

THE MARUBO POLITICAL SYSTEM

AN ABSTRACT

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BY

Javier Ruedas

APPROVED:

William L. Balée, Ph.D.
Chairman

Robert M. Hill II, Ph.D.

Judith M. Maxwell, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

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This dissertation presents the results of research carried out on the political system of the Marubo, an indigenous society of the Javari River basin of northwestern Brazil. The objective was to determine if prevailing views concerning indigenous lowland South American political systems were applicable to the Marubo case. The principal view concerning these systems was that they were universally, even essentially, egalitarian. In this dissertation, that view is referred to as ‘the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism’. Analysis of this hypothesis prior to fieldwork revealed flaws in the evidence and methods that produced it. The goal of this research was to examine the validity of the hypothesis against a specific case society, using different methods from those previously used in lowland political ethnography. To this end, information was gathered that permits an examination of the validity of previous models of lowland South American politics and to check the applicability of major definitions and models of egalitarian politics. The evidence obtained suggests that the Marubo political system alternates between egalitarian and non-egalitarian forms in different contexts. There exist features of Marubo political life that preclude the system from being categorized as ‘egalitarian’. There also exist significant deviations from major models of egalitarian lowland politics. Yet despite these deviations, clearly egalitarian modes of political organization existed in a number of Marubo villages, side-by-side with fundamentally non-egalitarian modes in other villages. Marubo society is one where the political ethos—ideals of political action—permit and even encourage a search for unequal influence and unequal success in accumulation of political resources, and ultimately allow the possibility of power. But it is also one where no one is handed power just for entering a social status; power must be constructed in a process that is long and difficult. There is no guarantee of success and there exists the possibility that at any given moment no one person has succeeded; but the fact that power is possible and desired and the paths to it are known ultimately renders problematic definition of Marubo society as egalitarian.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements _____	ii
Table of Contents _____	iv
List of Tables _____	viii
List of Figures _____	ix
Chapter One: Introduction _____	1
Chapter Two: Ethnographic Background _____	7
Chapter Three: Theory and Method _____	28
A. Theoretical background _____	28
1. Introduction _____	28
2. The hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism: sources _____	31
3. Developments in political anthropology suggesting a need to question the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism _____	42
4. The political economy of people _____	56
5. Validity of the Marubo as a test case for the of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism _____	58
6. Consequences of changes in political classification if indigenous Amazonians _____	67
B. Methods of inquiry _____	69
Chapter Four: Residential basis of political cohesion and conflict _____	86
A. Distribution of Marubo population _____	87
B. Analysis of social composition of 27 Marubo <i>shovo</i> _____	91
1. Aldeia Maronal _____	91
2. Aldeia Vida Nova _____	95
3. Aldeia Praia _____	112
4. Aldeia Alegria _____	114
5. Aldeia Liberdade _____	117
6. <i>Shovo</i> belonging to Paulino _____	119
7. Aldeia Paraná _____	121
8. Aldeia Água Branca _____	127
C. Social basis of Marubo residential group unity _____	130
1. Agnatic pattern of <i>shovo</i> composition _____	131
2. Uxorilocal pattern of <i>shovo</i> composition _____	135
3. Avuncular pattern of <i>shovo</i> composition _____	149
4. Anicular pattern of <i>shovo</i> composition _____	170
D. Implications of <i>shovo</i> composition patterns: distribution of status within <i>shovo</i> _____	176
E. Implications of <i>shovo</i> composition patterns: requirements for leadership _____	179

F. Implications of <i>shovo</i> composition patterns: centripetal and centrifugal forces in Marubo society	181
G. Residence of unwed minors	185
Chapter Five: Leadership of residential movements	201
A. Introduction	201
B. Methods	207
C. Census comparison	207
1. Residential movements prior to 1974	208
2. Residential movements, 1974-1998	213
D. Conclusions	343
Chapter Six: Relationships to non-indigenous people	374
A. Introduction	346
B. Options for interaction with non-indigenous people	376
1. New Tribes Mission	376
2. FUNAI	384
3. FNS	388
4. CIVAJA	389
5. MSF	397
6. <i>Os regatões</i>	399
7. Pension monies	400
8. Atalaia do Norte, Cruzeiro do Sul	401
C. Interactions with non-indigenous people: decision-making, conflict resolution, and access to desirable goals	402
1. CIVAJA	402
2. Aldeia Maronal: core <i>shovo</i>	412
3. Aldeia Maronal—periphery	506
4. Relationships to non-indigenous people at aldeia Maronal: implications concerning the political system	544
D. Presence and extent of power in Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people	558
1. Introduction	558
2. The <i>chefe de posto</i> issue	559
3. Resolution of conflicts of will on the Ituí River	573
Chapter Seven: Analysis of fields of choice	581
A. Participation in healing rituals	586
B. Feasting	613
C. Organization of labor	637
D. Political meetings	660
Chapter Eight: Reciprocity in the Marubo kinship system	688
A. Introduction	688
B. Derivation of relevant hypotheses from Lévi-Strauss' <u>The Elementary Structures of Kinship</u>	689
C. Characteristics of Marubo social organization that render Lévi-Strauss' ideas relevant to it	696
1. Characteristics of Marubo kinship system relevant to Lévi-Strauss' theory	698

2. Historical context of Marubo social organization	702
3. Conclusions	746
D. Operationalization and testing of hypotheses	748
E. Applicability of kinship data to political phenomena	754
F. Conclusions	761
Chapter Nine: The political economy of people	764
A. Introduction	764
B. Existence of a Marubo political economy of people	767
1. Premises	767
2. Applicability of premises to Marubo leaders	768
3. Applicability of premises to non-leaders	787
4. Existence of a Marubo political economy of people: conclusions	847
C. The means of production of the social network	851
D. Conclusions	911
Chapter Ten: The role of Marubo leader	920
A. Introduction	920
B. Force in Marubo society	923
C. Conflict resolution	937
D. Oratory	946
E. Generosity	954
F. <i>Shovo ivo</i> and <i>Kakaya</i>	960
Chapter Eleven: Conclusions	972
A. Summary of findings	974
Chapter four	974
Chapter five	982
Chapter six	989
Chapter seven	1001
Chapter eight	1004
Chapter nine	1008
Chapter ten	1023
B. Significance of findings	1030
Applicability of the concept of egalitarianism to Marubo society	1030
Variability in multiple contexts of Marubo politics	1048
Possible directions for future research	1056
Effect of method on results in political ethnography	1059
Political motives in relationships with non-indigenous people	1061
Concluding thoughts: Rousseau or Hobbes?	1063
Bibliography	1071

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	Indigenous populations in the Javari basin _____	14
2.2	Marubo lineages _____	23
4.1	Population of Marubo settlements _____	90
4.2	Social composition, Aldeia Maronal _____	92
4.3	Social composition of Tamãpa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	96
4.4	Social composition of Txumãpa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	97
4.5	Social composition of Mashkãpa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	99
4.6	Social composition of Kamãpa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	102
4.7	Social composition of Pekõpapa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	106
4.8	Social composition of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	111
4.9	Social composition, Aldeia Praia _____	113
4.10	Social composition of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Alegria _____	115
4.11	Social composition of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Liberdade _____	118
4.12	Social composition of Paulino's <i>shovo</i> _____	120
4.13	Social composition of Sherõpapa's <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Paraná _____	123
4.14	Social composition of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Água Branca _____	128
4.15	Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Maronal _____	187
4.16	Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Vida Nova _____	198
7.1	Attendance at <i>shôkiya</i> for Firmino _____	597
7.2	Distribution of able-bodied men at Aldeia Maronal _____	641
7.3	Contributions of labor for José's <i>akoya</i> _____	650
8.1	Marriages of Domingo and João Tuxáua _____	734
8.2	Number of members of each Marubo exogamous unit, 1974-75 and 1997-98 _____	749
8.3	Percentages of total Marubo population represented by each clan _____	750
8.4	Populations of Marubo <i>shovo</i> , 1974-75 and 1997-98 _____	756
9.1	Marubo postmarital residence patterns _____	805
9.2	Unmarried mothers _____	863
9.3	Women above and below the age of fourteen _____	866
9.4	Relative demographic growth correlated with polygyny _____	889
9.5	Number of children of polygamous and monogamous men on the Curuçá River, 1974-1998 _____	892
9.6	Effects of control over postmarital residence on development of demographic inequalities among upper Ituí Marubo groups _____	896

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	Extent of the Panoan language family	9
2.2	Indigenous groups of the Javari basin	10
4.1	Composition of Paulino's <i>shovo</i> , late 1974	152
4.2	<i>Shovo</i> of Paulino, 12/97-4/98	154
4.3	Genealogical relationships between the Varináwavo brothers and the Tamaoavo brothers	159
4.4	Hypothetical projection of what the Varináwavo-Tamaoavo <i>shovo</i> would look like if it had not broken up	164
4.5	Genealogical relations among adult males at Sinápa's <i>shovo</i> prior to the schism of 1997	165
5.1	Location of Marubo local groups, 1974-1975	215
5.2	Location of Marubo groups in 1998	216
5.3	Layout of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá, January 1998	217
5.4	Schematic layout of <i>shovo</i> on the upper Ituí River, January 1998	218
5.5	Schematic layout of <i>shovo</i> at Aldeia São Sebastião, middle Curuçá River, March 1998	219
5.6	Composition of <i>shovo</i> belonging to Aurélio, 1974	222
5.7	Composition and breakup of Domingo's <i>shovo</i> , 1974-1975	232
5.8	Layout of Sinápa's <i>shovo</i>	238
5.9	Arrangement of nuclear and uterine families in Sinápa's <i>shovo</i> , January-July 1998	240
5.10	Composition of João Tuxáua's <i>shovo</i> , 1974	255
5.11	Composition of Joãozinho's <i>shovo</i> , 1974	256
5.12	Composition of Miguel's <i>shovo</i> , 1974	257
5.13	Composition of Carlos' <i>shovo</i> , 1974-1975	282
5.14	<i>Shovo</i> of Wanópa, October 1997	283
5.15	<i>Shovo</i> of Mashépa, October 1997	284
5.16	<i>Shovo</i> belonging to Nakwa, January 1998	285
5.17	<i>Shovo</i> belonging to Pekópa, December 1997	286
5.18	Some genealogical relationships at Aldeia São Salvador, 1975-1978	301
5.19	Paulo's <i>shovo</i> in 1974	308
5.20	Fissions in Paulo's <i>shovo</i> by 1978	309
5.21	Composition of Arnaldo's settlement, 1974	310
5.22	Movement of Arnaldo, his wife, and his brother by 1978	311
5.23	Fission in Mariano's <i>shovo</i> by 1978	312
5.24	<i>Shovo</i> of Paulo at Rio Novo, 1997	315
5.25	<i>Shovo</i> of Mario (Kanípa) at Rio Novo, 1997	316
5.26	<i>Shovo</i> of Saípapa (João Marques) at Rio Novo, 1997	317
5.27	<i>Shovo</i> of José Nascimento velho at Vida Nova, 1974	326

5.28	<i>Shovo</i> of Reissamon, 1974	327
5.29	<i>Shovo</i> of Mariano, upper Ituí, 1974	333
5.30	Destinations of residents of Mariano's <i>shovo</i> , 1974-1998	334
5.31	Aldeia Paraná, <i>shovo</i> of Sherôpapa, January 1998	335
5.32	<i>Shovo</i> of Américo, upper Ituí, 1974	338
5.33	Destinations of residents of Américo's <i>shovo</i> , 1974-1998	339
5.34	Vimipa's <i>shovo</i> at Água Branca, 1998	340
5.35	<i>Shovo</i> of Alberto (Akôpa) at Água Branca, 1998	341
7.1	Distribution of <i>kexitxo</i> at Aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá, 1997-98	588
7.2	Layout of <i>tapos</i> around the core <i>shovo</i> , Aldeia Maronal, 1997-98	663
7.3	Txanõpa's <i>tapo</i> at Aldeia Maronal	664
8.1	Movements of Panoan groups during the rubber boom according to Marubo oral history	712
8.2	Geographic expansion of Marubo, 1965-Present	714
8.3	Variant clan-appellation alternation schemes in the class that includes Wanívó	718
8.4	Kariera-type kinship in the <i>shovo</i> of Wanõpa	743
8.5	Kariera-type kinship, Aldeia Vida Nova	745
9.1	Genealogical and affinal relations of individuals involved in Mema's flight	772
9.2	Marriage exchanges between the <i>shovo</i> of Wanõpa and of Txumãpa	825

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

From July 1997 to July 1998 I carried out fieldwork among the Marubo, a group of some 875 indigenous people in the Javari River basin of Northwestern Brazil, with the objective of obtaining knowledge about and understanding their political system. Prior to fieldwork I had found what I believed to be serious flaws with the consensus view of indigenous lowland South American politics, which was that these societies were universally, even essentially, egalitarian. This view I call ‘the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism’, with the understanding that ‘Amazonian’ here is a synecdoche for ‘indigenous lowland South American’. I wanted to test the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism against a specific case society, investigated with greater intensity than and with new and different methods from what previous researchers had used. To this end, I gathered information that would permit me to examine the validity of the previous models of lowland politics that had led to the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, and would also permit me to check the applicability of major definitions and models of egalitarian politics.

I found that the Marubo have a political system that alternates between egalitarian and non-egalitarian forms in different contexts. There exist features of Marubo political life that preclude the system’s being categorized as ‘egalitarian’. There also exist significant deviations from major models of egalitarian lowland politics. Yet despite these deviations, clearly egalitarian modes of political organization existed in a number of

Marubo villages, side-by-side with clearly non-egalitarian modes in other villages.

Marubo society is one where the political ethos—ideals of political action—permit and even encourage a search for unequal influence and unequal success in accumulation of political resources, and ultimately allow the possibility of power. But it is also one where no one is handed power just for entering a social status; power must be constructed in a process that is long and difficult. There is no guarantee of success and there exists the possibility that at any given moment no one person has succeeded, but the fact that power is possible and desired and the paths to it are known ultimately renders impossible any definition of Marubo society as egalitarian.

This dissertation begins with three introductory chapters. Chapter One is this introduction. Here I explain the problem this dissertation is addressing and describe the structure of the dissertation. Chapter Two presents essential ethnographic background information on the Marubo. Chapter Three presents the theory behind this dissertation—both the theories that led to the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism and those which led me to question that hypothesis—and the methods used to investigate those theories. The data are presented in Chapters Four through Ten, with the conclusions presented in Chapter Eleven.

The presentation of data begins with a detailed analysis of residential patterns. To establish a basis for understanding residential changes, I determine first what social relationships form coresident groups. This is done by means of an analysis of social composition of Marubo residences, presented in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five I proceed to analyze how residential arrangements change through time and why. I describe how Marubo settlements have shifted socially and spatially over time and present information

on the emic reasoning behind these changes. In Chapter Five, the role of leaders in residential changes receives particular emphasis. Previous models of lowland South American leadership made extensive mention of leaders' roles in directing group movements, and the applicability of these models in the Marubo case is discussed in Chapter Five. I examine the direction of leadership in group movements to determine the levels of power and, conversely, autonomy discernible in group decisions concerning residential changes. Equally significant in this chapter is establishing the processes whereby Marubo villages are formed. I identify several recurrent patterns of village formation. I also establish correlations between different types of village formation processes on the one hand, and different types of leaders on the other hand. I establish a typology of leaders based on their varying roles in village formation.

In Chapter Six, I present observations of sequences of events related to decisions on relationships to non-indigenous people. I focus mainly on one Marubo village, Aldeia Maronal, but present some evidence from other villages as a check on the typicality of the data from Aldeia Maronal. It is in this field of social relationships that I found the best evidence for interpersonal power in the form of certain individuals who repeatedly win conflicts of will, especially conflicts regarding the establishment of policies which others must follow once established. The information on distribution of power in the field of relationships to non-indigenous people is correlated with the data from Chapter Five to establish links between types of leaders on the one hand and levels of power on the other. I suggest that certain types of village formation process afford leaders greater opportunity to have power than do others. By understanding how a particular role in village

formation can be more conducive to the exercise of interpersonal power than another, it is possible to discern what the path to power is in Marubo society.

The data in Chapters Five and Six result from use of methods of inquiry aimed at observing interpersonal power if it exists (with Chapter Four forming an essential preliminary basis for Chapter Five). In Chapter Seven, I finish presenting the results derived from methods of seeking power. I present observations on four fields of social action: healing rituals, feasting, organization of labor, and political meetings. In many ways, analysis of these fields of action produced data that was different from what I was looking for, yet quite crucial for understanding Marubo political processes, the applicability of the concept of egalitarianism to understanding these processes, and the validity of previous models of lowland South American politics. The analysis of feasting is particularly important in that it suggests that there are links between certain types of feast and certain political statuses, and this signifies that access to labor is a prerequisite for access to certain statuses. This gains significance when processes for constructing social networks are described in Chapter Nine.

In Chapter Eight I investigate the possibility that reciprocity is embedded in Marubo social structure. The idea that some social structures are reflections of the principle of reciprocity is an important support for the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. In Chapter Eight I carry out an analysis of the Marubo kinship system in its historical context in order to determine whether it fits the predictions of the model of reciprocity. As a necessary basis for this analysis, Marubo oral histories going back to the rubber boom are presented together with information on changes through time in Marubo kinship and population. The analysis shows that the kinship system conforms to

the predictions of the model of reciprocity but the political system does not. This means that the fact that a particular people's kinship system follows the principle of reciprocity does not necessarily mean that every aspect of their society does so. It is possible for a kinship system to reflect reciprocity while the associated political system does not. Reciprocity in the kinship sphere does not mean the society as a whole forbids the existence of unequal accumulations of key resources.

In Chapter Nine I analyze demographic processes in order to understand why certain villages prospered demographically over the period of 1974 to 1998 while others declined. I show how these processes are related to active efforts by leaders to make their groups larger, and how these processes form part of a system of competition for limited human resources wherein individuals attempt to construct and expand social networks. I examine the various strategies available for construction of social networks and how different leaders' varying levels of success in these strategies explain the differences in demographic success among villages. The fact that in Marubo society, human resources are limited means that there is a limit to how many people can have political success. In many cases, competition among leaders for human resources is a zero-sum game where one person's gain is another's loss. This is seen especially in postmarital residence. Postmarital residence, polygyny, and access to valued relationships with non-indigenous people are analyzed as means of production of social networks. I analyze the distribution of these means of production and show that they are unequally distributed and that this inequality of distribution explains why certain leaders are more successful than others. I also show that these inequalities are occasionally (but not necessarily) linked to the exercise of power.

In Chapter Ten I present such characteristics of the behavior of leaders as are necessary to resolving the problem posed by this dissertation but are not described elsewhere in the dissertation. I use these data to establish the extent to which Marubo leaders fit the models of lowland leadership that underly the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism.

The conclusions are presented in Chapter Eleven. Here I present my interpretations of the data from Chapters Four through Ten. I explain why the Marubo system cannot be considered egalitarian, and what it is like instead. I make some comments on the significance of my findings and on the prospects for future research. This chapter also includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of those findings which may be useful to the reader in navigating this somewhat extensive dissertation.

CHAPTER TWO

ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to present essential background information on the Marubo. This information will be assumed in the remainder of the dissertation. Only such information as is necessary to understanding this dissertation will be presented here. For readers interested in further information, other references will be listed.


The Marubo were in 1997 a group of approximately 875 indigenous people inhabiting the Curuçá and Ituí Rivers in the Javari basin of Northwestern Brazil and, to a lesser extent, the towns of Atalaia do Norte on the Javari River and of Cruzeiro do Sul on the Juruá River in the state of Acre. The Marubo must be understood in terms of several ethnolinguistic, historical, and geographic contexts. Firstly, they are members of the Panoan language family, and have many cultural and historical connections to other members of that family. Secondly, they must be understood as forming part of the multiethnic interaction system of the Javari River basin. There are at least ten different indigenous groups in the area, only six of which are of the Panoan family. There are also members of the Katukinan and Arawan families, some isolated groups of unknown linguistic affiliation, and a variety of non-indigenous peoples of diverse origins. Thirdly they should be understood as part of the upper or Western Amazon area, where indigenous societies of the lowlands were aware of and had direct or indirect relations with the Andean cultures. Marubo historical and cultural affiliations are directed

westward where distant relatives such as the Panoan Shipibo live on the Ucayali river. In this way they were involved in a larger interaction sphere involving mainly Panoan and Arawakan groups in relation to the highland cultures. Finally, the Marubo are an Amazonian culture and share many adaptations, such as swidden horticulture, with other Amazonian groups.

The Marubo acknowledge linguistic, cultural, and historic connections with a number of other Panoan groups. The Shipibo are the largest Panoan group and the only one living on a major river, the Ucayali. Their population has been recently estimated at 35000 (International BioPark Foundation 2001). Their position in between the highlands and the interior Panoans along with their size and military prowess made them key elements of the regional interaction sphere historically connecting Andean and Western Amazonian societies (see Regan 1986, Heras 1992). The Marubo also recognize close historical and cultural ties with the Katukina and, to a lesser extent, the Kaxinawa, both in the state of Acre. The Katukina are a Panoan-speaking group. This is not to be confused with the Katukinan language family, which does not include the Katukina. The Katukina are often referred to as Katukina-Pano in order to avoid this confusion. The extent of the Panoan language family is shown in Figure 2.1. Basic ethnological work on the Panoan family has been done by Eugene Loos (1970, 1973), Kenneth Kensinger (1981, 1986) and Philippe Erikson (1992, 1993).

The Marubo are strongly affected by their geographical position in the Javari basin. The Javari basin is marked by the presence of areas that are very remote from non-indigenous settlements. Some of these are only remote, others are remote and


FIGURE 2.1: Extent of Panoan language family (following Erikson (1993)).



Relevant groups:

1. Marubo
2. Shipibo
3. Kaxinawa
4. Katukina

FIGURE 2.2: Indigenous groups of the Javari basin.
 (Follows Melatti (1981) and Coutinho (1998)).



Groups with regularized contact situation

KAN—Kanamari
 MAR—Marubo
 MAT—Matís
 MYR—Mayoruna

Isolated Groups

IAJ—Isolados do alto Jutaí
 IJB—Isolados do Jandiatuba
 KOR—Korubo
 MAY—Maya
 TDJ—Tsohom Djapa

inaccessible. In addition, the Javari is marked by considerable ethnic diversity. The indigenous groups of the Javari basin are shown in Figure 2.2.

The Javari basin has been affected multiple waves of contact with non-indigenous people which have generally had disruptive effects on the stability of indigenous societies. Although the various contact fronts have had great impact on the Javari peoples, the remoteness and inaccessibility of much of the basin has meant that there were few physical intrusions into the area and there were always places to hide from contact when the violence and disease proved too threatening. The basic outlines of Javari basin history have been presented in Montagner and Melatti (1975), Melatti (1981) and Coutinho (1993, 1998).

Melatti (1981) divides Javari basin ethnohistory into five phases. The first is the phase of Jesuit presence, 1638-1769. The initial Jesuit presence came from the Spanish side. Jesuits established the Mainas mission in Borja (in modern Peru) in 1638. From their original base among the Mainas (probably a Jívaroan group—see Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor 1988) they proceeded to establish missions throughout the area—first among Cahuapanan groups (Jeberos, Chayahuita, Paranapura, Munichi), then the more warlike Tupian groups (Cocamilla, Cocama), then among the Panoan Mayoruna by 1654. Shortly thereafter Franciscans contacted the Shipibo (1657) and established a mission which lasted from 1660 to 1670, during which time eleven Franciscans were killed by Shipibo. The Shipibo remained hostile to missionaries until the late 18th century. Portuguese Jesuits began penetrating the upper Amazon in the late 17th century and established a mission on the Javari River by 1752. No missions were established in the interior of the Javari basin by any of these missionaries. However, the missions had a

great impact on the regional interaction system. Missions were points of access to metal goods of all sorts, and some missionized groups became also military allies of the Spanish. The balance of power and the system of access to metal was profoundly altered. The Javari basin peoples, through their historic-ethnic connections to the Ucayali, were probably affected, and would have been peripheral peoples in the system, denied easy access to these new sources of technological and military power. The Jesuits were expelled from the Spanish colonies in 1769.

The second phase of Javari basin ethnohistory is the commercial fishing-collecting period, 1769-1870. During this time, the Javari basin was penetrated only sporadically, the main goals of non-indigenous people being the collection of sarsaparilla, cacao and Brazil-nuts. The Javari earned a reputation as an unhealthy area because of attacks by indigenous people and frequency of diseases.

The third phase of Javari basin ethnohistory is the rubber boom, 1870-1911. This was the first and only time the basin was intensely penetrated by non-indigenous people, with devastating consequences to the indigenous populations. Details of the Marubo experience of the rubber boom are presented in Chapter Eight. The Javari, Curuçá, and Ituí Rivers were all settled and exploited by rubber tappers who repressed indigenous resistance violently. Indigenous populations throughout the area were decimated and remnants had to flee into the spaces between the major rivers, where several groups remain in isolation to this day. This period of great chaos for the indigenous people of the Javari ended when the British harvests of rubber in Malaysia ended the high demand for Amazonian rubber.

The fourth phase of Javari ethnohistory is the decadence of the rubber trade, 1911-1945. During this period, some lingering exploitation of rubber occurred, but there was a steady withdrawal of the non-indigenous presence. The indigenous populations remained in hiding in remote places, and this period of peace afforded some opportunity to begin a demographic rebound.

The last phase of Javari ethnohistory, according to Melatti, is the logging phase (1945 to 1981, when Melatti's account was written). This was a period of increasing contact between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Several Javari groups established permanent peaceful relations with non-indigenous people while others remained isolated in the forest. The sequences of contact have had a significant impact on the evolving system of interethnic relations in the Javari basin.

A final phase should be considered to commence in 1991, the period of indigenous political organization. In 1991 the first encounter of the Javari basin's contacted indigenous people occurred, leading eventually to the establishment of a multiethnic political organization, CIVAJA, in 1992, and ultimately to the official establishment of a Javari Basin Indigenous Area in 1998. Commercial logging in indigenous areas, at least in the central areas of the basin, has come to a standstill as a result of these developments.

The Marubo have emerged from this historical context as the politically dominant indigenous society of the basin. This is partly due to their demographic predominance—they have the largest population of any indigenous group in the basin—and partly due to their precocity in establishing peaceful relations with the non-indigenous people and in propelling indigenous political organization. Some Marubo began emerging from their

TABLE 2.1: Indigenous populations in the Javari basin (from Coutinho 1998).
All figures as of 1995-96.

Jandiatuba Indians	300
Kanamari	576
Korubo	250
Kulina-Arawá	72
Kulina-Pano	49
Marubo	818
Matís	176
Maya	150
Mayoruna	651
Tsohom Djapa	100
Upper Jutaí Indians	150
Total	3292

post-rubber boom isolation to establish simple commercial relationships with rubber tappers and merchants by the late 1940s or early 1950s. By the 1980s they had extensive rights in the Javari basin and have dominated the political organization, CIVAJA (see Chapter Six), since its inception, both due to demographic predominance and more extensive experience with the non-indigenous world.

