided with the years of increased Por­tuguese expansion. The period of expansion began in 1838 with the conquest and establishment of a presidio at Duque de Bra- ganQa, in an area that lay nearly due east of Luanda. By mid­century the Portuguese had extended their formal control still farther east to the Kasanje market near the Cuango River. In the south, the town of Mo^amedes was founded on the coast south of Benguela in 1840. Both Luanda and Benguela served as bases for further expansion. The Portuguese also attempted to gain control of the coast from Luanda north to Cabinda through military occu­pation of the major ports, something they were unable to do en­tirely, mostly because of British opposition. This in large measure accounts for their inability to gain control of the mouth of the Congo River. Portuguese attempts to dominate African trade routes by controlling the immediate hinterland of important ports served primarily to arouse the hostility and opposition of the Afri­cans in those areas.

Furthermore the cost of military operations to secure economi­cally strategic points led, in 1856, to the imposition on Africans of a substantially increased hut tax, payable for the first time in cur­rency or trade goods rather than slaves. This prompted many Africans either to refuse outright to pay it or to move out of areas controlled by the Portuguese, continuing, especially in northern Angola, the trend toward depopulation that had begun with the slave trade.

The Portuguese expansion from the late 1830s to the early 1860s had exhausted the already depleted resources of the colony. The Portuguese had expanded at the cost of severe depopulation of their territories, financial and human losses from the constant wars with Africans that their policies required, and tremendous losses from disease. By 1861 they lacked the resources for continued military expansion or economic development, and most of the interior remained in the control of African traders and warriors.

It was during this period of expansion, in 1858, that slavery was legally abolished in Angola. Government slaves had already been freed in 1854, but the 1858 proclamation declared that all slavery should cease within twenty years. Legislation was passed to com­pensate owners and to care for the freedmen. Many of the colo­nists found ways to circumvent the decree. The actual conditions of labor in the following half century did not change significantly.

The situation was such that after 1861 the Portuguese were forced to concentrate on the coast at the expense of their interior garrisons. From then until the late 1870s the colonization, agricul­ture, and economic development of the colony improved margin­ally. Portuguese military strength declined primarily because Lis­bon could not afford to send more troops. Nevertheless, the Portuguese persisted in their attempts to occupy the whole Kongo coast. This and other actions continued to keep the Africans of the interior hostile to them.

During the period between 1860 and 1880 knowledge of the central African interior was coming to Europeans as a result of the explorations of such men as the Scottish missionary David Living­stone. He spent over a year in Angola and was followed by V.L. Cameron, a Britisher who arrived in Benguela in 1875. The ex­plorations and publicity Angola received from these men and from such others as Henry Morton Stanley, commissioned by a New York newspaper to go to Africa to locate Livingstone, por­trayed Portugal to the world as a poor colonizer and a second-rate power.

During the years from the late 1870s through the early 1890s there was renewed enthusiasm for expansion into the interior. Part of the impetus from this came from the Lisbon Geographical Society founded in 1875 by a group of industrialists, scholars, colo­nial officials, and a scattering of military men. Like other such societies in France, Belgium, and Germany, the society stimulated a popular concern for the colonies, which Portugal had not previ­ously known. Reacting to both the society and the increasing inter­est in colonial adventure that was gaining in Europe, the Por­tuguese government allotted large sums for public works in Africa and encouraged a minor revival in missionary endeavor.

An advisory commission to the Ministry of the Navy and Colo­nies was formed by some of the members of the Lisbon Geographi­cal Society. This commission recommended and formed a Por­tuguese expedition to link the two coasts as well as to explore the Congo basin. Three military men were appointed for the mission —Hermenegildo de Brito Capelo, Roberto Ivens, and Alexandre de Serpa Pinto—but when they arrived in Luanda in 1877, they found that Stanley had already explored much of the Congo basin in his search for Livingstone and so they proceeded into the Ango­lan interior.

The Portuguese split up into two different expeditions once they got into the colony. The results of their explorations and those of others who followed achieved nothing significant other than the transmission of knowledge back to Portugal. This in part was be­cause of the lukewarm attitude of the colonial administration and in part because of the lack of control of the hinterland.

One of the purposes of this and subsequent Portuguese explora­tions was related to the Portuguese dream of controlling a solid strip of territory from the Angolan coast across the continent to a linkup with the colony in Mozambique. The expeditions had been intended to establish at least a nominal sovereignty over portions of Central Africa for the Portuguese.

Aware of French and Belgian activities on the lower Congo River, Portugal occupied the towns of Cabinda and Massabi north of the river in 1883, where Portugal had long claimed possession. In the same year it annexed the region of the old Kongo kingdom. Seeking to uphold these claims against French and Belgian ad­vances in the Congo basin, Portugal negotiated a treaty with Great Britain in 1884, but domestic opposition in each country and, ultimately, rejection of the treaty by other powers killed its effec­tiveness. Portugal’s subsequent demands for an international con­ference on the Congo fell on deaf ears until German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck seized on the idea for his own purposes.

At the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the limits of Portugal’s claim to Angola were established in principle, and in later years its boundaries were delineated by subsequent treaties with the colonial powers that controlled the neighboring territories. But because other European powers of the nineteenth century had explored central Africa, it was they, not Portugal, who determined Angola’s boundaries.

Portugal’s dream of transcontinental empire ran afoul of the plans of Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company for a Cape to Cairo railroad, to be built from the Cape Colony to Egypt all on British territory. The Portuguese delegates to the Berlin Conference had been forced to back down on sev­eral points by greater powers. What they did get—the left

bank of the Congo and the Cabinda Enclave—were areas the great powers permitted them to have rather than possessions they won on their own. In 1890 the British gave the Por­tuguese an ultimatum and forced them to withdraw from Nyasaland and Rhodesia.

Several agreements were made by Portugal and Belgium be­tween 1891 and 1927 establishing a complex border generally following natural frontiers. Cabinda’s boundaries with the French and Belgian Congos were delimited in 1886 and 1894. By the end of the nineteenth century Portugal had staked out most of its claims in Angola. As far as Europe was concerned, Angola was in the Portuguese sphere of interest and not subject to further ques­tion. Portugal had done well to hold on to as much territory as it had, but the fact that Angola was recognized as being in the Portuguese sphere of interest by no means meant that it was under Portuguese control. The work of conquest took the better part of twenty-five years and, in some remote areas, longer.

Conquest and Settlement, 1885-1915

As the spheres of interest in the interior of Africa became set­tled, European nations turned to fulfilling the obligation of effec­tive occupation of territories claimed, imposed by the Berlin Con­ference. For Portugal this involved not only the conquest of the independent African kingdoms of the interior but also the attempt to settle Portuguese farmers. The conquest was easier than the settlement.

In the late nineteenth century the bulk of the Portuguese popu­lation of Angola (under 10,000 in 1900 and far fewer in the nine­teenth century) was confined to the coastal cities of Luanda and Benguela. Most were military men or administrators. Besides farming and fishing, European occupations extended only to mer­chants in the towns and traders in the bush who often were un­scrupulous profiteers. In the south, colonies of farmers who had been brought in earlier in the century had dwindled into small outposts as many returned to Luanda.

Despite sporadic attempts to encourage colonization, immigra­tion from Portugal was negligible: ambitious Portuguese emi­grants preferred the opportunities offered in Brazil. The few women who went to Angola seldom stayed. Immigration late in the century was discouraged by the same things that had dis­couraged it earlier: a difficult climate and the lack of economic development.

The key problem of the economy had always been the shortage of labor. Among other things, slavery had been a way to prevent the workers from leaving their place of employment. Thus whites considered it necessary to find ways of circumventing the aboli­tion of slavery. For example, although the 1858 decree permitted slavery only until 1878, legislation in 1875 defined all Africans engaged in “non-productive labor”—a category that ordinarily

A second persistent problem was the lack of capital. Portuguese inhabitants of Angola were for the most part traders or merchants. Their aims were to own their own small shops or businesses. They were in no position to accumulate a great deal of capital, nor were they disposed to invest it in developmental projects.

covered Africans who did not work for wages—as vagrants. Va­grants could be made to work without pay. Local administrators were usually empowered to adjudicate what labor was productive. There was, therefore, little difficulty in obtaining as many “va­grants” as the settlers needed to work for them. Legislation in 1878 that abolished forced labor was ignored, and the Portuguese developed an ideology that made it a moral obligation for Africans to work for them. An 1899 decree stated that blacks had a duty to work for whites and that only by doing so could they better their social conditions and raise themselves to a level higher than mere brutes.

Late in the century, however, the position of agriculture was improved, especially along the coast. Much of what was grown were crops that had been introduced from the Americas. Coffee became a major cash crop. The rubber industry began in the 1880s and boomed until the first decade of the twentieth century. (This industry, incidentally, greatly increased the demand for labor. Women and children, used as tappers and even transporters of latex, had little protection from exploitation.)

Just as Africans had maintained control of trade until it reached the coast during the eighteenth century, in the nineteenth cen­tury they controlled trade in the plateaus of the interior despite Portuguese expansion. The Ovimbundu proved highly successful middlemen on the southern trade route that ran from the Bie on. The Ovimbundu were more competitive than the *sertanejos* —frontiersmen, as Europeans and their representatives in the rural areas were called—and the latter often had to pay tribute and fines to African chiefs through whose territory they traveled. By the mid-1880s the Ovimbundu had by and large replaced them. The Chokwe and Imbangala also took advantage of their positions in the interior to extend their control over the region’s trade. To these Africans, Portuguese encroachments and the im­position of European rule not only limited their political freedom military was preoccupied with the subjugation of the African in­habitants of the hinterland. This period of warfare was intense, but it secured the colony for Portugal by 1915. Portugal’s ability to control the colony in the early twentieth century may be ac­counted for in part by the use of antimalarial medicines and mod­

plateau to Benguela. They won the share of trade that the Euro­peans and their mulatto and African representatives had carried

but diminished their prosperity as well.

For thirty years after the Berlin Conference the Portuguese

ern automatic weaponry.

Intensive military action was necessary in three major areas

before resistance was broken. The first campaign took place in the southern region in response to a request for protection against the Kuanyama Ambo people by the Boer settlement around Humbe. Sporadic campaigning included several serious reverses for the Portuguese. Only with the assistance of field artillery and the establishment of a series of fortified garrisons were the Kuanyama Ambo brought completely under control. On the Bie plateau, dislocations resulting from rubber trade and the introduction of rum to the Ovimbundu brought on an uprising in 1901-02. Por­tuguese troops suppressed this revolt.

The Dembos, a kiMbundu-speaking people who lived less than 150 kilometers northeast of Luanda, were attacked by Portuguese columns for three years before they were finally put down in 1910. Because of the tropical climate, the Dembos campaign proved to be one of the most difficult. Not completed until 1917, it was the last major operation of the Portuguese occupation. Traditional allies of the Dembos were the Kongo people to the north who, forty years later, were to be particularly restive under Portuguese authority.

Administration and Development, 1907-26

Portuguese colonial policies with respect to civil administration were first formulated in Mozambique, where in the 1890s Antonio Enes, former minister of colonies, advocated close control and full use of African labor, administrative reorganization, and coloniza­tion schemes. In 1899 Paiva Couceiro, who was with Enes in Mozambique, published a slim volume in which he advocated white colonization, decentralization of administration from Lis­bon, and the necessity of inculcating in the Africans the habit of work.

As governor general of Angola between 1907 and 1910, Couceiro prepared the basis of civil administration in the colony. Responsible military officers were to oversee administrative divi­sions, and through them European civilization was to be brought to the Africans. Many of Couceiro’s reforms were continued by his successor, Jose Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, whose own ideas were incorporated in legislation of 1914 that brought, at least in theory, financial and administrative autonomy to the colony.

Progress in the development of an infrastructure during the first quarter of the twentieth century was considerable. The key to the development of the colony was the Benguela railroad, linking the minefields of the Congo’s Katanga Province to Lobito, which would become Angola’s largest employer. New towns sprang up in the interior, and road construction advanced.

In the 1920s diamond mining was initiated by the Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola—DIA- MANG), exclusive concessionaire in Angola until the 1960s. As the employer of more Africans then any other industry, the extent of DIAMANG’s investment and social services deeply affected the lives of its 18,000 African workers.

The Portuguese, however, were generally unable to provide Angola with adequate development capital or with settlers. Trade had fallen off sharply as a result of the end of the rubber boom just before World War I, and the war itself produced only a transitory revival of foreign trade. At the end of what is commonly referred to as the republican era (1910-26) the finances of the colony were in serious difficulty.

The Era of the New State, 1926-74

The military coup of May 1926, ending the republican era, brought about the installation of a one-party regime in Portugal and the establishment of what came to be known as the New State (Estado Novo). A prominent young professor of economics, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, became minister of finance in 1928, minister of colonies for a time in 1930, and prime minister in 1932. He remained prime minister until incapacitated by a stroke in 1968 (he died in 1970) and left the stamp of the New State on Angola.

The most important changes introduced into Angola by the new regime were embodied in the Colonial Act of 1930. Its major effect was to bring the economy of Angola into line with the economic belt tightening the new regime was implementing at home. The drift toward autonomy in Angola was brought to a halt by Portu­gal’s application of strict financial controls over the colonial econ­omy.

The Colonial Act was drafted in large part by Salazar while he was minister of colonies. After its incorporation in the Portuguese Constitution of 1933, legislation for the colonies—now designated overseas provinces—was made compatible with the new political system of Portugal.

Portugal’s policies toward Angola in the 1930s and 1940s were based on the principle of national integration. Economically, so­cially, and politically, Angola was to become an integral part of the Portuguese nation. African towns were renamed, usually after Portuguese heroes. Still later, in the early 1950s, the currency known as the angolar was withdrawn and replaced by the Por­tuguese escudo.

Economic integration of the Angolan economy into that of Por­tugal was brought about by erecting protective trade tariffs and discouraging foreign investment capital except in regard to the construction of the Benguela railroad and the exploitation of dia­monds. Portugal’s goal was to make the province self-supporting and at the same time to turn Angola into a market for Portuguese goods. But despite a certain level of success, Angola recognized no real prosperity until the years after World War II, when it profited from a coffee boom. This prosperity encouraged white immigra­tion and the purchase of land by Europeans.

Until 1940 Portuguese had constituted less than 1 percent of Angola’s population, and it was only in 1950 that their proportion approached 2 percent. This incursion of Europeans and the con­tinuation of forced labor (not abolished until 1961) and other labor abuses led to an intensification of racial conflict that in 1961 broke into open rebellion. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the virtual absence of Portuguese women in the colony (the ratio in 1846 was 1,073 white males to 100 white females) had led to the development of a *mestizo* (mixed Euro-African) group of some size. Before 1900 that group had been engaged in a variety of commercial and governmental roles, but as the white population came to outnumber them the status of *mestizos* declined. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, laws and regulations requiring certain kinds and levels of education not available in Angola for certain government positions had the effect of exclud­ing *mestizos* from access to them. In 1921 the civil service was divided into European and African branches, and *mestizos* and the very few African *assimilados* (see Glossary) were assigned to the latter, effectively limiting their chances of rising in the bureau­cratic hierarchy. In 1929 statutes limited the bureaucratic level to which *mestiQos* and African *assimilados* could rise to that of first clerk, established different scales for the salaries of Europeans and non-Europeans, in both public and private sectors, and restricted competition between them for jobs in the bureaucracy. Differ­ences in salary scales prevailed until the beginning of the conflict between the Portuguese and African nationalists in 1961. Given this legal framework, the immigration of increasing numbers of Portuguese led to considerable disaffection among the *mestizos* who had hitherto tended to identify with the whites rather than with the Africans.

Beginning in the 1940s the system of forced labor came under renewed criticism. One particularly important critic, Captain Henrique Galvao, had served for more than two decades in an official capacity in Angola. Not only did he catalogue lists of horrors that were the direct results of the system, but he warned Lisbon that catastrophe would be the result of their policies. The Por­tuguese administration responded by arresting the man for trea­son and banning his report. Despite the introduction of some labor reforms from the late 1940s through the late 1950s, forced labor continued along much the same lines.

Forced labor was justified in 1899 by the declaration that labor was the method by which the African could elevate himself. The concept of transformation from uncivilized savage to someone sufficiently uplifted to partake of the benefits of European civiliza­tion was expressed in the body of legislation passed between 1926 and 1933 that established the New State’s policy toward Africans. No longer was it assumed that Africans would somehow naturally be assimilated by Europeans—there were definite standards Afri­cans had to meet to qualify for rights.

First, Africans were legally defined as a separate element in the population, referred to as *indigenes,* A select number could be­come assimilated; they would then be called *assimilados.* Africans became *assimilados* by learning to speak Portuguese, showing themselves to be economically responsible—which meant that they had abandoned their traditional way of life and earned in­come from an occupation in commerce or industry—and behav­ing as a Portuguese citizen. In accepting the rights of citizenship, *assimilados* took on the same tax obligations as the European citizens. “Noncivilized” males were required to pay a head tax. If they could not raise the money they were obligated to work for the government for half of each year.

In practice, the requirements for assimilation were stringently applied. In 1950, of an estimated African population of 4 million in Angola, there were fewer than 31,000 *assimilados* (0.7 percent of the total, a proportion that had not changed since 1940). More­over the number had not shown any great increase by 1960. It appeared that far from elevating the status of Africans the policy of assimilation had the effect of maintaining them in a degraded status. *Indigenes* were required to carry identification cards, of major importance psychologically to the Africans and politically to the Portuguese who were thus more easily able to control the African population.

An ever-present factor in the province was the Portuguese use of African informants to ferret out signs of political dissidence. Such things as censorship, border control, police action, and con­trol of education all helped retard the development of African leadership. Sometimes Africans who were educated in Portugal were even prevented from returning home. Offenses of a political nature brought severe penalties, and African organizations were viewed with extreme disfavor.

The Rise of African Nationalism

In the 1940s and 1950s Africans’ acceptance of Portuguese colo­nization began to change, particularly in the districts bordering the Belgian Congo and in Luanda, where far-reaching changes in world politics influenced a small number of Africans. The associa­tions they formed and the aspirations they shared paved the way for the liberation movements of the 1960s (see Background to Conflict, ch. 3).

Portugal’s assimilationist policy had produced a small group of educated Africans who considered themselves Portuguese. Find­ing themselves not fully respected as such, and increasingly aware of their alienation from their traditional origins, some began to articulate resentment both of their own ambiguous social and cultural situations and of the plight of the nonassimilated majority of Africans. They acquired Portuguese, which enabled them to communicate with a much wider group of people. By virtue of

their knowledge of the language and of European ways, these Africans became independent of traditional chiefs. This was a decisive transition. From among their ranks emerged most of the first generation, of liberation movement leaders.

The rise of African nationalism in Angola was not readily appar­ent to outsiders or to some of the Portuguese in Angola. On the surface things remained calm, at least during the 1950s. Journalists and scholars were not permitted to investigate the situation rigor­ously and openly, and it was therefore reported as a commonly accepted view that nationalism in Portuguese Africa did not exist.

The influx of rural Africans to towns also bred anticolonial re­sentment. In the 1950s the population of Luanda almost doubled, and most of the growth was among Africans. Lured by the expec­tation of work, Africans in towns learned some Portuguese and became aware of the inequality of opportunities between Euro­peans and Africans. The compulsory labor system, regarded as the most onerous aspect of Portuguese rule until its abolition in 1962, served more than any other factor to unite many Africans in re­sentment of Portuguese rule.

Contributing to the spread of anticolonial resentment were white settlement policies, especially after 1945, that resulted in increased competition for employment and growing racial fric­tion. Between 1955 and 1960, for example, the government brought from Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands over 55,000 whites and settled them on large tracts of land, creating *colonatos* (agricultural communities). Many of those on the *colonatos,* un­skilled at farming, often lacking even an elementary education, or otherwise disabled (by age, for example) were unsuccessful *colo- nos* and, after a time, moved to towns where they com­peted with Africans for—and often won from them—skilled and unskilled jobs. The Portuguese who held jobs of lower social status often found it all the more necessary to emphasize their social superiority over the Africans.

External events also played a role in the development of move­ments for independence. European powers were granting inde­pendence to their African colonies, and gradually the delegates of new African states were becoming articulate in the United Na­tions (UN). This group in turn began to bring pressures on Euro­pean powers still in Africa and contributed to the growth of the desire for independence in the remaining colonies.

The most influential external pressure for change came from the Belgian Congo, where contacts with other colonized Africans had been frequent and enduring. The northwestern region of Angola, the heart of the old Kongo kingdom, was not formally annexed by Portugal until the 1880s and was not militarily controlled before 1920. The frontiers of the French and Belgian Congos, which crosscut the land of the Kongo people, did not greatly disrupt their sense of unity or sense of history, which recalled their greatness in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and their standing of equality with the Europeans.

With the growth of Leopoldville (later Kinshasa) as a major commercial center, migration of Africans from the northern dis­tricts of Angola to the Belgian Congo in search of work increased. African religious movements, some with political overtones or political implications, which periodically swept the lower Congo were known in Angola, and after the Belgian suppression of one such movement around 1950, many Angolans were expelled from the Congo. Later, aspects of one of the Congolese African political parties—the Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des BaKongo— ABAKO)—revealed an antiwhite orientation that affected the An­golan liberation movement.

African Associations

There were two basic patterns in the rise of nationalism in Angola. In one case African *assimilados* and other Africans with some education, chiefly urban dwellers, joined *mestizos* and whites, also urban, in associations based on the assumption—expli­cit or implicit—that their interests were different from, and per­haps in competition with, those of the great bulk of the African populatiojrStill attached to their rural communities even if tempo­rary migrant workers elsewhere. Angolans also formed organiza­tions based on ethnic or religious groupings that encompassed or at least sought to include rural Africans, although the leaders were often persons with some education and urban experience. This combination of claps and ethnic interests yielded two major streams of nationalism: one comprised people from the Luanda area and the neighboring Mbundu; the second consisted of ethnic associations based on the Kongo on the one hand and the Ovim- bundu and Chokwe on the other and oriented mainly to the rural areas (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2).

The beginnings of African associations, from which the libera­tion movement traced its roots, are still obscure. Luanda was known to have recreational societies, burial clubs, and other mu­tual aid associations in the early 1900s. As early as 1923 the African League organized the second session of the Third Pan African Congress in Lisbon. Sponsored and financed by the Portuguese government, the African League was a federation of all African associations from Portuguese Africa. Its avowed purpose was to point out to the government injustices or harsh laws that ought to be repealed.

The personalities, activities, and goals of many of the early groups remain obscure. In 1929 the National African League (Liga National Africana—LNA), as well as a largely *mestizo* body called Gremio African© (African Guild or Union), which later became the Regional Association of Natives of Angola (Associacao Africana Regional dos Naturais de Angola-ANANGOLA), were formed in Luanda. An association of railroad workers in Nova Lisboa, the African Association of Southern Angola (Associacao Africana dos Sul de Angola—AASA), developed a militant program, but govern­ment surveillance soon curtailed its effectiveness.

Most associations were dominated by *assimilados (mestizo* and African), and their membership seldom included unlettered Afri­cans. That all were closely controlled by the authorities effectively prevented the growth of substantial expressions of discontent. The LNA was supposed to confine its activities to the nonpolitical realm but was used as a spokesman for the government’s African policy. In 1957, however, it refused a request by the government to testify before the UN on behalf of the Portuguese position in Africa, and its leader was replaced. .

Another African association that appeared about 1950 was the Movement of Young Intellectuals of Angola, reportedly founded in late 1940 by Viriato da Cruz, who later became a leader in the liberation movement. This group proclaimed the importance of Angolan as opposed to Portuguese culture in a literary review. Only three issues of this review appeared before further publica­tion was prohibited by the authorities.

Extralegal, politically oriented African associations began to appear in the 1950s. Far-reaching economic and social changes, the growth of the white settler population, increased urbaniza­tion of Africans, and the beginnings of nationalist movements in other parts of Africa, contributed to the growth of an­ticolonial feeling. In 1952 500 Angolan Africans appealed to the UN in a petition protesting what they called the injustices of Portuguese policy and requesting that steps be taken to end Portuguese rule.

The earliest anticolonialist political group in Angola, founded about 1953, was probably the Party of the United Struggle of Africans of Angola (Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola —PLUA). At Luanda in December 1956 the PLUA combined with other organizations to form the Popular Movement for the Libera­tion of Angola (Movimento Popular de LibertaQao de Angola— MPLA). The MPLA stated that its aim was to achieve indepen­dence for Angola by means of a united front of all African inter­ests. After many of its leaders were arrested in March 1959, the party decided to operate in exile and moved its headquarters to Conakry in Guinea early in 1960/The MPLA’s first leader, Mario de Andrade, an educated *mestizo* and a poet, gave the party a reputation for representing primarily the interests of urban intel­lectuals rather than the indigenous masses.

In 1954 a group calling itself the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (Uniao das PopulaQoes do Norte de Angola— UPNA) was formed. Founded to advance the interests of the Kongo, but not independence of all Angola, the UPNA petitioned the UN in 1957 for restoration of the formerly independent Kongo kingdom, a perspective shared by the ABAKO in the Belgian Congo. Because of important ties with the Kongo in the Belgian colony and because of the difficulties of operating in Angola, the UPNA was based in Leopoldville. In the following year the group dropped its particularistic orientations and adopted the title Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das PopulaQoes de Angola— UP A) and the aim of independence for all of Angola.

Rend Pelissier, a historian of Angola, has noted that the African organizations active before 1961 were all characterized by weak­ness of organization, resources, membership, and leadership. He has suggested a number of reasons for these weaknesses. The people were not prepared for either a political or a military strug­gle during the 1950s, however attractive they may have found nationalist ideals. They were divided socially as well as ethnically: there was a gulf between the *mestizos* and the *assimilados* on the one hand and the *indigenes* on the other that frequently resulted in their pursuing different goals. A substantial proportion of the white community also wanted to see Angola break away from Portuguese domination but only for their advantage: they would perpetuate the colonial regime in every aspect except its overlord­ship by Lisbon. A critical source of weakness was the lack of black leaders. The newly developing elite was not yet large enough to run a nationalist movement, while the traditional leaders were not prepared to lead such a movement: their focus was still on the ethnic group. The rural population really could not be stirred without such a leader. Churchmen, who might have been capable leaders, did not enter the nationalist struggle unless disaffected or until they became targets of police repression.

Finally a small minority of whites who had Marxist leanings were active in some political groups, including those formed by the *assimilados,* some of whom were in close contact with Por­tuguese liberals or Marxists. Other than this elite, there were very few Africans in Angola who were able to set aside ethnic consider­ations.

The Beginning of Revolution, 1961

The year 1961 was by any standard a watershed in Angolan history. Events of that year jolted the Portuguese out of their complacency and demonstrated to Africans their potential power.

After 1959 anticolonialist sentiment intensified and met with stiffening opposition from the Portuguese, characterized by in­creasing surveillance and frequent arrests. In December 1959 the Portuguese secret political police, the International Police for the Defense of the State (Policia International e de Defesa do Estado —PIDE) arrested fifty-seven persons in Luanda who were sus­pected of being involved in antigovernmental political activities. Among those arrested were a few Europeans, *assimilados,* and other Africans. After this incident, the Portuguese began to rein­force their military position, particularly in the northwestern dis­tricts.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, events in the Bel­

gian Congo and its gaining of independence served to inspire liberation movement leaders as well as to heighten the tension between them and the Portuguese authorities. Increasingly, Afri­cans suspected of illegal affiliations were questioned and impris­oned. The Portuguese tightened surveillance of the Belgian Congo border in an effort to diminish the flow of propaganda and frequently brought charges of communist subversion against sus­pected Africans. Such accusations were not without foundation. The Portuguese Communist Party had succeeded during the early days of the nationalist movement in infiltrating such authorized African associations as the LN A and AN ANGOLA. Africans re­cruited by these Communists provided the political and literary leaders of the nationalist movement during the years before na­tionalist sentiment had really surfaced. PLUA, the party that later merged with others to form the MPLA, may have been affiliated with the Angolan Communist Party.

Meanwhile the UPA and MPLA, both operating in exile, stepped up lobbying in international organizations to call atten­tion to the repressive measures being taken in Angola. Angolan liberation groups joined forces with similar groups from other Portuguese territories in Africa and Asia. The abandoning of colo­nies by Great Britain, France, and Belgium, along with the grow­ing self-assertion of newly independent African states, generated the hope of independence among Angolan Africans. International awareness of the liberation groups’ cause increased significantly in 1960 when the UN General Assembly agreed on a declaration calling for immediate steps to transfer all powers to the people of dependent territories. .

In the last months of 1960, events brought long-smoldering tensions to a head. These events were precipitated by opposition to the Portuguese government’s actions in the metropole rather than in the colonies. A former colonial inspector in Angola and leader of the opposition to the Salazar government seized a Por­tuguese cruise ship in January 1961. A rumor that the ship was heading toward Angola brought a large number of journalists to Luanda.

Angolans, hoping to profit from the possibility of unprecedented news coverage, attacked police stations and prisons in an attempt to free African political prisoners. They were reportedly under the leadership of the MPLA. After a week of sporadic violence in early February, official sources listed thirty-six Africans and eight mem­bers of the security force as killed and more than sixty as wounded. Some 120 Africans were arrested and the tension between Euro­pean and African communities in Luanda mounted. The situation did not become as volatile as it might have, in part because the African population lacked arms. Whites—especially rich whites— began to move out of Angola. They left behind them the poor whites who were unable to get out and who were also ready to take the law into their own hands.

Later in February, Africans who had escaped from Luanda orga­nized an uprising of cottonworkers in the Baixa de Cassange, in Malange District, attacking government buildings, a Catholic mis­sion, and an officer of the General Company of Angola Cotton, an overseeing company. A period of calm followed, until the morning of March 15,1961, when Kongo in Uige District attacked isolated farmsteads and towns in a series of forty coordinated raids in the northern districts, killing hundreds of Europeans in two days. Also involved in the rural uprisings were non-Kongo in parts of Cuanza Norte District.

The Uige and Cuanza Norte events took place in the area that, after World War II, had become the site of extensive coffee culti­vation. After the first days of rebellion, other attacks on farms, isolated homesteads, and administrative posts, and ambushes of Portuguese patrols and the like, spread from the initial locus of the rebellion in coffee country. Specifically the violent episodes of the next few months spread northward toward the border with Congo (Kinshasa) as the Portuguese put pressure on the rebels from the south. As time wore on, the composition of the rebel groups be­came almost exclusively Kongo, although it had not begun that way.

Official Portuguese explanations of the uprisings initially at­tributed them to outside agitators stemming from the Belgian Congo. Other observers argued that the rebellion was organized and directed by the UP A, that it was a purely ethnic phenomenon, and that converts to Protestantism or to African sects deriving from Protestantism were primarily responsible. There is some evidence that the UPA planned the timing of the uprisings and encouraged them. That the Kongo were deeply involved was al­most an accident of geography. Neither Protestant missionaries nor the most important African group, the Tokoist Church, en­couraged rebellion against the Portuguese authorities, and the section (the Zombo) of the Kongo in which the Tokoists had their greatest strength played little part in the events of 1961.

As the sociologist Jeffery Paige has shown the active participa­tion of many Kongo and, initially at least, of many non-Kongo (Dembos and Mbundu) may be traced to the impact of the coffee economy on Africans of Uige and Cuanza Norte districts. That impact took two basic forms: land was taken by Europeans from African peasants, themselves interested in growing coffee, and the means used to obtain and discipline African labor on European farms was coercive, often involving Africans who had lost all or part of their own land. Exacerbating this situation was a sharp decline in the price of coffee in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For those Africans still producing coffee on their own this meant a significant loss of income. This was also the case for European producers, and they dealt with it by lowering the wages of their laborers. Given the coercive nature of labor recruitment, Africans were forced to stay whether they liked it or not. Whatever the

*Men at work: the harbor at Luanda Courtesy Roloc Color Slides*

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other factors contributing to the rebellion, then, the decline of coffee prices in the context of land and labor policy in Angola made Africans ripe for it.

The incidents in Luanda, Baixa de Cassange, and the northwest were critical to the development of the liberation movement for several reasons: first, the attention of the outside world was for the first time focused on an area of Africa that it had long believed a tranquil exception to the pattern of rising independence move­ments; second, the incidents served notice of the rebels’ willing­ness and ability to resort to violence; third, the belief in the docil­ity of the African and the pro-Portuguese sentiments of all *assimilados* were confronted with a contradictory reality. The events of 1961 were among the few recorded incidents of African aggression against Europeans since the end of the conquest nearly fifty years earlier. Violence had the effect of forcing moderates to the rear, and the mood on both sides was militant.

According to some analysts, it was not the occurrence of the rebellion but its intensity—the racial massacres and the swiftness —that caught the Portuguese by surprise. Portuguese rule was saved because only a small percent of the African population dared to join the uprisings. South of the Cuanza River, for exam­ple, almost no Africans stirred.

The reaction of the Portuguese, predictably, was retaliation. In many cases the Portuguese regarded any African who had not taken shelter with them during the uprisings as an enemy. Settlers organized themselves into vigilante committees, and reprisals for the rebellion went uncontrolled by civilian or military authorities. Their treatment of Africans was as brutal and as arbitrary as had been that of the Africans toward them. Fear pervaded the coun­try, and a wedge was driven deeper between the races.

Fighting became particularly intense in the spring and summer of 1961, and casualties were high on both sides. The total loss of African lives as a result of the 1961 uprisings has been estimated as high as 40,000, many of whom died from disease or because of famine. Portuguese losses totaled about 400. By summer the Por­tuguese had reduced the area controlled by the rebels to one-half its original extent, but major pockets of resistance remained. Por­tuguese forces, relying heavily on airpower, bombed and strafed many villages, resulting in the mass exodus of African villagers toward the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To reestablish confidence among Africans and among those who had been sub­ject to reprisals by white settlers, the military initiated what was called a psychosocial campaign. African refugees were resettled into controllable village compounds and provided with medical, recreational, and some educational facilities.

The Portuguese were forewarned and never again permitted themselves to be caught as unaware and unprepared. They in­creased the number of their armed forces in Angola, and vigilance and suppression were intensified; some concessions were made, however.

In April and May 1961 the critical situation in Angola brought several changes in the Portuguese government. In the summer of 1961 cotton quotas for African growers, previously a source of constant friction, were abolished. As a result of new legislation, Africans could acquire civil law status more easily than before, and local government councils were expanded. After 1962 expendi­tures for rural development, health, sanitation, and education—all of which affected the Africans—were increased. In addition many of the abuses of the labor system were legally abolished.

Internationally the uprising attracted worldwide attention. Delegates from recently independent African states at the UN had, even before the rebellion, shown intense concern with the dependent status of Portugal’s possessions in Africa. The situation in Angola was, in fact, being discussed at the UN at the outbreak of violence in Baixa de Cassange on March 15,1961. Shortly the­reafter the UN General Assembly appointed an investigatory sub­committee on the situation in Angola. Although denied entry to the province, the subcommittee produced a report unfavorable to Portuguese rule.

The African-Portuguese Conflict, 1962-74

Initial organization among the insurgents, who had coordinated raids over an area of hundreds of square kilometers, did not last. It became apparent that no plans had been made for a sustained guerrilla effort, and Portuguese military units found little en­trenched resistance once they reached the northern districts. Effective military organization among the rebels came only in 1962.

Most participants in the March 1961 uprising were Kongo, among whom UPA influence had been strong. Although the UPA originally denied any role in organizing, the rebellion, it soon moved to assert its leadership. In the summer of 1961 the UPA- directed Angola National Liberation Army (Exercito Nacional de Libertacao de Angola—ENLA) emerged, claiming about 5,000 untrained and poorly armed men. Subsequently groups of Ango­lan Africans went to Morocco and Tunisia to train with the Al­gerian Nationalist Army, then fighting for its independence. The following year the National Front for the Liberation of -Angola (Frente Nacional de LibertaQao de Angola—FNLA) began its own training camp near Thysville, inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) staffed in part by African defectors from the Portuguese army. Its fighting capacity was strengthened by the arrival of arms and ammunition from Algeria.

In March 1962 the UPA had merged with another group of Kongo to form the FNLA and proclaimed the Revolutionary Gov­ernment of Angola in Exile (Govemo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio—GRAE). The president of GRAE, Holden Roberto, de-

dared it to be the sole authority in charge of anti-Portuguese military operations inside Angola. ’

By 1963, with training and arms from Algeria, bases in Congo (Kinshasa), and funds from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the GRAE military and political organization was im­proved, and its hopes were high. Inside Angola military sectors and rudimentary underground systems of communications, foot transport, and education programs were organized. Rebels harassed Portuguese troops in scattered hit-and-run skirmishes throughout the north and maintained loose control over an area about one-twentieth the size of Angola that extended from the Congolese border to below Luanda. Still, no significant gains of territory were made.

As the conflict dragged on into 1964 and 1965 it became stalemated. Hampered by insufficient financial assistance, the rebels were unable to maintain offensive operations against a fully equipped Portuguese military force that had increased to a strength of over 40,000. The FNLA settled into a mountain stronghold straddling the border of Uige and Zaire districts in the northwest and continued to carry on guerrilla activities. Unable to clear the area, the Portuguese sealed it off as much as possible.

The rebels found it increasingly difficult to sustain the organiza­tion and cohesion they had achieved after 1961 and 1962. Be­tween 1963 and 1965 differences in leadership, program, and following between the FNLA and MPLA led to open hostilities that seriously weakened their strength and effectiveness (see FNLA, ch. 3).

In 1965 and 1966 the Portuguese met with moderate success in their attempts to resettle refugees and seemed to be reestablish­ing a measure of the confidence between the Europeans and Afri­cans that had been lost during 1961. The government made sig­nificant progress in releasing Angola from the protectionist financial structure that had previously hampered foreign invest­ments and consequently development. The economic stabiliza­tion that followed the containment of the revolt brought a return of investments.

In 1966 the National Union for the Total Independence of An­gola (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola— UNITA) was founded by Jonas Savimbi. It drew its major support from among the Ovimbundu (see UNITA, ch. 3). Most of its guer­rilla actions were targeted against the Benguela railroad. UNITA sabotage efforts severely restricted the flow of goods to Zambia. As\* a result, the Zambian government expelled UNITA from Lusaka in 1967. Thereafter their headquarters were in Moxico District, southwest of Luso.

The UPA, led by Roberto and based in Kinshasa where there was strong support from the Kongo of the newly independent Congo, had gradually stagnated and was marked by corruption

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and internal dissension. The formation of the FNLA in 1962 was in part an effort to cover up the dissension (see FNLA, ch. 3).

The MPLA, which had been behind the initial uprisings in Luanda in February 1961, suffered a great deal from the reprisals of the Portuguese. Many of its militant leaders were dead or in prison. The rebuilding of the MPLA was substantially aided in 1962 by the arrival of Agostinho Neto, an *assimilado.*

Neto attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the MPLA and Roberto’s UPA, but his bid was rejected. The MPLA like the UPA was initially based in Kinshasa, a disadvantage be­cause that government favored Roberto’s UPA. In 1963 the MPLA shifted its headquarters to Brazzaville, where the government was more sympathetic. It also shifted its area of guerrilla activity to eastern Angola about this time (see MPLA, ch. 3). The campaign there really began in 1967; in 1968 the MPLA was based inside Angola rather than outside. The main MPLA base outside Angola was moved to Lusaka. In 1969 the OAU recognized that the MPLA had the only effective fighting force in Angola and, as a result, two years later withdrew its recognition from the FNLA- dominated GRAE.

The MPLA guerrillas drew military support from the Soviet Union and several other communist states allied with it, but they also captured much equipment from the Portuguese. Medical and other support was received from private organizations in the West and financial aid from African countries. UNITA received some support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but in the 1960s and 1970s it was remarkably little (see UNITA, ch. 3).

The Portuguese obtained a considerable amount of sophis­ticated equipment from members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The equipment was supplied according to the terms of the treaty, to be used only for defense of Portugal within the treaty’s framework. Portugal justified its use in Africa by claiming that integral Portuguese territory extended to Africa.

Nevertheless by the end of the 1960s the Portuguese had ap­parently decided that they could not win by exclusively mili­tary means. They therefore began making plans for the trans­fer of some power to the black elite, although in fact real power was to remain in European hands. In 1973 they permit­ted the election of Africans to advisory legislatures, while at the same time increasing the number of African conscripts in their military forces.

By early 1974, according to the estimate of Neil Bruce, a histo­rian of the Portuguese revolution, the danger to Portugal from Angola was far less than from Mozambique or Portuguese Guinea. In overall perspective the guerrilla threat remained minimal, al­beit a constant nuisance and expense, and it affected only a small part of the populated area of the province. The north remained calm, and since MPLA operations were centered in the far east,

they were a great distance from strategic areas and could probably have been contained there.

The military, economic, and political pressures that resulted from all of Portugal’s African wars, however, contributed signifi­cantly to the rapid changes in sentiment in Portugal toward the question of retaining the country’s colonial empire. These changes became a major cause of the overthrow of the government on April 24,1974. Led by a group of young officers, the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Formas Armadas—MFA) took over the government in a bloodless coup. An important part of their pro­gram was decolonization. The next month a spokesman for the new regime explained that the Portuguese army had reached the limits of neuropsychological exhaustion fighting the various na­tionalist movements in Africa.

Angola remained a problem for Lisbon; the white settlers there still apparently hoped that they could obtain a settlement favor­able to them: they had not, after all, experienced defeat in the colonial war. These settlers were responsible for much destructive violence in Luanda in the middle of 1974, but it soon became apparent that they could not affect the situation without military support form the outside, and this support would no longer come from Portugal. If continued violence and chaos were to be pre­vented, power would have to be transferred to one of the major African groups.

The MPLA was the only group that had a sufficiently broadly based program, but it had its own deep internal rifts. Efforts by presidents Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as well as other African heads of state to heal those rifts had little lasting success. The OAU also sought to bring the leaders of the three nationalist movements together so that they could negotiate the conditions of independence with the government of Portugal. Neto, Savimbi, and Roberto signed an agreement in Nairobi in early January 1975 in which they pledged to cooperate, to maintain the territorial integrity of Angola, and to work for “national reconstruction.’’ They then entered formal negotiations with the Portuguese on January 10 to establish the procedures and schedules leading to independence.

The talks at Alvor in Portugal led to an agreement, signed on January 15, despite distrust among the Angolan leaders. The movements headed by the three leaders were recognized as “the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola,” and the enclave of Cabinda was declared “an unalienable part of Angola.” November 11,1975, was set as the date for independence, and a transition government took office on January 31 (see Political De­velopments 1974-78, ch. 3).

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The most helpful work on Angolan history is Douglas L. Wheeler and Rend Pdlissier’s *Angola.* Somewhat older but still enormously useful is James Duffy’s *Portuguese Africa* and his shorter *Portugal in Africa.* The best accounts of Portuguese ex­pansion through the end of the eighteenth century are David Birmingham’s *Trade and Conflict in Angola* and his more con­densed *The Portuguese Conquest of Angola.* Basil Davidson’s *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People* is written for a general audience and concentrates more on the struggle for indepen­dence as it had progressed through 1973. By far the most complete and valuable account of the Angolan Revolution is John A. Mar­cum’s *The Angolan Revolution* in two volumes: *The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962* and *Exile Politics and Guerrilla War­fare, 1962-1976.* Jeffery M. Paige’s chapter on Angola in his *Agrar­ian Revolution* provides an interesting perspective on the rebel­lion of 1961. The nature of the interracial relationships between the Portuguese and Africans is one of the issues examined in Ger­ald J. Bender’s *Angola under the Portuguese: the Myth and the*

*Reality.*

Studies with the major emphasis on the history of the Africans in the area are Jan Vansina’s seminal *Kingdoms of the Savanna* and Joseph C. Miller’s *Kings and Kinsmen: Early Mbundu States in Angola.* For African prehistory see Roland Oliver and Brian M. Fagan’s *Africa in the Iron Age, c. 500 B.C. to A.D. 1400.* (For further information see Bibliography.)



ANGOLA’S 1,246,700 SQUARE KILOMETERS were sparsely in­habited by roughly 5.7 million people according to the (not very reliable) 1970 census. By mid-1978 several estimates placed the population at about 6.4 million, this after the departure of perhaps 300,000 Portuguese and without taking into account as many as 500,000 exiles. The great majority live in Angola’s western half, consisting chiefly of a plateau of varying but fairly high altitude and of a coastal strip of varying width in which lie several of the larger cities including the capital, Luanda. Most Angolans are rural, although there has been the usual tendency toward urban growth, interrupted by the departure of the Portuguese and the ensuing civil war between the Popular Movement for the Libera­tion of Angola (Movimento Popular de LibertaQao de Angola— MPLA) on the one hand and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de LibertaQao de Angola—FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) on the other. In 1970 the urban population was roughly 15 percent of the total, but a substantial proportion of it was Portuguese.

The peoples of Angola may for convenience be divided into a number of ethnolinguistic categories, but these categories are ar­tifacts of history. In many cases the names for the categories were imposed by others and their boundaries established by the Por­tuguese for census and other purposes. Although they have ac­quired a certain meaning for the people included in them in the course of the colonial period and during the anticolonial struggle, these categories are neither fixed nor internally homogenous and conflict-free, and they are subject to change under shifting histori­cal conditions.

Three of the categories—the Ovimbundu (at more than a third of the population the largest), the Mbundu, and the Kongo—to­gether constitute nearly three-quarters of Angola’s population. The *mestizos* (persons of mixed European and African ancestry), at 2 to 3 percent of the population, are important for the role some of them play in the ruling party and generally because they are fairly well educated in a society in which educated persons are relatively few. They have, however, been the target of much re­sentment, a consequence of their former identification with the Portuguese and often of their sense of superiority to Africans.

Not very much is known of the actual workings of indigenous (and local) social systems as modified during the colonial period. The most persistent of the groupings and institutions characteris­tic of Angolan societies before the establishment of Portuguese control were the groups based on descent from a common ances­tor, in most cases from a common female ancestor and traced through females. (With rare exceptions, however, authority lay in the hands of males.) As longlasting as these have been, they were showing signs of losing their significance toward the end of the Colonial era.

What will replace the Portuguese-imposed national structure remains uncertain. The MPLA-Labor Party inveighs against what it calls petty bourgeois tendencies—a set of self-aggrandizing atti­tudes and acquisitive behavior—but it makes room for incentives for those who contribute to development. Its rhetoric echoes with slogans of an alliance of workers and peasants but recognizes (and deplores) the tendency of urban people to be unconcerned with the problems of the vast rural majority. In order to cope with the country’s economic and administrative problems, the party’s ac­tions may generate one or more elites, but the form they take and the stresses such elite formation may give rise to cannot be fore­seen.

Also beyond accurate assessment on the basis of present knowl­edge is the status of the Christian churches, Roman Catholic and Protestant alike. Although only half the Angolan African popula­tion were in some sense identified as Christians (chiefly Catholics), the missions had considerable influence and formed important focal points for social and local political life as older institutions adapted to them or diminished in importance. The different Prot­estant churches in particular tended to be identified with specific ethnolinguistic groups. The MPLA-Labor Party has avoided a di­rect confrontation with religion as such, but in late 1977 the Roman Catholic bishops found some of the party and government actions unacceptable and in 1978 were subject to considerable criticism by the party’s leaders and press.

Physical and Demographic Setting

Angola’s area of 1,246,700 square kilometers (including the Cabinda Enclave’s 7,270) constitutes one of the larger but more sparsely populated of the sub-Saharan African states. A census taken in 1970 (and, given internal warfare, not very reliable) put the population at nearly 5.7 million, yielding an average (and fairly low) density of 4.5 persons per square kilometer. By mid-1978 the estimated population was 6.4 million, giving an average density of 5.1 per square kilometer.

Terrain

Most of the country’s territory is constituted by the westernmost extension of the great Central Plateau, partly edged in the west by mountains emerging out of the coastal lowland (see fig. 3). These highland areas sometimes reach altitudes of more than 2,­500 meters. In the north the plateau—the Portuguese term *pla- nalto* is commonly used—reaches the coastal fringe in a one-step or gradual descent; elsewhere the descent is usually a two-step process, the last step sometimes quite precipitous.

The coastal lowland varies in width from perhaps twenty-five kilometers near Benguela to more than 150 kilometers in the Cuanza River valley just south of Angola’s capital, Luanda, and differs markedly from Angola’s highland mass. The presence of the cold, northward-flowing Benguela Current substantially reduces precipitation along the coast, making the region arid or nearly so south of Benguela (where it forms the northern extension of the Namib Desert—locally called the Mo^amedes Desert) and quite dry even in its northern reaches. Even where, as around Luanda, the average annual rainfall may be as much as fifty centimeters, it is not uncommon for the rains to fail. Given this pattern of precipitation, the far south is marked by sand dunes, which give way to dry scrub in the middle sections. Some parts of the north­ern coastal plain are marked by thick brush.

The average altitude of the *planalto* ranges from 1,000 to 1,800 meters, but parts of the Benguela-Bie Plateau in the center and the Humpata Highland area of the Huila Plateau in the south reach heights of 2,500 meters and more. The Malange Plateau to the north rarely extends beyond 1,000 meters. The Benguela-Bie highlands and the coastal area in the immediate environs of Ben­guela and Lobito, the Malange Plateau, and a small section of the Huila Plateau near the town of Lubango have long been among the most densely settled areas in Angola. The climate and soils of the central *planalto* in particular proved attractive to those Euro­peans who lived outside the cities.

Vegetation in the Central Plateau varies with altitude: the pre­dominant cover is savanna with isolated baobabs and acacias, but precipitation at the highest points on the western edge permitted the growth of deciduous forest, much depleted by the demand for timber and fuel. Tropical savanna—elephant grass and more fre­quent baobab—marks the Malange Plateau in the north. In a re­gion of relatively sparse rainfall, the flat Huila Plateau and the rocky Humpata Highland have no natural forest cover.


The southern desert-steppe is sandy and dry and has sparse vegetation except along the courses of major rivers. East of the Okavango River (in Angola it is the Cubango) the streams are more likely to be permanent, and elephant grass and scrubby forest cover the surface of the sandy clay floodplains; but the grass, good pasture in the rainy season, disappears in the dry season.

Most of the eastern half of Angola is relatively flat and open plateau characterized by sandy soils. Running through its center into Zambia is the Lunda Divide, a set of low ridges marking the division between north-flowing and south- and east-flowing rivers. To the north the plateau slopes gently toward Zaire; to the south, toward Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia. For the most part the cover is savanna, but galley forests occur along the courses of the major rivers of the north.

The Mayombe Hills in northeast Cabinda were under rain forest cover, but they have been heavily cut. The remainder of the



*Figure 3. Terrain and Drainage*



enclave is an extension of the coastal plain, but it is warmer and wetter than much of the coastal fringe in Angola proper.

Drainage

Most of the country’s many rivers originate in central Angola, but the pattern of flow is quite diverse and their ultimate outlets varied. A number of rivers flow in a more or less direct westerly course to the Atlantic Ocean, providing water for irrigation in the dry coastal strip and the potential for hydroelectric power, some of it realized (see Power, ch. 5). Two of Angola’s most important rivers, the Cuanza and the Cunene, take a more indirect route to the Atlantic, the Cuanza flowing north and the Cuene south be­fore turning west. The Cuanza is the only river other than the Congo (running for a short distance between Angola and Zaire) that is navigable—for nearly 200 kilometers from its mouth—by boats of some size.

North of the Lunda Divide a number of important tributaries of the Congo River flow north to join it, draining Angola’s northeast quadrant. South of the divide some rivers flow to join the Zambezi and thence to the Indian Ocean, others to the Okavango and thence to the Okavango Swamp in Botswana. The tributaries of the Okavango and several of the southern rivers flowing to the Atlantic are seasonal, completely dry much of the year.

Climate

Lake the rest of tropical Africa, Angola is marked by clearly defined alternate rainy and dry seasons. In the north the rainy season may go on for as much as seven months—from September or October to April or May, with perhaps a brief slackening in January or February. In the south the rainy season begins later, November or December, and lasts no more than four months. In general precipitation is highest in the north, but at any latitude it is greater in the interior than at the coast and increases with altitude.

Temperatures decrease with distance from the equator and with altitude and tend to increase closer to the Atlantic Ocean. Thus at Soyo at the mouth of the Congo River the average annual temperature is roughly 26’C but is trader 16'C at Huambo in the temperate central *planalto.* The coolest months are July and Au­gust (in the dry season), when frost may sometimes be encoun­tered at higher altitudes.

