

# Applied Number Theory in Cryptography: RSA

## I Am Curious

Sebastian Schlesinger

Zalando SE

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
# Learning objectives of this presentation

- In-depth understanding of RSA with sound mathematical basis
- Ability to assess constraints w.r.t. selection of various parameters in RSA (e.g. key length, set up of encryption key)
- Provide formal foundations for further reading in mathematical cryptography

# Outline

- 1 Foundations of public key cryptography
- 2 Mathematical background
  - Basic Structures
  - Factor Rings
  - Euler's Phi and Lagrange's Theorem
- 3 The Algorithm
  - Soundness
- 4 Security of RSA - Known Attacks (Extract)

# Cryptography: Security Objectives



# The principle of cryptography

## Cryptographic System

An encryption is a function  $enc : K \times P \rightarrow C$  from the cartesian product of the set of keys  $K$  and the set of plaintexts  $P$  to the set cyphertexts  $C$ . A decryption is a function  $dec : K \times C \rightarrow P$ . A suitable decryption has a key  $k'$  such that

$$\forall k \in K \forall x \in P : dec(k', enc(k, x)) = x$$

Alternative notation for  $enc(k, m)$  is  $enc_k(m)$ .

# Desired Properties for Cryptographic Systems

- ①  $enc_k(m)$  must be efficiently computable
- ②  $dec_{k'}(m)$  must be efficiently computable
- ③ *Resilience against known ciphertext attack:* Given  $c_1, \dots, c_n \in C$ ,  $dec_{k'}(c_i)$  must not be efficiently computable (without knowledge of  $k'$ )
- ④ *Resilience against chosen ciphertext attack:* Given  $(m_1, c_1), \dots, (m_n, c_n)$ ,  $dec_{k'}(c)$  with  $c \neq c_i$  should not be efficiently computable

# Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography


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# Now let's start with the math

# Groups, Rings, and Fields

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 $\forall x \in G : x + n = x$  (denoted as 0 or 1 for multiplicative groups)
- **Inverse Elements:**  $\forall x \in G \exists y \in G : x + y = 0$ . It is called *inverse* of  $x$ , also denoted as  $-x$  or  $x^{-1}$  if multiplicatively denoted.

# Groups, Rings, and Fields

## Rings with 1

Let  $R$  be a set with at least two neutral elements  $0, 1$  w.r.t. the operations  $+, \cdot : R \times R \rightarrow R$ .  $(R, +, \cdot)$  is said to be a ring (with 1) if and only if the following properties hold.

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- $(R, +)$  is an Abelian group.
- For  $(R, \cdot)$  Associativity and Commutativity hold and 1 is the neutral element.
- **Distributivity:**  $\forall x, y, z \in R : (x + y) \cdot z = x \cdot z + y \cdot z$ .

## Example

An example is the ring of integers  $\mathbb{Z}$ .

# Groups, Rings, and Fields

## Fields

Let  $F$  be a set with at least two neutral elements  $0, 1$  w.r.t. the operations  $+,\cdot : F \times F \rightarrow F$ .  $(F, +, \cdot)$  is said to be a field if and only if the following properties hold.

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- Distributivity holds.


## Example

Examples are the rational numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$  and the real numbers  $\mathbb{R}$ .

# Important relations on integers

## Divisibility Relation

For  $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$  we define the divisibility relation  $| \subset \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}$  as  
 $a|b : \Leftrightarrow \exists m : a \cdot m = b$ . It is an order (reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive).



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## Equivalence mod $n$

For  $a, b, n \in \mathbb{Z}$ , we define the relation  $\equiv \subset \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}$  as  $a \equiv b \pmod{n} : \Leftrightarrow n|(a - b)$ . It is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric, transitive).

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Elements in  $[a]$  yield all the same residue by dividing through  $n$ . Note that

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{Z} \exists \xi, \eta \in \mathbb{Z} : x = \xi \cdot n + \eta \wedge 0 \leq \eta < n$$

and  $\xi, \eta$  are unique.

# Factor Ring

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The set of equivalence classes  $\mod n$  is defined as

$$\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} := \{[a] | a \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \{[0], [1], \dots, [n-1]\}$$

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We define operations  $+, \cdot$  on it as

$$[a] + [b] := [a + b], [a] \cdot [b] := [a \cdot b]$$

This yields a ring  $(\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}, +, \cdot)$ .

# Subgroups and Lagrange's Theorem

## Lagrange's theorem

For a group  $G$ , we call  $\#G := \text{ord}(G)$  the order of  $G$ . For a subgroup  $U$  of  $G$  always  $\text{ord}(U) | \text{ord}(G)$ .

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## Orders of elements

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## Corollary to Lagrange's Theorem

For every element  $g \in G$  it holds  $g^{\text{ord}(G)} = 1$ .

# Ring's multiplikative subgroups and Euler's phi

## Ring's multiplicative subgroup

For a ring  $R$ , we denote the set  $R^* := \{x \in R \mid \exists y : x \cdot y = 1\}$ , which is a multiplicative subgroup of  $(R, \cdot)$ .

