

Launching Packages 2025

Protecting Software and Hardware Implementations

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1 Résumé du Scientifique

With the advent of quantum computers capable of running Shor's algorithm [5], currently deployed public-key cryptography **will be catastrophically and irreversibly broken**, exposing all past and future encrypted communications. This risk has pushed a global initiative to develop cryptographic systems resistant to quantum attacks, known as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Research in PQC has intensified, particularly following **the launch of the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization project in 2016**. However, participation in this project is global, and most countries follow its standards (including the Europe Union).

The development of cryptographic schemes follows a structured process: (1) It begins with the establishment of computational hardness assumptions through mathematical analysis, providing the theoretical foundation for security. (2) These foundations enable the design of cryptographic primitives that leverage secure trapdoor functions, forming the basis of new encryption and signature schemes. (3) Once the theoretical groundwork is laid, algorithms are formally specified and prototyped, leading to reference implementations. (4) The final stage involves integrating these solutions into real-world applications, ensuring their adoption through production-ready implementations.

While schemes like Kyber and Dilithium (two post-quantum schemes) have reached advanced stages, post-quantum cryptography remains an active research area with *critical challenges*. Following **NIST's 2023 announcement of additional digital signature candidates**, improving efficiency and **hardening implementations against side-channel attacks (SCA)** have become **crucial**. As PQC transitions from theory to practice, its security in real-world deployments depends not only on its mathematical foundations but also on its resilience to physical attacks. Strengthening implementations against SCA is mandatory to prevent adversaries from extracting secret information through power analysis, electromagnetic leakage, or fault injection. This aspect of PQC is essential for secure adoption in applications such as hardware security modules, IoT devices, and vehicular communication—where attackers have physical access and SCA defenses are not optional but necessary.

The goal of this project is to ensure cryptographic security beyond mathematical guarantees by evaluating and strengthening its resistance to physical attacks.

Security Analysis of Post-Quantum Schemes

Cryptosystems face vulnerabilities to SCA, wherein an adversary can deduce confidential information from physical observations—such as timing, electromagnetic emanation, or power consumption—made during the execution of computations using sensitive data [1–3]. These attacks can be classified as passive, where the adversary simply observes leaked information without interfering, or active, where faults are intentionally injected to manipulate computations and extract secrets [4, 6]. Both types pose serious threats and have been successfully employed across various applications, often proving challenging to detect.

Exploring SCA requires specialized equipment and training, as the methodologies and counter-measures are highly dependent on the targeted cryptosystem. While techniques exist to mitigate these attacks, many are intrinsic to specific schemes and lack easy adaptability to others. Consequently, securing each implementation demands a unique approach, necessitating expertise in both cryptographic engineering and side-channel analysis. Unfortunately, the pool of individuals capable of combining these essential skills remains limited to a select group of professionals. Based on my experience in security architecture within the industry, there is a clear shortage of professionals with the necessary expertise in this field. We aim to give a first step to develop the knowledge and foundation for training students in hardware security.

Methodology. The proposed methodology comprises three interdependent phases designed to bridge gaps in hardware security and achieve practical implementation robustness:

1. Enumerate Attack Surfaces and Analyze Vulnerabilities

- Investigate cryptographic targets:
 - USA NIST PQC candidates ([Round 4, Additional Call](#))
 - [Korean PQC](#)
 - [China PQC](#)
- Assess vulnerabilities using Husky and CW-Lite boards;
- Execute attack:
 - *Passive*: Perform time analysis and Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
 - *Active*: Apply clock/voltage glitching

2. Prototype Adaptive Countermeasures

- Develop algorithm-aware protection strategies:
 - Implement masking techniques to obscure sensitive data without efficiency loss
 - Design fault-tolerant operations to resist induced faults
- Deploy countermeasures across platforms:
 - Integrate software protections on embedded systems (Cortex-M4/M3)
 - Implement hardware mitigations in FPGA architectures

3. Validate Implementations and Benchmark Security

- Test software countermeasures on Cortex-M3/M4 processors
- Verify hardware countermeasures using PolarFire and Xilinx FPGAs
- Quantify security improvements:
 - Measure side-channel resistance: Practical approach and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
 - Assess computational overhead: Cycle count analysis vs. baseline specifications

The research **fills a significant gap**, as LIX does not yet have the materials nor the expertise in hardware security. Validation is crucial to ensure that the developed countermeasures are both practical and effective. The project will be strengthened by leveraging my industrial experience and collaborations. A PhD student will be hired to work on the side-channel analysis and cryptographic hardware security framework.

Impacts on École Polytechnique de Paris (EPP). This project introduces a new research topic in hardware security, aligning with the objectives of the cybersecurity program at EPP. The program aims to equip students with expertise in cryptographic security, hardware security, and side-channel analysis. By fostering research and innovation in these critical areas, it contributes to the development of next-generation security professionals capable of addressing emerging threats in cryptography and beyond. Given the strong demand for expertise in this field, this initiative will play a crucial role in knowledge dissemination, training, and academic collaborations. Moreover, the project will be carried out within the new research team Éclair, where early support will help build a base for further developments, including lab projects and contributions to the Cybersecurity Master's program.