Population Structure and Dynamics

The census taken in 1970 yielded a (provisional) total population of 5,646,166, but internal warfare in several parts of the country may have proved an obstacle to an accurate count. Moreover the United Nations (UN) estimated that there were 413,810 refugees outside the country (most of them in Zaire) in 1970-71, and there were probably others in places—e.g., Congo (Brazzaville)—not accessible to the UN. For one reason or another (chiefly to seek employment) Angolans had left the territory even before the out­break of overt opposition to Portuguese rule in 1961, and it has been suggested that there may have been well over 500,000 per­sons considering themselves Angolans but living elsewhere in the early 1970s. Because of continuing opposition to the regime in power after the departure of the Portuguese, it is likely that sub­stantial numbers remained in exile, but they would constitute a significant addition to the population should political develop­ments encourage their return.

One group left at the end of the colonial period never to return. The 1970 census did not distinguish between Europeans and Afri­cans, but it has been estimated that there were then about 290,000 Europeans in Angola, roughly 5 percent of the population. That figure may have risen to as much as 350,000 by 1974 before the Portuguese decided to withdraw after their own revolution. It has been estimated that by 1976 there were fewer than 30,000 Por­tuguese in Angola and, although there were indications in 1978 that a few had returned or were contemplating return, it is not likely that they will ever constitute a significant element in the population.

The long-term determinants of population distribution are geo­graphic and economic, but in the period between the 1960 and 1970 censuses internal warfare between Africans and Portuguese had some effect not only on the departure of Africans for neigh­boring countries but also on internal migration. Long- and short­term factors together led to a diminished population in some areas in the intercensal period and increases in others beyond that ex­pected solely on the basis of natural growth in situ. Examination of the larger administrative units *(distritos* before independence) indicates a link between internal warfare and population loss, but the connection is neither regular nor wholly unambiguous (see table B).

The greatest loss proportionately was that in Zaire District, sparsely populated in any case by the Kongo ethnic group. A smaller decrease proportionately was suffered by part of Uige, also peopled by Kongo but including others who had come to work in the coffee plantations. Between 1950 and 1960 Urge’s population had grown faster than that of any other area, in part because the district encompasses the country’s m^jor coffee-producing area, developed in that decade. It is not likely that the population would have continued to grow at so rapid a rate in the 1960-70 period, but it would certainly have increased instead of showing a loss.

Moxico, then the territory’s largest administrative district, and one of its most thinly populated, lost substantial numbers of peo­ple, most of them probably to adjacent Zaire and Zambia. Showing a small decrease were Cuando Cubango District, also sparsely peopled, and Benguela District. Benguela’s loss seems to have been largely a consequence of economic developments rather than of Portuguese-African conflict.

Table B. Population and Population Densities by District, 1960 and 1970

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **District\*** | **Area (in square (kilometers)** | **I960** | | **1970** | | **Percent**  **Change** |
| **Number** | **Density** | **Number** | **Density** |
| **Cabinda** | **7,270** | **58,547** | **8.05** | **80,857** | **11.12** | **+38.1** |
| **Zaire** | **40,130** | **103,906** | **2.59** | **41,766** | **1.04** | **-59.8** |
| **Uige** | **55,818** | **426,939s** | **7.65** | **386,037** | **6.91** | **-9.6** |
| **Luanda** | **33,789** | **346,763** | **10.26** | **560,589** | **16.59** | **+61.7** |
| **Cuanza-Norte . .** | **27,106** | **235,534s** | **8.69** | **298,062** | **10.99** | **+26.5** |
| **Cuanza-Sul ....** | **59,269** | **404,650** | **6.83** | **458,592** | **7.73** | **±13.3** |
| **Malange** | **101,028** | **451,849** | **4.47** | **558,630** | **5.52** | **+23.6** |
| **Lunda** | **167,786** | **247,273** | **1.47** | **302,538** | **1.80** | **+22.3** |
| **Benguela** | **37,808** | **487,873** | **12.90** | **474,897** | **12.56** | **-2.7** |
| **Huambo** | **30,667** | **597,332** | **19.48** | **837,627** | **27.31** | **+40.2** |
| **Bi6** | **71,870** | **452,697** | **6.30** | **650,337** | **9.04** | **+43.7** |
| **Moxico** | **199,786** | **266,449** | **1.33** | **213,119** | **1.06** | **-20.0** |
| **Cuando-Cubango** | **192,079** | **113,034** | **0.59** | **112,073** | **0.58** | **-1.0** |
| **Mo^amedes. . . .** | **55,946** | **43,004** | **0.77** | **53,058** | **0.94** | **+23.4** |
| **Huila** | **166,348** | **594,609** | **3.57** | **644,864** | **3.87** | **+8.5** |
| **TOTAL . . .** | **1,246,700** | **4,830,449** | **3.87** | **5,673,046** | **4.55** | **+ 17.4** |

‘Preindependence term for major administrative units later called provinces.

’Actual figure for Uige was lower and for Cuanza-Norte higher in 1960, but the concelho (a second-level administrative unit) of Dange was transferred from Cuanza-Norte to Uige in 1961, and the transfer is noted under 1960 to permit comparability.

Major growth occurred in Luanda District, principally in the capital, the result of an influx of Europeans on the one hand and of Africans seeking employment on the other. Significant in­creases also occurred in the highland areas (Huambo and Bie dis­tricts) and in Cabinda, again partly in response to economic oppor­tunity and partly reflecting the arrival of Europeans, although most Europeans tended to cluster in the cities.

There has been no adequate description of internal migration between independence in late 1975 and mid-1978. The fact that there was a civil war in 1975 and 1976 between the forces support­ing Agostinho Neto’s government and those opposed to it and that the latter continued to carry on sporadic guerrilla activity may have had some effect on the distribution of the population, but the nature and degree of that effect is not clear. The northern prov­inces of Zaire and Uige had not regained their lost populations, however; in mid-1978 neither the refugees in adjacent Zaire, most of them Kongo, nor the Ovimbundu who had fled the coffee areas of Uige (and Cuanza Norte) for their homeland farther south had returned.

The end of the colonial regime and the subsequent internal strife also affected the process of urbanization. Angola’s urban population had grown from 5.5 percent in 1950 to 10.3 percent in 1960 to 15.1 percent in 1970. Much pf that growth had occurred in Luanda, which had more than doubled (to 475,328) between 1960 and 1970. Other towns had also acquired larger populations, but none of them approached Luanda in size (the next largest


town in 1970 was Nova Lisboa, now Huambo) at 61,885. Much of that increase reflected the arrival in Angola of numbers of whites, chiefly Portuguese, of which an estimated two-thirds settled in towns, particularly Luanda. Portuguese (including the military) continued to come until 1974, and many of them were also located in urban areas.

More than half of the urban growth between 1960 and 1970 may, however, be attributed to movements of Africans from the rural areas. This movement, estimated at roughly 5 percent of the rural population, although a significant contribution to the growth of urban areas, did not deplete rural communities except insofar as the urban migrants were typically young males.

Angola’s independence and the ensuing civil war brought urban growth to a halt; most of the Portuguese left, and many Africans —either out of loyalty to political movements (the FNLA and UNITA) other than the ruling MPLA or to avoid violence—re­turned to their home villages. Urban data for the mid- and late 1970s are not available, but it must be assumed that the urban population has not risen above the 15 percent of the total recorded for 1970 and that it may indeed have decreased.

Despite the presumably temporary halt in urbanization, the departure of the Portuguese, and the continuing exile of re­fugees from portions of the country, it is likely that the basic structure of population distribution remains the same as that indicated by the 1970 census and that this structure will pre­vail in the near future. The census showed the most densely settled areas of Angola to be the highland areas, those coastal zones including and adjacent to the cities of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, and Mo^amedes, and the enclave of Cabinda (see fig. 4). Easily the most densely settled province in 1970 (and in 1960) was Huambo, largely a high plateau area marked by more or less adequate rainfall, relatively fertile soils, a gener­ally comfortable climate, and a generally more healthful envi­ronment. The other large area of relatively dense settlement included much of Cuanza Norte and the southern part of Uige. Less comfortable and less healthful than the Benguela-Bie pla­teau of Huambo, it was the major center for Angolan coffee cultivation and had attracted a number of Europeans and mi­grant workers. Although coffee cultivation had been affected by the departure of the Europeans, the continued hostility of the Kongo to the existing regime, and the departure of Ovim- bundu laborers for their Huambo homeland, it may be assumed that coffee will continue to be important to the Angolan econ­omy and that the area will retain its importance as a center of population. Except for Zaire Province in the far northwest, the most thinly populated areas of Angola lie in the eastern half. The only important loci of population in that area are to be found in a few towns.

Estimates of the Angolan population since independence in



Source: Based on information from Angola, *Servi^o Provincias de Planeamento e Integra^do Economica,* Luanda, 1972.

*Figure 4. Concentration of Population, 1970*

1975 are subject to a number of caveats. The 1970 census on which such estimates would be based is of doubtful accuracy, and there are no adequate vital statistics. Further, the importance of white immigration (in the 1960s and early 1970s) and subsequent emi­gration and of the numbers of Africans who have left as refugees (or exiles) make it difficult to develop estimated rates of natural increase on which to base projections for the future. The Interna­tional Data Evaluation Branch of the United States Bureau of the

Census has made a number of estimates and projections based on careful consideration of these issues for its forthcoming *World Population 1977.* Its estimates take note of the departure of Afri­can refugees, particularly for Zaire, but the estimates do not in­clude these refugees or their children bom outside the country as part of the Angolan population. The estimated population for mid-

1. is 6,295,000. The annual rate of growth for 1976 is estimated at 2.4 percent. On the assumption that there has been no signifi­cant immigration or emigration since 1976, that rate may be used to estimate the mid-1978 population, yielding a figure of 6,446,- 000. It may be noted that should political stability permit the return of the estimated 500,000 Angolan refugees in the near future, that would be a substantial increment (nearly 8 percent) to the mid-1978 population.

In mid-1978 the vice president of Angola noted that there were more than 270,000 refugees from other African states in the coun­try (about 250,000 of them from Zaire), most living in the prov­inces of Moxico and Lunda. There were certainly numbers of refugees from Zaire in Angola at the time of the 1970 census, but it is not clear that they were counted; the projections for 1977 and

1. do not include them, nor does the estimate for mid-1978 take account of the 270,000 noted by the vice president.

Population Growth and Health

The estimated annual growth rate for the mid- and late 1970s of 2.4 percent is high compared with those of most industrialized states, but there is a potential for a substantially higher one should there be a considerable improvement in living conditions, particu­larly in medical care (including preventive medicine and sanita­tion) and diet. The most recent data on health personnel and facilities dates from the colonial era (1972) and is irrelevant to the postindependence situation, given the departure of Portuguese personnel and the fact that most such personnel were concen­trated in the urban areas and catered chiefly to non-Africans, although some facilities were established in the rural areas be­tween 1964 and 1974.

Also lacking are postindependence data on the incidence of disease. Preindependence data, available for 1974, suffer from certain shortcomings; they are based on illness or death treated by modem facilities or reported to the health authorities and may disproportionately reflect disease among whites. Further, the gathering of the data was probably affected by the conflict be­tween the Portuguese and various anticolonial movements. It therefore provides only a limited indication of the prevalence of specific diseases among the great bulk of the population. It does nevertheless suggest that Angola is characterized by nearly the full range of tropical diseases and some others.

It may be assumed that, as elsewhere, smallpox has been eradi­cated or nearly so, although a government statement of its health

program in late 1977 made the point that vaccination of the entire school population against smallpox (listed with other “chief dis­eases”) was one of its goals. Also listed among the chief diseases were tuberculosis, tetanus, and yellow fever. Tetanus in particular may be noted as one of the afflictions responsible for the presuma­bly high rate of infant mortality. Another of the goals of the health program was the immunization of preschool children against “the principal endemic diseases,” but these were not listed.

The 1974 figures, whatever their shortcomings, include what appear to be fairly high figures for tuberculosis and a much smaller number for tetanus (in this case deaths only rather than illness and death), but many tetanus cases, particularly those of infants, proba­bly remained unreported. Yellow fever is not reported, but a num­ber of cases of typhoid fever are.

The 1974 data include cases of what are usually infant and juvenile diseases: measles, whooping cough, chicken pox (all in fairly high numbers), mumps, and diphtheria (a small number). Of these only measles seem to be responsible for a substantial number of deaths. Also reported were meningococcal infections and infec­tious viral encephalitis.

Among the diseases affecting persons of all ages, malaria was by far the most frequently reported; there were also fairly high figures for influenza and venereal diseases (particularly gonococ­cal infections). Lesser numbers were shown for infectious hepati­tis, cholera, bacillary and amoebic dysentary, and leprosy. Much more rarely reported were tick-borne relapsing fever, anthrax, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and, even more rarely, plague. Not recorded, although reference has been made to them in some sources, are bilharzia (schistosomiasis) and helminthiasis (worms of several kinds), both much more likely to affect Africans than whites.

Many of these diseases, including the very prevalent malaria, lead to long-term., debilitation rather than to quick death, but they are more likely to have the latter effect (and to remain un­reported) when very young children suffer from them. Any mea­sures, especially those of a preventive kind, that have an impact on the incidence of disease are therefore likely to lead to a more rapid growth in population.

In addition to the disease vectors and contributing to their im­pact are deficiencies in nutrition, sanitation, and hygienic prac­tices. Here again information is fragmentary, but there are indica­tions that protein deficiency is not uncommon, although a summary of studies made under the colonial regime notes that physical signs of such deficiency (e.g., kwashiorkor) are most marked in the *planalto,* where neither fish nor milk and milk products are readily available to Africans. Also prevalent in some regions are vitamin deficiency diseases, such as scurvy, beriberi, and pellagra. Outright deficiencies in calorie intake were reported for the so-called hungry season, particularly in the drier areas of the south. Certainly many of the diseases noted are waterborne or are the result of the presence of vermin or other conditions that flourish unless care is taken to maintain a certain level of cleanli­ness.

The MPLA-Labor Party regime’s health program stresses, among other things, giving “priority to health education for the population ... as well as to the introduction of hygienic habits and health defense.” These priorities and the proposals for vaccination and other forms of immunization suggest quite clearly the govern­ment’s stress on preventive medicine.

In addition to its emphasis on preventive medicine the MPLA- Labor Party government has also given priority to a more ade­quate geographical distribution, particularly in nonurban areas, of health facilities and personnel and to making the procurement and distribution of medication more efficient. (Related to the lat­ter priority is the attention to be given to the study of the effective­ness of local—i.e., African—medicines.)

The government’s undertakings with respect to health care and maintenance and preventive medicine are predicated on the “So­cialist concept of medicine where health is defined as a right of the people.” In consonance with that concept, “private medicine was abolished and the principle of free medical and health care for the population was implemented.” Further steps in the socialization of the medical establishment will be the gradual replacement (but “in the shortest time possible”) of private importers of medications (responsible for about 20 percent of imports) by new government structures. At the same time the cost of imported medications was so high that “[it called] for a policy that will permit the population to participate in these expenditures through the purchase of medi­cations.”

Both therapeutic and preventive medicine require the training of health cadres ranging from doctors to health technicians of all kinds. (It was estimated that 3,000 health aides will be needed to staff the facilities to be established in rural areas.) That process will take some time, and in the interim the government has relied heavily on the health personnel made available by communist states, particularly Cuba. It was reported in late 1977 that more than 400 Cuban health technicians were distributed in all but two of Angola’s sixteen provinces and that 900 were expected to be working in the country in 1978. These states (again Cuba plays an important role) were also training Angolan technicians either in the country or at their own facilities.

Assuming that the construction (or reconstruction) of large highly capitalized facilities is neither possible nor necessary, the government’s program stresses the development of health care facilities outside the hospital, “creating health centers and stations especially in rural areas and places of employment.” Clearly the implementation of such policies requires not only the training of

personnel, but also the establishment of a stable political situation throughout the countryside.

Ethnic Groups and Languages

The great majority of Angolans (perhaps 98 percent of the total) speak languages of the Bantu family—some closely related, others remotely so—spoken by most Africans living south of the equator and by substantial numbers north of it. The remaining indigenous peoples fall into two quite disparate categories. A small number, all to be found in southern Angola, formerly lived in small nomadic or seminomadic hunting and gathering bands. Most speak so- called Click languages (after a variety of sounds characteristic of them) and differ physically from local African populations, sharing characteristics (small stature and lighter skin color among others) linking them to the hunting and gathering bands of southern Africa sometimes referred to by Europeans as Bushmen. The sec­ond category consists of *mestizos,* largely urban and living in west­ern Angola; most speak Portuguese although some also are ac­quainted with African tongues, and a few may use such a language exclusively.

The Definition of Ethnicity

Bantu languages have been categorized by scholars into a num­ber of sets of related tongues. Some of the languages in any set may be more or less mutually intelligible, especially in the areas where speakers of a dialect of one language have come into sustained contact with speakers of a dialect of another. Given the mobility and interpenetration of communities of Bantu speakers over the centuries, transitional languages, i.e., those that share characteris­tics of two tongues, have come into being on the border between them. Frequently the languages of a set, particularly those with many widely distributed speakers, are divided into several dia­lects. In principle (by definition) dialects of the same language are mutually intelligible, but they are sometimes not so in fact. For example, the historian Joseph C. Miller notes that “outlying Mbundu groups have at least as much in common with their near­est non-Mbundu neighbors as they share with distant Kimbundu- speakers.”

The existence of marginal or transitional communities between any two sets of communities considered to constitute separate ethnolinguistic groups and the occurrence of mutually unintelligi­ble dialects among those who are thought to be or think of them­selves as one people suggests that language alone does not define an ethnic group. On the one hand a set of communities lacking mutually intelligible dialects may for one reason or another come to share a sense of identity in any given historical period. On the other hand groups sharing a common language or mutually intelli­gible ones do not necessarily constitute a single group. Thus the Suku—most of them in Zaire but some in Angola—have a lan- *Qj&ge* mutually intelligible with at least some dialects of the Kongo, but their historical experience, including a period of domi­nation by Lunda speakers, makes them a separate group.

The same caveats apply to the significance of other aspects of culture for ethnicity. Miller notes that “despite the paucity of ethnographic data, available evidence shows that the most basic features of Mbundu culture and society have always occurred in non-congruent distributions which overlap with other people on all sides.” The absence of clear cultural boundaries between puta­tively different groups holds elsewhere as well.

Although common language and culture do not automatically make for common identity, they provide a framework within which such an identity can be forged given other historical experi­ence. If nothing else, insofar as common culture implies a set of common perceptions of the way the world works, it permits in­dividuals and groups sharing it to communicate more easily with one another than with those who lack that culture.

Historically, however, most Angolan groups had, as part of that common culture, the experience and expectation of political frag­mentation and intergroup rivalry. That is, because one commu­nity shared language and culture with another, political unity or even nonbelligerence did not follow, nor did either community assume that it should.

With the exception of the Kongo and the Lunda, none had experienced political cohesion overriding smaller political units (chiefdoms or, at best, small kingdoms). In the Kongo case an early kingdom encompassing most Kongo-speaking communities had given way by the eighteenth century to politically fragmented entities. Nominally a king continued to exist in Sao Salvador (for­merly and again since independence Mbanza Kongo), but he was unimportant except that succession to the throne became a point of conflict between the Portuguese and some Kongo in the twen­tieth century. In the Lunda case the empire had been so dispersed and internal confict so great by the nineteenth century that politi­cal cohesion was limited.

Very often the name by which a people has come to be known was given them by outsiders. For example, the name Mbundu was first used by Kongo. Until such naming, and sometimes long after, the various communities or sections of a set sharing a language and culture are likely to call themselves by other terms, and even when they come to use the all-encompassing name, they tend to reserve it for a limited number of situations. In virtually all colo­nial territories, Angola included, the naming process and the tend­ency to treat the named people as a fixed entity differing from all others became pervasive, carried out by the colonial authorities— sometimes with the help of scholars and missionaries—as part of the effort to understand, deal with, and control local populations. Among other things, the Portuguese tended to assimilate smaller, essentially autonomous groups into larger entities. As time went on, these populations, and particularly the more educated among them, seized upon these names and the communities presumably covered by them as a basis for organizing to improve their status and later for anticolonial agitation. Among the first to do so were *mestizos* in the Luanda area. Although most spoke Portuguese and had a Portuguese (male) ancestor in their genealogies, they often spoke kiMbundu as a home language. It is they who, in time, initiated the development of a common Mbundu identity.

In the Kongo case, the experience of the Zairian segment in what was then the Belgian Congo led to the development of a degree of Kongo cohesiveness there. Angolan Kongo, many of whom had gone to work in Belgian territory, were inspired by the sense of cohesion they encountered to the point that, in the early days of anticolonial political agitation, Holden Roberto and his colleagues talked in terms of an all-Kongo state rather than all­Angola independence.

Angolan Kongo identity was further enhanced by more con­crete experience in the economy. Many Kongo in the part of Uige District devoted to coffee production were deeply affected by the ways in which production was organized, including as it did Euro­peans taking African-held land and the requirement that Africans work on the coffee estates. Other groups, particularly Mbundu of Cunza Norte, were similarly affected, and the result was an agrar­ian rebellion in the two districts in 1961 (see The Beginning of Revolution, 1961, ch. 1). The sociologist Jeffery M. Paige has ar­gued persuasively that the rebellion was primarily a peasant re­sponse to specific social, economic, and political conditions rather than based on or organized in terms of ethnicity. Nevertheless this experience helped reinforce a sense of Kongo identity that had other sources as well.

In general, then, the development of ethnic consciousness in a group (such as the Mbundu or Ovimbundu) encompassing a large number of communities has reflected a shift from the identifica­tion of individuals with small-scale units (e.g., descent groups, local communities or, at best, small kingdoms or the regions formerly defined by those kingdoms) to at least partial identification with larger entities and from relatively porous boundaries between such entities to less permeable ones. But the fact that these larger groups are the precipitates of relatively recent historical condi­tions suggests that they are not permanently fixed. Changes in these conditions could lead to the dissolution of the boundaries and to group formation on foundations other than ethnicity.

In any case ethnic identities are rarely exclusive; identification with other entities, new or old, also occurs in certain situations if only because not every section of a large ethnic group has identical interests. It is not unlikely that earlier identities (and interests) will be appealed to in some situations or that new cleavages will sur­face in others. For example, descent groups or local communities were often involved in competitive relations in the precolonial or

the colonial era, and the conditions similar to those giving rise to such competition may still prevail in some areas. In other contexts, younger members of an ethnic group may consider their interests to be different from those of their elders, or a split between urban and rural sections of an ethnic entity may become salient.


Ethnolinguistic Categories

Caveats notwithstanding, a listing of the more commonly used ethnic rubrics and an indication of the dimension of the categories they refer to is useful as a first approximation to the description of Angola’s peoples. The 1970 census did not enumerate the popu­lation in ethnic terms. The most recent available count therefore is that of the 1960 census. It may be assumed that the rank order of the major ethnolinguistic categories has not changed although the proportions may well have done so. In particular a fairly large segment of the Kongo of the northwestern provinces of Zaire and Uige were already refugees in 1970 and were not included in the 1970 census. Although it is not clear how many have subsequently returned to Angola, it may be assumed that most will ultimately return and that their relative status as the third largest group will hold.

The two largest ethnolinguistic categories—the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu—are also the only ones to be included wholly within the country and are located in west-central Angola, the Mbundu lying north of the Ovimbundu (see fig. 5). The largest, the Ovimbundu (the language is umBundu), constituted nearly 38 percent of the African population and more than 36 percent of the total population in 1960. It must be emphasized, however, that there is some dispute among scholars as to who is linguistically a member of the category and that some Ovimbundu did not (as of the 1940s) recognize some groups included within the category by Portuguese authorities.

The core area of the Ovimbundu was that part of the Benguela Highlands north of the town of Huambo. But expansion continu­ing into the twentieth century enlarged their territory considera­bly, although most Ovimbundu remained in the highlands above 1,200 meters.

Like most African groups of any size, the Ovimbundu were formed by the mixture of groups of different origin (and varying size). Little is known of developments before the seventeenth century, but there is some evidence of multiple contributions to the people who occupied the Benguela Highlands at that time, and there seems to have been at least one important kingdom in place when some of the groups called Imbangala, having their origin to the northeast, penetrated Ovimbundu country (as they did Mbundu territory to the north). In the course of Imbangala interaction over roughly a century with the population already there, a number of political entities, usually referred to as king­doms, were formed. By the eighteenth century there were



Source: Based on information from Jose Redinhas, “Carta Etnica da Provincia de Angola,” Luanda, 1973.

*Figure 5. Distribution of Selected Ethnolinguistic Categories* twenty-two of these, thirteen of them fully independent, the other nine largely autonomous but owing tribute to one of the more powerful entities, in most cases to the kingdom of Bailundu but in some, to Wambu or Ciyaka. By the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century effective occupation by the Portuguese led to a fairly rapid decline in the power of the heads of these kingdoms, but Ovimbundu continued to think of themselves as members of one or another of the groups based on these political

units after World War II. Whether that kind of identification had any significance in the late 1970s is not known.

In addition to the groups that clearly speak dialects of um- Bundu, there are two on the periphery of Ovimbundu distribu­tion: the Mbui who, on the basis of present knowledge, seem to straddle the linguistic boundary between the Ovimbundu and the Mbundu; and the Dombe living to the west near the coast whose language is closely related to umBundu but not a dialect of it. The Dombe and several other groups, e.g., the Nganda and the Hanya (who on one account speak umBundu dialects) rely on cattle keep­ing as do their southern neighbors, the Herero and the Ambo. Still others, typically the old tributary kingdoms, came to speak um­Bundu relatively recently.

Until the Portuguese established firm control over their terri­tory, the Ovimbundu—particularly those of the major kingdoms of Bailundu (to the northwest), Bihe (to the northeast), and Wambu (in the center)—played important roles as middlemen in the slave, ivory, and beeswax trade, acting as carriers, entre­preneurs, and raiders. With the decline of the slave trade in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the entrepreneurs among the Ovimbundu turned to the rubber trade, abandoning the war­fare and raiding that had hitherto been integrally related to their economic activities. The rubber slump at the beginning of the twentieth century, the end of the de facto autonomy of their kingdoms not long after, and the displacement of Ovimbundu traders by Portuguese forced these people to turn to cash crop agriculture. (The men had hitherto been little involved in cultiva­tion, and in fact the women continued to be responsible for the cultivation of subsistence crops.)

The introduction of cash crops, particularly coffee, led to a series of changes in the settlement patterns and social arrangements (see Local (Rural) Social Systems, this ch.). But after a time soil exhaus­tion, lack of support for African agriculture by the colonial authori­ties, the incursion of Portuguese settlers who took over valuable land in the highlands, and a number of other factors contributed to a decline in the success of Ovimbundu cash cropping. By the early 1960s up to 100,000 Ovimbundu, estimated at about one- quarter of the able-bodied males, were migrating on one- and two-year labor contracts to the coffee plantations of Uige and Cuanza Norte, another 15,000 to 20,000 sought work in the towns of Luanda and Lobito, and roughly the same number worked in the industrial plants of Nova Lisboa or for European farmers in the Benguela Highlands. In most cases their remuneration was low, but they had little alternative. This pattern continued through the remainder of the colonial period except for those males who were involved in anti-Portuguese guerrilla activity (usually with UNITA).

Given the degree of change in Ovimbundu society and the involvement of the Ovimbundu in the anticolonial struggle with a group—UNITA—that remains in opposition to the formally con­stituted and generally recognized government of Angola domi­nated by the MPLA-Labor Party, it is difficult to determine their long-range role. Although their experience since the late nine­teenth century has led to a degree of ethnic solidarity, there have been internal conflicts or at least tension between various ele­ments of the Ovimbundu. In the earlier years of the twentieth century not all kingdoms cooperated in risings against the Por­tuguese, in part because they were differently affected by Por­tuguese economic and political activity. In later years there were differences of interest between ordinary peasants and the de­scendants of kings and chiefs. The latter had little or no power after the first decade of the twentieth century, but they tended to have a different perspective on aspects of social change and the exercise of Portuguese power from that of the ordinary Ovim­bundu. Just how long Ovimbundu solidarity will persist under changed circumstances cannot therefore be predicted.

*The Mbundu*

Just north of the Ovimbundu lie the Mbundu (the language is kiMbundu), the second largest ethnolinguistic category at an es­timated 23 percent of the African population and nearly 22 per­cent of the total in 1960. In the earliest period of which anything systematic is known (the sixteenth century), most of the groups that came to be known as Mbundu (a name apparently first ap­plied by the neighboring Kongo) lived well to the east of the coast in the highlands (at a somewhat lower altitude than the Ovim­bundu, however); a few groups in the far northeast lived below 700 meters. In general the outlines of the area occupied by the Mbundu have remained the same. The major exception is their extension to the coast, formerly occupied by Kongo and others.

Although most of the boundaries of the Mbundu territory have remained fairly firm, the social and linguistic boundaries of the category have shifted historically, some of the peripheral groups having been variably influenced by neighboring groups and the groups close to the coast having been more strongly influenced by the Portuguese than the remoter ones. Moreover the subdivisions discernible for the sixteenth century (and perhaps earlier) have also changed in response to a variety of influences in the colonial period. The Mbundu generally and the western Mbundu particu­larly, located as they are not far from Luanda, were susceptible to those influences for a longer time and in a more intense way than other Angolan groups.

Although a degree of local diversity persists, “wider gulfs for­merly divided the Mbundu than is the case today,” according to Miller, who has also engaged in some ethnographic study of the Mbundu. There are a number of Mbundu dialects; but two, each incorporating Portuguese terms, have gradually become domi­nant, serving as lingua francas for many Mbundu. The western

dialect is centered in Luanda to which many Mbundu have mi­grated over the years. The people speaking it, largely urban or peri-urban, have come to call themselves Ambundu or Ak- waluanda, thus distinguishing themselves from rural Mbundu. The eastern dialect, known as Ambakista, had its origins in a mixed Portuguese-Mbundu trading center at Ambaca near the western edge of the highlands during the eighteenth century, but it spread in the nineteenth through much of eastern Mbundu territory.

By 1969-70, according to Miller, a “pan-Mbundu lifestyle with a pseudo-Portuguese component” was emerging, the conse­quence of the experience of many Mbundu in the city of Luanda and the town of Malange and in the colonial army into which they had been drafted. A degree of formal education also contributed to this development. It is not clear, however, that this tendency to homogenization affected the rural components of the Mbundu ethnolinguistic group.

*The Kongo*

The Kongo (the name of the entire group is BaKongo, of the language kiKongo), at an estimated 13.5 percent of the African population and 12.9 percent of the total in 1960, constitutes the third largest ethnolinguistic group (assuming the ultimate return of most of them from exile). Localized in the far northwest (Uige and Zaire provinces) and in Cabinda where they make up the bulk of the population, the Kongo spill over into Zaire (the largest single ethnic group in that country) and Congo. Although Sao Salvador in Angola was the capital of their ancient kingdom, most of the Kongo were (and are) situated in Zaire.

Their former political unity long broken, the various segments of the ethnolinguistic category in Angola experienced quite differ­ent influences in the colonial period. The BashiKongo, lying be­hind the coast, had the most sustained interaction with the Por­tuguese but were less affected by participation in the coffee economy and its strains and stresses than the Sosso and Pombo situated farther east and south. All three groups, however, were involved in the rising of 1961. The Zombo, still farther east but close to the Zairian border, were much influenced by develop­ments in the Belgian Congo, and a large contingent of members of this group living in Leopoldville formed a political party in the early 1950s. The Sonongo, dwelling on the relatively dry coastal plain, had little contact with the Portuguese. They and the AshiLuanda of the island of Luanda to the south were the only African sea fishermen of Angola.

The Yombe (Mayombe) of the mountain forests of Cabinda speak a dialect of kiKongo but were not part of the ancient king­dom. That part of the Yombe living in Zaire did join with the Zairian Kongo in the Alliance of Bakongo (Alliance des BaKongo —ABAKO) during the period of party formation in the Belgian Congo, but the Cabindan Yombe (and other kiKongo-speaking groups in the enclave), relatively remote geographically and cul­turally from the Kongo of Angola proper, have shown no solidarity with the latter.

*The Lunda-Chokwe*

The hyphenated category Lunda-Chokwe (or Lunda-Quioco in many Portuguese sources) constituted 8.8 percent of the African population and 8.2 percent of the total in 1960. As the hyphena­tion implies, the category comprises at least two subsets, the ori­gins of which are known to be different and the events leading to their inclusion in a single set recent. In fact the Lunda alone are a congeries of peoples brought together in the far-flung Lunda Empire (seventeenth to nineteenth centuries) under the hegemony of a people calling themselves Ruund, its capital in the eastern section of Katanga Province (later Shaba) of Zaire. Lunda is the form of the name used for the Ruund and for themselves by adjacent peoples (to the south) who came under Ruund domi­nation. In some sources the Ruund are called Northern Lunda, their neighbors Southern Lunda. The most significant element of the latter are called Ndembu (or Ndembo) and are to be found in Zaire and Zambia. The people with whom the northward-expand­ing Chokwe came into contact were, in Angola, chiefly Ruund speakers. The economic and political decline of the empire by the second half of the nineteenth century and the drawing of colonial boundaries ended Ruund political domination over those ele­ments beyond the Zairian borders.

The Chokwe, until the latter half of the nineteenth century a small group of hunters and traders living near the headwaters of the Cuango and Cassai rivers, were at the southern periphery of the Lunda Empire and paid tribute to its head. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Chokwe became increasingly in­volved in trading and raiding and expanded in all directions, but chiefly to the north, in part absorbing Ruund and other peoples and in the late nineteenth century going so far as to invade the capital of the much-weakened empire in Katanga in what was to become Zaire. As a consequence of this Chokwe activity a mixed population emerged in parts of Zaire as well as Angola, although there are communities in both countries that are essentially Chokwe, Ruund, or Southern Lunda alone.

The process of mixing of Lunda (Ruund and Southern Lunda) and Chokwe in which, presumably, other smaller groups were also caught up, continued until 1920. In effect it is barely two genera­tions since the mixture acquired the hyphenated label and began to think of themselves in some contexts as one people. In other situations, however, according to Miller, the Lunda and Chokwe take note of the differences between them, but he provides no details.

West of the Chokwe homeland, lying partly in Angola, partly in Zaire and Zambia, are two groups called the Lwena and Lovale (some consider these simply different names for the same people), who are clearly much closer linguistically and in other respects to the Chokwe then either is to the Ruund or Lunda. Nevertheless developments in the nineteenth century made the Lunda- Chokwe mix of greater modern significance.

The language spoken by the various elements of the so-called Lunda-Chokwe are more closely related to each other than they are to other Bantu languages in the Zairian-Angolan savanna, but they are by no means mutually intelligible, and the three chief tongues (Ruund, Lunda, and Chokwe) have long been separate, although some borrowing of words, particularly of Ruund political titles by the others, has taken place.

Portuguese anthropologists and some others accepting their work have placed some of the peoples (Minungu and Shinji) in this area with the Mbundu, and Miller refers to the Minungu language as transitional between kiMbundu and Chokwe. There may in fact have been important Mbundu influence on these two peoples, but the work of a number of linguists places their languages firmly with the set that included Ruund, Lunda, and Chokwe.

Miller puts the Lunda-Chokwe in the northeastern quadrant of Angola, but Portuguese sources and maps show the Chokwe spe­cifically in southern Moxico Province and even in Cuando Cubango in the southeast quadrant. Even if the Portuguese sources are correct, however, there is no doubt that the great bulk of the Chokwe and certainly of the mixed category called Lunda- Chokwe live farther north.

Recent developments, economic and political, have had varied impact on different sections of the Lunda-Chokwe. Substantial numbers of them live in or near Lunda Norte Province, demar­cated in 1978, to comprehend the diamond-mining areas of An­gola. Diamond mining has been significant since 1920, and prein­dependence data show that the industry employed about 18,000 persons. Moreover the mining company provided medical and educational facilities for its employees and their dependents, thereby affecting even greater numbers. How many of those em­ployed were Lunda-Chokwe is not altogether clear, but some must have been and, in any case, neighboring villages would have been affected by the presence of the mining complex (see Mining, ch. 5). In the inter-African political conflict preceding and im­mediately after independence, there seems to have been some division between the northern Lunda-Chokwe, especially those with some urban experience, who tended to support the MPLA and the rural Chokwe, particularly those farther south, who tended to support UNITA.

A somewhat different kind of political impact dates from the late 1960s when refugees from Katanga in Zaire, speakers of Lunda or a related language, crossed the border into what is now Lunda Sul and northern Moxico. In 1977 and 1978 these refugees and others whom they had recruited used the area as

a launching pad for their invasions of Shaba. In 1978 these and perhaps still other refugees remained in Angola, many in Lunda Sul, although the MPLA government as part of its rap­prochement with Zaire was moving them out. The significance for local Lunda-Chokwe of the presence and activities of these Zairians is not known.

*The Nganguela*

Nganguela is a term, pejorative in connotation, applied by the Ovimbundu to the peoples living east and southeast of them. The distribution of the essentially independent groups constituting what was no more than a Portuguese census category was split by the southward penetration of the Chokwe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only two groups in the western section of the territory accept the name Nganguela; the others carry such names as Lwena (Luena) and Luvale, Mbunda and Luchazi (Lutchaze)—all in the eastern division. The Lwena and Luchazi, roughly equal in size, constituted roughly a third of the census category of Nganguela that altogether made up a little more than 7 percent of the African population and a little less than 7 percent of the total in 1960.

Unlike most of the peoples making up the larger ethnolinguistic categories who rely almost entirely on some form of agriculture for subsistence, the groups in the western division of the Ngan­guela are cattle keepers as well as cultivators. Those in the eastern division near the headwaters of the Zambezi River and the streams tributary to it rely in addition on fishing.

All of the groups included in the Nganguela ethnolinguistic category speak languages apparently related to those spoken by the Ruund, Southern Lunda, and Chokwe, and it has already been noted that Lwena-Luvale and Chokwe, although not mutually intelligible, are probably more closely related than Chokwe is to Ruund or Lunda. Except for sections of the Lwena, however, most of these peoples were outside the periphery of Lunda influence, and some (in the western division) were affected by Ovimbundu activity (including slave raiding).

Of the ethnolinguistic categories thus far treated, the Ngan­guela have had the least social or political significance, in the past or in modern times. For the most part thinly scattered in an inhos­pitable territory, split by the southern expansion of the Chokwe and lacking the conditions for even partial political centralization, let alone unification, the groups constituting the category have gone different ways when anticolonial activity gave rise to political movements based in part on regional and ethnic considerations. By and large the western division, adjacent to the Ovimbundu, was most strongly represented in the Ovimbundu-dominated UNITA. Some of the groups in the eastern divisions were repre­sented in the Mbundu- and *mestizo-* dominated MPLA, although

the Lwena, neighbors of and related to the Chokwe, tended to support UNITA.

*The Southern Bantu-Speakers: Ambo, Nyaneka, Herero, and Others*

In far southwestern Angola three categories of Bantu-speaking peoples have been distinguished, two of which, the Ambo (Ovambo is the Bantu form for two or more persons) and the Herero (Ovaherero) are more heavily represented elsewhere: the Ambo in Namibia and the Herero in Namibia and Botswana. The Herero dispersion, especially that section of it in Botswana, is the consequence of their migration from German Southwest Africa (now Namibia) after their rebellion against German rule in 1906. The third group is the Nyaneka (the Portuguese census category was Nyaneka-Humbe; their ethnographer Carlos Estermann calls them Nyaneka-Nkumbi). Unlike the other groups the distribution of the Nyaneka-Humbe seems to be restricted to Angola. Accord­ing to the 1960 census the Nyaneka-Humbe constituted 3 percent of the African population and a slightly smaller proportion of the total. The Ambo (the largest single section by far are the Kuanyama) came to about 2.5 percent of all Africans and a little less than that of the total. The Herero, few in number, came to no more than 0.5 percent of the population.

In the southeastern comer of the country the Portuguese distin­guished a set of Bantu-speaking people, noted on the map pre­pared by Jose Redinha in 1973 as the Xindonga. The sole group listed in this category are the Cussu. The *Language Map of Africa* prepared under the direction of David Dalby for the International African Institute noted two sets of related languages in this part of Angola. The first includes Liyuwa, Mashi, and North Mbukushu. These and other members of the set are also found in Zambia and Namibia. The members of the second set, Kwangali-Gcikuru and South Mbukushu, are also found in Namibia and Botswana. The hyphen between Kwangali and Gcikuru implies mutual intelligi­bility. Little is known of these groups; in any case, their members are very few.

All of these southern Angolan groups have relied in part or in whole on cattle keeping for their subsistence. Formerly the Herero were exclusively herders, but they have gradually come to engage in some cultivation. Although the Ambo have depended in part on cultivation for a much longer time, dairy products have been an important source of subsistence, and cattle have been the chief measure of wealth and prestige.

The southwestern groups, despite their remoteness from the major centers of white influence during most of the colonial pe­riod were to one degree or another affected by the colonial pres­ence and, after World War II, by the arrival of numbers of Por­tuguese in such places as MoQamedes and Sa da Bandeira (Lubango). The greatest resistance to colonial rule was offered by

the Ambo who were not finally made fully subject to it until 1915 and earned a considerable reputation among the Portuguese and other Africans for their efforts to maintain their independence. In the anticolonial struggle of the 1960s and early 1970s and in the postindependence civil war the Ambo tended to align themselves with the Ovimbundu-dominated UNITA.

*Hunters, Gatherers, Herders, and Others*

Scattered throughout the lower third of Angola, chiefly in the drier areas, are small bands of people most of whom were, until the twentieth century, nomadic hunters and gatherers, although some engaged in herding, either in addition to their other subsist­ence activities or as their chief means of livelihood. Those who have survived have turned, in part at least, to cultivation.

The bands living a nomadic or seminomadic life in Cuando Cubango Province (and occasionally reaching as far east as the upper Cunene River) differ physically and linguistically from their sedentary Bantu-speaking neighbors. Short, saffron-colored, and in other respects physically unlike the Nganguela, Ambo, and Nyaneka-Humbe, they speak a language of the !Xu-Angola or Maligo group of a set of tongues referred to as Click languages (the ! denotes a specific kind of click), the precise relations of which are not yet fully understood.

Several other hunting and gathering or herding groups, the members of which are taller and otherwise physically more like the local Bantu-speakers, live farther west, adjacent to Ambo and Herero. These people speak Bantu languages and are less nomadic than the Click speakers, but they are clearly different from the Ambo and Herero and probably preceded them in the area.

*The Mestizos*

In 1960 a little more than 1 percent of the total population of Angola consisted of *mestizos.* It has been estimated that, by 1970, these people constituted perhaps 2 percent of the population. Some left at independence, but the departure of much greater numbers of Portuguese probably resulted in an increase in the proportion of *mestizos* in the Angolan total.

The process of mixing started very early and continued until independence. But it was only before 1900, when the number of Portuguese in Angola was very small and consisted almost entirely of males, that the proportion of *mestizos* in the population ex­ceeded that of whites.

As time went on, the antecedents of many *mestizos* were al­ready mixed, and the Portuguese established a set of distinctions among them that many *mestizos* accepted as a basis for social ranking. One source suggests that the term *mestizo* used alone in this context applied specifically to a mix between a mulatto and a white; *mestizo cabrito* referred to the descendant of a union between two mulattos; and the term *mestizo cafuso* was applied



*Woman of an elite assimilado family*

*Courtesy Wendy Holmes*

to the child of a union between a mulatto and a black African. It is possible that an even more complex set of distinctions was used by some.

Most *mestizos* have been urban dwellers and learned to speak Portuguese either as a home language or in school. Although some of the relatively few rural *mestizos* lived like the Africans among whom they dwelt, most apparently achieved the status of *as­similados,* the term applied before 1961 to those nonwhites who fulfilled certain specific requirements and were therefore regis­tered as Portuguese citizens.

With some exceptions *mestizos* tended to identify with Por­tuguese culture, and their strongly voiced opposition over the years to the conditions imposed by the colonial regime stressed their rights to a status equivalent to that of whites. Only occasion­ally did *mestizo* intellectuals raise their voices on behalf of the African population before World War II. Thus, despite the in­volvement of *mestizos* in the anticolonial struggle beginning in 1961 and their very important role in the upper reaches of the MPLA, significant segments of the African population have tended to resent and dislike them.

Local (Rural) Social Systems

In the absence of extensive and intensive modem research of high quality, it is difficult to determine the significant social ar­rangements in Angola even in the late years of the Portuguese period, let alone in the postindependence era. A few broad gener­alizations may be made, however.

Kingship and chieftainship over territorially organized polities, characteristic in some form of the Mbundu and Ovimbundu until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of the Kongo earlier, and of other groups on a smaller scale, had for all practical purposes been destroyed by the mid-twentieth century. A king of the Kongo was recognized by the Portuguese; his office was largely symbolic, and for that reason, succession to it was a focus of conflict in the 1950s among various Kongo groups oriented to ethnic na­tionalism and between some of these and the Portuguese. The office, however, was of no practical significance for the ordinary Kongo villager. In some other groups the Portuguese also permit­ted the retention of chiefs *(sobas)* chosen on a more or less tradi­tional basis, and some of these played an administrative role. Else­where incumbents of such roles were chosen without reference to local criteria.

At the level of the local community (a village or group of vil­lages) a headman was appointed, again sometimes from among those who would have been chosen by local standards but who also met Portuguese criteria. Sometimes, however, a quite different person was appointed, and in this case activities of the more tradi­tional leader and the elders of the community were carried on to some extent even if formal authority was held by the man chosen

by the colonial regime. Chiefs and headmen *(regedores)* had,

among other tasks, those of collecting taxes, helping to maintain order, and recruiting labor.

In most cases in the early 1960s and later, after the outbreak of

African opposition to colonial rule, most chiefs and headmen were, if not loyal to the Portuguese, reluctant to support the an­ticolonial movements. Given this history, the dislocations of parts of the countryside before independence and since, and the insis­tence of the MPLA-Labor Party on local administrators loyal to it, it is unlikely that former chiefs and headmen have a significant role. On at least one occasion, however, a party leader suggested that where chiefs still have the trust of their people and are willing to cooperate with the regime, some use for them will be found. How this situation will in fact develop cannot be foreseen.

The crucial, and in some form continuing, units in local social systems are villages (or other form of local community) and groups based on common descent, actual or putative. These were basic entities, even if subject to change in form and function in the period preceding the Portuguese incursion and during the centu­ries when they exercised only indirect influence in the interior. Throughout these hundreds of years changes in the structure of local political systems and the influence of trade, slave raiding, and the like had their impact on local communities and kin groups, as did urban migration, forced labor, African involvement in cash cropping, and specific legal measures after the establishment of full Portuguese control; but local community organization and the organization of kin groups, often linked, remained the most signifi­cant elements in the lives of ordinary Africans.

In general, the connection between a local community and a descent group (or some other kin-based set of persons) lay in the fact that the core of each community consisted of a descent group of some kind. The other persons in the community were tied to the members of the group by marriage or, in an earlier period, by a slave or client relationship, the effects of which may well have survived the formal abolition of slavery as they have elsewhere. Except for the village in which a king or major chief resided, the village was usually small, and even the community in which a king lived was not very large. Partial exceptions were some of the major trading towns of the Ovimbundu in the late nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. Typically neighboring villages were tied together either by virtue of the fact that their core groups were made up of members of related de­scent groups (or different segments of a larger descent group) or, in some cases, by fairly frequent intermarriage among members of a limited set of villages.

Ordinarily descent groups in Angola are matrilineal; that is, they include all persons descended from a common female ancestor through females, although the individuals holding authority are, with rare exceptions, males; in some cases junior males inherit

from (or succeed to a position held by) older brothers; in others males inherit from their mother’s brother. Descent groups, the members of which are descended from a male ancestor through males (hence patrilineal), apparently occur in only a few groups in Angola and have been reported only in conjunction with ma­trilineal groups, a comparatively rare phenomenon referred to as a double descent system.

It must be heavily emphasized that even where double descent systems did not exist, kin traced through the father were impor­tant as individuals in systems in which group formation was based on matrilineal descent. In some cases, e.g., the Kongo, an individ­ual was tied through his father to the latter’s matrilineage, appro­priate members of which had an important say in aspects of that individual’s life.

Broadly speaking, matrilineal descent groups alone have been reported for the Kongo (but well described only for some of the Zairian Kongo), the Mbundu, the Chokwe, and the Ambo, but it is probable that they occur elsewhere. A double descent system has been reported for Angola’s largest ethnolinguistic group, the Ovimbundu, and may also be found among some of the southern groups.

The way in which the double descent system of the Ovimbundu was structured and worked has not been adequately described. In any case ethnography done about the middle of the twentieth century suggests that patrilineal groups as such (as opposed to links with the father and some of his kin) had virtually disappeared and that matrilineal groups had, by and large, lost most of this signifi­cance in response to major changes in patterns of economic activ­ity.

Descent groups vary in size, degree of localization, function, and degree of internal segmentation. In the kinds of groups com­monly called clans the links between a putative common ancestor and the living cannot be traced, and no effort is made to do so. Such groups are larger in scope than the units into which they are divided, although they need not have many members in absolute terms. They are rarely localized, and their members may be widely dispersed. Clans have not been widely reported in Angola. The only large ethnic category in which they have been said to exist is the Kongo. Even there they do not seem to have political or economic functions.

More typical of Angolan communities are the kinds of descent groups usually called lineages, in most cases matrilineages. Here the common ancestor is not so remote, and genealogical links can be traced to her. Structurally lineages of greater depth (for exam­ple, those five to seven generations in depth from ancestor to most recent generation) may be further segmented into shallower line­ages (perhaps three to four generations in depth), lineages at each level having different functions. This seems to have been the case among the Kongo. There the deeper unit controlled the allocation

of land and had tasks connected with that crucial function, whereas shallower lineages controlled such matters as marriage.

In the Ovimbundu case the precise structure of the matriline- age is not clear. Early ethnographers referred to it as large and very widely dispersed, sometimes extending across the boundaries between kingdoms. One source, however, describes the unit as the descendants through females of a common great-great grand­mother; that is, five generations from ancestor to youngest adult generation. The patrilineage appears to have been localized in a number of related villages. Typically males lived with their fa­thers, women going to live with their husbands. The senior male in the local community was the head both of the village and of that section of the patrilineage living in it. There seems to have been no head of the patrilineage as a whole, except in the case of the royal patrilineage. Political authority at all levels was inherited patrilineally, and land was allocated and rights to land inherited within the patrilineal descent group. The group also had certain ritual functions.

The dispersed matrilineage was the entity in which movable property was inherited. It also provided mutual aid, including financial aid in connection with the caravan trade in which the Ovimbundu were so heavily involved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The period of the rubber trade (which ended abruptly in 1912 with the sudden availability of rubber from sources elsewhere) led to a diminution in the importance of the patrilineage and an en­hancement of the significance of the matrilineage. It also led to the development of social differences based on wealth; some of the most successful traders were men who, under the earlier eco­nomic system based on agriculture and hunting, would not neces­sarily have acquired the degree of wealth and power that—tempo­rarily at least—came to them because of their entrepreneurial talents.

With the end of the caravan trade the Ovimbundu became cultivators again, this time of cash crops. (Subsistence cultivation had never disappeared, simply become less salient.) But having become cultivators they were confronted with the fact that much of their highland territory was attractive to European settlers. Their mode of cultivation and the loss of some good land to Euro­peans led to a land hunger and commercialization of land. The lineage, matrilineal or patrilineal, had less and less control over what had become the primary resource in the Ovimbundu econ­omy. A study in 1968 showed that most of the holdings had been acquired by direct inheritance from father to son, purchase, and tenancy or lease, all without the involvement of the community.

Even earlier (in the mid-1950s) an anthropological study of one (admittedly peripheral) Ovimbundu area had suggested that there was no significant trace of either the matrilineal or the patrilineal lineage, and this in a reputedly conservative community. The village consisted of persons related in a variety of ways but not forming a group, unilineal or otherwise. The terms formerly used for the patrilineal and matrilineal descent groups were still heard, but they did not refer to a cohesive group. They were applied instead to patrilineal and matrilineal relatives seen as individuals. Moreover the Portuguese term *familia* was often used. Later data seem to confirm this picture.

The development of cash-crop agriculture and changes in land tenure, given often inadequate soils and Ovimbundu agricultural techniques, led to soil depletion and the need for fairly extensive holdings to support a nuclear family. Nucleated villages became less and less feasible.

