15-213 Recitation: Attack Lab

____TA___ 11 Feb 2017

Agenda

- **Reminders**
- Stacks
- Attack Lab Activities

Reminders

- Bomb lab is due tomorrow (14 Feb, 2017)!
 - "But if you wait until the last minute, it only takes a minute!" **NOT!**
 - Don't waste your grace days on this assignment!
- Attack lab will be released tomorrow!

Stacks

- Last-in, first-out
- x86 stack grows down
 - lowest address is "top"
 - \$\square\$ srsp contains the address of the topmost element in the stack
- Uses the pushq and popq instructions to push and pop registers/constants onto and off the stack


Stack - pushq & popq

pushq {value} is equivalent to

sub \$8, %rsp mov {value}, (%rsp)

popq {reg} is equivalent to

mov (%rsp), {reg} add \$8, %rsp



Stack - Caller vs. Callee

- **■**Function A calls function B
 - A is the caller
 - B is the callee
- Stack space is allocated in "frames"
 - Represents the state of a single function invocation
- **■** Frame used primarily for two things:
 - Storing callee saved registers
 - Storing the return address of a funciton

Registers - Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

Caller-saved

- Registers used for function arguments are always callersaved
- \$rax is also caller-saved
- Called function may do as it wishes with the registers
- Must save/restore register in caller's stack frame if it still needs the value after a function call

Callee-saved

- If the function wants to change the register, it must save the original value in its stack frame and restore it before returning
- The calling function may store temporary values in callee-saved registers

x86-64 Register Usage Conventions

%rax	return value	%r8	argument #5
%rbx	callee saves	%r9	argument #6
%rcx	argument #4	%r10	caller saves
%rdx	argument #3	%r11	caller saves
%rsi	argument #2	%r12	callee saves
%rdi	argument #1	%r13	callee saves
%rsp	stack pointer	%r14	callee saves
%rbp	callee saves	%r15	callee saves

Registers - Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

Before function call

- ■rdi = first argument
- ■rsi = second argument
- ■rax = some temporary value
- ■rbx = some important number to use later (15213)
- ■rsp = pointer to some important buffer (0x7ffffffaaaa)

After function call

- ■rdi = garbage
- ■rsi = garbage
- ■rax = return value
- ■rbx = some important number to use later (15213)
- ■rsp = pointer to some important buffer (0x7fffffffaaaa)


x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

■ Current Stack Frame ("Top" to Bottom)

- "Argument build:"
 - Parameters for function about to call
- Local variables
 - If can't keep in registers
- Saved register context
- Old frame pointer (optional)

Caller Stack Frame

- Return address
 - Pushed by call instruction
- Arguments for this call



Stack Maintenance

- **■** Functions free their frame before returning
- Return instruction looks for the return address at the top of the stack
 - ...What if the return address has been changed?

Attack Lab

- We're letting you hijack programs by running buffer overflow attacks on them.
 - ■Is that not justification enough?
- To understand stack discipline and stack frames
- To defeat relatively secure programs with return oriented programming

Attack Lab Activities

- Three activities
 - Each relies on a specially crafted assembly sequence to purposefully overwrite the stack
- Activity 1 Overwrites the return addresses
- Activity 2 Writes an assembly sequence onto the stack
- Activity 3 Uses byte sequences in libc as the instructions

Attack Lab Activities

- One student needs a laptop
- Login to a shark machine
 - \$ wget http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213/activities/rec5.tar
 - \$ tar xf rec5.tar
 - \$ cd rec5
 - \$ make
 - \$ gdb act1

Activity 1

```
(gdb) break clobber
```

(gdb) run

(gdb) x \$rsp

(gdb) backtrace

Q. Does the value at the top of the stack match any frame?

Activity 1 Continued

```
(gdb) x /2gx $rdi  // Here are the two key values (gdb) stepi  // Keep doing this until

(gdb)
clobber () at support.s:16
16 ret


(gdb) x $rsp
```

Q. Has the return address changed?

(gdb) finish // Should exit and print out "Hi!"