Publications and scientific outcome. Targeting top-tier cryptography and security conferences and journals such as [CHES](#), [EUROCRYPT](#), [ASIACRYPT](#), [IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security](#), and the [Journal of Cryptographic Engineering](#).

Scientific Collaborations. Engaging in academic collaborations with international researchers, including [Monika Trimoska](#) (TU/e, Netherlands) and [Fábio Campos](#) (H-BRS, Germany), with other international researchers ([Chris Brzuska](#) (Aalto, Finland) and Łukasz Chmielewski (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)).

Industrial Impact. Leveraging my experience at [Qualcomm](#), this project addresses the shortage of professionals skilled in assessing physical threats to cryptography. Industry demand exists for specialists bridging theoretical security and practical implementation, particularly in embedded systems and hardware-based cryptography. By collaborating with industry partners, we aim to cultivate expertise for real-world security solutions and translate state-of-the-art research into practical countermeasures through training and partnerships.

Funding Prospects. The plan is to set up this project and acquire the necessary materials to consolidate the results and prepare an application for European Research Council (ERC) funding in 2026. The deadline for the Starting Grant is July 2026. I did take into consideration and added at calendar the period for preparing and submitting the grant to ERC.

Budget

Table 1: Budget for hardware equipment.

Hardware	Usage	Qty	Total Price (€)	Link
Husk Board	Side-channel acquisition / fault attack	2	€1,060	Mouser
Server	Run analysis and store the data acquired by the boards.	1	€3,100	
Polarfire FPGA	Development of specific hardware for cryptography	1	€150	Microchip
Arty S7: Spartan-7 FPGA	Development of specific hardware for cryptography	1	€300	Digilent
CW-lite ARM	Small ARM board for side-channel attacks	2	€700	NewAE
Nucleo ARM	Board with Cortex-M3/M4 (NUCLEO-F207ZG/NUCLEO-L4R5ZI)	4	€400	Mouser
PicoScope 3000E	Oscilloscope	1	€4,225	PicoTech
Wires / Cables / Others	Connection with oscilloscope, soldering kit, etc.	1	€700	
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
Table 2: Budget Breakdown

Category	Details	Amount (€)
Personnel	1 PhD	€157K ^a
	2 x 6-month M2 interns	€8,352 ^b
Equipment	Hardware	€10,635
	Laptop for PhD	€3K
Travel	International conference (Overseas)	€3K/year
	International conference (Europe)	€2K/year
	National workshops & seminars	€1K/year
Total		€196,987

^a PhD student starting in 2025 is €157,000, and it will rise to €163,500 for a thesis starting in 2026.

^b According to the École: For trainees, the minimum remuneration is 4.35 euros per hour, with no additional charge.

2 Calendar



CV - Gustavo Banegas

Current position: INRIA ISFP & Chargé d'Enseignement in Computer Science, École polytechnique

[Personal Webpage](#)

gustavo.souza-banegas@polytechnique.edu

Education

PhD in Computer Science and Mathematics (Oct/2015–Nov/2019)

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Eindhoven, Netherlands

Title: Constructive and Destructive Approaches to Post-Quantum Cryptography

Supervisors: Professor Tanja Lange & Professor Daniel J. Bernstein

Master in Computer Science (Sep/2012–Oct/2015)

UFSC - Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil

Title: Irreducible Pentanomials over \mathbb{F}_{2^m} to improve the modular reduction

Supervisors: Professor Ricardo Custódio & Professor Daniel Panário

Bachelor in Computer Science (Sep/2007–Sep/2012)

UFSC - Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil

Supervisor: Professor Ricardo Custódio

Professional Experience

Start	End	Institution	Position and status
01/10/2024	Current	INRIA	ISFP (Cryptography Researcher)
01/06/2022	30/09/2024	Qualcomm (France)	Senior Cryptographer
01/12/2020	30/05/2022	INRIA Saclay (France)	Post Doc
01/11/2019	30/11/2020	Chalmers University of Technology (Sweden)	Post Doc
01/11/2015	12/11/2019	Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (Netherlands)	Ph.D. Candidate
01/09/2018	01/12/2018	CryptoExperts (France)	Internship
01/02/2017	01/05/2017	Riscure (Netherlands)	Internship
01/10/2014	31/10/2015	Bry Tecnologia (Brazil)	Software Engineer

Supervision

Master Thesis

Iggy van Hoof, *Concrete quantum-cryptanalysis of binary elliptic curves*, Eindhoven University of Technology, 2019.

Bachelor Lab Project

Sigurjon Agustsson, *Montgomery Reduction in RSA*, École Polytechnique, 2021.

Bachelor Thesis

David Brandberg, Lisa Fahlbeck, Henrik Hellström, Hampus Karlsson, John Kristoffersson, Lukas Sandman, *End-to-end Encrypted Instant Messaging Application*, Chalmers University of Technology, 2020.

Intern at Qualcomm

Liana Koleva, *Vectorization of HQC on RISC-V architecture*, 2023.

