# Cryptography and Network Security

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### The need...

- In CERTs 2001 annual report it listed 52,000 security incidents
- the most serious involving:
  - IP spoofing
    - intruders creating packets with false address then taking advantages of OS exploits
  - eavesdropping and sniffing
    - attackers listen for userids and passwords and then just walk into target systems
  - as a result the IAB included authentication and encryption in the next generation IP (IPv6)


# IP Security

- We've considered some application specific security mechanisms
  - eg. S/MIME, PGP, Kerberos, SSL/HTTPS
- however there are security concerns that cut across protocol layers
- would like security implemented by the network for all applications

### **IPSec**

- general IP Security mechanisms
- provides
  - authentication
  - confidentiality
  - key management
- applicable to use over LANs, across public & private WANs, & for the Internet

### IPSec Uses



### Benefits of IPSec

- in a firewall/router provides strong security to all traffic crossing the perimeter
- is resistant to bypass
- is below transport layer, hence transparent to applications
- can be transparent to end users
- can provide security for individual users if desired
- additionally in routing applications:
  - assure that router advertisments come from authorized routers
  - neighbor advertisments come from authorized routers
  - insure redirect messages come from the router to which initial packet was sent
  - insure no forging of router updates

# IP Security Architecture

- RFC 2401 (Primary RFC)
- specification is quite complex
- defined in numerous RFC's
  - incl. RFC 2401/2402/2406/2408
  - many others, grouped by category
- mandatory in IPv6, optional in IPv4

### IPSec Services

- Two protocols are used to provide security:
  - Authentication Header Protocol (AH)
  - Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP)
- Services provided are:
  - Access control
  - Connectionless integrity
  - Data origin authentication
  - Rejection of replayed packets
    - a form of partial sequence integrity
  - Confidentiality (encryption)
  - Limited traffic flow confidentiality


### Security Associations

- a one-way relationship between sender & receiver that affords security for traffic flow
- identified by 3 parameters:
  - Security Parameters Index (SPI)
    - a bit string
  - IP Destination Address
    - only unicast allowed
    - could be end user, firewall, router
  - Security Protocol Identifier
    - indicates if SA is AH or ESP
- has a number of other parameters
  - seq no, AH & EH info, lifetime etc
- have a database of Security Associations

### Authentication Header (AH)

- RFC 2402
- provides support for data integrity & authentication of IP packets
  - end system/router can authenticate user/app
  - prevents address spoofing attacks by tracking sequence numbers
- based on use of a MAC (message authentication code)
  - HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-1-96
  - MAC is calculated:
    - immutable IP header fields
    - AH header (except for Authentication Data field)
    - the entire upper-level protocol data (immutable)
- parties must share a secret key


### Authentication Header




### Transport and Tunnel Modes

- Both AH and ESP have two modes
  - transport mode is used to encrypt & optionally authenticate IP data
    - data protected but header left in clear
    - can do traffic analysis but is efficient
    - good for ESP host to host traffic
  - tunnel mode encrypts entire IP packet
    - add new header for next hop
    - good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security


### Transport & Tunnel Modes




#### (a) Transport-level security





# Transport & Tunnel Modes





(a) Transport mode






(b) Tunnel mode

# Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

- RFC 2406
- provides message content confidentiality & limited traffic flow confidentiality
- can optionally provide the same authentication services as AH
- supports range of ciphers, modes, padding
  - incl. DES, Triple-DES, RC5, IDEA, CAST etc
  - CBC most common
  - pad to meet blocksize, for traffic flow


# Encapsulating Security Payload



# Combining Security Associations

- SA's can implement either AH or ESP
- to implement both need to combine SA's
  - form a security bundle
- have 4 cases (see next)

### Combining Security Associations



- a. AH in transport mode
- b.ESP in transport mode
- c. AH followed by ESP in transport mode(ESP SA inside an AH SA
- d. any one a, b, c inside an AH or ESP in tunnel mode

### Key Management

- handles key generation & distribution
- typically need 2 pairs of keys
  - 2 per direction for AH & ESP
- manual key management
  - sysadmin manually configures every system
- automated key management
  - automated system for on demand creation of keys for SA's in large systems
  - has Oakley & ISAKMP elements


### Oakley

- RFC 2412
- a key exchange protocol
- based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- adds features to address weaknesses
  - cookies, groups (global params), nonces, DH key exchange with authentication
- can use arithmetic in prime fields or elliptic curve fields

### **ISAKMP**

- Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (RFC 2407)
- provides framework for key management
- defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify and delete SAs
- independent of key exchange protocol, encryption algorithm and authentication method

### ISAKMP





### Summary

- have considered:
  - IPSec security framework
  - AH Protocol
  - ESP Protocol
  - key management & Oakley/ISAKMP