Activity 1 Post

- Clobber overwrites part of the stack with memory at \$rdi, including the all-important return address
- In act1 it writes two new return addresses:
 - 0x400500: address of printHi()
 - 0x400560: address in main



Activity 2

- \$gdb act2 (gdb) break clobber (gdb) run (gdb) x \$rsp
- Q. What is the address of the stack and the return address?

(gdb) x /4gx \$rdi

Q. What will the new return address be? (i.e., what is the first value?)

Activitity 2 Continued

```
(gdb) x/5i $rdi + 8 // Display as instructions Q. Why rdi + 8?
```

Q. What are the three addresses?

```
(gdb) break puts
(gdb) break exit
```

Q. Do these addresses look familiar?

Activity 2 Post

- Normally programs cannot execute instructions on the stack
 - Main used mprotect to disable the memory protection for this activity
- Clobber wrote an address that's on the stack as a return address
 - Followed by a sequence of instructions
 - Three addresses show up in the exploit:
 - 0x48644d → "Hi\n" string
 - $0x4022e0 \rightarrow puts()$ function
 - 0x4011a0 → exit() function

Activity 3

```
$gdb act3
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x /5gx $rdi
```

- Q. Which value will be first on the stack?
- Q. At the end of clobber, where will the function return to?

Activity 3 Continued

(gdb) x /2i <return address>

- Q. What does this sequence do?
- Q. Do the same for the other addresses. Note that some are return addresses and some are for data. When you continue, what will the code now do?

Activity 3 Post

- It's harder to stop programs from running existing pieces of code in the executable.
- Clobber wrote multiple return addresses (aka gadgets) that each performed a small task, along with data that will get popped off the stack while running the gadgets.
 - ■0x457d0c: pop %rdi; retq
 - ■0x47fa64: Pointer to the string "Hi\n"
 - ■0x429a6a: pop %rax; retq
 - ■0x400500: Address of a printing function
 - ■0x47f001: callq *%rax

Activity 3 Post

Note that some of the return addresses actually cut off bytes from existing instructions

```
457cfa: 48 83 c4 28
                              add
                                     $0x28,%rsp
457cfe: 5b
                                     %rbx
                              pop
457cff: 4a 8d 44 3d 00
                                     0x0(%rbp,%r15,1),%rax
                              lea
457d04: 5d
                                     %rbp
                              pop
457d05: 41 5c
                                     %r12
                              pop
457d07: 41 5d
                                     %r13
                              pop
                                     %r14
457d09: 41 5e
457d0b 41 5f
                                     %r15
                              pop
457d0d: c3
457d0e: 48 83 7c 24 10 00
                                     $0x0,0x10(%rsp)
                              cmpq
457d14: 74 8a
                                     457ca0 < IO getline info+0xd0>
                               ie
```

0x457d0b0c	0d
pop %r15	retq
41 5f	c3
pop %rdi	retq
5f	c3

Operation	Register R							
	%rax	%rcx	%rdx	%rbx	%rsp	%rbp	%rsi	%rdi
popq R	58	59	5a	5b	5c	5d	5e	5f

If you get stuck

- Please read the writeup. Please read the writeup. Please read the writeup. Please read the writeup!
- CS:APP Chapter 3
- View lecture notes and course FAQ at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213
- Office hours Sunday through Thursday 5:00-9:00pm in WH 5207
- Post a private question on Piazza
- man gdb, gdb's help command

Attack Lab Tools

- ■gcc –c test.s; objdump –d test.o > test.asm

 Compiles the assembly code in test.s and shows the actual bytes for the instructions
- ./hex2raw < exploit.txt > converted.txt
 Convert hex codes in exploit.txt into raw ASCII strings to pass to targets
 See the writeup for more details on how to use this
- (gdb) display /12gx \$rsp (gdb) display /2i \$rip
 Displays 12 elements on the stack and the next 2 instructions to run

GDB is also useful to for tracing to see if an exploit is working