


Session hijacking

Clickjacking

Waterhole

Session hijacking

- taking over an active TCP/IP communication session without the user's permission
- same access to resources as the compromised user
- Identity theft, Information theft, stealing sensitive



Types of session hijacking attacks






Figure 2: Session Hijacking



Session Hijacking Process



Application Level Hijacking


- Man in the middle attack:
- Cross-site scripting
- Using Proxy:
- Man-in the–Browser:
- Session Replay:

Network Level & Application Level


Activity

- Spoofing vs. Hijacking pg 125
- TCP Concepts: Three-Way Handshake pg 126

Network or TCP Session Hijacking



TCP session hijacker is to create a state where the client and server are unable to exchange data; enabling him/her to forge acceptable packets for both ends, which mimic the real packets. Thus attacker is able to gain control of the session.



Counter Measures:


- Using secure protocols instead of clear text protocols like HTTP, FTP, Telnet, Rlogin, etc.
- Encrypting session id will increase the complexity of the session id prediction.
- Sending session id over SSL.
- Use long random numbers for session id.
- Implement timeout for the session when the session is logged out, or session id expires.
- Having different session id for each page.
- Use switches rather than hubs.
- Ensure server side and client side protection software.
- Use IDS for detecting ARP spoofing/Poisoning.
- Do not click on suspicious links.
- Check the web application for all errors.
- Using IPSec is a valid defence mechanism.

Waterhole Attack




Waterhole Attack

2. Attacker then tests these websites for vulnerabilities.




Likejacking

- The user can be tricked into clicking website
- User visits attacker.com
- Like button hidden behind another button



button, on an attacker's





Clickjacking: Definition

- **Prerequisite**: Multiple mutually distrusting applications sharing the same display, and having permission to manipulate each other's visual appearance
- Attacker compromises context integrity of another app's UI components
 - Temporal Integrity
 - Visual Integrity


Types of Context Integrity

Visual Integrity

- What the user sees, is actually what is present
- No transparent, overlaid objects
- Eg  should be visible
-  should be visible


Temporal Integrity

- State of the UI between *time of user checking* and *the time of initiating the click*, remains the same



Compromising Visual Integrity

- Hide the target
- **Partial Overlays**



The image shows a PayPal payment confirmation window. At the top, it displays the user's name 'Lin-Shung Huang' and links for 'Not you?' and 'Log out'. The PayPal logo is in the top right corner. A blue banner reads 'You are about to pay'. Below this is a table with two columns: 'Receiver' and 'Amount'. The table lists 'Adblock Plus' for '\$5.00' and a 'Total' of '\$5.00 USD'. A dashed line separates this from the 'Pay with:' section. Under 'Pay with:', there are links for 'My PayPal Balance View' and 'PayPal policies', followed by 'PayPal' and '\$0.00 USD'. Below that is a dropdown menu showing 'BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. XXX' and '\$5.00 USD'. A 'Memo' field contains the text 'Contribution for Adblock Plus'. At the bottom, there are 'Pay' and 'Cancel' buttons. A footer note states 'PayPal protects your privacy and security.' with a '[+]' icon.

Receiver	Amount
Adblock Plus	\$5.00
Total	\$5.00 USD

Pay with:

[My PayPal Balance View](#) [PayPal policies](#) **PayPal** \$0.00 USD

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. XXX \$5.00 USD


Memo: Contribution for Adblock Plus

Pay [Cancel](#)

PayPal protects your privacy and security. [+]


Compromising Visual Integrity

- Multiple cursor feedback known as *cursorjacking*



Compromising Temporal Integrity

- Bait and switch: As mouse comes near “Claim you..” button, Like moves to take it’s location before the user realizes it




Existing Defences

- User confirmation
 - Degrades user experience
- UI randomization
 - Unreliable & not user-friendly. (Multi-click attacks)
- Framebusting (X-Frame-Options)
 - Incompatible with embedding 3rd-party widgets
- Opaque overlay policy
 - Breaks legitimate sites
- Visibility detection on click
 - Allow clicks only on elements that are visible

Protecting temporal integrity


- Imposing a delay after displaying a UI
 - Annoying to users



New Attacks Demonstrated

- Authors conducted new exploits using Clickjacking & with and without their own patches using Amazon Mechanical Turks
- Reported the effectiveness of the attack
- Attacks:
 - Accessing user's webcam: **Attack success: 43%**
 - Stealing user's email: **Attack success: 47%**
 - Revealing user's identity: **Attack success: 98%**

Accessing user's webcam




Fake Cursor



Real Cursor

Stealing user's email




InContext Defence

- Design Goals:
 - Should support 3rd party object embedding
 - Should not have to prompt users for actions
 - Should not break existing sites
 - Should be *resilient* to new attacks

Basic Idea

- Techniques to ensure user is always *InContext* of the sensitive UI in interaction
- Websites can indicate their sensitive UI
- Browsers can *enforce* context integrity rules on these sensitive UIs



Ensuring visual integrity of target


- OS can compare the screenshot of sensitive UI with the reference bitmap
 - 30ms overhead on click processing



What is displayed
(OS screenshot)



What should be seen
(Reference bitmap)




Ensuring visual integrity of pointer

- Remove cursor customization
- Freeze screen
 - Attack success: 43% -> 15%
 - Attack success (margin=10px): 12%
 - Attack success (margin=20px): 4%



Ensuring visual integrity of pointer

- Lightbox effect around target on pointer entry



Ensuring temporal integrity

- **UI Delay**

- On a visual change, all buttons are inactive for a certain time

- **Pointer Re-entry:**

- On a visual change, invalidate clicks till pointer re-enters the UI