The other members of CIVAJA are the Kanamari, Mayoruna, and Matís. Of these, the Kanamari have the longest history of peaceful contact with non-indigenous people. The Kanamari have worked with commercial loggers and rubber tappers since the 1950s (Coutinho 1998). They currently inhabit two main areas. There are population nuclei on the Itaquaí and Jutai Rivers, where a more traditional indigenous lifestyle exists; a second set of nuclei is on the Javari River itself, where many of the younger Kanamari are becoming monolingual in Portuguese. The Kanamari language is in the Katukinan language family, not to be confused with the Katukina ethnic group, which has a Panoan language.

The Mayoruna are traditional enemies of the Marubo. Mayoruna is a term that has been applied to a number of Panoan groups since the 17th century. The group that is currently called Mayoruna in the Javari basin does not have any demonstrable connection to the group called Mayoruna during the mission period, except that both are Panoan (Coutinho 1993). The Javari Mayoruna call themselves Matses and this is the term used in much of the literature (e.g., Romanoff 1984). However, in the Javari basin the Matís and Korubo also call themselves Matses, so use of this term can be misleading. Furthermore, the Javari Mayoruna are known as Mayoruna to the other groups of the Javari, are referred to as such at multiethnic indigenous meetings, and accept and

recognize that usage even if it is exogenous. Therefore, Mayoruna is a useful term for this group in the specific context of the Javari basin.

After the rubber boom, the Marubo retreated to the headwaters of affluents of the east side of the Curuçá River, while some Mayoruna settled in the area of the Pardo River, an affluent on the west side of the Curuçá. In the 1960s, there was a clash between the two which resulted in deaths on both sides and the kidnapping of some Marubo women, one of which returned to the Marubo after many years. The clash with the Marubo forced the Mayoruna to retreat back to the Javari and its affluents, leaving the Curuçá to the Marubo. The Mayoruna had conflictive relations with non-indigenous people beginning in the 1950s due to encroachment by loggers (Coutinho 1998). They became the subject of violent reprisals on the part of non-indigenous posses, due to which they had to cease violence by 1969 and accept peaceful relations with the Brazilian government by 1972. The Mayoruna were the first other ethnic group contacted by CIVAJA founders when they sought to establish a multiethnic organization, and they play an important role, second only to the Marubo, in the region's indigenous politics.

The fourth member ethnic group in the Javari indigenous council (CIVAJA) are the Matís. The Matís are also a Panoan group, and the smallest group in CIVAJA in terms of population. They lived in isolation in the area between the Ituí River and the Branco, an affluent of the Itaquaí, until they were first contacted by Brazilian government agents in 1975. They continued to inhabit the interior while regularly visiting the government posts until 1982, when they moved to the Ituí River.

There is a small number of indigenous people called Kulina scattered throughout the Javari. These are of two distinct ethnic heritages. Some are Kulina-Pano, speakers of

a Panoan language who have inhabited the Javari basin for some time. They were decimated by the rubber boom, then further decimated by Mayoruna attacks until their population fell beneath the point where it could maintain social coherence. Some moved to a Marubo village where they have become submerged into the Marubo population, others dispersed to various villages along the Javari where they merged with local populations. A small concentration settled in a village called Campinas on the Javari but they have intermarried with non-indigenous people and do not speak Kulina. The Kulina have disappeared as a society and remain only as scattered pockets of individuals, mostly married to members of other ethnic groups.

The term Kulina is also applied to speakers of an Arawan language who live mainly on the Itaquai and Jutaí Rivers. The Kulina-Arawá are mainly located on the middle Jutaí and only a few of them live within the confines of the Javari basin. They are mentioned here mainly to avoid confusion with the Kulina-Pano.

There are more uncontacted groups than contacted ones in the Javari area. The most famous of these are the Korubo, who have been in a state of war with non-indigenous people since at least 1965 and have killed numerous government agents attempting to contact them. It is hard to consider them uncontacted at this stage, since they actually interact quite frequently with non-indigenous people, but there are no regular peaceful contacts. There is a far more mysterious group in the headwaters of the Quixito River known as the Maya that lives in isolation and avoids contact between non-Indians and its main population. The Maya are probably Panoan. In addition, there are a number of uncontacted groups speaking various Katukinan languages—related to Kanamari—in the headwaters areas of the Jandiatuba, Curuena, and Jutaí Rivers.

The Marubo geographic location places them in a position to relate to two separate foci of non-indigenous settlement. By descending the Curuçá and Ituí Rivers to the Javari, the Marubo can reach Atalaia do Norte, the seat of government for the municipality which Marubo land is in. Following the Javari until it enters the Amazon, one reaches the larger town of Tabatinga. Next to Tabatinga is the even larger Colombian town of Leticia, a tourist center with nice hotels and an ATM machine. Marubo often seek education in Atalaia and Tabatinga, and also bring agricultural products to market. The Marubo political activities are largely directed from Atalaia, since Marubo land is in the state of Amazonas and the seat of power for that state is Manaus, downriver from Tabatinga. In the opposite direction from Marubo land is Cruzeiro do Sul, the second largest city in the state of Acre. To get to Cruzeiro do Sul, Marubo must walk overland, an arduous journey but one which is regularly undertaken. Relations with Cruzeiro do Sul were far more intense in the past, when rubber tapping was more frequent. For details of Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people, the reader is referred to Chapter Six.

Initial anthropological research among the Marubo was conducted by Julio Cezar Melatti and Delvair Montagner. Their research resulted in a number of publications: Melatti (1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1992); Montagner (1977, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991); Montagner and Melatti (1975, 1979, 1986). Thanks to this previous research, many of the basic elements of Marubo social structure and lifeways were known prior to my fieldwork.

The Marubo social structure was described by Melatti (1977, 1983) and settlement patterns were described by Melatti (1977) and Montagner and Melatti (1986).

The basic Marubo residential unit is the large communal longhouse called *shovo*. The Portuguese equivalent for *shovo* is ‘maloca’, but I will use the indigenous term throughout this dissertation. The term may be singular, as in ‘the *shovo*’, or plural, as in ‘there were five *shovo* in the village’. *Shovo* range from 9 to 31 meters in length and 7 to 17 meters in width (Montagner and Melatti 1986). They can be inhabited by a single nuclear family but more often there is an extended family. The social composition of *shovo* is analyzed in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

Marubo *shovo* are almost always located in the center of a cleared dirt plaza called *ikote*. The *ikote* is tended regularly to keep it clean and clear of weeds. Almost every *shovo* has a series of smaller huts surrounding it on the edge of the *ikote* (see Figure 8.2). These smaller huts are called *tapo* in Marubo, tapiri or jirau in Portuguese. In contrast to the *shovo*, which is a communal space, the *tapo* are built and used by individuals, who often keep them locked.

Marubo subsistence is typically Amazonian. Agriculture is done in swiddens by the slash-and-burn method. Marubo *shovo* often have a small swidden surrounding the *tapo*, beyond the edge of the *ikote*, but the main swiddens are located in the forest, as close as possible but still often twenty minutes or more on foot. Making the swidden and planting it are male tasks while harvesting and processing are female tasks. The main staples are plantains and bananas; sweet manioc has nearly equal importance. Virtually every meal includes boiled plantains and a cooked banana porridge called *manimotsá* (interestingly, the Marubo term for electric blender is *manimotsáti*, banana porridge-device). Corn is also a major crop but is harvested all at once rather than as needed (the latter being the case for staples). Sugarcane is also prominent in swiddens. It is mainly

just chewed, but occasionally syrup and sugar are made. Other Marubo food crops of lesser significance include various forms of sweet potato, yam, and taro, papaya and pineapple. Peach palms are cultivated and their harvest occasions a series of invitations to eat among multiple *shovo*. Hot pepper bushes are grown on the edges of the *ikote*. before any given meal, it is common to crush some peppers in water and salt to make a dipping sauce.

Marubo use of domesticated animals was recent and did not appear to contribute significantly to diets. Many Marubo kept chickens, but these were not used as a regular part of the diet. Instead, they were consumed in emergencies when other meat was not available. Chicken eggs were not gathered on any regular basis, either. Some Marubo also kept pigs, which were killed and eaten as often as the maintenance of the herd permitted. Alfredo also had some sheep he had been given by the missionaries.

As their source of protein, the Marubo emphasized hunting meat rather than domesticated animals or fishing. Game available in the area included white-lipped and collared peccary, deer, tapir, several kinds of monkey (mainly black spider monkey), game birds (called ‘jacu’ and ‘mutum’ in Portuguese), paca, armadillo, and land turtle. The main weapon used was the shotgun. When ammunition was not available, some people used dogs and machete, traps, or bow and arrow.

Fishing was de-emphasized compared to hunting as a source of protein. Nevertheless the Marubo knew a variety of techniques for fishing. These included hook and line, various forms of nets, and the use of poison. The fish-poison plant, uaca in Portuguese, was cultivated near the *shovo*. The usual mode of usage was to find a pool in a small river that had a natural dam and to release large quantities of it into the pool,

spear or netting the fish that come up. This technique can produce an abundance of fish for a day's work. Another technique involves taking smaller amounts of poison and passing it through a certain grub's body, creating poisoned bait. Fish that nibble on this bait come up to the surface and can be speared.

A considerable amount was known about Marubo kinship, social structure and social organization prior to my fieldwork thanks to the research of Melatti and Montagner. This information is found in Montagner and Melatti (1975) and in Melatti (1977, 1983). I will summarize that main points that are essential to understanding the rest of the dissertation.

Every *shovo* has an individual who occupies a position called *shovo ivo*, which is translated in Portuguese as 'dono de maloca', or *shovo*-owner. This is generally the person who organized the labor to build the *shovo*, though occasionally it is someone who has inherited leadership of the *shovo*. The role of *shovo ivo* is further discussed in Chapter Ten.

Some *shovo* are isolated from the rest, but most contemporary Marubo *shovo* are found in clusters. Clusters of *shovo* were called by Melatti (1977) 'grupos locais', local groups. By the time of my fieldwork, they were commonly known in the area as 'aldeias', which I translate as village.

The highest political status in Marubo society is called *kakaya*. A *kakaya* is often, but not necessarily, the headman of a village with multiple *shovo*. The role of *kakaya* received some attention from Melatti (1977, 1983). Considerably more detail on this topic will be added in the body of this dissertation.

The other significant linguistically encoded non-kinship roles are religious and medical in orientation. The *romeaya* is a shaman who enters into possession trances during which a healing spirit occupies his body. The *kexitxo* are individuals who cure by singing. These roles are discussed in Chapter Seven of this dissertation as regards their political aspects. For details on their ritual and healing practices the reader should consult Montagner (1985).

The Marubo kinship system was first elucidated by Melatti (1977). I found his description highly accurate. The Marubo kinship system is a variant on the Kariera type (Radcliffe-Brown 1930). There are nine exogamous lineages but each is divided in two according to the principle of alternating generations. Descent is reckoned matrilineally. The largest lineage is the Shanenáwavo/Iskonáwavo lineage. If I am a Shanenáwavo woman, my children will be Iskonáwavo, my daughter's children will be Shanenáwavo again, and my daughter's daughter's children will be Iskonáwavo again. The lineages are listed in Table 2.2. It is notable that some group names are repeated in multiple exogamous lineages, specifically 'Nináwavo', 'Inonáwavo' and 'Iskonáwavo'. Despite this, each group recognizes its distinctiveness from its eponyms by referring to the other half of its lineage.

The Marubo have both proscriptions and prescriptions for marriage, but the former are stricter than the latter. The proscription is the incest taboo, which applies to both parts of one's own exogamous lineage. Occasionally the taboo is extended to another lineage as well. For example, the Tamaoavo/Varináwavo lineage and the Txonavo/Iskonáwavo lineages do not intermarry. The prescriptions are interlineage preferences. Most lineages have one other lineage they prefer to marry into. The ideal is

TABLE 2.2: Marubo lineages.

Shanenáwavo	_____	Iskonáwavo
Satanáwavo	_____	Rovonáwavo
Wanīvo	_____	Kamānáwavo
Varináwavo	_____	Tamaoavo
Shawāvo	_____	Iskonáwavo
Ranenáwavo	_____	Nináwavo
Txonavo	_____	Iskonáwavo
Nináwavo	_____	Inonáwavo
Inonáwavo	_____	Kananáwavo

for two lineages to intermarry repeatedly and exclusively over multiple generations.

When this occurs, structures almost exactly analogous to the Kariera type occur.

However, because the prescriptions are weaker than the proscriptions, individuals often marry into different lineages than their maternal grandparents did, so in practice the system deviates from the Kariera type. Further details on this topic are presented in Chapter Eight of this dissertation.

The Marubo kinship terminology is closely related to their lineage and marriage system. Genealogical relationship is not a good predictor of what kin terms will be used between any two individuals. Relative descent group membership typically determines kin-term usage. The main exceptions to this are cases where a man marries multiple women of different descent groups. The man's children are in different descent groups but still often refer to one another as 'brother' and 'sister'.

Anyone in one's own descent group is called *otxi* (brother) if male or *txitxo* (sister) if female. Here I use the word descent group to refer to half of an exogamous lineage, assuming group membership is being received from one's mother's mother, which is how the Marubo explain the rule without referring to the notion of alternation of generations (the question of proper terminology receives further discussion in Chapter Eight). If the individual in ego's descent group is much older than ego, the kin term is modified by the morpheme *-txo*: *oshtxo* for males, *txishtxo* for females. Men may refer to women of their descent group as *txira* if the woman in question is much younger. Individuals in the alternate descent group of ego's own exogamous lineage are called *koka* (mother's brother) if male or *ewa* (mother/mother's sister) if female. Again these terms may be modified by the morpheme *-txo* to address or refer to older people:

kokatxo, ewatxo. Individuals in ego's father's descent group are called *epa* (father's brother) if male and *natxi* (father's sister) if female. One's own father is addressed and referred to as *papa*. Individual's in ego's father's sister's children's group are called *vava, txaitxo*, or *txai* (male cross-cousin) if male, *pano* (female cross-cousin) if female. These are the individuals that ego should marry. This sets up the following scheme of kinship classification:

Koka	Epa
Ewa	Natxi
Otxi	Txai/Txaitxo
Txitxo	Vava
	Pano

Each Marubo can marry into as many as eight different descent groups. The terms for cross-cousin and father's kin are extended to all the members of lineages that are marriageable to ego. Which descent group in the lineage is called *epa/natxi*, and which called *txai/pano*, is set by custom. These customary usages are most discernible in the use of terms for male cross-cousin. The terms *vava* and *txaitxo* are reciprocal, such that if I call you *vava* you call me *txaitxo*. These terms are used mostly among lineages that have actually intermarried, as opposed to the term *txai*, used reciprocally among members of lineages that are not actually intermarried but are potentially intermarriageable. Repeated attempts to elucidate genealogical correlates for when each term is used failed. The hypothesis that best fits available evidence is that the reciprocal terms *txaitxo* and *vava* are learned by analogy from the way other members of ego's

descent group address and are referred to by others. Thus, once established the reciprocal usages replicate themselves intergenerationally and divorce themselves of genealogical correlates. Once the usage is established, individuals in the alternate descent group to the classificatory cross-cousin's must be known as *epa* and *natxi* and are thus subject to the incest taboo with respect to ego.

Further evidence that the kinship terminology is descent group-linked comes from the repetition of terms on alternating generations. The terms *koka* and *ewa*, for example, are applied to members of the alternate descent group in one's own exogamous lineage regardless of whether they are in the generation above or beneath ego. The term *txaitxo* can refer to cross-cousin, as explained above, but its central meaning is mother's father ($txaitxo=txai+txo=$ 'txai who is much older than me'). Likewise, *vava* can refer to cousin but it also refers to son's daughter's children. This indicates that terms correlate with descent group but not with genealogical relation. The logic of this system can be seen in extending the diagram presented above to six generations of two exogamous lineages that have hypothetically intermarried repeatedly over those generations. In the following diagram, ego is a Txonavo:

Txonavo Oshtxo/Txishtxo	Rovonáwavo Txaitxo/Pătxo
Iskonáwavo Koka/Ewa	Satanáwavo Epa/Natxi
Txonavo Otxi/Txitxo	Rovonáwavo Txaitxo/Pano
Iskonáwavo Koka/Ewa	Satanáwavo Epa/Natxi
Txonavo Otxi/Txira	Rovonáwavo Vava/Pano

The Marubo kinship system encompasses the entire society, so that everyone is kin to everyone else, even if only distant *txai*. The one phenomenon that might disturb the system are recent virilocal marriages of Marubo men to Kanamari, Mayoruna, and Kulina women. Because the descent system is matrilineal, the children of these unions are referred to by the ethnic appellation of their mothers. I do not know how the Marubo inheritance system and kinship terminology will adapt to this new situation. It should receive attention from future researchers.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORY AND METHOD

A. Theoretical Background

1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to present the hypothesis that was tested during fieldwork, and the reasons why that hypothesis had to be tested. This dissertation is a reaction to the long-held belief that the indigenous societies of lowland South America are essentially egalitarian. This belief is based on a conceptual framework for political analysis rooted in structural-functionalism and structuralist anthropologies. While the conceptual frameworks out of which the idea of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism arose have been subsequently criticized and superseded by more thorough and accurate concepts and associated methods, the idea itself has remained. In order to test the validity of that idea, I examine its applicability to one particular society, the Marubo. By determining whether or not the concept of egalitarianism is applicable to Marubo politics, I aim to determine also whether it can be applied to all indigenous Amazonians.

I will present the theoretical background to this dissertation in five parts. In the first part, I will examine the development of what I call ‘the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism,’ which is the idea that is being examined in this dissertation. I will discuss the main sources of this idea as well as the social phenomena, and

interpretations thereof, from which the idea of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was constructed. I will then show how the observations and conclusions made regarding the political life of indigenous lowland South Americans affected their placement in concurrently developing schemes of neoevolutionist classification of world societies. Lowland societies were placed in the category of ‘egalitarian’ based on information available at that time. It is the task of this dissertation to determine whether that label truly applies to all indigenous Amazonian societies by examining its applicability to one case society. Hence, in the first part of this section on theoretical background, I will present the definition of egalitarianism that was used in this research.

In the second part of this section, I will discuss theoretical developments in political anthropology that suggest there is a need to revise our understanding of indigenous lowland South American politics. First I will describe the development of action theory and its shifting of emphasis in political inquiry from structure to processes of individual action within the structure. I will then explain how these theoretical developments have been linked to changes in the definitions of the concepts of politics and power. This is important because the definitions of these concepts affect the range of phenomena that are observed during fieldwork, from which coherent perceptions of political systems are constructed. Here I will present the working definitions of politics and power that were used in the research this dissertation is based on. I will then specify how all these changes in theory and definitions create a need to re-examine old conclusions about indigenous lowland South American politics.

Thirdly, I will present an idea which was developed specifically as an interpretation of lowland South American social dynamics, and which also suggests a

need to revise old conclusions about indigenous lowland politics—the concept of the political economy of people. This concept suggests that competition for human resources is a major aspect of indigenous lowland South American social life, raising the prospect that unequal results in this competition are linked to political inequalities. This possibility was never considered in the development of the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. In order to test the validity of that hypothesis, an examination of the political economy of people is, therefore, necessary.

Fourth, I will explain why the Marubo are an appropriate test case for a hypothesis that purports to apply to all of indigenous lowland South America. In this dissertation, I make the argument that, since the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is supposed to apply to all indigenous Amazonian groups, by examining whether or not it applies to one particular society, I am examining the validity of the hypothesis as a whole. If the Marubo are not egalitarian, then not all Amazonian societies are egalitarian, and therefore the hypothesis is invalid. This argument requires that the Marubo be an appropriate test case for the Amazonian region. In the fourth part of this section, I argue that they are an appropriate test case.

Finally, I will point some consequences that a change in our perception of indigenous Amazonian politics might have beyond simply altering the position of indigenous Amazonians in the system of categories of socio-anthropological typologies. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to point out every theoretical and practical ramification of such a change in perceptions. However, it is important to point out some of these ramifications. For example, the perception of indigenous Amazonians as egalitarian has had consequences for shaping certain types of economic relations between

indigenous and non-indigenous people and for shaping broad Western philosophical debates about the place of power in human social nature. By pointing out some of these consequences, I highlight the wider significance of this research beyond the central issue of political typology.

2. The Hypothesis of Pan-Amazonian Egalitarianism: Sources

The hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is not the work of one person, but of many anthropologists working under related theoretical, methodological and analytic frameworks beginning in the 1940s. However, from the perspective of present-day political anthropology, these frameworks are riddled with problems and any conclusions derived from them must be scrutinized to evaluate their validity.

Conceptually, the main flaw is the emphasis on social structure as object of analysis. The focus in this type of political analysis is on explicitly encoded social positions and their normative roles. This entirely missed political roles that are covert or extra-structural (interstitial). The focus on structure also creates a static picture of eternalized positions and essentialized roles, completely missing the *processes* which modern political anthropology focuses on in observing real political systems. Use of the social-structure orientation in Amazonian political ethnography and ethnology thus misses the bulk of the data that are necessary to a real understanding of a small-scale indigenous political system. The hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is based on research that very rarely focused on the political aspects of life, and when it did, did so by methods that produced extremely incomplete pictures of indigenous politics. Furthermore, the social-

structure approach was ahistorical, and derived conclusions concerning allegedly permanent features of indigenous politics from observations made at a very particular historical juncture. But, even if their observations were correct, this does not mean that what they saw was what had always been there and what *would* always be there. The conclusion ultimately arrived at—that indigenous societies of lowland South America have an egalitarian essence—must be questioned in light of the multiple conceptual and methodological flaws with which it is associated. To facilitate the reader’s understanding of why my research was necessary, I will examine the origins and development of the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism.

The idea that all societies of lowland South America are egalitarian has its source in the early synthesizers of South American ethnology, especially Robert Lowie (1948) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1967[1944]) but also Kalervo Oberg (1955), Julian Steward and Louis Faron (1959) and somewhat later, Pierre Clastres (1977[1974]). These researchers and theorists have contributed key elements to the broad consensus on the absence of power in lowland indigenous politics (this conceptual genealogy has been written about by Santos Granero (1993)). Ideas about lowland South American politics, in turn, have contributed to the development of political typologies of worldwide scale (Fried 1967) and theories of political evolution purporting to apply to all humanity (Boehm 1999). I will first explain the development of concepts of egalitarianism in a strictly South American framework, then show how these concepts contributed to the development of broader, universalizing theoretical frameworks.

In the area of lowland South America the cornerstone of theory-building in political anthropology has been Claude Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss’ work on Nambiquara

leadership (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]) was the main element used by subsequent authors (Lowie 1967[1948], Clastres 1977[1974]) in the construction of ethnological frameworks. To understand Lévi-Strauss' interpretation of Nambiquara leadership, it is necessary to understand his ideas on reciprocity, which also heavily informed the subsequent work of Clastres and contributed to essentialist notions on the powerlessness of indigenous lowland societies.

In The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969[1949]), Lévi-Strauss argued that the principle of reciprocity, reflected in the universality of the incest taboo, is a basic aspect of human nature and principle of human society. Among the examples he gave to illustrate his point is that of Nambiquara cross-cousin marriage. This type of marriage was seen by Lévi-Strauss as a manifestation of the principle of reciprocity in the structure of a simple human society. The rules of prescriptive marriage and postmarital residence established a system of equal exchange between groups as well as individuals, preventing conflict over access to marriage partners at the same time as it established group unity by making groups of people dependent on one another for reproductive continuity.

Lévi-Strauss argued that the incest taboo, by preventing individuals from taking their own family members in marriage, forced intergroup exchanges of marriage partners and thus initiated social organization. He saw the Nambiquara rule of bilateral cross-cousin marriage as an illustration of this phenomenon. When seen as an idealized structure, bilateral cross-cousin marriage (with its correlated Dravidian kinship terminology) implies the perpetual equal exchange of marriage partners between two groups, which may or may not be formal moieties. Exchange has to be equal or one of the groups would slowly cease to exist. Thus, the basis of Nambiquara society was the

principle of reciprocity made manifest in the most essential social process: marriage, through which the group perpetuates itself.

Lévi-Strauss' work on kinship in general and the Nambiquara in particular set up the hypothesis that the flow of marriage partners in simple societies, particularly where bilateral cross-cousin marriage is involved, is based on the principle of reciprocity. Prescriptive marriage and postmarital residence rules prevent the accumulation of marriage partners by any single individual or group, because any such accumulation is a threat to the continuity of society itself. The need to prevent unequal accumulation of reproductive resources leads to the establishment of the incest taboo, which by forcing intergroup alliances generates social organization beyond the level of the family. The incest taboo, essentially a reflection of the principle of reciprocity, is thus the very genesis of society itself.

Lévi-Strauss' ideas on kinship and reciprocity set up the conclusion that indigenous lowland South American societies are entirely structured around the principle of reciprocity. Their kinship systems are reflections of this principle. The kinship system is the fundamental base of the social structure; in many cases in the lowlands social structure beyond the level of kinship was hardly discernible at all. Therefore, logic would seem to dictate that lowland social structures are fundamentally organized around the principle of reciprocity. This was supported by evidence of reciprocity in food distribution. Lévi-Strauss argued that the principle of reciprocity operated relative to all resources that are essential to group survival, which included food. He noted the equivalent of the incest taboo in the realm of food, namely rules that determine that one must give away one's own food and receive food from others (Lévi-Strauss

1969[1949]:32-37). These rules, particularly dictating various customary distributions of meat, are common in lowland South America (for example, Marubo hunters would not eat tapirs or monkeys that they had killed themselves, only those killed by another hunter), indicating that the principle of reciprocity is present in the economic system as well as the kinship system. This provides further evidence that reciprocity is the principle which structures all social relations. It is with this understanding that Lévi-Strauss approached the analysis of political relations.

In 1944 Lévi-Strauss published a seminal article on leadership among the Nambiquara which became a main source for subsequent ethnological syntheses. Lévi-Strauss used his notion that the principle of reciprocity is the ultimate basis of human society to interpret the role of leaders in Nambiquara society. Ultimately the leader's power is given to him by the group and thus could be removed at any time.

Lévi-Strauss observed that Nambiquara leaders exercised their leadership functions without any coercive power at their disposal. They directed their groups in horticultural, hunting, and gathering activities, and they determined the timing and direction of all group movements. Yet the group followed the leader not because it was subject to the threat of force but because it agreed with the leader's ideas as to what ought to be done:

Consent is at the origin of leadership, and consent, too, furnishes the only measure of its legitimacy...The chief is able to make public feeling coincide with his own opinion. Thus, he must continually display a skill belonging more to a politician trying to keep hold of his fluctuating majority than to an overpowering leader.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:53)

To maintain his leadership, the Nambiquara 'chief' had two means at his disposal: first, he had to be very knowledgeable about the environment and how to exploit it for

survival purposes; and second, he had to be extremely generous, constantly giving away valued items to everybody in his following. The difficult task of directing the actions of a group without the power of coercion at their disposal made the Nambiquara leaders the most hardworking and yet the most materially impoverished members of their society.

