See the INSTALL file for installation instructions.
NOTE: this version of mod_auth_tkt (2.0.x) works with Apache 1.3.x, 2.0.x, and 2.2.x. The older mod_auth_tkt 1.3.x is now deprecated, and all users are encouraged to upgrade.
mod_auth_tkt is a lightweight cookie-based authentication module for Apache, written in C. It implements a single-signon framework that works across multiple apache instances and multiple machines. The actual authentication is done by a user-supplied CGI or script in whatever language you like (examples are provided in Perl), meaning you can authenticate against any kind of user repository you can access (password files, ldap, databases, etc.)
mod_auth_tkt supports inactivity timeouts (including the ability to control how aggressively the ticket is refreshed), the ability to include arbitrary user data within the cookie, configurable cookie names and domains, and token-based access to subsections of a site.
mod_auth_tkt works by checking incoming Apache requests for a (user- defined) cookie containing a valid authentication ticket. The ticket is checked by generating an MD5 checksum for the username and any (optional) user data from the ticket together with the requesting IP address and a shared secret available to the server. If the generated MD5 checksum matches the ticket's checksum, the ticket is valid and the request is authorised. Requests without a valid ticket are redirected to a configurable URL which is expected to validate the user and generate a ticket for them. This package includes a Perl module for generating the cookies; implementations for other environments should be relatively straightforward.
Pros and Cons
The mod_auth_tkt scheme has several advantages and only one significant disadvantage:
Usable on any apache webserver: because it's written in C using only the Apache C API, mod_auth_tkt should be usable on the simplest stripped down Apache server - no mod_perl, mod_php, or servlets required. mod_auth_tkt's only requirement is that the Apache supports DSO (Dynamic Shared Objects).
Single-signon across Apaches and machines, including mixed environments: mod_auth_tkt enables a user to login once and then be seamlessly authorised across multiple Apaches or machines. Mixed environments work fine too - lightweight static HTML Apache with heavier mod_perl/mod_php/servlet enabled Apache, or a mixed Unix/Windows environment. Only requirements are a shared secret across all the servers.
Pluggable authentication and authorisation: mod_auth_tkt hands off the authentication and authorisation problem to the URL of your choice. This means that you can use whatever technology (CGI, Perl, PHP, ASP, Java etc.) and whatever repositories (passwd files, LDAP, NIS, RDBMS, radius, or any combination thereof) you like - as long as the authorising page or script generates a valid ticket for a valid user everything should work just fine.
Drop-in replacement for Basic Authentication: mod_auth_tkt sets the Basic Authentication REMOTE_USER environment variable on authorised requests, so that existing scripts that work with Basic Authentication should work unchanged in a mod_auth_tkt environment.
Supports cross-domain authentication (as of version 1.3.8): although cookies are domain specific, the newest version of mod_auth_tkt allows initial tickets to be passed via URLs, allowing single-signon across completely unrelated domains (www.foo.com and www.bar.com).
- Requires cookies: browsers without cookie support will never have a valid ticket and will therefore never be authorised by mod_auth_tkt. There are no current plans to support non-cookie-based authentication.
- Login procedure (by user script/CGI)
1.1 User logs in by supplying user credentials to server-side login module. Login module is implemented e.g., as CGI or servlet.
1.2 Login module has access to a login database that has following information: user credentials and additional information such as user class/groups etc.
1.3 If login module finds that user credentials supplied matches the ones in database, an authentication cookie is constructed.
1.4 Contents of authentication cookie: user ID, client IP address, timestamp, optional token list, optional user data, plus an MD5 checksum to ensure the integrity of the cookie. The MD5 checksum is generated from following information: - shared secret - user ID - client IP address - timestamp - token list, if supplied - user data, if supplied
1.5 The basic format of the ticket / authentication cookie value is as follows:
ticket := <MD5-checksum> <timestamp> <uid> ['\0' <tokens>] ['\0' <user-data>] tokens := ! <token1> [ , <token2> ... ] user-data := ! <arbitrary-user-data>
- Request authentication by mod_auth_tkt
2.1 If no authentication cookie is present in a request, request is redirected to a configurable login URL.
2.2 If authentication cookie is present and timeout checking is enabled, timestamp in the cookie is compared with the current time on the server. If the cookie has expired, request is redirected to a configurable timeout URL.
2.3 If authentication cookie is present and not expired, MD5 checksum is generated as described in 1.4. The MD5 checksum in cookie is compared with the one generated. If they match the user is successfully authenticated.
2.4 If a TKTAuthToken is also required for this url/area, mod_auth_tkt will then check the first field of the user_data (which has been checked via the MD5 checksum in the previous step) for a comma- separated list of tokens for this user. If the required token is not found in this list, the request is redirected to a configurable unauthorised URL.
2.4 Upon successful authentication authentication mod_auth_tkt sets environment variables for user ID and user data. User data is also placed in query string.
2.5 If authentication fails, request is redirected as in 2.1.
2.6 Upon redirection in 2.1, 2.2 or 2.4 mod_auth_tkt attempts to pass the requested URL as a 'back' link so that after checking user credentials login module can bounce the request back again. If the TktAuthBackCookieName parameter is set, mod_auth_tkt will set a cookie with that name to hold this link; otherwise it will pass it as a GET parameter to the authenticating URL (back=).
The TKTAuthCookieName cookie is constructed using following algorithm:
('+' is concatenation operation)
cookie := digest + hextimestamp + user_id + '!' + user_data
or if using tokens:
cookie := digest + hextimestamp + user_id + '!' + token_list + '!' + user_data
digest := MD5(digest0 + key)
digest0 := MD5(iptstamp + key + user_id + '\0' + token_list + '\0' + user_data)
iptstamp is a 8 bytes long byte array, bytes 0-3 are filled with client's IP address as a binary number in network byte order, bytes 4-7 are filled with timestamp as a binary number in network byte order.
hextimestamp is 8 character long hexadecimal number expressing timestamp used in iptstamp.
token_list is an optional comma-separated list of access tokens for this user. This list is checked if TKTAuthToken is set for a particular area.
user_data is optional
Credits and Disclaimer
This is the Open Fusion version of the mod_auth_tkt Apache module. mod_auth_tkt was originally written by Raimondas Kiveris for Liquid Digital Information Systems, Inc. (see http://www.ldis.com/tkt_auth/), and further developed by Nelio Alves Pereira Filho (see http://www.ime.usp.br/~nelio/software/apache/). This version is the work of Gavin Carr of Open Fusion Pty. Ltd. (Australia), and the contributors cited in the CREDITS file in the distribution. The definitive site for this version is http://www.openfusion.com.au/labs.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE APACHE GROUP OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.