Increasingly, particularly in the coffee-growing area, the home­stead was no longer part of the nucleated village, although dis­persed homesteads in a given area were defined as constituting a village. The degree of dispersal varied, but the individual family, detached from the traditional community, tended to become the crucial unit. Where either Protestants or Roman Catholics were sufficiently numerous, the church and school rather than the de­scent group became the focus of social and sometimes of political life. In at least one study of a section of the Ovimbundu, it was found that each entity defined as a village consisted almost exclu­sively of either Protestants or Roman Catholics.

But given the problems of soil depletion and, in some areas, of land shortage, not all Ovimbundu could succeed as cash-crop farmers. Substantial numbers of them thus found it necessary to go to other regions (and even other countries) as wage workers, so that some households came to consist of women and children for long periods.

In 1967 the colonial authorities, concerned by the political situa­tion east of the Ovimbundu and fearing the spread of rebellion to the highlands, gathered the people into large villages in order better to control them and, in theory at least, to provide better social and economic services. The Ovimbundu, accustomed to dispersed settlement, strongly resented the practice, among other things fearing that the land they were forced to abandon would be taken over by Europeans (and some of that in fact happened). According to the German agronomist Hermann Possinger, the only supporters of the move were the chiefs who had lost what­ever power they still retained as the increasingly individualistic Ovimbundu became dispersed.

By 1970 compulsory resettlement had been abolished in part of Ovimbundu territory and reduced elsewhere. A rural advisory service was instituted, and the formation of what the Portuguese called agricultural clubs was encouraged. The old term for ma­trilineal descent group was sometimes applied to these organiza­tions, which were intended to manage credits for Ovimbundu peasants. These units, however, were based on common interest, although traces of kin connections sometimes affected their opera-

tion, as did the relations between ordinary Ovimbundu and chiefs. Moreover conflict within the group of ten took the form of accusa­tions of sorcery. At the time of Possinger’s observations these units had been functioning for two or three years, and the effects on them of independence, the stripping away of the advisory service, and the conflict between the MPLA-Labor Party regime and UNITA were unknown. What comes through, on the basis of the observations of Possinger and others, however, is that the Ovim­bundu are not likely to take to enforced cooperation or collectivi­zation easily.

Among the Mbundu, according to Miller, the matrilineage *(ngundu;* pl, *jingundu)* survived centuries of change in other institutions. Membership in and loyalty to it was of great impor­tance. The lineage supported the individual in material and non­material ways: because most land was lineage domain, access to it required lineage membership, and communication between the living and their ancestors, crucial to traditional religion, was me­diated through the lineage. To be a slave or a pawn was to lack the protection offered by one’s natal lineage and to be attached as a dependent to a lineage not one’s own.

Much of Miller’s data, however, was gathered in the course of historical research and focused on the Mbundu’s theory of the matrilineage rather than on its actual functioning. Moreover much of his work was done among the people of the old state of Kasanje at the eastern edge of Mbundu territory and was perhaps not wholly representative of all of the Mbundu even in earlier times—and less so given the greater impact of social and economic change on the western Mbundu. Nevertheless a summary of Miller’s description of Mbundu lineages provides some indication of what may be found.

The Mbundu lineage differed from Kongo and Ovimbundu groups in its underlying theory; it consisted not of individuals but of statuses or titles filled by living persons. The relations between these offices or titles were conceptualized in terms of kinship, and the individual occupying, for example, two statuses defined as bearing the relationship of brothers would treat each other as such whether or not they were brothers biologically. In this system a Mbundu could move from one status to another, thus acquiring a different set of relationships. How in fact this theoretical system affected interpersonal relationships between biological kin has not been described, however.

The Mbundu matrilineage was in some respects a dispersed unit, but a core group maintained a lineage village to which its members returned, either at a particular stage in their lives or for brief visits. Women went to the villages of their husbands, and their children were raised there, the girls, like their mothers, then joining their husbands. The young men, however, went to the lineage village to join their mothers’ brothers. The latter and their sisters’ sons formed the more or less permanent core of the lineage

Google

community, visited from time to time by the women of the lineage who, as they grew old, might come to live the rest of their lives there. After a time, when the senior mother’s brother who headed the matrilineage died, some of the younger men would go off to found their own villages. A man then became the senior male in a new lineage, the members of which would be his sisters and his sisters’ sons. One of these younger men might, however, remain in the old village and succeed the senior mother’s brother in the latter’s status and take on his role completely, thus perpetuating the older lineage. This account suggests that the functioning lin­eage has a genealogical depth of three to four generaitons; a man, his fully adult sister’s sons, and the latter’s younger but married sister’s sons. How this unit encompasses the range of statuses char­acteristic of the matrilineage in Mbundu theory is not altogether clear.

Formerly a variety of groups or relations cut across the lin­eage system in addition to the institutions of the state organiza­tion (kingdom). Among these were witch finding or witch erad­ication movements and cults devoted to healing. The consequences of affiliation with either the Protestant or the Roman Catholic church have not been adequately described, but one report suggests that the Methodist organization charac­teristic of a minority of Mbundu was hierarchically structured and may have served as a way of bringing lineages together at least for some purposes.

Whatever the kind and degree of change in the workings of lineage and community in rural Angola, research in the *musseques* of Luanda shows that the lineage system has little significance there. The *musseques* are the settlements in and around Luanda (and some of the other big towns) in which poor Africans (and in the preindependence period some poor whites) live. Residents of these settlements are, in great majority, of Mbundu origin; there were also some Ovimbundu and Kongo and a scattering of Afri­cans of other origin in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (Many of the non-Mbundu may have left with the onset of the postindepend­ence civil war.)

Some of the inhabitants of the *musseques* at the time of research worked regularly in manual jobs, but others were employed only intermittently, and still others had been unemployed for some time. The variation in the material circumstances of (particularly) the males in the population sampled affected the composition of the households; but ideally, and often in fact, the household con­sisted of a man and a woman living in a union legally sanctioned or otherwise and their children. Occasionally another kinsman or woman would be part of the unit.

The man was expected to assume the primary responsibility for supporting the household and to provide, if possible, for the educa­tion of the children, although others sometimes made some contri­bution. Given the economic circumstances of most of these men,

the burden sometimes became overwhelming, and some men reacted by leaving the household. This accounts, with some excep­tions, for the presence of women heads of households.

The effects of more extended kinship ties were felt largely in the expectation of immigrants from rural areas that they could turn first to their kin already in place for at least temporary housing and other aid. The tendency was to look to heads of households who were of the same matrilineage, but that practice was not universal. Moreover it did not signify that the matrilineage had been trans­planted to the *musseques.* The relationship between the head of the household and the newly arrived immigrant was that between two individuals. The urban situation does not provide the condi­tions for the functioning of the matrilineage as a social, political, and economic unit.

Given the combination of the nuclear family household, the absence of matrilineages, and the relative ethnic homogeneity of the *musseques* of Luanda, the organization of permanent or temporary groups engaged in social or political activity and the formation of interpersonal relationships are likely to be based directly on economic concerns or on other common interest arising out of the urban situation. Elsewhere such concerns and interests are often mediated by or couched in terms of consid­erations of ethnicity or kinship. In Luanda that is less likely to be the case.

Angolan Society After Independence

Whatever national society existed in Angola before indepen­dence was imposed and largely defined by the Portuguese pres­ence. On their withdrawal and the ensuing civil war there was a tendency to fragmentation, not wholly overcome in the late 1970s. Replacing the earlier ruling group was a Marxist-Leninist party, confronted in its first three years not only by the civil war but also by a variety of internal economic and other problems. Beginning in late 1977 with the First Congress of the MPLA, at which the conversion of the movement to a so-called vanguard party was announced, the party leaders attempted to define the kind of society and economy they wished to develop in the near future. The process of definition was by no means systematic and often simply drew on well-worn Marxist-Leninist cliches. Never­theless from time to time statements of either purpose or criticism focused on specific features and problems of Angolan society as these leaders saw them. Sometimes the solutions offered appeared to have conflicting implications. Because most writing, journalistic or scholarly, has been concerned with internal politics and eco­nomic or international problems, these party utterances provide the few clues to postindependence developments and to inten­tions (if not to actual programs).

Running through the statements of leaders and editorials in the *Jomal de Angola* and other party and state publications are fre-

quent and strong references to the need to eliminate all signs of tribalism, regionalism, and racism. On several occasions it is as­serted that tribalism and regionalism are not the same thing, but the differences are not spelled out. Because there is a link between ethnolinguistic category and place, the differential effects on be­havior of tribalism and regionalism are often difficult to deter­mine. In principle, however, a focus on the economic and other interests of those living in a given region as opposed to common culture and language does distinguish the two. Any of these three modes of social and political alignment runs counter to the ruling party’s insistence on the putative common interests of workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals as against the so-called petty bourgeoisie and all others, foreign and domestic, opposed to the establishment of a socialist society.

The reference to race no longer speaks to the activities and attitudes of a dominant European minority but to those of a vast African majority, to the remaining Portuguese, and to the *mestizo* population. The role of these Portuguese and some *mestizos* in the anticolonial cause notwithstanding, the behavior of those physi­cally and socially like them in the colonial era predisposes many, if not most Africans, to look at them askance. It is also probable that, for some Africans, Portuguese and *mestizos* are visible obsta­cles to their own advancement. From the point of view of Africans in the ruling group, however, the Portuguese and *mestizos* in the MPLA-Labor Party have, on the one hand, the appropriate skills and ideology; on the other hand they have no alternative but to be loyal, inasmuch as they have no base in the country other than the party.

A somewhat different kind of potential for conflict may arise with the return to Angola of Portuguese and *mestizos* who fled the country after independence and, unable to find a place in Portu­gal, were seeking to return, according to reports in mid-1978. The total number is not likely to be very large, but they are likely to be in direct competition with Africans for the kinds of jobs to which the latter aspire.

At the same time that the party cautions against racism, it also seems to consider it necessary to say that old attitudes of superior­ity must go, presumably an allusion not only to the preindepend­ence attitudes of Portuguese and *mestizos,* but also to those shown by urban educated Africans who would in former times have been called *assimilados.* In fact it is unlikely that the Portuguese in the party would act in the style of the Portuguese colonial official or settler, but some *mestizos,* uncommitted ideologically, might act in such a way; and educated Africans, secure in their racial situa­tion, are even more likely to exhibit a sense of superiority to ordinary Africans.

Related to these warnings about untoward attitudes are refer­ences to the tendency for urban Africans to ignore the needs of and look down on those living in rural areas. Thus an editorial in the *Jomal de Angola* notes that the “petty bourgeoisie [of the urban areas] will have nothing to do with the problems of the countryside—in other words with the majority of the Angolan people. Proof of this can be seen in the unwillingness to go into the interior to work, in the bureaucratic methods of many public employees, and in the calumnies and rumors that are constantly being put into circulation.” (The meaning of the last accusation is not known.)

The category “petty bourgeoisie” is widely and pejoratively used and seems to refer not to a class with a certain range and source of income but to those with a given set of attitudes and proclivities, the central one of which is material self-aggrandize­ment at the expense of others. That self-aggrandizement is di­rected toward the establishment of a style of life in which what are considered luxuries, given the circumstances of most of Angola’s people, play a great part.

A set of people singled out for occasional castigation are the bureaucrats who are accused of obstructing productive work by failing to perform the duties necessary to maintain the flow of permits and materials and by avoiding the making of quick deci­sions. This criticism applies largely to low- and middle-level work­ers in the state apparatus who refuse to take responsibility in the absence of their superiors. To the extent that these criticisms have a foundation in fact, the behavior involved may be attributed in part to patterns established in the colonial era, when middle- and low-level African bureaucrats were not expected to take responsi­bility for significant decisions. Some of it, however, may be at­tributed to the fact that party directives may not always be clear, and the wrong decision may bring an accusation not of simple error, but of counterrevolutionary intention.

A further example of acting to serve “selfish interests” (the term *petty bourgeoisie* was not used but easily could have been) was the attempt of segments of the urban population—who they were in socioeconomic terms is not mentioned—to acquire as many mate­rial items and as much housing as they could by posing as militants and volunteering to participate actively in Neighborhood People’s Commissions. These people were accused of “desiring to become a new elite.”

What seems to be at issue here is not simple egalitarianism, but the fact that corrupt means were used to acquire material goods and that those who were seeking to accumulate did not deserve what they obtained, having performed no useful function as the party defined it. The party’s rhetoric and some of its actions seem to be directed to the widest distribution of the facilities for a minimum level of health and welfare, but its slogan is “from each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.” A certain inequality of rewards is thus foreseen.

What is to be counted as a worthwhile contribution remains unclear. The party stresses the equal value of “intellectual” and

manual labor but, given the shortage of educated Angolans and the history of contempt for manual labor exhibited by both Por­tuguese and *assimilados,* it is unlikely that—equal dignity or no— compensation and prestige will be equal. Further the party, in its discussion of important goals, names among them the develop­ment of an Angolan scientific establishment and suggests that adequate incentive be given to those whose scientific work con­tributes to the development of the economy. Differences in in­come and status between very well-educated Angolans in highly technical or central political roles on the one hand and urban workers and peasants on the other may not give rise to conflict, in part because the rate of interaction between these intellectuals and ordinary Africans is not likely to be very high. If, however, the category of intellectuals includes, as it probably does, the whole range of white-collar workers, most of them part of a bureaucracy, then the level of conflict over rewards may be high.

From the point of view of the party, the existence of intellectu­als, scientific or otherwise, in salaried government positions may give rise to one or more elite groups (at a minimum a political/- bureaucratic elite and a scientific/technical elite), but they would be fully dependent on it. But the party has also apparently decided to permit the development of what may be called an entre­preneurial bourgeoisie. Confronted by a fragmented distribution network and the lack of a wide range of necessary goods, the MPLA-Labor Party will allow small businessmen to operate in the economy (in addition, of course, to state-owned enterprises on a larger scale and cooperatives) as long as these businessmen do not demonstrate counterrevolutionary or petty bourgeoisie tenden­cies, to use the party jargon.

Less than a century ago, however, before the implantation of Portuguese rule and the immigration of Portuguese who took over most trading in Angola, many Africans had shown themselves to be capable of entrepreneurial activity, and there is no guarantee that all Africans who engage in trade and small-scale manufactur­ing will be content to be tame entrepreneurs. It is possible there­fore that the party’s efforts to develop the country and come to grips with its economic and technical problems will generate not only a bureaucratic middle class and elite, very common in African states, socialist and other, but a business middle class less amenable to control than a salaried state bourgeoisie.

When the MPLA-Labor Party leaders turn from dealing with specific problems and irritants to projecting the ultimate nature of the state and society, they insist on using the standard language of many Marxist-Leninist groups, culled almost verbatim from early twentieth-century rhetoric and modified only by the ines­capable recognition that the bulk of Angolans are rural. Thus the party was to be a vanguard party of the workers, for only they had the potential for revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary elan, but the peasants must be in close alliance with the workers

—not only because there were simply not enough workers to do the job but also because, realistically, it was acknowledged that Angola was essentially rural and would remain so for a long time. Unacknowledged (publicly at least) is the possibility that urban workers and peasants may not have the same interests.

Religious Groups and Religious Life

Religious Affiliations

Information on the religious affiliation of Angolans after inde­pendence is lacking, and the estimates available for affiliation in the colonial period are in conflict. Moreover the meaning of reli­gious affiliation is ambiguous. An individual may, for example, claim membership (or be recorded as belonging) to a specific Christian denomination, a claim recognized by the domination and by his local community, but he may also share perceptions of the natural and supernatural order characteristic of indigenous religious systems and participate in some of the rituals embedded in those systems. Sometimes the Christian sphere of the life of a community will be institutionally separate from the indigenous sphere. In other cases the local meaning and practice of Christian­ity may be modified by indigenous patterns of belief and practice.

The problems of conflicting data and ambiguous meaning not­withstanding, it may be useful to present available estimates as a rough approximation to the preindependence situation and as a basis for reasonable conjectures on affiliation in the late 1970s. A religious census in 1960 gave the entire white population (3.6 percent of the total) and 48 percent of all Africans as Roman Catholics. In the absence of data for *mestizos* (roughly 1 percent of the population), it may be assumed that half or more were Roman Catholics. The *Annuario Pontificio* for 1966 (information furnished by the relevant dioceses), however, gave the proportion of Roman Catholics in Angola at 36 percent and that for 1968 at roughly 40 percent. Assuming the white population at from 3 to 4 percent, African Catholics constituted roughly 33 to 36 percent in the mid- to late 1960s. The discrepancy between the official figures for 1960 (repeated in a number of sources) and those given by the Vatican publication may be accounted for in part by the fact that the 1960 figures are based on a census and that some Africans living in communities with substantial numbers of Roman Catholics or Protestants may refer to themselves as such when asked, whereas church sources are likely to list as Christians only those who meet the formal criteria for membership. In the ab­sence of unambiguous information for the end of the colonial era, it is estimated that African Roman Catholics constituted from 40 to 45 percent of the population.

Most Roman Catholics are to be found in western Angola, not only because that part of the country is the locus of the densest population, but also because Portuguese penetration into the far

interior was comparatively recent and Roman Catholic missionar­ies tended to follow the flag. The most heavily Roman Catholic areas before independence were Cabinda Enclave, where most of the people may be included in the Kongo ethnolinguistic category but are separated from the Kongo of Angola proper not only geographically but in other respects as well. The latter are not quite so heavily Roman Catholic, and Protestantism has been very influential there. There was a substantial proportion of Roman Catholics in Luanda and Cuanza Norte districts. Luanda, particu­larly the city, is ethnically mixed; but there are large numbers of Mbundu in the area, and a kiMbundu dialect is the local lingua franca. Cuanza Norte is heavily Mbundu. Less heavily Catholic were the Ovimbundu-populated districts of Benguela and Huambo although Huambo has been estimated at two-thirds Catholic. In the southern and eastern districts the proportions of Roman Catholics fell off considerably.

It is not possible to determine whether the not-very-cordial relations between the MPLA-Labor Party government and the Roman Catholic Church have affected church affiliation (see Church, State, and Community, this ch.). The functioning of the Roman Catholic Church in its usual fashion requires the availabil­ity of priests, and most of those were foreigners and members of missionary orders. Less than 20 percent of all Catholic clergy were Africans in the colonial era. The state formally permits the pres­ence of foreign religious personnel, but continuing conflict may lead to their departure, weakening the institutional structure of the church.

Official data in 1960 gave the proportion of Protestants in the population at 17 percent, the great bulk of them presumably Afri­cans, although some *mestizos* may have been affiliated with one or another Protestant church, and one source claims 8,000 white Protestants. Here again, either the official figures are belied by another source or there was a substantial falloff by the mid-1960s. The tendency noted for individuals living near Christian com­munities to identify themselves as Christians of the appropriate kind applies to those living in largely Protestant communities. The *World Protestant Handbook, 1968* gives the total number of com­municants (full members) of the Protestant churches in Angola at 95,926 and of members of the total Christian community at 350,000. The dates for the information available for each of the churches or denominations listed vary, but in general it may be assumed to refer to the mid-1960s, and the proportion of Protes­tants in the category of total Christian community may therefore be estimated at under 10 percent. That category includes (in addi­tion to communicants) other worshipers, children of Christian par­ents, catechumens, and members of groups associated with the church. It may be noted that, by contrast, children of Roman Catholic parents are likely to have been baptized and to be enumerated as fully Roman Catholic., Some churches (e.g., the Church of God) recognize only full communicants. In churches where the distinction was recognized the ratio between the two categories ranged from roughly two to one to as much as four to one. Altogether omitted from the 1968 handbook are figures of the Baptist Missionary Society. This mission and several smaller Bap­tist groups were located entirely in the northwest among the Kongo. After the uprisings of 1961 these districts were declared a military zone by the colonial authorities, and foreign missionar­ies were not permitted to operate. Then and thereafter, substan­tial numbers of Kongo fled to Zaire, and the missions dispersed northward with them. In many cases, even if the figure for total Christian community in the mid- to late 1960s is raised by 50 percent, the proportion of Protestants would have been substan­tially under the 17 percent given by official sources in 1960 and the proportion of communicants or full members much smaller.

There was a very strong tendency for specific Protestant denominations to place their missions in particular regions and therefore to become involved with the ethnic groups living there. Lawrence W. Henderson, a Methodist missionary, has gone so far as to refer to Protestantism as a “tribal religion,” by which he means not only that there was a link between specific denomina­tions and ethnic groups, but also that the social structure of the ethnic community affected the way in which the local church was organized (see Church, State, and Community, this ch.). The fact of such links does not mean, however, that only one Protestant group carried out missionary activity amogg the communities of any ethnolinguistic category.

Among the Ovimbundu the missionary group longest in situ consists of the smaller units that eventually came to make up the United Mission (combining the United Church of Canada and the United Church of Christ Congregational—an American group). *The World Christian Handbook, 1968* gives the figure for com­municants as 50,000 and that for the total Christian community as 200,000. The Plymouth Brethren (not listed in the handbook) had 7,500 full communicants in the eastern Ovimbundu territories according to Henderson; they have also made an impact in Chokwe territory immediately to the east. The Philafrican Mission (also known as the Swiss Mission) reported nearly 6,000 full mem­bers in the late 1960s and about 11,000 members in the total Christian community. There were also some Seventh Day Adven­tists in the area. According to the 1960 religious census about 21 percent of the Ovimbundu were Protestants, but later figures suggest a smaller percentage even if members of the total commu­nity rather than communicants are counted.

The sole Protestant group active among the Mbundu was the Methodist Mission, largely sponsored by the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States. Portuguese data for 1960 indicated that only 8 percent of the Mbundu considered themselves Protes­tants, but Henderson noted that the missions had considerable success among the people called Dembos (after the rugged area in which they live), a kiMbundu-speaking group strongly resistant to Portuguese rule from the beginning and active in the rebellion of 1961. Because the area came under military rule after that year, later information was not available.

In addition to the Baptist Mission, several other Baptist groups have worked among the Kongo, without, however, achieving the success of the Baptist Missionary Society, a London-based group. Late 1960s or more current data are not available, but as many as 35 percent of the Kongo were considered Protestants by the offi­cial religious census of 1960. The Baptist Missionary Society’s figures for 1962 showed nearly 11,000 communicants and almost 40,000 members of the total community. Even if the other Baptist missions were, together, equal in membership to the Baptist Mis­sionary Society, Protestants would not have accounted for more than 10 percent of the Kongo.

The Plymouth Brethren working among the Chokwe did not communicate information on their numbers to easily available sources, but in 1958 they claimed more than 6,000 individuals in fellowship in eighty assemblies. Henderson notes the devel­opment of a spontaneous Christian movement in the diamond territory of what is now Lunda Norte Province, in which lay Christians, working for the Diamond Company of Angola, did the first evangelical work. If these are taken into account, as many as 8 percent of the Chokwe may have been Christians in the early 1960s.

The South Africa General Mission (after 1965 the Africa Evan­gelical Fellowship) was the only Protestant group to attempt mis­sionary work among the very heterogeneous Nganguela category. The scattered mission stations in this sparsely settled territory have reported a total of up to 3,450 communicants and more than 10,000 in the total community; but this area was the locus of considerable military activity, and the situation in the late 1960s, let alone that in the postindependence period, was unknown.

In addition to the Protestant churches directly generated by the missions and continuing in a more or less orthodox pattern, there were other groups that stemmed at least in part from the Protes­tant experience but expressed a peculiarly local tendency and were dominated entirely by Africans (see Church, State, and Com­munity, this ch.). How many Angolans identified themselves with such African churches is not known, but it is reasonable to assume that numbers of Africans were (and are) attached to them. If it is assumed that roughly half of Angola’s population was affiliated in some sense to either the Roman Catholic or one of the Protestant groups, then the other half is involved with indigenous religious systems. Those so involved are not likely to be isolated individuals but members of communities or parts of communities that have been little affected by missionary activity.

In a state dominated by an explicitly Marxist-Leninist party, the

party leaders and many of the militants are likely not to have a formal religious commitment or at any rate to deny having one. The total number of such persons, however, is probably quite small.

Indigenous Religious Systems

There are as many indigenous religious systems (patterns of beliefs, ritual, et cetera) as there are ethnic groups or even sections of ethnic groups. Two or more ethnic groups may share specific elements of belief, ritual, and organizational principle; but the configuration of these is peculiar to each group or section. Never­theless certain patterns are widespread.

All groups believe in the existence of a high god, but his attrib­utes vary (for example, some groups emphasize his role as a crea­tor, others not). Specific events in the world of human beings are not usually explained by reference to him, however, nor is a cult addressed to him.

The active entities in indigenous religious systems were ances­tral and nature spirits. The first were relevant to the welfare of a descent group or its members, the second to the welfare of a community in a given location, although specific individuals could be directly affected by one of the nature spirits resident in rocks, trees, or natural forces, such as wind or lightening.

Ancestral spirits, especially those of relatively recently deceased kin, had to be honored by appropriate rituals if they were to look with favor on the enterprises of their descendants. Only some of these rituals are performed by the descent group as a whole. More frequently they are performed by and on behalf of a segment of the group or an individual. Among some groups the ancestors of chiefs were significant not only for the chiefly lineage (see Glos­sary) but also for the communities ruled by their descendants. In theory, nature spirits were not generally considered to have led a human existence, but there were exceptions; occasionally the spirits of chiefs or others were detached from specific descent groups or thought to have the characteristics of other nature spir­its in that they were resident in features of the landscape.

The spirits of the ancestors of a kin group are looked to for assistance in economic and social matters, and some misfortunes —famine, poor crops, personal losses—are ascribed to having failed to perform the appropriate rituals or to having misbehaved in some other way. Not all misfortunes are attributed to ancestral or nature spirits, however. In most societies it was (and largely still is) believed that magical powers inhere in things, that these pow­ers are usually neutral, but that they may be used malevolently to afflict others or to prevent and deal with affliction, particularly illness and death. It is thought further that individuals, sometimes unconsciously and without the use of material or technical means, can bring illness or other affliction to human beings. Such persons, usually called witches, are thought to be marked by the presence

of a substance in the stomach or other organ (e.g., among some Ambo, the throat). The terms *witch* and *sorcerer* have been ap­plied to those who use their powers malevolently, the distinction between the two based in part on whether the power is inherited (witch) or acquired for something of value (sorcerer), that is, whether the power is mystical or technical and whether the power is used on one’s own behalf (the witch) or may be used, at a price, on behalf of others. In fact this distinction is made only in some societies and may be linked to certain features of community social structures and associated with patterns of accusation, that is, whether kin by blood or marriage or non-kin are held to be re­sponsible. Although the presence of beliefs in witchcraft or sor­cery has been recorded for Angolan groups, the kind of careful description and analysis that would show the link between specific features of belief, ritual, and social relations in any specific society have not been done.

Whether an individual’s difficulties are to be attributed to witch­craft or sorcery or to the acts of ancestral or nature spirits is usually up to the decision of a diviner, a specialist whose personal power and use of material objects are held to be generally benevolent (although there are cases where a diviner may be accused of sor­cery) and whose awareness of patterns of stress and strain in the community help him or her make the decision. A diviner—widely called a *kimbanda—*may also have substantial knowledge of her­bal medicine, and at least part of the *kimbanda's* work will be devoted to the application of that knowledge.

The *kimbanda* has inherited or acquired the ability to commu­nicate with spirits. In many cases the acquisition of such power follows illness and possession by a specific spirit. There is a good deal of variation in the proficiency and degree of specialization of diviners. Some will deal only with particular symptoms, others with a wide range. Some are limited to a specific village, others are widely recognized and may journey from one village or even district to another. The greater the reputation of the *kimbanda,* the more he or she charges for services. This widespread term for diviner/healer has entered into local Portuguese, and so central is the role of the *kimbanda* to the complex of beliefs and practices characterizing most indigenous religions, whatever the variation in detail, that some sources (e.g., the *Jomal de Angola)* in listing the religions of Angola apparently use the term *kimbandism* to refer to indigenous systems.

In general the belief in spirits (ancestral or natural) and in ma­levolent persons is associated with a view of the world that leaves no room for the accidental. Whether events are favorable or ad­verse, responsibility for them can in principle be attributed to a causal agent. If things go well, the correct ritual has been per­formed and the spirits therefore placated or their help invoked. If things go badly, the correct ritual has not been performed, or a spirit has been otherwise provoked, or malevolent individuals have succeeded in breaching whatever protective (magical) mea­sures have been arrayed against them.

This view of the world often persists even when individuals have been influenced by a Christian outlook or a degree of secular education. With some change in particulars, it seems to pervade urban areas where a *kimbanda* rarely lacks for clients.

Witchcraft was considered at the MPLA-Labor Party’s First Na­tional Conference on Organization, held in August 1977. The re­port, which gave no details, stated that “witchcraft is considered a problem within the scope of religion, but with special character­istics,” and that “militants should prevent acts of violence by the population against individuals accused of witchcraft.” Information for modem Angola is not available, but it has not been uncommon for individuals in similar communities elsewhere in Africa to claim the ability to find and root out witches when the community seems to be saturated with the kinds of tensions that generate accusa­tions of witchcraft. “Witchfinding” movements or simply spon­taneous outbursts against those believed to be witches have some­times turned to violence.

Church, State, and Community

Although Roman Catholic missions were largely staffed by non­Portuguese, the relevant statutes and accords provided that for­eign missionaries could be admitted only with the approval of the Portuguese government and the Vatican and on condition that they be integrated with the Portuguese missionary organization. The foreign Roman Catholic missionary was required to renounce the laws of his own country and submit to Portuguese law and to furnish proof of his ability to speak and write the Portuguese language correctly. Missionary activity was to be under the au­thority of Portuguese priests. All of this was consistent with the Colonial Act of 1930, which saw Portuguese Catholic missions overseas as “instruments of civilization and national influence.” In 1940 the education of Africans was to be the exclusive responsibil­ity of missionary personnel, and all church activities, education included, were to be subsidized by the state. In fact, Protestant missions did engage in educational activity and were permitted to do so—but without subsidy and on condition that Portuguese be the language of instruction (see Education, this ch.).

Because the Roman Catholic Church was so clearly tied to the Portuguese colonial system and has been so perceived by the postindependence regime of the MPLA-Labor Party, the poten­tial for conflict between the church and the party-state was there from the beginning. Such conflict became manifest not long after independence.

The important Protestant missions in place in the 1960s (or their predecessors) arrived in Angola sometime in the late nineteenth century and were at work before the Portuguese managed to establish control over the entire territory. Their early years, there­fore, were little affected by Portuguese policy and practice. Before the establishment of the New State in 1926 the authorities kept an eye on the Protestant missions but were not particularly hostile to them. (Settlers and local administrators often were, however, be­cause Protestant missionaries tended to be protective of what they considered their charges.) In those early years and later Protestant missionaries were not only evangelists but also teachers, healers, and counselors—all perhaps in paternal fashion but in ways that involved contact with Africans in a more sustained fashion than that characteristic of Roman Catholic missionaries and local ad­ministrators.

Among other things, Protestant missionaries worked quite hard at learning the local language, in part to communicate more ade­quately with those in their mission field, but above all in order to translate as much as they could of the scriptures into African tongues. Protestant missionaries were much more likely than ad­ministrators and settlers to know the local language. Roman Cath­olic missionaries did not similarly emphasize the translation of the Bible and, with some exceptions, did not make a point of learning the language.

In 1921, even before the era of the New State, the colonial authorities insisted that except as a temporary aid to teaching, only Portuguese be used in Protestant schools, and they also re­quired all translations of the Bible to be in Portuguese, although a translation in the local language could accompany it. The order was complied with, but parallel translations in the vernacular were made available, and Protestant missionaries by and large continued to make a point of knowing the language of those among whom they worked.

That specific Protestant denominations were associated with particular ethnic communities had, as already noted, the effect of linking the structure of religious organization to that of these communities. This was brought about in part by the tendency of entire communities, whether they were localized lineages or vil­lages or substantial segments of either of these, to turn to the variety of Protestantism offered locally (see Local (Rural) Social Systems, this ch.). The conversion of isolated individuals was rare. Those who did not become Christians remained to a greater or lesser extent adherents of the indigenous system; unless they mi­grated to one of the larger towns, persons of a specific locality did not have the option of another kind of Christianity. Those in a community who had not yet become Christians were tied by kin­ship and propinquity to those who had. On the one hand indige­nous patterns of social relations affected church organization; on the other the presence of Christians in the community affected the local culture to varying degrees. Christians who could quote scrip­ture in the local tongue contributed phrases to it that others picked up, and the attributes of the Christian God as interpreted by the specific denomination sometimes became attached to the high god of the indigenous religious system and typically made him more salient than he had been in that system (see Indigenous Religious Systems, this ch.).

The effects of the local social system on the ecclesiastical organi­zation of the Baptist church among the Kongo has been indicated by Henderson. In the first place, as time went on and the seniors of the church corresponded to the elders of the lineage, authority in the organization of the local lineage was often consonant with local congregational organization. Moreover neighboring villages were often linked by the fact that their core members were mem­bers of different segments of the same matrilineal descent group or were tied by marriage. In time villages, related in one or both of these ways became parts of a single circuit, the next higher level of church organization. A number of circuits then made up a “church,” of which there were three, each headquartered at one of the mission stations of the Baptist Missionary Society.

Whereas the Baptists had not attempted to impose a system of this kind but had seen it develop as an adaptation to the local social structure, the Methodists assumed that there would be a hierarchi­cal organization—and the kind they imposed was consistent with the local organization of the Mbundu. The outcome was very similar to that of the Kongo. The basic unit was a cohesive local community based on kin groups. These communities were orga­nized into circuits, and these in turn into districts that constituted the Angola Annual Conference. The government required an offi­cially recognized leader in each village, the *cataquista,* and the Methodist mission gave specific leadership roles to so-called class leaders, pastors, and district superintendents. In general, as Hen­derson remarks, the role of such official leaders, whether imposed by government or the mission, “was similar to the local chief . . . who was arbiter or spokesman for the elders rather than arbitrary ruler.” The elders had the real authority at each level. The Methodist Episcopal Church calls for a bishop, but there has been a resident bishop in Angola only since 1965. In the postin­dependence era he was an African.

Ovimbundu kingdoms as effective political entities were elimi­nated by the Portuguese, but the mission churches in the area were identified with the old kingdoms, each pastor in a sense corresponding to a king. The deaconates corresponded roughly to local chiefdoms, and each of the villages served by a deacon had an officially recognized *cataquista.* The village elders held real authority, however. Here again, in Protestant villages there was a close correspondence between the village elders who made deci­sions about land allocation, marital disputes, and even certain criminal cases and the elders of the congregation who had the significant voice in religious matters. At the higher levels, the pastors turned out to be members of the traditional chiefly fami­lies. In effect, even if the community could no longer choose the officially recognized chiefs (who might or might not be members

of the noble families) they could chose church leaders; and they apparently preferred those with a traditional right to be consid­ered for positions of authority. Henderson points out that this hierarchical arrangement was not characteristic of the sponsoring churches or missionaries themselves but was an adaptation to the local system.

The involvement of the Protestant churches in the languages of their mission areas, their medical and other welfare activity, and their ability either to adapt to local structures or (in the case of the Methodists among the Mbundu) to be fortuitously consistent with them gave Protestants much more influence than their mere num­bers would suggest. For example, the leaders of the three major anticolonial movements were raised as Protestants, and many oth­ers in these movements were also Protestant even if their commit­ment may have diminished over time. Thus, Agostinho Neto, pres­ident of the republic and leader of the Marxist-Leninist MPLA-Labor Party, is the son of a man who was a leading African Methodist minister and of a woman who remains very active in Methodist affairs.

This does not mean, however, that the notion sometimes voiced by Portuguese authorities and outside observers and frequently by settlers—that the Protestant missions were responsible for radical­izing their members—was accurate. By and large the missions eschewed political agitation. Unlike the Roman Catholic missions, however, they were not considered an integral part of the colonial regime, and they did not see it as their duty to turn Africans into Portuguese.

However, the Protestant missions, enmeshed as they were with particular ethnic groups and particular educational systems, could not act as channels by which a Protestant elite could be unified. In the end, those Protestants who opposed the colonial regime for whatever reasons and from whatever perspective had no exten­sive experience of each other (see Education, this ch.).

The official position of the state, expressed in Title II, Article 25 of the Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola (Con­stitution), was that “freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable. The People’s Republic of Angola recognizes the equality of all religions and guarantees the practice thereof, consistent with the public order and the national interest.” Elsewhere it is empha­sized that education is solely within the competence of the state and is to have an entirely lay character. The phrase on equality of religions and the insistence on the lay character of education, of course, mark a clear shift in the status of the Roman Catholic Church.

On the occasion of the First Congress of the MPLA in early December 1977, when the decision to convert the movement into the MPLA-Labor Party—a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party—was announced, the report of MPLA’s Central.Committee dealt with the relations between the party-state and religions. The relevant section of the report begins by stating the standard view that “throughout history, religion has always been one of the weapons the exploiting classes have utilized to divert the exploited ones in the revolutionary struggle for their liberation,” and that religion is nothing more than a distorted form of social awareness, to be changed only when the world reflected by religious ideas is trans­formed. It then goes on to say that the party and state will not ban religion (reaffirming the formal constitutional provision) but that efforts to have the party make “concessions” to religious ideas and to abandon its “position of principle” on religion will be fought, and “the party will not permit religious postulates to be used to combat revolutionary progress... or to avoid commitments which the law may prescribe.”

The Central Committee’s report then goes on to say that the party’s premise will be that “the struggle for a free and materialis­tic conscience is an integral part of the struggle for the construc­tion of the new society, where there is no more exploitation of man by man, a struggle in which it is essential that both believers and atheists participate.” There will, therefore, be “a continual and systematic dissemination of the scientific concepts about the world and society among the masses,” but party policy also takes into account “the fact that the struggle to strengthen national unity is incompatible with the segregation and repudiation of believers.” The party, therefore, must develop a policy that will attract be­lievers and “involve them in the tasks of the nation.”

In two major speeches party leaders dealt with the problem of the participation of the faithful of any kind (including those adher­ing to indigenous systems) in a party pursuing a materialist orien­tation. Acknowledgment was first made of the fact that numbers of believers, including some Roman Catholic priests, were activists in the movement and that they continue to be so. Although the formation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party that distinguishes between militants and sympathizers would seem to demand that the militants fully accept materialist doctrine, the two speakers (one of whom, Lucio Lara, was an important party ideologist) argued that sectarianism must be avoided and that at the stage of party development reached in the late 1970s, it was entirely possi­ble for a believer to be a militant if he otherwise met the appropri­ate criteria. Further if a believer felt himself unprepared to join the party, the roles of sympathizer and member of party-related mass organizations were open to him.

In general, then, the party-state was not prepared to embark on a militantly antireligious program, in part because many of its supporters, if not its leaders, had religious affiliations. Perhaps more important, an assault on religion and religious groups per se would detract from the pursuit of solutions to the variety of eco­nomic and political problems confronting the regime.

The state did, however, institute certain specific controls over

religious organizations, and it was prepared to act quickly when it felt that it was challenged by the acts of a specific group. Thus it was reported in early 1978 that the Political Bureau of the MPLA-Labor Party had ordered the registration of “legitimate” churches and religious organizations. Further construction of new churches without a permit was forbidden, but the government would consider requests for such permits. Priests and missionaries were to be permitted to stay in the country as foreign residents, and religious groups or churches could receive goods from abroad; such institutions would no longer be tax exempt, however.

The order on the registration of religious organizations seems to have been issued in the context of the banning of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, of whom there were only a few in Angola. The doc­trines of this group are such that its members withdraw from all obligations to nation and state (including military service), al­though they do not directly oppose the state, which they consider irrelevant given the imminent approach of Armageddon. Because of this withdrawal, seen by most governments as anarchic, a num­ber of states, Marxist and non-Marxist, have outlawed the group.

More significant was the conflict developing in the late 1970s between the party-state and the Roman Catholic Church. In De­cember 1977 the bishops of Angola, meeting in Lugango, drafted a pastoral letter subsequently read to all churches. The burden of the letter was “the frequent and lamentable violations” of reli­gious freedom. In their view, the sections of the Constitution gua­ranteeing religious freedom had not been implemented. Specifi­cally they protested the establishment of a single system of education that ignored the “inalienable rights of the parent.” They stated further that young people (and some children) are removed from the custody of their parents without the consent of the latter.

The bishops also objected to the systematic propaganda for atheism and to the fact that the church’s radio (Radio Ecclesia) had been closed down in 1976. The *Jomal de Angola* justified its closing on the grounds that the station was “abusively over­stepping its role and becoming a powerful instrument of the active counterrevolution.” A decree signed by President Neto on January 25, 1978 (after the pastoral letter had been issued) stated that there was complete separation between church and religious institutions and that the MPLA-Labor Party was to hold a monopoly on information. Radio Ecclesia, already si­lenced, was immediately dissolved and its assets and liabilities nationalized.

With respect to general philosophic differences, the bishops claimed that the church did not oppose a socialist society open to “human and Christian values,” but (in the words of the letter printed in the *Star* of Johannesburg) that “imposing atheistic ma­terialism on a naturally spiritual and religious people was a form of violence which could have the most evil consequences.” Again,

as the letter has it: “Christianity and atheistic materialism are incompatible and irreconcilable.”

Their protests notwithstanding, the bishops asserted that they would continue to work with the authorities. Whether they could do so was open to question. The *Jomal de Angola,* reflecting the party’s view, reacted to the letter in January 1978, accusing “some men called venerable representatives of the ever changing, so- called universal church” of preparing “a provocative, insulting, insolent, mendacious, reactionary document questioning the in­tegrity of the Angolan revolutionary process and making various unfounded accusations.” The newspaper then went on to accuse the church of “opportunistic, servile, criminal support ... for fascism and colonialism” despite the “good behavior of some Cath­olics.” It alluded to the church’s persecution of “some priests who valued their condition of men and patriots above the alliances [i.e., their connection with the church] of the past.”

Reference was then made to differences within the church, and the Basque missionaries in Malange Province were singled out as having collaborated with the MPLA in aspects of “National Recon­struction.” It was noted that the bishops had attempted to with­draw the right of the Basques to continue their missionary activity but that this effort had been forestalled by the regime. The *Jomal de Angola* closed its attack on the bishops by pointing out the clause of the third plenary of the central committee of the party, which considers “as illegal and punishable any activity which at­tempts to use faith or religious belief to oppose the revolutionary transformation of society.”

Information for mid- and late 1978 was not available, but the line had been drawn. In the circumstances, the church may not press its case. What remains unclear is the extent to which the bishops represent the roughly 40 percent of the population es­timated to be Roman Catholic and, further, whether those Afri­cans who became Catholics as a mode of adaptation to the colonial regime will remain so.

The situation of the Protestant churches was different but seems to have varied from church to church. However, there was little useful information about them. That variation was in large part a function of the attachment of the missions to particular ethnic groups. The Methodists, closely tied to the Mbundu who were, in turn, among the leaders and followers of the MPLA, seemed in the late 1970s to have accommodated to the regime, although detailed observations on this matter were not available. The Methodist Bishop, Emilio de Carvalho, is reputed to be quite sympathetic to the MPLA-Labor Party and has been quoted as stating that social­ism was the best option for Angola.

Given the uncertain status of the Kongo, the numbers of them probably still in Zaire, and the dispersal of the Baptist mission, nothing firm can be said about the situation of the Baptists. The situation of the churches in Ovimbundu territory is also uncertain.

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It is not clear how many Ovimbundu continue overtly or covertly to support Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA and what role if any the churches play in the politics of opposition to the Neto regime.

In February 1978 the Christian Council of Angola, headed by Daniel Mzinga, was formed as an umbrella group for Protestant churches, but no information on the denominations represented or their status was available in late 1978. Presumably the forma­tion of the council was approved (or at least permitted) by the regime, but aside from an appeal to Christian bodies overseas for help in averting famine, its activities have not been publicized.

Education

African access to educational opportunities was limited for most of the colonial period. Until the 1950s facilities run by the govern­ment were few and largely restricted to the urban areas. Responsi­bility for educating the Africans rested with Roman Catholic mis­sions (as opposed to the Portuguese church, concerned chiefly with whites and *mestizos)* and with various Protestant missions (see Religious Groups and Religious Life, this ch.). As a conse­quence each of the missions established its own school system, although all were subject to ultimate control by the Portuguese with respect to certain matters of policy. For example, the colonial authorities insisted on the use of Portuguese. The use of African languages for instructional purposes was explicitly rejected.

In the early years all of the missions tended to recruit their converts and students from among the sons (and daughters) of traditional leaders. This pattern was not as important later, but the missions did educate the first generations of the modem elite, some of whom were to become the leaders of various anticolonial movements. The fact that the then-potential elite did not have their ethnic (and religious) differences mitigated by a common educational experience at the higher levels (often the case in other African colonies) may account in part for their inability to cooper­ate later.

Beginning in the mid-1950s and accelerating considerably after the uprisings of 1961, the Portuguese government paid a good deal more attention to the education of Africans, substantially increasing the number of government-sponsored schools available to them. The data do not distinguish between African and non­African schools and students, but calculations based on a variety of sources indicate that African primary-school enrollment, only 3,733 (0.4 percent of the age cohort between five and fourteen) in the school year 1950-51, rose to 75,233 (6.3 percent of the age cohort) in 1960-61 and to 453,000 (nearly 32 percent of the age cohort) in 1971-72. Secondary-school enrollment grew from 1,754 (0.2 percent of the age cohort fifteen to nineteen) to 6,688 (0.6 percent of the age cohort) in 1960-61 to 62,668 (4.3 percent of the age cohort) in 1971-72.

Clearly education beyond the primary level was available to very few Africans before 1960, and the proportion of the age cohort that went on to secondary school in the early 1970s was still quite low. Nevertheless the growth in primary-school at­tendance was substantial. Whether those who entered primary schools received an adequate education—acquiring at least functional literacy in Portuguese—is another matter. Primary school consisted of a total of four years made up of a pair of two-year cycles. Portuguese statistics do not indicate how many students completed each of the cycles, but it is estimated that far fewer completed the full four years than entered the first cycle. Similarly there seems to be general agreement among observers that a great number of those who entered secondary school did not complete it. In general the quality of teaching at the primary level was low, carried on largely by Africans with very few qualifications. Most secondary-school teachers were Portuguese, but the first years of these schools were devoted to materials at the primary level. The problem of unqualified teachers at the primary level and of the lack of teachers at the secondary level (most of the Portuguese having left) confronted the postindependence government.

The University of General Studies was created in 1962 as an integral part of the Portuguese university system. Its faculties were dispersed: those of English and medicine at Luanda, educa­tion at Sa da Bandeira, and agronomy and veterinary medicine at Nova Lisboa. Given the lack of preparation of Africans, only 5 to 10 percent of the enrollment in the mid-1960s was African, a figure that probably rose slightly by the early 1970s.

The conflict between the Portuguese and the various an­ticolonial movements and the civil war that ensued after indepen­dence left the educational system, such as it was, in chaos. Most Portuguese instructors had left (almost the entire staff of the sec­ondary schools), many buildings had been damaged, and the avail­ability of instructional materials was limited. Cubans and others were able to provide some teachers, but the need to give instruc­tion in Portuguese and perhaps ultimately in African languages limited their utility.

In 1977 there were said to be more than 1 million primary­school students (at what levels is not clear, but presumably not yet in the eight-year course) and about 100,000 secondary-school stu­dents (again actual level not clear), roughly double the numbers in 1973. What proportions of the relevant age cohorts these consti­tute is not known, but in the case of the primary-school students it may have been almost two-thirds, in that of secondary-school students, perhaps a tenth to an eighth.

According to a report of the First Congress of the MPLA pub­lished in December 1977 and concerned with the “Essential Ob­jectives and Tasks of the Phase of National Reconstruction,” edu­cation has very high priority. The guidelines laid down emphasize Marxism-Leninism as a base for the educational system and its importance in shaping the new generation, but they also mention the objective of developing national consciousness and respect for traditional values. The training—at all levels—of persons who will be able to contribute to economic development is heavily stressed.

Primary and secondary education are said “to constitute a task . . . exclusively within the state’s competence,” and the party document reaffirms “the Constitutional Law on the lay character of education.” These statements presumably refer to the earlier role of the church and the missions in African education, but it is not clear that the involvement of the missions in education is completely rejected.

Primary education, defined as a basic eight-year course, is to be universal, and education at all levels is to be free. It is hoped that the goal of universal basic education will be achieved by 1980, a difficult task given the inadequate supply of instructional materials and the paucity of teachers, particu­larly trained ones. Of roughly 25,000 primary-school teachers at work in the late 1970s, only 7 percent were deemed “actually qualified to teach.” Moreover the distribution of primary teach­ers is distorted: the number of students per teacher in 1977 varied from as many as ninety-four in Cunene Province, to six­ty-three in Huambo, to forty-nine in Lunda (before its division into Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul), to a presumably acceptable thirty in Luanda. The combination of unskilled teachers and the generally high student-teacher ratio clearly suggests that if the goal of universal primary education is achieved in the near future, the level is going to be low.

Secondary education is expected to comprise a number of insti­tutions with different aims. Among these are “medium-level insti­tutions specializing in sectors of major interest to the country’s economic and social development” and “college preparatory insti­tutions specializing so as to facilitate rapid admission to college; these institutions will have a provisional character.” Presumably the middle schools are to train those Angolans who do not go on to high education in a variety of useful skills. The reference to the provisional nature of the college preparatory schools may imply that the emphasis on rapid preparation will continue only as long as it takes to provide several batches of students for the university so that the country’s need for reasonably well-trained cadres can be met. Some of the MPLA-Labor Party’s leaders, including Neto, are well-educated men and may ultimately prefer a secondary­school system that does not cut comers.

At the University of Angola special attention is to be given to “developing scientific and engineering courses essential for the country’s development, keeping in mind that agriculture is its foundation and that industry is the decisive factor.” The faculties in the 1978-79 academic year were those of Agrarian Sciences, Medicine, Economics, Engineering, Sciences, and Letters, but there is no information on the distribution of students among

them. Moreover professors are to be selected “so as to guarantee the implementation of the MPLA’s political line and a reasonable course level.” Exactly what is meant by the last phrase is not clear, but it may imply that, at least to begin with, the courses are not to be too demanding. This interpretation is consistent with the kind of college preparatory curriculum under consideration. The emphasis on the appropriate political line suggests that Angola will look to the Soviet Union or its associates for faculty. The vice rector of the university, installed in late 1977 and directly respon­sible for running it, was not an academic but a long-time activist in the MPLA. In June 1978 it was announced that several East German professors were to teach at the university.

Given the widespread tendency in much of Africa, at least in the early years of independence, for most students to avoid courses in science, engineering, and the like, the report of the MPLA’s First Congress makes the point that “the state will have to orient the choice of courses by students in accordance with the national interest.” How successful such an orientation will be in producing the requisite number of graduates cannot be foreseen.

In addition to the programs for formal schooling for the young people of the country, the report stressed the importance of adult literacy education and advanced vocational training or retraining for those already in the work force. The literacy program seems to have had some success since independence, but the MPLA thought it necessary to establish an institute to study the possibility of using African languages in literacy training, particularly in cer­tain regions. For those Africans who had at least rudimentary spoken Portuguese, learning to read the language, although diffi­cult, has a base on which to build. In the eastern and southern areas relatively few Africans have that base, and the use of local languages is expected to facilitate literacy training.

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This chapter has been based on a number of sources, none of which is satisfactory as a piece of conceptually sophisticated em­pirical research. Parts of some of them do provide useful informa­tion on some subjects, e.g., Hermann Possinger’s “Interrelations Between Economic and Social Change in Rural Africa: The Case of the Ovimbundu of Angola,” but even these refer to the prein­dependence era. Chapter II of Joseph C. Miller’s *Kings and Kins­men,* although primarily a historical work, contains a discussion of the complex character of Mbundu matrilineages.

If due account is taken of their heavily ideological character, the speeches of party leaders and the editorials and other matter in the *Jomal de Angola* and other Angolan publications provide some clues to tendencies, stresses, and strains in an evolving na­tional structure. Substantial excerpts from these sources are tran­slated by the United States Joint Publications Research Service in its *Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa* series. (For further infor­mation see Bibliography.)



IN LATE 1978 ANGOLA was ruled by President Agostinho Neto, whose regime represented only a part of the Angolan people and maintained itself in power only by means of massive foreign help. Not a day had passed since independence on November 11,1975, without armed conflict somewhere in the country, either with internal or external enemies or with both. The continuous struggle put a heavy strain on the economy, kept the regime dependent on outsiders, and severely limited its options.