Lévi-Strauss also noted that Nambiquara leaders were the only people in that society who were allowed multiple wives. Putting this together with his own observations of the basis of leaders' authority, Lévi-Strauss argued that Nambiquara leadership was not the exercise of power by one person over many, but rather a system of reciprocal exchange between group and leader:

Consent is the psychological basis of leadership, but in daily life it expresses itself in, and is measured by, a game of give-and-take played by the chief and his followers, and which brings forth, as a basic attribute of leadership, the notion of reciprocity. The chief has power, but he must be generous. He has duties, but he is entitled to several wives. Between him and the group, there is a perpetual balance of prestations, privileges, services, and obligations...The chief-commoners' relationship, as every relationship in primitive society, is based on reciprocity.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:59)

Lévi-Strauss thus painted a picture of Nambiquara society in which the leader, lacking coercive power, makes enormous self-sacrifices for the benefit of the group, as a means of maintaining his authority; in return, the group grants him the right to several wives, whose labor is then used to benefit the group. Lévi-Strauss used this interpretation to argue that consent, not coercion, lies at the origin of human leadership:

Unilateral relations such as right of age, autocratic power, or others, may appear in groups having an already complex structure. In simple forms of social organization, such as the one I have tried to describe, they are inconceivable. Here, on the contrary, the relations between the chief and the group can be seen as a perpetual process of arbitration where the chief's talents and authority on the one hand and the group's size, cohesion, and willingness, on the other, constantly react on and influence each other.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:58-59)

Lévi-Strauss explicitly claimed the Nambiquara example as evidence to support Rousseau's view (Rousseau 1984[1755]) that consent based on a vision of the group's general welfare was the original basis of human group unity. This was a society where power was given to the leader so he could exercise it on behalf of his followers (remarkably similar, in my opinion, to certain democratic ideals related to the French Revolution). The operation of the principle of reciprocity in the political system made the leader's power an aspect of a system of exchanges between leader and follower that fits the definition of what would later be called a reverse dominance hierarchy (Boehm 1999) by means of which the power is really in the hands of the followers. This perspective would strongly influence the way Robert Lowie interpreted lowland South American political systems in his ethnological synthesis of Amerindian politics (Lowie 1967[1948]).

Lowie's ethnological studies of Amerindian political organization drew on the interpretive framework developed by Radcliffe-Brown and others in the 1940 volume African Political Systems (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940). Radcliffe-Brown had developed a view of politics heavily informed by his concept of social structure (Radcliffe-Brown 1940). In Radcliffe-Brown's framework, an outline of the social structure was the objective of research. A system of institutionalized positions and roles customarily determined the behavior of individuals. In the study of political organization, the central question was what positions in the structure had as their role "the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940:xv). This narrow but highly influential definition of political organization set the boundaries of what early political anthropologists looked for. Thus,

when Lowie carried out his comparative study of “political organization”, he looked for coercive, force-based power. Not finding it among the bulk of lowland societies, he was able to conclude that the lack of power was a major feature of lowland societies.

Lowie's study (1967) reviewed societies for institutionalized positions of authority and leadership, then listed the main features of behavior known to be associated with those positions. Lack of coercive power was one feature he found to be common to leader in lowland societies. For this conclusion he draws largely on Lévi-Strauss (1967[1944]) although he also consulted Curt Nimuendajú (1939, 1942, 1943, 1946a, 1946b) on the Apinayé, Sherente, Kayapó, Timbira, and Botocudo, Alfred Métraux (1946a, 1946b) on the Chaco Indians and the Botocudo, John Gillin (1936) on the Barama River Carib, Fritz Krause (1911) on the Karaya, Theodor Koch-Grünberg (1923) on the Taulipang, Pompeu Sobrinho (1934) on the Tapuya and Kariri, Martin Gusinde (1946) on the Ona, and Rafael Karsten (1923) on the Jívaro. From these fourteen cited sources he formed a synthetic view of lowland politics that became a widely accepted consensus (Santos Granero 1993). In addition to lack of power, Lowie argued that lowland leaders shared the qualities of being peacemakers, being generous, and having the gift of oratory. His characterization of lowland societies as having powerless leaders would come to strongly affect the way these societies were placed in political typologies.

The work of Lowie and of Lévi-Strauss would find its synthesis in that of Clastres (1977[1974]). Clastres shared with Lowie the method of distilling certain representative qualities of lowland leadership, and from Lévi-Strauss he used the concept of reciprocal exchange as the basis of society. His list of leaders' qualities was consistent with Lowie

and Lévi-Strauss. Leaders were peacemakers lacking in coercive power; they had oratorical skills and were generous. In addition, Clastres noted that lowland headmen were often polygynous, and this fact took a central place in his theoretical framework. Clastres argued that polygyny necessarily created shortages of marriage partners, and therefore was antithetical to the basic *raison d'être* of lowland kinship systems which, as Lévi-Strauss had argued, was to ensure that such shortages did not occur. Societies must therefore find a way to restrict polygyny so as to prevent excessive shortages from occurring. Clastres argued that lowland South American societies in fact restricted polygyny to headmen. He thus explained headmen's polygyny as a phenomenon consciously determined by 'society'. The qualities of the headman, he argued, were aspects of a system of prestations and counter-prestations linking leader to group. Polygyny was in this view a grant from the group to the leader, something which the group *allowed* the leader to do. This gave the leader an imbalance of society's most precious resource, and since this was a gift from the group, it placed the leader in debt to the group. The leader then attempted to repay this debt through his services to the group, as seen in his generosity, oratory, and conflict resolution activities. But the leader could never fully repay the debt. He was thus kept perpetually in check by the group, and this prevented him from ever exercising power. To Clastres this was evidence of a conscious social rejection of power, an actively maintained social mechanism for keeping power in check, reflective of a social ethos equating power with nature and making culture its opposite. Clastres' ideas led to the conclusion that ontological rejection of power is a fundamental basis of lowland societies, and complex

polities do not develop in this social environment because of a conscious and active rejection of power.

The work of Lévi-Strauss, Lowie, and Clastres determined the place lowland societies would take in simultaneously developing schemes of political typology and cultural evolution. Ethnological syntheses of political systems took varying levels of social stratification as their main classificatory criteria (Oberg 1955; Sahlins 1958). The typologies arranged political systems in order from the least stratification to the most stratification. The least stratified were called egalitarian:

In some societies... the only qualifications for higher status are age, sex, and personal characteristics... A society in which the only principles of rank allocation are these universals can be designated "egalitarian", first, because this society is at the stratification minimum of these organized human societies; second, because, given these qualifications, every individual has an equal chance to succeed to whatever statuses may open.

(Sahlins 1958:1-2)

Typologies of political systems according to their levels of stratification were explicitly molded into evolutionary schemes (Service 1962). In these schemes, political systems with centralized power structures were considered to temporally succeed egalitarian systems. Egalitarian systems were linked to hunter/gatherer and extensive-agriculture groups, which in the archaeological record preceded states. In this context it became highly significant that ethnographic and ethnologic research in the South American lowlands had concluded that lowland societies were egalitarian. Lowland societies were thus regarded as representing sociopolitical forms antecedent to highland states. There arose the ethnological conundrum of how to explain the development of states in the highlands concurrent with their non-development in the lowlands. Famously, Steward and Faron (1959) and more explicitly Betty Meggers (1954, 1971)

argued that ecological factors determined limitations on development of social complexity in the lowlands, whereas Clastres (1977[1974]) argued that socio-ethical factors determined lowland resistance to state formation and Carneiro (1970, 1981) proposed his theories of circumscription.

Neoevolutionists produced multiple typologies of world social systems, many of them emphasizing political aspects as classificatory criteria. Service (1962, 1975), in developing the enormously influential band/tribe/chiefdom/state typology proposed the idea of a “Great Divide” (Service 1975:3) between societies with formal power structures and societies without such structures. Bands and tribes were on the powerless side, chiefdoms and states on the power side. Fried (1967), in developing his egalitarian/rank/stratified typology, was somewhat more restrained, and proposed a technical definition of egalitarianism:

An egalitarian society is one in which there are as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them... An egalitarian society is characterized by the adjustment of valued statuses to the number of persons with the abilities to fill them... An egalitarian society does not have any means of fixing or limiting the number of persons capable of exerting power.

(Fried 1967:33)

Despite variations in the definitions of the categories and in the precise criteria used to place societies in those categories, these typologies have in common the use of portraits of sociopolitical structure in their construction. The facts available at the time when these typologies were constructed dictated that indigenous societies of lowland South America be placed in the ‘egalitarian’ category, and they have been considered, thanks largely to the work of Clastres, as exemplars of that category (e.g., Boehm 1999).

3. Developments in Political Anthropology Suggesting a Need to Question the Hypothesis of Pan-Amazonian Egalitarianism

a. Introduction

Even as the notion of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was solidified and incorporated into world-scale theoretical frameworks, other developments in the field of political anthropology—specifically, the development of the set of concepts and methods for political inquiry known as *action theory*—have created a need to question it. New approaches to political inquiry in anthropology have resulted in pictures of small-scale societies that are much more detailed and accurate than those derived from structural-functional inquiry. In addition, the development of concepts in political anthropology has resulted in a refinement of definitions of basic concepts such as *politics* and *power*. As the definitions of the phenomena investigated have changed it has become clear that the previous definitions missed a whole range of phenomena the observation of which is essential to an accurate understanding of small-scale political systems. To understand why developments in political anthropology strongly suggest a need to revise the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, and simultaneously present the theoretical framework of my own research, I will explain relevant aspects of concepts and method in action theory, show how definitions of power and politics have changed, and present the definitions that I used in fieldwork and in this dissertation. I will first present the basic changes in theory in political anthropology that suggest a need to revise the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. I will then present the changes in definitions of key concepts that suggest the same need. I will conclude by

explaining how these changes in theory and definitions force a re-evaluation of old perceptions of indigenous lowland South American politics.

b. Theoretical Developments in Political Anthropology Suggesting a Need to Question the Hypothesis of Pan-Amazonian Egalitarianism

The theoretical perspective known as action theory (Vincent 1978) has called attention to the benefits of supplementing research on the social structure with research on the behavior of real individuals within that structure (e.g., Turner 1957). Social structure is seen, not as a determinant of behavior, but as a set of parameters establishing a general framework for action. Within this framework, individuals have what Lucy Mair called “freedom for manoeuvre” (Mair 1969:123). Within the social structure, individuals have a certain room for choice. They manipulate the structure to further personal interests, rather than merely follow custom out of selfless devotion to tradition. By observing what choices individuals make within the framework of the structure, it is possible to come to understand what goals they are pursuing and what interests they hold dear; if this is done over a period of time it is possible to understand the strategies used to those ends. Thus, a picture of what is valued in society and of how those values are pursued emerges. Using the methods of action theory, it is possible to observe the operation of political systems that do not conform to our preconceptions of what such a system should be. Instead of predetermining what the values at the root of the system are and then going out to observe them, action theory allows one to observe what values are actually being pursued. This allows the observation of a working political system: a system for the resolution of conflicts of will. Once the will (i.e., set of self-interests and

goals) of individuals is known, it is possible to watch conflicts of will being played out.

If certain individuals are seen to impose their will on others, the operation of power is revealed.

The emphasis on individual action within the structure rather than on the structure itself has rendered visible certain forms of power and inequality that were either unperceived or minimized by observations of structure alone (e.g., Van Velsen 1964). Thus, Lévi-Strauss (1967[1944]) did observe power and inequality in Nambiquara society. However, he minimized the significance of these phenomena by depicting an overall structure in which they are balanced off and, hence, negated. The new emphasis renders such minimization impossible: if a man has more wives than anyone else, there is inequality in that field, no matter what else the polygynist must give away (Flanagan 1989). Similarly, if one individual repeatedly wins conflicts of will with others, then power is a factor in social dynamics, a line of reasoning that will become clear when I define power and politics, below.

The validity of the structural conception of egalitarian society has been seriously questioned by political anthropologists examining the experience of individuals within the structure (Flanagan 1989). The notion of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was developed largely from research that focused on creating abstract portraits of social structure, then categorizing societies according features of that structure. The social phenomena revealed by action theory—i.e., detailed sequences of individual acts—thus played no role in elucidating and classifying these political systems. Where the methods of action theory have been applied—namely, in Africa (e.g., Turner 1957, Middleton 1960, Van Velsen 1964) and New Guinea (cf. Strathern 1982)—societies with

structurally egalitarian systems have been shown to exhibit unexpected levels of power and inequality and systems of interpersonal competition among individuals seeking to become unequally powerful. These methods have led, in particular, to a revision of the role of inequality in the societies of New Guinea (e.g., Josephides 1985; Kelly 1993). Therefore it seems a logical step to suggest that the societies of lowland South America, even if we accept that they fit purely structural definitions of egalitarianism, should be re-examined with new methods in order to determine what they are really like and if, after such an examination, they can still be classified in the same way.

c. Changes in Definitions of Key Concepts in Political Anthropology

The development of new methods in political anthropology has been accompanied by changes in the definitions of key concepts such as power and politics. The definition of a phenomenon determines precisely what data are gathered during inquiries into it. In lowland South America, early political ethnographers and ethnologists were looking for what their definitions told them to look for, and this affected the form of the social portraits they painted. If subsequent developments have suggested that new definitions provide more realistic and complete pictures of political systems, then it is necessary to question the validity of research that used the old definitions and to conduct research using newer definitions to see how the results differ.

The changing definitions of power and politics have mirrored the change in emphasis from structure to process in political analysis which took place as action theory superseded structural-functionalism in political anthropology. A consequence of these

changes has been a broadening of the concepts of power and politics—an expansion of the range of phenomena covered under these rubrics. This may be seen by comparing the definitions utilized by these two schools of thought.

The type of power and political organization which Lowie and Lévi-Strauss looked for in lowland South America—with no success—is the type suggested by the structural-functional mode of analysis prevalent at that time. Structural-functional political analysis focused on coercion by use, or threat of use, of force as the primary marker of the political aspect of society: “the political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force” (Radcliffe-Brown 1940:xxiii). This, in turn, derived from Max Weber’s definition of political community as “a community whose social action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants a ‘territory’ and the conduct of persons within it, through readiness to resort to physical force, including normally force of arms” (Weber 1978[1947]:901). Ultimately this derived from the concept of a state as form of political structure based on a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. In this framework, the word *power* signified the ability to control others’ behavior through the control and regulation of the use of physical force. This is the type of power and political organization which Lowie and Lévi-Strauss looked for in lowland South America but could not find.

It is equally important to note that the object of attention of structural-functional inquiry was a structure:

Thus in the comparative study of political systems we are concerned with certain special aspects of a total social structure, meaning by that term both the grouping of individuals into territorial or lineage groups and also the differentiation of individuals

by their social role either as individuals or on the basis of sex and age or by distinctions of social classes. (Radcliffe-Brown 1940:xxii)

Ultimately, this approach reduced the study of politics to a search for explicitly encoded social statuses whose role involved the use of coercive force to exercise power. This is the type of method used in the work of both Lowie and Lévi-Strauss, which led to the conclusion that power is absent in lowland South American societies.

With the development of action theory, the type of power discussed by Radcliffe-Brown and searched for by Lowie and Lévi-Strauss came to be considered but one, specialized, type of power among many types. The fundamental text establishing a diversity of modes of power is the introduction by Marc Swartz, Victor Turner and Arthur Tuden to the edited volume Political Anthropology (Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966). These authors define power as “the capacity to secure compliance with binding decisions” (Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:17). They present three different techniques for securing compliance: force and coercion, consensual power, and persuasion (Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:22). The latter is not a form of power, but the first two are: “it is entirely possible for political decisions to be implemented by persuasion alone; thus officials can gain compliance with their decisions without the use of power either in its consensual or coercive forms” (Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:21). This last quote also indicates that Swartz, Turner and Tuden divided power into two types: consensual and coercive. Coercive power, the technique of securing compliance by means of force or threat thereof, is equivalent to the structural-functionalist conception of coercive force-based power. To this, however, they add a second type, consensual power.

The notion of consensual power is intimately linked to the concept of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, is what Swartz, Turner and Tuden call a *support*. By support, they

“mean anything that contributes to the formulation and/or implementation of political ends” (Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:10). Force is one type of support, but another is legitimacy:

“Legitimacy” is a type of support that derives not from force or its threat but from the values held by the individuals formulating, influencing, and being affected by political ends... The derivation of legitimacy from values comes from the establishment of a positive connection between the entity or process having legitimacy and those values.

(Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:10)

Thus, legitimacy is at work when individuals can secure compliance with their decisions because those decisions are consistent with the values of those who must comply. This is the basis for the exercise of consensual power:

[Consensual power] is an interaction in which the power holder gains compliance with a decision concerning group goals in exchange for the understanding that the complying entity is entitled to invoke certain obligations in the future. In other words, obedience to the leader is conditioned upon his undertaking (tacitly or explicitly) to reciprocate later on with beneficial actions... Power, in this sense, we propose to call ‘consensual power’ to distinguish it from power based on coercion. In the sense that we use it here, power may be regarded as the dynamic aspect of legitimacy... Compliance based on consensual power is motivated by the belief (which may be only vaguely formulated) that at some time in the future the official, agency, government, etc., with which individuals comply will satisfy the compliers’ positive expectations.

(Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:14-15)

The concept of legitimacy will receive considerable attention in this dissertation as I will argue that village leaders who are also the founders of their villages have a certain legitimacy as spokespersons, while leaders who are appointed by consensus do not. This, in turn, will support my argument that power does exist in Marubo politics.

If power is the ability to secure compliance with decisions, and if persuasion is *not* a form of power but *is* a technique for securing compliance, then we must consider persuasion as one of the modes of social action whereby power is exercised:

Still another means of gaining compliance with decisions, despite the absence of demand satisfaction, is persuasion. Persuasion can bring about compliance by bringing about changes in belief and attitude... Persuasion can operate through inducements..., through threats, and through pointing out that noncompliance is a violation of commitments... It can also operate on the basis that the individual or group is persuaded that behaving in a certain way is a 'good thing' for him. If the process is based solely on appeal that is independent of inducements, threats, and the 'activation of commitments,' it is called 'influence.'

(Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:21)

The role of persuasion as a method whereby Marubo leaders gain compliance with decisions will also receive considerable discussion, as persuasion by means of oral addresses is quite common in Marubo politics.

The expansion of the concept of power was limited by a major omission: the exclusion of forms of interpersonal power such as that exercised by a father over a son. These forms of power were arbitrarily excluded from the realm of politics despite the fact that, in the small-scale social systems that are the chief object of action theory analysis, political relations are largely coterminous with kinship relations, and since kinship relations are private, it would seem that an analysis of private relations is necessary to a complete understanding of politics. Despite this, the power looked for in action theory was strictly in the public sphere. This has to do with the definition of politics itself. We have seen how structural-functionalism defined political organization as those aspects of social structure related to the control and regulation of use of physical force. With the expansion of the concept of power beyond mere coercive power came the need for an expanded definition of politics. Swartz, Turner and Tuden argue that there are three main characteristics that help to define the political sphere:

Several qualities that lead us to consider a process as political are readily noted and widely accepted as characteristic. First, a political process is public rather than private...The second generally accepted quality of politics is that it concerns goals. Combining the first characteristic with this second one, we can go a bit further and

say that politics always involves public goals. Although individual, private goals will always be importantly involved..., the emphasis will be upon goals desired for the group as a whole. A final major characteristic of ‘politics’ is [that] it involves some kind of focusing of power—using ‘power’ in its broadest sense... The study of politics, then, is the study of the *processes* involved in determining and implementing public goals and in the differential achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with those goals.

(Swartz, Turner and Tuden 1966:4-7; italics in original)

The action theory definition is broader than that of structural-functionalism, reflecting the broadening of the concept of power and the addition of persuasion to the realm of politics. The main difference between this action theory definition of politics and the structural-functional definition is that action theory focuses on processes whereas structural-functionalism looked at structure. Structural-functionalism sought power in the structure, in the roles assigned to social statuses. Action theory sought power in processes, in actual sequences of social interactions between real people. Yet the action theory definition can be said to include and incorporate the structural-functional definition in the sense that control and regulation of physical force is one type of process involved in determining and implementing public goals. Hence its broader scope and its inclusion of a broader range of phenomena.

In developing definitions of power and politics for the research on which this dissertation is based, I went one step further in the expansion of these concepts. I do not accept the total exclusion of private-sphere power from the realm of politics. Barth (1959) argued that dyadic relations of dominance and submission are manipulated to create corporate followings. Thus, private power relations can be accumulated and transformed into public power under the right circumstances. This indicates that to exclude private-sphere power would be a methodological error that would limit our understanding of the bases for the exercise of public power. I further argue that an

understanding of individual goals is essential to constructing a picture of a dynamic political system. We must understand what everybody is trying to get in life, what goals structure individuals' decisions as to long-term courses of action. From there we proceed to understand how these goals create conflict and cooperation and how people come together in groups for common action, groups whose composition changes depending on the goals which they are formed to pursue. Thus, the public sphere is ultimately constructed from multiple personal spheres. With this in mind, I developed a definition of politics that incorporates action theory, while also including such other phenomena as I felt the latter unjustly excluded, just as the action theory definition incorporated that of structural-functionalism while also including other phenomena the latter had excluded. I define politics as *all processes involved in the resolution of conflicts of will*. This reflects my method of constructing a picture of the political system on the ultimate basis of a knowledge of multiple individuals' goals. How the multiplicity of personal goals leads to processes of formation of groups that cooperate to secure common goals and to conflicts among individuals and groups whose goals are at variance, is an essential aspect of politics. This incorporates the study of processes related to public goals but establishes the need to connect these to the multiple individual goals which are part of any process of public goal resolution. Furthermore, there are certain phenomena that are not public but cannot be excluded from coverage by the word 'politics'. For example, the frequent contestations of mutual spheres of influence that commonly accompany husband-wife relationships can suitably be referred to as 'marital politics'; expanded to the whole family, these could be referred to as 'family politics'. Likewise, an individual's internal struggles to overcome contradictions among multiple goals, duties or allegiances could

fruitfully be understood as ‘inner politics’ analogous in many ways to public-sphere politics. While I agree that political ethnography should focus on the public sphere, I take issue with any definition of politics that totally excludes private relations. My definition incorporates these forms of politics as well as those phenomena which action theory defined as politics.

To maintain theoretical and methodological consistency, I define power in relation to my definition of politics, as *the ability to repeatedly win conflicts of will*. In establishing this definition, I first distinguished instances of power from the quality of having power. If we consider the Swartz-Turner-Tuden definition of power as the capacity to secure compliance with decisions, it is one thing to secure compliance with a single decision, quite another to repeatedly secure compliance with multiple decisions over a long period of time. What I am looking for is not a set of specific instances of power, but rather individuals who exercise power consistently in successions of situations. Since I define politics as all processes involved in the resolution of conflicts of will, I define power as the ability to repeatedly win conflicts of will. I do not claim ecumenical status for this definition. However, it points to the specific phenomena which I looked for in the field. The Marubo individuals who have this quality will be specified in Chapter Six, and I argue that the phenomena thus isolated are quite clearly and recognizably instantiations of power, and would be so even if the Swartz-Turner-Tuden definition were utilized, though not if the narrower structural-functionalist definition were utilized.

My definitions of power and politics leave open the possibility of including in the political analysis forms of interpersonal, private-sphere power that are significant in the

construction of public-sphere power. This is the most significant rationale for using my definitions as opposed to those of action theory. Specifically, in this dissertation I address the construction of relations of inequality through control of human resources, a field of political action called the *political economy of people*, which will be defined more clearly below. If a man has a daughter or daughters whose behavior is sufficiently controllable, he can induce another man into uxorilocal residence, and also exact repeated compliance with requests for labor. More importantly, the uxorilocal in-marrier can become a part of the father-in-law's political support base—or, with the passage of time, vice-versa. The possibility that control of human resources can be translated into political power is explored in most detail in Chapter Nine. The Swartz-Turner-Tuden definitions would seem to exclude these phenomena from the realm of political analysis because they are private relations, but since these private relations can be converted into supports in public contests of will, I believe that they must be included in the analysis. My somewhat expanded definition incorporates these modes of interpersonal power, as well as coercive power, consensual power, persuasion, and influence. All these are considered techniques whereby an individual can construct the quality of having power.

d. Conclusions: The Need to Question the Hypothesis of Pan-Amazonian Egalitarianism

The above discussion of definitions of power and politics can now be led back into the overall argument of this section, which is that there is a need to revise old perceptions of indigenous lowland South American politics. It should be clear by now that the definition used in research affects the type of data that are obtained and the social portrait that is produced. The ethnologists who produced our current picture of lowland politics—the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism—were working with conceptual definitions that are very narrow by today's standards. They used a view of power and politics derived from the definition of a state as a monopoly on the use of force. The fundamental classificatory criterion was coercive power. Lévi-Strauss wrote that “[the Nambikuara chief’s] rather versatile duties,... are not facilitated by any fixed power or recognized authority...The chief has no coercitive power at his disposal” (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:53). Lowie looked at “the manifestation or adumbration of coercive authority in aboriginal America” (Lowie 1967[1948]:70), developing a division into two types of leaders, ‘titular chiefs’ who have no coercive authority, and ‘strong chiefs’ who do. Lowland South American leaders were placed in the former category. From this was derived the placement of lowland South Americans in neoevolutionist typologies. But what if there are other types of power which the early ethnologists' definitions and methods were not capable of discerning?

In his discussion of Nambikuara leadership, Lévi-Strauss pointed out certain aspects of leaders' behavior that closely resemble what would later be called ‘consensual power.’ Lévi-Strauss states that the Nambikuara *uilikande*, which is translated as ‘chief’

(this was prior to Elman Service's definition of 'chief' as a type of leader with coercive power), determines all survival and food-related group movements, gardening and hunting activities, and organizes labor in general (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:52-53). He does so, Lévi-Strauss says, purely through consent: "consent is at the origin of leadership, and consent, too, furnishes the only measure of its legitimacy" (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:53). This is suspiciously similar to consensual power, but that concept was not included in Lévi-Strauss' conceptual tool kit. Instead he interpreted it in terms of his ideas of reciprocity as reflecting a system of exchange between leader and followers, an idea that led to Clastres' assertion that power is a gift from the group and the group controls the leader. Despite this potential presence of power in the data from which the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was derived, it is the idea that lowland societies have rejected power that has gained currency. But, if we can no longer accept the restriction of the term 'power' to 'coercive power' and, if we agree that power is a more multi-faceted phenomenon, then it is necessary to question these conclusions. It is necessary to re-examine these societies with methods that are attuned to the perception of multiple modes of power in order to really understand the place of power in lowland South American politics. Once we understand the real role of power, it will be possible to evaluate the validity of the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, which is based on research that used an excessively narrow definition of power. It is with this in mind that I approached the Marubo with an expanded definition of power. My definition was sufficiently broad that it included forms of power which were invisible under the old methodological regime. The influence of action theory on my definitions and methods also changes *where* I look. The methods current at the time of Lévi-Strauss' and Lowie's

work called for researchers to look at structure, constructing a written portrayal of institutions, statuses, and assigned roles. In accordance with action theory I look instead at processes. Rather than seeking for power only in the roles assigned to statuses, I look for it in interpersonal relations embedded in concrete social processes.

