

Chapter 3 outline

3.1 transport-layer services

3.2 multiplexing and demultiplexing

3.3 connectionless transport: UDP

3.4 principles of reliable data transfer


3.5 connection-oriented transport: TCP

- segment structure
- reliable data transfer
- flow control
- connection management

3.6 principles of congestion control

3.7 TCP congestion control


TCP segment structure




Connection Management

before exchanging data, sender/receiver “handshake”:

- ❖ agree to establish connection
- ❖ agree on connection parameters





`clientSocket.connect((serverName,serverPort))`




`connectionSocket, addr = serverSocket.accept()`

Agreeing to establish a connection


2-way handshake:



TCP 3-way handshake



TCP 3-way handshake: FSM



Server may not accept the connection

❖ Why?


- Server may not be accepting TCP connections to that port
- Server may be out of resources

❖ What happens?

- Sends **RST**
- No connection established
- No resources allocated

❖ USP servers do not have connections

- just listen to a socket on a dest port#
- If server receives a UDP packet with dest port# that does not match an existing UDP socket → Sends ICMP message back



Scanning ports


❖ www.nmap.org

❖ Scanning TCP ports

- Send TCP SYN
- receive SYNACK, RST, nothing



❖ Scanning UDP ports

- Receive ICMP messages



[Agreeing to establish a connection]

2-way handshake:





Q: will 2-way handshake always work in network?



- ❖ variable delays
- ❖ retransmitted messages (e.g. `req_conn(x)`) due to message loss
- ❖ message reordering
- ❖ can't "see" other side

[Why not 2-way connection establishment?]


2-way handshake failure scenarios:



Attack I: SYN Flooding




TCP 3-way handshake - revisited



Attack II: Spoofing


Client with IP A



Can the server be sure that this is really A, and not B pretending to be A?

Attack II: Spoofing

Attacker with IP B (pretending to be A)



TCP: closing a connection

- ❖ remember: this is a duplex connection
- ❖ client, server **each** close their side of connection
 - send TCP segment with FIN bit = 1
 - either of the two can initiate the closing
- ❖ respond to received FIN with ACK
 - on receiving FIN, ACK can be combined with own FIN
- ❖ simultaneous FIN exchanges can be handled

TCP: closing a connection

client state

ESTAB

`clientSocket.close()`

FIN_WAIT_1

can no longer
send but can
receive data

FIN_WAIT_2


wait for server
close

TIMED_WAIT

timed wait
for $2 * \text{max}$
segment lifetime

CLOSED

close



FINbit=1, seq=x

ACKbit=1; ACKnum=x+1

FINbit=1, seq=y

ACKbit=1; ACKnum=y+1

can still
send data

close

can no longer
send data

server state

ESTAB

CLOSE_WAIT

LAST_ACK

CLOSED

[TCP Connection Management (cont)]