When the Portuguese dismantled their empire, an internal war was raging between three contenders for power: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de LibertaQao de Angola—MPLA), the National Front for the Libera­tion of Angola (Frente National de Liberta^ao de Angola—FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uni ao National para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA.) A fourth liberation movement, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Liberta^ao do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC) fought, not to dominate Angola, but to secede from it. Four-way partition seemed likely at times. Since none of the contending forces was strong enough to win on its own, and since all attempts by other African governments for an Angolan solution to Angolan problems failed, external intervention was probably inevitable. In any case, the MPLA, led by Neto, eventu­ally won because of Cuban troops backed by massive Soviet help in weapons and materiel.

An outstanding characteristic of Neto’s regime therefore was the extreme narrowness of its political base. The ruling party was dominated by a small elite, largely *mestizo* (see Glossary) and ideologically Marxist-Leninist. This elite was committed to build­ing the political, material, and social bases for what it termed scientific socialism. The vehicle for ruling the country was the MPLA-Labor Party (MPLA-Partido de Trabalho), which defined itself as the “leading force in the State and in Angolan Society.” The government apparatus, though a separate structure, func­tioned under its directive. Mass organizations for women, youths, and workers transmitted party guidelines to the people.

The party’s rigid ideology has been tempered by economic pragmatism. The constitution specifically “recognizes, protects and guarantees private property,” and a Marxist orientation had not prevented the Neto regime from coming to terms with the Gulf Oil Corporation in Cabinda nor from looking for closer ties with Western countries.

In late 1978 areas in the central highlands, in the east and southeast, and pockets in the north were still contested by oppo­nents of the government. Both the FNLA and UNITA continued to demand the loyalties of people—their combined numbers re­portedly greater than those loyal to the MPLA and the govern­ment.

The overwhelming importance of external factors was the other characteristic of the Neto regime. Tensions and in some cases outright hostility between the Soviet Union and the People’s Re­public of China (PRC), between the United States and the Soviet Union, between South Africa and black Africa, between Congo and Zaire, between factions within Zambia or within the Namibian liberation movement, and possibly even between the Soviet Union and Cuba, impinged on the Angolan situation. In mid-1978 peace feelers toward Zaire and South Africa and over­tures to the United States were presumably signs that Neto wanted to reduce his complete dependency on the Soviets and the Cubans and that he was sensitive to the concern among African leaders over the growing military involvement of foreign powers on the African continent.

No outsider could gauge the degree of grass-roots support for the regime in the areas it controlled. Apparently it still had support in the major cities, but even there disillusionment had set in over the regime’s inability to make good on its promises. Most people seemed apathetic and mainly concerned with sim­ple survival. An attempted coup in May 1977 brought the de­gree of dissatisfaction, the internal divisions within the ruling elite, and the precariousness of its grip on the country into sharp relief.

Nor was it possible to guess at the precise extent of the areas that the regime did not control and the degree of support in these areas for the FNLA and UNITA. There were rumors of internal splits within UNITA and of discontent in the highlands when people were forced to destroy their crops rather then sending them to markets on the west coast.

What did seem undisputed in late 1978 was that no military solution to internal conflict seemed possible. In much of the coun­try, the contending parties claimed not control but a presence. It was a no-win situation in which all parties would eventually have to try for accommodation, if not between the present leaders, then perhaps between those who will replace them.

Political Geography

The boundaries with three territories, Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia, extend for more than 5,000 kilometers, mostly following rivers or watersheds, but in the south and east lengthy stretches are designted by lines of longitude or latitude. The coastline of 1,653 kilometers is the longest of any West African country. (An­gola claims territorial waters of twenty nautical miles.) Angola includes Cabinda, a small coastal area north of the Congo River estuary, which is separated from the main body of the country by a strip of land. The enclave also shares a boundary with Congo.

As an overseas province of Portugal, Angola was divided for administrative purposes into fifteen districts, which after indepen­dence were redesignated provinces. By 1978 their number had increased to seventeen by dividing Huila and Lunda into two. Provinces were in turn divided into districts (called *municipios* in Portuguese and often misleadingly referred to in English as “municipalities”). Still other administrative levels exist below the districts (see Local Administration, this ch.).

Background to Conflict

The nationalist movement in Angola was weak and divided at the time of the April 1974 coup that toppled the Marcello Caetano regime in Portugal. Three main liberation movements were bit­terly at odds with each other despite certain similarities. In princi­ple they all wanted a unified Angola and opposed a separate status for Cabinda; all had had support from whites, and all got weapons and other help from Eastern as well as Western countries at one point or another. The political labels they were to get later— pro-West, pro-East, communist, socialist, conservative—evolved in the course of the struggle and shifting alliances and were largely meaningless for local followers.

The movements, however, were deeply divided by ethnic loyal­ties and some other factors. The MPLA had its base among the Mbundu and mixed urban elements in north-central Angola from Luanda inland to Malange, the FNLA among the Kongo of the north, and UNITA among the Ovimbundu people of central An­gola (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). As attempts at reconciliation by outsiders failed, each of the movements increas­ingly mobilized support in its own ethnic region. In addition there were other distinctions between them based on class, race, reli­gion, and the experiences of exile, all of which combined to pro­duce different strands of Angolan nationalism.

Distinctions based on class had evolved under the colonial re­gime. *Mestizos* constituted a particularly privileged class. Above them socially were the European settlers. Below them were the *assimilados* (Africans who were usually the product of the educa­tional system provided in Roman Catholic mission schools and who had divorced themselves from their native culture (see Eth­nic Groups and Languages; Angolan Society After Independence, ch. 2). *Mestizos* and *assimilados,* many of them urban, tended to view the fight against colonial rule mainly in terms of class, and they found allies among leftist whites. Members of these groups founded the MPLA in December 1956.

The question of the role of *mestizos, assimilados,* and whites sharply divided the nationalist movements. Rural Africans, the vast majority of them illiterate, saw grievances mainly in terms of race. They considered the highly visible *mestizos* as an extension of the whites, all of whom were privileged in contrast to them­selves. Both the FNLA and UNITA had mainly rural constituen­cies. The MPLA, which saw the nationalist fight essentially as a class struggle and thought that Portuguese culture would ease national integration, accused the FNLA and UNITA of being paro­chial.

Religion, too, was a divisive factor. British and American mis­sions of various Protestant denominations had historically divided the territory between them, the Baptists having their missions mainly in the north among the Kongo, the Methodists mainly among the Mbundu in the center, and the Congregationalists a little farther south, mainly among the Ovimbundu. In fact, Holden Roberto, leader of the FNLA, was educated in a Baptist mission, Neto went to a Methodist mission school, and Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s head, to one run by the United Church of Christ. During the years of struggle each Protestant denomination became iden­tified with the liberation movement in its area whose members turned to it for help. Thus the missions unwittingly reinforced ethnic divisions.

There were Catholics among the followers of all three move­ments but comparatively more among the MPLA. The Catholic church, however, was generally regarded as closely associated with the colonial regime, and during the initial uprising in the north in 1961-62 their missions and schools were singled out for destruction.

Because of the miniscule size of the elite and because of the constant harassment by the Portuguese police, which restricted their travel and contacts, the various liberation groups were locked into their local bases and doomed to a limited political vision, even though each tried to reach beyond its ethnolinguistic community. Each stressed its own multiethnicity and blamed the other for being ethnocentric, but each fell back on its ethnic base for its main support. After 1961 efforts to liberate the homeland were made mainly from exile. In 1962 and 1963 both the MPLA and the FNLA developed parallel and competitive organizations abroad. Only UNITA, a latecomer that got started in 1966, spumed exile and emphasized the importance of the struggle within.

The psychological effects of exile were many. There developed a tendency to overestimate the value of outside support, and lead­ers spent much time in diplomatic travel. It led also to overe­stimating support at home, to exaggerated claims, and to much ' time spent in mutual vituperation. Eventually outside interfer­ence became more important than internal strength. Ideological differences, which had been blurred initially—for example, both FNLA and MPLA units had been trained in 1961 by radical Algeri­ans, the former in Tunisian camps, the latter in Morocco—shar­pened later under the influence of third parties, leading to a marked pro-West, pro-Soviet division between the two.

The Portuguese dwelled on the conflict, fed it, and used jt. In contrast, African states encouraged reconciliation because the fac­tional quarrels were sapping the nationalist struggle. But all at­tempts to get the leaders to evolve a common strategy and to pool their resources, such as the establishment of the Supreme Libera­tion Council of 1972, failed. The three continued to conduct their separate guerrilla campaigns predominantly in their own ethnic regions. The quarrels between them developed into physical at­tacks, each taking prisoners of the other. There was fighting be­tween the FNLA and MPLA from 1962 on, and after UNITA was founded, it fought the FNLA to the north and the MPLA to the south. \

Whenever a movement was weak it was ready for united action \ but spumed it during times of strength; UNITA, the smallest of the j

three, declared itself repeatedly ready for tripartite unity. It did ; eventually unite with the FNLA when both feared the ascendancy of the MPLA.

The FNLA

Stimulated in part by the tradition of an ancient kingdom, in part by the ideology developed by their brethren in the Belgian Congo, the Kongo of Angola had exhibited a strong ethnic con­sciousness, and it is they who provide the majority of FNLA follow­ers (see The Kongo Kingdom, ca. 1400-1665, ch. 1; Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). The roots of the movement go back to the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (Uniao das Popula­tes do Norte de Angola—UPNA) founded in exile in July 1957 to protest the installation by the Portuguese of an illiterate puppet, Dom Antonio III, as king of the Kongo. In December of the follow­ing year, when Roberto, UPNA’s delegate to the first All African Peoples’ Conference at Accra, Ghana, found little sympathy there for regional ethnic separatism, the “Norte” was dropped and the name changed to Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Popula- Qdes de Angola—UP A). The organization purported from then on to stand for the liberation of all Angolan people. In 1962 Roberto formed the FNLA by allying the UPA with a couple of smaller northern groups.

The UPA was responsible for the first major uprising in the north in 1961, which was brutally repressed by the Portuguese. Uprisings persisted in the following year despite the brutality of the repression. However, up to 400,000 Kongo (about two-thirds of their number in Angola) moved across the border into Zaire. As a result, the political constituency of the FNLA resided mainly outside the country. Roberto tried to enlarge the ethnic base by including non-Kongo in the leadership. Savimbi, of Ovimbundu origin, for example, became foreign minister of the FNLA’s Kin­shasa-based Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Govemo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio—GRAE) in March 1962. The attempt failed, however, and the movement remained

predominantly Kongo, functioning mainly outside the country and with little impact on the rest of the Angolan population. Nevertheless the FNLA, when compared to the other two move­ments, received the most consistent external aid, nearly all of it coming directly from or channeled through Zaire. Not only did Zaire’s Kongo provide a natural home base for Angola’s Kongo, but Roberto’s policies for the most part converged with those of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Moreover ties of kinship were estab­lished between the two when Roberto married a relative of Mobutu’s wife.

Mobutu came to power in 1965, but the FNLA had begun to count on Zaire’s help even earlier. Joseph Kasavubu, Zaire’s presi­dent from 1961 to 1964, provided some support. Moise Tshombe, who was Zaire’s president in 1964 and 1965, curtailed FNLA ac­tivities because his own support came from the Portuguese in Angola and white settlers in Zaire. But when Mobutu came to power the Zairian army took on organizing, training, and equip­ping the FNLA armed forces. In fact Roberto and Mobutu’s poli­tics became so closely tied as to be undistinguishable.

This close relationship spelled continuous and extensive sup­port, but it prevented Roberto from developing an ideology capa­ble of rousing people. He spoke of political independence for Angola, of agrarian reform—mainly the distribution of white-held land to Angolan peasants—of industrial development, and of pan­African unity, but for success he relied less on winning hearts than on winning military victories.

The then newly founded Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the GRAE in July 1963 and provided it with funds. This recognition was withdrawn in June 1971, after which only Zaire continued to recognize it. Covert support in the form of funds was provided by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) beginning in 1962. From 1973 on there was also some help from the PRC, which sent advisers and equipment. Romania sent arms. This happened at a time when Mobutu, too, established ties with the PRC.

Roberto ran a one-man show. He collected all the information and personally distributed all the funds he received. He domi­nated, with little accountability, all of FNLA’s executive bodies. Years went by without a meeting of the FNLA National Council or the GRAE Council of Ministers. Ambitious, obstinate, and pru­dent, Roberto eliminated potential rivals from leadership posi­tions. He remained in his secure Zairian base, living in a comforta­ble villa in Kinshasa, with his Zairian wife, guarded by Zairian soldiers, and never went across the border into Angola.

He concentrated on building military strength. By 1974 there were about 2,000 guerrillas operating inside Angola and another 10,000 to 12,000 making forays from the Kinkuzu military base in Zaire near the Angolan border—the largest fighting force of the three liberation movements.

The MPLA

The MPLA was founded secretly in December 1956 by joining several small organizations—urban based and *mestizo* and *as- similado* led—that had sprung up after World War II in Angolan cities, particularly in Luanda. Among them was the tiny clandes­tine Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Communista Por- tugues—PCP). The initial manifesto called for an end to colonial­ism and the building of a modern society free of prejudice regarding color of skin, social status, or religious affiliation. It warned, however, that this goal could be realized only after a lengthy period of political preparation followed by a revolutionary struggle. One of the founders of the MPLA was Amilcar Cabral, who had established the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde—PAIGC) a few months earlier in Guinea- Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands.

The first secretary general was the *mestizo* Viriato da Cruz, a poet. Both he and Mario de Andrade, who was MPLA’s first presi­dent in exile, emphasized that *mestizos* identified with exploited black Africans, and they invited whites who were similarly moti­vated to join their cause. Although a *mestizo* and an *assimilado* intellectual leadership created antagonism among rural Angolans, the MPLA found support not only among the urban intelligentsia and the shantytown dwellers of the *musseques* (Luanda’s slums) but among the one- and one-half million Mbundu around the Cuanza Valley and eventually beyond that among Lunda, Chokwe, and other groups after it had established its eastern front.

Armed struggle came earlier than foreseen. The Portuguese, aware of the budding political unrest, began ruthlessly arresting suspects during the late 1950s. In February 1961 an attempt was made to free political prisoners from a Luanda jail. There was also unrest among the peasants in the Dembos forest to the east and northeast of Luanda concurrent with the FNLA-instigated unrest among the Kongo farther north. The MPLA had been forced into exile in 1957, the leaders who had escaped arrest going first to Paris, then to Conakry in Guinea, and finally to Leopoldville. There they were joined in 1962 by Neto, a Lisbon-educated physi­cian from Catete. Neto had spent twelve years in Portugal and had been involved in anti-Salazar student politics. In 1959 he returned to Angola but was arrested and taken back to Portugal. In mid- 1962 he escaped detention and fled by sea from the Algarve coast to Morocco. After arriving in Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) he assumed the presidency of the MPLA.

Neto tried unsuccessfully during his sojourn in Kinshasa to form a common front with Roberto. In fact, guerrillas sent by the MPLA from Zaire to help partisans fighting in the Dembos forest were attacked by the FNLA. Therefore the MPLA exile group moved to Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of the Congo, in mid-1964 from where it began to conduct small guerrilla operations in the Cabinda Enclave. In 1966 a second front was opened in the settled eastern grassland of Angola, the guerrillas making their base in Zambia, which had become independent in 1964. During those first years the MPLA remained militarily far weaker than the FNLA. Moreover it lacked an operational base—in contrast to the FNLA—from which it could reach the thickly populated north and center of Angola.

In June 1966 the MPLA supported an unsuccessful coup against President Marien Ngouabi of the Republic of the Congo, where­upon activities of all guerrilla groups in Brazzaville were curtailed. In 1968 headquarters were moved to Lusaka, and from then on the MPLA conducted intensive guerrilla warfare in the Angola districts of Moxico and Cuando Cubango and, beginning in 1969, in Lunda and Bie districts, forcing the Portuguese to settle the inhabitants in fortified villages. Wherever MPLA guerrillas were in control they created new political structures, mainly village action committees. Politically indoctrinated MPLA guerrillas, some of them militarily trained in Eastern Europe, ranged all over eastern Angola from the Malange districts in the north to the Ovambo region in the far south. By 1968 the MPLA was able to hold regional party conferences inside the country. Political and military coordination were difficult, however. Operations were directed at times from offices in Brazzaville, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cabinda, and from inside eastern Angola. The most seri­ous weakness of the MPLA, however, was a succession of internal schisms, which arose mainly over the leadership by intellectuals from Luanda. In 1973 Daniel Chipenda, like Savimbi of Ovim­bundu origin and military commander of the Zambia-based east­ern forces, complained of *mestizo* domination, too close ideologi­cal affiliation with the Soviet Union at the expense of the PRC, and what he considered the personality cult of Neto. The quarrel that disrupted military activities in the east heated up again in the summer of 1974, and in the following December Chipenda was expelled from the MPLA for his so-called Eastern Revolt, taking with him his own faction and about 1,500 fighters. Subsequently he joined the FNLA. In March 1974 a small group of *mestizo* intellectuals, based at Brazzaville and led by Gentil Viana and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, also split off, denouncing Neto for “presidentialism. ”

During the years of struggle the MPLA had help from many sources. In contrast to the other liberation movements, the MPLA had a built-in advantage because of the links of its leaders to the worldwide ideological left. Its multiracial, Marxist, and nationalist (versus ethnic or regional) views appealed to liberals in Europe and North America. The Scandinavian countries, for example, provided help early. Because of his radical orientation, however, Neto failed to get help from the United States government when he first visited the country after taking over the presidency of the movement. Reportedly he visited the Soviet Union in the mid- 1960s and began getting regular but not very substantial support in August 1968. MPLA cadres were sent for training to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Cubans began providing training at the end of 1965 in Brazzaville, which had by then become the staging zone for such help. The PRC also gave help for a period.

Relations with the Soviet Union were not always smooth, how­ever. The Soviets backed the Chipenda faction in 1973 but then changed sides, probably judging Neto to be the ultimate winner in this conflict, by tipping him off that Chipenda was planning to kill him. But after hearing reports of military reverses and con­tinuing internal dissent, they withdrew help in early 1974. Only on the very eve of the Portuguese coup, when the fortunes of the MPLA seemed uncertain, did help from the Soviet Union and Cuba become substantial and decisive, causing in turn further radicalization of the MPLA.

UNITA

UNITA, the smallest of the three liberation movements, is backed by the largest of Angola’s ethnolinguistic groups, the Ovimbundu in central and southern Angola. In free elections, it could conceivably get the largest vote. Its founder, Savimbi, had connections with the MPLA until March 1962, from which experience stemmed a deep and lasting personal enmity be­tween him and Neto. He then joined the FNLA and became foreign minister of GRAE from 1962 until July 1964 when he had a falling out with Roberto whom he accused of being a pawn of the Americans.

After leaving GRAE Savimbi traveled to a number of countries including Algiers where he met Ernesto (Che) Guevara and to the PRC where he met Mao Tse-tung. Then he returned to Lausanne, Switzerland, where previously he had been studying. In the fall of 1965, not wishing to rejoin the MPLA and after a visit to Zambia (which had become independent in the previous year), he decided to found his own movement. He felt that a genuine need existed for a third movement since the MPLA represented mostly Mbundu, and the FNLA mostly Kongo, which left half the country without a voice.

He opened an office in Lusaka but planned to establish his move­ment inside the country southwest of Luso in the foothills of the Bie plateau. In addition to the Ovimbundu, Savimbi’s supporters included a few who had left GRAE with him in 1964, some stu­dents who were politically active abroad in the National Union of Angolan Students (Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos), and some whites—probably because of his belief in a mixed economy. (Their support was not going to help him much when they fled during the civil war.) He also got some backing from churches and missions.

Savimbi presented himself as a leader of black peasants, in

contrast to the *mestizo-* dominated, urban-based MPLA. He was not tied to a particular ideology. UNITA’s constitution, decided on at the founding conference, proclaimed that the movement would strive for a government proportionally representative of all ethnic groups, clans, and classes. It also put all exiles on no­tice that the struggle for independence had to be waged within the country.

In June 1967 President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia asked Savimbi to close his Lusaka office because of a UNITA attack at Teixeira da Sousa during the previous Christmas and another at­tack in March that cut the Benguela railroad, a vital link for Zambia’s copper exports. Savimbi went to Cairo where he stayed until mid-1968 and then returned to Angola by way of Zambia with help from the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which was fighting to free Namibia from South African control. From then on he remained inside the country. Taking a leaf from Mao he concentrated on raising the political conscious­ness of the peasants, most of them illiterate and widely dispersed. He preached self-reliance and founded cooperatives for food pro­duction and village self-defense units. He set up a pyramidal struc­ture of elected councils grouping up to sixteen villages that—at least in theory—made their wishes known through a political com­missar to the thirty-five member Central Committee whose mem­bers were to be chosen every four years at a congress. The Central Committee reported to the policymaking body, the nineteen- member Political Bureau, which was chosen and chaired by Savimbi. Its decisions flowed down through the various levels by the same route. Savimbi himself was to be reconfirmed by secret ballot by congress at its quadrennial meetings.

Beginning in 1970 UNITA began infiltrating the major popula­tion centers, slowly expanding its area of influence westward be­yond Bie into the Central Plateau. There, however, it began to collide with the eastward thrust of the MPLA, which was sending Soviet-trained political cadres to work among the Ovimbundu and specifically with Chokwe, Lwena, Luchazi, and Lunda, exploiting potential ethnic antagonisms. Some Chokwe began advocating an independent Republic of Moxico, which they hoped to establish by negotiating with the Portuguese.

Savimbi had asked Kaunda to invite Neto and Roberto when he first arrived in Zambia in October 1965 so that the three could discuss a united front. Both turned down the invitation. Kaunda subsequently did arrange a meeting between Savimbi and Roberto in 1966. Roberto used the opportunity to demand an apology from Savimbi and a promise to rejoin the FNLA. The MPLA simply viewed UNITA as an intruder in eastern Angola. When pressured by Zambia to unite with the MPLA, Savimbi declared that he wanted no part of a movement dominated by *mestizos* and *assimilados.*

Savimbi’s political views were moderate, halfway between

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*Boys at a UNITA political meeting Courtesy Wendy Holmes*

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those of the pro-Soviet, Marxist MPLA and the pro-Western, con­servative FNLA—and possibly closer to the latter. He condemned imperialism including the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. He stressed the priority of political over military action and preached policies based on practical experience inside the country and not those bom in the rarefied unreal atmosphere of exile. Most of all he emphasized the importance of being truly independent. In fact, from 1966 until the collapse of the Portuguese regime in 1974 he had a little help from Egypt and from no other country. UNITA always had more recruits than weapons, and Savimbi claimed that 80 percent of whatever weapons UNITA did have were either captured or stolen from the Portuguese. The Por­tuguese, in turn, did not harass UNITA too much since they con­sidered it militarily weak and a valuable counterweight to the MPLA.

On the eve of independence UNITA controlled much of the rich, food-producing central and southern provinces and was therefore able to limit the food flow to the rest of the country. It claimed to possess the allegiance of about 40 percent of the popu­lation.

Liberation Movements in Cabinda

Several movements for a separate status for Cabinda were founded in the early 1960s, all of them basing their claims on their own interpretation of Cabindan history. The most important of these was the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Mouvement pour la Liberation de 1’Enclave de Cabinda —MLEC), led by Luis Ranque Franque, which had evolved out of various emigrant associations in Brazzaville. In December 1961 a faction of MLEC seceded under Henriques N’zita Tiago to form the Action Committee for the National Union of Cabindans (Co­mite de AcQao de Uniao Nacional de Cabinda—CUNCC). A third group, Alliama, led by Antonio Eduardo Sozinho, represented the Mayumbe, the ethnic minority of the interior. The three groups resolved their differences and united in 1963 under the umbrella organization of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a LibertaQao do Enclave de Cabinda— FLEC). (A French version, Front pour la Liberation de 1’Enclave de Cabinda, is also in use, since most educated Cabindans speak French.) When the MPLA began its military incursions into Cabinda in 1964, it encountered hostility not only from coastal members of FLEC who were living in and near Cabinda City, but also from the Mayumbe peasants of the interior, whose region near the Congo frontier MPLA guerrillas had to traverse.

Emulating the FNLA, FLEC created a government in exile on January 10,1967, in the border town of Tshela in Zaire. Reflecting earlier divisions, however, the faction headed by Tiago established at the same time the Revolutionary Cabindan Committee (Comite Revolutionaire Cabindais) in the Congolese town of Pointe Noire.

When Gulf Oil began pumping oil in 1968, many emigrants returned. In hopes of a flourishing economy there was an upsurge of Cabindan nationalism that seemed near realization when the coup occurred in Portugal.

Internal dissent persisted, however. In the mid- and late 1960s the Tiago group continued to get help from Brazzaville, Franque’s group from Kinshasa. Within the Franque wing sev­eral factions had developed, including one led by Auguste Tchioufou. A member since 1963, he had his own following among his ethnic group, the Vili, who live along the coast as far north as Gabon. In 1974 Tchioufou took over, and Franque became honorary president.

Political Developments, 1974-78

The Portuguese Coup

On April 25,1974, the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Portuguese government. Much of the discontent that led to the coup was caused by the wars that Portugal had been fighting to preserve the empire and that had drained the country’s resources.

The next day the revolutionary regime in Lisbon dismissed all governor generals and civil governors in the overseas territories. Angola Silvino Silverio Marques, who had held the post earlier under Salazar, became provisional governor. Decolonization be­came the official policy, but there was considerable disagreement over what precisely that term meant.

The new Portuguese president, General Antonio de Spinola, had been the first major leader to suggest publicly that colonial wars could not be won and that the country’s overseas problems required political rather than military solutions. In his book *Portu­gal and the Future,* published shortly before the revolution, he envisioned a Lusitanian community (Lusitania is the classical name for Portugal) comprising metropolitan Portugal, the over­seas provinces, and the former Portuguese colony of Brazil, all autonomous but all retaining specific ties for mutual benefit. In­stead complete decolonization was quickly decided on; in May, less than a month after the coup, Portuguese leaders began confer­ring with independence leaders from Guinea-Bissau, Mozam­bique, and Angola. On July 25, 1974, President Spinola officially recognized the right of the overseas provinces to total indepen­dence.

In most of its African territories Portugal had only one indepen­dence movement or at least one clearly dominant one to deal with, but Angola, with three separate movements, not counting those in Cabinda, provided a perplexing exception. The Portuguese policy was therefore to recognize all three independence movements, show complete neutrality in dealing with them, and support a postindependence coalition government. FNLA, UNITA, and some Western observers charged, however, that Portuguese au­thorities in Angola actually favored the MPLA during the period of increasing communist influence that followed the coup.

Portuguese events had caught the three liberation movements unprepared. It also caught the white settlers unprepared because guerrilla fighting had not taken place in the urban centers where most of them lived. Thus they did not declare independence from the metropolis as whites had done in Southern Rhodesia. Hun­dreds of political prisoners were released during May—1,200 from the Sao Nicolau camp near MoQamedes alone. There was a wave of strikes, and workers’ committees were established in enter­prises giving labor a voice. A spontaneous outburst of rage among whites led to killing and destruction in the African slums until the army restored order. After demonstrations in Luanda Governor Marques was removed. In his stead Admiral Alba Rosa Coutinho was appointed. Because of his left-wing leaning, he was resented by some of the Portuguese settlers and military.

Each of the three liberation movements reacted to the new situation in a different manner. The FNLA intensified prepara­tions for a projected Angolan army of 15,000, and PRC instructors and Zairian paratroopers started training recruits at the FNLA Kinkuzu army base in Zaire. Romania and Libya sent military supplies. Meanwhile the Portuguese and UNITA ended hostilities on June 14; at the end of July the Portuguese signed cease-fire agreements with both UNITA and MPLA. Savimbi, hoping for a political victory at the polls, made statements reassuring to the whites, welcoming them to stay. He also implied a break in his relations with SWAPO by promising noninterference in South African affairs. Neto, who had been in Canada when the coup occurred, opened offices in Luanda. During July and August the FNLA moved military units into northern Angola, but it, too, signed a cease-fire agreement with the Portuguese on October 12.

After several unsuccessful attempts to form a common front, the three independence groups met at Mombasa, Kenya, on January 4,1975, and agreed to conduct negotiations with Portugal regard­ing decolonization. Both the Chipenda faction and FLEC wanted to be included, but they were excluded from the conference that took place in Portugal at the end of the month and that came to be known as the Alvor summit. At this meeting all parties agreed on November 11, 1975, as the date for Angola’s independence. They also formally agreed to a transitional government headed by a Portuguese high commissioner.

The Transitional Government

On January 31,1975, the transitional government was sworn in, but FNLA and UNITA insisted on Coutinho’s resignation because of his support for the MPLA. He was succeeded by General An­tonio Silva-Cardoso. Within days localized conflicts began again between MPLA and FNLA forces. Moreover on February 13 the MPLA attacked the Luanda office of Chipenda’s faction, killing between fifteen and twenty people and driving the group out of town. Chipenda joined the FNLA and became the assistant secre­tary general.

Meanwhile there was increasing involvement by foreign pow­ers, each move in one camp leading to countermoves in another. In late January the United States government’s 40 Committee (a group of high-level representatives of the departments of state and defense and the CIA concerned, among other things, with covert activities), authorized a grant of US$300,000 to the FNLA, which at the time seemed militarily the strongest of the three movements. The FNLA, striving for support outside its own area, set up offices in Luanda, and with funds from the United States and Zaire acquired a television station and a leading daily newspaper, *A Provincia de Angola.* It also moved heavily armed contingents of its military forces into Luanda and other urban centers. This led to several serious armed clashes between the FNLA and the MPLA in March, April, and May, including some pitched battles that left many dead and wounded.

In April the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana de­cided at a meeting to support Savimbi as leader of an Angolan government of national unity. Savimbi also had the support of some francophone states and of Nigeria and Ghana. Some of these countries later withdrew their support. The OAU and virtually all African governments pleaded for reconciliation and adherence to the Alvor agreement. In vain, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya personally tried to make peace in June and again in July.

The provisional constitution was published on July 6, and there were some attempts at celebrating unity week here and there, but there were also MPLA attacks on UNITA units and clashes between FNLA and MPLA units. FNLA forces march­ing south came within fifty kilometers of Luanda on July 24, and UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA on August 1, 1975. FNLA and UNITA, united by a weak alliance, withdrew their ministers from the provisional government in Luanda he­ralding full-scale civil war.

Cabindan nationalists’ hope for a separate state rose during this period. On July 24 Tiago announced the setting up of a provisional Cabindan government from Paris. A week later Franqqe pro­claimed the establishment of a rival provisional government, headed by FLEC’s General Francisco Lubota from his headquar­ters in Kinshasa. This lack of unity allowed the MPLA to get tenuous control of the enclave, a control intermittently chal­lenged by FLEC forces.

The continuing fighting led to an exodus of whites and wide­spread speculation that the refugees might interject a significant conservative, anticommunist element into Portuguese politics, possibly altering Portugal’s decolonization policy to one sympa­thetic to the more Western-oriented FNLA and UNITA. Some refugees demonstrated in Lisbon in support of these two groups. In July the civilian government fell, and the Armed Forces Move­ment took over. Long-standing personal ties existed between indi­vidual members of the MPLA and members of the movement. From then on the Portuguese government clearly supported the MPLA.

Soviet arms deliveries intended for the MPLA had increased in March. They were delivered to Congo (Brazzaville) and Pointe Noire and then shipped, trucked, or flown south in small craft. In the following months further military supplies were sent on Yugoslav, Soviet, East German, and Algerian ships. By mid-July the MPLA was getting appreciably stronger militarily. Alarmed, the 40 Committee decided to send substantially more funds to the FNLA and, for the first time, to UNITA.

Cuba had given small-scale aid to the MPLA since the mid- 1960s. In late spring of 1975, however, Cuban military instructors began training MPLA guerrillas. By late September and early October more Cuban military personnel arrived, this time chiefly combat troops, their total number then probably reaching be­tween 1,100 and 1,500.

The South African Intervention

For some time South Africa had been striking from Namibia at SWAPO bases in southern Angola. In August 1975 it militarily occupied the Ruacana Falls hydroelectric scheme and other instal­lations on the Cunene River. But on October 23 a force of 300 men —later increased to 2,000—invaded Angola, bringing about far- reaching political consequences. The strike force included, among others, some Africans who had served in the Portuguese colonial army, some white Angolans, some right-wing followers of General Spinola, and some white mercenaries. They marched swiftly north for nearly 1,000 kilometers and came within 100 kilometers of Luanda. These forces had come to the aid of the FNLA-UNITA alliance as a result of earlier negotiations with Chipenda. The South African entry prompted the Soviets to increase their flow of military supplies massively and the Cubans to send thousands of men, an act that quickly and dramatically revised the military situation (see Foreign Military Aid, ch. 4).

Independence and Civil War

Independence was declared on November 11, 1975, as previ­ously planned. There was no central government to which the Portuguese could relinquish control, and warring factions con­trolled separate geographical areas. High Commissioner Admiral Leonel Cardoso (who had replaced Silva-Cardoso on August 2, 1975) therefore refused to surrender power to the MPLA and instead ceded independence to the people of Angola. The MPLA announced the establishment of its government in Luanda and called the territory it controlled the People’s Republic of Angola. It was recognized by seven African states, including all of Portu­gal’s former African territories, the Soviet Union, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the communist nations of Europe, and Brazil.

FNLA and UNITA announced a separate regime with head­quarters in the southern city of Huambo and called their territory the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola. Because of continu­ing hostility the two components had difficulties setting up a gov­ernment and managed only in December to form a council of ministers and a revolutionary council of twenty-four members. They made no attempt to fuse their armies.

No states gave formal recognition to the Huambo regime. The South African intervention had clearly backfired, because it legiti­mized the Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA, particularly in the eyes of other African states.

The South Africans planned at first to hold the positions they occupied by mid-December in the hope that the OAU would be able to effect a political settlement, possibly also, although there is no proof, waiting for the United States to join them. Since neither came about, they began withdrawing their forces on January 22, 1976, and the last men left on March 27 after a promise by the Neto government to safeguard installations on the Cunene River.

Portugal continued its policy of condemning all foreign inter­vention in Angola through January 1976. On January 6 it banned the use of the Azores as a transfer point for men and supplies destined for Angola. Despite the ban, Cuba reportedly continued using the Azores for several days for the transfer of troops.

In January 1976 the OAU met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for the purpose of finding a solution to the Angolan situation. Like earlier attempts the meeting came to naught as a stalemate developed among the organization’s member states, an equal number sup­porting each of two conflicting resolutions. The first resolution, introduced by Senegal, called for a coalition government of na­tional unity; the second, by Nigeria, called for official recognition of the MPLA regime. On February 10, after the MPLA with the support of Cuban troops had emerged as the dominant military power, the OAU recognized the Luanda regime as Angola’s official government. The FNLA and UNITA pledged to continue guerrilla warfare, but by the end of the month more than eighty nations had recognized the MPLA regime.

The Portuguese government extended official recognition on February 22. This decision followed an all-night cabinet meeting in Lisbon in which the socialist and communist parties joined in support of the move. Portugal’s second largest party, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democratic©—PPD), re­mained adamant against MPLA recognition, as did the large num­ber of Angolan refugees.

Victory, of a Sort, for the MPLA

By mid-February the regime controlled virtually every impor­tant city once held by the FNLA, but the fighting did not stop. UNITA in particular had developed well-organized guerrilla groups and in May was able to hold its party conference in a secret place inside the country and to interfere with the operation of the Benguela railroad. The FNLA was less successful at first but by the middle of the year was able to infiltrate the north again.

Two rival separatist Cabindan groups also continued sporadic guerrilla raids, forcing Neto to depend on the Cubans to protect the Gulf Oil installations. One was Tiago’s group, which, since 1975, no longer had Brazzaville’s support; the other, the Move­ment for the Liberation of Cabinda (Movimento da LibertaQao de Cabinda—MOLICA), was led by Joao da Costa and supported by the French. Angola’s borders to the north, east, and south re­mained unstable and permeable with frequent violations and infil­trations, leading to acrimonious accusations. The South Africans took advantage of the continued guerrilla warfare by striking at SWAPO camps in November.

In May 1976 United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger announced that he had received a message from Fidel Castro that Cuba would start withdrawing its troops at the rate of 200 per week. (At the time between 11,000 and 15,000 were estimated to be in Angola.) The announcement was greeted with skepticism. Voicing widespread opinion, the British newspaper *The Guardian* commented that the Neto regime needed the Cubans in its cam­paigns against guerrilla forces, that they were also performing many useful civilian functions, and that they were clearly support­ing the regime’s attempt to forge a multiracial society against a strong current of black nationalism that was resentful of the domi­nant influence of *mestizos* and opposed to the presence or return of Portuguese. Castro claimed a year later that the withdrawal did actually begin in March 1976 at the end of the civil war.

World public opinion was divided over the question of who was the first to intervene in the Angolan struggle, South Africa or the Soviet Union and Cuba. The highly respected International Insti­tute of Strategic Studies published a survey in May in which it said that the Soviets had been the first to provide major arms supplies to the MPLA but that Cuban soldiers had entered in force only after the South Africans invaded and were moving north. Dealing with the question of outside aid, John A. Marcum, perhaps the leading American analyst of recent Angolan history and politics, stated that the total help given the MPLA and FNLA-UNITA was roughly equal.

In June Angola’s application for membership at the United Na­tions (UN) was defeated because the United States vetoed it. Fi­nally on November 22 the UN Security Council recommended by thirteen votes to none that Angola should be admitted. The PRC

did not take part because it considered Angola under “Soviet imperialist” influence. The United States abstained, expressing the view that Angola could hardly be called truly independent while massive contingents of Cuban troops were stationed on its soil.

Internal Dissent

The Neto regime also faced problems within its own ranks gen­erated by independent left-wing organizations and militant work­ers. Neto made the first public reference to internal dissent on February 6, 1976, when he publicly denounced a demonstration that had taken place outside the presidential palace. Students and dockworkers had protested the closing of a popular radio program critical of the “new bourgeoisie” within the government and had demanded rule by workers and peasants. There were several ar­rests, followed by a major crackdown on opposition elements. One of these was the so-called Active Revolt faction, which comprised intellectuals of varying political orientation within the MPLA. It had been founded in 1973 and included MPLA’s first president, Mario de Andrade, and his brother Joaquim Pinto de Andrade among several prominent MPLA leaders. Another was the Com­munist Organization of Angola, of Maoist orientation, which had been founded in 1975 and which, in its *Jornal Communista,* at­tacked the MPLA as a bourgeois party, condemned Soviet imperi­alism, and asked for withdrawal of all Cuban forces.

Despite the arrests, political opposition continued, especially among workers who no longer routinely accepted orders from state or private bosses. The government therefore passed a Labor Discipline Law in January 1976 that called work stoppages or strikes not ordered by the official National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA) “crimes against production” punishable by six to twenty-four months in jail. A big strike in June at a coffee bag factory was quelled by sending government troops to occupy the factory.

Because of strikes and slowdowns and the continuing unrest in rural areas the elections for members of local people’s councils, which had been scheduled for May 13, were postponed to June 27 and then held only in Luanda. There was little interest, and no more than 10 percent of the voters went to the polls. In July Neto for the first time publicly mentioned dissent within the MPLA, noting that clandestine meetings (i.e., those not reported to the Central Committee or the Political Bureau), were being held. Discipline, he said, must be tightened, and top-level decisions must be obeyed.

The First Shaba Invasion

On March 8,1977, an attack was launched from Angolan soil on the Shaba Region of Zaire by members of a political opposition group hostile to Zaire’s President Mobutu, the National Front for

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the Liberation of the Congo. Some of them had belonged to a paramilitary force, the so-called gendarmes, who had fought for Tshombe, secessionist leader of Katanga (as Shaba used to be called) from 1960 to 1963. Most members left Zaire for Angola after Tshombe disappeared from the political scene, and they then served the Portuguese in fighting Angolan nationalists. After the coup they were recruited by the MPLA to fight against the FNLA, whom their enemy Mobutu was supporting. They were in fact instrumental in stopping the FNLA advance on Luanda.

The Shaba invasion was ended eighty days later with a victory for Mobutu achieved with the help of Moroccan troops. Mobutu angrily accused the MPLA of having instigated the attack, which, he claimed, had been led by Cuban officers. No proof was ever published to substantiate these allegations. In return Neto bitterly charged Mobutu with harboring and militarily supporting both FNLA and FLEC, preparing them for large-scale invasions. As a sign of sympathy for Neto a front-line summit, which was to be held at Dar es Salaam to discuss southern African problems, espe­cially Rhodesia, was shifted to Luanda. Another result of the Shaba incident was a halt in the withdrawal of Cuban troops in June. From then on their numbers increased. Border violations and mutual recriminations continued.

The Nitista Plot

An uprising by ultraleftists on the night of May 27, 1977, brought the prevailing unrest into sharp relief. Efforts to socialize agriculture had been resisted. Guerrilla fighting in the south against UNITA had disrupted crop planting. The rate of unem­ployment in the cities was high, and there were reports of dissatis­faction among factory workers.

The uprising was led by Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem. Alves had been among the guerrilla forces in the Dembos forest who had started fighting in 1961 when the attack on the Luanda prison failed. At the time of the coup in Portugal he had been the political and military leader of what had come to be called the First Region. He became the self-proclaimed spokesman for Luanda’s slums, where committees called Poder Popular (people’s power) had spontaneously organized themselves to fight first against the whites and later against the FNLA forces, whom they helped drive from the city. Largely because of his leadership in the slums, Alves became the first minister of interior. He continued to be identified and respected as the leader of the First Region—that area of An­gola where the MPLA had established its first guerrilla stronghold within the country—in contrast to those who fought from sanc­tuaries in other countries. As minister he was able to place many of his followers in the administration at both the national and local levels. He also played an important role in the department of mass organization. He was instrumental, as minister of interior, in sup­pressing the Angolan Communist Organization, although in some respects their outlook was akin to his, and thus lost much of his support in the slums.

Alves had been violent in his criticism of the government, ex­pressing a long-simmering general discontent well known to Neto and other leaders. In October 1976 the Plenary Meeting of the MPLA Central Committee condemned Alves for factionalism and abolished his ministry. Liaison with provincial commissars became a function of the Council of Ministers.

Van Dunem had been a political prisoner in Sao Nicolau camp during the first years of the liberation struggle and still had a network of friends among former fellow prisoners. He became political commissar of the armed forces in southern Angola. He was married to a white Angolan, Cita Vales, who had been promi­nent in the Union of Communist Students in Portugal.

Rumors spread of secret plotting, and clandestine leaflets ap­peared containing racist attacks on white Portuguese who worked as expatriates for the Angolan government. A commission of in­quiry was set up to investigate, among other things, reports that Van Dunem and Alves and their followers had purposefully caused food shortages in order to stir up discontent. Presumably they were able to do this with the help of the provincial commis­sars of Malange and Benguela, the two provinces that traditionally supplied Luanda. The commission’s findings were discussed by the Central Committee that met on May 20-21. Both Alves and Van Dunem were found guilty and both, despite their protests, were expelled from the Central Committee.

The attempted coup got under way in the early morning of May 27 with an attack on Sao Paulo prison and other key points using mortars and automatic rifles. The radio station was seized, and appeals were broadcast calling for mass demonstrations outside the presidential palace. Alves counted on people in the slums responding, and Van Dunem thought that army units sympathetic to him would protect the demonstrators. Neither happened, nor was there an uprising in the provinces as the plotters had hoped. Moreover the Cubans did not remain neutral but rallied to the president. By midday the small group of demonstrators had left, the radio station was retaken, and the rebels had fled into the slums taking with them a number of hostages.

Reportedly Neto planned at first to be lenient with the plotters, but in the afternoon ten senior government leaders, including five members of the Revolutionary Council, were killed, causing an outburst of public indignation and sorrow.

By May 30 there was still a dusk-to-dawn curfew in force and roadblocks throughout the capital. Soviet-supplied tanks and ar­mored cars with Cuban crews guarded the main public buildings. The following day, in an emotional speech, the president reported that the rebels had followers in the provinces and in such mass organizations as the MPLA-Youth Quventude do MPLA— JMLPA), the Organization of the Angolan Woman (OrganizaQao da Mulher Angolana—OMA), the Army Women’s Section, and the Military Police.

As a result there was a massive purge. The radio admitted that more than 100 people including the deputy chief of staff of the army were detained, although the actual number was probably much higher. Both Van Dunem and Alves escaped but were cap­tured later, Van Dunem in June and Alves in July.

In the nine months that followed Neto tried to deal with his internal enemies by purging and reorganizing the MPLA and by making sweeping changes in the staffing of state and provincial bodies and the popular mass organizations. The commissars and directing committees in eight provinces, appointed by Alves when he had been minister of the interior, were removed. Thousands of Alves supporters, referred to as Nitistas, were dismissed from their positions and detained. Seven ward committees in Luanda that were packed with Nitistas were disbanded. All mass organizations including the UNTA were made subordinate to the MPLA at their respective levels. To achieve these changes national and provin­cial restructuring committees were set up.

Increased Warfare

Meanwhile UNITA, which was said to control the countryside in the south, was accelerating its hit-and-run war with the MPLA government. In July its forces captured Cuangar, a small town on the Namibian border, causing a swelling flow of refugees. Lon­don’s *Daily Telegraph* reported that UNITA was operating from three bases in northern Namibia from where they were able to move freely back and forth across the border.

On July 21 Angola protested South Africa’s escalating acts of aggression to the UN, saying that these constant attacks made it entirely legitimate to call on friendly countries for help. In the same month Savimbi sent his spokesman, Jorge Sangumba, on a mission to drum up support among moderate African states for the establishment of a separate republic to be called the Black African and Socialist Republic of Angola. Its northern border was to be the eleventh parallel, roughly on a line from Novo Redondo on the Atlantic Coast to Teixeira de Sousa near the Cassai River border with Zaire. The establishment of such a republic was not to be seen as a secessionist move but as a step in the eventual unification of the country once the Cubans and Soviets left. Savimbi drew on the example of Vietnam, which was unified once the Americans left.

On October 9 Cuangar was recaptured by government and Cuban forces. Meanwhile sporadic fighting persisted in Cabinda, where Gulf Oil installations depended for safety on Cubans. Guer­rilla forces continued, however, to be plagued by factionalism.

On October 16 FLEC leader Franque proclaimed the Indepen­dent State of Liberated Areas of Cabinda, which, he said, com­prised two-thirds of the enclave. This was promptly disclaimed by two officers of the Cabindan Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Marcelino Luemba Tubi and Major Luis Fernandez, who were disillusioned with FLEC’s external leadership—Franque spent most of his time in Paris or Kinshasa. They set up a new organiza­tion inside Cabinda designed to replace FLEC, which they named the Military Command for the Liberation of Cabinda.

UNITA was reported to have launched ill attacks within three weeks in October 1977, repeatedly cutting the Benguela railroad. Accusations of attacks and counterattacks characterized the first half of 1978. In April government forces, aided by Soviet advisers and Cuban troops (and according to some sources, also by Nigeri­ans, Guineans, Congolese, and East Germans), mounted a con­certed attack on UNITA.

On May 4, 1978, South Africa made a lightning attack on the mining town of Kassinga 230 kilometers inside Angola after inten­sive bombing. It was the first full-scale raid since South Africa’s involvement in the 1975-76 civil war. The purpose, according to South Africa’s Minister of Defense P.W. Botha, was to hit SWAPO camps. The scope and skill of insurgency campaigns in northern Namibia had been increasing just at a time when delicate negotia­tions concerning Namibian independence were being held. An­gola denounced the raid as barbaric, claimed the death of women and children at a refugee camp, and requested a meeting of the UN Security Council to protest the “invasion by racist South Afri­can troops.” The UN Security Council unanimously condemned the raid, which left 600 persons dead and 420 injured, and warned that punitive measures would follow another such attempt.

On May 11,1978, again representing the anti-Mobutu National Front for the Liberation of the Congo, guerrillas launched another strike at Shaba from their bases within Angola, capturing the min­ing town of Kolwezi. A week later they were driven out by some 2,500 French and Belgian paratroopers who rescued more than 2,000 whites. The attack and counterattack left the town deva­stated and several hundred dead. The invaders returned to Angola or vanished into the surrounding bush, presumably to strike again. This second attack led to claims of Angolan, Soviet, and Cuban involvement by President Mobutu and denunciations of such in­volvement by President Jimmy Carter.

Peace Feelers

Peaceful accommodation between Angola and Zaire rather than armed conflict, and thus possibly less need for foreign assist­ance, seemed a distinct possibility at the OAU meeting in Khar­toum in July 1978. After two secret meetings Neto and Mobutu announced that they would henceforth respect their common borders and make serious efforts to prevent rebel groups from crossing into each other’s territory. In addition Neto promised to reopen the Benguela railroad. A four-nation committee of observ­ers from Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Rwanda were to super­vise the accord. Neto also said that returning Zairian guerrillas had been disarmed and their vehicles confiscated and that steps were being taken to settle the roughly 250,000 Zairian refugees in An­gola farther away from the border. There was also hope that the Namibian dispute would be peacefully settled, resulting in the removal of South African forces from Namibia, which in turn might make South Africa less concerned to support Savimbi (see South Africa, this ch.).

The Party

The MPLA held its first congress from December 4 to 11,1977, during which Lucio Lara, powerful, long-standing political secre­tary and—aside from Neto—the movement’s principal ideologist, announced plans to replace it with a new vanguard working-class party, the MPLA-Labor Party (MPLA-Partido de Trabalho). This step, according to Neto, would take Angola closer to Marxist rule. The party would strengthen workers’ participation and reign su­preme over the organs of state according to classical Leninist doctrine.

Party statutes state that the MPLA-Labor Party is the driving force of the nation. It defines the official political line in all fields of activity, guides its application, and oversees its execution. It thus has supremacy over the government, although the two retain different hierarchical structures. The party is conceived as the link between workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, and all those who are devoted to the revolutionary cause of the proletar­iat.

Ideology

The official ideology is Marxism-Leninism. So-called scientific socialism, it was hoped, would eliminate forever the exploitation of man by man.

Leaders see the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a logical development. From its inception in 1956 the MPLA was not only anticolonial but anti-imperialist. It eventually became anticapitalist as well. The MPLA’s first congress called the working class the most consistent adversary of capitalism and therefore the logical revolutionary leading force in state and soci­ety. It acknowledged, however, only an insignificant working class in Angola when the war began. The vast majority were peasants, many of whom fought in the national liberation struggle but had not yet, in the party’s view, acquired a true class consciousness. An alliance between workers and peasants was not considered a prob­lem because of the recent peasant origin of Angolan workers.

Radio, television, and newspapers (mainly the *Jomal de Angola* and *Diario de Luanda)* had been nationalized in 1976. The Minis­try of Information was abolished and the Angolan Press Agency set up. In April 1978 a presidential decree designated this agency as the disseminator of the official ideology. Its directorate was ap-

pointed by the Political Bureau from among the members of the Central Committee. They were under the jurisdiction of the Revo­lutionary Guidance Department of the Central Committee, which would “insure [the agency’s] correct and effective participation in the raising of the educational, cultural, and political level of the Angolan people.”

Membership

Only persons who live exclusively from the fruit of their labor and who in no manner exploit the labor of others can be members. They are expected to be students of Marxism-Leninism, imple­ment party goals actively and in an exemplary manner, and be outstanding in their jobs. As the MPLA transformed itself from a movement to a vanguard party, the leaders initially decided to admit as party members only those who had been truly militant members of the movement. Others were considered potential candidates. All had to fulfill strict requirements.

Applications for membership are made to the party unit in the workplace and handed in together with a record of past political, professional, and social activities, and two recommendations by people who had been members for two years but were not mem­bers or candidate members of the Central Committee. On accept­ance candidates serve an apprenticeship for two years (only one year if they were workers or soldiers with a working-class back­ground). This rule, it was hoped, would discourage members of the lower middle class from “their discreet course to power.” In his message on the second anniversary of independence President Neto referred to the latter as the “moldy” class and warned that members of this class were plotting to restore their subordination to capitalism.

In very special cases persons could become members or candi­dates without any formality, simply on approval by the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, or its secretariat. There existed a third category, aside from members and candidates, of so-called sympathizers who were urged to join one of the mass organiza­tions subordinate to the party. People under twenty-five could enter the party only by way of the JMPLA.

Organization

In theory the organizing principle of the party is democratic centralism; that is, after presumably free and open discussion, decisions are binding for all members of a unit. The minority has to submit to the majority, and lower organs are subordinate to higher organs.