4. The Political Economy of People

In the field of research into lowland political systems, the concept of the political economy of people also suggests the need for a reevaluation of how we view lowland politics (Rivière 1984; Mentore 1987). The central concept of the political economy of people approach is that people are a form of wealth in lowland societies. In the absence of money and markets, it is through membership in a high-quality social group that survival, security, and success are obtained (Arvelo-Jimenez 1971). Thus, the pursuit of membership in a high-quality social network is a major goal of lowland individuals (Overing 1975). This concept opens up a field of inquiry within which the presence or absence of power and inequality may be tested. First, it must be asked what are the means whereby a desirable social network may be obtained. This sets up the possibility that the means of producing a good network are unequally distributed, a hypothesis testable through detailed observations of those means of production and their distribution. Finally, if such inequality exists, it must be asked whether the unequal accumulation of this form of wealth confers power on the accumulators, a hypothesis testable through observations of the results of conflicts of will between those who have higher-quality/more desirable social networks and superior access to the means of production on

the one hand and those who have lower quality/less desirable social networks and less access to the means of production on the other.

The main assumptions underlying the reciprocal-exchange model of Lévi-Strauss and Clastres may be formulated as testable hypotheses. Thus, the applicability of the model to any given society may be evaluated. The model is based on a certain interpretation of the role of leaders, their relationship to their followers, and the flow of valued resources. These three features of society must be observed in order to test the validity of the model. First, the role of the leader must be carefully observed in order to determine whether it fits the structural description used by Lévi-Strauss and Clastres. Second, the relation of the leader to his followers must be examined in order to determine whether the leader's privileges are in fact a collective grant from the group or have instead some other basis. Third, the flow of resources in society must be examined to evaluate the validity of the reciprocal exchange model and to test the hypothesis that inequality does not exist. Included in the examination of the flow of resources must be the flow of human resources, analysis of which can lead to determination of the extent to which a political economy of people exists.

5. Validity of the Marubo Political System as Test Case for the Hypothesis of Pan-Amazonian Egalitarianism

The Marubo were selected for this research because the evidence available prior to fieldwork (see Chapter Two) indicated that they were representative of the type of society that previous researchers had examined in formulating the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. When the first ethnological syntheses were developed, South American societies were divided into four categories in a culture-area approach: Marginal, Tropical Forest, Circum-Caribbean, and Andean (Steward 1949). Although many of the groups which Lowie used to construct his political synthesis were so-called ‘marginals’ (e.g., Kayapó, Ona), others were ‘tropical forest tribes’: Nambiquara, Barama River Carib, Taulipang, Jívaro (Lowie 1967[1948]). In terms of politics, both these areas stood in opposition to the Andes and Circum-Caribbean area, where centralized power structures existed. Together, Steward’s ‘marginals’ and ‘tropical forest tribes’ compose the region known more generally as ‘lowland South America.’ Clastres’ arguments (Clastres 1977[1974]) were based largely on evidence of his own from the Guayakí, which are not Amazonian but are lowland, and from Lévi-Strauss’ research on the Nambiquara, who *are* Amazonian. The hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was thus developed in reference to all lowland groups, including the Amazonian groups called ‘tropical forest tribes’ with the non-Amazonian lowland groups formerly called ‘marginal’.

The Marubo are members of the Panoan language family, and were categorized by Steward as a ‘tropical forest tribe’ along with the other Panoans (Steward and Métraux 1948). The Panoan language family is one of the major families of lowland South

America, with some thirty-three languages (Girard 1971). The Marubo share with the other Panoans the standard Amazonian economic base involving swidden agriculture, hunting and fishing. Within the Panoan language family, the Marubo are a typical group in that they have a language, kinship system, rituals, and cosmology that share many elements with other Panoans and are recognizably Panoan; and within the area of Amazonia the Panoan language family is exemplary of the region's general social features and lifestyle. Therefore, the Marubo may be considered highly representative of the area as a whole and models that purport to cover lowland South America should cover the Marubo as well.

Beyond their cultural representativeness in the context of the broader Amazonian culture area, the evidence available prior to fieldwork indicated that an analysis of the social structure would lead to a conclusion that they are egalitarian. This is because they had no centralized political structure, nor any social status assigned the use of coercive force (Melatti 1977, 1983). This should be enough, according to the old methodologies, to classify them. However, the old methods did not gather sufficient data to confirm or deny the existence of power, nor to understand whether power is present in real political processes. If the use of new methods on the Marubo reveals the existence of power where the old methods would not have, it becomes possible to question the general validity of all lowland political ethnography that is based on the old methods. Thus, the Marubo can be approached as a case the examination of which reflects on the validity of theories that purport to apply to the culture area as a whole.

In evaluating the validity of the Marubo as a test case for the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, the particular historical context of research must be

considered. Here the argument could be made that any deviations from hypothetical egalitarianism are results of the increasing levels of contact with non-indigenous people. From this perspective, one could argue that, as contact with government agencies is established, indigenous persons establish themselves as intermediaries and utilize their positions to establish unequal power relative to others of their group. These inequalities are directly consequent and dependent upon the presence of the encroaching non-indigenous state, and so any political developments in this context must be considered historical aberrations rather than aspects of indigenous social organization. To this argument at least four counter-arguments may be presented.

Firstly, if the current historical context involving increasing indigenous contact with non-indigenous people prevents us from testing the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, then that hypothesis is untestable except by means of time-travel, unless sufficient ethnohistoric data could be found, which is unlikely given the deficiencies in observational methods that existed until recently. Therefore, provided there is no such ethnohistoric data awaiting discovery, the hypothesis is unscientific. A hypothesis that can never be tested has no place in scientific endeavor. If, in fact, the hypothesis can only be field-tested under conditions of limited contact with non-indigenous people, then the conditions for its testing are forever gone. If this is so, then the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is at any rate applicable only to the specific time during which it was developed. It does not apply to the current conditions of indigenous lowland South American societies. Therefore, we do not know what these societies' political systems are like now, and there is still a need to revise our understanding of these systems. Thus, this research is still important because there is still a void in our knowledge of indigenous

lowland South American politics.

Secondly, I argue that the historical context under which the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was developed is even less ‘naturally indigenous’ than today’s context. The hypothesis was developed largely between the 1920s and 1950s. This period was the tail end of four hundred years of disease, depopulation, forced migration and genocide consequent upon non-indigenous presence. Through a broad swathe of Amazonia, this period of decreasing indigenous populations culminated in the rubber boom which lasted roughly from 1850 to 1920, with variations for specific areas (Weinstein 1983). The rubber boom was one of the worst episodes of depopulation in lowland South America because very remote indigenous territories were physically invaded, the indigenous inhabitants often taken to forced labor, killed, or decimated and forced to flee (see Chapter Eight for the Marubo experience of this episode). Where the rubber boom did not reach, other episodes led to similar results (Denevan 1976). When anthropologists began research on these societies they thus encountered small, isolated communities with dangerously low population levels, many on the brink of extinction. Surprisingly, the explanation suggested for these low population levels was ecological: the Amazon basin was purported to be incapable of supporting large populations; therefore the small, atomized societies are adaptations to regional ecology (Meggers 1954, 1971). Yet evidence from the ethnohistory of such groups as the Omagua, archaeology of areas such as Marajó Island or the lowlands of Bolivia, and evidence of steady depopulation that has ceased only with the slow establishment of indigenous control over land, all suggest that indigenous populations in 1920 were at their lowest point in centuries. Therefore, we must consider that the societies observed from the

1920s to the 1950s were, in fact, historically aberrant, and that the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism does not reflect ‘pre-contact’ indigenous social organization at all.

In this dissertation, I will make the argument that the Marubo have a political ideology that permits and even advocates the possibility of power. However, the indigenous path to power passes through individuals’ construction of legitimacy, and that legitimacy is derived from founding a village and attracting others to live there, whereupon the founder has the ability to make certain decisions over the objections of those attracted to his village. This path to power has two significant requirements: a certain population level, and sufficient settlement stability. The latter was unavailable until the end of the rubber boom, and the former had to be slowly rebuilt after the rubber boom, so that conditions permitting the development of real power have only arisen recently. It took seventy years of peace and the consequent freedom to build settlements free from the need to flee at a moment’s notice, and of demographic growth, for these conditions to arise. We must consider that these conditions have rarely been available to lowland South Americans over the past four hundred years, so that when the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was developed it is arguable that few if any of the area’s societies were in a condition to have manifested power structures even if their political ideals permitted these. Under those circumstances it is understandable that such a hypothesis should develop. It is even probable that the early ethnologists’ observations were accurate and that these groups were, in fact, organized along egalitarian lines. What is not accurate is the deduction from these observations of an egalitarian Amazonian social ‘essence,’ typical of the ahistoric structural-functionalism

approach. Yet the observations made at that very particular historical juncture were interpreted as permanent, essential features of the societies observed. These conclusions can no longer simply be accepted: even if Amazonian societies were largely egalitarian in the 1940s, that does not mean that they were always egalitarian, always will be, or are essentially so.

If my argument is correct, then there is every reason to believe that what we see now is more reflective of indigenous political organization than what was seen sixty or seventy years ago. Increasingly, Amazonian peoples are securing rights to land, are establishing peaceful relations with one another and with non-indigenous people, and have the population levels and freedom from interference to develop social systems of considerable complexity along lines of their own design. They are able to fulfill ideals of political action that have been unattainable until recently. Therefore, the types of political organization we see developing today are much more reflective of what an indigenous political system is really like, than are those of the 1930s that were hampered by externally imposed conditions of depopulation and land insecurity.

The third argument concerning historical context and the validity of the Marubo as a test case for the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism concerns the time-depth of access to the state as a mode of stratification in Amazonian societies. This argument is presented at greater length in the section on means of production of the social network in Chapter Nine. In brief, there is evidence from ethnohistorical research (Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor 1988) that prior to the arrival of Spaniards the societies of Western Amazonia had long been in contact with highland states, and were in fact part of an intricate regional interaction sphere connecting lowlands and highlands.

Lowland groups such as the Panoan Kaxinawa put themselves in positions to be intermediaries between their lowland kin and the highland societies and used their access to metal goods, military backup, and prestige symbolism to create a situation of unequal power relative to those who lacked such access (Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor 1988). Therefore, processes of stratification related to access to the power of the state might be a partly prehispanic phenomenon, at least among the societies of Western Amazonia. Consequently, the argument that, because such phenomena are occurring today in relation to the Brazilian state, the political systems that are developing as a result are not indigenous, is likely to be invalid because evidence exists to suggest that the process of state-related stratification is prehispanic and, therefore, indigenous. Combining this with the previous argument suggests that what is occurring is actually the re-development of truly indigenous systems of political organization after many years in which they were prevented from developing by adverse historical conditions.

The fourth argument could be termed the ‘so what if they do’ argument. The most recent syntheses of egalitarianism suggest that it is an ethos as much as a mode of social organization (Boehm 1999). Egalitarian societies have belief systems that consciously devalue power and efforts to obtain it. This is similar to Clastres’ argument that lowland societies consciously reject power as equivalent to nature (where culture is its absence). In either case, egalitarian societies consciously reject power even when they are aware of its existence, i.e., if there are states nearby. Therefore, egalitarian societies would not stratify no matter how much contact with a state occurred, because it is against their most deeply held values. If a society undergoing increasing contact with the state becomes increasingly stratified as a result, then it could not have been egalitarian in the

first place because in an egalitarian system stratification would not occur as the members of society would actively reject and suppress it. Therefore, if a society develops stratification as a result of contact with a state, it was not egalitarian to begin with, and is even less egalitarian as a result. In either case, the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is disproved. So what if they do stratify in relation to the state, this argument concludes, the hypothesis is still falsified. This argument reinforces the previous ones by suggesting that some of these societies in fact had distinctly un-egalitarian political belief systems but did not have the population levels or settlement stability necessary to fully develop these ideals; as soon as they have the opportunity, however, they stratify. Therefore, even if their organization appeared egalitarian sixty or seventy years ago, they were not in fact egalitarian because they kept the doors to power open even when they could not walk through them, and they walked through as soon as possible.

A final issue related to the validity of the Marubo as a test case for the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism has to do with changes internal to Marubo society during and since the rubber boom. These changes are related to the activities of the post-rubber boom leader, João Tuxáua. These activities are discussed mainly in the section on feasting in Chapter Seven, in the rubber-boom oral histories in Chapter Eight, and in the section on use of force in Chapter Ten. From these data it is clear that João Tuxáua was the main force behind a revitalization movement (Wallace 1956) that caused profound changes in the Marubo value system. From the end of the rubber boom on, the Marubo underwent a change in the frequency of use and the number of contexts for appropriate use of force, a change which essentially removed the element of force from the intra-

Marubo political game. If such a dramatic change has occurred as a direct result of a traumatic encounter with non-indigenous people, then is not what we are seeing today radically removed from anything we could consider ‘traditional’ indigenous sociopolitical organization? It is not, because the process of selection of cultural traits drew on the pre-existing pool of cultural variants. There is no reason to believe that the belief system propagated by João Tuxáua was syncretic in any way. He drew the survivors of the rubber boom to a remote area where he subjected young people to intensive programs of enculturation including learning of traditional mythology, cosmology, and healing practices. The Marubo existed in complete isolation for some forty years, 1910-1950. Thus, João Tuxáua did not create a new synthesis of indigenous and non-indigenous beliefs, he simply selected a set of variants of currently existing beliefs. This was an internal process of indigenous cultural change and, so, what we see today is as rooted in tradition as what we might have seen a century ago. Furthermore, if even after the conscious elimination of physical force as a feature of Marubo political contests we still find that power in its other guises *is* a feature of those politics, then we can assume that power is something that is rooted in Marubo values. What happened is that one path to power—that of coercive force—was eschewed but others were left open. If power were somehow inconsistent with Marubo values we should find a conscious rejection of it because the effect of João Tuxáua in reinforcing key values is so recent (he died in 1996). In fact, we do not, which is consistent with my argument that the Marubo have a non-egalitarian political ethos. At any rate, most of the changes in Marubo values after the rubber boom occurred under conditions of extreme isolation, so that we must consider these changes entirely indigenous in nature. Rather than contradicting it, this

supports the validity of the Marubo as a test case for the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism.

6. Consequences of Changes in Political Classification of Indigenous Amazonians

The perception of indigenous Amazonians as egalitarian has had consequences in several areas of social interaction and social thought beyond the technical domain of political typology. Because of this, a change in this perception can have broad consequences. It is not the role of this dissertation to point out what all these consequences might be. However, by highlighting a limited number of them I show that this research does have a broad significance that affects practical social interactions between indigenous and non-indigenous people as well as more abstract scientific and philosophical debates. I limit myself to pointing out three possible consequences of this research—practical, scientific, and philosophical.

From a practical standpoint, it can be argued that the generalized perception of indigenous Amazonians as egalitarians with reciprocal economies has affected the way Westerners judge the response of indigenous people to programs of economic development. When indigenous Amazonians obtain access to economic production resources or to development assistance, they are expected to distribute the benefits equally through their society, an expectation that is directly related to the perception that they are egalitarian and reciprocal. When indigenous individuals instead accumulate unequal amounts of wealth, they are *accused* of enriching themselves by non-indigenous people (Ramos 1998)—a truly bizarre case of hypocrisy in interethnic relations. We see

them as what we are not but wish we were, then judge them when they deviate from our fantasies of communistic Eden. It is to be hoped that by replacing an inaccurate perception of indigenous Amazonians with an accurate one, the tendency to negatively judge indigenous entrepreneurs—a subtle way of keeping them from economic development—can be curtailed.

From a scientific standpoint, this research should highlight the significance of proper methodology in political ethnography. I have pointed out in this chapter how the methods used by the early ethnologists virtually dictated their results. These results were based on incomplete data, ignoring many forms of power and politics that are today considered essential to accuracy and completeness in political ethnography. For this research, I developed methods of inquiry specifically geared to constructing an accurate understanding of an indigenous Amazonian political system. The picture that emerges from use of these methods is very different from that which emerged from more limited methods, or from research that uses no real method at all. In this sense, this research has two important consequences. Firstly, it should lead us to question the results of research that is based on inadequate methods, or that lacks method altogether. Secondly, I strongly hope that it will lead future researchers into small-scale political systems to use methods that can accurately determine the role of power in those systems.

From a philosophical standpoint, I have pointed out that Lévi-Strauss made a direct connection between the political dimension of indigenous Amazonian social life and the validity of Rousseau's ideas about the place of inequality in human social nature. The issue of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism is thus linked to the Rousseau-Hobbes debate in western philosophy (Rousseau 1984[1755]; Hobbes 1947[1651]). This is essentially a

debate between two positions: on the one hand, that the first human societies had no inequality (Rousseau's position); on the other hand, that mutual oppression by force is the basic human condition (Hobbes' position). This research affects the way Amazonian societies are seen in terms of the role of inequality and power in their political systems; since these societies have been seen as supporting one side in the Rousseau-Hobbes debate, a change in our perception of indigenous Amazonian politics can affect the debate as a whole.

I emphasize that these three issues are merely examples of a wider range of effects and consequences of this research that could be considered. However, these issues, while interesting, are ultimately tangential to the dissertation, the role of which is limited to testing the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. I point out these consequences of my research only to show that it does have a broader significance beyond the central issue of political typology. To bolster this argument, I will revisit these issues in the conclusions once it is clear what changes are necessary to our perception of indigenous Amazonian politics.

B. Methods of Inquiry

In designing a research methodology, I sought primarily to follow basic scientific procedure by designing a method for gathering data which would determine whether Marubo politics were egalitarian *or not*. It was a major concern of mine that the methods should be capable of finding non-egalitarian politics, but should also be capable of finding egalitarian politics if such was the case. The hypothesis had to be falsifiable,

such that the data gathered could prove it true *or* false. The hypothesis in question was that of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, and the procedure called for the validity of this general hypothesis to be tested by detailed examination of its validity in a particular case. To carry out this test, I examined a variety of published methods for inquiry in political ethnography. I determined the type of data that would be required for the test, and the methods that would produce such data. The data had to include territory covered by previous researchers so as to examine the validity of their conclusions; but I also wanted to go beyond what previous researchers in lowland South America had done, to obtain new types of data that had not been included in the formulation of previous conclusions concerning lowland politics.

In addition to falsifiability and relevance to past research, a major concern in research design was methodological redundancy. This concern derived from the fact that I could not predict field conditions with much accuracy, and so could not hope to determine which methods would prove fruitful and which impossible to carry out or simply irrelevant when confronted with field realities. Therefore, I wanted a wide variety of methods available so that if some of them were unproductive, others would yield data. Hence I made sure to come at the issue of politics and inequality from a variety of angles, with the expectation that some of these angles would be productive lines of inquiry, and the equal expectation that some would not.

In the methodological design for this dissertation, the primary influence was the approach of action theory in political anthropology (Mair 1969; Vincent 1978), and specifically the methods of inquiry of the so-called ‘Manchester school’ of British ethnography (Turner 1957; Middleton 1960; Van Velsen 1964). There were theoretical

as well as practical reasons for this. From a theoretical perspective, action theory was designed to go beyond precisely the type of frameworks which Amazonian ethnography seemed to me to be stuck in. Action theory was in many ways a response to the methods of structural-functionalism as exemplified by Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard. Those methods were based on obtaining a portrayal of social structure. Victor Turner and others went beyond the portrayal of social structure to examine the behavior of individuals within the social structure. In Africa, as in South America, societies had been categorized politically by socio-structural analysis according to the presence or absence of centralized power structures (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940), but the new focus on the individual within the structure led to a fine-grained understanding of the non-centralized political systems and the active political lives of people in ‘tribes without rulers’ (Middleton and Tait 1958). Genealogical successors of action theory methods were subsequently applied in New Guinea, with similar results (e.g., Josephides 1985). This line of research into decentralized political systems led directly to the current of thought that questions the reality of the concept of egalitarianism and the real role of power in societies that appear structurally egalitarian (Flanagan 1989). However, it was a type of research methodology that had been but sparingly applied in the South American lowlands (for an example, see Arvelo-Jimenez 1971). It seemed to me that to be confirmed, the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism had to survive sustained analysis by the methods of action theory. If these societies were truly egalitarian, then research by the methods of action theory would confirm that; but such research also held out the potential to produce new data that would force a reconsideration of old conclusions.

The practical reasons for the adoption of methods from action theory involved the methodological explicitness of authors in that tradition. Turner (1957), Middleton (1960), Van Velsen (1964) and Mair (1969) all provided details of methods of inquiry that could produce relevant data on political systems. I could see that the types of data thereby produced were not commonly found in ethnographies of lowland South Americans, and based on available ethnographic data on the Marubo (see Chapter Two) I could see that many of these methods could be applied to the Marubo in such a way as to produce precisely the type of data I wanted: data serving to potentially falsify the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism, while simultaneously retaining the potential to confirm it.

The method most closely linked to the Manchester School is known as the 'extended-case method' or 'situational analysis'. This was pioneered by Victor Turner (1957). Turner began with an analysis of Ndembu social structure and the general parameters of Ndembu social action. From the basis of this structural analysis, he proceeded to an analysis of individual behavior within the context of the structure. Individuals were followed through sequences of events ('social dramas') which illustrated the way structural relationships were actually played out. This method did not ignore structural analysis, it built on it:

The extended-case method can only be used in conjunction with a statement of the structure of the society for it deals essentially with the way in which individuals are able to exercise choices within the limits of a specified social structure. The extended case is not merely an excerpt from the fieldworker's notebook. It is an edited extract designed to show the way in which the variations excluded by the necessary process of abstraction are in fact contained within the social structure. The anthropologist therefore studies the social structure of a people by whatever means available to him over as large a part of society as he can manage. He carries out his village censuses, he collects his genealogies, he attends ceremonies and social occasions, he listens to court cases and tribunals, he talks to people and he consults

documentary sources where these exist. Where he can, he presents data in quantitative form, for the extended-case method is in no way a substitute for quantitative methods of study. This use of ‘case material’ is different from that proposed by sociologists some twenty-five years ago when a controversy arose between antagonists some of whom advocated ‘case study’ methods and some ‘statistical’ methods as if they were mutually exclusive alternatives. Situational analysis is supplementary to, not competitive with other methods of studying a social system. An excellent modern example of the combined use of quantitative, observational and extended-case methods is in Turner’s study of the social processes in Ndembu villages.

(Mitchell 1964:xii-xiii)

The starting point for political ethnography using the methods of action theory is thus an analysis of social structure. This forms the basis for subsequent analysis of individual behavior. For this dissertation, this is useful because previous research on lowland politics was heavily informed by the concept of social structure. To ensure that my research reflected on the validity of prior work on the topic, I had to obtain the same type of data as prior researchers obtained (in *addition* to new types of data). Therefore the analysis of social structure would serve to ensure that my research would reflect on the validity of prior work as well as setting up the use of the extended-case method.

To follow this procedure I planned to conduct a complete census and genealogy of Marubo society immediately upon arrival. The plan called for me to begin fieldwork with a series of short visits covering every Marubo settlement, establishing a complete census and understanding of kinship relations prior to any further research. In practice, the census and genealogical work had to be carried out in three separate stages over nine months of fieldwork. The local Brazilian government agents interpreted my permit to signify that I had to begin my fieldwork on the upper Curuçá, where the government post was located (in fact a tiny bark-walled hut with little more than a radio, a skeleton typewriter and a hammock). I complied, and commenced by obtaining a census and genealogy of the upper Curuçá. This was begun in August 1997 and complete by

October. I then made plans to proceed to the Ituí River, but was blocked by bureaucratic issues for several months. Eventually I was able to visit the Ituí in December 1997 and January 1998, and to obtain during my visit a complete census and genealogy of that area. I then sought the earliest opportunity to carry out a census of the middle Curuçá, the only area I did not yet have these data for. To reach those settlements I had to descend the river to Atalaia first because the only way to go was to take advantage of a group of Marubo that was travelling to Atalaia and back. Downriver I was delayed by a visa problem. Finally I came back up the Curuçá, where I obtained the census of the middle Curuçá Marubo villages on the 10th and 11th of April, 1998.

The procedure I followed was straightforward. To obtain the census and genealogies I visited each *shovo* in succession. By December 1998 I could carry out inquiries in this area without an interpreter, but I was never sure my interpretations were fully accurate. Thus, I always had an interpreter with me in carrying out this research. The one that most helped me was Ronipa, who guided me to the Ituí *shovo* and also helped me with several upper Curuçá *shovo*. Txanõpa and Amélia also helped me at Aldeia Maronal. On the middle Curuçá I was assisted by César Dolis. I was welcomed in every *shovo* and found that people enjoyed testing their knowledge of kinship relations and genealogical connections.

At each *shovo* I began by asking who was the *shovo ivo*. I then used the inquiry routine known as ‘the genealogical method of anthropological inquiry’ (Rivers 1968[1914]). This involves use of only the terms *mother*, *father*, *child*, *husband*, and *wife*, the minimum possible number of kinship terms necessary to the construction of genealogies, in order to avoid confusion over ambiguous classificatory terms. I first

asked of the *shovo ivo*, who is his mother and father. Did either the mother or father have spouses other than each other? What other children did each have? This provides as a beginning point a chart of the descendants of the *shovo ivo*'s parents. I then proceeded by asking the same questions: (1) Who are this person's parents? (2) Who did this person marry? (3) What children did this person have. I continued until I was satisfied that I knew everybody who lived in that *shovo* and their relationships to each other as well as some of their relationships to other *shovo*. For each individual I recorded the sex; the name(s) (both child name and teknonym as well as Portuguese name, wherever possible); the kinship relations, as explained above; where possible, the age; the individual's exogamous lineage affiliation; other significant social roles occupied or performed by the individual, particularly political or religious roles; and the types of relationships with non-indigenous people the individual had. The census eventually covered 871 individuals.