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## Examples

$[1], [3] \in (\mathbb{Z}/4\mathbb{Z})^*$ :

$[1]^{-1} = [1]$ ,  $[3]^{-1} = 3$ ,  $[2] \notin (\mathbb{Z}/4\mathbb{Z})^*$  ( $[2] \cdot [2] = [0]$ ,  $[2] \cdot [3] = [2]$ )

$1, 2, 3, 4 \in (\mathbb{Z}/5\mathbb{Z})^*$

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## Formula for calculating Euler's phi

For  $n = \prod_{p|n} p^{k_p}$ , we can calculate

$$\varphi(n) = \prod_{p|n} p^{k_p-1}(p-1) = \prod_{p|n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right)$$

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Particularly if  $n = p \cdot q$ , we have

$$\varphi(n) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$$

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Now you no the basics, let's move on to the algorithm...

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Say, we encrypt  $m = 8$ . This yields  $m^e = 8^7 \equiv 2 \pmod{55}$ , which means 8 is encrypted by 2.

# Decryption

## Private Key

The private key  $d$  fulfills

$$d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$

$d$  can be obtained via Enhanced Euclidean Algorithm.

# Enhanced Euclidean Algorithm

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We were looking for  $d$  such that  $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ . This translates in the example to  $d = -17 \equiv 23 \pmod{40}$

## Decryption Example

In our example, we have obtained  $d = 23$ . We had  $m = 8$  and obtained  $c = 2$ . To decrypt, we calculate

$$c^d = 2^{23} \equiv 8 \pmod{55}$$

Soundness proof: From [complex looking math] it straightforwardly follows...

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Hence,  $c^d = (m^e)^d = m^{e \cdot d} = m^{k \cdot \varphi(n) + 1} = m^{k \cdot \varphi(n)} \cdot m = 1 \cdot m = m$



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Since  $\gcd(p, q) = 1$ , this yields  $m^{k \cdot \varphi(n)+1} - m \equiv 0 \pmod{p \cdot q}$ .



# Are you still with me?

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## Fermat Factorization

It is based on the formula  $x^2 - y^2 = (x + y)(x - y)$ .

Particularly we consider  $n = pq = \left(\frac{p+q}{2}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{p-q}{2}\right)^2$ .

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If this is a square, this yields the factorization  $n = (k + h)(k - h)$ .

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## Fermat Factorization

It is based on the formula  $x^2 - y^2 = (x + y)(x - y)$ .

Particularly we consider  $n = pq = \left(\frac{p+q}{2}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{p-q}{2}\right)^2$ .

Let  $k$  be the smallest integer so that  $k^2 > n$ , consider  $k^2 - n$   
(Note  $n = (\sqrt{n})^2$ ).

If this is a square, this yields the factorization  $n = (k + h)(k - h)$ .

If not, try again with  $(k + 1)^2 - n$ ,  $(k + 2)^2 - n$  etc.

## Example

Let  $n = 6699557$ , then  $\sqrt{n} \approx 2588.35$ . Hence,  $k = 2589$ .

# Issues with choosing $p$ and $q$

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## Example

Let  $n = 6699557$ , then  $\sqrt{n} \approx 2588.35$ . Hence,  $k = 2589$ .

$k^2 - n = 2589^2 - 6699557 = 58^2$ . Hence,

$6699557 = 2589^2 - 58^2 = (2589 + 58)(2589 - 58) = 2647 \cdot 2531$

# Small encryption exponent $e$

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If the same message  $m$  is sent encrypted with small exponent  $e$ , e.g. 3 to different partners (using different moduli  $n_1, n_2, n_3$ ), then the simultaneous congruence

$$x \equiv c_1 \pmod{n_1}$$

$$x \equiv c_2 \pmod{n_2}$$

$$x \equiv c_3 \pmod{n_3}$$

can be solved by exploiting Chinese remainder theorem.

If  $m^3 < n_1 n_2 n_3$ , this also implies  $x = m^3$ , which in turn yields the plaintext  $m$ .

Solution: Salting (Add random bit string to message)

## Other attacks

- Small decryption exponent  $d$  ( $d < n^{1/4}$ ): Attackable if  $\gcd(p-1, q-1)$  small. Then  $d$  can be calculated.
- Adaptive chosen cypher text attack due to homomorphic property:  
$$(m_1 m_2)^e \equiv m_1^e m_2^e \equiv c_1 c_2 \pmod{n}$$
- Coppersmith attacks: Exploit if messages depend linearly on each other, i.e.,  $m_1 = a \cdot m_2 + b$
- Cycling attacks: For  $c = m^e \pmod{n}$ , there is a  $k$  such that  $c^{e^k} \equiv c \pmod{n}$ . Hence,  $c^{e^{k-1}} \equiv m \pmod{n}$  (like taking  $e$ -th root of  $c$ ). However, proven to be as hard (and therefore as low-likely as factorization)
- Message concealing: If  $m^e \equiv m \pmod{n}$  (very small probability).

Thank you for your attention

Any Questions?