The supreme organ of the party is the congress, which meets every five years. Its task is to assess, discuss, amend, and approve reports submitted by the various central organs; to establish and modify (if needed) the program, statutes, and political orientation of the party; and to elect the president and the seventy-five mem-



*A May Day parade by followers of the MPLA Courtesy Wendy Holmes*



bers and twenty-five alternate members of the Central Commit­tee.

The Central Committee is responsible for the general policy of the party within the guidelines laid down by congress. It directs the activities of the administration, the army and security forces, and the mass organizations. It appoints the top leaders of govern­ment and economy. Its plenary meetings take place every six months. Seven departments of the Central Committee deal re­spectively with foreign relations; organization; revolutionary guidance; political and ideological education; education, culture, and sport; national reconstruction; and administration and finance.

The Central Committee elects the Political Bureau of eleven members (including the president) and three alternates from among its members. This bureau, which constitutes the supreme executive organ of the nation, directs party activities between plenary meetings of the Central Committee. In turn a secretariat, also appointed by the Central Committee, directs the day-to-day activities under the guidance of the Political Bureau.

Party organization follows administrative divisions (see Local Administration, this ch.). The superior organ of the provincial, district, and communal levels is the conference that meets every two years and elects an executive committee and a committee coordinator. For the ward or settlement, the superior party organ is the assembly of members that meets once a year, at which time a coordinator and one or two associate coordinators are elected.

The basic party unit is the cell in enterprises, factories, planta­tions, or agricultural cooperatives, schools, hospitals, and govern­ment offices. Cells may have up to thirty members. When there is more than one cell in a place of work, a work party committee is created. Cell members meet at least once every fifteen days.

Committees and coordinators are responsible for all party activi­ties at their respective levels. They are allowed to solve local problems independently if their solutions are not contrary to reso­lutions taken by higher level committees. Whereas lower level committees are elected by show of hand, those serving on commit­tees at the provincial level and up are supposed to be elected by secret ballot. However, the *Jomal de Angola* reported on March 30,1978, that for the time being they would be appointed to make sure of adequate factory worker representation.

All party organs base their activities on the decisions of the congress and the Central Committee and ensure their application within their administrative area. Each level directs the levels below it and also guides the activities of the JMPLA and the mass organizations, such as the UNTA, the OMA, and others. Mass or­ganizations, which had been established during the liberation struggle in areas controlled by the MPLA, are seen as providing a framework for organizing the masses. They constitute the main vehicle for the transmission of party guidelines to the entire popu­lation, and they guarantee the participation of the masses in the study, discussion, and application of party policies.

The JMPLA is for people from age seventeen to twenty-five. Its members participate in the Popular Defense Organization, in mass literacy campaigns, and in various other projects—such as organizing students on school holidays for voluntary manual work —and in national reconstruction.

Party control commissions have the task of eradicating all at­tempts at factionalism at the national, provincial, municipal, and communal levels. Members of the control commissions are elected by the respective party committees but have to be approved by the party committee higher up in the hierarchy. They can ap­prove or modify resolutions taken by lower control commissions.

Internal Tensions

The *Jomal de Angola* editorialized on April 13, 1978, that the country needed a revolutionary democratic dictatorship because of the huge problems it was facing. Apart from the fact that demo­cratic dictatorship may seem a contradiction in terms, the regime in mid-1978 was definitely becoming less democratic and more dictatorial. The turning point was the Nitista plot in the spring of 1977 and its aftermath. It brought the divisions within the MPLA into the open and led to less conciliatory, more inflexible policies. It culminated in constitutional changes that gave more power to the president, downgraded grass-roots institutions, transformed the MPLA into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, and established control commissions that scrutinized the background and ideolog­ical soundness of cardholders. The changes provided control mechanisms but did not eliminate the contradictions and tensions within the party.

The MPLA had come to power with latent schisms within itself, manifested in Chipenda’s Eastern Revolt and Viana’s Active Re­volt in the summer of 1974. Chipenda had complained of *mestizo* domination; Viana had accused Neto of dictatorial methods. Alves, during his first meeting with Neto at a congress in Lusaka in 1974, had declared himself as a “champion of the struggle against the bourgeoisie,” which he identified as whites and *mestizos.* He pro­posed—in total opposition to the multiracial stand of the MPLA— that citizenship be withheld from all whites born in Angola except for those who had actively participated in the liberation struggle and that *mestizos* would have to apply for citizenship. In his at­tempt to overthrow the government three years later he appealed to the widespread resentment against *mestizos,* whites, and as­similated Africans among Luanda’s slum dwellers. He also de­plored the pervasive presence of the Cubans, who were seen by many simply as replacement for the departed Portuguese.

Alves also stood for Poder Popular, the name given to ward committees that had been spontaneously established during the civil war and that had given people a chance to play a direct

political role. Neto, in contrast, saw them as a threat to the govern­ment and party hierarchies.

Alves had called for a struggle against the bourgeoisie but saw it as a struggle between races. Neto, too, in December 1977, de­clared himself an enemy of the bourgeoisie, but he did so strictly in terms of class. In opting for a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party Neto espoused the cause of the working class, which he contrasted with the small urban-based elite. “In the past,” he said on the eve of the MPLA’s first congress, “our fight was against Portuguese colonialism and for our independence. . . . Today it is a class confrontation which we cannot avoid and which we must try to transform into a victory for the proletariat and peasant class in order for those classes most exploited under colonialism to take up the leadership of the country.”

Thus Neto presented the vast majority of workers and peasants as locked in a class struggle with the petty bureaucrats, small traders, and businessmen. Actually, however, workers constituted only a small minority in mainly rural Angola. Thus there were very few workers in party leadership positions. For example, men who had fought in the anticolonial war held over half the seats in the Central Committee and were prominent elsewhere in the party.

Ethnicity, too, continued to be a source of tension or stress, as official exhortations against tribalism and regionalism demon­strated. It continued to be—at least in part—the basis for loyalties shown by many Kongo for the FNLA and by many Ovimbundu for UNITA. The MPLA attempt to politically educate and mobilize the peasantry—a difficult task anywhere—was rendered more difficult by the perceived predominance not only of whites and *mestizos,* but of Mbundu, in the leadership. The first appointment of a man of Ovimbundu origin, Fernando Faustino Muteka, to the Council of Ministers in January 1978 was clearly an attempt to broaden the ethnic base.

The party also faced the problem of lack of participation. De­spite ceaseless exhortations by press and radio for greater mili­tancy, greater involvement, and higher consciousness the prevail­ing mood in the late 1970s seemed one of apathy. Neto complained about “widespread resistance to the dynamics of the revolution,” and especially about the civil servants who “will not familiarize themselves with the revolutionary theory of social­ism.”

Relations with the Roman Catholic Church

In the fight for the allegiance of Angolans, the Neto regime has had to contend with various Christian bodies, particularly the Roman Catholic Church. In a pastoral letter in December 1977 the bishops of Angola’s twelve dioceses complained that no steps has been taken to guarantee freedom of religion as promised in the Constitution and that Catholics, constituting about half of the population, were discriminated against. The bishops pointed out

that they did not oppose socialism but deplored the taking over and damaging of welfare institutions and the setting up of a single form of education. The educational system, as a result of the deci­sions and recommendations of the MPLA’s first congress, was to be totally reorganized in line with the new socialist option. Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento countered that the bishops’ letter contained lies and misrepresentation of facts and that no mention had been made of the “cowardly attacks of the puppet bands” (i.e., FNLA and UNITA). He asked the provincial commissioners to appoint a liaison person for church-related business who would work closely with the provincial party committees.

In January 1978 Radio Luanda cited a decree by President Neto, effective immediately, that separated the state and religious insti­tutions completely. The MPLA would have a monopoly on infor­mation. Consequently Radio Ecclesia, a private radio station owned by the Roman Catholic Church in Angola, was dissolved and all its assets nationalized. The bishops promptly protested the silencing of the radio station and the systematic propaganda in favor of atheism. Religion, the government countered, had been used to protect the political and economic prerogatives of the ruling classes and must not be made a tool against revolutionary progress and against socialism.

In a related action, on March 14 the regime banned Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose beliefs prevented them from supporting certain government policies and particularly from doing military service. It also imposed restrictions on religious activities. Legitimate churches and religious organizations were to be registered, and those promoting disobedience and disregard for laws were to be banned. No longer could religious buildings be constructed with­out a permit, and no longer would they be exempt from taxes. Priests and missionaries, however, would be allowed to stay in the country as foreign residents, and churches and religious organiza­tions would be permitted to receive goods and donations from abroad, but their distribution would be handled by the State Sec­retariat for Social Affairs.

The Governmental System

The Constitution

The Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola (Constitution) in force in 1978 had been promulgated in-Novem- ber 1975 and revised and amended on January 7, 1978, by the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party. The changes in­creased the power of the president and of the party’s Central Committee at the expense of the Council of the Revolution and spelled out the role of the newly instituted MPLA-Labor Party.

The fundamental principles of the Constitution declared as the republic’s prime objective the liberation of the Angolan people from the vestiges of colonialism. The MPLA-Labor Party was

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defined as the organized vanguard of the working class and made responsible for the construction of a socialist society. The elimina­tion of regionalism and tribalism was called one of the most impor­tant tasks. There was to be complete separation of state and reli­gious institutions, but all religions were respected, and their places and objects of worship were protected by the state as long as they conformed with the laws. Although avowedly socialist, the repub­lic protected private activities and property as long as they were beneficial to the interests of the Angolan people. The fundamental principles also contained a declaration that the republic was not affiliated with any international military organization, nor would it permit the construction of foreign military bases on the national territory. ’

The Government

The government is dominated by the president. Subnational units have little or no autonomy.

***The President***

The president of the republic is head of the government, presi­dent of the party, and commander in chief of the armed forces. He heads the Council of the Revolution and the Council of Ministers, and he appoints and discharges the prime minister, other mem­bers of the government, and the provincial commissioners. He also appoints his substitute, in case of temporary absence or disability, from among the members of the party’s Political Bureau.

***The Council of the Revolution***

The Constitution calls for a people’s assembly, but the special law that would establish its composition and manner of election, as well as its powers and functions, had not yet been passed in 1978. Meanwhile the Council of the Revolution is the supreme organ of government. It comprises all the members of the MPLA- Labor Party Central Committee, the minister of defense, the chief of general staff, the national political commissar, the commanders of the military regions, and those provincial commissioners and other government members who are specially appointed to the council by the Political Bureau. The council guides the republic’s major domestic and foreign policy based, however, on the defini­tions and resolutions of the party’s Central Committee. It exercises legislative functions in conjunction with the government. Among other functions it approves the national plan and the state budget, appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other members of government on the recommendations of the MPLA, and author­izes the president to declare war and make peace.

***The Council of Ministers***

The Council of Ministers is the executive organ of the govern­ment. It comprises the president, who is the chairman, the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, the ministers, state secretar­ies, the director of the directorate of information and security, and the deputy minister of defense. The president may, if he wishes, delegate the chairmanship to the prime minister, who is responsi­ble for the coordination of all government activity and supervises the activities of the provincial commissioners. A permanent com­mittee operates between meetings of the Council of Ministers.

Ministries are grouped under the three deputy prime ministers under the overall authority of the prime minister. Foreign affairs, justice, education, health, and social affairs are under the first deputy prime minister. Also under him are the regional council for culture and the supreme council for physical education and sports, both of which are headed by state secretaries. The second and third deputy prime ministers divide between them a number of ministries dealing with a wide range of economic matters (see fig. 6).

***Local Administration***

The national territory is divided into provinces, districts *(muni- cipios),* and communes *(communas).* Urban communes are di­vided into wards *(bairros)* and rural communes into settlements *(povocaoes).*

The provinces are headed by commissioners responsible di­rectly to the prime minister, who supervises them and monitors their activities. They are selected and appointed by the president. A commissioner is the highest government representative. The highest political representative is the coordinator of the MPLA Directing Commission.


Districts and communes are also headed by commissioners, ac­cording to the Constitution, to be “selected and appointed as prescribed by law.” The relevant law was not available, but an earlier source suggests that selection at least is on the recommen­dation of the MPLA.

In late 1978 preoccupation with internal conflict still interfered with the running of an effective administration, and the structure and authority of the lowest units of local administration had not yet been established. At one point the Poder Popular that had sprung up spontaneously in Luanda and elsewhere during the turmoil after the coup were thought of as models for the basic administrative units. A report by the Central Committee to the MPLA’s first congress warned, however, that this would establish a second apparatus alongside the government structure that could be used against it, as was demonstrated by the Nitista plot.

The Judicial System

In late 1978 a comprehensive court system to replace the one inherited from colonial times had not yet been established, al­though the new principles of justice had been enunciated. The stated goal was popular and revolutionary justice dispensed in People’s Courts by representatives of the working class in conjunc-

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Source: Based on information from "Government Functional Organization Chart,” *Jomal de Angola,* Luanda, November 26,1976 (U. S. Department of Commerce, JPRS: 68505, No. 1704, January 19, 1977).

*Figure 6. Organization of Government*

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tion with professional judges, the two having the same rights and obligations. The working-class representatives were to be chosen by the mass organizations of the party.

A decree published on February 24, 1978, proclaimed that the “law must be a tool of national unity and consolidation of the people’s regime.’’ The National Court Administration within the Ministry of Justice was assigned the task of reorganizing and oper­ating the courts. The ministry was also required to study the vari­ous legal systems and devise a body of socialist laws. Certain norms of customary law that were not in obvious contradiction to the revolutionary process were to be kept in force. The ministry was also ordered to simplify and popularize the laws in order to make it possible for the people to implement them.

The central institution of the new legal system will be People’s Courts as courts of first instance, according to a law promulgated on April 30, 1978. Criminal, police, and labor courts will become collective tribunals. Along with professional judges, these courts will have two lay judges. These lay judges, who must have Angolan nationality, at least four years of elementary school, and a clean criminal record, will perform their duties for a period of one year. They will have an equal voice with professional judges and be empowered to speak out on all aspects of the cases being tried.

During the anticolonial struggle local people, usually peasants, took part in meting out justice in the areas controlled by the MPLA. The first step toward establishing the new system at the level of provincial courts was taken in the province of Luanda in December 1977. A commission was formed comprising repre­sentatives of the provincial party committees, the provincial com­missariat, and UNTA. Its duty was to select the lay judges to be appointed by the Ministry of Justice. They were chosen from among the best and most competent workers in various enter­prises, and they would serve after having been trained in a basic course lasting one and one-half months. Representatives of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee participated in the first course in December 1977. The Ministry of Justice thus initiated an experiment that, in a first phase, was to be extended throughout the republic at the level of provincial courts. A second phase, to be initiated later, will establish People’s Courts at the national level.

In presiding over the first session of the six-week seminar for lay judges, justice minister Diogenese de Assis Boavida warned trainees that they should not become simple bureaucrats content with merely handing down sentences in the cases that were brought before them. Each judge and each lay judge, according to the minister, must continually study the peculiarities of the uniqueness of the peoples they would be dealing with and must constantly inform the Ministry of Justice of any conflicts between customary law and the law of the state that they are sworn to uphold. Although not specifically detailed, the underlying assump­

tion concerning the lay judges was that they would be native to the provinces in which they would be assigned. Workers would be trained for the courts in industrial areas and peasants in rural areas.

In addition a decree of June 1978 established the system of People’s Revolutionary Courts. They were to deal with crimes against the security of the state (see Legal System, ch. 4).

Foreign Relations

Speaking to the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference in Luanda on February 2, 1976, President Neto said: “We reaffirm our complete adherence to the policy of non-alignment. We have no intention whatsoever—nor has any­one asked it of us—of making available or establishing military bases in our country, which are not strictly in the interests of our national defence. We have no intention of being dragged into any of the different blocs.” And answering the frequent accusations that Angola, because of its military dependence on Cuba and the Soviet Union, had become a virtual satellite of the Soviet bloc, he said, on May 23: “We have the right and the duty to choose our own destiny. We are not dependent on anyone. We do not inter­pret proletarian internationalism as making us dependent. . . . Angola is independent. We make our own policy. In our interna­tional policy we want to establish diplomatic, economic and cul­tural relations with all the countries in the world, without regard to the socio-political systems or administrative and government structures of these countries.”

Notwithstanding these statements, Angola’s foreign relations are heavily influenced by extraneous factors. Rivalries between the PRC and the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent between the Soviet Union and the United States have been played out in the Angolan context. Cuba has become a decisive presence in Angola, partly at the bidding of the Soviet Union but also compelled by a missionary ideology. South Africa, driven by its own exigencies, gambled unsuccessfully on the success of a military strike in the 1975-76 period, which decisively affected Angola’s relations with the rest of Africa.

Relations with African Countries

The behavior of African states during Angola’s internal guerrilla war showed their concern over foreign intervention. Throughout the military conflict between the liberation movements, African states advocated strict neutrality but made numerous attempts at reconciliation, individually and through the OAU. A conciliation commission set up a few days before independence as the result of an earlier OAU meeting at Kampala proposed a coalition gov­ernment, the demilitarization of Luanda, the sending of an OAU peacekeeping force, and the holding of elections, all of which were rejected by the MPLA.

After independence an emergency summit meeting, con­vened at Addis Ababa in January 1976, broke up in a deadlock over the question of Angola’s admission to the OAU. Shortly af­terward, however, there was a shift in African public opinion and a growing concern about the degree of Savimbi’s involve­ment with South Africa. On February 10 the OAU was obliged to admit the People’s Republic of Angola, after twenty-five countries had recognized it. In February 1977 the OAU’s Council of Ministers, meeting at Lome, told Angola that it did not have to make a contribution in 1977-78—an indication of the sympathy the regime had earned among the majority of African countries. The council also told Angola that it could get aid for resettling the displaced population from the newly founded OAU Assistance Fund.

By mid-1978, however, there was growing concern over the role played by the Soviet Union and Cuba. A number of African leaders warned against letting the continent become a stage for foreign power rivalry.

Angola is one of the so-called front-line states along with Tan­zania, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique. These support black nationalist forces challenging the governments of Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, and South Africa’s control of Namibia.

***Portuguese-Speaking Africa***

Relations with Portuguese-speaking African countries have been close because of the long-standing ties between the leaders, which go back to 1958. At that time students from Portuguese colonies studying in Europe formed a coordinated front called the Anticolonialist Movement (Movimenta Anti-Colonista—MAC), out of which grew in 1960 the National African Revolutionary Front of the Portuguese Colonies (Frente Revolucionaria Africana para Independencia—FRAIN). In September 1965 the Confer­ence of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (Con- ferencia das OrganizaQoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portugesas— CONCP) was set up in a meeting by representatives of the various liberation movements. CONCP members exchanged knowledge of guerrilla tactics, information, and joined in lobbying. Roberto never took part in these meetings, because he had started military insurrection in 1961 in the north of Angola and apparently felt the FNLA could win on its own. Moreover he was suspect because of his connection with Mobutu and his lack of radicalism. Thus the MPLA was able to forge close ties to the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, both of which became the ruling parties in their respective countries on independence. Mozam­bique at once used its media to discredit the FNLA and UNITA and, after Angola became independent, lobbied among African nations for recognition of the MPLA as the sole representative of the Angolan people.

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*Zambia*

Landlocked Zambia finds itself in a difficult and ambiguous posi­tion, which gives it little room for maneuvering with respect to Angola. It depends for its economic survival on mineral exports, mainly copper, and therefore on outlets to the sea, which were severely curtailed after the Rhodesian-Zambian border was closed in January 1973. Before the Benguela railroad was closed in 1975, it carried nearly 40 percent of Zambia’s exports, including one- third of its copper exports. Zambia’s dependence on the railroad —and possibly an ideological orientation that was closer to Savimbi’s than to Neto’s or Roberto’s—led President Kaunda in the early 1970s to give (unofficial) support to UNITA, which con­trolled some of the territory traversed. At that time the MPLA, which had had an office in Lusaka since 1968, moved back to Brazzaville. Zambia’s effort to divert some of its exports to Tan­zania via the Tazara railroad has had only limited value, in part because of the lack of rolling stock, in part because the terminal port at Dar es Salaam cannot handle the traffic.

The upsurge of SWAPO guerrilla activities against Namibia pre­sented another difficulty for Kaunda. He was concerned that an MPLA victory would make Angola a sanctuary for SWAPO, of which one faction, the so-called Shipanga wing, had close ties to anti-Kaunda dissidents in Barotseland in western Zambia.

Refugees, too, pose a problem. Thousands of Angolans have fled into Zambia because of the clashes between UNITA guerrillas and MPLA forces led by Cuban officers. Many are housed in the Maheba refugee camp in northwest Zambia. Others are estimated to be living in remote areas of Zambia.

The seizure by MPLA forces of the strategic port of Lobito in August 1975 and the collapse of the UNITA-FNLA coalition forced Kaunda to come to terms with Neto. On March 16, 1976, an Angolan delegation, led by Foreign Minister Jose Eduardo dos Santos, arrived in Lusaka to discuss normalization of relations be­tween the two countries. Shortly after the visit Zambia forbade UNITA and FNLA use of bases in Zambia; on September 22 it recognized the MPLA regime. Kaunda said he had waited so long because the MPLA owed its victory to the Soviets and Cubans, whom he compared to a tiger and its pup stalking the continent. He did not wish to see Angola become a theater for superpower rivalry.

In May 1978 Zambia was drawn into the Zairian-Angolan dis­pute over the attack on Shaba for which some of the invaders had crossed a strip of Zambian territory. Kaunda subsequently played a role in urging Angola and Zaire to reconcile their differences.

***Zaire***

Mobutu’s long-standing support for the FNLA, a highly volatile and permeable border with hundreds of thousands of refugees on either side hostile to the other side’s regime, basic ideological

differences, and the bitter memory of two invasions into Shaba Province have made relations with Zaire highly explosive. Yet there have also been frequent attempts at reconciliation based on recognition of mutual dependency. Zaire’s shaky economy needs the Benguela railroad for the export of its copper. The repeated attempts of Zairian dissidents to invade Shaba are as much a threat to Mobutu’s regime as Roberto’s people fighting for the FNLA were to Neto’s.

In February 1976 Mobutu and Neto met in Brazzaville and agreed to suspend all military conflict, to guarantee the safety of returning refugees, and to establish a joint standing commission for the implementation of the agreement. Mobutu promised to end his insistence on the inclusion of the FNLA in the Angolan government.

He continued, however, to help the FNLA, and the Shaba inva­sion of 1977 led to bitter accusations of Angolan involvement. In January 1978 Neto, in a new diplomatic initiative, offered to send a delegation to Kinshasa and promised to normalize relations if Mobutu would finally withdraw his support for the FNLA and UNITA. In return he offered to consider reopening the Benguela railroad. A second Shaba invasion put an abrupt end to these tentative negotiations. But by mid-1978 both regimes, faced with mounting difficulties, renewed their efforts to come to terms (see Peace Feelers, this ch.).

*Congo*

Relations between the MPLA and the People’s Republic of the Congo have been close ever since the overthrow of Fulbert You- lou and the establishment of a radical regime by Massemba-Debat in August 1963. Congo gave operational bases to MPLA guerrillas, and beginning in 1975 the country was used for the transshipment of Soviet arms and Cuban soldiers to Angola.

Yet, like Mobutu, Marten Ngouabi, successor to Massemba- Debat, played an ambiguous game. While helping the MPLA, he allowed Cabindan separatists to organize. At times of military success he slowed shipments to the MPLA to give FLEC forces time to recoup. He changed this policy in 1975 after the death of his foreign minister and from then on fully supported the MPLA.

*South Africa*

The agreement reached in Luanda on July 11, 1978, between Namibian nationalists and representatives of five Western powers held out hope that hostility between Angola and South Africa might finally be muted. Earlier in May the South African attack on the Namibian refugee and guerrilla camp at Cassinga had led to the worst relations between the two states since South Africa’s military involvement in the 1975-76 civil war. South Africa’s de­fense department enumerated the reasons for the Kassinga strike (which had followed a number of small-scale attacks): to protect

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the Cunene River hydroelectric and irrigation scheme, to aid UNITA and the FNLA in their fight against communist forces, and to strike at SWAPO guerrillas.

South Africa had been feeling threatened ever since the col­lapse of the Portuguese empire, which had provided a cordon sanitaire between it and black Africa. SWAPO guerrillas had actu­ally crossed southern Angola since 1966 on their way to Ovambo- land in Namibia, at times collaborating with the MPLA, more often with UNITA. In December 1976, however, after clashes had occurred between UNITA and SWAPO, UNITA, in an about-face, announced that it would henceforth destroy SWAPO in southern Angola. Moreover serious military losses forced UNITA into closer ties with South Africa. Concurrently there were rumors of camps for UNITA supporters inside Namibia run by South African army officers. Neto accused South Africa of turning Namibia into a “base of aggression against Angola”; at the same time he presumably gave SWAPO bases in Angola in return for its fight against UNITA. In January 1978, on a visit to Nigeria, he called on South Africa, in a joint communique with Lieutenant General Olusegun Oba­sanjo, to end the illegal occupation of Namibia. He also pledged continued support for SWAPO, which he called the sole repre­sentative of the Namibian people. There was speculation, how­ever, that Neto might have helped influence SWAPO to accept— however reluctantly—the agreement for a peaceful transition to independence after months of patient negotiations with the help of the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada, and the Fed­eral Republic of Germany (West Germany).

As with all its neighbors, Angola’s relations with South Africa involved a refugee problem. There were an estimated 10,000 or more refugees living among the Ovambo in Namibia.

Relations with Communist Countries

***Soviet Union***

The Neto regime clearly owes its existence to the Soviet Union (and Cuba), and that fact colors relations between the two coun­tries. Basil Davidson, historian and journalist, estimates that in 1971 as much as 70 to 80 percent of MPLA arms came from the Soviet Union and its satellites, which also provided training for students and military personnel.

Aid began to dwindle in 1972 and ceased entirely by 1973, mainly because of the Soviet Union’s impatience with the MPLA’s internal squabbles. In 1974, however, as Neto regained power, with events in Portugal and with the threat of growing FNLA military strength due to PRC help, the Soviets decided to resume aid to Neto. In October and November small arms shipments arrived again. Extensive aid was given only when the struggle between the MPLA and its rivals became fiercer and when the Soviet Union began to worry seriously over the PRC’s growing influence, which it seemed to fear far more than Western influ­ence, as demonstrated by the propaganda war over Angola be­tween Moscow and Peking. The size of that aid is difficult to ascer­tain. Secretary of Defense Donald M. Rumsfeld, in testimony before the United States House of Representative Armed Services Committee in January 1976, said that the Soviet Union provided the MPLA with some US$108 million worth of military aid and 170 military advisers. Secretary of State Kissinger spoke of US$200 million, but other sources find all such figures unreliable. Undoubt­edly, however, the first sizable number of Soviet (and Yugoslav) arms arrived on March 25, 1975, and continued on an increasing scale before the South African invasion. That attack, hitting a raw nerve, legitimized the Soviet Union’s help in the eyes of even some moderate African countries.

On October 8, 1976, Neto and Leonid Brezhnev signed a twenty-year friendship and cooperation treaty in Moscow. It pro­vided for increased economic, technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation and the further strengthening and broadening of links between the Soviet Communist Party and the MPLA.

If rumors and reports, largely unsubstantiated, are to be be­lieved, there were strains in this close relationship. In December 1977 Jorge Sangumba, Savimbi’s right-hand man, talked of recent secret meetings during which Soviet diplomats had attempted to persuade UNITA leaders to join a coalition government with the MPLA—reportedly a proposal that UNITA would consider only if Cuban forces were withdrawn and that Neto would refuse out of hand. Earlier in the year, during the Nitista plot, there were ru­mors that the Soviets were actually supporting the rebels—in con­trast to the Cubans, who came promptly to Neto’s rescue.

*Cuba*

Two cooperation agreements—one between the Cuban Com­munist Party and the MPLA and the other providing for Cuban economic and technical aid—were in force in 1978. Both had been signed during President Neto’s visit with Fidel Castro in July 1976. Eight further agreements on economic, social, and technical aid were signed in December of that year on the occasion of Prime Minister Nascimento’s visit to Cuba.

Angola’s relationship with Cuba was a very special one because the military and technical aid given by that country in mid-1978 continued to be crucial to the survival of Neto’s regime. The long­standing involvement had its roots in contacts made by Che Guevara with Portuguese-speaking Brazilian revolutionaries dur­ing Castro’s attempts at fomenting uprisings in South America. After a number of setbacks on that continent Cuban leaders focused on Africa, which they came to see as a more fertile ground for revolution.

By 1966 Cuban military forces were training guerrillas who were fighting the Portuguese from the base they had established in Congo (Brazzaville). The Cubans concentrated at first on the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde but also established ties with the MPLA, which they considered the legitimate leader of the fight against the colonial regime in Angola. The guerrillas were also trained in Cuba and friendly African nations, such as Guinea, Algeria, and Tanzania. They were provided with weapons and money and were supported in international forums.

Direct participation in combat began on November 5, 1975, according to official Havana sources. By that time the FNLA was only fifteen kilometers from Luanda, and South African forces were approaching from the south. Despite the fact that the MPLA controlled only 20 percent of the country (including, however, the capital) and that independence came only on November 11, it claimed sovereignty; thus Cuba would claim that in this case they were helping, not a liberation movement, but a legitimate govern­ment. According to Swedish and American intelligence, close to 2,000 Cubans were fighting in Angola by the middle of the month. They had come from Cuba and from different parts of Africa. In February of the following year their number had increased to 14,000, and their presence decisively turned the tide of war in favor of the MPLA. At first they had used their own means of transport, but they could not have continued coming in increasing numbers without logistical backing from the Soviet Union.

In May 1977 the Cubans again played a decisive role during the Nitista plot when their military presence maintained Neto in power. Shortly after the coup attempt their numbers increased to 23,000, of which 19,000 were military men, and 4,000 were play­ing important roles in health, education, housing, and other fields.

Although the Cuban presence was viewed by many as an ex­tension of Soviet power, they also were undoubtedly in Angola out of solidarity with the goals of the MPLA. Castro has charac­terized his nation as Latin-African, and he was clearly in sym­pathy not only with the Marxist orientation but with the mul­tiracialism of the Neto regime as well. Although not without cost—some observers have suggested that Angola may prove Castro’s Vietnam—the involvement has been a matter of con­siderable pride to a small nation like Cuba, able to play an im­portant role among the superpowers. As long as Neto’s regime remained as vulnerable as it appeared in mid-1978, the Cuban presence would be needed. In turn their presence would give Neto assured access to Soviet arms without making him totally dependent on the Soviet Union.

Cuba’s role as well as that of the Soviet Union has come under increasing attack by African governments. Typically at the OAU meeting in Khartoum in July, Nigeria, which had been sympa­thetic to the MPLA regime since the South African intervention, warned that both countries should not overstay their welcome. The same criticism directed particularly at Cuba could be heard at the Conference of Nonaligned Nations in Belgrade in July. It was not clear in August 1978 what effect these statements would have on the continued presence of Cubans in Angola.

*The People’s Republic of China*

The regime’s relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were hostile in 1978 because of the PRC’s continued siding with UNITA and FNLA and its publicly comparing the Soviet and Cuban presence to Portuguese colonialism. These relations seemed to be a function of PRC-Soviet relations, each power sup­porting whomever the other was not helping.

In 1968 Savimbi had been invited to Peking and given some small help. When Neto followed him in 1971, he received nothing, since he was already getting help from the Soviets. Beginning in 1973 the FNLA became the recipient of help from the PRC, which in the following year began training FNLA guerrillas at the Kin- kuzu base in southern Zaire and sending military equipment. In August 1975 the PRC tried to help UNITA, which was badly in need of weapons; but its shipment of arms to Dar es Salaam never reached Angola because President Julius K. Nyerere was by that time firmly supporting the MPLA. In late September, three weeks before independence, the PRC withdrew military instructors from the FNLA camps in Zaire, heeding the pleas of the OAU. With the massive infusion of Soviet and Cuban help to the MPLA, however, the PRC lined up firmly and openly on the opposite side, which proved a costly political gesture.

In June and again in November 1976, when the question of Angola’s admission to the UN came up before the Security Coun­cil, the PRC delegate was absent. Neto contemptuously de­nounced the PRC as a country that allies itself with the forces of imperialism while calling itself socialist.

*German Democratic Republic*

The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) has been increasingly involved in Angola. After a 1973 agreement East Germans gave extensive support to the MPLA, training units and flying wounded guerrillas to East Germany for treatment. In 1978 they were training police units, running harbor traffic, and provid­ing various kinds of technical assistance. Their total numbers in Angola were estimated at several hundred.

Relations with Western Countries

In mid-1978 the regime made overtures to Western countries in a search for more trade and technological aid. These overtures were directed at France, the United States, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. Most Western states had by then given Angola full diplomatic recognition, including those that had previ­ously helped or sympathized with the FNLA and UNITA. The first to recognize Angola was France on February 17, 1976, one day ahead of other Common Market countries. Countries that had supported the MPLA, such as Sweden, Italy, and Brazil, quickly

expanded their trading arrangements and investment opportuni­ties.

*' Portugal*

Relations with Portugal were stormy after independence but began improving in mid-1978. Although officially neutral, the Por­tuguese government favored Neto and the MPLA by mid-1975. Neto, when he studied in Portugal, had established close contacts with leftist circles as early as 1947. Mario Soares, the Portuguese foreign minister and socialist, had been his friend and classmate. But during the turmoil of the civil war and the resulting flood of refugees to Portugal relations soured. On August 29,1975, Portu­gal formally annulled the Alvor agreement and dissolved the tran­sitional government after appointing a new high commissioner. MPLA ministers, however, refused to leave their desks, and the FNLA and UNITA ministers pledged to govern from Huambo. The leaders of the three movements agreed on only one subject —the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops. They were, in fact, withdrawn before independence, leaving large quantities of arms in the areas controlled by the MPLA.

Portugal formally recognized the MPLA regime on February 22, 1976, and in March Neto received the credentials of Portu­gal’s first ambassador to Angola. In April 1977, however, the Angolan government, after a bomb attack, closed its official mission in Portugal, the Casa de Angola in Oporto. The Casa de Angola had handled visa applications of refugees who wanted to return. On May 18 Angola broke diplomatic rela­tions with Portugal. Negotiations and mutual visits followed and finally, after a meeting of Portuguese and Angolan foreign ministers on the Cape Verde Islands on September 30, diplo­matic relations were reestablished.

In June 1978 the presidents of the two countries met for three days in Guinea-Bissau and agreed to set up a joint commission, which would negotiate cooperation in several fields. It was hoped that this agreement would lead to a resumption of trade between the two countries and the return to Angola of a sizeable propor­tion of the Portuguese who had left. This would somewhat lessen dependency on the Cubans who were performing many vital technical tasks.

In July in a joint statement from Lisbon, the two governments announced that they would cooperate in repatriating Angolan refugees who wished to come home. They would seek help from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for this undertaking.

*United States*

In mid-1978 efforts were under way to improve relations be­tween Angola and the United States. They had been tense and hostile since 1975 when Neto invited the Cubans to fight for him and at a particularly low ebb in May when President Carter ac-

cused the regime of having permitted Zairians in Angola to attack Zaire.

American policymakers, preoccupied with assured access to military facilities in the Azores, had been totally unprepared for the swift crumbling of Portuguese power. After the Lisbon coup Secretary of State Kissinger favored General Ant6nio de Spinola’s proposal for a Lusitanian commonwealth. Help was extended to the FNLA because of its links with the pro-Western regime of President Mobutu, but it was held at a low level.

The build-up of Soviet and Cuban military aid and the South African intervention put the United States in a quandary. The United States warned the Soviet Union of the danger of a confron­tation over Angola. After a consultation between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviets halted their airlift to Angola on December 9, 1975, but resumed it again on December 24. The United States after the experience of Vietnam could not be induced to engage in new military ven­tures abroad. It was decided in July to give covert support to FNLA with lesser amounts to UNITA. This support was stepped up in January 1976 and sent via Zaire.

The United States also was involved with Cabinda where Gulf Oil had begun to pump oil in 1968. Under Department of State pressure Gulf Oil stopped its considerable royalties to the MPLA regime in January 1976. But in March, after the victory of the MPLA, Gulf resumed payments with the department’s agree­ment. The MPLA declared that it did not intend to nationalize Gulfs interests.

The United States perception of the conflict as a test of great power rivalry with the Soviet Union led American policymakers to overlook Angola’s local, regional, and international tensions and stresses. Officially the United States supported a coalition that would include the MPLA. In fact, however, its intervention on the side of anticommunist forces, including its military build-up of Zaire, convinced the MPLA that the United States was trying to destabilize the situation.

In the aftermath of the second Shaba invasion in the spring of 1978, the CIA was reportedly considering supplying covert aid to UNITA guerrillas still fighting in Angola against the MPLA re­gime. The rationale was to tie down the Cubans in Angola, thus preventing their involvement elsewhere, particularly in Rhodesia. On May 25, however, President Carter announced that he was ruling out all covert United States involvement in Angola and that he would deal directly and openly with the Neto regime. The efforts of Donald McHenry, American deputy ambassador to the UN, to find a peaceful solution for the Namibian problem went far toward creating goodwill between the two countries. Although Neto indicated that he would neither abandon his option for Marx­ism nor be willing to meet a precondition of withdrawal of Cuban

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troops, he nevertheless called on the United States in July to estab­lish diplomatic relations.

For the most authoritative account of the long anticolonial war see John A. Marcum’s *The Angolan Revolution. Vol. II: Exile Poli­tics and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-76.* Covering events from 1962 to the end of 1976, it describes the circumstances under which Angola won independence and traces the course of the continuing conflicts among revolutionary groups. Marcum examines in detail the origin, programs, leadership, and structure of the contending parties, their transterritorial relations, and their interaction with external powers.

Other long-time observers of the Angolan political scene are Gerald J. Bender and Kenneth L. Adelman, whose articles appear in the periodical literature. For an insightful recapitulation of the many and intricate external factors influencing the Angolan situa­tion see Charles K. Ebinger’s “External Intervention in Internal War; the Politics of the Angolan Civil War.” (For further informa­tion see Bibliography.)

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**National** SECURITY IN the People’s Republic of Angola has been a daily concern of the regime established by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA) since early 1976 when it defeated its opponents in a civil war (see Independence and Civil War, ch. 3). Angola, a single-party state under the presidency of Agostinho Neto, had evolved from the former Portuguese colony that be­came independent on November 11, 1975. Supported by Soviet materiel and Cuban manpower, MPLA had defeated two rival movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente National de Liberta^ao de Angola—FNLA) and the Na­tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Na­tional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA). The lead­ers of the defeated groups, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi respectively, vowed to carry on guerrilla warfare. Roberto and the remnants of his forces fell back to sanctuaries in Zaire from which they had operated for several years while Savimbi and his remain­ing followers disappeared into the remote interior of the country. Both groups recuperated, rebuilt their forces, and as of late 1978 had harassed the government in traditional guerrilla fashion for more than two years (see Increased Warfare, ch. 3).

The Neto government has at its disposal the usual means of maintaining national security—that is, an army, a navy, and an air force, a militia, and national police forces—but the major factor in the defense of the country against external or internal threat has been the continuing presence of approximately 20,000 Cuban troops. The mission of the armed forces is to protect national integrity and to maintain internal security; in fulfilling their obli­gations the forces have been continually engaged in guerrilla war­fare and have been continually supported and sometimes led by Cubans; often, Cuban units have carried out combat tasks on their own rather than in support of the Angolans. Many Western ob­servers credit the Cuban military with keeping the Neto govern­ment in power.

Collectively the army, the navy, and the air force were known as the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Formas Armadas Populares de Liberta^ao de Angola—FAPLA), a name adopted by the MPLA guerrilla army more than a year before independence. During the civil war FAPLA became a conven­tional army and acquired a navy and an air force, both of which remained very small in 1978. In late 1977 the International Insti­tute of Strategic Studies estimated FAPLA strength at 31,500 of which the army with a strength of 30,000 was by far the largest branch. The navy had a force of 700 and the air force of 800 men. The army and the air force have been well equipped by the Soviet

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Union (the seagoing navy consists mostly of ex-Portuguese patrol craft), but problems have arisen because the servicemen recruited from a largely illiterate society have difficulties in learning how to operate and maintain intricate modern weapons and equipment.

According to the Constitution the commander in chief of the armed forces was the president of the republic. In that capacity the president was advised and assisted by the minister of defense. President Neto, who has been the leader of the MPLA since 1962, was not an active commander of the forces and left actual military affairs to his military experts. The minister of defense, Henrique Teles Carreira, had been a commander of guerrilla forces during the anticolonial war, commander of forces during the civil war, and military adviser to Neto since the early days of the movement. In 1978 Carreira appeared to be the overall commander of forces in addition to his position as minister of defense although he was not publicly designated as such.

The military situation in Angola in 1978 in many ways could be a replay of history taken from almost any period during the past 500 years except that the actors were different. The MPLA-Labor Party controlled the central government in Luanda, the coastal area, and certain urban centers in the interior as the Portuguese colonialists did for many centuries. The present-day government also lays claim to the entire country as the Portuguese colonial authorities always did, but its control over much of the country appears to be tenuous as it often was for the Portuguese.

Threats to internal security in Angola came from the dissident movements that opposed the government on political, ethnic, and ideological grounds. Ordinary crime (nonpolitical) did not seem to constitute a major problem to the country’s police although it was difficult for Western observers to learn much about the situation. From the little that was known, it seemed that criminal activities were within acceptable bounds, and under Neto’s government news reports of corruption seemed to be low compared to many other emerging states. Police forces are national organizations under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense except for a special security force under the office of the president. The na­tional police force is the People’s Police Corps of Angola (Corpo de Policia Popular de Angola—CPPA). Its strength in 1978 was unknown.

Armed Forces

The Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola (Constitution), which was promulgated by the MPLA on the day that Angola gained its independence from Portugal, established the military arm of the MPLA as the country’s armed forces. At that time the MPLA was one of three factions contending for power, and at independence the two opposing groups formed a rival republic within the borders of Angola. In the civil war that followed the MPLA was the ultimate victor, and its constitution

eventually became the law of the land. The military arm of the MPLA, which has been known since August 1974 as FAPLA, con­sisted primarily of a guerrilla force at independence; nevertheless it was institutionalized by the Constitution and became the na­tional army.

The mission assigned to the FAPLA by the Constitution is the preservation of Angola’s territorial integrity. The designated com­mander in chief is the country’s president who, by the terms of the Constitution, is also the president of the MPLA-Labor Party. The constitutionally stipulated responsibilities of the commander in chief are limited to the appointment and dismissal of the officers of the military hierarchy, but his responsibilities as president in­clude the declaration of war or the making of peace “with prior authorization from the Council of the Revolution” (see The Gov­ernmental System, ch. 3). The president is also enjoined to “exer­cise superior leadership in national defense and security, as com­mander in chief of the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola and chairman of the National Security Commission.” The president’s chief aide in national security affairs is the minis­ter of defense.

Under the Angolan scheme of government, the People’s Assem­bly “will be the supreme organ of State Government,” and as such it will presumably play an important role in the making of national defense policy, but until enabling legislation establishes the com­position of the assembly and creates an electoral system, the Coun­cil of the Revolution is the major legislative body and has among its responsibilities the drawing up of the necessary laws relating to national defense and internal security. Authorization by the coun­cil is required for the declaration of war or for the making of peace. In addition to the commander in chief, who is a member of the Council of the Revolution by virtue of his party position, the council membership also includes the minister of defense, the chief of the general staff, and the commanders of the military regions, making the military well represented on this important governmental body.

The Council of Ministers, which the Constitution refers to as “the executive organ of government,” is ordered to “provide for the national defense and the maintenance of internal order and security.” The Ministry of Defense is the agency through which these powers are exercised; unlike other ministries, which are grouped under one of the three deputy prime ministers, the Min­istry of Defense is directly subordinate to the president. It is charged with the administration, supervision, and support of the entire military establishment. Despite the intricate governmental structure and the elaborate constitutional framework, the making of basic defense policy and other important decisions are party matters as is the case in the Soviet Union.

The political leaders of the MPLA and its offspring, the MPLA- Labor Party have constantly stressed that defense is the business



of all the people, and President Neto has been the strongest advo­cate of popular defense. Article 3 of the Constitution states, “The popular masses are guaranteed full, genuine participation in and exercise of political power, through the consolidation, extension and development of the organizational forms of the people’s gov­ernment.” Neto and other members of the party hierarchy con­tinually remind “the Masses” that service in the country’s defense organizations is an excellent means by which they may exercise their political rights. The emphasis that Neto has placed on the arming and training of the members of the People’s Defense Or­ganization (OrganizaQao de Defesa Popular—ODP) since its in­ception has been an indication of the importance he places on the idea that the entire population constitute a people’s army (see People’s Militia, this ch.).

Attitudes Toward the Armed Forces

In a country that has been torn by warfare for seventeen years it would be difficult to find anyone whose life has not been touched by that warfare. Popular attitudes toward the military therefore have probably been considerably affected by personal experi­ences, that is, how the people’s lives have been touched by en­counters with the colonial armies, the guerrilla armies, or the present-day government army and the insurgents. Most of the country’s more than 6 million people in 1978 were peasants whose greatest immediate concern was subsistence; the urban minority was also mostly concerned with eking out a meager existence in a war-torn economy. In addition the population was divided among several ethnic groups, the three largest of which—Ovim­bundu, Mbundu, and Kongo—have been actively or passively in­volved in warfare for several years. Although there is more than ethnicity involved in the political divisions of the country, the three named groups do form the bases of the three factions— UNITA, MPLA, and FNLA—respectively. Given the problems of daily living, the ethnic and political divisions among the people, plus the constant insurgency, it is almost impossible to assess pub­lic attitudes accurately.

The government continually stresses that the armed forces are of the people and exist for the people. President Neto, in public pronouncements, often refers to the “glorious fighters” of FAPLA and makes frequent reference to die MPLA guerrilla forces (FAPLA’s predecessors) who won independence for the country. No doubt the president’s (and the government’s) intention is to build national pride in FAPLA and to change popular opinions of the military that had been formed during the colonial period. The Portuguese army in Angola, even though its ranks contained more Africans than Portuguese, was looked on as an instrument of op­pression. Near the end of its tenure in Angola the colonial army made some slight attempts at winning the hearts and minds of the people; but that had certainly not been its strong point over the

centuries, and from the overall historical record it is obvious that most people thought of the army as the enforcing arm of the oppressor. Changing such popular attitudes presents a major prob­lem to the authorities, and their task is compounded by the high rate of illiteracy throughout the country.

The emphasis on the idea that FAPLA is a “people’s army” indicates the importance that the government places on forming proper public attitudes. One newspaper article noted that some members of FAPLA spent “voluntary days” working in the port facilities of Luanda while others assisted in the harvesting of the coffee crop out in the provinces. These activities were said to increase the respect that the people held for the military, and through working side by side on the docks or in the fields, “the unity of the people with the FAPLA was becoming consolidated.” Another article in early 1978 decried the use of the terms *military* and *civilian,* stating that the task of national reconstruction was the only important occupation and that artificial barriers should not be allowed to come between soldiers and civilians. In the new Angola, according to the article, the troops and the workers and peasants were “intimately linked” in their common objectives whereas in the past the military was in fact an elite with nothing in common with the people. “The distinction between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ is artificial. Whether they wear the uniform of the FAPLA or work clothes, the citizens of the nation are contributing to the nation’s reconstruction; they are building socialism; and they are carrying out the revolutionary process.”

Because of their concern with the popular image of FAPLA, the politicomilitary leaders of the government established public rela­tions departments at several echelons of the military structure. At the top of this publicity network was the public relations section of the political commissariat of the general staff. At lower levels sections were established in each branch of the forces, in each military region, and in major units stationed in urban areas. The principal operating theme of all of the public relations sections was “FAPLA-Popular Unity,” and one of the chief assigned tasks of the military imagemakers was to work closely with the country’s mass organizations—labor, women’s, and youth groups—to ensure close cooperation between civilian and military institutions.

One indication of popular attitudes toward the military might be the fact that the conscription law was implemented for the first time in early 1978. Until that time volunteers filled the ranks of the FAPLA, but for undisclosed reasons the number of young people volunteering for military service had dropped below base levels. Although military pay scales had not been published by the government, it is safe to assume that they were low because of the chaotic state of the economy. That plus the inherent dangers of the constant counterinsurgency warfare probably affected the at­titudes of young people. The remainder of the people living under

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MPLA-Labor Party influence, if they thought about the FAPLA at all, probably respected the force because of its long history of anticolonial warfare.

Manpower

Under ordinary, peacetime circumstances an African country gaining independence from a colonial power would have main­tained a small military force, but in Angola the civil war of the immediate postindependence period and the continuing guerrilla insurgency has necessitated the maintenance of relatively large armed forces. Maintaining a force level of about 31,500, as FAPLA strength was estimated in 1978, should not have caused a serious drain on the nation’s manpower resources; but a problem must necessarily have arisen because the central government did not control the entire population, and many young people were filling the ranks of opposition forces. This problem has not been acknowl­edged, nor has it been publicly discussed. Yet the insurgency con­tinues, and those Angolans who support the insurgent movements certainly cannot be considered eligible for FAPLA service. An­other serious problem in the available manpower resources con­cerns the educational qualifications of the eligible recruits or draft­ees. The acquisition of modern weapons and equipment demanded technologically proficient personnel, but such person­nel were needed in every sector of the economy and few were available.

Article 19 of the Constitution states, “It is the right and loftiest, most nondeferrable obligation of every citizen of the People’s Republic of Angola to participate in the defense of the nation’s territorial integrity and to increase the gains made by the revolu­tion.” By early 1978 the authorities evidently decided that too few citizens were exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations in the defense field, because a conscription system was imple­mented as authorized by the Mobilization and Recruitment Law. For the first time in its short history the Angolan government had resorted to a draft to fill FAPLA ranks and in so doing became the first black state in sub-Saharan Africa to initiate compulsory mili­tary service. Both men and women from age eighteen through thirty-five were made eligible regardless of race, ethnic back­ground, or place of birth. Length of service for draftees in the various branches of service was not publicized, but it was noted that after completion of regular tours of duty all personnel were obligated to enroll in the ranks of the ODP.

After the call-up of the first draftees an MPLA newspaper car­ried an editorial criticizing young people who offered “preposter­ous” excuses in attempts to avoid military service. For example, some who were called for service, “discovered at the last minute that they were the sole support of their families; others found that they had physical defects.” The editorial heaped the most scorn, however, on those who reported themselves to be indispensable

to their employers. The newspaper implied that the authorities were not deceived by the would-be draft dodgers.

In a speech to the graduates of a military school Minister of Defense Carreira noted that the draft law had been put into effect and that there was a high incidence of attempted evasion. He reproached employers and supervisors who classified young work­ers as indispensable in efforts to avoid vacancies. Carreira stated that everyone who was physically fit would be required to serve; if someone was truly indispensable, he would be drafted and then returned to his place of employment where he would be under military obligation and discipline. The defense minister said that those trying to escape their responsibilities were, in every case, of the petty bourgeoisie, and he was sure that they would “be tough­ened in the environment of the Armed Forces” and would lose their bourgeois attitudes.

Women are eligible for the draft and do serve in the armed forces, but little is known about their role. Although the govern­ment newspaper seems to carry information about FAPLA on a regular basis, there have been no specific articles about women in the military, and even brief mentions in news stories are compara­tively rare. The number of women in uniform in 1978 was un­known.

Military Traditions

Little is known about the military history of the African king­doms that occupied the area of present-day Angola before the late-fifteenth century arrival of the Portuguese. Some of these kingdoms were large, centrally organized entities holding lesser kingdoms in vassalage. When Portuguese explorers arrived in 1482, the kingdom of Kongo was dominant in west-central Africa. Kongo occupied the area bounded by the Congo, Dande, and Cuango rivers plus parts of the present-day People’s Republic of the Congo and Zaire—a kingdom of well over 100,000 square kilometers. The Portuguese recorded little concerning the mili­tary organizations of the African kingdoms, but the oral histories of some of the indigenous peoples included stories of armies and battles and of dynastic struggles that were settled by force of arms (bows and arrows or spears).

The Portuguese did not actually take over sovereignty of the region they called Angola until late in the seventeenth century, but because of their superior firepower and because the various peoples of the area were not united, they were able to exercise undue influence. This influence was generally confined to regions along the Congo River and along the Atlantic coast; the interior remained in African hands, but the balance of power that had existed before the arrival of the Portuguese was upset and would never be the same.