Upon completion of each stage in the census, I compared the data thereby produced to the genealogical and census data obtained by Julio Cezar Melatti during his visit in 1974 and 1975. Dr. Melatti generously made available to me a copy of his manuscript containing these data. By comparing the two censuses I was able to discern what changes had occurred since 1975. I tracked individuals from one census to the other to obtain a database on residential movements. The comparison also produced data on how the thirteen *shovo* that existed in 1975 became the thirty-eight that existed in 1998. I obtained a database on the fissioning and fusing of *shovo* and of villages, on village formation, and on the population movements that had occurred in Marubo society from 1975 to 1998. Having thus obtained an exhaustive database on residential changes,

through informant interviews I obtained information on the reasons for the residence changes. As often as possible, I asked directly of the individuals involved why they had moved; where this was not possible I asked other informants. I thus obtained a rich (though not exhaustive) database on the causes of and reasoning behind changes of residence, especially those involving substantial groups.

The data obtained through the genealogy and census, its comparison to Dr. Melatti's data, and the interviews to elucidate the reasons for the differences between these sets of data, were put to a variety of analytic uses. Upon return from the field, my first task was to analyze the data to test Lévi-Strauss' theory of reciprocity in marriage exchanges. Lévi-Strauss' assertion that societies with elementary structures of kinship had social structures organized on the principle of reciprocity was based on specific claims about the effect of these kinship systems on population distribution. The main claim was that marriage exchanges tended to produce demographic equality among groups. To test the applicability of this theory in the Marubo case I counted the number of people in each exogamous lineage, each *shovo* and each village. I then rendered these numbers as proportions of the total population and compared these proportions to those that existed in 1975, as calculated from the data of Dr. Melatti. As a result I was able to render conclusions about the validity, in the Marubo case, of Lévi-Strauss' claims that reciprocity is the structuring principle of certain types of societies—claims that are a major underpinning of the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter Eight.

The second step taken with the census data was an analysis of the social composition of *shovo*. This method was adapted from Victor Turner's Schism and

Continuity in an African Society (1957). I took as point of reference the *shovo ivo*. For each *shovo* I listed what each individual's kin relation to the the *shovo ivo* was. I then tabulated the numbers for each type of relation. This shows what social relationships most commonly form coresident groups—i.e., what are the social bonds that hold groups together. It gives an idea of how the kinship system is reflected in actual coresident arrangements. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter Four.

The data from the 1997-98 census provided a complete picture of the web of kin relations connecting the Marubo. It also showed who occupied the main political and religious statuses—*kakaya*, *shovo ivo*, *romeaya*, and *këxitxo*. To this was added the analysis of social composition. The result was a complete picture of the Marubo social structure and the position of each individual within it.

The original plan was to carry out the census and genealogy all at once, at the start of fieldwork, then proceed to use the extended-case method. Since it proved impracticable to obtain all the census data sequentially, I found myself from the beginning compelled to remain in one village for an extended period. I therefore commenced the use of the extended-case method immediately upon insertion to the fieldsite.

The method called for me to follow the activities of specific individuals in successions of related events over time in order to observe how individuals use the room for maneuver left open by the social structure. In this sense I focused on the activities of individuals in what are called *fields of choice* (Swartz 1968). Fields of choice are areas of social activity in which individual actors exercise choice within the parameters set by the social structure. Actors' interests are revealed by the choices they make. This

provides a source of data on the goals people are pursuing and the strategies employed in pursuit of those goals. In turn, this enables the analyst to discern whether or not access to commonly cherished goals is equally distributed and the processes governing distribution of access to these goals. If access is unequal, then we may expect various forms of conflict to occur. These can be between different people with the same goal, or with the same goal but different strategies, or with different goals. Observing the way multiple, often conflicting strategies unfold over time is a way to focus the observing eye on social loci wherein interpersonal conflicts of will occur and are resolved. The overall social patterns of resolution of conflicts of will are by definition the political system. These data provide a window on the issue of power. Repeated observation of the resolution of conflicts of will shows whether or not any individuals repeatedly win these conflicts. This enables the discovery of interpersonal power—the ability to impose one's will on others—even if such power is not structurally encoded or emically recognized, but rather exists only in concrete interpersonal relations that can only be observed and not heard of from informants.

The precise fields of choice analysis of which would prove fruitful, was an issue that could only be resolved once fieldwork was underway because it was impossible to predict precisely which activities would be socially prominent and which less so. I prepared as best as possible by analyzing certain classic political ethnographies to see what fields had proven fruitful to other analysts, and evaluating based on my reading of available information on the Marubo whether these modes of analysis might prove useful in the Marubo context. Ultimately, the fields of choice that proved the most informative

were ritual action, feasting, relationships with non-indigenous people, organization of labor, political meetings, and residence changes.

Techniques for the analysis of ritual action were adapted from Turner (1957) and Middleton (1960). Turner observed a succession of social events—secular as well as ritual—surrounding certain conflicts and disputes. He recorded the participants and their actions and he correlated these observations with the knowledge of the social relationships of the participants derived from prior census and genealogy work. This method proved most useful in his analysis of Ndembu ‘cults of affliction’ (Turner 1957: 295-317). He started with analysis of the social composition of ritual assemblies to understand the relationships of the participants. These cults occasioned rituals during which conflicts and disputes were brought to the surface and resolved (if only temporarily). The analysis of these ritual assemblies enabled Turner to observe conflict resolution and also to understand what kin stood together on what issues—i.e., which principles of social connection operated under a variety of different conditions. Similar methods were utilized by Middleton (1960), who observed a succession of rituals and through their analysis obtained a rich set of data on how the behavior of individuals in the field of ritual action reflected their pursuit of individual, often political goals.

During fieldwork, I observed, recorded and analyzed (mainly in writing but occasionally on video or audio) as many social gatherings as possible, but especially those involving members of multiple *shovo* and key members of the political structure. The methods of Turner and Middleton were used but adapted to the particular types of gatherings common to Marubo social life. As it turned out, the Marubo gathered together in large groups frequently and for a variety of reasons. Many of these gatherings were

recurrent, ritualized events. Healing rituals were quite frequent, and they gathered together key members in the political structure—owners of *shovo* and their married brothers, for the most part. Analysis of healing rituals proved very fruitful. The Marubo gathered together for feasts frequently, and these gatherings were much larger than healing rituals. Analysis of feasts also proved very fruitful. Finally, the Marubo gathered together for political meetings quite often—though more so in some villages than others—and this proved a key field of social action for this dissertation because decision-making processes were made quite transparent at these meetings. The analyses of healing rituals, feasting, and political meetings are found in Chapter Seven.

The analysis of organization of labor was an on-site addition to the list of fields of choice. Clued by Turner to pay close attention to social gatherings involving members of multiple residential sites, I noted that Marubo *shovo* often cooperated with one another in agriculture, construction of *shovo*, path-cutting, canoe-building, organization of feasts, and other tasks. I carefully recorded as many instances as possible of multiple-*shovo* cooperation in organization of labor and analyzed their social composition. The results of this analysis are also found in Chapter Seven.

In all this, there is a difference between the way I proceeded and what I interpret to be ideal procedure. I did not have a complete Marubo census until nine months into my fieldwork. Thus, for many of the social gatherings I had to record the participants as best as I could, often by simple physical tags, and I only developed a full understanding of their social relationships much later. Nevertheless these methods proved very effective. In many cases, new understandings of events that had occurred early in fieldwork came to me long after the conclusion of fieldwork when I had time to fully

analyze the relationships of event participants and to correlate their actions with the actions I observed in other fields of choice. In addition, I had originally wanted to live in two villages selected according to unlike levels of contact with non-indigenous people, for six months each, but this proved impracticable. I had to settle for a stay of nine and a half months in one village—Aldeia Maronal—combined with briefer visits to other villages. I was still able to follow successions of actions, choices, and decisions made by members of villages other than Aldeia Maronal, by using the radio, taking advantage of short visits, and eliciting information from the ever-fruitful Marubo grapevine (i.e., gossip). By far my most detailed and productive observations were specific to Aldeia Maronal. However, sufficient data from other villages was obtained so as to check on the typicality of Maronal political processes (which are in fact atypical) and acquire some understanding of political processes elsewhere.

Probably the most fruitful field of choice in terms of sheer data production was the field of relationships with non-indigenous people. This was a major concern of many Marubo people. By observing how people acted in relation to non-indigenous people I was able to obtain data on goals, strategies, conflict, and conflict resolution. These data proved decisive in my interpretation of Marubo politics because it was in this field that I observed interpersonal power, as reflected in certain individuals' repeatedly winning conflicts of will. These results are presented in Chapter Six.

The sixth field of choice analyzed was residence choice. This method of inquiry was adapted from Van Velsen (1964). Van Velsen found that the social structure did not narrowly define where any given individual may live. Instead, people choose where to live in accordance with calculations of self-interest. By studying residence choices over a

period of time it is possible to obtain data on what goals are being pursued through residence changes. As explained above, I obtained a database on residential movements by comparing my census with Dr. Melatti's and a database on the goals pursued through residence changes through interviews. These data are presented in Chapter Five. The data on residence changes were also essential to evaluating Lévi-Straussian conceptions of Amazonian leadership, as will be explained below.

The analysis of fields of choice was my primary method for seeking forms of interpersonal power beyond what is explicitly encoded in the social structure. It was a way to examine interpersonal relations in such a way as to ascertain the presence or absence of power in those relationships. It was a method that proved extremely useful and highly productive in the Marubo context.

The data from the genealogy and census and on choice and change in residence were used to construct a picture of the Marubo political economy of people. To establish the existence of a Marubo political economy of people I had to show that human resources are valued as wealth and are actively pursued as such. To this end, I first analyzed the behavior of leaders in relation to residence changes. I wanted to see if leaders made observable efforts aimed at constructing, retaining and expanding social networks by accumulating human resources. I found such behavior to be quite common. I also looked for conflicts among leaders over allocation of personnel. These conflicts were also observable, often involving postmarital residence. I then examined the actions of nonleaders to see if they were consciously manipulating their residence choices so as to maximize their social profit. The method for this was analysis of the data on the reasoning behind residence changes. The results of this analysis are found in Chapter

Nine. When these data were put together it became quite clear that there was indeed a Marubo political economy of people.

Having established that social networks and human resources are a form of wealth, I proceeded to examine the distribution of this product and of its means of production with a view to determining if inequality existed. My plan called for me to determine specifically what forms of social network were considered valuable, but this proved an impossible task. There were a variety of configurations and conditions which different people found appealing, but often these were contradictory; different people sometimes held mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed goals. It was nevertheless clear that certain configurations were widely regarded as desirable, and that the quality of having such a configuration was unequally distributed. In particular, it was clear that village leaders wanted to make their villages larger, in part to extend the range of their authority, and that success in village expansion was very unequally distributed. It became necessary to explain this unequal distribution. To do this, I identified and analyzed the means whereby social networks are produced.

The chief means of production of the social network that were analyzed were marriage (and more specifically, polygyny), control over postmarital residence, and access to valued relations to non-indigenous people. I also investigated the possibility that exercise of leadership roles and shamanic roles were means of production of the social network. I determined the distribution of access to these means of production. I then checked to see which means of production correlated with unequal success in social-network production. In this way, I arrived at explanations for the development of demographic inequalities in Marubo society. I had previously observed the distribution

of power through analysis of fields of choice; I now concluded my analysis of the political economy of people by checking for correlations between power and social wealth, and between power and unequal access to the means of production of the social network. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter Nine.

The analysis of the political economy of people proved extremely significant to my eventual conclusions on Marubo politics. This analysis showed a system of competition over access to limited resources. The system produced inequalities and that inequality was a socially accepted and emically recognized goal. This strongly affects the validity of Clastres' model of lowland social organization, as is explained in Chapters Nine and Eleven.

To check the validity of previous conclusions about lowland South American leadership it was necessary to gather specific types of data about the behavior of leaders. Firstly it was necessary to obtain information about the role of leaders in residence changes and the extent to which such changes were related to food-production activities. This information is presented in Chapter Five. To examine the validity of Clastres' interpretations it was necessary to make a detailed analysis of polygyny. This is presented in Chapter Nine as part of the analysis of the political economy of people. It was necessary to understand the behavior of leaders in terms of coercive force (rather, alleged lack thereof), generosity, oratory, and conflict resolution, the classic features of lowland headmen according to Lowie. These data are presented in Chapter Ten. The data on behavior of leaders was gathered by simple observation. In this sense the main target of my ethnographic gaze was Alfredo, the headman of Aldeia Maronal. Observations of Alfredo as well as conversations with him, and conversations with others

about him, were a major source of data. However, it was clear that Alfredo was exceptional (though not abnormal) among Marubo headmen so I made sure to learn something about other leaders' behavior as a check on the typicality of my observations on Alfredo.

To render conclusions about what Marubo politics are like, I put together the data from the different methods of inquiry used: (1) data from the analysis of fields of choice, Chapters Five through Seven; (2) examination of the operation of reciprocity on Marubo society, Chapter Eight; (3) description and analysis of the Marubo political economy of people, Chapter Nine; and observations of the behavior of leaders, Chapter Ten. The conclusions are presented in Chapter Eleven.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESIDENTIAL BASIS OF POLITICAL COHESION AND CONFLICT

Analysis of census data serves to reveal the residential basis of political group unity, and thus the basis for groups engaging in common action, as residential groups exemplify. First I will present data on the overall distribution of population throughout Maruboland. I will proceed to analyze social composition of Marubo villages and of 27 individual *shovo*. This will show what social relationships are used to make up a functioning *shovo*, as well as suggest what strategies a leader must use to establish and maintain an independent *shovo*, and how authority and status are distributed within the *shovo*.

Following the social composition analysis, I will tabulate data on residence of unwed minors with respect to their parents. This will show what percentage of families is normative. At Maronal, 25% of children reside with one parent alone. By explaining each case of broken family, I will be able to show some of the social forces that tend to oppose unity and disrupt normative lifestyles. Analysis will show that relationships between men and women can be very brittle in Marubo society, and will reveal other conflictive zones within the Marubo social system. These are the relationships that subject Marubo villages to the possibility of dispersion of personnel.

The completed census analysis will show what relationships bring groups together and hold them together within Marubo society, and what relationships threaten to split groups apart. These data are essential to understanding the following chapter (Chapter Five), which will examine the causes of residential movements, and how these involve alliance and schism.

A. Distribution of Marubo Population

Three sets of census data on the Marubo are available and have been used in this analysis. For this chapter the most important is the census obtained by myself during fieldwork in 1997-98. Data on the upper Curuçá population was obtained and continuously updated during the entirety of fieldwork, from July 1997 to July 1998. Data on the population of Ituí was obtained during a visit to that river from 27 December 1997 to 4 January 1998. Data on the middle Curuçá was obtained during a visit, in April 1998. Middle Ituí was not visited. Census data on the middle Ituí was obtained from three residents of that location who were travelling to other villages.

The second source of data is the census taken by Dr. Júlio Cezar Melatti in 1974-5 and updated by him in 1978. This census is an extremely important set of data for the following chapter on residential movements.

The third set of data is a census of Aldeia Maronal that was made available to me at the CIVAJA offices in Atalaia do Norte. Unfortunately, this census is of unknown authorship. It was made in 1995 and was helpful in providing a starting point for the understanding of social relationships at Maronal. However, in the course of fieldwork I discovered numerous errors in the 1995 census, and I was forced to update completely the Maronal census with the help of several informants. This source of data was not used

for the analysis which this chapter and the following ones are based on. However, it was of great assistance in the construction of my own census, because instead of having to conduct a census from scratch I only had to revise an existing census, so that regardless of its anonymity of authorship it proved very useful.

In the course of my fieldwork I recorded the existence of 857 Marubo. This count probably misses a certain number of Marubo dwelling in towns in Amazonia and Acre, specifically Atalaia do Norte, Cruzeiro do Sul, and Manaus. I counted 427 male and 432 female Marubo. However, there are 8 male and 2 female non-Marubo who are married to or descended from Marubo (in the matrilineal Marubo system, children of a non-Marubo mother are non-Marubo) and live in Marubo *shovo*. Including these non-Marubo, the sex ratio is 435 males and 434 females.

These counts do not include the fluctuating population of American, Canadian, and Brazilian New Tribes missionaries, which at maximum consisted of 14 permanent inhabitants in two missions. All missionaries are married couples. In addition, there are 4 Mayoruna, 4 Kulina, one Kanamari, and a Peruvian man living among the Marubo.

The bulk of the Marubo population is distributed along two rivers, the Curuçá and Ituí (see Figure 8.2). There are 23 Marubo in Atalaia do Norte, 2 Marubo in Cruzeiro do Sul, 359 on the Curuçá river and 475 on the Ituí river. At present we may consider Maruboland to consist of the areas in between the uppermost and lowermost settlements on the Ituí and Curuçá rivers, as well as the areas north and south of them that are regularly utilized and fall within the boundaries of the Área Indígena do Javari. Within Maruboland we may count four concentrations of population, with ten villages (*aldeias*) and 37 *shovo*. This information is represented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1.: Comments

Note that four of the ten villages are relatively large, one medium-sized, and five small. On the upper Curuçá river may found the largest Marubo village, Aldeia Maronal, with 220 people. The village of São Sebastião on the middle Curuçá is also rather large at 115 people. São Sebastião has an outlier village, Tacanal, a single *shovo* with 24 people.

The Ituí is organized rather differently. The population of the upper Ituí, totaling 370 people, is dispersed among six villages ranging in population from 22 to 152 inhabitants. On the mid-Ituí is Aldeia Rio Novo, which theoretically has 105 inhabitants; in practice, however, because several families from this village have employment in Atalaia, the population of Rio Novo at any given moment hovers at 80.

TABLE 4.1.:
POPULATION OF MARUBO SETTLEMENTS

<u>River</u>	<u>Aldeia</u>	<u># shovo</u>	<u>population</u>
Ituí	Rio Novo	3	Middle
			105
Upper			
Ituí	Vida Nova	5	152
	Praia	1	22
	Liberdade	2	39
	Paulino	1	33
	Paraná	1	22
	Água Branca	2	38
	Alegria	3	64
Middle			
Curuçá	Tacanal	1	24
	São Sebastião	7	115
Upper			
Curuçá	Maronal	12	220
	Totals	38	834

B. Analysis of Social Composition of 27 Marubo *Shovo*

Based on the genealogical and census data available, an analysis of composition of Marubo *shovo* was carried out. The objective of this analysis is to uncover the forces that bind people together into residential groups Marubo society. This is of great importance to the understanding of political organization as it offers a perspective on the basis for cooperation to achieve common goals.

Analysis focused on tabulating the relationships between the *shovo ivo (dono da maloca)*; ‘hut-owner) and the inhabitants of the *shovo*. Differences in social composition exist from village to village. The data will therefore be presented by village.

1. Aldeia Maronal

The inhabitants of Maronal may be placed in three categories according to their relationship to the owner of the *shovo* they live in. I have labelled these categories *shovo*-owner’s ‘primary’, ‘secondary’, and ‘tertiary’ families, defined in Table 4.2

Table 4.2
Social Composition, Aldeia Maronal

A. Primary family: *Shovo*-owners, their spouses, direct descendants, and direct descendants' spouses.

<u>Category</u>	<u>n</u>
1. <i>Shovo</i> owners	12
2. <i>Shovo</i> -owners' children	58
3. <i>Shovo</i> -owners' children's children	9
4. <i>Shovo</i> -owners' wives	15
5. <i>Shovo</i> -owners' children's spouses	9
Total	103

B. Secondary family: *Shovo*-owners' siblings, siblings' spouses, siblings' direct descendants, and siblings' direct descendants' spouses.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Patrilateral</u>	<u>Matrilateral</u>	<u>Classificatory Total</u>
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother	9	1	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother's children	29	3	1
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother's children's children	17	5	0
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother's wife	9	0	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother's children's wife	5	1	0
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's sister	2	0	4
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's sister's children	2	0	6
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's sister's children's children	1	0	0
Total	74	10	15
			99

C. Tertiary family: Other.

<u>Category</u>	<u>n</u>
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's wife's children	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's wife's children's children	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's wife's siblings	3
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's wife's mother	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's mother	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's brother's mother	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's daughter's husband's brother	2
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's daughter's husband's brother's wife	1
<i>Shovo</i> -owner's daughter's husband's brother's children	2

Table 4.2: comments

It may be seen from table 4.2 that 91.8% of individuals at Maronal are in the categories of primary or secondary kin of the *shovo*-owner. We may conclude that there are two major social forces at work in the determination of residence at Maronal. In the first place, *shovo*-owners invariably marry and have children. In the second place, the bond between brothers expands the *shovo*'s population to include the brother's spouse and descendants as well. These two components are of almost equal importance, as the *shovo*-owner's families are 46.8% of the population of Maronal, while the *shovo*-owner's brother's families are 45% of the population of Maronal.

Of slightly lesser numerical importance but significant nevertheless is the ability to attract permanently residing spouses for one's descendants. There are 15 examples (6.8% of the total) of this occurrence: nine cases of *shovo*-owner's children's spouses and six cases of *shovo*-owner's brother's spouses.

From these data we may isolate a norm. The *shovo*-owner typically lives with his wife or wives, children, children's spouses, and children's children. He often has with him one or more brothers, who also have wives, children, children's spouses, and children's children.

The deviations from the norm may also be enumerated as they are limited in number:

- (1) A *shovo*-owner dies, leaving the *shovo* to his son; the widow thus falls into the category of *shovo*-owner's mother (2 examples) or *shovo*-owner's patrionbrother's mother (1 case).
- (2) A man marries a widow or a divorcée and raises her children (2 cases).

(3) A problem arises whereby a mother is temporarily unable to care for her children, who go to live with their grandmother (7 cases).

(4) A woman divorces and lives with her sons, who are the *shovo*-owner's brothers (1 case).

(5) A woman divorces and lives with her daughters and sons-in-law (2 cases); she brings her children with her (2 cases).

(6) Men who are classificatory brothers live together with one of their wife's fathers (3 cases); one of them is married (1 case) with two children.

(7) There is a single case of uxorilocal residence. The individual in question lives with his wife's father and he has three children.

(8) Out of the 91 cases of *shovo*-owner's children and *shovo*-owner's brother's children, 11% (n=10) are women who do not marry or are unwilling to go live with the father of their children. These women live with their parents but not with their spouses. These women have 11 children, 35.5% of *shovo*-owner's children's children and *shovo*-owner's brother's children's children (11 out of 31). The phenomenon of the single mother is thus a significant component of the expansion of the *shovo* into the second descending generation.

(9) On one occasion, the *shovo*-owner died and one of his daughters, Txuna-ni, left to live in another village. Txuna-ni's daughter Rave stayed behind and bore a child out of wedlock.

The processes that cause deviation from norms will be examined in a subsequent section.

2.. Aldeia Vida Nova

The residential arrangements whereby *shovo* are formed and persist are at the root of all other forms of political organization, as they constitute the basis for coalition-building and the formation of self-interest; at the same time, each type of arrangement not only binds its members together, but also sets up potential fault-lines where conflict and schism may occur. The bulk of this dissertation is based on observations taken at Maronal, where uxorilocality is insignificant. Vida Nova exemplifies the processes not found at Maronal; in order to acquire a better understanding of the range of Marubo social organization and of those processes not occurring at Maronal, the social composition of Vida Nova's five *shovo* will receive brief independent treatments.

TABLE 4.3.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF TAMĀPA'S *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	10
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter</i>	2
Total	18

Tamāpa-*shovo*: Comments

We note here a pattern very similar to the Maronal norm with one exception: the category of sister's daughter ($2/18=11.1\%$) replaces that of children's spouse. This reflects the practice of true cross-cousin marriage, albeit virilocal in this case. Cross-cousin marriage in this *shovo* is part of a larger system of exchange fitting the guidelines of Kariera-type kinship (see Table 8.5.).

TABLE 4.4.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF TXUMĀPA'S *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i>	12
<i>Shovo-owner's children's spouses</i>	3
Total	21

Txumãpa-*shovo*: Comments

The *shovo* belonging to Txumãpa is very similar to Tamãpa's. There is very little deviation from the norm that was discerned at Maronal, save for the absence of any brothers for the *shovo ivo*. A closer analysis, however, reveals a significant difference relative to the Maronal norm. Among the three 'children's spouses' two are son's wives and one is a daughter's husband. Thus, Txumãpa's sons live virilocally but he has at least one daughter living uxorilocally.

Txumãpa's daughter's husband is named Simão. Simão is older than Txumãpa's sons, speaks Portuguese, has experience living among non-indigenous peoples, and learned traditional myth- and healing songs from his father Misael. Thus, Simão has considerable status and in fact plays a role in this *shovo* second only to Txumãpa. This secondary, 'lieutenant' role is played at Maronal always by the *shovo ivo*'s brother, never by a son-in-law. Simão may look forward to increased leadership as Txumãpa ages. Simão, his wife, and four children compose 28.6% (6/21) of the *shovo*.

It should be noted that Simão and his brother Ako both married Txumãpa's daughters, but while Simão resides uxorilocally, Ako resides virilocally. The reason for this is not known. However, in accordance with other data, we may presume that the promise of higher status over time is a major factor in inducing a man to live uxorilocally. Txumãpa's sons are married to Simão's sisters and cousins (classificatory sisters) in a Kariera-type exchange system (see Figure 8.4.).

TABLE 4.5.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF MASHKĀPA'S *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	6
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sibling</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sibling's children</i>	7
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's mother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son</i>	1
Total	20

Mashkāpa's *shovo*: comments

This *shovo* is formed along principles that are different from all the *shovo* thus far analyzed. The glue that holds this *shovo* together is not the *shovo ivo* but his mother-in-law. The *shovo ivo*'s primary family is here 40% (8/20) of the *shovo*. But the rest is not comprised, as at Maronal, by the brother's family; nor, as in other Vida Nova *shovo*, by an in-married son-in-law's family. Instead, the *shovo* is formed by his wife's sisters' families as well as his wife's mother and one wife's brother. Excluding his wife, Mashkāpa's affines thus comprise 55% of the *shovo* (11/20), outnumbering Mashkāpa and his sons.

One of Mashkāpa's wife's sisters is the mother of six children, all in residence at this *shovo*. This situation is apparently the result of a divorce. Evidence will be presented later this chapter as statistical support for the assertion that kinship has a tendency to predominate over marriage in the determination of residence. The reason why this woman and her sisters and brother moved here, of all the places they could have moved, is the presence of their siblings and mother.

Mashkāpa's mother-in-law is named Mayewa. She is elderly—in her late fifties at least—and the daughter of a famed shaman, now dead, who once dreamed of an impending Mayoruna ambush, allowing the Marubo to win a skirmish. She has three daughters, ages 29, 35, and 41, and a son, 38, living with her. She and her descendants thus comprise 90% of the inhabitants of this *shovo*, excluding only Mashkāpa himself and his sister's son Pana.

The reason for Pana's residence here instead of with his father and brothers at Tamāpa's was not ascertained. However, it is a strong supposition that he is endeavoring

to procure marriage with Mashkāpa's daughter, a marriage that is highly appropriate within the framework of the Kariera-type exchange system operational at Vida Nova. Nevertheless, although this is a strong supposition based on the social context, I have no direct evidence that he is wooing her.