Scientific Responsibilities

Table 3: Conference Involvement

Role	Conferences and Years
Program Committee Member	AsiaCCS: 2025 Communications in Cryptology: 2025 CBCrypto: 2020, 2021 CHES: 2022, 2023, 2024 Eurocrypt: 2022 LatinCrypt: 2023, 2025 Asiacrypt: 2023 ACNS: 2024 PQCrypto: 2025
External Reviewer	CRYPTO: 2022, Asiacrypt: 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, FSE: 2021, LatinCrypt: 2021, SPACE: 2020, PQCrypto: 2018 Design, Codes and Cryptography Springer Nature Quantum Information Processing Springer Nature Scientific Reports IEEE Transactions on Quantum Engineering, IEEE Access, IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers, IEEE Communications Letters, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Springer Algorithmica

Table 4: Workshop Organization

Event	Year
Quantum Research Retreat	2018
Quantum Research Retreat	2016

Selected Publications

For a full list of publications see: [Google Scholar](#), [Personal Website](#) or [DBLP](#).

1. Estuardo Alpirez Bock, Gustavo Banegas, Chris Brzuska, Łukasz Chmielewski, Kirthivaasan Puniamurthy, and Milan Šorf. Breaking DPA-protected Kyber via the pair-pointwise multiplication. *ACNS 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol 14584.
2. Gustavo Banegas, Valerie Gilchrist, Anaëlle Le Dévéhat, and Benjamin Smith. Fast and Frobenius: Rational isogeny evaluation over finite fields. *LATINCRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol 14168.
3. Gustavo Banegas, Juliane Krämer, Tanja Lange, Michael Meyer, Lorenz Panny, Krijn Reijnders, Jana Sotáková, and Monika Trimoska. Disorientation faults in CSIDH. *International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques - EUROCRYPT*. Springer. 2023.
4. Gustavo Banegas, Daniel J. Bernstein, Fabio Campos, Tung Chou, Tanja Lange, Michael Meyer, Benjamin Smith, and Jana Sotáková. CTIDH: Faster constant-time CSIDH. *IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES*, 2021(4):351–387, 2021.
5. Gustavo Banegas, Daniel J. Bernstein, Iggy van Hoof, and Tanja Lange. Concrete quantum cryptanalysis of binary elliptic curves. *IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES*, 2021(1):451–472, 2020.
6. Gustavo Banegas, Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Brice Odilon Boidje, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Gilbert Ndollane Dione, Kris Gaj, Cheikh Thiécoumba Gueye, Richard Haeussler, Jean Belo Klamti, Ousmane Ndiaye, Duc Tri Nguyen, Edoardo Persichetti, and Jefferson Ricardini. DAGS: Key encapsulation using dyadic GS codes. *Journal of Mathematical Cryptology*, 12(4):221–239, 2018.
7. Gustavo Banegas, Ricardo Custódio, and Daniel Panario. A new class of irreducible pentanomials for polynomial-based multipliers in binary fields. *Journal of Cryptographic Engineering*, Online first:1–15,

2018.

8. Gustavo Banegas and Daniel J. Bernstein. Low-communication parallel quantum multi-target preimage search. *SAC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol 10719, pp. 325–335.

In cryptography, it is common to author list in alphabetical order. We usually follow the cultural statement of [American Mathematical Society](#).

Teaching

Chargé d'Enseignement (2025) — Computer Science, École polytechnique, Paris, France
Practical classes in CSC_43042_EP - Algorithmes pour l'analyse de données en Python

Special Class (2021) — Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Online), Florianópolis, Brazil
Taught Quantum Computation, Grover's Algorithm, and Shor's Algorithm.

Special Classes (2020) — Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
Taught various cryptography topics, replacing Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa:

- RSA and Primality Testing
- Attacks on Block Ciphers and Intro to PKC
- Block Ciphers and Operation Modes
- Sigma Protocols

Tutor (2016–2019) — Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, Netherlands

Tutor for courses including:

- Introduction to Cryptology
- Basic Mathematics
- Algebra and Discrete Mathematics

Software

- **WAVE**: github.com/wavesign/wave
- **Wavelet**: github.com/wavelet/
- **CTIDH**: ctidh.isogeny.org/software.html
- **DAGS Key Encapsulation**: github.com/gbanegas/dags_v2
- **HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signatures**: github.com/gbanegas/sphss
- **More Code**: github.com/gbanegas/

References

- [1] David Brumley and Dan Boneh. Remote timing attacks are practical. *Computer Networks*, 48(5):701–716, 2005.
- [2] Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. Differential power analysis. In Michael Wiener, editor, *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99*, pages 388–397, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1999. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- [3] Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, Benjamin Jun, and Pankaj Rohatgi. Introduction to differential power analysis. *J. Cryptogr. Eng.*, 1(1):5–27, 2011.
- [4] Jörn-Marc Schmidt and Christoph Herbst. A practical fault attack on square and multiply. In *2008 5th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography*, pages 53–58, 2008.
- [5] P.W. Shor. Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring. In *Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science*, pages 124–134, 1994.
- [6] Ingrid Verbauwhede, Dusko Karaklajic, and Jörn-Marc Schmidt. The fault attack jungle - a classification model to guide you. In *2011 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography*, pages 3–8, 2011.