The story of relations between Portugal and the kingdom of Ndongo was similar to that of Kongo but, if anything, more diffi-

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cult. For over 100 years Portuguese expeditions fought against the forces of the *ngola a kiluanje* (king) of the Ndongo, sometimes suffering defeats but persisting until the kingdom was defeated. By the late seventeenth century the Atlantic seaboard of Angola, that is, the kingdoms of Kongo, Ndongo, and Loango (in present- day Cabinda) was under the somewhat tenuous control of the Portuguese crown. The control was tenuous because, inter alia, the African kingdoms resented vassalage to a European monarch, the Portuguese never properly staffed or protected the colonial governments, and the activities of the local Portuguese were more often than not self-serving rather than serving the interests of Lisbon. As for military activities, they were unending for both the Portuguese and the African populations. The Angolans fought continually, either in the service of the colonialists or against them, and when they were not fighting against the Portuguese the various groups fought each other. Warfare was a business the product of which was captives who were sold as slaves. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the principal occupation of the colony was the traffic in human beings.

In the four centuries of Portuguese occupation of Angola before the 1884-85 meeting of European powers in Berlin, the colony was never truly pacified. Constant military campaigns were re­quired to maintain trade routes into the interior, to punish some group or other for an uprising, or simply to show the flag remind­ing the indigenous peoples that they lived under Portuguese hegemony. Portugal rarely had large numbers of its own troops in the area; military units were generally made up of African auxiliar­ies, but officers and noncommissioned officers were white Por­tuguese, many of whom were *degredados* (exiled convicts) who had been sent from prisons in Portugal and Brazil. The first Afri­can auxiliaries in the Portuguese ranks used traditional weapons —bows and arrows and spears—but they were soon armed with firearms. The advantage that the Portuguese armies enjoyed be­cause of superior weaponry was soon overcome as more and more firearms were traded for slaves.

In the early nineteenth century the Portuguese in Angola were still confined to the coastal area—the slave trade in the interior had been carried on generally by *mestizos* (persons of mixed Afri­can and European origin) or blacks. Even along the coast Por­tuguese control was often tenuous because of African opposition, and travel between the ports of Luanda, Benguela, and Mo^a- medes was generally by boat because overland journeys were too dangerous. When the slave trade was decreed illegal and Euro­pean interest turned to the exploitation of other resources, Portu­gal began a gradual program of expansion into the interior. As always in Angola, the army was the instrument of expansion be­cause the peaceful spread of settlers was impossible in the face of opposition from the original inhabitants who resented the en­croachment and contested the advance into their lands. The move inland began in the 1830s after the promulgation of the anti-slave­trading decree but did not gain momentum until after mid-cen­tury. As the army moved eastward, new presidios were con­structed, but they were not always permanently garrisoned, and the countryside was not permanently pacified. The Portuguese army that led the way into the interior consisted primarily of Africans as had been the case since the beginning of Portuguese activities in the area.

After the meeting at Berlin had delineated spheres of influence in Africa, Portugal became much more serious about securing the vast territories that it claimed. For forty years after 1885 Por­tuguese military forces in Angola were almost constantly on cam­paign, and many battles were fought before some semblance of pacification was achieved in the late 1920s. To conduct those mili­tary campaigns the authorities relied on the African auxiliaries who made up the bulk of the army. A change of policy had allowed a few *assimilados* (assimilated Africans) to become officers, but for the most part the commissioned ranks were reserved for whites and a few *mestizos.* A spirit of rebellion also prevailed during much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, becom­ing more pronounced as the colonialists moved into the interior. In addition there was a similar spirit growing among some colo­nists as well as some *assimilados,* but only the African nationalism presented a problem and required a military response.

The short-lived republic of the early twentieth century was replaced by a military government in 1926 that led into the au­thoritarian regime of Ant6nio de Oliveira Salazar (see Administra­tion and Development, 1907-26. ch. 1). The last of the so-called pacification campaigns had ended by about 1930, and from that time until 1961 there was a lull in the interminable colonial wars that had plagued the Portuguese since the early days of their tenure in Angola. During the era of the New State (Estado Novo), as Salazar dubbed his regime, colonial affairs were dominated by the dictator as were most other aspects of Portuguese govern­ment, and in the colonial armies he continued the policy of using mostly African troops to fill the ranks. The use of African auxiliar­ies to fight the colonial wars had been a constant of Portuguese colonial policy, which also directed that African soldiers would be led by white officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Until the 1960s the ratio of black to white in the army in Angola was generally about 70 or 80 percent to 30 or 20 percent. No black Angolan attained officer rank during the Salazar era.

*War for Independence*

The thirty-year lull in the Angolan campaigns—the longest pe­riod of relative peace since the arrival of Diogo Cao in the late fifteenth century—was shattered in January 1961 when a sect calling itself Maria rose up against the Portuguese settlers and authorities in the cotton growing area of Malange Province. At first thought to be some kind of religious movement, the sect turned out to be the followers of Ant6nio Mariano, and their origi­nal protest against the system of enforced cotton growing became a feeble cry for independence known as Maria’s War. Mariano, who earlier had some contact with the Union of Angolan Peoples (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola—UPA), led his followers on a rampage of property destruction and livestock killing, but no Por­tuguese settlers were killed as they fled from the countryside into the towns. As the uprising spread, the colonial authorities re­sponded in force with troops and aircraft, inflicting heavy casual­ties—the almost predictable result of an undisciplined band of peasants armed with hoes, scythes, and ancient muskets fighting against a well-armed, numerically superior regular army.

Although the Portuguese army had little trouble in stopping the spread of hostilities, it could not stop the dissemination of news about Maria’s War to the nationalist forces that were increasing in number rapidly throughout the country. Even while the little war was in progress in Malange, another blow against the colonialists was delivered in Luanda where a large group of unemployed slumdwellers attacked the Sao Paulo prison hoping to free political prisoners who were being held there. The attackers, armed only with knives and clubs, failed to release any prisoners, but seven Portuguese policemen were reportedly killed as were many more of the rebels. Rioting between blacks and whites broke out next day after the funeral of the policemen, and when another attack on a Luanda prison a few days later again caused police casualties, the authorities once again responded with great force. In the words of John A. Marcum, an American who chronicled the Ango­lan revolution in a two-volume study, “Portuguese vengeance was awesome.”

Heavy censorship prevented foreigners from learning the full extent of the massacre that followed the Luanda prison attacks but, according to missionaries and newsmen who were in Luanda at the time, indiscriminate killing took several hundred lives as white vigilante groups roamed through the Luanda slums attack­ing Africans. Although there was some disagreement about who organized the original attack on Sao Paulo prison, the MPLA took the credit and in later years commemorated February 4,1961, as the date on which their war for independence began.

Maria’s War had occurred in a remote area and was hardly noticed outside Angola but, despite censorship, the Luanda trou­bles could not be hushed up, and enough attention was focused on the Portuguese colony to warrant the discussion of these events in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. But even as Luanda was being discussed, the third uprising of early 1961 occurred, which for sheer ferocity overshadowed everything that had happened during Maria’s War or the prison attacks. In the northern part of the colony, peoples of the Kongo ethnic group, assembled under the banners of the UPA, attacked government installations, farms,

and trading posts, killing Portuguese men, women, and children indiscriminately. Killed also in the orgy of violence were *mestizos* and *assimilados* as well as many contract laborers of the Ovim­bundu ethnic group who had been brought north to work on the coffee plantations. The latter killings evoked charges of tribalism that would haunt the opposing Angolan factions throughout the wars of independence and on into the postindependence civil wars. Roberto, leader of the UP A, was in New York at the UN hearings at the time of the attack and later decried the extreme violence but attributed it to the “centuries of Portuguese brutality against the Africans.”

The government threw its full weight against the rebels in the north and with a 9,000-man army (including 6,000 African auxil­iaries) armed with modern weapons and supported by bombers plus units of the settlers’ militia bent on vengeance, the response was terrifying. An estimated 20,000 Africans were killed during the six months after the UPA uprising. In Lisbon, Salazar reacted to the events of March 1961 by firing his defense minister, person­ally taking over that portfolio, and ordering 10,000 additional European Portuguese troops to Angola. The guerrilla fighting, which later became known as the War for Independence, was under way. The government forces were able to bring the situa­tion under control, but they were not able to eliminate the dissi­dent organizations nor end the widespread guerrilla attacks. By the end of 1962 the situation had been stabilized enough so that Salazar gave up personal direction of the defense department and appointed armed forces chief of staff, General Manuel Gomes de Araujo, to the position.

During the first half of the 1960s as the forces of the MPLA under Neto and those of the UPA—which had become FNLA under Roberto—increased their strength, so did the Portuguese. By the mid-1960s as many as 50,000 troops were in the field against the guerrillas. Half of the Portuguese force consisted of locally conscripted soldiers, mostly Africans but also including some settlers. In 1966 still another guerrilla force joined in the fighting as UNITA made known its presence by attacking Por­tuguese forces. UNITA’s troops were drawn primarily from the Ovimbundu and were led by Savimbi.

As the war progressed, most combat actions were fought in the rural areas away from the urban centers, and European casualties were relatively light making the war seem quite distant to the settlers as well as to the metropolitan Portuguese. As the fighting dragged on into the early 1970s, however, dissatisfaction began to grow, and public complaints became more frequent. Portugal’s African troubles were not confined to Angola; rebellion was also rampant in Portuguese Guinea (later Guinea-Bissau) and Mozam­bique, and even though casualties remained relatively light, when statistics from the three separate wars were totaled, people began to worry. Objections from the young men who were being con­scripted to fight the African wars also became much more fre­quent. As for the financial burden, most of the funds for the Ango­lan operation were coming from the export of Angolan coffee, diamonds, and crude oil. Nevertheless for a country as poor as Portugal, the annual expenditure on colonial wars was alarming. By the beginning of 1974 war weariness had infected a large segment of the Portuguese population, but because the rebels could not marshal enough strength to defeat the colonial armies, some observers were of the opinion that hostilities could drag on indefinitely.

The end of the anticolonial wars came about not because the insurgents suddenly gained strength or because they finally unified their separate efforts; the end of the war coincided with the end of the authoritarian regime that had dominated Por­tuguese affairs for almost fifty years. Salazar had suffered a dis­abling stroke in 1968, and the reins of government had been picked up by Marcello Caetano who generally maintained the status quo for the next six years. To the Angolan rebels the change made no difference; they continued to fight against the colonial power and at times against each other. In April 1974, thirteen years into the Angolan war, a group of young Portuguese military officers known as the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the Caetano government and announced that the future of Portugal’s colonies would be determined by the people of those colonies.

*Civil War*

The existence of three rival movements, each having its own army, complicated the question of the inheritance of the govern­ment when the Portuguese departed. The hostility between the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA during the long years of anticolonial warfare had often led to internecine battles, and that hostility was exacerbated by the intervention of foreign governments. The So­viet Union, Cuba, and various other communist countries backed the MPLA. The United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa supported FNLA (which was generally based in and supported by Zaire) and UNITA. When MPLA was criticized for seeking communist aid, Neto countered by stating that he would accept help from the devil if it would further his cause—words similar to those of Winston Churchill when the So­viet Union entered World War II on the Allied side. Accepting aid from the devil, however, could not be compared to accepting aid from South Africa, which later proved to be a reason for the con­demnation of FNLA and UNITA, particularly the latter, by many African governments.

Early in 1975 the new government in Lisbon set November 11, 1975, as the effective date for Angolan independence. The leaders of the factions—Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi—agreed to a truce and a coalition administration that would seek a peaceful transi­tion to self-government, but the truce broke down almost im­

mediately, and the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA renewed their in­ternecine warfare. Fighting was so intense in and around Luanda in July that Portuguese troops were asked to help restore order. In August the FNLA and UNITA, which had formed a tenuous alliance, bowed to superior strength in the capital area and evacu­ated their troops and supporters from Luanda. When indepen­dence came, for all intents and purposes, the country was divided into three unequal territories—the FNLA controlled the north­west, the MPLA occupied a strip from Luanda eastward to the Zairian border (plus the enclave of Cabinda), and UNITA had the lion’s share of territory—the entire southern sector of the country. On Independence Day the existence of two republics was de­clared: Neto announced the establishment of the People’s Repub­lic of Angola with its capital at Luanda; Roberto and Savimbi agreed that their divided territories would henceforth be the Peo­ple’s Democratic Republic of Angola and its capital would be Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) in Savimbi country.

The amount of territory occupied by FNLA in the north and by UNITA in the south plus the strength of their forces on indepen­dence day seemed to bode ill for MPLA, apparently in a precari­ous position between the two opposing forces. MPLA had a psy­chological advantage in that it controlled Luanda, the capital and most important city and port; it also had Soviet weapons and supplies plus Soviet and Cuban advisers, but the American, PRC, and South African aid to the other side appeared to balance the equation. The seemingly superior position of FNLA-UNITA deteriorated rapidly during the next few weeks as the Soviets carried out a massive logistics build-up by air and sea at the same time that Cuban fighting troops were being ferried into Angola on a daily basis. The Soviet weaponry included MiG aircraft, tanks, and truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers known as Stalin Organs. These weapons were crucial to the eventual success in the civil war, but they would have been of little use to FAPLA without Cubans to fly the MiGs, drive the tanks, fire the weapons, and maintain all of the technically advanced equipment.

The civil war, which has taken its place in MPLA legend as the Second War of Independence, was brief. The Soviet Union and Cuba also carefully avoided using the terminology “civil war” stating that their aid was being given to a sovereign government that had asked for help because it was being attacked from outside. Regardless of the language used, it was the heavy involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba that proved decisive in the MPLA victory. The cessation of assistance to FNLA and UNITA by the United States and the subsequent withdrawal of the South Afri­cans ended any hopes of defeating MPLA. Actually the turning point came with the introduction of Cuban troops, which changed the entire complexion of the Angolan hostilities. Facing an enemy’s superior weaponry was nothing new for FNLA and UNITA—the Portuguese always had better weapons—but in the past the Angolans had fought as guerrilla armies. Misconstruing their own strength and resources after independence, they briefly stood up against the Cuban-FAPLA combination in a conven­tional warfare stance and were roundly defeated. In addition to lacking the tanks, antitank guns, heavy artillery, and antiaircraft artillery that they sorely needed, the FNLA-UNITA command also lacked the expertise required. Years of guerrilla warfare had not prepared Roberto and Savimbi and their top commanders to match the Soviet-Cuban strategy, tactics, and weaponry used against them between November 1975 and February 1976.

Administration and Organization

When it was created on August 1, 1974, FAPLA seemed to be a scheme concocted by the leader of MPLA to achieve legitimacy for its armed forces. As FAPLA the MPLA army acquired the aura of a national army rather than being merely the military arm of a political movement that was itself contending for power with two other movements. In effect nothing changed militarily on that date other than the title of MPLA’s fighting force—it was still the same guerrilla army that had been fighting the Portuguese colo­nial administration since the early 1960s. What had changed was the setting. The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship had put Angola on a straight path to independence, and the institutionaliz­ing of its military arm by MPLA was a smart political move as well as a propaganda ploy. As hostilities among the three contending factions became more intense during 1975, and particularly after the greatly increased intervention on the part of various foreign powers, FAPLA began to take on the appearance of a regular army, and after the end of the civil war in 1976, with Soviet and Cuban help, the guerrilla army was converted into a regular force. The existence of such a military structure proved to be an aid in the transition of MPLA from liberation movement to governing body.

*Military Command and Mission*

As commander in chief of FAPLA, the president of the republic is ultimately responsible for the defense of the country. In fulfilling that responsibility and in overseeing the organization, administra­tion, and day-to-day operations the president relies on his minis­ter of defense. The government and the MPLA-Labor Party are closely parallel structures, and both the president and the minister of defense are members of the Political Bureau at the top of the party as well as being members of the Revolutionary Council at the head of the government. President Neto has held the top position in the MPLA since 1962 and has held the highest govern­ment office since the country became independent. Neto has not been a field commander of FAPLA or of the predecessor guerrilla forces and has generally relied on subordinates and foreign advis­ers for military expertise.

In his public statements about FAPLA, Neto continually stresses three themes that seem to sum up his philosophy on what the armed forces of a socialist state should be: the armed forces must be of the people, of the party, and internationalist, i.e., devoted to the liberation of all Africa. Neto has stressed that FAPLA must not be allowed to become an elite force, remote from the everyday life of the country. He has credited the armed forces with having been in the forefront of the liberation struggles but has warned that under the MPLA-Labor Party the “concept that the Army is only a military combat organization” is rejected. As an example of keeping the army close to the people as well as an answer to an economic exigency, Neto ordered in early 1978 that units would be responsible for growing their own foodstuffs. Neto stated, “Mili­tary units will be called upon more and more to contribute to the development of agriculture. In every barracks there will be agri­cultural and livestock production to every extent possible.” Con­cerning internationalism Neto declared, “We shall have to grant our constant help to the people of Namibia, to the people of Zim­babwe, and to the people of South Africa in particular.”

Neto’s view that the armed forces should be an arm of the party seemed to be fully concurred in by other members of the MPLA- Labor Party hierarchy, several of whom were former guerrilla fighters and some of whom were still active members of the armed forces. It would appear that the Political Bureau of the MPLA- Labor Party would be the ultimate authority in military matters as in any other national affairs of major importance. As in the Cuban system as well as the governmental and party systems of many other socialist countries, the minister of defense in the An­golan government is a uniformed army officer. Unlike many of the other systems, however, officer ranks have not been inflated, and in 1978 Minister of Defense Carreira retained the rank of com­mander. In the late 1970s FAPLA was an amalgamation that showed traces of the guerrilla force from which it evolved as well as traces of the Soviet and Cuban forces on which it has been modeled.

***Army***

By 1974 the MPLA had split into three rival groups all of which contended for control of the movement. As part of the- astute maneuvering that eventually gained control for the pro-Neto group within MPLA and with a view toward approaching inde­pendence, eighty-three of Neto’s guerrilla officers created FAPLA. The former guerrilla army had, of course, undergone considerable evolution during the long years of fighting the Por­tuguese. For example, in the earliest days tiny units of from six to ten men operated semi-independently, striking and then melting away as is typical of such operations; later the units grew in size to the point that they could be designated companies. As com­munications equipment improved and the leaders and troops learned more about coordinated attacks, companies could be brought together to form battalions for specific engagements, al­ways relying on the tactic of rapid dispersal. The great influx of modem weapons at the time of independence and during the ensuing civil war, plus the arrival of large numbers of Cuban and Soviet advisers, ensured the conversion of FAPLA into a conven­tional army, and before the end of 1976 an air force and a navy had also been created.

President Neto and other leaders of the MPLA-Labor Party have impressed on the people and particularly on those people entering the armed forces that FAPLA should not be considered a traditional military force, i.e., a bourgeois military force. Party spokesmen let it be known that FAPLA members are citizen­soldiers who must not develop or try to develop into an elite corps. President Neto wants his soldiers to be part of the nationbuilding process that is so important to Angola in its early years of indepen­dence, but it is difficult to see how the FAPLA soldier can become very involved in nationbuilding as long as the guerrilla warfare of the FNLA and UNITA movements continues.

The rank structure of the FAPLA army is rather unconventional in that there are no generals. Officers ranks are second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, major, and commander. These seem to have been the ranks that evolved during the guerrilla days, and no accommodation has been made to the structure of the conven­tional army. As far as can be determined from available literature, majors and commanders make up the membership of the general staff of FAPLA and also command the military regions, brigades, and battalions of the army in the field. Little is known of the enlisted rank structure. Most sources refer to “sergeants and ranks,” but it is generally assumed that there are probably at least three or four NCO ranks.

Until the establishment of the navy and air force, FAPLA con­sisted only of ground troops, and the army has continued to be by far the largest and most important component. In late 1978 West­ern strength estimates ranged from 11,000 to 50,000, but the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ estimate of FAPLA army strength at 31,000 seemed to be reasonable. Army deploy­ment is regional, the country being divided into six numbered military regions. Whether the military regions are structured for purely administrative purposes or whether they have tactical re­sponsibilities has not been publicly disclosed, but some newspaper stories have contained indications that military region staffs do fulfill tactical functions, such as reconnaissance. Military orders that have been made public showed the appointment of a major to be commanding officer of the First Military Region, which prob­ably is headquartered at Luanda, and a commander to be com­manding officer of the Second Military Region, which encom­passes the Cabinda Enclave. The boundaries of the other regions have not been publicized, but Huambo is certainly a region head­quarters, and the other three headquarters are possibly located at Uige or Mbanza Kongo, Saurimo, and Menongue.

Exact information on the tactical organization of the FAPLA army has been scarce, at least for Western observers. If in fact an army Table of Organization exists, it has not been released to the public. Certain assumptions about organization can be made be­cause of the heavy Soviet and Cuban influences on FAPLA, but these can only be assumptions, and the evolution of the organiza­tion from guerrilla force to regular army must also be taken into account. The groups, sections, and squadrons that existed in the guerrilla army became the squads, platoons, and companies of the regular army and are probably commanded by sergeants, lieuten­ants, and captains respectively. Battalions commanded by majors or commanders were included in the structure of the new army, but how many companies constitute a battalion is unknown. It is likely that battalion organization varies and is probably tailored for specific operations.

The MPLA Central Committee, in published documents per­taining to its plenary session of October 1976, stated, “On the eve of independence the first regular military unit was formed: the 9th Brigade, whose action was decisive against the invading groups.” No details concerning the brigade were given, and nothing was known of its composition, its command structure, or its comman­ding officer. Later Carreira, in an interview for a Cuban publica­tion, mentioned the creation of brigades as the basic unit of the army but gave no information on size, organization, or personnel complement. The only further public mention of the 9th Brigade came in news reports of the purges that followed the abortive coup attempt against the Neto government in May 1977. The “rebellious” brigade was listed among organizations whose ranks were purged.

In all likelihood the brigade is a flexible organization that is formed for specific operations. The defense minister so indicated when he said, “These brigades can be equipped with technology ranging from field artillery cannons to tanks supplied by the Soviet Union.” In early 1978 a major campaign against UNITA forces in southern Angola was carried out by five FAPLA battalions accord­ing to newspaper accounts. Obviously a five-battalion operation had to be coordinated by a higher headquarters, and it is possible that one brigade or even two brigades comprised the FAPLA force; but no mention of such units appeared in news accounts.

***Navy***

Carreira has stated that plans for a navy had been discussed with Soviet advisers even before independence, but it wasn’t until late 1976 that the Angolan navy actually began to take shape. The first vessels were Portuguese patrol craft that were transferred to the Angolans from the Portuguese navy before its departure and some landing craft transferred from the Soviet navy. The FAPLA navy

also took over the shore facilities that had been abandoned by the departing Portuguese. These consisted of the Luanda Naval Base and smaller facilities in Lobito and Mocamedes. In discussing the navy Carreira noted the greater difficulties inherent in the crea­tion of naval and air forces where none had previously existed compared to the building of an army from combat-tested guerrilla forces. The assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuba in building the navy was considered invaluable by the military officials of the Neto government.

The navy in 1978 was a very small force of about 700 officers and sailors manning various kinds of patrol boats and landing craft and a few shore installations. The inventory of vessels in February 1978 included thirteen patrol boats, one torpedo boat, and eight landing craft. Four of the patrol boats were Argos class mounting two 40-mm guns and having a complement of twenty-four. All had been commissioned between 1963 and 1965. There were two smaller Jupiter class patrol boats, each of which mounted a 20-mm gun and carried a crew of eight. Commissioning dates were 1964 and 1965. Four similar patrol boats were of the Bellatrix class with the same armament but carrying seven crew members. These were all of 1961 and 1962 vintage. One Soviet patrol boat, listed as a “fast attack craft” mounting four 14.5-mm machine guns, was transferred from the Soviet navy in 1976. The remaining two patrol boats were older Portuguese craft of the Alfange class. The torpedo boat and one of the landing craft were new acquisitions, presented by Soviet naval authorities in December 1977 at cere­monies held at the Luanda Naval Base. Soviet crewmen evidently were scheduled to give on-the-job training to Angolan crews. The chief of the Soviet Military Mission in turning over the vessels said, “We are sure that with the help of Soviet specialists, the Angolan comrades will soon be able to assimilate this complicated technol­ogy and to create a powerful force capable of resisting any attacks by enemies of the Angolan revolution.”

***Air Force***

The creation of the Angolan air force was proclaimed by Presi­dent Neto on January 21,1976, and by March of that year MiG jets, piloted by Cubans, were flying combat missions against UNITA guerrillas in the southern part of the country. Two years later, in a major FAPLA offensive against UNITA, the MiGs and helicop­ters used in the operation were still being flown by Cuban pilots. The technical qualifications needed for most personnel assigned to a modern air force proved to be a stumbling block, particularly because of the low literacy level in Angola, but young people were being sent to Cuba and the Soviet Union for training, and eventu­ally they will begin to take over positions in their own air force. Meanwhile Cubans provided the trained manpower needed to fly and maintain modern aircraft. There have also been rumors of Soviets and East Germans working as technicians; the latter have been reported as helicopter pilots in anti-UNITA operations, but the East German government has denied all such reports.

The air force, like the navy, is small; the personnel complement at the end of 1977 was estimated at about 800. Equipment at that time included thirty-three combat aircraft, about thirty tran­sports, and several helicopters. The combat planes included sev­enteen MiG-21s, twelve MiG-17s, and four G-91s. An un­confirmed report from a British pilot who had visited Luanda in 1978 said that the Angolans had twenty-four MiG-2 Is and thirty “battered” MiG-17s, considerably more than the generally ac­cepted estimate. The MiG-17s, a subsonic single-seat fighter, was originally put into production in 1953. Its armament consists of three 23-mm guns, and it carries either four rocket pods (eight rockets each) or two 550-pound bombs. The MiG-21 flew in proto­type in 1955 at supersonic speed and was later produced in more than twenty versions. It is also a single-seat fighter mounting a twin-barrel 23-mm gun, and it carries various combinations of rocket pods and bombs depending on model. The G-91, an Italian Fiat twin jet, mounts two 30-mm guns and is capable of carrying four 1,000-pound bombs. The four G-91s in the Angolan air force were transferred from the Portuguese air force before its depar­ture. The transport aircraft included a variety of Western and Soviet planes, some regular propeller and some turboprop. The helicopters were mostly French Alouettes—eleven—but there were also four Soviet Mi-8s and two American Bell-47s. During the first half of 1978 UNITA took credit for shooting down several FAPLA aircraft, but the reports were unconfirmed.

*Military Training*

During the first year after the end of the civil war, the processes of building naval and air forces were begun. Schools were estab­lished to train officers, technicians, and specialists and, at the same time, centers were constructed or refurbished for the basic train­ing of recruits and for the more advanced combat training of regular troops. In all of these activities the assistance given by Soviet and Cuban advisers has often been described as invaluable by the MPLA leaders. Both of those countries also opened their own military schools and training centers to Angolan military per­sonnel who later returned to become troop leaders, technicians, and instructors. By late 1978 FAPLA operated several training centers and schools for army officers, NCOs, and soldiers, but most navy and air force personnel as well as some army personnel were still sent abroad for training, and most FAPLA schools were still staffed by Cubans and Soviets.

The high percentage of illiterates placed additional burdens on schools and training centers, particularly because of the need for technicians to man and maintain FAPLA’s modern equipment. During 1977 and 1978 the government placed great emphasis on the establishment of primary schools at military installations

around the country in order to bring personnel up to a level of education that would enable them to receive necessary training.

In December 1976 President Neto gave the commencement address at the first graduation ceremony held at the Nicolau Gomes Officers School in Huambo when 1,200 new army officers took their oaths of allegiance and were commissioned. The presi­dent mentioned that these graduates were the first to receive their training within Angola, and in congratulating the new officers he expressed his and the country’s thanks to the Soviet Union and to Cuba for the particular roles they have played in assisting the armed forces of Angola. The course of instruction that this first class underwent lasted from July until December, was primarily taught by Cubans and Soviets and, according to Neto, concen­trated on making the students “capable of waging a modem war by mastering military techniques and tactics.”

*Foreign Military Aid*

Some observers of the southern African scene in 1961 attributed the March uprising of the Kongo peoples to a Soviet-inspired revolution or some sort of a communist conspiracy. In retrospect, however, most authors discussing the event concluded that it was initiated by a purely indigenous movement and that, although not spontaneous, it did not evidence careful planning or external di­rection. Not that the Soviet Union was uninterested in African affairs; Moscow soon labeled the Angolan trouble a “just war of national liberation” and began to support the Marxist-oriented MPLA by supplying money and military materiel and by tran­sporting Angolans to the Soviet Union and to other East European countries for military training.

The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Ro­mania were among the East European countries allied to the So­viet Union that joined in sending economic and military aid to the MPLA, and the East Germans also sent some technicians. Nona­ligned Yugoslavia lent its support to Neto’s movement and, for a short time, so did the PRC. The armaments—usually small arms, grenades, light mortars, and ammunition—that were supplied to the MPLA by the communist countries during the 1960s and early 1970s were never enough to be decisive in the anticolonial war, but they were sufficient to keep the MPLA guerrillas operating and fighting during those years. In 1964 Denmark, Norway, and Sweden began sending nonmilitary aid to the MPLA. The PRC later switched its aid to the Zaire-based FNLA and to UNITA, but the quantity of PRC military materiel sent to those movements never approached the quantity being given to the MPLA by the Soviet Union and its allies.

For a time during 1973 Soviet aid to MPLA ceased. The authori­ties in Moscow apparently concluded that the movement’s inter­nal disarray precluded efficient use of the aid that was being sent. After the collapse of the Caetano government in Lisbon on April 25, 1974, and the promise of the new government to free the African colonies, Neto established dominance over the rival fac­tions in MPLA and Moscow’s aid shipments were resumed at in­creased volume and frequency. The character of aid materiel also changed as heavier weapons and equipment were shipped as op­posed to the small arms, light weapons, and ammunition that had characterized Soviet aid during the long anticolonial war. The United States was not assisting any of the Angolan movements in 1974.

After the early 1975 failure of the Alvor agreement through which the three Angolan factions had agreed to participate with Portugal in a transitional government leading to independence, the Soviet Union stepped up its aid shipments, and during the spring of that year FAPLA achieved a definite edge over its adver­saries because of the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons that it received. Even though independence was not supposed to be official until November, by mid-summer Portuguese control had ended, and the former colony was in a full-scale civil war. The PRC continued to send aid to FNLA through Zaire but still in limited quantity. The United States also began sending aid to FNLA and UNITA through Zaire. Former CIA agent John Stock­well charged in his book, *In Search of Enemies,* that much of the materiel never reached Angola because some Zairian officials were diverting shipments into illegal channels for their own per­sonal gain and that FNLA officials were reluctant to complain too loudly for fear of losing their sanctuaries in Zaire.

In testimony later given to the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the United States Senate, then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stated that, in addition to the Soviet and Cuban military advisers and instructors known to be present in Angola, intelli­gence reports had indicated the presence of Cuban combat troops as early as August 1975. The number of advisory personnel was increased during the late summer, and in late September and early October additional Cuban fighting men arrived in Luanda. Marcum, following newspaper reports, estimated that there were from 1,100 to 1,500 Cuban troops in Angola. On October 23 a heavily armed unit of the South African army—accompanied by white Portuguese Angolans, black soldiers of the former Por­tuguese Angolan army, and assorted mercenaries—made its way north, pushing FAPLA troops back toward Luanda. As Cubans joined FAPLA units using Soviet rocket launchers, artillery, and jet fighters, the South African advance stalled about 100 kilome­ters south of Luanda, and the tide of battle turned.

During the last three months of 1975 the Soviet Union mounted an airlift and sealift that delivered enough military hardware to convert FAPLA from a lightly armed infantry organization into a modern mechanized force capable of rapid movement to wide­spread targets on which it could deliver heavy firepower sup­ported by air and naval units. The influx of warplanes, tanks, ar­

mored cars, artillery, and other accoutrements of modem warfare overwhelmed the technological capabilities of the FAPLA troops, but well-trained Cuban troops filled the gap while both Cubans and Soviets hastily set up facilities to train their Angolan allies.

On December 19, 1975, at the height of the Soviet-Cuban build-up of war materiel and combat troops, the United States Senate voted to end all aid to FNLA-UNITA. During the debate that led up to the vote it was stated that US$32 million in military aid had been funneled covertly to the two groups during 1975 and an additional US$37 million had been earmarked, but the Senate vote and a similar negative vote in the House of Representatives in January 1976 ended the aid program. With the end of American participation, the South Africans reassessed their position and made a hasty retreat to the southern border. The Cuban troops then proceeded to push the FNLA back into Zaire before turning their attention to UNITA, which they soon dispersed but did not defeat or drive out of Angola. The MPLA, with the support of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops, became the government of Angola, but both opposition groups reverted to the guerrilla war­fare that they knew so well from the anticolonial wars. Over the next two and one-half years the forces of FNLA and UNITA, operating separately, harassed FAPLA and Cuban units but cau­tiously avoided engagements in which the government forces could use their superior weaponry.

*People’s Militia*

In September 1975 President Neto announced the establish­ment of a paramilitary organization that he said would eventually spread throughout the country enlisting virtually every able-bod­ied citizen. The new militia was called the People’s Defense Orga­nization (Organizacao de Defesa Popular—ODP), and in creating it Neto emphasized that national defense is everybody’s business. ODP units were established in towns and villages, at factories and mines, and at other places of employment as well as on farms in remote rural areas. At first the units were organized and trained by party militants and members of FAPLA, but soon regular schools had been established in the provinces, and by the end of June 1977 the first class of ODP instructors had graduated from a training course in the province of Uige. Armed and uniformed, they passed in review during a graduation ceremony before being dispersed to their home areas to organize and train local units.

In a speech made in September 1977 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of ODP, Neto discussed the necessity for popular participation in any revolutionary activity or national liberation struggle mentioning “the great October Social­ist Revolution of 1917’’ that established Bolshevism in Russia. He said that the success of such movements cannot depend only on the young men serving in armies but must have the support of all citizens who must be dedicated to specific ideals and objectives of

a political nature. He then said, “It is a noteworthy fact that the politico-military aspect has always been predominant in the de­fense of the people’s interests.” This statement perhaps tells a great deal about why the ODP was organized. It is a paramilitary organization intended to assist the regular forces in an emergency, but its political possibilities as a mass patriotic organization over­ride its military potential. Neto called on every member of ODP to “apply himself increasingly to the study of Marxism-Leninism.” In effect the ODP became a convenient tool through which the government could reach the people for political indoctrination and political control.

Neto congratulated those citizens who shared in the defense of the country by serving in ODP and urged every citizen to partici­pate in the militia activities “with the same ardor and the same love with which our country’s independence has been defended for years.” From the tone of the speech it would seem that Neto was not particularly satisfied with the operation of ODP, but he did not actually criticize it, and no publicized accounts support such a theory. Nevertheless he did leave the impression that the organization was not all that it should be, and in a rather peculiar remark he said that members of ODP should not confuse them­selves with members of FAPLA. In the president’s words ODP should not “mistake this irregular formation for the regular forma­tion of our army.” He did not expand on that remark but left the impression that some friction had arisen between FAPLA and ODP.

Ever since its creation the ODP has been referred to in govern­ment publications and in speeches by officials as being led by the “4th of February patriots,” but the identity of these patriots has not been made known. Presumably the leadership of the ODP includes some veterans of the attack on Luanda’s political prison on February 4, 1961, a date that has become enshrined in MPLA legend as the beginning of the anticolonial war. Whether or not veterans of the prison attack are actually leading the ODP is not as important as the association of the symbolism of that historic event with the present-day popular efforts for national defense.

On the second anniversary of independence, November 11, 1977, approximately 10,000 armed workers, members of the ODP, marched in a celebration parade in Luanda. President Neto, members of the MPLA Central Committee, and members of the diplomatic corps reportedly reviewed the parading militiamen. News reports stated that the arming of workers and peasants was in response to the “external and internal aggression” occurring in Angola and went on to say that ODP ranks at that time included 150,000 members. The missions of the ODP, as defined by Presi­dent Neto, were to maintain peace at places of work and in the villages and communities and to assist FAPLA in the defense of the country’s territorial integrity.

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Political Control of the Armed Forces

The present-day armed forces—FAPLA—and the MPLA guer­rilla units from which they were created have been under the control of the movement’s top political leaders since the first shot was fired against the Portuguese in 1961. In the early days many of the political leaders were also guerrilla fighters, and practically all of the members of the movement were militants, that is, highly motivated political activists. Some of the natural leaders who came to the fore during the anticolonial warfare were sent for training to Algeria, the Soviet Union, or to another country of similar orien­tation. When these leaders returned to their duties with guerrilla units, they were expected to be political indoctrinators as well as combat officers.

The establishment of FAPLA in 1974 brought greater structure to the armed forces; for example, the hierarchy included the Gen­eral Staff, and one of its sections was the Political Commissariat of the Armed Forces, charged with overseeing politicomilitary affairs. Indoctrination became much more formalized and later, after the establishment of the republic and the civil war that followed, political training in FAPLA became more Marxist-Leni­nist oriented. Such orientation was a natural consequence of the rapid influx of Soviet and Cuban advisers as well as the build-up of Cuban troop strength but probably also reflected a natural proclivity of the MPLA. At any rate, during the First Congress of the MPLA, held in December 1977, the movement was converted into a full-fledged political party—MPLA-Labor Party—using Marxism-Leninism as its philosophical underpinning (see The Party, ch. 3). The congress emphasized the role of FAPLA as the military arm of the party and directed that political training be enhanced in order to work toward the goal of having every mem­ber of the armed forces be a party activist.

An indication of the importance given political indoctrination and political control in the armed forces was the appearance of President Neto at the closing session of the Second National Semi­nar of the National Political Commissariat of the FAPLA in Febru­ary 1978. Several other members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee also attended the final session, and during the week-long seminar speeches by important party officials were included in the eight-hour-day political sessions. Commander Dino Matross, national political commissar of FAPLA and member of the Central Committee, opened the seminar and also made a summation speech at the closing session. The participants were the political commissars from battalion level up to the general staff section headed by Matross. The chain of political control has a commissar at battalion, brigade, and military region headquarters, at each school, at each major support unit—communications, sup­ply, and maintenance—and at the headquarters of the army, navy, and air force. There are also political officers below battalion level in the platoons and companies. Party members and members of

the youth group are brought together in cells at the lowest levels, in committees at company level, and in assemblies at battalion and above. Similar chains and structures were recommended for the militia, police, and security forces.

External Threats to National Security

President Neto continually warned his people of the danger they faced from attacks by imperialist powers. He invariably re­ferred to FNLA and UNITA as “puppets of imperialism” and stated that the most immediate danger to Angola was presented by the forces of South Africa and, until mid-1978, Zaire. In the past South Africa had certainly given the Neto government reason to be wary—by the penetration of its troops deep into Angola in 1975 and by frequent military incursions after that time. Never­theless the rapid withdrawal of South African troops in 1976 after the United States Congress voted to end assistance to FNLA and UNITA should have convinced Neto that South Africa did not desire any prolonged military actions as long as Soviet advisers and Cuban troops were present. In addition if the promising steps made toward independence for Namibia during 1978 proved to be successful, that new state would provide a buffer between Angola and South Africa.

Neto has also accused Zaire of provocations along the border, but real danger in late 1978 appeared to be minimal. The Zairian units that supported FNLA forces during incursions into Angola were not particularly effective and did not accomplish any impor­tant objectives. After the poor showing of the Zairian army during the Katangan invasions of Zaire’s Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978, it would appear that Zairian forces did not present a credible threat to Angolan security. Furthermore meetings between Neto and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in late 1978 held the promise of easing tensions between the two countries. No threats to national security were presented by Angola’s other neighboring countries—Zambia and the People’s Republic of the Congo.

Public Order

Years of anticolonial warfare, internecine hostility, civil war, and guerrilla conflict suggest that there could not possibly be any public order, but life goes on even under such chaotic conditions, and the government does maintain order in the country or, at least, in parts of the country. The constant guerrilla attacks have caused the government to develop a siege mentality that makes it difficult for outsiders to acquire information about security mat­ters and to learn much about actual conditions in the country. The fact that the MPLA-Labor Party professes to be building a socialist state and is being advised in this venture by Soviet and Cuban personnel also restricts the flow of information. Having been fighting for much of the time since 1961, it is understandable why the MPLA is chary about releasing security information.

Police

The national police force, known as the People’s Police Corps of Angola (Corpo de Policia Popular de Angola—CPPA), was sub­ordinate to the Ministry of Defense. CPPA strength in 1978 was unknown, as was its exact functional breakdown; but it appeared to be all-encompassing, that is, having both urban and rural re­sponsibilities and having sufficient strength to fulfill its national tasks. Organizationally CPPA was compartmentalized according to function, and it was believed to have sections or divisions cover­ing criminal activities, traffic, railroads, ports and harbors, and mining, as well as other economic enterprises. Military Police were frequently mentioned in Luanda news reports, but their responsibilities were not defined, nor were their functions, partic­ularly vis-a-vis the regular police. The Military Police was one of the organizations purged after the May 1977 coup attempt for having rebels in its ranks.

The general commandant of the CPPA in late 1978 was Com­mander Santana Andre Pitra, who was also an alternate member of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party in keeping with the policy of having the highest government positions filled by top-level party personnel. Other CPPA officer grades seemed to be generally comparable to the military, accenting the parallel­ism that existed between the armed forces and the police forces. Lower ranking police personnel were referred to as sergeants and agents.

The main police headquarters was located in Luanda. The or­ganizational structure was regional; there were police commands in the province capitals and police squadrons below province level. It was not known how much of the country was actually covered by the CPPA or how much may have been without na­tional police presence because of the continuing guerrilla warfare. In February 1978 Pitra stated, “We are gradually extending police activity to all provinces,” and he also announced that the Benguela Provincial Command was to be inaugurated and a squadron head­quarters was to be reopened in Cunene, indicating that those areas previously had been without national police protection.

The CPPA was created on February 28,1976, at about the same time that the civil war was drawing to a close. Most of its personnel at that time were probably transferred from the ranks of FAPLA. Whether the police force was receiving new personnel through the conscription system in 1978 was not known, but some indica­tions pointed toward a volunteer system rather than a draft. Ac­cording to Pitra special emphasis has been placed on making “a radical change in the structures inherited from the colonial era,” and in order to study other police forces and establish means for cooperation he has made trips to Algeria, Nigeria, Zambia, Yugo­slavia, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and Cuba. Reports in Western newspapers had at various times stated that Angola’s police were being trained and advised by East Germans or Soviets or Cubans, but in an anniversary speech Pitra gave great credit to the Cubans stating that they had made valuable contributions in advising the police force at its various levels and that they had also provided the faculty for the basic school in which new police recruits were trained.

The school that the Cubans had staffed was the Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School in Luanda. The training received by the recruits was both technical and political, and it appeared that since the MPLA Congress of December 1977 political and ideolog­ical indoctrination had been increased. As in the military forces, a concerted effort was being made in the CPPA to establish party cells in the smallest police groups and to foster the study of Marx­ism-Leninism among all of the rank-and-file policemen. A politi­cal commissariat was established in the main police headquarters, and officers were sent to the FAPLA political school to receive training that would enable them to return to their police units as political teachers. President Neto in trying to instill patriotic en­thusiasm in the police forces stated, that every member would have to “be a revolutionary,” and the political commissars have shown fervor reminiscent of the early Bolsheviks in trying to instill socialist ideals in the members of the CPPA. A message sent to all personnel from the Political Commissariat at the beginning of 1978 stated, “We must create within each one of us a new man with a different awareness. We must destroy in each one of us the vices and incorrect principles created by distorted and inadequate education. We shall have to fight in our ranks alcoholism and corruption, permissiveness and squandering of property and ma­terial placed in our hands for carrying out police work.”

At the end of 1977 sixteen members of the CPPA were con­victed of sabotage. The sabotage in these cases consisted of the damaging or destruction of government property, in most cases police patrol cars. In effect the trial amounted to a mass condem­nation in which evidence was presented and the accused sen­tenced. There did not appear to be any effort made to defend them. The report of the case stated, “An ad hoc commission made up of general command members and corps agents organized the trials and recommended the penalties, which were confirmed by the minister of defense.” Evidently indiscipline had reached a stage in the CPPA that the authorities thought needed to be cor­rected, hence this show trial presided over by Commander Pitra and attended by his chief of staff and the chief CPPA political commissar. Most of the crimes amounted to using vehicles without permission or driving under the influence of alcohol and, invari­ably, involvement in accidents. The accused were all found guilty and sentenced to confinement, generally of about two years. An editorial in the government newspaper praised the trial and the sentences, saying that two years of hard labor would teach the “saboteurs” the error of their ways and rehabilitate them morally

and politically after which their return to society would be guaran­teed.

In addition to the CPPA there was another police organization known as the Directorate of Information and Security of Angola (Direcao de Informa^ao a Seguran^a de Angola—DISA). Little was known about this organization other than the fact that it was the national security police—apparently a combination criminal in­vestigation and intelligence gathering agency. DISA was directly subordinated to the president of the republic rather than to the minister of defense as was the CPPA. According to an article in the *Washington Post* written by Elizabeth Pond, East German advis­ers were instrumental in the organization and operation of DISA. Pond, quoting West German intelligence sources, said that the special forte of the East Germans in Africa was in “setting up and arming police agencies,” and other Western writers have con­curred in that assessment.

In late 1978 the government established the State Secretariat for Internal Order as a supervisory and administrative body oper­ating directly from the office of the president. The secretariat was charged with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with exist­ing laws. The announcement of the establishment of the new office stated that prevention of common crimes and prosecution of criminals would fall within its competence and that it would also be the control agency for firearms, explosives, and other danger­ous materials. As of the end of September 1978, information on the implementation of the new secretariat’s responsibilities and par­ticularly its interactions with existing police and legal offices was not available.

Penal Code

The penal code that was in effect before independence was based on the code used in metropolitan Portugal. The colonial authorities never compiled the customary laws of the indigenous peoples living under their rule, and the accommodation made to Angolan culture was generally slight. Portuguese law was the law of the land, but the place of the native Angolan under that law was never precisely defined. In civil cases involving *indtgenas* (see Glossary) the Portuguese official hearing the case would rely on chiefs or elders for advice concerning customs and tribal laws, but litigants were not permitted to be represented by counsel. In a civil case involving an *indigena* versus a white or an *assimilado,* and in all criminal cases, only Portuguese law applied. Even when disparities in the law were recognized and acknowledged, reforms never sufficiently incorporated customary law and therefore re­mained alien to the indigenous populations. An imperative task of the MPLA government after it came to power was the implemen­tation of a new code that would be just to all citizens. That task was complicated by the incessant guerrilla warfare, by the difficul­ties of adapting Marxist-Leninist principles to Angolan realities, and by a general lack of legal expertise among the new rulers.

The code that was drawn up defined misdemeanors and felonies and prescribed maximum sentences. The death sentence was not included as a permissible punishment under the code as it was first promulgated. By early 1978, however, the Revolutionary Council had determined that capital punishment was necessary “to defend the revolution from within and from without,” and on April 3, 1978, a law was published that authorized the death penalty for crimes against the state or against the revolution. The Revolution­ary Council stressed that capital punishment could only be admin­istered for specifically stated high crimes, and a mandatory system for reexamination of the sentence was instituted as was a method for final appeal to the president. As defined by the law crimes against the state or against the revolution included treason, sabo­tage of military installations or war materiel, espionage, entering an enemy country, and spreading false information that would endanger the good name of the state.

According to the new law, pregnant women or persons under the age of eighteen at the time of a crime were exempted from the death penalty. Actually the MPLA government had previously used capital punishment but only in sentences by special military tribunals as in the highly publicized executions of mercenaries in 1977. The new law allowed its use in the regular court system. If final appeal fails, sentence is carried out by firing squad within twenty-four hours. In commenting on the institutionalization of the death penalty a government editorial said, “The revolution must defend itself and exemplarily punish those who engage in counterrevolutionary and criminal activities which serve the in­terests of imperialism against our people. It is an undeniable duty.”

Incidence of Crime

Crime statistics have not been reported by the Neto govern­ment since it came to power, and newspaper references to crime have been rare. Moreover the Neto government’s apparent lack of control over certain areas of the country complicates any effort to assess the incidence of crime. Given the unsettled conditions and the economic turmoil that have been part of Angolan life for such an extended period of time, it was reasonable to assume in 1978 that there was probably a rather high incidence ofcrime and, particularly, of such crimes as smuggling and theft.

In November 1977 Minister of Justice Diogenes de Assis Boavida held a press conference wherein he reviewed the work of his ministry over the first two years of its existence. In the course of his remarks Boavida mentioned police cases that had been referred to trial in Luanda during a one-month period; included in these, in addition to a great many automobile accident cases, were 140 assault cases, sixty-four marijuana cases, and two dia­

mond smuggling cases. There were also 270 cases that were simply listed as pending with no explanation or details given. From the context of the minister’s statements it was not possible to deter­mine whether he considered the crime rate to be excessive or routine.

During the same month an article in the government news­paper *Jomal de Angola* referred to a police sweep through three Luanda districts that had uncovered evidence of consid­erable criminal activity by enemies of the revolution “who live by plundering and exploiting the people.” According to the newspaper article, the Ministry of Defense, working with all of the armed forces, the police, the militia, and the security forces, had “established a detection and correction mecha­nism,” which infiltrated various neighborhoods and found va­grants, thieves, and marijuana peddlers. The police sweep also turned up stolen automobiles and motorcycles as well as large caches of weapons and ammunition. Apparently there were protests on the part of residents in the areas that were searched, but the article stated that they were quick to under­stand that such sweeps were necessary, and they would now be secure in the knowledge that “dozens of antisocial individuals have been taken out of circulation to be reeducated.”

What is defined as a crime also has a bearing on how newspaper coverage should be given. For example, workers walking off of a job might be a news item in some other society, but in Angola this received coverage as sabotage. In March 1978 at an assembly of workers of the Cuban-Angolan Friendship Sugar Company, the lack of responsibility on the part of some workers was highly criti­cized by company officers and by delegates of the national labor union. Fifty sugarcane cutters had left their jobs after receiving their pay in January, and several others did the same in February. These workers were branded “saboteurs” and were given five days to return after which their cases would be turned over to a labor court for resolution.

Legal System

Under the Portuguese there were two kinds of colonial courts: ordinary and special. Ordinary courts hearing cases involving *in- digenas* were usually presided over by a colonial administrative official. Special courts, which were presided over by judges, heard more serious cases and appeals from the lower courts. Appeals beyond the level of the special court could be made only to an appeals court sitting in Lisbon. In the chaos that accompanied independence, courts were abandoned, and the system fell apart as officers and judges fled the country in the mass exodus of Por­tuguese. When the civil war ended in early 1976, the MPLA was faced with the task of reestablishing the legal system to fill the void. At first many ad hoc juridical committees were formed to hear cases while military tribunals heard others. In time, judges were appointed, and courts were staffed in order to take care of the judicial functions until the MPLA could devise a new system that would be more in keeping with the movement’s Marxist- Leninist orientation. Under the system that was still evolving in 1978, the Ministry of Justice controlled the court system, the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, the Judicial Police (similar to district attorneys’ investigators in the United States), and the prison system.

In Luanda at the beginning of 1978 there were five criminal courts, a labor court, and several police courts. According to the minutes of the First Congress of the MPLA, the labor court will eventually be abolished in favor of arbitration boards, and the other courts will be converted into people’s courts. The existing police courts had handled misdemeanors and similar low-level cases, and presumably this will continue, but these courts will have a professional judge and two lay judges as will the criminal courts. The minutes of the congress did not spell out the levels of courts that would exist under the new system. A later decree established a court of appeals *(tribunal da rela^ao)* within the Ministry of Justice. At the time that the congress met, the legislation approv­ing the death penalty had not been promulgated, and the maxi­mum sentence that a people’s court could hand down was twenty- four years. The addition of capital punishment to the list of permissible sentences adds a burden to the lay judges, who have no formal legal training.

In May 1976 thirteen foreign mercenaries who had been cap­tured during the civil war were tried for crimes against the Ango­lan people by a specially created court known as the People’s Revolutionary Court. Two years later, citing the “effective reply to counterrevolutionary activity” provided by that court, Presi­dent Neto stated that continuing activity by enemies of the Ango­lan state demanded the institutionalization of the People’s Revolu­tionary Court. To that end he signed into law a decree that created the National Directorate of People’s Revolutionary Courts to ad­minister the establishment and operations of such a court in each province. Within the competence of the new courts were crimes against the security of the state, war crimes, mercenary activities, and crimes against humanity. The law also authorized revolution­ary courts to assume competence in cases usually heard by ordi­nary courts if a crime has had a significant impact on the state or the society. Such a determination would be made by the tevolu- tionary court in the area and could not be overruled by the ordi­nary court.