TABLE 4.6.:

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF KAMĀPA'S *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i>	15
<i>Shovo-owner's children's spouse</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's children</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's children's children</i>	6
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's children's children</i>	3

Kamāpa's *shovo*: Comments

This *shovo* has more genealogical depth than any other Marubo *shovo*, and for good reason: Kamāpa is the oldest living Marubo. Kamāpa's *shovo* also exemplifies the later stages of development of the uxorilocal system of *shovo* development found on the Ituí river. The uxorilocal system has already been seen in operation at Txumāpa's *shovo*, where the son-in-law enjoyed higher status than the *shovo*-owner's sons. Here the son-in-law enjoys higher status than the elderly *shovo*-owner himself. The process of transference of status was underway during my visit.

The key element in the social composition of Kamāpa's *shovo* is the uxorilocal marriage of three of his daughters to his sister's daughter's son, Raomayāpa. Raomayāpa, his two living wives, his descendants and his descendants' spouses, account for 51.3% of this *shovo* (20/39).

What is *not* found at Kamāpa's is as interesting as what is found. His brothers are all long dead, but his sons are not. And yet, only one of his sons resides with him, Rame, a middle-aged bachelor with no children. Kamāpa's sons are widely dispersed. This *shovo* thus represents the opposite end of the spectrum from those found at Maronal, as it is not based on children or the virilocal marriage of sons, nor on the bond between brothers. It is based on uxorilocal marriage.

At Kamāpa's *shovo* the ideal of the Kariera-type *shovo*, a self-replicating four-section exchange system wherein all coresidents become kin, is in active process of creation and maintenance. Along with Pekōpapa's *shovo* and the smaller, more recent *shovo* of Tamāpa and Mashkāpa, Kamāpa and his family have pursued this avenue of

social self-replication for decades of recorded and oral history (Figure 8.5.). This may be opposed to the uxorilocal plan of *shovo* construction as found further upstream at Vim̄pa's, where the uxorilocal marriages do not fit into a multi-generational Kariera-type exchange system.

A second key component of Kamāpa's *shovo* is Wanīshavo Peko, playing a role here analogous to that of Mayewa at Mashkāpa's. This woman's presence is noted on Table 4.6. as the *shovo ivo*'s sister's child. There are three of her children in residence at Kamāpa's. One is Raomayāpa, but there are two daughters as well. These two women in turn have eight descendants. Thus, excluding the consequences of Raomayāpa's marriage, Wanīshavo and her descendants comprise 28.2% of the *shovo* (11/39). However, if we simply count all the people who are either descended from her or married to someone who is descended from her, the component increases to 79.5% of the *shovo* (31/39). Clearly, the crucial link is Raomayāpa's marriage (51.3%), but Wanishavo and her daughters add a considerable proportion of the *shovo*'s population.

The case of Wanīshavo's daughter Meto requires special mention. Meto is Kamāpa's ZDD and is the widow of a deceased shaman at Pekōpapa's *shovo*. I was told by Pekōpapa's sister's son that after the shaman died, many members of Pekōpapa's *shovo* left. Obviously this is one such case. Meto resides at Kamāpa's with her 5 children and 3 grandchildren. This is another case of the predominance of bonds of kinship over those of affinity. Meto's mother and siblings act as the attracting force drawing her here, bonds that are evidently stronger than those she formed by marriage even after 30 years of residence with her husband.

Kamāpa's *shovo* thus displays the following features:

- (1) Uxorilocal marriage plays a crucial role in *shovo* composition, as it does at Txumāpa's;
- (2) Links through an elderly woman to her daughters play a significant role, as it does at Mashkāpa's;
- (3) The owner's sons play an insignificant role and his brothers play none at all.

Were it not for the presence of his sister's daughter's descendants and their marriage to his daughters, Kamāpa would not have a *shovo*.

At first glance, it would appear that the distribution of status in this *shovo* mirrors that of Txumāpa. In fact, a reversal is in operation. At the time I visited, Raomayāpa was constructing a new *shovo*. This *shovo*, while it will house all the members of the old one, will be known as Raomayāpa's; he will thus become *shovo ivo* while Kamāpa passes into retirement. This demonstrates that a successful uxorilocal marriage need not be a path to subservience for the Marubo son-in-law. Raomayāpa has become the most influential man in the *shovo* and, since Kamāpa is becoming too old for effective leadership, Raomayāpa is poised to become *shovo ivo*. Thus, uxorilocal marriage in fact offers the possibility of increasing status and, in old age, *shovo* ownership, providing it outbalances brotherhood and descent in *shovo* composition or status.

TABLE 4.7.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PEKŌPAPA'S *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA**1. Primary family**

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
Wife	1
Children	12
Children's children	1
Wife's children	1

2. Secondary family

<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's brother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's brother's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's brother's children</i>	13
<i>Shovo-owner's brother's spouses</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's brother's children's children</i>	19
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter's son</i>	1

Pekōpapa's *shovo*: comments

This *shovo* was originally formed by four brothers, including Pekōpapa; however, two of these are now dead. One of these brothers was the shaman Veo, whose widow and children moved to Kamāpa's after his death.

Despite the formation of the *shovo* along the same agnatic lines as typical at Maronal, the expansion of this *shovo* on the second generation has followed different lines. Specifically, the uxorilocal marriage of sister's daughter's son to two brother's daughters accounts for 20.4% of the *shovo* (11/54). There is also a brother's son, married and with five children; and an uxorilocally married sister's son married to a brother's daughter and with four children. The two uxorilocal marriages thus account for 31.5% of the *shovo*, again underscoring the significance of uxorilocality in *shovo* composition at Vida Nova.

Vida Nova: concluding comments

There are significant differences in social composition of *shovo* between Maronal and Vida Nova. The tabulation of data on social composition at Maronal revealed a clear norm (Table 4.2.). The dominant practice at Maronal is that of basing a *shovo* on one's own marriage and descent **plus** the bond of brotherhood. The bond of brotherhood is of nearly equal importance to the *shovo*-owner's own marriage and descent in the demographic construction of *shovo* at Maronal. At Vida Nova, this is not the case at all. The difference is clear statistically: whereas at Maronal, the *shovo*-owner's brother and brother's family account for 38.2% of the village population, at Vida Nova that

percentage is 20.7%. These figures are statistically significant: a chi-square test reveals only a two to five percent chance that such differences could occur by chance alone.

Vida Nova is organized in an uxorilocal pattern which causes the observed variations in social composition, variations which are not, therefore, results of mere chance.

Furthermore, if we examine the category of secondary family, that is, the *shovo*-owner's siblings and their families, we find significant differences between Maronal and Vida Nova. At Maronal, *shovo*-owner's sisters and their families account for only 15 out of 99 secondary family members, or 15.2%. At Vida Nova, *shovo*-owner's sisters and their families account for 14 out of 46 secondary family members, or 30.4 % (these differences are significant too, though to a lesser degree: there is a slightly greater than 10% chance they could be arrived at by chance). We may conclude that at Vida Nova, not only are the *shovo*-owner's siblings less significant overall, but within that category, sisters and their families play a more significant role than they do at Maronal, where brothers are dominant. These differences are discernible in comparing tables 4.2. and 4.8. The explanation for the differences is to be found in the relatively greater significance of uxorilocal cross-cousin marriage and the associated centripetal attracting power of the mother-in-law at Vida Nova.

. The social processes that bind Marubo together into residential groups are not uniform across all *shovo*. The significant variations in the composition of Marubo *shovo* at Maronal and at Vida Nova exemplify this lack of uniformity. At Maronal, virilocal marriage and brotherhood are statistically dominant; at Vida Nova uxorilocal marriage and sisterhood play significant roles. The result is *shovo* that are socially different-

looking, subject to different centrifugal pressures and bearers of different centripetal forces.

Uxorilocality is the recurring feature that distinguishes Vida Nova from Maronal in terms of social composition. At Kamāpa's this accounts for 51.3% of the *shovo* (21/39); at Txumāpa's it is 28.6% (6/21); and at Pekōpapa's it is 31.5% (17/54). Overall, uxorilocally married men, their wives and children account for 30.3% of the population of Vida Nova (44/145). This should be contrasted with the single case at Maronal that accounts for 2.7% of that village's population (6/220).

As will be seen in Chapter Eight of this dissertation, these uxorilocal marriages are cross-cousin marriages following a precise Kariera-type pattern. The phenomenon of Kariera-type cross-cousin marriage, typically uxorilocal, and involving *shovo* composition via the *shovo*-owner's sister (a rare format at Maronal) accounts for 39.3% of Vida Nova (57/145).

Where uxorilocality occurs it plays a significant role not only demographically but politically, the son-in-law supplanting the son as inheritor of the *shovo*. In the case in which this takeover of leadership has actually been consummated at Vida Nova—the passing of the torch from Kamāpa to Raomayāpa—the process is accompanied by the dispersion of the *shovo*-owner's sons, such as Tamāpa, to other *shovo*. The same process, whereby the *shovo* owner's sons disperse while the son-in-law inherits authority—is discernible also in the history of the villages of Paraná and Água Branca.

A second important factor in the determination of social composition at Vida Nova is the centripetal attraction of the uterine family. In both salient cases, it is an elderly woman who plays the role of strong social attractor. At Kamāpa's this woman is

Wanishavo, the mother of Raomayāpa; as noted, she and her descendants, and those married to her descendants, compose 79.5% of that *shovo* (33/39).

At Mashkāpa's, the centripetal attraction of the uterine family is the main determinant of social composition. Here, the entirety of the *shovo* save for Mashkāpa himself and his sister's son is composed by Mayewa and her descendants—90% of the *shovo* (18/20).

TABLE 4.8.:SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF *SHOVO* AT VIDA NOVA**A. Primary Family**

<i>Shovo-owner</i> _____	5
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i> _____	6
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i> _____	36
<i>Shovo-owner's children's spouse</i> _____	3
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i> _____	32
<i>Shovo-owner's children's spouse</i> _____	4
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i> _____	1
Total _____	87

B. Secondary Family. All relationships relative to *shovo-owner*.

<i>Brother</i> _____	1
<i>Brother's wife</i> _____	1
<i>Brother's children</i> _____	14
<i>Brother's children's wife</i> _____	1
<i>Brother's children's children</i> _____	13
<i>Sister's children</i> _____	3
<i>Sister's children's children</i> _____	4
<i>Sister's children's children's children</i> _____	6
<i>Sister's children's children's children</i> _____	3
Total _____	46

C. Tertiary Family. All relationships relative to *shovo-owner*.

<i>Wife's sibling</i> _____	3
<i>Wife's sibling's children</i> _____	7
<i>Wife's mother</i> _____	1
<i>Wife's daughter</i> _____	1
Total _____	12

3. Aldeia Praia

Aldeia Praia is a single *shovo* a 45 minute walk downstream from Vida Nova. The owner's name is Wan̄eshēpa, also known as Floriano. Floriano is the son of Kamāpa's mother by a different father. In 1974-5 he lived in Kamāpa's *shovo* but by the time of my visit he had started his own *shovo*, and had already experienced an important schism.

We may note at this *shovo* the absence of any "secondary family" accompanied by a significant component of wife's family (7/19). Between the wife's brother and sister and the wife's sisters' descendants, affinity plays an important role in *shovo* composition (36.8%).

Because his son-in-law Wasinawa has moved out, it may be said of this *shovo* that it represents an unsuccessful attempt at the uxorilocal plan of *shovo* composition. Floriano has 3 sons in residence, one of whom is married with three children. It would appear that this *shovo* will follow the familiar pattern of accretion through direct descent. However, this is only because Floriano's son-in-law Wasinawa moved to Curuçá some years back and now owns his own *shovo* at Maronal. Wasinawa married two of Floriano's daughters. He has 6 children by Floriano's daughter Peko, and five children by Peko's sister Wanieshe. When he moved to Maronal, only Peko and her children went with him. Wanieshe remained in residence with her father. At the time of my passage through the area, Wasinawa lived with Peko and six children, plus his oldest daughter's husband and their children, at Maronal. The uxorilocal component was taken out of Aldeia Praia by Wasinawa's departure and, despite the significance of his wife's family, Floriano's *shovo* remains composed at its core of his own direct descendants.

TABLE 4.9.: SOCIAL COMPOSITION, ALDEIA PRAIA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sons</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's daughters</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's children</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's daughter</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's brother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister's child</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister's child's child</i>	2
Total	22

4. Aldeia Alegria

Aldeia Alegria was founded some 30 years ago by the two brothers Lauro Brasil (Panipa) and Antônio Brasil (Tekapa). These brothers compete for leadership, authority and influence with one another as well as with other aldeias such as Vida Nova and Liberdade. Since the founding of the aldeia, Tekapa has split off to found a successful *shovo* of his own, while Lauro's son-in-law has formed a third *shovo*.

In table 4.10. we may perceive that Tekapa, like Txumapa, is a *shovo ivo* who combines virilocality for his sons with uxorilocality for his daughters. Thus, he has two married sons (one of them married to Tekapa's sister's daughter), both with children. In addition to these individuals, there is a daughter's husband, Kanapa, in residence here. Kanapa is 44 years old; although his wife, Tekapa's daughter Yove, is dead, Kanapa remains here with his four children. Thus, in this case affinity in the form of uxorilocality predominates over kinship as a determinant of residence (Kanapa did not simply go elsewhere once death terminated his marriage to Yove). The strength of uxorilocality may be due to the promise of future status, as he is the 2nd oldest man in the *shovo*.

Finally, there is a second sister's daughter in residence at Tekapa's with her children. Thus, there are several strategies and principles in play here:

- (1) Marriage of *shovo ivo*, offspring, virilocal marriage of sons;
- (2) Uxorilocality;
- (3) Connections through sister—ZD, ZDS/ZDD, ZDDS/ZDDD.

TABLE 4.10.: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF *SHOVO* AT ALDEIA ALEGRIASOCIAL COMPOSITION OF TEKĀPA'S *SHOVO* AT ALEGRIA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's children</i>	7
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's children</i>	6
<i>Shovo-owner's sister</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter's children's children</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's brother</i>	1
Total	30

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PANÍPA'S *SHOVO* AT ALEGRIA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	10
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's son</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's children</i>	4
Total	20

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF MENE'S *SHOVO* AT ALEGRIA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's mother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's brother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son</i>	2
Total	12

Lauro's *shovo* displays extreme simplicity in its methods of social construction. He has two wives and ten children, one of whom is a son married virilocally, and with a son of his own. One of his daughters is married uxorilocally. It should be noted that Lauro had, until not long ago, a second uxorilocally married daughter, but this woman's husband, Mene, has recently made an adjacent *shovo* of his own (see Table 4.10.). We may conclude that Lauro, like his brother Tekāpa, combines virilocality with uxorilocality in socially constructing his *shovo*.

The third *shovo* analyzed in Table 4.10. was made by one of Lauro's sons-in-law, Mene. Mene, his wife and daughter form only 25% (3/12) of the *shovo*, however. His siblings, one of whom is married with two sons, predominate in social composition (67%, 8/12). The last component is Mene's mother. In a sense, however, she is the key component. We have seen this type of social composition at Mashkāpa's, where an elderly woman acts as the social glue of the *shovo*, a number of siblings residing together under her wing. We may understand why Mene felt a need to start a new *shovo* independent of his father-in-law's: Mene's own kin had reached the critical quantity at which *shovo* construction was a real possibility.

5. Aldeia Liberdade

Aldeia Liberdade was founded by Reissamão, a celebrated Marubo leader who died of cancer some months prior to my arrival in Maruboland. Liberdade consists of two *shovo*. When I passed through the *shovo* formerly belonging to Reissamão, I asked who the *shovo ivo* was, and those assembled pointed to a woman—Kemõewa, Reissamão’s widow. She is the only woman considered to be a *shovo*-owner. Kemõewa’s *shovo* is composed of (1) Kemõewa’s sons and son’s children; (2) her daughter and daughter’s descendants; and (3) her sister’s daughter, with that woman’s husband and their three children.

At Ronípapa’s *shovo* we again encounter the combination of virilocality and uxorilocality, common elsewhere on upper Ituí (e.g., Txumãpa, Panípa, Tekãpa). The uxorilocal component is significant both in pure numbers and in actual status. His sons, son’s wife and son’s sons amount to 30.4% (7/23) of the *shovo*, but Ronípapa’s daughters, son-in-law, and daughter’s children, with his daughter’s son’s wife, amount to 52.2% of the *shovo* (12/23). Both of Ronípapa’s in-resident daughters are married to Eduardo (Panã). Eduardo is not only polygynous with numerous children, he also speaks Portuguese, participates actively in political meetings both traditional and non-traditional, and studies to be a health worker, again combining traditional and non-traditional approaches. Eduardo’s status is second only to Ronípapa’s in this *shovo*; in terms of interactions with non-indigenous people, Eduardo’s actual influence is greater. Eduardo plays a role as ‘lieutenant’ similar to that of Simão at Txumãpa’s, Raomayãpa at Kamãpa’s, or Kanãpa at Tekãpa’s.

TABLE 4.11: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF *SHOVO* AT ALDEIA LIBERDADESOCIAL COMPOSITION OF KEMÓEWA'S *SHOVO* AT LIBERDADE

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's children</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's daughter</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's children</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's daughter's children</i>	3

TABLE 4.15: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF RONÍPAPA'S *SHOVO* AT LIBERDADE

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's mother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's children</i>	4
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's children</i>	8
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's son's wife</i>	1

6. *Shovo* belonging to Paulino

Paulino (Memāpa) runs his own *shovo* which politically is also an independent ‘aldeia’. This is the only village with no name aside from that of its single *shovo*’s owner. The composition of Paulino’s *shovo* is somewhat complex compared to previous examples. The *shovo* can be understood as resulting from the interaction of two families (1) 4 sisters and a brother, all children of JÚLIO and KENA; (2) 3 sisters and a brother, all children of DOMINGO and YAKA.

The children of Júlio and Kena were: (1) Paulino himself; (2) Vó, the mother of Valdir and Shori by João Tuxáua, and mother of Tamasai by João Aurélio; (3) Kana, mother of Zézinho; (4) and (5) the now-departed Kai and Ino.

The children of Domingo and Yaka were: (1) Mema, now at Liberdade with her children; (2) Yoshiewa, also no longer residing here; (3) Valdir’s wife Vane; (3) Yoshiipa, who married Vó’s daughter Shori.

The result of the interactions of these people has been the formation of four core families of which this *shovo* is composed: (1) Júlio’s son Paulino, his wife and six children; (2) Paulino’s sister’s son Zézinho, his wife and four children; (3) Paulino’s sister’s son Valdir, married to Yaka’s daughter Vane, with four children; (4) Yaka’s son Yoshiipa, married to Paulino’s sister’s daughter Shori, with five children. In addition, Paulino’s sister’s daughter Tamasai has two daughters, one of which has married a son of Valdir.

At Paulino’s *shovo*, although his own marriage and descendants are quite successful, composing 34.3% of the *shovo* (12/35), the primary link of construction is

TABLE 4.12.: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PAULINO'S *SHOVO*

<i>Shovo-owner</i> _____	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i> _____	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i> _____	6
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife</i> _____	1
<i>Shovo-owner's son's wife's daughter</i> _____	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children's children</i> _____	2
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children</i> _____	4
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's spouses</i> _____	3
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's children</i> _____	15
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's children's children</i> _____	1
Total _____	35

through sister's children, composing 65.7% of the *shovo* (23/35). This particular format is not found elsewhere in Maruboland. However, there have been a few examples, now broken up—the *shovo* of José Barbosa before his current one, and the Rovonáwavo/Satanáwavo *shovo* downstream from it, prior to its breakup, were composed along similar lines. However, these other two examples have since broken up, and it is precisely the sister's sons who broke off from the mother's brothers. At Paulino's, however, the arrangement seems more successful. When I expressed my opinion that this sort of *shovo* composition was unusual, it was explained to me that within the system of kinship and residence they have, the Marubo consider residence with one's mother's brother(s) to be completely normal, one of several possible arrangements within the norms.

This *shovo* does not appear to have been strategically composed by Paulino from the ground up. Rather, it is the product of particular circumstances and chance may have played a role in its composition. This was one of the original settlements established on the Ituí in the mid-1960s after a conflict split apart the Marubo population on the upper Maronal. Since I was confused by the bewildering array of relationships composing this *shovo*, I asked why these diverse individuals were living together. I was told that they just did—they were all raised together and spent time together when they were in the headwaters areas. Thus, informal or contextual relations—what we might call ‘friendships’ in our own cultural parlance—dating back to before the Ituí-Curuçá split seem to have played some role in the composition of this *shovo*.

7. Aldeia Paraná

Paraná, upstream some distance from Vida Nova, Liberdade and Paulino, consists of a single *shovo* under the leadership of Sherōpapa (Armando). This *shovo* must be understood in the context of its past. It has undergone a shift over the past generation from the uxorilocal pattern of composition to the agnatic pattern.

To understand the principles based upon which this *shovo* is composed, it is necessary to reconstruct the process whereby it has become as it is. In 1974-75, this residential unit was under the leadership of Sherōpapa's father Vimipeia (Mariano). The *shovo*'s progenitors are a couple named Kene and Yoshi. Kene and Yoshi had 2 sons and 4 daughters. One of the sons is Saipapa (João), who 25 years ago lived here with his wife and children; however, he has since founded his own *shovo* at Rio Novo on the middle Ituí. The other son is Wakanawa (Raimundo), who also lived here with his wife 25 years ago. Since then, however, he moved to Aldeia Água Branca, becoming a successful uxorilocal "lieutenant". The four daughters of Kene and Yoshi are Sheta, Meto, Mema, and Shawashavo. The nuclear family of Kene and Yoshi forms the baseline from which Aldeia Paraná evolved.

The daughter of Kene and Yoshi, Shawashavo, married a man named Vimipeia (Mariano). Vimipeia came to reside uxorilocally. At the time of Melatti's visit, Vimipeia was considered *shovo ivo* here, much as Raomayápa was poised to become *shovo ivo* at Vida Nova. This is thus another case of leadership passing from an elderly male to his son-in-law, and passing over his own sons. This may be why Kene and Yoshi's sons moved away, each to find leadership elsewhere, while their brother-in-law

TABLE 4.13.: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF SHERÔPAPA'S *SHOVO* AT PARANÁ

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's siblings</i>	8
<i>Shovo-owner's brother's children</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's father's wife's mother</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's father's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's father's wife's sister</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's father's wife's sister's children</i>	5
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's son</i>	1
Total	23

took over leadership of what had been their father's *shovo*.

Shawāshavo and Vimipeia had a number of children. Vimipeia already had 2 sons by a since-deceased woman. These two are Romeya (Sebastião) and Sherōpapa, the current *shovo ivo*. Both Romeya and Sherōpapa married and had children. In addition, Vimipeia and Shawāshavo had a daughter who herself bore a number of children while unmarried.

The changing patterns of leadership-transmission at Paraná may thus be discerned. This was one of the original residential units formed after the Ituí-Curuçá split around 1965. By the mid-70s the elderly Kene had passed leadership to his son-in-law Vimipeia, following the uxorilocal pattern of *shovo* composition. However, Vimipeia did not perpetuate this pattern to a third generation. Instead, leadership passed from Vimipeia directly to his son Sherōpapa, following the agnatic pattern of *shovo* composition. This process resulted in Kene's own sons leaving the *shovo* while his son-in-law remained. At the time of my census, Kene's widow Yoshi was still alive and residing here, as were two of Kene's and Yoshi's daughters.

Based on the 1998 census data, we may divide the current social composition of Paraná into the following four categories: (1) Sherōpapa and his new wife (a Kulina woman), with their two children; (2) Sherōpapa's brother Romeya, his wife and two children; (3) 7 half-siblings and their mother, Sherōpapa's father's wife Itsãewa; (4) The sister of Itsãewa, married to Sherōpapa's ex-wife's son, with five children.

In terms of status, the core of this *shovo* is the *shovo ivo* Sherōpapa and his brother Romeya. This *shovo* thus has an agnatic scheme of distribution of power similar to that at Maronal, where the second highest status belongs to the *shovo ivo*'s brother, and

different from the common Ituí pattern of handing down authority to the son-in-law.

Shovo composition reflects the agnatic political structure. 65.2% of this *shovo* (15/23) is composed of primary and secondary family of the *shovo* owner, including his full brother's wife and children as well as his patrilateral half-brothers and half-sisters. Along with his own wife and children, his siblings make up the central component of the *shovo*. This statistic, however, belies two important features.

Firstly, there is at Paraná an extremely important elderly woman whose daughters remain in residence with their whole families. This woman, Yoshi, is the mother-in-law of the former *shovo ivo*, the current one's father. Two of Yoshi's daughters, one now dead, bore five children to Sherópapa's wife's son; another of Yoshi's daughters bore nine children of Vimipeia's, seven of them still in residence—Sherópapa's half-siblings. Yoshi, her two living daughters and twelve grandchildren count for 15/23 people here, 65.2% of the *shovo*. Once again, as at Kamápa's, Mashkápa's, and Mene's, we find that connections through an older woman who keeps her daughters and daughter's offspring near her are a significant factor in *shovo* composition.

Second, while Sherópapa now runs this *shovo* with and through his siblings, and to a lesser extent through Yoshi's line of descent, we must note that Sherópapa's father Vimipeia was in fact married uxorilocally, and in 1974 the uxorilocal component of this residential unit was 16/27 or 59.3%. Therefore, this is a *shovo* in which uxorilocality has played a key role in the past but no longer does. Through uxorilocal marriage, Vimipeia acceded to *shovo ivo* status ahead of his brothers-in-law, Saípapa and Wakanawa, who both moved elsewhere. However, Vimipeia himself did not try to perpetuate uxorilocality as a means of perpetuating and expanding the *shovo*. Instead, he and his

sons have used the 'Maronal technique': marrying, having children, endeavoring to find virilocal marriage for one's sons.

We may conclude that the principle of social composition has here shifted from uxorilocal to agnatic and thus the place has features of both.

8. Aldeia Água Branca

Água Branca (an exogenous name applied by health assistance agencies) is the remainder of what was in 1974 a single *shovo* belonging to Ako (Américo). Like many Ituí *shovo ivo*, Ako combined uxorilocal marriage of daughters with virilocal marriage of sons in order to expand his *shovo*'s population. After his death, however, the settlement split into two *shovo*, one belonging to Ako's son Akōpa, the other to Ako's son-in-law Vimipa.

Akōpa's *shovo* is a splinter of the *shovo* constructed by Akōpa's father Ako. This *shovo* may be analyzed into three components: (1) Akōpa himself, with his wife and three children; (2) Akōpa's sister, a divorcée, lives here too along with her son, son's wife, and that couple's five children; (3) Akōpa's wife's sister's son, with that man's wife and three children.

