

Software Engineering Disasters

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Mistakes in software engineering can have serious consequences and lead to disasters. The consequences of these disasters can lead to injury and loss of human lives, financial and material losses and security vulnerabilities, among many others. Next chapters cover two software disasters from a list by Flynn (2011), reasons behind them and the direct and indirect costs.

Year 2000 Problem

Year 2000 problem was a bug related to the formatting and storage of calendar data. In early days of computers, when memory was very expensive, dates were often shortened using two characters to indicate years, for example date 1978-01-01 would be stored as string 780101 instead of 19780101 using all four characters as the year. Kappelman and Scott (1996) discusses how an this lead to significant savings in storage costs for an organization. For the time this was justifiable optimization, but by the year 2000 the saving in storage costs were no longer significant. The bugs that resulted of using two digit year format were things such as overflow from year 1999 to 1900 or invalid date formatting of the year 2000 as 19100. The bugs would cause errors in date arithmetics and break the assumption that years were ascending. Some problems were also caused by software that didn't recognize the year 2000 as a leap year (Wired 2000).

From software engineering perspective one of the causes was *short-sighted temporal requirements*. Many of the programmers who wrote the code for the software at the 90s were not thinking that it would

still be running in 21th century, even though they most likely understood that problems would occur. Another perspective is to think the problem as *pre-mature optimization* but in the light of to the significant savings in data storage costs it can be regarded as design choice.

Because the bug was well understood, countries and organizations could preparare for the bug in advance or fix them on failure. The actual damages were minor, but the engineering costs to prepare and fix the bugs were estimated to be around 300 billion USD. Although the cost of fixing the bugs were high it resulted in better and more modern software (Carrington 2000).

Therac-25

Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). It's name also referres to series of radiation therapy incidents that lead to atleast three injurys and three deaths between the years 1985 and 1987 (Rose 1994). In these incidents Therac-25 erroneously administered an overdose of radiation to the patient leading to radiation poisoning. The incidents eventually lead to investigation into Therac-25 and discovery of several flaws in the software design and development processes that were found to be responsible for incidents.

Two problems were discovered in the software design of Therac-25. Both of the problems were a result of race conditions within the operating system. *First problem* occurred when the operator switched between X-ray and electron modes quickly resulting the elec-

tron beam to be set to X-ray mode. This would cause the electron beam dose to be approximately 100 times higher than intended dose. *Second problem* was caused by an one byte sized integer being used as a flag variable. The variable was incremented by one rather than set to a fixed value to indicate truth, therefore an overflow would cause the variable to incorrectly indicate falsity. This also resulted the machine to deliver an overdose of radiation.

Initial investigations blamed the bugs solely on hardware and the problems in software design were not considered at all. It was later identified that the bugs were caused by the software and bad software design practices. For example Therac-25 reused old code from its predecessor Therac-20, which had relied on hardware safety features, but which were removed from Therac-25. Developers should not have assumed that reusing old code was safe without the hardware safety features. Also, Therac-25 should not have relied completely on software for safety since complex software is always bound to have bugs.

Leveson and others (1995) discusses about investigation into the incident in great detail. They list other problems in the software engineering practices and development process such as overconfidence on the software, unrealistic risk assessments, inadequate investigation on accident reports, complacency (safety was assumed since there had not been serious accidents in decades) and lack of government oversight.

Therac-25 incident eventually lead to atleast three deaths and three injuries that are known. Government response was the development of better safety standards for developing medical software (Hall 2010). These standard for example prohibit the use of code that is not properly documented, tested and verified in medical devices which may result in serious injury or death.

Goals for Software engineering Course

- 1) Understanding software engineering principles, processes and tools and being able to apply them in practice.
- 2) Being able to design and build larger software that can be used and understood by other people instead of writing simple code for personal use.
- 3) Being able to function in an organization that utilizes software engineering principles.

All of these goals would help me to become better programmer and provide me the ability to use my skills to deliver value for other people.

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