According to the law the national directorate was to be located in Luanda, and a court was to be established in each provincial capital; but the courts were authorized to hear cases in any part of their jurisdictions. Each court will be composed of either three or five judges, the number depending on the gravity of the case as determined by the national directorate. A people’s prosecutor will be responsible for presenting the government’s case, and an accused person will have a court-appointed lawyer as a defense counsel if he does not have one of his own choosing. The law provides that trials are to be open, and appeals to special appellate courts are to be permitted.

Penal System

At the end of the civil war the victorious MPLA took over the colonial prison system, the facilities of which were generally old; moreover many had been heavily damaged during the war. Most Portuguese personnel who had been affiliated with the system had fled the country, and many of the Africans had abandoned their posts as prisons were enveloped in the hostilities. Most of the facilities had been looted of everything of any value. The immedi­ate task of the MPLA was to rebuild, refurnish, and resupply the system and, at the same time, train personnel to take over its operation. The National School for Penal Technology opened as soon as it could be staffed in 1976, and some students were sent to Cuba to undergo specialist training in penology.

The operation of the penal system is a responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. The system consists of maximum and minimum security prisons and so-called production camps where offenders are sent to be rehabilitated through regular work and reeducation programs. There is less constraint at the production camps, but the inmates are still prisoners and are still under guard. One of the specific points made by the justice minister in reviewing operation of the system was that prisoners were engaged in productive work whether it was the raising of their own food or such activities as carpentry, metalworking, or crafts. The minister also boasted about the policy that has brought about “a progressive system that has been established in the prisons whereby the treatment of the inmates varies according to their conduct during their detain­ment.” The ministry was reportedly trying to ensure that all pris­ons and camps complied fully with that policy, and the MPLA Congress specified that a prisoner’s living standard would depend on his behavior and the degree of rehabilitation he had achieved. The Congress and the ministry both stressed rehabilitation as the key to the entire system, and the Congress also directed the estab­lishment of some kind of postconfinement assistance for ex-con­victs.

A Danish mariner, Paul Matthieson, traveling alone along the west coast of Africa, developed engine trouble and entered an Angolan port in late 1977. He was promptly imprisoned and was held for about five months until Danish authorities discovered his whereabouts and demanded his release. Recuperating in a Danish hospital, Matthieson said that prison conditions were “indescriba­ble.” He also claimed that there were several other non-Angolans in the same prison, including South African soldiers and British and American mercenaries. The International Red Cross asked for

permission to inspect Angola’s prisons after hearing Matthieson’s story, but permission was not granted.

Internal Threats to National Security

Ever since the end of the civil war in early 1976 the MPLA government has been under almost constant guerrilla attack on three different fronts. The two major organizations opposing the government are the same ones that were defeated by the com­bined Cuban-MPLA forces during the civil war: the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) under Savimbi and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de LibertaQao de Angola—FNLA) under Roberto. The third thorn in the side of the Neto government is the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertagao do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC). Because many educated Cabindans used French as their everyday language, FLEC is often referred to as the Front pour la Liberation de 1’Enclave de Cabinda. In late 1978 the MPLA government was not in danger of overthrow as long as it had Cuban troops supporting it.

*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*

UNITA, operating in the southern part of the country under the leadership of Savimbi, had recuperated from the defeats of the civil war and in mid-1978 was a powerful guerrilla movement that seemed capable of constant harassment at the same time that it was constantly able to elude the counterstrikes launched against it by the Cuban-MPLA forces. UNITA was formed by Savimbi in 1966, and its foundations are in the Ovimbundu ethnic group, of which Savimbi is a member. In 1975 the Ovimbundu comprised about 38 percent of the overall population, and some observers believe that UNITA could win an open election. Barring that highly unlikely event, UNITA will no doubt continue its guerrilla warfare, and the Cuban-MPLA coalition of troops will no doubt launch more reprisal campaigns in what appeared to be in late 1978 a very costly impasse (see UNITA, ch. 3).

*National Front for the Liberation of Angola*

FNLA, which has operated from sanctuaries in Zaire from the earliest days of the anticolonial war, also appeared to have re­gained strength by early 1978 and had resumed its guerrilla at­tacks in the northwest part of the country, but on a scale that seemed much lower than UNITA’s actions in the south. FNLA’s foundations were in the Kongo ethnic group, and in 1978 it was still led by Roberto, who continued to exercise strong personal control over the movement. Roberto has lived in exile in Kinshasa, Zaire, since the early 1960s and has directed FNLA activities from that haven. The meeting between Neto of Angola and Mobutu of Zaire in August 1978 could have dire effects on Roberto and FNLA if the two presidents are able to agree on what can be done

about cross-border attacks by the FNLA into Angola and by the Katangans who have twice invaded Zaire’s Shaba Region from Angola (see FNLA, ch. 3).

*Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda*


FLEC is a separatist movement that claims that Cabinda, under colonial protocols, should have been granted independence when the Portuguese pulled out rather than being considered part of Angola. FLEC split into two factions, one headed by Louis Ranque Franque and the other by Henriques N’zita Tiago. Both have been constant irritants to the MPLA government, but in 1978 it seemed highly unlikely that they could become anything more than irri­tants, and the August meeting of Neto and Mobutu could also deny FLEC its Zairian sanctuaries. FLEC insurgency has also been cur­tailed by internal dissension and by the determined defense of the oil-rich enclave, the income from which was keeping Angola sol­vent. (see Mining, ch. 5). In a paradox of present-day international politics and business, Cuban troops fight to protect the Cabindan oil fields that are operated by the American Gulf Oil Company (see Liberation Movements in Cabinda, ch. 3).

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There are no books specifically on the national security affairs of Angola; therefore newspapers, periodicals, and *Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa* from the United States Joint Publications Re­search Service have been used extensively in the preparation of this chapter. *The Angolan Revolution: Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)* and *Volume II: Exile Politics and Guer­rilla Warfare (1962-1976)* by John A. Marcum are invaluable for any reader desiring in-depth knowledge of the final years of Por­tuguese colonialism and the first year of independence in Angola. An outstanding series of articles on the operations of UNITA by reporter Leon Dash appeared in the *Washington Post* from Au­gust 7 to 13, 1977. (For further information see Bibliography.)

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ANGOLA’S GREAT ENDOWMENT of natural resources and the continuing world demand and generally upward trend of prices for its major products—oil, coflfee, and diamonds—offered consid­erable promise for the future of the economy under almost any circumstance. Although in need of further rehabilitation in 1978, the country already had a transport system surpassing that of most African states. Hydroelectric production and potential, and petro­leum output and vast reserves, offered independence from exter­nal energy sources. The agricultural sector had produced food­stuffs in quantities generally adequate to feed the population before disruptions—departure of the Portuguese and military ac­tions—brought drastic declines in output from 1975. This capabil­ity still existed. There was also a relatively well developed con­sumer goods manufacturing industry that in 1978 was producing far below capacity. The industry, however, faced major problems —aside from spare parts and raw materials—in the lack of trained technicians to keep it operating effectively and of purchasing power on the part of the Angolan consumer.

In this setting the ultimate aim of the regime controlled by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Pop­ular de LibertaQao de Angola—MPLA) was the establishment of a fully planned socialist economy. Realism, however, had tempered the drive toward that goal, and for the time being there was an acceptance of a mixed economy comprising state enterprises, cooperatives, and private operations. The state sector had already assumed substantial proportions by 1978 as the result of a program of nationalization of Portuguese enterprises that had been aban­doned by their owners and not subsequently reclaimed, of hold­ings of the Portuguese government, and of certain other busi­nesses considered essential to the economy, including banking and insurance. The cooperative sector, comprising mainly agricultural but also some industrial units, was developing but was still greatly outweighed by small-scale private economic activities.

Underlying opposition to the transformation to a socialist econ­omy—from that of the rural peasant to the introduction of cooper­atives to the more subtle opposition of management in the han­dling of business enterprises—had been reported. In the urban areas in particular, many Africans had seen the actual or apparent affluence of the Portuguese and in independent Angola were in­terested first of all in securing a measure of it for themselves. The extent of opposition to economic change, however, could only be guessed at through criticisms by members of the government. Some inkling of the situation at higher levels was given by Presi­dent Agostinho Neto in an address on the second anniversary of independence in November 1977, when he discussed the continu­ance of the colonial mentality among persons in administrative and management positions, in business enterprises, and in the public services, and accused them of seeking to imitate the de­parted colonial bourgeoisie.


The efforts of the MPLA— a thinly spread group of pragmatic Marxist-Leninists—had been strongly buttressed by the very large foreign exchange earnings from oil exports, which provided the vital underpinnings for the economy. Soviet and Cuban advisers had also made up a small part of the deficiency in technical staffs at higher levels.

In 1978, in brief, the revival of the economy from the low point to which it had declined in early to mid-1976 was continuing, but at a slow pace, and efforts suffered still from the tremendous short­age of skilled personnel, a situation that appeared to have no short-term solution barring the return of Portuguese technicians. The regaining of the production levels of 1973, set by the MPLA in 1976, continued to be the goal of the national reconstruction period, which tentatively ran to 1980. Statistical data on which to base comparisons continue to be inadequate. The general situa­tion could be gauged, however, from the lack of official claims of attainment of the 1973 goals through mid-1978; only in petroleum production could it be stated with any certainty that the 1973 level had been achieved. In 1978 perhaps the single most impor­tant economic problem that remained was how to increase pro­duction quickly enough and widen distribution sufficiently to se­cure the popular support needed to carry out further economic changes.

Agriculture

The Angolan government estimated that about 85 percent of the population was living in rural arenas at the beginning of 1978. Those economically active engaged chiefly in subsistence agricul­ture. Many, however, also produced food surpluses for sale, and a considerable number grew such crops as cotton and coffee specifi­cally raised for the commercial market (see fig. 7). The vast major­ity apparently continued to cultivate their own holdings, but about 175,000 persons in the agricultural labor force worked on state farms or on cooperatives under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Climate and topography permit the cultivation of a rather wide variety of crops in Angola including tropical foods, such as cassava, sugarcane, bananas, coffee, citrus fruits, and oil palm products, and temperate crops, such as wheat, maize, rice, millet, potatoes, beans, and cotton. Livestock raising is limited to certain areas because of tsetse fly infestation and is an important industry in the southern part of the country. It was still in a somewhat disrupted state in 1978 as the result of earlier, and to some extent continuing, military actions between MPLA forces and those of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para



|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Cu** | **copper** | **p** | **petroleum** | **I coffee** | **[SZTl sisal** |
| **D** | **diamond** | **Ph** | **phosphate** | **KWVff cotton** | **maize** |
| **Fe** | **iron** | **S** | **salt** | **It. 1 sugar** | **y cattle** |
| **Mn** | **manganese** |  | **oil palm** | lllillilllllll **tobacco** | **dam** |
|  |  |  | **0** | 100 200 Miles |  |
|  |  |  | **0** | 100 200 Kilometers |  |

Figure 7. Principal Centers of Cash Crop and Mining Activity

a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) (see Internal Threats to National Security, ch. 4). In the fisheries sector, the waters off Angola’s coast are an especially abundant source of marine pro-

tein. Production in the late 1970s, however, was relatively low as the Angolan government sought to cope with the loss of a signifi­cant part of the commercial fleet—taken by the departing Por­tuguese—and the problem of training adequate indigenous per­sonnel for the industry (see Fisheries, this ch.).

The contribution of the agricultural sector to gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) was an unknown in 1978. During the Portuguese era statistical information that might have permit­ted computation of sectoral contributions to GDP appears not to have been compiled, and since independence statistics in general have been negligible. Agricultural and forestry products con­stituted well over 60 percent of exports in the mid-1960s. Their share had declined to less than 45 percent by 1970 as exports of mineral products grew, and in 1973, the latest year for which statistics were available, agricultural and forestry exports repre­sented only 34 percent (see Foreign Trade and Balance of Pay­ments, this ch.). Coffee was the single most valuable agricultural export, accounting in 1973 for 26.6 percent of all exports.

Angolan agriculture at the end of the Portuguese colonial era comprised two main systems of production. One followed the basic African patterns of cultivation that had been universal in the area at the time of the Portuguese arrival in the fifteenth century and continued with little change into the twentieth century. The other was based largely on Western concepts of cultivation and was engaged in primarily by Portuguese but also by some *mestizo* (see Glossary) farmers and by Africans who had secured or were attempting to secure title to land (see Land Occupancy and Own­ership, this ch.). The Angolan provincial government, however, in annual surveys of agriculture conducted during the agricultural years 1969-70 to 1971-72, classified production according to whether the individual production unit operated under custom­ary African law or under Portuguese law. The two categories were labeled, respectively, traditional and commercial. The statistical information presented in the published surveys, therefore, in­cluded in the traditional category an unknown amount of produc­tion that was actually nontraditional in character.

The traditional sector, comprising the greater part of the Afri­can population, practiced shifting or bush fallow cultivation or a combination of both, in which plots of land were cropped for a few years, then abandoned, and new areas cleared and cultivated, or the land was left in fallow usually for ten or more years before being recleared and used again. The technology employed was elementary and based primarily on knowledge and methods handed down by one generation to the next. Almost 86 percent of the traditional farms, according to the 1971-72 survey, used only human labor, the remaining 14 percent employing animal power supplied by animals belonging to the individual farmer or secured from others.

The sector included almost 1.2 million farming units. Their holdings amounted to more than 4.7 million hectares, of which some 3.4 million hectares were under cultivation in 1971-72. About one-fifth of the farming units cultivated only one plot, over one-half cropped two to three plots, and another one-fifth worked four to five plots. The remaining 7 percent raised crops on from six to nine plots. Some units cultivated plots that were more than one kilometer apart. In areas of better growing conditions, as on the Central Plateau, increasing population was bringing heavy pressure on the land. A1972 study of Huambo Concelho (a second- level administrative unit) showed, for instance, that a considerable number of family units held less than one-half the amount of land considered necessary following traditional cultivation practices to provide the subsistence requirements of the family unit.

The so-called commercial sector at the time of the 1971-72 survey consisted of somewhat over 8,000 units. In all the sector had tenure of an estimated 3.3 million hectares, but only about one-quarter of the area was actually under cultivation. Commer­cial farming units generally used modem agricultural inputs, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and many of them were mechanized. There were many small farms in this category, how­ever, that were worked using only animal and human labor and without the benefit of chemical fertilizer and whose output went principally to support the occupants. In size the farming units varied greatly from a few hectares to one of over 17,000 hectares, the Boa Entrada plantation in Amboim Concelho, Cuanza Sul, which belonged to the Companhia Agricola de Angola (CADA).

A large proportion of the commercial units were abandoned by their Portuguese holders during the exodus of colonists in 1975. These units were gradually taken over by the new government starting in 1976, an action that was still continuing in 1978. Re­portedly larger units were to become state farms, and the smaller ones were to be operated by newly organized agricultural cooper­atives. Considerable difficulty was apparently experienced in the takeover because of the lack of education and technical knowl­edge of workers recruited to operate the confiscated units. The effort was also slowed, according to the minister of agriculture in a press interview in late 1977, by the politicomilitary situation in some areas, by a lack of government funds, and by some failure of state bodies charged with carrying out the task to take action. The total number of reactivated commercial farms was not given, but the minister stated that 1,500 abandoned units, or 24 percent of the total number in Angola, had been put back into operation in approximately the first eleven months of 1977.

The program to establish cooperatives in agriculture and live­stock raising, a principal objective of the MPLA, seemed also to be progressing at a comparatively slow pace. To an unknown extent this was due to resistance by the rural population. The primary reason, however, was apparently the inability of the government to cope adequately in terms of personnel, management, and

financing with the immensity of the undertaking, which involved some four-fifths of the entire population. In late 1977 the minister of agriculture reported that only about 150 cooperatives encom­passing 9,000 hectares had been given legal status, about 300 others covering another 8,000 hectares were in existence but had not yet been accorded legal standing, and approximately 300 more were then in the process of organizing.

Cooperatives were initially divided into first and second degree categories depending on the level of development. In early 1978, however, a national seminar on agricultural production recom­mended that the preliminary step should be the formation of the Peasant Association, branches of which had already been founded in different parts of the country under the guidance of local MPLA members. When local understanding and acceptance of collective production had reached the stage where new techniques, includ­ing mechanization, could be usefully introduced, the association should be transformed into a first-degree cooperative. The final stage would be the second-degree cooperative, which would pre­sumably operate as a fully functional collective, although this was not explicitly stated.

Land Use, Soils, and Crop Zones

Reliable statistics on the amount of potentially arable land were unavailable in mid-1978; however, a United States Department of Agriculture source has cited a figure of 8 million hectares, or about 6.4 percent of the national territory, classified as arable. Moreover estimates of land under cultivation or temporarily in fallow varied considerably. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organi­zation (FAO) reported that in 1975 somewhat over 1.8 million hectares (about 1.5 percent of the total land area) were under cultivation. Included in this figure were some 550,000 hectares devoted to such perennial crops as coffee. However, a government sample survey of agriculture carried out in the 1971-72 agricul­tural year indicated that some 4.7 million hectares (close to 3.9 percent of the total area) was utilized.

The greatest portion of the country, according to FAO, is cov­ered by forest and woodland, which together accounted for almost 72.7 million hectares (about 58.3 percent). Permanent pastures totaled another 29 million hectares (23.3 percent), and land in miscellaneous categories, which included that occupied by build­ings, parks, and roads, as well as barren areas and the like, made up more than 21 million hectares, or 17 percent.

The country’s most important soils are found in the western half of the interior plateau. Reddish- to yellowish-brown in color, they are of moderate fertility, relatively easily tilled, and in general well drained. They are, however, somewhat deficient in plant nutrients, but this can be made up by the application of fertilizers to which these soils respond satisfactorily. Coffee growing and most other agricultural development are found in areas underlain

by soils of this kind. The savannas of the eastern half of the country and most of the southern part have soils of yellowish or grayish color developed from so-called Kalahari sands, largely windblown deposits from an earlier period. They are of low fertility and gen- r erally of little value for agriculture. In the same region, however, although comparatively small in total area, the river bottoms con­tain some excellent soils. Sandy soils characterize the coastal plain, and the river valleys transversing the northern part of the plain have heavy black soils.

The coastal plain, for more than half its distance southward from the northern border, receives sufficient rainfall to permit dry farming, which is supplemented in the major river valleys by irrigation. Almost all of the country’s sugarcane is grown there; other important cash crops include cotton, sisal, and bananas. The region’s principal subsistence crops are cassava and oil palm pro­ducts. South of Lobito an increasingly arid climate produces se­midesert to desert conditions that severely limit cultivation, re­flected also in the extremely sparse population (see Physical and Demographic Setting, ch. 2).

A combination of good soils and suitable climatic conditions has resulted in major agricultural development in several areas of the western plateau region. A concomitant has been a concentration of people in these areas that at the 1970 census accounted for 60 percent of the total population. In the north the hot and humid zone generally encompassing the Malange Plateau is a principal producer of robusta coffee. Other commercial crops of this zone included cotton and tobacco, as well as garden crops for the urban market. Cassava was the most important food grown in the zone, which also produced a large part of the peanut crop.

A large zone comprising the Central Plateau around Huambo is a second major agricultural producing region, also characterized by a heavy population concentration. The temperate climate of the plateau and adequate rainfall make the area highly suitable for the cultivation of maize. The region also accounts for a substantial part of Angola’s cassava production, most of the country’s potato crop, and almost all of the output of the arabica variety of coffee. Tobacco is grown, and this zone produces most of the bean crop.

Land Occupancy and Ownership

At independence land was held under two different systems of tenure, one based on customary law, the other based on Por­tuguese law. The vast majority of the African population occupied land in accordance with traditional concepts—which varied some­what with ethnic group. In all cases ultimate and residual rights in land were held by political units, whether chieftains, descent groups (see Glossary), or local communities. Specific areas were granted to heads of families for use, and the right to such land was retained indefinitely so long as it was under continuous cultiva­tion. Usually such rights could be transmitted to heirs. Areas could not be disposed of otherwise, however. The second system encom­passed non-Africans, most *mestizos,* and the few Africans who had met the requirements for *assimilado* (see Glossary) status (see The Era of the New State, 1926-74, ch. 1).

The basic principles governing land policy in effect at indepen­dence were laid down in a number of laws enacted by the Por­tuguese government between 1901 and 1961. On May 9, 1901, a law declared that all land that did not constitute private property under the provisions of Portuguese law was state domain. The law only vaguely touched on African traditional land rights, and in theory—since land inhabited by Africans did not constitute pri­vate property—it was in fact state domain. Settlers and other qualified persons could claim uncultivated land anywhere for which a concession was granted with the provision that certain development requirements be met within a specified period. A quitrent was paid during this time, after which a definitive conces­sion was given that in effect conferred complete property rights. The right of Africans to possess the land habitually cultivated by them and occupied by their dwellings was recognized, however, and no concession was to encroach on traditional land rights.

An Angolan decree in May 1919 created reserve areas for the exclusive use of Africans. They were permitted to occupy any part of these areas, but such occupation did not convey ownership rights. Africans were also allowed to take possession of unoccupied areas outside the reserves, although they could be dispossessed on payment of compensation and a guarantee that an equal amount of land in a reserved area would be made available. Under the decree, moreover, African land could be expropriated if the occu­pants were moved to a reserve area or to another part of the concession. Land expropriations in some places soon reached large proportions, and in 1923 High Commissioner Jose Mendes Ribeiro Norton de Matos, to correct the abuse, decreed that African land rights included an area five times that traditionally occupied; none of this land could be made part of a concession. Within such areas customary laws and usage were to prevail, and such land could not be disposed of to a person of another group.

In 1954 the Native Statute restated the basic principles of Afri­can communal landholding and the rights of usufruct. It also spelled out the circumstances under which an African could ac­quire individual ownership of land. The statue stated clearly, how­ever, that only those who came under Portuguese civil law could obtain full rights of ownership, a provision that in the case of Africans applied only to those who had attained the standing of *assimilado.* For other Africans the procedure for securing title to land was both long and complicated, and even when completed the land could not freely be disposed of to non-Africans, nor could it be used as collateral for a loan. In fact very few certificates of title appear to have been granted. The status of an independent smallholder exempted the African owner from forced labor, which was in conflict with the settlers’ requirements for workers, especially in coffee-producing regions, and pressures from the local European population apparently played no small part in delaying the issuance of titles.

In the late 1940s and continuing in the 1950s high world market prices for coffee attracted many immigrants to the areas suited to this crop, and between 1950 and 1960 large areas were conceded to non-Africans in the coffee-growing regions. Land certification for Europeans also became hopelessly bogged down during this time, and many occupants held their land illegally by force includ­ing land appropriated from African coffee growers on various pre­texts—such as claims that the land was not registered or had been abandoned—against which the unarmed African grower had little recourse. Exact figures are unavailable, but it has been estimated that in a four-year period in the mid-1950s roughly 40 percent of one coffee-growing region was claimed by Portuguese, and in another principal producing areas as much as 60 percent or more was similarly claimed. Both regions were heavily populated, and the number of Africans dispossessed appears to have been in the tens of thousands. Five reserves were created on the edges of the regions, and a considerable number of Africans were moved to them, with many former African smallholders ending up as labor­ers on coffee estates that had earlier been theirs.

In 1961 the Native Statute of 1954 was repealed, and a new Portuguese law covering occupation and concession of land in the overseas African provinces went into effect. It continued to recog­nize two categories of land rights, one applying to persons gov­erned by Portuguese civil law, the other applying to Africans who had not yet registered under that law. Two main classes of land were established, one encompassing population centers and the surrounding areas, the other so-called vacant lands, which also included land that was reserved for use by Africans under custom­ary law. Land continued to be granted by concession, but a provi­sion stipulated that if a concession to a non-African encroached on an administrative unit inhabited by Africans living according to customary law, an area five times that of the administrative unit had to be marked out and added to the African holdings before the concession could be granted. Africans could also obtain conces­sions and occupy vacant land but were required to keep the land cleared, harvest a crop, and shift eventually to more modern culti­vation methods to acquire title. Statistics on such African-held land were unavailable, but holders reportedly increased in the 1960s, especially in the areas growing cash crops. The number remained small relatively, however, in areas suitable for such crops as coffee, tobacco, and the like, where Europeans received most of the concessions.

In the early 1970s there were indications that the colonial gov­ernment was considering altering land tenure laws to benefit Afri­cans, but nothing appears to have come of this. To what extent

laws concerning existing property rights may have been changed since independence was unknown in late 1978, but government officials have stated that land can only be held by those who use it themselves. The Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of Angola (Constitution), revised and amended in January 1978, de­clared that the People’s Republic of Angola recognized, pro­tected, and guaranteed private activities and property, even of foreigners, so long as they were beneficial to the nation’s economy and to the interests of the Angolan people. In a speech in early January 1978 President Neto, touching briefly on the necessity to organize agriculture, stated there was a need to give guarantees to peasants who farmed their own private plots. Confiscation of considerable numbers of agricultural companies and European private farms has occurred, however. In actions in December 1977 covering over 100 farms, the chief reasons given for confisca­tion were either abandonment or occupation by third parties who took over holdings illegally. In all cases the farms were made state property and attached to the Ministry of Agriculture for suitable disposal.

Agricultural Production Before Independence

*Crops of the Traditional Sector*

The principal crops produced by the traditional sector on the basis of estimated relative values (1971-72) were maize, cassava, coffee, beans, cotton, peanuts, and potatoes (see table 2, Appen­dix). Maize, the most widely grown staple, was cultivated by al­most 86 percent of traditional farming units, cassava by close to 69 percent, and beans by about 48 percent. Potatoes, an important food in some areas, were raised by well over 12 percent. A number of other staples of essentially regional significance were wheat, rice, sorghum, millet, and oil palm products. Rice was grown chiefly on the floodplains of the upper Cuanza River and its tribu­taries and in river bottoms in Lunda District. Cultivation was completely manual. Both sorghum and millet were crops of the drier savannas of southern Angola. Millet was the staple food of this region, and some millet was used to brew beer. Sorghum was used principally for the latter purpose. Oil palms, found in Cabinda and northern Angola, provided the traditional sector there with oil for home consumption. Bananas and plantains were also commonly grown in the northern and western parts of the country for food.

By the early 1970s, although production in the traditional sector continued to be chiefly of a subsistence nature, large numbers of family units produced crop surpluses for sale, or devoted part of their holdings to strictly cash crops. Almost 24 percent of the units in 1971-72 cultivated coffee along with other crops for home consumption. A traditional farm in this group having about two hectares usually had one hectare in coffee and the remaining land

in staples. Cotton was another cash crop, although only about 2 percent of traditional farm units grew it in the early 1970s. From 1927 African farmers in Luanda, Cuanza Norte, and Malange dis­tricts had been forced by law to cultivate cotton. In 1960 almost 55,000 farm units were raising this crop, but the revolt in 1961 was followed in 1963 by the abolition of the requirement, and the number of producers dropped thereafter; producing units totaled only 21,456 in 1971-72 (see The Era of the New State, 1926-74, ch. 1).

In the early 1970s, however, the most important cash earner in the traditional sector was maize. According to estimates made by FAO the amount received by the sector from the sale of maize was almost as great as total receipts from all other agricultural pro­ducts sold to the commercial market. Large numbers of farmers sold small quantities of maize to traders and grain buyers, but another highly important outlet was the small country store, which took grain in trade for goods. These stores usually gave somewhat higher prices than offered in the open market; the store could absorb the difference because of the high markup on goods traded to the farmer. The availability of desirable merchandise and the price incentive encouraged the farmer to grow maize even where yields were comparatively low.

*Commercial Sector Production*

Most of the crops cultivated by the so-called commercial sector were the same ones grown by traditional production units, includ­ing wheat, rice, maize, beans, potatoes, cotton, peanuts, oil palms, bananas, and coffee. The sector also produced sugarcane, sisal, sunflower seeds, bananas, citrus fruits, pineapples, and tobacco. Coffee was the commodity with the greatest volume, and its value was half or more of the total value of the main commercial sector crops (see table 3, Appendix). In the mid-1970s Angola had an estimated 500 million coffee trees. Some 540,000 hectares were planted in coffee according to the 1971-72 survey, and about two-thirds of this area was in some 2,500 commercial plantations, which produced 142,000 tons of coffee in the 1971-72 season. The remainder was in smallholdings of over 286,000 traditional farm­ers who produced about 64,000 tons of coffee during the same season.

About 98 percent of Angolan coffee was of the robusta variety. Dry-processed coffee was produced in a zone lying between the cities of Ndalatando and Uige and wet-processed coffee in an area east of Porto Amboim. Because many Africans in the areas had their own trees, the large plantations were highly dependent for labor on migrant workers who came mostly from the Central Plateau. The small amount of arabica coffee was grown both by smallholders and on a number of plantations in an area north of Huambo and also in the Cuima Highlands in Benguela District.

Sugarcane and sisal were next to coffee in value of production



in 1971-72. Both were plantation crops. Sisal was mainly cul­tivated in an area southeast of Benguela where 110 plantations produced more than 95 percent of the country’s total output. Sugarcane was grown on about thirty-five plantations, but almost 99 percent of the total was produced by five large operations. Three in the Luanda area that cultivated close to 4,900 hectares harvested about 384,000 tons in the 1971-72 season, and two others in the Lobito-Benguela region having 7,350 hectares be­tween them produced almost 491,000 tons. Tobacco, introduced at least 400 years ago, was grown commercially on over 200 plan­tations, and small quantities for personal consumption were also raised widely by traditional farmers. Most of the crop was pro­duced west and northwest of Lubango and at the Matala *colonato* (settlement) to the east of that city, where the colonial govern­ment had emphasized tobacco cultivation for export (see The Era of the New State, 1926-74, ch. 1).

The abolition in 1963 of the law requiring traditional farmers in certain districts to plant cotton was followed by the entry of the commercial sector into cotton cultivation, and despite the marked drop in the number of traditional farm units growing this crop Angola’s overall production rose substantially during the 1964-73 period. In 1973 of the total production of 79,000 tons of seed cotton more than 62,000 tons were grown by 645 commercial plantations. Most of the crop was raised in the coastal zone from the M’Bridge River in the northern part of the zone southward almost to Lobito, and in an area to the east of the city of Malange. Some important commercial holdings also were found on the western approaches to the Central Plateau.

Less than one-third of the commercial sector farms grew maize. Its cultivation was rather widespread, however, with the largest areas of production found on the Malange Plateau, the Central Plateau, and in a zone adjacent to, and generally south of, the Central Plateau. Yields were considerably higher on commercial units, and in 1971-72, with a total cropped area less than 3 percent of that farmed by the traditional sector, commercial production accounted for almost 12 percent of the maize output. In 1971-72 fewer than 300 commercial operations grew rice; but they cul­tivated an area roughly equal to three-fifths that cropped by the almost 53,000 traditional farms and produced over 47 percent of the rice crop of some 50,000 tons that year. Most commercial rice-growing operations were in the Central Plateau or areas bor­dering it on the northeast and northwest. Potatoes were another important food crop grown by the commercial sector. More than one-third of the producing units were in the Central Plateau. These units cultivated almost one-half of the area planted to potatoes and accounted for one-half of the commercial output. Productivity was substantially higher than in the traditional sec­tor, averaging 5.6 tons per hectare compared with less than 2.2 tons.



In the 1971-72 agricultural year 263 commercial plantations had some 41,700 hectares in oil palms of which over 36,700 hec­tares were found in Luanda District and in the coastal area and low eastern elevations of Cuanza Sul District. Rainfall conditions in Angola are not completely satisfactory for high fruit output by the native oil palm except under irrigation; some areas of good yields, however, also occurred where ground-level water re­mained relatively high during the dry season. Measures to im­prove output were taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s through the planting of large numbers of hybrid seedlings.

Commercial fruits of economic importance included citrus, pineapples, and bananas. Citrus fruits were grown largely in the Central Plateau and in a zone around Huila and pineapples mainly on the Central Plateau. Bananas were cultivated on large-scale plantations near Luanda, other plantations along several rivers in the northern coastal region, and by mostly small-scale growers along the Cavaco River, which empties into the Atlantic Ocean near Lobito. Before independence almost all of the commercial production of these various fruits went to Portugal. Angola also produced a small amount of cocoa, almost entirely in Cabinda.

Agricultural Production since 1975

Information on agricultural production after independence was still very fragmentary in late 1978. The disruptions caused by internal warfare and aggravated by the departure of the Por­tuguese resulted in a large overall decline in output. Production by the traditional sector was adversely affected by the collapse of the marketing system in 1975 as the Portuguese operating it left, taking with them the greater part of the transport fleet (see Do­mestic Trade, this ch.). As a result the farmer was unable to sell his surpluses—and unable as well to buy supplies and desired goods. The government took emergency measures to reestablish a retail trade network, but this was apparently not completed until th end of 1976 or early 1977 and was essentially of a skeleton nature. In early 1978 the *Jomal de Angola* reported that the marketing situation still acted as a definite disincentive to production of much more than the crops necessary to feed the family.

In March 1976 imports of foodstuffs worth EscA650 million (for value of the Angolan escudo—see Glossary) were authorized and a further US$50 million worth in September 1976. In a statement announcing the latter Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento noted that in 1973, the last year of relatively normal conditions, Angola had to import no more than 10 percent of its food requirement, almost the inverse of the situation in 1976. In a 1978 New Year message President Neto reported the continuing shortage of basic foodstuffs—foreign observers estimated that imports still ac­counted for about 50 percent of the market sales of staples and other foods—and announced that 1978 had been designated the

Year of Agriculture by the MPLA Political Bureau. The armed forces were to be called on to contribute by developing self-suffi­ciency in agricultural production and stockraising to the extent possible.

The MPLA in 1976 set the attainment of the output levels of 1973 as the short-term production goals for the reconstruction effort. In November 1977 the minister of agriculture stated that for most crops this had still not been reached and that in fact most planned totals for the year had not even been met. He noted that, compared with the 1973 production of 60,000 tons of sisal and the planned 1977 goal of 45,000 tons, under 20,000 tons had actually been produced. In the case of tobacco only about 2,000 tons were expected against a high of 4,000 tons (in 1972) during the colonial period. Only in the production of citrus fruits was the goal almost achieved with an output of about 14,000 tons compared with 15,000 tons in 1973.

Coffee production, which, according to United States Depart­ment of Agriculture estimates, had averaged just over 199,000 tons (3.32 million sixty-kilogram bags) during the 1968-72 five- year period, was 192,000 tons in 1973. It declined to 180,000 tons in 1974 in part affected by the arrival in the northern coffee growing region, near the end of the harvest season (June to Au­gust), of guerrilla forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Liberta^ao de Angola—FNLA). During 1975 fighting between FNLA and MPLA forces, especially in the Uige area, contributed to a great shortage of labor much of which was migratory and would not return for the harvest. At the same time a mass exodus of Portuguese owners and operators of plantations from all coffee areas occurred, disrupting regular har­vesting practices. The result was a total production of only 1.2 million bags (72,000 tons) that year.

Despite the relatively small harvest in 1975, however, adequate quantities of coffee to fill export quotas well into 1976 under the International Coffee Agreement (to which Portugal was a signa­tory) were in stock, largely in the Luanda area, as the result of overproduction (relative to quotas) in prior years. During early 1976 the MPLA government regained control of the northern coffee region from the FNLA, and steps were taken to ensure picking of the 1976 crop both there and on nationalized planta­tions in other areas. “Operation Coffee” was announced, designed to motivate workers in and around the coffee zones to participate in the harvest. The number of laborers needed to work the former Portuguese plantations was determined at 150,000 of whom only about 25,000 were believed to be locally available. Details of the harvest were unknown, but output was estimated at 72,000 tons, the same as in 1975. The situation remained about the same in 1977, although production increased to an estimated 84,000 tons against a planned 80,000 tons. A report on production activities that year indicated that labor on the plantations was organized



into work brigades and that output was mixed; in some cases brigades exceeded targets, in others they failed to meet goals, on occasion by substantial margins.

Forecasts set the 1978 coflee harvest at 1.5 million bags or 90,­000 tons. The process of restoring production to the level of over 200,000 tons a year achieved in the early 1970s had been es­timated in 1976 by the director of the Angolan Coffee Institute at between five and ten years. Especially in the northern coffee re­gion where fighting had occurred from 1974 to 1976, maintenance of coffee trees on the plantations had been seriously neglected, and it was expected to require two or more years to bring them back into full production. Some indication of the situation relative to the nationalized plantations was seen, for example, in Amboim District in Cuanza Sul Province where only 105 of 202 plantations were worked in the 1977 harvest and in Ambaca District in Cuanza Norte Province where twenty-seven of fifty-two planta­tions had been reactivated.

Some 79,000 tons of sugar were produced in the 1973-74 season (August-March) and 80,000 tons in 1974-75, the last production year of the colonial period. That amount was slightly larger than the average annual production total during the preceding five- year period. In 1975-76, however, output declined to an es­timated 60,000 tons, and in late June 1976 the new government initiated “Operation Sugar” to recruit workers for the coming 1976-77 production year. Despite its efforts production was re­ported at only 43,000 tons for the year. Subsequently a goal of 68,160 tons was set for 1977-78, but available information in mid- 1978 indicated this had not been met, the estimated production figure being close to 54,000 tons.

An analysis was made by concerned officials in February 1978 of the poor performance by the nationalized 4 February Sugar Mill at Dombe Grande and the 1 May Sugar Mill at Catumbela, both in Benguela Province. Officials concluded that at Dombe Grande the unusually dry conditions and inadequate deliveries of the cane had been contributing factors, as had frequent break­downs of the mill’s electrical system. The main cause of the plant’s failure to meet its quota, however, was declared to be the high level of absenteeism, which was explained in part by the poor food distribution system that had led workers to leave their jobs to purchase foodstuffs and supplies. At the 1 May Sugar Mill a short­age of cut cane in the fields, transportation problems in getting the cane to the mill, and plant equipment breakdowns were the main factors noted for nonfulfillment of the plan. The low level of worker discipline was also cited as was the attitude of many work­ers, which was labeled counterrevolutionary.

Complaints of a similar nature were voiced during an inspection of the Amizade Angola-Cuba Sugar Mill in Luanda Province in March 1978. In particular the low productivity in cutting cane was noted. This was tied into a lack of proper work organization and policy that resulted in few workers meeting more than minumum daily quotas. Some workers left the fields after only two hours, and a like situation in the sugar mill, where workers took off from jobs for personal reasons, had resulted in a three-month delay in get­ting a scheduled second production plan under way. Political en­lightenment brigades were to be established, and the fieldworkers were to be divided into three brigades to stimulate competition and allow comparison of work accomplished.

Livestock

The situation in the livestock industry was highly uncertain in late 1978 with information on the national cattle herd essentially nonexistent. The warfare in the southern parts of the country in the mid-1970s, the principal area in which cattle were raised, did an unknown amount of damage through the slaughtering of ani­mals for food or in some cases to destroy their value to opposing forces. The government’s opinion of the situation was probably expressed by President Neto in a speech in September 1976 in which he stated that it would take at least seven to ten years for the herd to regain the level of the colonial period.

Cattle husbandry has been largely restricted to areas of central and southwestern Angola whose arid and semiarid climate and freedom from the tsetse fly are generally satisfactory for raising cattle. Before independence perhaps three-quarters of the cattle were herded by traditional pastoralists who considered their hold­ings an evidence of prestige and wealth, rather than a source of income, killing animals for meat usually only when they were injured or old. Cattle ordinarily were used to pay debts, for mar­riage payments, and the like. Certain ethnic groups, however, used milk in various forms as a staple item in the diet, and some young cattle were sold to European ranches. The remaining roughly one-quarter of the national herd was mainly on the es­timated 250 (in 1970) European ranches, which with government assistance had acquired and fenced in some of the best grazing land, particularly near customary watering points, thereby posing problems for the migratory traditional herder.

Estimates of the size of the national herd in the last years of the Portuguese era vary widely. In 1967 both the Banco de Angola and FAO estimated the total at somewhat fewer than 2.1 million head. In 1973, however, the bank set the number at over *4.4* million, whereas FAO estimated fewer than 2.9 million. Substan­tial differences also existed for pigs, which the bank estimated to total almost 1.3 million in 1973 against an FAO figure of 345,000. Pigs were found in many places, but the largest concentration was on the Central Plateau. They were also raised in numbers around Luanda and Lobito for the urban market.

Similar large discrepancies in estimated numbers also existed between the other two main kinds of livestock, sheep and goats. The bank’s estimate for sheep in 1973 was 385,000 head and for

goats almost 2.1 million, compared with FAO estimates of 187,000 and 870,000 respectively. European commercial farms often reared some sheep, and they were widely kept by the African population, providing a considerable amount of meat in rural areas. Goats were found in African family compounds everywhere but in only limited numbers on commercial farms. Poultry were ubiquitous, and their meat and eggs formed an important source of protein for the African population. There were also some com­mercial poultry operations, mainly near Luanda and Malange. FAO estimated the total flock at close to 4.9 million in 1975. In an effort to expand and improve production the government im­ported 1.2 million chicks from the Netherlands in late 1976 and early 1977.

Fisheries

Marine fishing was a major industry under the Portuguese. The waters of the cool Benguela Current, which runs near the shore along the Angolan coast, provide an abundance of nutrients that favor fish propagation. Fish landings varied considerably, how­ever, in part because of overfishing and in part because of the movement of schools of fish farther out to sea beyond the range of the fishing fleet. After reaching a peak of over 420,000 tons in 1956, production declined to only 252,000 tons in 1960. It began to rise again in the 1960s and in 1972 attained a high of over 599,000 tons but dropped thereafter and was about 470,000 tons in 1974. Growing international restrictions on fishing in the north­ern hemisphere in the 1960s resulted in a substantial increase in fishing in Angolan waters by fleets of other countries, and the combined annual take was estimated in the early 1970s at approxi­mately 1 million tons. Most of the domestic Angolan catch was processed for export, either as fishmeal or as dried, frozen, or canned fish.

Although small native boats engaged in fishing during the Por­tuguese period, the commercial fishing fleet was Portuguese- owned, and fishing was carried on mostly by the Portuguese them­selves, using also a substantial number of African laborers. The Portuguese were the owners of the fishmeal, canning, and freez­ing plants located in Mo^amedes, Lobito, Luanda, and other fishing ports. During a period just before, and continuing for a time after, independence all of the fleets some 300 large fishing vessels left Angola, many carrying departing colonists. Some own­ers of the approximately 500 small ships also sailed their craft from the country. The commercial fishing fleet in late 1977, according to official sources, consisted of fewer than 275 operational vessels, almost all small craft—the government was reported to have pur­chased a number of large second-hand trawlers. It also received a number of fishing vessels from the Soviet Union as a gift in 1978.

Considerable efforts appear to have been taken to encourage African fishermen, who had been largely ignored by the Por­tuguese, to expand their activities. These were to be grouped into cooperatives, although to what extent this had been carried out was unknown in late 1978. To meet the substantial shortage of technicians at all levels in the industry, several East European states and Cuba were reported also to have provided training in their own countries and in Angola to assist in building an indige­nous cadre of trained personnel.

The MPLA has pushed for revival of the fishing industry as an immediate-term pump primer for increasing general economic activity. In strong contrast to the export orientation of the industry under the Portuguese, however, the main task for the late 1970s and early 1980s was seen as the need to meet the domestic food requirement. The production of fishmeal in particular was viewed as a purely secondary goal. Details on the fish catch and processing were sketchy in 1978. Under an agreement made in 1976 with the Soviet Union that country was taking substantial quantities of fish in Angolan-claimed jurisdictional waters (to 200-nautical miles from the Angolan coast). Part of the catch was delivered to Ango­lan processing facilities—most of which apparently had been na­tionalized—but by far the greater amount was sent abroad. In return the Soviet Union was to assist in various ways in restoring the industry.

In MoQamedes Province in early 1977 the commercial fish catch by the local Angolan fishing fleet of about 100 vessels, which in­cluded sixty small indigenous-type fishing boats, averaged be­tween 2,300 and 2,500 tons a month. About 5 percent was proc­essed into fishmeal, another 15 percent was dried, 25 percent was frozen for shipment to other parts of Angola, and under 1 percent was canned. The remainder of the catch was consumed fresh locally. At Luanda the Vivilar State Fishing Company, a process­ing complex that was taken over in early 1976 and subsequently operated under the Ministry of Fisheries, ordinarily handled over 2,000 tons a month of fresh and frozen fish in mid-1977—it re­ported a high of almost 3,100 tons in May 1977. Fish was provided by Angolan fishermen, but the greater proportion received appar­ently was supplied by Cuban and Soviet refrigerated ships. In mid-1977 the company’s fishmeal and fish-oil-processing units re­mained shut down (they had been inoperative since 1976 primar­ily because of a continuing lack of trained personnel, and the company was acting merely as a distributor of fish to Luanda\* and the northern and northeastern parts of the country).

Forestry

Almost three-fifths of Angola is covered with forest or woodland, but during the colonial period only the rain forest found in eastern Cabinda and in limited stands in northern Angola and the savanna woodlands in Moxico were exploited for timber to any extent. Timber exports, mainly from Cabinda, totaled about 110,470 tons in 1974. Wood pulp exports, processed from eucalyptus trees,

accounted for another 18,260 tons—the eucalyptus was originally planted along the railroads to furnish fuel for locomotives, but dieselization beginning in the 1960s gradually did away with this requirement. In addition large amounts of wood were used throughout the country for fuel, posts, and the like. In the mid- 1970s timber cutting in eastern Cabinda reportedly had been seriously affected by guerrilla warfare (see Internal Threats to National Security, ch. 4.). Commercial exploitation of this resource in Cabinda and elsewhere still appeared limited in mid-1978.

Mining

Angola may eventually prove to be one of the richest countries of southern Africa in mineral wealth in the view of some geolo­gists. Three minerals in particular—diamonds, iron ore, and petro­leum—were major foreign exchange earners in the early 1970s, and after independence petroleum exports became the principal support of the country’s economy (see fig. 7).

Diamonds

The principal source of diamonds was Lunda Norte Province where in 1978 the main areas mined were in the regions around Dundo-Chitato, Lucapa, and Cuango. Before independence the industry employed about 18,000 workers, who constituted one of the largest worker groups outside the agricultural sector. Dia­monds were the major source of export earnings from 1920 until after World War II when rising coffee prices and production pushed that crop to the forefront. Thereafter diamonds remained the second most important foreign exchange earner until 1971 when they dropped to third position behind petroleum products. Production in 1973 was over 2.1 million carats of which about three-quarters were of gem quality.

Until 1971 the Diamond Company of Angola (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola—DIAMANG) held a monopoly on diamond mining. Principally a Portuguese enterprise that had its headquar­ters in Lisbon, the company’s shareholders included not only Por­tuguese government and private interests but also American, Bel­gian, British, and South African investors. In 1921 the company had received exclusive rights for thirty years—subsequently ex­tended an additional twenty years—to prospect and exploit dia­mond deposits in a vast area lying north of the Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (Benguela railroad) and east of 15° east longitude with the maximum area acquirable through claims set at 50,000 square kilometers. In 1971 the original contract was replaced whereby a new consortium composed of DIAMANG and De Beers Con­solidated Mines of South Africa was accorded the prospecting and exploitation rights. At the same time the new consortium agreed to give the Angolan government free of charge 10 percent of the shares of the new group (it had held 5 percent of DIAMANG), and a claim to an additional 15 percent when the first new deposit

to be sent to Portugal for disposition but with sales handled through the De Beers Central Marketing Organization.

began working. Production, however, remained restricted under international marketing agreements, and all diamonds continued

In early 1976 DIAMANG stated that it was operating at a great loss and sought to return its concession to the government offering to continue on thereafter as a contractor-partner. Production in 1975 was estimated at no more than 750,000 carats, about one- in illicit mining and smuggling that occurred as DIAMANG’s for­merly tight security measures—which had given rise to charges that its holdings constituted a state within a state—dissipated, and MPLA authority in the area continued to be weak. The situation appears to have further deteriorated in 1976 and 1977, but little information was available; one estimate placed the 1976 diamond output at about 660,000 carats, and production for 1977 was re­ported to be about 353,000 carats only. In mid-1978, as a step toward bringing smuggling to a halt, Lunda Province was divided into northern and southern provinces. Lunda Norte Province in­cluded the mining areas, and entry and egress to it were to be strictly controlled.

third of the annual output in the preindependence 1970s. The tremendous decline appears to have been associated in considera­ble part with the departure of much of the company’s European (mainly Portuguese) technical staff and with the large drop in the African work force. There was at the same time a marked increase

The MPLA government very early expressed strong interest in having diamond mining readjusted to bring greater benefits to the country but took pains to indicate that it had no intentions of nationalizing the DIAMANG operation. In late August 1977, how­ever, a government decree nationalized those shares that be­longed primarily to small stockholders; the reason advanced was that such stockholders merely received dividends and did not participate significantly in the actual operation of the company. At the same time it was indicated that holders of nationalized shares would be indemnified. This action increased government holdings to almost 61 percent of total shares and gave it effective control of the company. The decree also specifically exempted the hold­ings of some twenty foreign corporate bodies from the nationaliza­tion. Subsequently the Portuguese corporate stockholders joined smallholders in an action to halt the takeover—a move that was opposed by the other large international interests. This was fol­lowed in early 1978 by the freezing of DIAMANG assets by the Portuguese government and a continued stalemate in the devel­opment of new contractual arrangements between the Angolan government and the company. There was some possibility that resolution of this situation might be aided by the general agree­ment on cooperation between Angola and Portugal signed by the presidents of the two countries in June 1978 (see Relations with Western Countries, ch. 3).

Iron Ore

Iron ore deposits were worked from the mid-1950s in Huambo and Bie *concelhos* and in an area near Malange, which together produced several hundred thousand tons of ore annually. In 1960 mining began at Kassinga in Huila Concelho. In 1978 this region was the country’s richest known iron ore site, having reserves variously estimated at up to 5 billion tons. In 1973 production at the Kassinga mines amounted to almost 5.7 million tons, with total output for the country roughly 6.1 million tons. Exports, which went mostly to Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), were valued at over EscA1.2 billion in both 1973 and

1. and were in fourth place as a foreign exchange earner. Oper­ating the Kassinga mines until 1975 was the Portuguese govern­ment-owned Companhia Mineira do Lobito, which had received substantial financial backing from the Krupp interests of West Germany and from various Austrian, West German, Danish, and American banks. The mines were connected by a spur to the MoQamedes-Menongue Railroad, and the ore was exported through modern ore-loading facilities installed at Saco do Giraul near Mo^amedes, which were capable of handling 7 million tons a year.

The Kassinga mines were reported to have been damaged in

1. either in fighting between MPLA and UNITA forces or, according to another report, by sabotage by departing members of the mines’ European staff. For whatever reason, production appears to have come to a complete standstill during that year, and there were no indications that it had been resumed through late 1978. In late 1976 the MPLA government had expressed strong dissatisfaction with the way the company had carried on exploitation of the Kassinga deposit. The government stated that it would restart the mines but that different production criteria would be used. In mid-1977 it announced takeover of the mines by the state, and in December an arrangement was reported with a Yugoslav enterprise to develop plans for reopening the mines and getting the ore to the export point.

Petroleum

Through 1977 oil in exploitable quantities had been found in both Angola proper and the Cabinda Enclave. It was first discov­ered in commercial amounts in 1955 in the lower part of the Cuanza River Basin, and in 1961 a second major find by the same concessionaire was made along the coast at Tobias, about 120 kilometers south of Luanda. In 1962 the combined production of the two fields was over 471,000 tons. It had risen to over 904,000 tons by 1964, but the following year the Tobias field began giving out, and production dropped to 655,000 tons in 1965. A 100,000- ton refinery was built at Luanda in 1958; its capacity had increased to some 650,000 tons by 1966 and was further expanded to 1 million tons in 1971 as new discoveries raised crude oil availability substantially.