From a social perspective, it may be claimed that Akōpa did not build this *shovo* from ground up. Instead, the residents here represent those people who went with Akōpa when he split off from his brother-in-law's half of the old *shovo*. This is thus only a part of a larger social network built up by the now-deceased Ako, broken up by his successors. In this context, we should note the great significance of women to the social composition of this *shovo*: key connections are established through the *shovo*-owner's sister and wife to those women's sons.

The principles of social composition represented at Akōpa's are: (1) direct descendants from the *shovo ivo*; (2) connection through the *shovo*-owner's sister to his married sister's son; (3) connection through his wife to his married wife's sister's son. This

TABLE 4.14.: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF *SHOVO* AT ALDEIA ÁGUA BRANCASOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AKÓPA'S *SHOVO* AT ÁGUA BRANCA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's children</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's sister</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's sister's son's children</i>	5
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister's son</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister's son's wife</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's wife's sister's son's children</i>	3
Total	19

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF VIMÍPA'S *SHOVO* AT ÁGUA BRANCA

<i>Shovo-owner</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's wife</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughters</i>	2
<i>Shovo-owner's daughters' husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughters' children</i>	9
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's daughter's husband</i>	1
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's daughter's children</i>	3
<i>Shovo-owner's daughter's son's wife</i>	1
Total	19

latter appears to result from a strictly contextual situation, rather than from a generalizable social principle. Some years ago, a widow named Rave resided in Ako's *shovo* with her four children. One of these children married Ako's daughter's son. Rave's sister Peko married Ako's son. And Rave's sister Vane came here at some point with her son Shawānawa. Shawānawa remains here, now married with two wives and three children. This situation is unique to this *shovo*, and thus does not represent a social principle generalizable to "Marubo society". It is the result of a long-standing informal association between two groups of kin, one of them formerly leaderless and homeless (the old widow and her children). Ultimately, attraction of and intermarriage with Rave's kin has benefited Ako's kin by helping the social network to grow and perpetuate itself.

Vimīpa's *shovo* has been composed entirely along the uxorilocal plan, perpetuated over at least three generations. Vimīpa, now an old man, married uxorilocally into Ako's household. Vimīpa married two of Ako's daughters, one now dead. Vimīpa then married two of his daughters to Wakanawa. There is a certain amount of irony in this marriage. Kene had two sons, Saīpapa and Wakanawa, but the *shovo ivo* status passed to Kene's son-in-law Vimipeia instead of to his son Wakanawa. Wakanawa responded by moving elsewhere. Following the same strategy successfully used by Vimipeia to attain leadership, Wakanawa entered into an uxorilocal polygynous marriage. The result was discernible upon superficial inspection. When I asked who the *shovo ivo* was, I was told that it was the 80-year old Vimīpa. However, *de facto* leadership already belonged to Wakanawa, who directed day-to-day subsistence and production, made decisions, and was the person named when it was considered necessary to get the aldeia's opinion on an issue. Like the aging Kamāpa at Vida Nova, Vimīpa has passed effective

leadership to his son-in-law, the “uxorilocal lieutenant” so common on the upper Ituí. Wakanawa is the acting authority in this *shovo*.

Of equal significance to the uxorilocal pattern of status transmission is the fact that there is no other path for status to take: Vimipa has neither brothers nor sons with him, only his daughters’ descendants through Wakanawa.

Wakanawa himself married off two of his daughters to a younger man, Tae, who had come here to reside uxorilocally. This completes three generations of uxorilocal *shovo* composition: Vimipa married Ako’s daughters; Wakanawa married Vimipa’s daughters; Tae married Wakanawa’s daughters. All these marriages are polygynous and uxorilocal, and all are laden with implications concerning status transmission: the son-in-law has more status than any of his brothers-in-law, and is first in line for *shovo ivo* status upon the elder’s retirement.

C. Social Basis for Marubo Residential Group Unity

In the previous section I analyzed 27 Marubo *shovo* in terms of their social composition. The analysis focused on Aldeia Maronal and on the villages of upper Ituí. There are reasons why these areas were selected. It was essential to understand Maronal because most of the data in this dissertation comes from observations made at that place. I lived in Aldeia Maronal for 9½ months, carrying out detailed observations of dynamic sociopolitical processes as well as of the underlying social structure that frames such processes. After a little more than a month, the agnatic basis of *shovo* unity at Maronal became intuitively obvious. From there, it became essential to ask whether Maronal

social organization was common to all Marubo. Upper Ituí is thus analyzed as a control on the Maronal data. This proves to be an indispensable exercise, since there are very different forms of *shovo* social organization present along the Ituí river. The purely agnatic nature of Maronal *shovo* cannot be generalized to all Marubo. Instead we see that there are several patterns of *shovo* organization that are acceptable within the range of Marubo norms. I leave the eight *shovo* on the middle Curuçá and three on the middle Ituí unanalyzed for the time being as it does not seem necessary given the objectives of this chapter.

The analysis revealed four types of Marubo *shovo* composition pattern: agnatic, uxorilocal, avuncular, and anicular. The purpose of this section is to describe each of these types. The section is therefore subdivided into four sections, one for each type of *shovo* composition pattern.

1. Agnatic pattern of *shovo* composition

At Maronal, brothers and sons are the essential pieces of the social puzzle for any given *shovo ivo*. This has been demonstrated statistically in Table 4.2: 91.8% of the individuals at Maronal fall into one of two categories, which I have called *shovo-owner*'s primary family and secondary family. Primary family consists of the *shovo ivo*, his wife(s), descendants, and descendants' wives. Secondary family consists of his siblings, siblings' spouses, siblings' descendants, and siblings' descendants' spouses. Note that the word 'sibling' is ambiguous in regards to gender. In fact, brothers form a more significant component than do sisters. Out of the 99 secondary family members at

Maronal, 84.2% are brothers and brothers' families. This relates to Maronal's near-total virilocality. Out of the 37 marriages at Maronal, only one is uxorilocal, and even that one changes appearance upon closer inspection: a residential history of that *shovo* suggests that the father-in-law moved in with the son-in-law, not vice-versa. The implication of virilocality with respect to *shovo* composition is clear: brothers are more significant than sisters and sons are more important than daughters if one's goal is to perpetuate and expand one's *shovo*. The sisters of the *shovo ivo* at Maronal have gone elsewhere, while the brothers have remained. Likewise, the marriageable daughters of the *shovo ivo* at Maronal have gone elsewhere to marry, while the adult sons have remained, married, and produced nuclear families of their own. *Shovo* at Maronal thrive and expand when the *shovo ivo* has one or more brothers who live with him, and one or more sons who marry virilocally.

A common format at Maronal is for a man to construct and run his *shovo* with the assistance of one or more brothers. To specify the relationship between brothers who are coresident, co-builders of a *shovo*, and work together over many years to achieve common goals, I coined the term "brother-companion". Brother-companions are a fundamental basis of Maronal social organization. My own host, José Barbosa, had founded his *shovo* many years ago with the assistance of his brother Pedro. José and Pedro left their pentagynous father's large *shovo* in their youth, apparently in 1974. They have lived together and worked together since then, building their first *shovo* in 1977 and another in 1994. They plan work strategy, discuss issues and goals, divide tasks and support one another's authority with great efficiency and a minimum of conflict. José

told me: "My brother and I are always together. Sometimes he goes off to do something else, but he always comes back here to live with me."

Other *shovo* at Maronal are immediately recognizable as fitting the "brother-companions" format. *Kakáya* Alfredo (a full brother of José and Pedro), resides with his full brother Zacarias and his half-brothers Joãozinho and Miguel. All three of Alfredo's brothers have adult sons who are married, as does Alfredo himself. This is physically the largest *shovo* in Maruboland, with ten main structural posts (no other *shovo* has more than eight). To establish this large and thriving *shovo*, Alfredo has had to secure a number of key relationships: firstly those with his three brothers; secondly the virilocal marriage of his sons; and thirdly, his brothers have also had to secure virilocal marriage for their sons. All this has been successfully accomplished. At the series of meetings that was held upon my arrival I always saw Alfredo accompanied by Joãozinho. The latter always had a large bottle of tobacco snuff available, which his brother Alfredo constantly requested. Alfredo's brother Miguel has a similarly essential function, operating as lieutenant when Alfredo is travelling. Zacarias was absent during my fieldwork, pursuing pension money, but Zacarias' married sons, in their 30s in years, played an important part in the life of the *shovo*.

The "Varináwavo *shovo*" at Maronal is a striking example of Maronal's agnatic pattern. This *shovo* was constructed during my stay by four full brothers of the Varináwavo clan, all of them virilocally married, one with a virilocally married son. A visit to this *shovo* often resulted in semiformal greetings from all four, who would face the visitors across the guests' benches. The "Satanáwavo *shovo*" is another example, constructed and run by three young brothers of the Satanáwavo clan. The Txonavo clan

elder Wanōpa runs his *shovo* with his brother, the respected healer and storyteller Misael. The sixth example of the brother-companion pattern is Vasho, who constructed a *shovo* with his full brother Nato, though there is a significant sister's son component in that *shovo*.

Some *shovo ivo* at Maronal do not have a brother-companion. The simplest of these *shovo* consist solely of the *shovo ivo*'s nuclear family. The *shovo* of Pekōpa, Nakwa, and Anīpa follow this pattern, each with only minor exceptions. Each of these *shovo ivo* lives with his wife and children, and none of their male children are married yet. A higher level of expansion, time-depth and complexity is offered by Sināpa's *shovo*. Sināpa's first wife bore six straight sons before the first daughter. Three of these are now adults, two of them with children of their own. In addition, Sināpa has a second wife with six children, for a total of 13 children. Sināpa's *shovo* thus consists of his own two wives' uterine families, as well as his three virilocally married sons' families. The sight of Sināpa's six young, muscular sons facing one across the visitors' benches is most impressive—and extremely agnatic. Downstream, Ivāpa's *shovo* operates along similar lines. Both the *shovo* of Sināpa and of Ivāpa are over 15 years old, whereas those of Pekōpa, Nakwa and Anīpa have all been constructed within the past two years. We may assume that over time, the latter three will, if successful, come to resemble the *shovo* of Sināpa.

The final *shovo* at Maronal is that of Wasinawa, a special case as it is a recent fission of personnel from Sināpa's. This case is best left for detailed explanation in the following chapter. However, its basis is, I believe, avuncular rather than agnatic, albeit with a strong agnatic component.

From the preceding analysis it may be seen that the residential groups at Maronal are based on alliances between men and their wives, brothers, and sons. *Shovo*-owners at Maronal have built up coresident networks by gathering to them one or more women with whom they produce offspring; the male offspring remain at the *shovo* into adulthood, invariably find virilocal marriage, attracting a wife to their father's *shovo*, and adding their own nuclear families to the residential group started by their fathers. The most successful *shovo*-owners also have with them one or more brothers who themselves are married with children, and whose sons also marry virilocally. I will call this pattern, based on the relationship of brother-companions and on the virilocal marriage of sons in a context devoid of uxorilocality, the "agnatic pattern" of *shovo* composition. It is agnatic because the core of kin that stays together, attracting and producing other humans, consists of brothers and sons.

The simplest pattern of *shovo* composition is the single nuclear family. However, such a *shovo* is subject to the need to expand or fade away. At Maronal, a *shovo* expands through the virilocal marriage of sons or the accretion of brother-companions and subsequent virilocal marriage of *their* sons. The only other option seen at Maronal is composition through sister's sons, to be described below as the 'avuncular pattern'.

2. Uxorilocal pattern of *shovo* composition

In Marubo *shovo* along the upper Ituí river, it is often the case that the *shovo*-owner's son-in-law is the essential component of the *shovo*, more important than brothers and sons. Having lived at Aldeia Maronal for five months prior to visiting Ituí, I was

bewildered at first by the frequent uxorilocality and the novel genealogical schemes that resulted. Upon returning to Maronal, I asked an informant which was the traditional plan. Ituí practices uxorilocality; Maronal does not. How were things done before the Ituí-Curuçá split, I asked? The informant, an elder who recalled the pre-split days, replied that in the old days, marriages followed the uxorilocal plan as practiced along the Ituí. He said that back then, a man had to go live with his father-in-law when he married. I asked him why Maronal did things differently. He replied that “there are more people now”. I was never able to understand what causal processes were implied by this statement. The issue of priority and change in Marubo *shovo* composition patterns must remain, for now, unsolved; we can with certainty, however, state that there are two different patterns of *shovo* composition in existence, one practiced at Aldeia Maronal, the other throughout Ituí, and some Marubo claim that the Ituí uxorilocal pattern is prior.

Pure uxorilocality

The most complete example of uxorilocal *shovo* composition is the *shovo* of Vimipa at Aldeia Água Branca. The *shovo*-owner, Vimipa, has no brothers and no sons residing with him. Residing with him, however, are two of his daughters. These daughters are uxorilocally married to a man named Wakanawa. Wakanawa has five children by one wife and four by the other. Two of Wakanawa’s daughters are married uxorilocally to a young man named Tae. Tae in turn has three children by one of these women. In considering the multi-generational uxorilocality of this residential group, it must also be kept in mind that, according to Dr. Melatti’s census data, Vimipa himself

married uxorilocally, and polygynously, into the household of the former *shovo ivo*, the now-dead Ako (Américo).

To understand the dynamics of uxorilocal *shovo* composition, it is necessary to understand the residential history of Aldeia Água Branca. Água Branca now consists of two *shovo*, but 25 years ago consisted of only one, under the *shovo ivo* Ako. Although Ako had two married sons, Kemōpa and Akōpa, his son-in-law Vimīpa was older, married sooner, and already had a sizeable family by the time Ako's sons started theirs. Ako's son Kemōpa, with his wife and children, left the *shovo* by 1977, establishing his own residential nucleus at Vida Nova, then moving to the middle Curuçá by 1992-3. At some point, the elder *shovo ivo* died, and when I encountered the aldeia it had split into two *shovo*, one under Ako's son Akōpa, the other under Ako's son-in-law Vimīpa. Thus, the expansion of Ako's *shovo* by uxorilocal, polygynous marriage was accompanied by the departure of Ako's sons upon adulthood and marriage.

Vimīpa's *shovo* is composed almost entirely of the results of uxorilocal marriages. Vimīpa's wife is the former *shovo ivo* Ako's daughter, whom Vimīpa married uxorilocally. Vimīpa has neither brothers nor sons with him, only two daughters, married to Wakanawa. Vimīpa is some 80 years old, while Wakanawa is about 50. Wakanawa himself has married two of his daughters to Tae, a young man in his early 30s. Thus, on the third descending generation the *shovo* will once again expand its population by means of an uxorilocal, polygynous marriage.

Tae's polygynous marriage bears closer examination as it reveals the dynamics of such a marriage. I saw birth certificates for the inhabitants of this *shovo*, and was surprised to discover that Tae's wives were aged 16 and 10. The 16-year old had three

children already. Upon return to Maronal, I requested clarifications. I was told that in such a marriage, a man moves in with his father-in-law based on a grant of possession and promise of future access to the girls in question. A girl can be “given away” (by her father unless her father is dead, in which case another male relative becomes responsible) when she is as young as six or seven. Such a girl is said to “belong to” her future husband, who nevertheless waits until puberty to enact sexual access. In the case of Tae’s ten-year-old wife, he is not yet engaging in sexual relations with her, but she “is his” (Pg. é dele; Marubo *awenarvi*) and he will presumably endeavor to expand the *shovo* population together with her “as soon as her breasts are rounded”. The dynamics of such a marriage become clear. Polygynous marriage is difficult to obtain and highly desirable. In these cases, a man who receives an offer of polygynous marriage moves to reside with the girls’ father, often years before receiving sexual access. The father-in-law thus adds an adult male to his workforce and ensures the future demographic expansion of his coresident network. The glue that holds the *shovo* together socially is the uxorilocal marriage: attracted by that bond, the son-in-law remains. But what makes this bond so permanent?

It has been noted that some South American Indians practice temporary uxorilocality followed by neo- or virilocality (e.g., Harner 1972; Turner 1979; Rivière 1984). In these situations, a young man moves in with his father-in-law upon marriage, and lives there for a variable period of time, perhaps 1-3 years or until the first child, depending upon the particular culture. During that time, the young man must work for his father-in-law. After this requirement is fulfilled, the man may become independent if he wishes. This practice does occur occasionally among the Marubo, but it is

impermanent and thus does not affect long-term *shovo* composition. However, in the case of Vimipa's *shovo*, uxorilocality is permanent. The key to this permanence is the potential for an eventual transfer of status from the elder *shovo ivo* to his son-in-law, bypassing his sons.

The transference of status is discernible at Vimipa's *shovo*. Upon arrival there, I asked who the *shovo*-owner is, and Vimipa answered that he was. In fact, Vimipa's efforts are largely responsible for the establishment and success of this residential unit. But it was equally clear that the *de facto* leader here was Wakanawa. The elderly Vimipa no longer actively hunted, nor did he determine the daily work patterns of the *shovo* workforce nor plan strategy for interacting with other *shovo* and with non-indigenous people. When the *shovo* was referred to elsewhere along Ituí, it was clear that Wakanawa was considered the man to talk to if any interaction with the *shovo* was necessary. For Wakanawa to be considered *shovo ivo* he will have to direct construction of a new *shovo* at some point. But for the time being, he enjoys all the privileges of the high status he has received from Vimipa—he is polygynous, has nine children and a coresident son-in-law, and is acting leader over the *shovo* workforce, all of which amounts to a highly privileged situation by Marubo standards. This transference of status, from Vimipa to his son-in-law, is unproblematic because Vimipa has no sons to vie for the position. Thus, Marubo uxorilocality does not imply permanent subservience. On the contrary, Marubo uxorilocality offers the potential for high status and leadership as the elder father-in-law fades to retirement.

Several other *shovo* on the upper Ituí illustrate various stages in the development of the uxorilocally composed *shovo*. The *shovo* of Kamapa shows the later stages of an

uxorilocally composed *shovo*. Kamāpa's *shovo* expanded on the first and second descending generations thanks to the uxorilocal marriage of Raomayāpa to three of Kamāpa's daughters. Again, we find the association of uxorilocality with polygyny. We also have the association of uxorilocality with the dispersion of the *shovo*-owner's sons. Kamāpa has no brothers with him, and the only son who still resides with him is a childless gimp bachelor. Brothers and sons are thus irrelevant in *shovo* composition here. Instead, Raomayāpa and his family account for over half the *shovo*'s population. Kamāpa's sons, Tamāpa and Ramīpa, have built their own *shovo* elsewhere, leaving their father's *shovo* to be dominated by Raomayāpa.

At the time of my visit in 12/97-1/98, Raomayāpa was in the process of building a new *shovo* some distance away from the old one built by Kamāpa some 20 years previously. Like Vimīpa, Kamāpa has retired from active leadership due to age. Kamāpa's age is unknown but he is the oldest of all Marubo and is certainly over 90. His son-in-law Raomayāpa directs the *shovo* work patterns, has directed the construction of the new *shovo*, participates in meetings representing the *shovo*, and in every way acts as leader. Because he is directing the construction of the new *shovo*, utilizing primarily his own work force, once he moves in to the new residence Raomayāpa will be *shovo ivo*, leader both *de facto*, as he is now, and *de jure*.

The uxorilocal pattern at Kamāpa's thus shares the following features with Vimīpa's:

- (1) The *shovo ivo* attracts a son-in-law.
- (2) The son-in-law is older than the *shovo ivo*'s sons.
- (3) The son-in-law marries more than one of the *shovo ivo*'s daughters.

- (4) The son-in-law enjoys higher status than the *shovo ivo*'s sons.
- (5) The *shovo ivo*'s sons depart to raise families elsewhere.
- (6) Leadership is transferred from the aging *shovo ivo* to the son-in-law.

The difference between the *shovo* of Kamāpa and of Vimīpa is that at Kamāpa's there is no new generation of uxorilocality. Kamāpa's sons and brothers are gone, and the *shovo* lives on through his son-in-law Raomayāpa; but Raomayāpa has procured virilocal marriage for his sons and has no uxorilocally married daughters. There is thus a transition from uxorilocal to agnatic *shovo* composition underway. This may be a shift of convenience, since Raomayāpa has six sons between the ages of 17 and 28, forming a strong agnatic core whose virilocal marriages should help this *shovo* thrive for another generation at least. Thus, it seems more effective for Raomayāpa to shift to the agnatic pattern rather than replicating the uxorilocal pattern. However, Raomayāpa's thoughts on the matter are not known to me.

Mixed uxorilocality and virilocality

Ronípapa's *shovo* at Aldeia Liberdade is an example of the uxorilocally patterned *shovo* in an earlier stage of its natural history. Upon the death of the previous leader at Liberdade, Ronípapa was chosen to hold this status. Unlike Vimīpa and Kamāpa, Ronípapa was, when I visited, an actively functioning leader. Residing with him is his son-in-law Panã (Eduardo), married to two of Ronípapa's daughters. Eduardo plays an extremely important role in *shovo* and inter-*shovo* politics. When meetings are held to discuss issues such as relations with FUNAI or with the missionaries or CIVAJA, it is

Eduardo who goes as representative of Liberdade. Ronípapa rarely makes the journeys to attend meetings himself. Eduardo also speaks much better Portuguese than Ronípapa, being thus more effective as an intermediary with non-indigenous people. What Eduardo does not have is the wealth of traditional knowledge and wisdom held by Ronípapa. Ronípapa knows healing songs, traditional rhetorical forms, and traditional law (ese) to a far greater extent than does Eduardo. Eduardo's role is a recurring one in Marubo *shovo* of the upper Ituí, a role which I named "uxorilocal lieutenant." Eduardo's status in the *shovo* is second only to Ronípapa; Eduardo has higher status and a more active leadership role than does Ronípapa's son; Eduardo and his descendants are a more significant component of the *shovo* than are Ronípapa's sons. Eduardo's role is similar to that of Raomayãpa and of Wakanawa, though the latter two have already received the transference of status from their fathers-in-law, while Eduardo has not.

Although Eduardo has two wives and eight children, so that the uxorilocal component of this *shovo* is over 52.2% of its total population, there is also a virilocal component. One of Ronípapa's sons is married virilocally, and has four children. Thus, Ronípapa is in fact combining the uxorilocal marriage of daughters with the virilocal marriage of sons in order to secure the *shovo*'s demographic expansion. Feature (5), above ("the *shovo ivo*'s sons depart") does not apply in this case.

The *shovo* of Txumãpa exemplifies the dual approach seen at Ronípapa's. Txumãpa has three virilocally married sons and one uxorilocally married daughter. That daughter is married to Simão who, as already explained, plays the role of uxorilocal lieutenant for this *shovo*. Simão's status is second only to Txumãpa's within the *shovo*. However, numerically he, his wife and descendants are only half as significant as we

noted Eduardo's was (28.6% vs 52.2% of the *shovo*). Txumāpa's sons, despite the varying success of their marriages, are numerically a more significant component (61.9%, 13/21) than is Txumāpa's son-in-law (28.6%, 6/21). In part, this relates to another significant difference with respect to the previous examples: Simão is not polygynous. It is thus more difficult for him to achieve a dominant position here than it was for Eduardo at Ronípapa's.

At Aldeia Alegria are to be found further examples of the combination of uxorilocality and virilocality. Tekāpa's two sons are married virilocally and have seven children between them. The wife of one of Tekāpa's sons is Tekāpa's sister's daughter, and so does not show up as "son's wife" on table 4.10. The *shovo*-owner's sons and their nuclear families compose 36.7% of the *shovo*. Tekāpa's son-in-law (named Kanāpa) also lives here. However, his wife—Tekāpa's daughter—is deceased. Despite this, Kanāpa continues to live here with his four children, Tekāpa's grandchildren. This uxorilocal component of the *shovo* is only 16.7%. Numerically, Kanāpa is thus outnumbered by his brothers-in-law. The situation in terms of status is not known due to a lack of direct observation of this *shovo*. Kanāpa is older than his brothers-in-law, and may be an "uxorilocal lieutenant", much as Simão and Eduardo. However, this remains an unproven hypothesis.

Across a carefully tended plaza from Tekāpa is the *shovo* of his brother Panípa. Panípa has also combined virilocality with uxorilocality. Panípa's *shovo* consists largely of his own two families—he has two wives and ten children. One of his sons lives virilocally, and one of his daughters lives uxorilocally. Like the previous three *shovos* discussed (Txumāpa, Ronípapa, Tekāpa), this *shovo* combines uxorilocality and

virilocality. However, it should be noted that Panīpa had two uxorilocally married daughters until very recently. One of his sons-in-law, Mene, built a small independent *shovo* a short distance away from Panīpa. This is not simply a case of a son-in-law moving out from under his father-in-law. In addition to his wife and daughter, Mene has with him his mother, four sisters (one of them married with two sons), and a brother. Mene has a sizeable coresident kin set. This distinguishes Mene from other uxorilocally married men. Mene's schism from Panīpa was made possible by the fact that Mene was not alone at Panīpa's. The presence of a son-in-law in the *shovo* is not distracting to the distribution of authority—it remains easy for the *shovo ivo* to direct activities. Mene was not just a son-in-law, however—he had a sizeable kin faction embedded within Panīpa's strategy for demographic expansion. The presence of that faction rendered this case of uxorilocality unstable as a means of *shovo* composition.

The *shovo* of Ronīpapa, Txumāpa, Tekāpa and Panīpa serve to illustrate the combined virilocal/uxorilocal approach to *shovo* composition. These four *shovo ivo* clearly do not see the agnatic and uxorilocal patterns as mutually exclusive. If there is a chance to retain both sons and daughters, they will do so. In some cases, the son-in-law obtains "lieutenant" status and stands in line to inherit *shovo ivo* status. In other cases, the son-in-law's status is unclear. In one case at least, the son-in-law chose to be head of his own *shovo* rather than waiting years to become head of his father-in-law' Ronīpapa s (potentially larger) *shovo*.

Alternation of uxorilocal and agnatic patterns

The history of Aldeia Paraná suggests that, when leadership shifts from one generation to another, the pattern of *shovo* composition may change too. Paraná started out as an uxorilocally patterned *shovo*, but is now agnatically patterned. Melatti's census of this *shovo* in 1974 shows the elderly Kene and Yoshi, with two adult sons and four daughters, forming the key compositional elements. However, the *shovo ivo* was not Kene, nor one of Kene's sons; it was Kene's son-in-law, Vimipeia. Vimipeia had no brothers with him. However, Vimipeia did have two sons by a since-deceased woman. Aside from the elderly, probably retired Kene, there were thus five adult males at the *shovo*: Kene's sons Saípapa and Wakanawa, Kene's son-in-law Vimipeia, and Vimipeia's sons Romeya and Sherópapa. Saípapa and Wakanawa had been passed over for leadership in favor of Vimipeia. Upon marriage, Saípapa left to eventually found his own *shovo* at Aldeia Rio Novo on the middle Ituí. Wakanawa moved to Água Branca to become Vimipa's son-in-law, uxorilocal lieutenant, and *de facto shovo ivo*. Thus, both of Kene's sons are *shovo ivo*, the one *de facto* and the other *de jure*. But to achieve these statuses, they had to move away from their father's household. This left Aldeia Paraná in a situation where there were three main men: Vimipeia and his two sons.