The exploration and exploitation of these first discoveries in Angola were carried out initially by the Companhia de Combus- tiveis do Lobito (Carbonang), which in 1952 had been given an exclusive concession covering the sedimentary zone of the coastal region from the mouth of the Congo River to near Porto Amboim and to the offshore continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters. In 1956 after commercial production began, Carbonang interests were transferred to the Companhia de Petroleos de Angola (PETRANGOL), newly set up under the terms of the concession and owned one-third by the Belgian Compagnie Financiere Beige des Petroles (Petrofina) and two-thirds by the Portuguese govern­ment and private Portuguese investors. PETRANGOL signed a new contract in 1965 with the government. It was at the time supposed to return areas not under exploitation but instead set up a subsidiary, ANGOL, to carry this out. Subsequently PETRANGOL also entered into a partnership arrangement with the American oil company TEXACO. Combined production by the three was over 1 million tons of crude oil in the early 1970s; the 1976 (July 1975-June 1976) total was more than 1.1 million tons.

In August 1976 PETRANGOL suffered damage to a major oil terminal as a result of guerrilla action, and work was at times held up in drilling and prospecting areas. In general, however, the company was able to maintain continuous operations. During 1975 a large number of European technicians quit the refinery, causing intermittent interruptions in operations through 1976. The com­pany then stepped up its program to train indigenous personnel and also engaged a number of Cuban refining technicians. The processing of crude oil dropped, however, in both 1975 and 1976 to about 707,000 tons, down more than one-third from 1974. Al­though this reduced the supply of petroleum products available to the Angolan economy, the effect was offset by a large decline in demand caused by the essential collapse of the domestic transpor­tation system. The research contract for the concession was to end in mid-1976, but the MPLA government extended it until the end of 1977. One source has reported that PETRANGOL’s partner, TEXACO, had discovered a large field off the mouth of the Congo River with reserves variously stated to be from two to as much as ten times those of the Cabinda fields.

The second oil concession was granted in 1957 to Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States, covering the Cabinda Enclave. This was later expanded to include the continental shelf off the enclave to a depth of thirty meters, where a large oil strike was made in 1966 in a field es­timated at about 260 square kilometers in area. A new contract that year further extended the concession offshore to a depth of 300 meters. Onshore storage facilities and a pipeline extending out to sea some thirteen kilometers to a tanker loading point were constructed. Production increased rapidly and by 1974 was re­ported at close to 150,000 barrels per day, or 7.5 million tons a year, with royalty payments of US$10 per barrel to the Angolan government. Reserves at the time were estimated to total 300 million tons. The oil had a low sulphur content, and Gulf s Cabinda exports to the United States constituted about one-fifth of the crude processed in that country annually by the corporation.

Internal warfare in Cabinda involving the MPLA, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Liberta- Qao do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC), and the FNLA erupted in 1975, but oil operations continued relatively normally. In Decem­ber, however, Gulf Oil headquarters in Pittsburgh announced that at the request of the United States Department of State it was withdrawing personnel and suspending operations. Gulf also noted that during September and October it had paid US$116 million in taxes and royalties to the Banco de Angola, but that since then three conflicting groups had each demanded that any further payment be made to them. Gulf found the position impos­sible and stated it would put all payments coming due (US$125 million through mid-January 1976) in an escrow account, to be paid later to the government that controlled Angolan territory and its population.

After victories in early 1976 the MPLA pressured Gulf to re­sume operations. It also stated that a new contract would be nego­tiated but that the immediate concern was to restart pumping oil, failure of which was creating a threat of serious damage to the installations and costing Angola about US$1.5 million a day. In early March Gulf announced that it had made a payment to the MPLA government of US$120 million. Oil production began again at the end of April and shortly reached a rate of about 123,000 barrels per day, said to be approximately the limit of the wells; it was reported to be running at 122,000 barrels daily in mid-1978. Various sources estimated tax and royalty payments to the Ango­lan government in 1977 at between US$600 and US$800 million. The corporation, however, stated that payments had totaled US$460 million during the year, but the period for which these were made was not specified. Receipts from Gulf were estimated in mid-1978 to account for 60 to 80 percent of government reve­nue.

Through late 1978 the government had evinced no intentions of fully nationalizing oil, although negotiations were reportedly under way to acquire a 55-percent interest in the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company. The *Jomal de Angola* reported that ANGOL had been nationalized on February 25,1977. Details were lacking, however, and further information on the action was unavailable. In mid- 1976 the government created a public enterprise, the Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (SONANGOL), to supervise all aspects of petroleum and other hydrocarbon exploitation, refin­ing, distribution, and related activities, including the petrochemi­cal industry, and to manage the shares held by the state in any such activities. A provisional commission was set up to prepare within one year the necessary plans, by-laws, and other details for govern­ment approval. Further information was meager, but in Septem­ber 1978 a new law—which stated that all petroleum and natural gas deposits in Angola belonged to the Angolan people—gave SONANGOL a monopoly over their exploitation. However, SONANGOL was authorized to enter into agreements’with for­eign concerns to secure effective operational and financial assist­ance.

Other Minerals

A wide range of other minerals has been found, although exploi­tation remained limited in 1978. Manganese ore has been mined for some time in the Malange area, and large deposits were re­ported in Cabinda and Zaire provinces. Production was influenced considerably by external demand, however; output, for instance, reached 37,700 tons in 1972 but dropped to less than 4,700 tons in 1973 (latest data). Copper was produced in Uige Province, and in other areas good indications have been found of lead, zinc, fluorspar, bauxite, gold, and radioactive minerals. Salt is mined along the coast, and phosphate rock that can be ground into fertili­zer occurs in Cabinda and Zaire provinces. The government has stated that it will stress mining development, but it was apparent that for any degree of success this would require not only an adequate source of investment capital, but also a substantially greater amount of management and technical skills than was avail­able in the country in 1978.

Manufacturing

Industrial Development

At independence Angola possessed a rather wide range of manufacturing plants, but industry was geared almost entirely to producing goods for the domestic market; manufactured goods accounted for about 7 percent of total exports in 1973, although industrial production was estimated at roughly 18 to 20 percent of GDP. All enterprises of any significance were located in the western part of the country where inexpensive electric power, transportation facilities, and most consumer purchasing power were found. The largest industrial concentration was at Luanda, but major plants were also situated at other ports, and there had been some buildup of manufacturing in larger cities of the plateau areas, such as Huambo and Lubango.

The most important industry was food processing, which ac­counted for 36 percent of the gross production value of the indus­trial sector in 1973. Among this subsector’s main products were flour of various kinds, sugar, animal oils and fats, canned fish, canned preserves, confectionary, baked goods, and noodles. Tex­tiles, chiefly cotton cloth and thread, ranked second (12 percent),

and third place was occupied by beverage production (10.8 per­cent), of which the principal item was beer. Other industries in­cluded the manufacture of tobacco and cigarettes, paints, pesti­cides, matches, paper, metal furniture, containers, cutlery, fishmeal, footwear, soap, plastic goods, such items of rubber as tires and inner tubes, and leather goods. In 1973 approximately 720,000 tons of refined petroleum products and 768,000 tons of cement were also produced. Motor vehicle assembly, the fabrica­tion and assembly of bicycles, and machine building were among other industrial activities.

The development of domestic manufacturing took place chiefly after 1961. During the 1950s Portuguese policy had been to dis­courage the establishment of any industry that would compete with enterprises in Portugal. After the rebellion of 1961, however, industrialization was encouraged as a way to speed up economic development in the province (see Development Planning, Gross National Product, and Income Distribution, this ch.). In 1965 An­gola was authorized to set up industries previously prohibited, and protective measures against foreign (in some cases Portuguese) competition were decreed. Up to 100 percent non-Portuguese ownership (in nonstrategic industries) was also permitted for the first time. These steps attracted a growing volume of investment capital as did the expanding market resulting from a steady influx of Portuguese settlers, a situation that was further enhanced by the some 50,000 troops stationed in the province and the availabil­ity of cheap African labor. In 1971 import controls were again strengthened leading to new investments in and the rapid expan­sion of import-substitution industries. Although most earlier in­vestment capital had come from Portuguese sources, in the early 1970s other foreign funds were drawn increasingly to Angola.

Capital actually invested in new manufacturing plants or the modernizing of existing ones in 1973 reached a total of EscAl,178 million, and the number of new jobs created was estimated at over 6,500. In the same year overall government investment authoriza­tions for industry amounted to Esc A11,430 million, which was expected to result eventually in the creation of more than 28,200 jobs. There was also a steady rise in industrial output, which ave­raged over 20 percent a year in the decade ending in 1973 when the value of gross industrial production was EscA14,539 million, compared with EscA2,450 million in 1963. Industrial employment also grew—from an estimated 62,570 in 1964 to 87,216 in 1971 and, in view of new employment created by modernization and new operations, to possibly as many as 100,000 in 1973.

Manufacturing since 1975

In 1975 manufacturing suffered a major setback along with the other productive sectors as the Portuguese managerial and techni­cal staffs of almost all the country’s industrial plants left Angola. The situation was worsened by the departure of practically all the Portuguese population, who had consumed an unknown but very large part of the goods made by the sector—in contrast to the remaining Africans, whose low purchasing power had permitted them to buy manufactured goods only occasionally. In 1975 pro­duction dropped precipitously, and in late 1976 President Neto noted that only rarely was a plant working at more than 55 per­cent of capacity, with some at 50 percent and others at no more than 30 percent; overall utilization of installed capacity was es­timated at 40 percent in late 1977. Production was reported to have leveled off in about mid-1977, but statistical data on output were extremely scarce in mid-1978; those available indicated out­put well below the 1973 production target that the government has set for attainment during the reconstruction period (1976-79).

Agreements on technical and economic cooperation signed since 1976 with the Soviet Union, several other East European communist countries, as well as with Italy, Brazil, and Cuba, were expected to show up in improved production eventually. In June 1978 agreement was reached with Portugal to establish a joint commission on cooperation. As a result there was also the possibility that a substantial number of Portuguese techni­cians might return to Angola. Despite these agreements, which had the potential to bring more effective and efficient utiliza­tion of the industrial plant, there still remained the overriding question of developing a new domestic market able to absorb the goods producible.

Some of the problems faced by industrial firms were highlighted in a mid-May 1978*Jomal de Angola* account of the situation at the CIPAL Plastics Factory, a plant equipped to manufacture items ranging from sandals and shoes to buckets, containers, and hoses. The great majority of workers directly engaged in the production process among the firm’s 380 employees (the same number em­ployed in the preindependence period) had received little or no training in machine operation and maintenance from the former Portuguese technicians. Equipment breakdowns were very fre­quent, and the lack of capable repairmen resulted in often lengthy work stoppages. A training program had been undertaken, but success was reported to be only limited, and the impression was given that considerable time would be required to develop a qua­lified staff. Moreover production had been affected by failure of the state distribution system to move stocks, as a result of which warehouses were continuously full, and workers had slackened their activities in the belief that they had been working too hard. Concern had grown at the plant over raw material availability. Orders placed months before through the state procurement agency remained unfilled, and some shortages were already being experienced. The article noted finally that whereas 4,000 tons of raw materials had been processed monthly in 1973, only about 110 tons a month were used in early 1978.

Nationalization in the Manufacturing Industries

The MPLA government, as in agriculture and other productive sectors, has extended state holdings in the manufacturing field through nationalization. Article 10 of the Constitution, however, contained a guarantee of private activities and property, including those of foreigners, and in early 1976 government spokesmen declared that at least for the time being nationalization would affect mainly enterprises abandoned by their owners. The inter­ests of multinational companies would be respected so long as they promoted the development of the country and were beneficial to the Angolan people. These assurances were reinforced by the Law of State Intervention in the National Economy, adopted in Febru­ary 1976 by the Council of the Revolution, which included a res­tatement of the constitutional guarantees.

Nationalization of industrial firms actually began before inde­pendence in the area controlled by the MPLA, apparently not so much as a step to socialize the economy, but as a measure to get productive facilities back into operation. A principal example was the large textile plant of the Sociedade Textil de Luanda (TEX­TANG). In October 1975 the Angolan transitional government in Luanda (in MPLA hands), pointing out that the plant’s manage­ment and regular staff including the heads of most departments had left for Portugal and that the plant was unable to operate, announced the appointment of an administrative commission to take over the enterprise. This abandonment of plant facilities has been the chief reason given for the nationalization of other plants, a process that still continued in late 1978 (the total number or percentage of plants taken over as of that time was not known). The government has shown a generally pragmatic attitude toward the situation, and where foreign interests were actively carrying on operations, the enterprises have been left in their hands. In cases of minor foreign ownership, plants have been nationalized and were run by state agencies, but the foreign holding continued to be recognized (for instance the brewery, Nova Empresa de Cervejas de Angola, in which Belgian and Dutch interests re­tained 27 percent of the capital).

Power

In late 1978 there was almost no information on developments in the field of electric power generation and use after indepen­dence other than that concerning the hydroelectric (and irriga­tion) scheme in progress on the Cunene River. This scheme, in­tended to benefit both Angola and Namibia, was initiated under a joint agreement between Portugal and South Africa signed in 1969. The initial phase of the project largely financed by South Africa—directly and through loans to Portugal—included a hold­ing dam to regulate the downstream flow of the Cunene at Gove on the upper reaches of the river, completed in March 1973; construction of a second holding dam at Calueque not far north of the Namibian border—the dam was reported virtually comp­leted in early 1978, while initial pumping facilities at the dam to send water for irrigation into Namibia had been finished in August 1973; and construction on the Namibian side of the border at Ruacana of a hydroelectric plant having an installed capacity of 240,000 kilowatts. The first generating unit, at Ruacana, was ready to operate in January 1978, but Angola had refused to divert water to the plant by a weir built in Angolan territory at the top of Ruacana Falls located above the plant. Angolan sources gave as the reason that Angola had signed no international agreement concerning the project, that it considered the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)—which had bases in Angola—to represent the population of that territory, and that it would under­take negotiations with the legitimate representatives of Namibia for an agreement at the proper time.

The development of power resources, begun in the 1950s, had continued at a rather steady pace during the 1960s and early 1970s, carried out by both private and government agencies. Dur­ing the 1963-73 period power production increased at an average annual rate of 16.4 percent as industrial requirements and con­sumer demand grew. In 1973 it reached a total for all of Angola of 984.3 million kilowatt-hours, with consumption amounting to 914.5 million kilowatt-hours. By the end of the 1960s most cities had electricity, and smaller towns might provide power a few hours each night for lighting purposes using gasoline-powered generators. Household use was largely restricted to the Por­tuguese residential areas of the cities, however, and only rarely was it available in the African sections.

At the beginning of 1974 there were 1,542 power plants of all sizes in Angola having a total installed capacity of over 580,000 kilowatts. Almost three-quarters of the capacity was accounted for by seventy hydroelectric plants. The remaining 1,472 plants were thermoelectric diesel installations scattered throughout the coun­try mostly serving local needs but in a number of cases consisting of substantial thermal plants that supplemented or served as standby units for hydroelectric systems. The main generating facilities were in the western half of the country where the major cities and most industrial activity were found. Electric power for this western area was supplied by three separate, chiefly hydroe­lectric, systems in the northern, central, and southern regions. The northern system was privately owned by the Sociedade National de Estudo e Financeamento de Empreendimentos Ultramarinos (SONEFE), a Portuguese firm in which the Portuguese govern­ment held slightly less than half the shares. The company, whose concession area covered Luanda, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, and Malange districts, had a major generating installation at the Cam- bambe Dam on the Cuanza River and a smaller unit at the Mabu- bas Dam on the Dande River. The Mabubas plant, whose capacity was 17,500 kilowatts, was completed in 1954 as the country’s first

hydroelectric plant. It was used chiefly as an auxiliary power source in the mid-1970s; in late 1977 it was reported to be supply­ing local communities only. Damage and some deterioration to the facility were caused by FNLA guerrilla action in 1976, but the plant had been repaired and was said to be ready to provide supplementary power to Luanda if needed. SONEFE was re­ported to have received in about April 1978 a 30,000-kilowatt gas turbine generator—supposedly also able to operate on other fuels —to be used also as an emergency power plant for Luanda. This unit of Swiss manufacture had been ordered originally in 1974.

The power requirements of the central region, including Lobito, Benguela, and Huambo, were supplied by generating plants at the Biopio and Lomaum dams on the Catumbela River. The system was owned by the Empresa Hidro-E16ctrica do Alto Catumbela, a private power company. Whether the company still retained ownership was unknown; however, the government had replaced its management in April 1976 by an interim operating commission. In the south the major source of power was a hydroe­lectric plant at Matala on the Cunene River. The plant furnished electricity to Lubango, Mo^amedes, Porto Alexandre, and the Kas- singa iron mines. The system was owned by the government, which also had a number of thermal plants in operation in the region. In the diamond mining area of northeastern Angola power generation was carried out principally by DIAMANG, which had a hydroelectric plant at Luachimo (12,000 kilowatts), a large ther­mal plant at Lucapa, and a number of small units at other locations in its concession.

Transportation

Railroads

Rail facilities in 1978 consisted of three unconnected main lines of 1.067-meter gauge running almost parallel inland from the ports of Luanda, Lobito, and Mo^amedes, and a small fourth line of 0.600-meter gauge running from Porto Amboim to Gabela (see fig. 8). At independence two of the lines, the Luanda and Mo$a- medes railroads, were Portuguese government owned and were taken over by the new Angolan administration. The Benguela railroad, originating in the port of Lobito, was privately owned by Tanganyika Concessions, a corporation based in the Bahama Is­lands (since 1978 located in London). The Portuguese government had held a 10-percent interest in the railroad, which was inherited by the new government. Under the terms of the concession the entire railroad, including all installations and equipment, were to become the property of the Angolan state on expiration of the concession contract in 2001. The small line from Porto Amboim had been privately owned by the Companhia do Caminho de Ferro do Amboim under a concession granted in 1923 to operate the port and railroad facilities. It ceased operations in 1975, and


in mid-1977 the contract was canceled, and all of the company’s property reverted to the state without indemnity; its employees were at the same time integrated into the government transport services. Another quite short, narrow-gauge (0.600-meter) rail­road, also privately owned, had operated between the minor port of Cuio, south of Benguela, and Dombe Grande and Luacho. The line primarily served sugar plantations and mills of the Com- panhia de A^ucar de Angola. This company was nationalized in 1976, and the rail line presumably was included in the takeover.

The Luanda Railroad serving the northern plateau hinterland was the country’s oldest, the first section having opened in 1901. In 1978 it had a total route length, including three spurs, of over 450 kilometers and went inland as far as Malange. One pre-1975 spur ran south to Dondo on the Cuanza River, and another north­ward to Golungo Alto, a coffee-producing area. Since indepen­dence the MPLA government has built a new spur northward from Luanda to Cacuaco; this went into service in October 1977. The Cacuaco spur was the first step in construction of a planned new branch line through the traditionally agricultural Bengo River Valley that will roughly parallel the main Luanda line and connect with it again at Catete. Information on the Luanda line’s operations and equipment was unavailable for the period after independence.


The Mo^amedes Railroad extended from that port eastward for some 756 kilometers to the city of Menongue, capital of Bid Prov­ince. The railroad and its two branches (to Chiange and Kassinga) had a total route length of about 980 kilometers in the mid-1970s. Construction was begun in 1905 initially to help secure Por­tuguese control of southern Angola through facilitating troop movements in the area, but the line came later to serve Por­tuguese settlement in the region. Before 1975 commercial traffic from around Menongue was relatively light; information on the situation after that was unavailable. The most important prein­dependence value of the railroad was the service provided by the 130-kilometer branch from Lubango to Chiange, a major area of Portuguese agricultural development and settlement, and a nine­ty-six-kilometer-long spur from Dongo to the iron mines near Kas­singa. The latter branch, opened in 1967, was of major economic significance. The year before that total freight carried by the rail­road amounted to only 291,000 tons. In 1967 it more than trebled to 938,000 tons, rose to almost 4.9 million tons in 1972 and reached 6.4 million tons in 1973—the major part of this was Kassinga iron ore (see Mining, this ch.). Freight totals thereafter were unknown; however, the mines closed in 1975 and had not reopened as of late 1978.

The Benguela railroad, having a total route length of 1,348 kilometers, is the only line completely traversing Angola. It ex­tends from the port of Lobito through Benguela, Huambo, Bid, and Moxico provinces to the Zaire border, where at Luao it con-

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*Figure 8. Transportation System*



nects with the Zairian rail system. The Zairian line continues east­ward to mineral-rich Shaba Region and subsequently connects with railroads in the Zambia copperbelt and through the latter with rail systems in Southern Rhodesia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa. The Benguela line was originally undertaken by private interests, under a ninety-nine year concession granted in 1902 as an alternative transport route for the export of minerals from the Shaba area. Financial and other difficulties delayed com­pletion to the border until 1928, and the Zaire line was not finished until 1931. After it opened, however, between 20 and 25 percent of Shaba copper on average was carried by the line an- nuallly until the civil disturbances in Zaire during the first half of the 1960s when the associated damage and deterioration of the transport system of that country led to greatly increased depen­dence on the Benguela line both for exports from and essential imports to Shaba. Because of transportation costs, the line also offered the only economically feasible route for the export of Zairian manganese, which was mined not far from the border. Deterioration of Zambian relations with Southern Rhodesia after the latter’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 also resulted in growing exports and imports utilizing Benguela facili­ties. In 1973, the latest year for which data were available, the combined tonnage of Zairian and Zambian shipments accounted for over 56 percent of the total carried by the Benguela line.

The Benguela railroad was closed in August 1975, when MPLA forces seized the eastern section of the line between Luena and Luao, while a central section including the cities of Huambo and Bie continued to be held by UNITA. Subsequently bridges were damaged or destroyed at Lumeje, about 100 kilometers east of Luena, and at Luao on the Angolan-Zairian border, effectively closing the railroad to international traffic. After the MPLA at­tained dominance in early 1976, internal use of the line was gradu­ally extended. It was reported that the two bridges had been repaired by midyear, and a government official stated that inter­national freight shipments were to be resumed in August 1976— although this was quickly denied by other government sources. UNITA claimed that the continuing closure of parts of the line was the result of their guerrilla operations, and the MPLA government has admitted that incidents occurred almost daily. Tanganyika Concessions stated in mid-1977 that the incidents involved mostly track removal and that physical damage to equipment had not been enough to prevent operations but in a later statement ac­knowledged difficulties because of the interruptions.

Various reasons had been offered for the failure to open the line to international traffic. They included the effects on opera­tions of the departure of Portuguese staff, the loss of Ovim- bundu technicians and laborers (the Ovimbundu were the prin­cipal supporters of UNITA), and a desire on the part of the government not to overload Lobito harbor facilities that might be required in domestic reconstruction. Tanganyika Conces­sions had also stated that it had been unable to get the neces­sary permission from the government, the reason advanced being uncertain conditions. Difficulties in relations between An­gola and Zaire related to charges of support by each for the other’s dissidents, appeared possibly to be the principal stum­bling block. Discussions concerning reopening the line to Zairian goods were held by delegations from Angola and Zaire in early July 1978 in Brazzaville, People’s Republic of the Congo (see Peace Feelers, ch. 3). A report in August 1978 from Zambia indicated that repairs on several bridges were still under way, and it seemed likely that some track work might still be required for the railroad to be able to operate all the way to the border. Repair work was said to be almost comp­leted in October 1978, and in mid-October President Neto stated that the line would reopen for international shipments in mid-November.

In 1978 the railroad’s capacity appeared adequate to handle both domestic and international traffic in the foreseeable future, having been almost doubled by improvements in the mid-1970s to approximately 3 million tons in each direction. These improve­ments included completion in late 1974 of the so-called Cubal Variant, a shorter and better aligned section from Lobito ascend­ing the escarpment to the Central Plateau, and acquisition of diesel locomotives, the use of which the new variant permitted. The line was in straitened circumstances, however, because of the reduction in traffic, and reduced local receipts had to be supple­mented by loans from the Banco de Angola to cover salaries and operating expenses. Opening of the line to Zairian shipments pre­sumably would improve the situation measurably. Zambia mean­while had acquired an alternate, although longer, route through a new line to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania that opened in late 1975. A solution to the political situation in Southern Rhodesia would also presumably allow easy rail access for Zambia to Beira in Mozambique.

Roads

Development of a good all-weather road system was a major aim of the Portuguese colonial administration both as an aid to eco­nomic expansion and for effective military operations. In 1975 of the 72,300 kilometers of roads of all kinds reported in existence, 8,500 kilometers, or about 12 percent, were asphalted, another 27,300 kilometers (38 percent) had improved gravel or dirt sur­faces; these roads were generally usable throughout the year. The remaining 36,500 kilometers, or one-half the total, consisted of rough dirt roads, many no more than tracks, that were impassable during the rainy season and could be used at other times only with considerable inconvenience. By the mid-1970s almost all district capitals had been connected by paved roads. It was possible, for instance, to drive on hard-surfaced highways all the way from Uige in the north to the Namibian border in the south, and from Luanda to Saurimo, capital of Lunda Sul Province, and south from there to near the Zambian frontier.

The extent of damage to the roads during the fighting in 1975 and 1976 was unknown, but 128 bridges were reported damaged or destroyed. External assistance was received mainly from the socialist states, and especially from Cuba, to help rebuild and in some cases to construct new bridges. A Cuban construction bri­gade of several hundred men, operating in teams around Caxito, northeast of Luanda, and Ngunza and Cela in Cuanza Sul Prov­ince, in the first stage of their assistance program, were reported to have completed twenty-three bridges during 1977. In spring 1978 a government spokesman stated that in all seventy-nine bridges had been rebuilt throughout the country.

A rough estimate of motor vehicles in Angola in 1977 placed the total at 65,000, compared with more than 183,000 cars, trucks, and motorcycles registered in 1973. A major problem in late 1978 was a lack of replacement parts and of mechanics, and the number of vehicles actually operable was unknown. Portuguese leaving An­gola in 1975 were reported to have taken thousands of vehicles with them on vessels bound for Portugal, South Africa, and Brazil, while many others were said to have been driven across the bor­der into Namibia and Zaire. An unknown number was also sabo­taged, and many were damaged or destroyed during the civil conflict. Through early 1978 the government had purchased sev­eral thousand trucks, passenger cars, and buses from European manufacturers in a start to rebuild transportation services. A state- owned transportation company, Empresa de Transportes Pub- licos, was set up in early 1976, but little was known of its functions.

Ports and Shipping

The major port facilities are at Luanda, Lobito, and MoQamedes, although in tonnage handled Cabinda was in first position by 1972 because of rising petroleum production and export. MoQamedes was a close second based on iron ore exports from the Kassinga mines. Imports through these two ports, however, were only a small fraction of outbound shipments. Lobito, which in 1973 han­dled over 2.5 million tons, or roughly one-third the tonnage of Cabinda and MoQamedes, was growing in importance before inde­pendence as the entry and exit point for increasing quantities of goods bound to or from Zaire and Zambia over the Benguela railroad. The railroad also served the heavily populated Central Plateau, and merchandise passing through the port was more evenly balanced between imports and exports. Cargo turnover at Luanda was about 2.3 million tons in 1973. Luanda was the entry point for most domestic imports, which were quite diversified; coffee, the principal export, constituted only a comparatively small part of the port’s total tonnage. Among secondary ports of some importance were Porto Amboim and Ngunza, through which coffee was exported, and the fishing ports of Porto Alexan­dre and Bahia dos Tigres.

The civil disturbances of 1975 and 1976 and their aftermath had a major effect on the three principal ports in Angola proper. At Cabinda oil production dropped off temporarily but recovered during 1976, and reports in early 1978 indicated export tonnages running close to those just before independence. Lobito was hard hit by the closure of the Benguela railroad in 1975, as was MoQa- medes by the shutting down of the Kassinga mines that same year (see Mining, this ch.). The volume of shipping through the two ports was unknown in mid-1978, but fragmentary reports in­dicated it was only a fraction of the preindependence level. Traffic through Luanda was reportedly heavy, but information on ton­nage was also unavailable. At Luanda a large backlog of goods awaited unloading and loading in early 1978, and in March 1978 the Ministry of Domestic Trade created a task force to try to clear the port; the result of this effort was unknown in late 1978.

At approximately the beginning of 1978 the government estab­lished a national merchant marine. Three state enterprises were set up, one to handle maritime shipping, the second to provide coastal passenger and freight service, and the third to act as agent in domestic ports for both Angolan and foreign ships. The size of the fleet was not reported, but in late March 1978 the Soviet Union delivered three merchant vessels ranging between 1,200 and 4,­000 tons to the government at the port of Luanda, as part of the buildup of the new merchant marine.

Air Service

The Portuguese colonial administration operated an interna­tional airport at Luanda and had built main domestic airfields at the district capitals, as well as at Lobito, Portugalia, and Jamba (near the Kassinga iron mines). It has also constructed some 170 smaller air strips for civilian and military use throughout the coun­try. Regular domestic air service was provided by Linhas Aereas de Angola operated by the provincial Division of Air Transport (Divisao de Transportes Aereos—DTA) between Luanda and ten of the district capitals and to Lobito and Portugalia. In October 1973 DTA turned over operations to the newly formed mixed private-public concessionary enterprise Transportes Aereos de Angola (TAAG). A number of small private companies also pro­vided air service before independence, essentially on a charter basis, to many places not covered by the district-level system. International service was furnished by the Portuguese airline Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP), operating from Lisbon. Because of the strong political opposition to Portuguese colonial­ism by African states, however, TAP aircraft from Luanda flew only to Mozambique and white-dominated South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Namibia.

After independence the Angolan government acquired the Por­tuguese government’s 51-percent interest in TAAG, which was given responsibility for both domestic and international services. In mid-1978 TAAG had regular flights from Luanda to most of the provincial capitals, and international flights (in part under lease and bilateral arrangements) to Lisbon, Paris, Rome, East Berlin, and Moscow in Europe and a number of African national capitals including Algiers, Brazzaville, Lagos, Addis Ababa, and Maputo. Flights also went to the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome, and Havana. In March 1976 TAAG received two Boeing 737s, which had been purchased earlier during the interim tripartite govern­ment period. Delivery had been held up in late 1975 by the United States government, apparently over concern that they would be used for military purposes. These aircraft and several Soviet planes were bought for use primarily in the domestic ser­vice. In November 1977 two Boeing 707s were also acquired for the international service. In late 1978 the TAAG fleet reportedly included three Boeing 707s and three 737s. Airport facilities have been improved with major additions to Belas International Air­port at Luanda, and first-phase construction of a new airport was completed at Mo^amedes in late 1977. A new airport at Catum­bela intended to serve Benguela and Lobito was expected to open by late 1978. Domestic air travel was apparently growing rapidly; passengers carried in 1977 were reported to have totaled 270,000, compared with 150,000 in 1976 and the preindependence 1973 figure of 198,700.

Development Planning, Gross National Product, and Income Distribution

Development plans were elaborated for Angola beginning in the late 1930s. The early programs, however, were primarily gov­ernment efforts aimed at expanding port facilities and the trans­portation system and were financed almost entirely from surpluses in the province’s general budget. It was not until 1953, when Portugal formulated a six-year development plan (1953-59) en­compassing the entire Portuguese community, that the concept of improving living standards and incomes was introduced. Metro­politan Portugal’s aid to Angola under the plan, however, turned out to be mostly a small amount of long-term loans. Financing continued to come very largely from local funds, and over 90 percent of the EscA2.2 billion invested went into transport, hy­droelectric power, settling Portuguese immigrants, and irrigation. Industrial development was limited to sectors that did not com­pete with Portuguese industry. Insofar as the African population of Angola was concerned, the planned social and economic be­nefits proved to be more promise than fact.

A second plan (1959-64) also stressed infrastructure but gave some emphasis to agriculture and animal husbandry and included projected expenditure for social projects. In contrast to the first

plan, metropolitan Portugal was expected to finance about one- half of the hoped-for total investment. In fact neither the first nor second plans were much more than indications of goals and of the permissible level of state intervention that would maintain and strengthen the market economy without interfering with private initiative and competition. Participation by the private sector was voluntary, and state expenditure lagged during the second plan, with the result that, according to Banco de Angola data, expendi­ture had reached only somewhat over two-thirds of the pro­grammed EscA4 billion by the end of the plan period.

Portuguese complacency was shaken by the Angolan uprising of 1961, which brought a realization of the need for more far-reach­ing development efforts. In October 1962 a three-year interim development plan for the period 1965 to 1967 was drawn up. It carried a new emphasis on industrial development, but like its predecessors it remained essentially only a frame of reference for private sector activity and a guide for government economic pol­icy. In contrast to the generally inadequate implementation of earlier plans, it was accompanied by positive steps including liber­alization of the foreign investment law, a new labor industrial code, and other measures designed to encourage private invest­ment, particularly in manufacturing and mining (see Manufactur­ing, this ch.). At the same time, however, government expenditure continued to give priority to infrastructure, communications, and similar projects of immediate need for defense purposes.

A third six-year plan, initiated in 1968, ran to 1973. It included significantly larger investment by the Portuguese government than in earlier plans, and about one-third of investment funds were expected to derive from foreign sources. The major em­phases were again on manufacturing, mining, transport, and com­munications. Total expenditure during the six years was set at close to EscA25 billion, more than six times greater than for the second plan and almost ten times the reported actual expenditure on that plan. Information on implementation of the third plan was meager for the period after 1969. Mineral discoveries and exploi­tation in the late 1960s gave the economy a substantial boost and apparently encouraged foreign investment that continued into the early 1970s. Reports on development from 1972 were conflict­ing, however. In 1961 Portugal had set up the Escudo Area Com­mon Market comprising the Portuguese community within which there was to be a gradual removal of all customs duties and quan­titative restrictions on trade by 1972. Serious imbalances in pay­ments developed between Portugal and the overseas provinces, however, and in 1972 economic integration was shelved, and im­port restrictions on goods from Portugal were reimposed. To what extent this affected the flow of development funds from foreign sources to Angola was not known. Domestic investment, however, may have increased because of the resultant expanded demand for locally made goods and the increased availability of local re- 241

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sources caused by restrictions placed on fund transfers abroad that were part of the measure to bring the balance of payments be­tween Angola and Portugal in line. In 1974 a fourth six-year plan began. The plan was soon interrupted, however, by political and military events and to a large extent did not materialize beyond the opening stage.

Since independence, in line with the socialist philosophy it pro­fesses, the MPLA government has stressed the need for central planning of the economy. The general principles involved, the direction of planned economic and social development, and the planning organs required for the task were outlined in some detail by the MPLA Central Committee at its plenary meeting in Octo­ber 1976. The committee also called for the preparation of annual plans beginning in 1977—a government spokesman in early 1976 had stated that available statistics were neither suitable, adequate, nor sufficiently trustworthy to prepare a national development plan at that time. Through mid-1978 available published data had made only incidental references to the plans, although the First Congress of the MPLA in December 1977 reaffirmed the commit­tee’s call for annual plans to be drafted to 1980 when a regular five-year plan was to start.

Although the development plans of the Portuguese period were basically promotional in nature, the government in Portu­gal did eventually put important amounts of investment funds into the Angolan economy, and a relatively significant degree of economic and social improvement was attained. Between 1953 and 1962 per capita GDP was estimated by one source to have grown in real terms at an average annual rate of over 5 percent. The rate was believed to have been over 4 percent between 1963 and 1965 and during the remainder of the dec­ade. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated per capita gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) growth at 3.3 percent from 1960 to 1965, at 4.8 per­cent from 1965 to 1970, and at 4.2 percent during the 1970-74 period. The World Bank (see Glossary) placed per capita GNP growth rates in current prices at 3.7 percent between 1960 and 1974 and 3.2 percent from 1965 to 1974. GNP per capita was estimated by USAID at US$290 in 1960 and US$431 in 1970. Portuguese estimates place the amount at the equivalent of US$457 in 1972 and US$509 in 1974. The World Bank *Atlas* of 1977, however, estimated the 1974 figure at US$390.

Statistical information from 1974 to mid-1978 was fragmentary and of doubtful reliability. The large drop in production in 1975 and the continued decline in 1976 indicated the probability of a negative growth rate of GNP, which was reflected in World Bank estimates of per capita GNP at current prices of US$370 in 1975 and US$330 in 1976. With the notable exception of petroleum production, output in 1977 in manufacturing, mining, and agricul­ture also remained well below that in 1973, according to govern­ment sources, although there was some belief that the decline may have been halted during the year.

Growing per capita GNP during the Portuguese era was not in itself an indication of betterment of income and living stan­dards for the African majority. A much greater proportion of the increasing national product during that time accrued to the Portuguese colonists or remained in the hands of foreign inter­ests. The departure between 1974 and 1976 of most Por­tuguese left the national income in possession of the African sector, although a certain amount of this income still accrued in 1978 to foreign concerns and was remitted abroad. Since 1976 the independent Angolan government has spoken only in very general terms about distribution or redistribution of the national income, although it has cited the use of pricing as an instrument for this purpose. It has stated that for an under­developed country like Angola to progress it will be necessary to increase the percentage of the national income that is de­voted to investment and that private consumption cannot ab­sorb a disproportionate share of any increased productivity. At the same time it has explained that what it called social con­sumption, used in the provision of various services, such as edu­cation and health facilities, in fact represented an increase in the level of consumption by individual citizens.

Wages and Prices

After independence growing worker demands for higher wages and shorter working hours added to the general deterioration of the economic situation. Conditions reached such a point that the minister of labor in early July 1976 ordered all wage negotiations in Angolan firms to cease. His directive stated that the ungoverned demands for wage increases bore no relationship to productivity and were contributing to a weakening of the economy, inflation and speculation, and illegal commerce. The directive declared further that wage policy was the prerogative of the state and that wage determinations would be based on proposals made by study bodies established by the Ministry of Labor and the Uniao Na­cional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA—National Union of Angolan Workers). In early July also the Council of the Revolution adopted a law against “economic sabotage” that carried penalties of two to eight years for such acts as strikes not organized by regular unions and passive resistance to work. During 1977 and 1978 government spokesmen on various occasions noted that in­justices existed in wages but at the same time emphasized that absolutely no wage adjustments could be made without increased production.

Wage determinations were slow in coming, and through mid- 1978 they had apparently been published only for maritime fisher­ies, civil construction, and agricultural and stockraising workers.

*Market at Lusiado Courtesy Wendy Holmes*

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In fisheries and construction eight job categories had been estab­lished having parallel pay scales, with the differential between top and bottom pay about three to one. The lowest group, unskilled labor, received kw!8 (for value of the kwanza—see Glossary) an hour and kw792 for the standard forty-four-hour workweek. The highest category, which included supervisory personnel, was kw55 an hour. In maritime fisheries the amount of pay received was affected by certain production norms and bonuses or reduc­tions calculated on attainment or nonattainment of the norm. In agriculture and stockraising six job categories had been defined, but pay scales were not available; working hours were also eight hours a day, or forty-four hours a week. The stipulated regulations, however, applied only to regularly organized activities in this sector controlled by state-owned, mixed state-private, and private agencies. Pay scales for government workers and workers in other sectors were unavailable in late 1978.

As in the case of wages, information on prices was sparse and fragmentary in late 1978. The consumer price index in Luanda, which had risen by 5.2 percent in 1970 and 6.4 percent in 1971, jumped by over 13 percent in 1973 and almost 19 percent in 1974 influenced by developing worldwide inflation and to some extent apparently by the greater domestic availability of money and credit that had resulted from the exchange controls introduced in 1972 (see Development Planning, Gross National Product, and Income Distribution, this ch.). The marked drop in consumer goods production beginning in 1975 and the breakdown of the domestic distribution system resulted in what the government has called an exaggerated increase in prices and speculation. By mid- 1977 production of consumer goods had increased sufficiently, however, together with improvements in distribution channels, for the government to introduce some price control measures. In August prices were set for certain staples—rice, flour, salt, sugar, milk, vegetable oils, soap, and matches. The prices were to be applied uniformly throughout Angola, which necessitated some increases in areas nearest the point of production to offset reduc­tions made in outlying provinces where the items had cost more because of transportation costs. Violators of the price schedules were threatened with prosecution under the economic sabotage law. Among the prices established refined sugar was fixed at kw22 a kilogram, long-grain rice at kw21, vegetable oils, excluding palm oil, at kw42 a liter, and matches at kwl.5 for a box of forty. By comparison an unskilled laborer in the construction industry earned kwl8 an hour.

Domestic Trade

Until the Portuguese exodus in 1975 practically all domestic trade, urban and rural, was in Portuguese hands. Portuguese mer­chants predominated from early times in the cities and towns, and in the rural areas Africans had been virtually eliminated during

the 1900s as increasing Portuguese immigration was accompanied by the spread of traders throughout the countryside. The depar­ture in 1975 of these traders en masse, taking with them most of their transport vehicles, together with the departure of the Por­tuguese staffs of government agencies engaged in specialized farm purchases, such as of coffee and maize, brought the collapse of trading in rural areas (see Agricultural Production since 1975, this ch.). The situation was almost equaled in the urban centers as the distribution system disappeared, creating extreme difficulties in the provisioning of the population.

In the cities, state people’s stores and consumer cooperatives were established, which were complemented by stores operated by private individuals. In Luanda ten state stores and eighteen neighborhood cooperatives were functioning in late 1976, in addi­tion to which there were ninety-one private groceries. There were 160 enterprises that also had employee cooperatives. The number was insufficient to meet the requirements of the city’s some 500,­000 inhabitants, and there were reports of long queues at stores and absenteeism because workers left their posts to seek food sources. By February 1977 state stores had increased to twelve, cooperatives to twenty-one, and employee cooperatives to 212. Private stores handled 40 percent of the trade, people’s stores, 18 percent, and cooperatives, 42 percent, of which neighborhood cooperatives accounted for 15 percent. Although improvement in distribution channels was reported, complaints of black-market operations in Luanda, voiced by government sources in late 1977, indicated that the supply situation remained a major problem. Socialization of the domestic trade sector, and in particular of wholesale trade in foodstuffs, continued to be a principal aim. The government, however, had taken a pragmatic stand on private foodstores, and in January 1978 Prime Minister Nascimento stated that they were also being utilized in Luanda in the food distribu­tion system.

Replacement by the government of the trading apparatus in rural areas apparently occurred at a relatively slow pace owing in part to the shortage of adequate transport and in part to the attitude of the rural people who had been accustomed for years to barter transactions with Portuguese traders and did not want to accept the money offered for their products by the government trade organization. The latter problem was resolved by the gov­ernment’s finally agreeing to barter exchanges.

The situation was also complicated by the rise of private traders who offered higher prices than those of the government, espe­cially for foodstuffs that were in short supply in urban areas. In March 1978 reports were issued of substantially increased distri­bution of consumer goods to rural areas during the first two months of the year, but distribution plans still remained unfulfilled except for textiles. It also was noted that the greater part of the items were imported.

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National Budget

The composition and level of receipts and expenditures of the national budget since independence appeared not to have been published through late 1978. The implications of a law adopted in late 1977 by the Council of the Revolution, described as effecting a reorganization of the state’s general budget, were that the gen­eral character of the colonial budget was probably maintained during 1976 and 1977. The preamble of the 1977 law defined the budget as the basic financial plan for the creation and use of the monetary resources of the state. Budgetary revenue was stated to be derived from state economic enterprises, earnings from joint enterprises, taxes paid by private and joint enterprises and cooper­atives, taxes paid by individuals, earnings on loans, and receipts from miscellaneous sources. The aim of expenditures was eco­nomic and social development that would increase national de­fense capability and improve the living conditions of the Angolan people.

A multiplicity of taxes was levied during the Portuguese pe­riod, but most Angolans paid relatively low taxes as individuals. The colonial tax structure also appears to have been continued by the newly independent government. In late 1977, however, a law abolishing a number of existing taxes effective January 1978 declared that to implement fiscal policy as defined by the MPLA and the government, it had become necessary to begin eliminating certain levies and simplifying others. At about the same time, another law created the National Reconstruction Stamp Tax, the revenue from which was to go to the National Reconstruction Fund. The purpose of the latter was to finance certain annual government programs and provide subsidies to the cooperatives and state economic enterprises. The tax, also effective from January 1978, was to be levied on a wide range of items including tickets to various performances; air, land, and sea travel tickets; postal money orders, house rent receipts, and receipts from insurance premiums above a certain amount; radio and television sets; cigarettes and cigars; customs duty payments; claims and petitions to government departments; and others.

Financial Institutions and Currency

Financial Institutions

At independence the banking system included the Banco de Angola, the country’s bank of issue, five commercial banks, one development bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional), which was the Angolan branch of Portugal’s national development bank, and one bank providing agricultural credit (Caixa de Credito Agro-Pecuario de Angola). The Banco de Angola, founded in 1926, had headquarters in Lisbon and was controlled by the Banco de Portugal. Three of the commercial banks were par-

tially owned by non-Portuguese interests: Barclays Group, headquartered in London, had minority holdings in the Banco Comercial de Angola, First National City Bank of New York had a half interest in Banco Inter Unido, and the Standard and Chartered banking group owned half of Banco Totta-Standard de Angola. The remaining two commercial banks, Banco de Credito Comercial e Industrial and Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor, were owned by Portuguese interests.

The uncertainties of the economic situation in mid-1975 led the transitional government to appoint a government supervisory committee to take over management of the five commercial banks. By early 1976 one, Banco Totta-Standard de Angola, had run up a large deficit position with the Banco de Angola and was forbidden in April to make further loans. On November 11,1976, the first anniversary of independence, the Banco de Angola was nationalized taking the name Banco National de Angola, and the Banco Comercial de Angola was confiscated and renamed Banco Popular de Angola. The government stated that the takeover of the latter bank would have no effect on deposits but was basically a change to state management. The two institutions together re­portedly handled about 85 percent of Angola’s banking opera­tions. A few days later the authorization of the Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor to carry on banking business was canceled as not conform­ing with the aims of the Angolan revolution, and the bank closed. Angolan employees were to be integrated into the state banking system. Foreign employees wishing to stay in Angola were also to be placed in the state system.

In early February 1978 Prime Minister Nascimento announced that Angola was in the process of fully nationalizing its banking system. This policy was carried to conclusion by a law adopted by the Council of the Revolution on February 25 that declared that all banking activities conducted by banking institutions of any kind were in the public domain and would be carried on by the state through its financial institutions. At the same time all non­state banking facilities were directed to close their operations in accordance with procedures to be established by the Ministry of Finance. A draft bill covering the organization and structure of the state banking system was to be prepared for the Council of Ministers by December 31, 1978.

As part of the takeover of financial activities, the government has also nationalized the insurance industry, which had been en­tirely in private hands. In 1976 and 1977 authorization to operate in Angola was withdrawn from several insurance companies. On April 15,1978, the National Insurance and Reinsurance Company of Angola (Empresa Nacional de Seguros e Resseguros de Angola —ENSA) began operations, and subsequently the permits for ap­parently all remaining private companies were canceled effective May 31; their policies were to become null and void the next day, except for life insurance.

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Currency

During the colonial period the unit of currency was the Angolan escudo (EscA), which was officially set nominally at par value with the Portuguese escudo. The Angolan escudo, however, was issued separately from the Portuguese unit, did not circulate outside Angola, and in the free market was worth less than its Portuguese counterpart, mainly stemming from the effects of the large cumu­lative payment deficit with Portugal, the proclivity of local Por­tuguese to remit earnings and savings to Portugal, and regulations controlling such transfers.

The escudo continued in use after independence until January 1977 when a new currency unit, the kwanza (kw—see Glossary), comprising 100 Iwei (Iw), was introduced. The exchange was effected on a one-to-one basis during the three days of January 8-10 with a maximum amount changeable by one individual of kw20,000. Holdings above that sum possessed legally were cred­ited in the individual’s name at the Banco National de Angola, to be paid later. In June the deposited amount recoverable by pri­vate persons was set at kw200,000, drawable over a period of several months, and kwl.5 million by private companies and mer­chants, the amount drawable at any one time to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The new currency was nonconvertible, but in mid-1978 official international exchange rates were being set bi­weekly by the Banco National de Angola.

The changeover in currency had several motivations. At the time of the exchange it was estimated that about EscA22 billion had been issued of which approximately EscA5 billion were out­side Angola, mainly in Portugal. Much of the latter amount, which became worthless, was held by the Banco de Portugal purchased from former colonists who had returned from Angola around the time of independence. According to Portuguese sources these escudos had been bought based on an agreement between finan­cial authorities of the two governments, and the Portuguese gov­ernment asked for reimbursement, but through late 1978 resolu­tion of this question had not been reported. The changeover also made valueless any escudo holdings of the FNLA and UNITA. One of the results of the exchange was that it brought full control over the national currency into the hands of the government, impor­tant to the development of the planned socialist economy.

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

Foreign Trade

Information on the country’s foreign trade since independence was very meager and essentially available only from data pub­lished by its trading partners. In early 1978 petroleum was es­timated to make up about four-fifths of export values, and coffee and diamonds accounted for much of the remainder. A considera­ble range of other items was also exported before independence

with iron ore the most valuable, and further significant amounts of foreign exchange were earned by fishmeal, tobacco, raw cotton, sisal, maize, and bananas (see table 4, Appendix).

Foodstuffs and consumer goods apparently constituted a large proportion of imports between early 1976 and 1978. In early 1978 imported foods reportedly made up about half of the foodstuffs available in markets in the monetized sector, and about half of the consumer items sold or bartered to rural residents by the govern­ment retail distribution system were imported. Imports also in­cluded a considerable amount of transport equipment. Prein­dependence imports were weighted heavily toward machinery, transport equipment, iron and steel products, and chemical and allied products.

Since independence the government has concluded a number of economic and technical agreements with socialist countries, but as in the pre-1976 period the Western nations and Japan con­tinued overwhelmingly to be the chief purchasers of Angolan exports and the main supplier of imports. Until 1973 Portugal had been the single most important destination of exports, with the United States in second place. The increasing flow of Angolan oil to the United States and growing purchases of coffee, however, pushed that country in 1973 well into the lead, a position it con­tinued to hold through 1977. Other major importers in the prein­dependence period were Japan and Canada, although Canadian purchases dropped precipitously from 1975 (see table 5, Appen­dix).

Portugal was the most important source of Angolan imports throughout the preindependence period, but proportionately its share had gradually declined from more than two-fifths of the total in the mid-1960s to less than one-quarter in 1974. Angola con­tinued to buy heavily from Portugal after independence although the United States surpassed Portugal as the main supplier in 1976, and Portugal was second to West Germany in 1977 (see table 6, Appendix). Pre-1976 trade with African countries was chiefly with other Portugese or former Portuguese overseas provinces—prin­cipally Cape Verde and Mozambique—South Africa, and Zaire. Trade with the former colonies and Zaire continued to be of some significance after independence although relatively small in total value. Since 1976 major trade relations in both directions had also developed with Brazil.

Balance of Payments

Statistical detail necessary for determination of Angola’s balance of payments appeared not to have been published from 1974 through late 1978. A government statement in late 1976 noted only that a serious balance-of-payments deficit existed. Trade bal­ances were positive throughout the decade from 1964 to 1974 except in 1967 and 1968. The restrictions on imports imposed after 1971 resulted in a very large surplus in the merchandise

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account amounting to almost EscA3.2 billion in 1972 and close to EscA5.9 billion in 1973. Since independence petroleum and coffee export earnings overall have remained at a high level, but to what extent these, and minor earnings from other exports plus those from diamond sales, have offset the need for food, consumer goods, military supplies, and equipment and materials to restore the country’s infrastructure was not ascertainable. Information with respect to invisible transactions and capital was completely unavailable in late 1978.

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In 1974 the colonial government’s mechanisms for collecting statistical information on the Angolan economy disintegrated, and most organized data in published form ended with those issued for 1972 or 1973 and a few statistics covering the early months of 1974. A hiatus exists for 1974 and 1975. Published statistical detail thereafter available through late 1978 consisted essentially of figures that appeared in official statements and speeches by party and government leaders or information that could be extracted from data published by countries having economic relations with Angola, e.g., foreign trade information.

For statistical detail in English covering the colonial period from 1960 to 1973, the reader should consult the Banco de Angola’s *Economic and Financial Survey,* first published in 1966, covering the 1960-65 period and subsequently on an annual basis through the year 1973. Herbert H. Steiner of the United States Depart­ment of Agriculture has published *Angola's Agricultural Econ­omy in Brief,* which includes a report on the agricultural sector as it was just before independence.

One of the more valuable sources of economic information from 1976 through late 1978 has been the *Jomal de Angola,* published daily in Luanda. This periodical is in Portuguese, but translations of many items are found in the United States Joint Publications Research Service’s *Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa.* The French-language weekly journal *Marches Tropicaux et Mediter- raneens* also regularly carries information on Angola secured from a variety of sources. (For further information see Bibliography).


Appendix


Table

1. Conversion Coefficients and Factors
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3. Principal Crops Produced by the Commercial Sector, Agricul­tural Years 1970-71 and 1971-72
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