Vimipeia had a number of children by the daughter of Kene and Yoshi, but he has not had any of his daughters marry uxorilocally. His sons, however, married virilocally. Kene the elder died, and so did his son-in-law Vimipeia. This left Vimipeia's son in control, along with his full brother. To the current observer, therefore, this seems a straightforward agnatic *shovo*, directed by a man with his brother-companion. Analysis of *shovo* composition (Table 4.13.) supports this conclusion, showing that the *shovo ivo*'s

primary and secondary family compose 60.9% of the *shovo*. But this is still not near the 90% primary/secondary composition ratio at the purely agnatic Aldeia Maronal. The difference is due to the significance of Sherōpapa's father's wife's family (34.8%). These latter are the remnants of the uxorilocal origins of the *shovo*.

Aldeia Paraná began by following the uxorilocal pattern of *shovo* composition when the status of *shovo ivo* passed from Kene to Vimipeia. This follows the classical uxorilocal pattern described above: the *shovo ivo* attracts a son-in-law, that son-in-law is older than *shovo ivo*'s sons, that son-in-law enjoys higher status than *shovo ivo*'s sons, and the *shovo ivo*'s sons depart to raise families and acquire leadership status elsewhere. Leadership is transferred from the elderly *shovo ivo* to his son-in-law. However, Vimipeia did not himself extend the uxorilocal pattern to a descending generation. Instead, the *shovo* shifted to an agnatic pattern as Vimipeia passed the *shovo ivo* status to his son, and his son runs the *shovo* with and through a full brother and a set of half-brothers. Aldeia Paraná is thus a *shovo* that has shifted from an uxorilocal pattern in one generation to an agnatic pattern in the next.

Uxorilocality and schism

Uxorilocal marriage does not always succeed in generating permanent *shovo* cohesion. Discerning a pattern of *shovo* composition from several individual *shovo* composition analyses is like studying the various phases of life in a given culture in order to derive a picture of the cultural life cycle. In no one case are all the possible ramifications of uxorilocality displayed, but by putting them together one may understand the uxorilocal pattern and the options it offers. Among the startling facts thus far

discovered is that uxorilocally married men often remain with their fathers-in-law throughout their lives, achieving a position of prominence, dominating their brothers-in-law, and eventually becoming leaders themselves. This appears to be a very attractive possibility for the son-in-law and thus acts as a rather permanent glue holding the *shovo* together. In such a situation, the *shovo*-owner's relationship with his own sons can become brittle (as in the case of Aldeia Paraná), though this is not at all always the case (e.g., Aldeia Alegria). But we have seen in the case of Panipa's *shovo* that the son-in-law may effect a departure, as well. Aldeia Praia offers an instructive example of this.

Reconstructing Aldeia Praia prior to the schism of Wasinawa, we see a classic uxorilocal pattern. The *shovo ivo* was and still is Floriano. Two of Floriano's daughters were married to a man named Wasinawa. In the course of time, Wasinawa has had eleven children by these two women. However, after approximately a dozen years of uxorilocal marriage, Wasinawa moved permanently to Maronal. In 1997 he directed the construction of a *shovo* and is now *shovo ivo*. Nevertheless, his victory is not complete: only one of his wives came with him when he left. His wife Peko resides with him at Maronal, along with 6-7 children; his wife Wanieshe remains at Praia with her father, raising the other 4-5. The children frequently move back and forth between Praia and Maronal. In this arrangement, neither Floriano nor Wasinawa reap the full benefits of polygynous uxorilocality. For Floriano, the arrangement did not result in a permanent accretion to his *shovo*; nor did it result in the full amount of demographic growth it might have if Wasinawa had stayed. For Wasinawa, the move prevented him from enjoying the full benefits of polygyny and the status that is derived from a large and growing polygynous family. Instead, he has only half his family with him. The schism has

resulted in a sort of compromise. Relations between Floriano and Wasinawa appeared highly cordial and unproblematic when I observed them. The reason for Wasinawa's schism is not known.

The uxorilocal pattern: conclusions

Uxorilocality, practically absent from Aldeia Maronal, is commonly practiced along the upper Ituí. Uxorilocality is not a mere choice or custom of postmarital residence. When practiced, it alters the social organization of the *shovo* in fundamental ways. The fundamental relationships in an agnatic system are between a man and his brothers and sons; in an uxorilocal system it is between a man and his son-in-law. The uxorilocal system sets up a potential structural conflict with the *shovo*-owners' sons. Because the second highest status in an uxorilocally patterned *shovo* belongs to the son-in-law, the sons must go elsewhere if they have ambitions towards independence. The uxorilocal system thus potentially strips a man of his own sons. The resulting *shovo* contains daughters and daughters' children, perhaps a son-in-law's son-in-law and another generation with a similar social organization. Sometimes shifts occur when one generation follows the uxorilocal pattern and the next generation pursues the agnatic path (the reverse—an agnatic *shovo* shifting to uxorilocal—has not been observed). The agnatic-pattern *shovo* consists of a man, his wife and descendants, brothers and brothers' wives and descendants, sons and sons' wives and descendants. The implications of these contrasting forms for politics and leadership will be discussed below. For the time being, it is important to note that the agnatic and uxorilocal patterns emphasise different relationships. Certain social relations are crucial to the permanence and expansion of a

shovo. These relationships must be strong for the *shovo* to exist. Agnatic and uxorilocal *shovo* require different relationships, and thus the activities a *shovo ivo* will be forced to engage in in order to retain his status will be different. Keeping your brother happy is very different from keeping your son-in-law in line.

3. Avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition

In the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition, the essential relationships in terms of forming, perpetuating and expanding the *shovo*, are the relationships between the *shovo*-owner and his sister's sons. Although rare, this should be considered one of the three patterns of *shovo* composition that fall within the boundaries of Marubo norms. When two categories of people are in a relationship where the members of one category are the others' mothers' brothers, the members of both categories are called kokavo. Recall that in Marubo social structure, clan membership is passed on matrilineally, but in any given lineage there are two appellations that alternate with alternating generations. If I am Shanenáwavo, my mother was Iskonáwavo, and my mother's mother is Shanenáwavo. Those who fall under the same rubric as I do are takevo, siblings; but those who are in the appellation that alternates with mine are my mothers' brothers and mothers' sisters—kokavo (koka=mother's brother, -vo=pluralizer for human categories) and ewavo (ewa=mother, mother's sister). The term is reciprocal. The Marubo value system idealizes mother's brother's daughter marriage—marrying one's koka's daughter. Hence the significance of the relationship between *kokavo*. Given the Marubo social structure and marriage system, it is considered highly ideal to have a self-replicating, self-contained four-section system coterminous with the residential unit. This ideal may

be seen in action at Vida Nova, though it there requires three *shovo* to bring it about (see Chapter Eight). The important thing to note is that as a basis for *shovo* composition, the relationship of *kokavo* is a normative one. It is a rare pattern, seen only at Paulino's *shovo* and in reconstruction at two *shovo* that no longer exist. Nevertheless, this should not be construed as signifying that this is an extranormative, aberrant, or random event. I found it unusual because of its rarity, but my informants did not find it unusual at all. The range of options available within the parameters of Marubo social structure include the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition.

The basic social structure of Paulino's *shovo* has not changed in the past 25 years. The avuncular format discernible in Dr. Melatti's genealogical diagram based on 1974 data (Figure 4.1.) is still the core of the *shovo* according to my own data gathered on location on 30/12/97 (Figure 4.2). Dr. Melatti's diagram is simpler to follow so the analysis will begin with Figure 4.1. On the top right hand note number 1, the *shovo ivo* Paulino. The darkened circles next to him represent his coresident sisters. The ones that would actually prove to be important elements of long-term *shovo* composition are Kana, numbered 2, and especially Vó, numbered 3. In Figure 4.1, Paulino is married and has two children. However, a man, his wife and two children cannot make a functional *shovo*. The crucial elements of this *shovo* are Paulino's sister's children, #14 (since moved elsewhere), 5 and 6. All of these are married and with children. It is thus through the marriages of his sister's children that Paulino's *shovo* is able to perpetuate itself and expand demographically.

Figure 4.1.--Legend: essential persons

The children of Júlio and Kene: #1 is Paulino, the *shovo ivo*. #2 is Kana, the mother of Zézinho. #3 is Vó. In this picture Vó is credited with three children by #4, João Tuxáua. These are #5 (Shori), #6 (Valdir) and #7 (Tamasai). I should note that when I carried out my census, Tamasai was attributed not to João Tuxáua but to João Aurélia, a much younger man. Nevertheless, all three (1, 2, and 3) are children of Júlio (concerning Júlio, see Chapter Eight) and of Júlio's wife Kena.

Two of Júlio's daughters have moved elsewhere since 1978. These include #8 and #9, who therefore are not considered part of the *shovo* composition.

The children of Domingo and Yaka: The important ones for this analysis are #10, Yoshipa, married to Paulino's sister's daughter Shori, #5, with two daughters; and #11, Vane, married to Paulino's sister's son Valdir, #6, with a daughter, #15.

By the time of my own census (Figure 4.2.), Kana and Vó were dead, only Paulino and his wife remaining from that generation. But in the following generation, Paulino's sister's son Zézinho remained, married and with children; Paulino's sister's son Valdir, #6, remained, married, as per Dr. Melatti's census, to #10, but with four children, including a son married to his sister's daughter; Paulino's sister's daughter Tamasai, #7, remained, single but with a daughter married to Valdir's son; and Paulino's sister's daughter Shori, #5, remained, married, as per figure 4.1., with #10, but with 5 children now.

FIGURE 4.1. Composition of Paulino's *shovo*, late 1974.

Source: Genealogical chart drawn by Dr. Julio Cezar Melatti based on his census data, gathered during his fieldwork in 1974-75 (Melatti 1980).




FIGURE 4.2: Comments

Twenty-five years after Dr. Melatti, I returned to Paulino's *shovo* and took a census. This genealogical chart represents the results of my census and genealogical inquiries. On the top right, note Julio and Kena with their three children, Vó (3), Kana (2) and Paulino (1), this latter still the active *shovo ivo*. On the top left note Domingo, #101, with four of his wives whose descendants form part of the *shovo* in various ways. In the upper center, note #104, João Tuxáua. Domingo, João Tuxáua, and Júlio played essential roles in the emergence of the Marubo after the rubber boom (Chapter Eight).


On the second descending generation from Domingo and Júlio, on the far left note Domingo's children Yoshiipa (10) and Vane (11). These are married, as they were in 1974, in a brother-sister exchange format to Paulino's sister's children Valdir (6) and Shori (5). On the lower left corner are the results of those marriages, five children for 5/10 and four children for 6/11. To the right of Valdir and Shori is represented the marriage of Paulino's sister's son Zézinho to a granddaughter of João Tuxáua. They have four children.

On the same row as Paulino's sister's children may be seen Paulino's own six children. One of his daughters, though unmarried, has two children; his elder son has married, but is childless. His wife has a child borne prior to marriage.

Finally, note Paulino's sister's daughter Tamasai, #7, has a daughter, Rami, who is married to Valdir's son. This is for him a father's sister's daughter marriage.

FIGURE 4.2.: Shovo of Paulino, 12/97-4/98

Individuals currently residing at Paulino's *shovo* have darkened triangles and squares.



If we proceed to examine the current situation in Figure 4.2., we note that the core constituency of the *shovo* in 1974 has formed the basis for its continuing demographic expansion. Breaking down Figure 4.2 into constituent family units, we note that Paulino, his descendants, his wife and his son's wife and son's wife's daughter, number 12/33, or 36.4% of the *shovo*. Paulino's sisters' children (5, 6, 7, and Zézinho), with their spouses and descendants, count for 21/33, or 63.6% of the *shovo*. Thus, the maintenance of coresidence between Paulino and his sisters' children is the key to this *shovo*'s existence.

In seeking an explanation for the attractiveness of this pattern of residence, a digression into the Marubo clan system and its effect on individual values regarding marriage is necessary. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight, the Marubo have a tendency to engage in marriage alliances with other exogamous units. The Marubo kinship universe divides the human landscape into four categories, one of which is yours, another the category of cross-cousins, real and classificatory, into which one marries. On the generation above you there are two other categories, your mother's kin and your father's kin. In such a system, there exists the possibility of a self-enclosed, self-replicating four-section system. This is very difficult to achieve in practice, but several groups of Marubo are trying. Figures 4.1. and 4.2. suggest that this is the case at Paulino's *shovo*.

In Figure 4.1. are to be seen small annotations referring to the clan membership of individuals. A1 is the Shanenáwavo clan, while A2 refers to their mothers' brothers and sisters' sons (kokavo), the Iskonáwavo. B1 is the Varináwavo clan, while B2 represents the kokavo of the latter, the Tamaoavo. Note in the middle row, representing Paulino's sisters' children, that all marriages are between B1 and A2, i.e., between Iskonáwavo and

Varináwavo. This results in a generation consisting entirely of A1 and B2, i.e., of Shanenáwavo and Tamaoavo. The situation on the lowest generation in chart 4.2 is the same, but expanded. As these youths are now reaching the age of marriage, the ideal would be for the Shanenáwavo children of 5/10 and of 7 to marry the Tamaoavo children of 6/11 and of Zézinho. In fact, one such marriage has already taken place. The sole marriage currently consummated on that generation is precisely between A1 and B2, producing a B1 girl. If more such “appropriate” marriages take place, the *shovo* will continue to expand, on each generation producing more members of each category and thus more possibilities for marriage. Marriages will continue to display the same form as the brother-sister exchange of 5/6/10/11.

These observations lead me to believe, in the absence of interview data, that the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition at Paulino’s is related to the pursuit of that elusive Marubo social ideal, the active Kariera-type kinship process. In considering their arrangement, the participants will be inclined to feel that what they are doing is good and right because it provides a correct traditional social order, provides everyone with a marriage partner, and makes them feel in a sense superior to other *shovo* because others have given up on the Kariera-type ideal in favor of more randomized marriage arrangements. The latter are considered deplorable, but accepted as a fact even as the elders complain that the incorrect marriages are mixing up the clans and confusing the onomastic system. The successful enactment of a traditional arrangement requires effort and discipline as well as considerable luck, and any *shovo* even partly successful can feel proud of the achievement. It is likely that the inhabitants of Paulino’s *shovo*, at least on his nephews’/nieces’ generation, feel a sense of the value of the social arrangement they

are enacting. It is likely that they will feel an active desire to maintain and perpetuate the system and deter contrary forces. These suggestions on my part must remain, unfortunately, speculative until confirmed by future interview data.

Paulino's *shovo* is the only currently extant example, in the analyzed sample, of the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition (I suspect the *shovo* of João Aurélio at Aldeia São Sebastião is also avuncular). Nevertheless, in gathering together the residential histories of *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal, I was made aware that four currently separate *shovo* are splinters of two *shovo*, both now defunct, fitting the avuncular pattern. These cases are extremely interesting as they suggest that the relationship between kokavo is not a solid basis for long-term *shovo* composition. The cohesive force mentioned above—attraction to the Marubo kinship ideals—is balanced by a counterforce, namely, the brittleness of the relationship between a man and his kokavo. This latter relation is subject to factors that cause schism. At Paulino's, the centripetal social forces have prevailed; at Maronal the centrifugal forces have prevailed.


Residential movement histories collected at Aldeia Maronal indicate that the persons now dwelling in the separate *shovo* of José Barbosa and of the Varináwavo brothers were at one time coresidents in a single *shovo*. José started a *shovo* as a young man a year or so after his marriage. He built his *shovo* with his brother Pedro. However, at that time (c.1977-8), the *shovo* of the elder Domingo broke up, causing the various uterine families that lived there to disperse. One of these, consisting of four Varináwavo brothers and of their mother, assisted José with the *shovo* construction and moved in with José and Pedro. This arrangement lasted some 15 years. In 1993-4, José and his brother, now assisted by José's sons, built a new *shovo*. At this point, for reasons to be explored

in the next chapter, the Varináwavo decided to stay behind and became the sole dwellers in the old *shovo*. Three years later they built a new one for themselves. Thus, when I arrived, José and Pedro on the one hand, and the Varináwavo brothers on the other, lived separately. This separateness belied 15 years of coresidence.

The *shovo* thus revealed by my inquiries into the past essentially consisted of two sets of brothers: on the one hand José and Pedro, of the Tamaoavo clan; on the other hand Võpa, Mayãpa, Potõpa, and Emãpa, of the Varináwavo clan. Our interest in this chapter is the social basis for unity and dispersal. It is therefore necessary to ask, what is the relationship between these sets of brothers? This relation is graphically laid out in Figure 4.3. The Tamaoavo's mothers' sister is the Varináwavo's mother's mother. To understand the significance of this relationship we should key in on the relation between José (the *shovo ivo*) and Yaka, the mother of the Varináwavo brothers. Yaka is José's mother's sister's daughter—matrilateral first parallel cousin. Classificatorily, this is a sister, and indeed, José considered Yaka his sister. Therefore, Yaka's sons are José's sister's sons.

FIGURE 4.3.

Genealogical relationship between the Varináwavo brothers and the Tamaoavo brothers.




The genealogical relationship linking José to Yaka's sons is supplemented by the social relation between the Tamaoavo and Varináwavo clans. Analytically, these form a single matrilineal exogamous unit. The child of a Tamaoavo woman is Varináwavo, and the child of a Varináwavo woman is Tamaoavo. Their relation to one another is that of kokavo, mother's siblings and sister's children. Although Yaka's sons are José's mother's sister's daughter's sons, not his sister's sons, this extra step of genealogical distance is glossed over in the Marubo kinship universe. To José, the Varináwavo brothers are his nephews, kokavo; and to the Varináwavo brothers, José is an uncle, koka.

As close as the relationship between these two sets of brothers is, my impression is that there was an element of chance to the assembly of the *shovo*. The Varináwavo's father's *shovo* was just breaking up as José was planning to build his first *shovo*. Whereas at Paulino's, the sisters of the *shovo ivo* are his full sisters, in this case we have a parallel cousin. The difference is that Paulino, his sisters, and sister's sons were coresident from childhood, whereas José, Yaka, and Yaka's sons were not. The crucial relationship between Yaka and José is not as close as that which linked Paulino to his sisters.

According to interviews, the main reason for the breakup was differences concerning what relationship to have with nonindigenous people. However, this chapter is concerned purely with the *social* basis of unity and dispersal. A comparison between Paulino's *shovo* and this one reveals one major social difference, precisely in that aspect which I pointed out as a strong centripetal force at Paulino's: the practice of traditional four-section marriage exchange arrangements. Note in Figure 4.4. that the Varináwavo brothers are all married to Iskonáwavo women, and have had Shananáwavo children.

Note also that José's brother Alfredo married Shanenáwavo women and had Iskonáwavo children. These marriages form part of a traditional arrangement explained to me as follows: a Tamaoavo should marry a Shanenáwavo, and a Varináwavo should marry Iskonáwavo.



José did not follow the traditional arrangement, marrying instead Satanáwavo women and having Rovonáwavo children. The Varináwavo are committed to the traditional arrangement. Accordingly, the children of the Varináwavo brothers should be marrying Tamaoavo partners. If José had married a Shanenáwavo woman according to tradition, having Iskonáwavo sons who married Varináwavo women according to tradition, there would eventually grow up a generation of Tamaoavo, the appropriate marriage partners for the children of Yaka's children. At Paulino's *shovo* this possibility—that the members of the third *shovo* generation may intermarry, that by maintaining coresidence one assures marriage partners for all children and therefore a perpetually expanding *shovo*—formed a centripetal social attraction force. At José's *shovo* this same attraction did not exist. Hence, there was little incentive in terms of commonly held social ideals that might induce these sets of brothers to work out their differences. Given that they were not intermarried, and their children and children's children were unlikely to intermarry, and that they had different ideas concerning strategies for interaction with non-indigenous people, they were in fact separate families.

After fifteen years, this coresidence of convenience ended and the two went their separate ways.

Figure 4.4.: Comments.

At top left is Domingo. His first wife to the right is Yaka, Tamaoavo. She is the mother of the four Varináwavo brothers on the –1 generation at far left. Domingo’s 2nd and 3rd wives to his right are Rovonáwavo, and their daughters are Satanáwavo. At top right is João Tuxáua. His first two wives to his left, are Varináwavo. These are Yaka’s mother’s sisters (see Figure 4.3.). On the –1 generation, far right, we see three Tamaoavo brothers. To the farthest right are José and Pedro, married to Domingo’s Satanáwavo daughters. The third from the right is Alfredo, with two Shanenáwavo wives. On the –2 generation, on the far right, we see the three Iskonáwavo offspring of Shanenáwavo women. These Iskonáwavo are intermarried with the Varináwavo children of Yaka. Four Varináwavo brothers having all married Iskonáwavo women, we see their Shanenáwavo children on the lowest row: the first through sixth and the seventeenth through twenty-second from the left. The appropriate marriage partners for these individuals, in order to perpetuate the extant system, are Tamaoavo. At the far right of the –3 generation, we see one such marriage has been made. However, with José’s marriage to Satanáwavo women producing a large number of Rovonáwavo children, the seventh through sixteenth from the left on the lower row (–3 generation), the potential for a successful multigenerational four-section system is reduced. Shanenáwavo should marry Tamaoavo, but lives with Rovonáwavo instead. The new generation do not intermarry, the kokavo remain unlinked, and the *shovo* does not persist for another generation. The Varináwavo brothers and Tamaoavo brothers each establish individual agnatic-type *shovo*.

FIGURE 4.4. Hypothetical projection of what the Varináwavo-Tamaoavo *shovo* would look like if it had not broken up. Includes families of all those who lived in the *shovo* when it was together, along with children born up to the present. Also includes some essential genealogical connections that are not actual coresidents.





FIGURE 4.5.:

Genealogical relationship between adult males at Sināpa's *shovo* prior to schism of 1997.



The *shovo* of Sināpa at Aldeia Maronal, prior to a schism that took place in 1997, provides a third example of avuncular *shovo* composition. The key relationships in this *shovo* are laid out in Figure 4.5. The elders of the *shovo* are Wasinawa and Sināpa. Sināpa is the *shovo ivo*. Both Wasinawa and Sināpa are members of the Satanáwavo clan. Tae, Ronípa, and Shinípa are younger men of the Rovonáwavo clan. Note that the younger men are sister's sons of the elders; the elders are mother's brothers to the young men.

Histories of residential movements collected from informants indicate that the *shovo* was built by Sinãpa and his nephews. This was in the early 1980s. Sinãpa grew up in the *shovo* of his father Domingo. When that *shovo* broke up in 1977-8, Sinãpa moved to the upper Curuçá. Meanwhile Tae and Ronipa, who had grown up together, joined up with Shinipa to tap rubber, near where Sinãpa was living. All three young men were unmarried. At that time, the three teamed up with their koka Sinãpa to build a *shovo*. Subsequently, Wasinawa moved from Ituí to reside with this group. All together now, they built a new *shovo*, c. 1985. This was the *shovo* Sinãpa and his family still lived in when I visited. However, Wasinawa and his nephews built a *shovo* of their own, which they completed in 1997, consummating a schism and leaving Sinãpa alone, as he had been in 1978-80. As a result, the composition of Sinãpa's *shovo* is agnatic, while the newer *shovo* of Wasinawa remains avuncular.

According to informants, the increasing significance of Sinãpa's sons in the *shovo* composition and status distribution, and especially the virilocal marriage of the eldest three, put increasing pressure on the avuncular links. At Paulino's *shovo*, the highest status after the *shovo ivo*'s is that of his sister's sons, Valdir and Zézinho. Paulino's oldest son plays a subsidiary role in terms of status. However, my observations suggest that Sinãpa was not prepared to ascribe status to any of his nephews, preferring instead an agnatic pattern and devolving status to his eldest son. An incongruence between the pattern of *shovo* composition and the pattern of status transmission becomes here a centrifugal social force propelling a schism.

When constructed, Sināpa's *shovo* consisted of the following people:

- (1) Sināpa, his wife and six children, ages one to seventeen;
- (2) Wasinawa, his wife and three children, ages one to six;
- (3) The Rovonáwavo companions, Ronīpa, Tae and Shinīpa.

Sināpa's family thus composed 50% of the *shovo* (8/16), while Wasinawa and the nephews composed the other 50%.

When it broke up twelve years later, Sināpa's *shovo* consisted of the following people:

- (1) Sināpa, his two wives and thirteen children, ages one to twenty-nine;
- (2) Sināpa's son's wives. Three of his sons married virilocally;
- (3) Sināpa's son's son. By the time of the schism, Sināpa's eldest son had his own first son;
- (4) Wasinawa, his wife and five children, ages three to eighteen;
- (5) Tae, now married to Wasinawa's daughter, with three children;
- (6) Shinīpa, now married with a son; and
- (7) Ronīpa, still unmarried.

By the time of the schism, Sināpa's family had grown to compose 58.9% of the *shovo* (20/34), while Wasinawa and the nephews composed 41.2% (14/34). Sināpa's family more than doubled in numbers; his sons grew up and married virilocally, starting

families of their own; and Sināpa himself married a second wife who was a very active childbearer. Meanwhile, Wasinawa's side of the *shovo* was expanding also, though not as quickly. Wasinawa's wife bore two more children, his eldest daughter married and had children, and Shinīpa married as well (Ronīpa is rumored to have married and divorced three times). The way this situation was described to me by informants was, "when Sināpa's children got wives, the *shovo* became crowded." In fact, the virilocal marriages of Sināpa's sons were probably a straw that broke the camel's back. Ronīpa told me that Wasinawa had been talking about building a *shovo* for years, but only in 1997 did they actually begin work. Those numbered (1) to (3), above, stayed with Sināpa, while those in the categories numbered (4) to (7) composed the new *shovo*'s population.

The result of the schism is to leave Sināpa's *shovo* in a purely agnatic pattern of composition. Sināpa's *shovo* expands by his own marriages and by the virilocal marriages of his sons. The *shovo* of Wasinawa, however, is avuncular in its composition pattern. In addition to Wasinawa's own marriage, this *shovo* expands by the marriages of his sister's sons (one of whom is also his son-in-law). The marriage of Tae to Wasinawa's daughter is the sole example of uxorilocal residence at Aldeia Maronal, and this is the only non-agnatic *shovo* at Maronal. Because of its peculiar history, I feel justified classifying this as an avuncular *shovo* rather than as an uxorilocal one.

The evidence of Paulino's *shovo* on the Ituí river, of the old Varináwavo/Tamaoavo *shovo* on the upper Curuçá, and of the original composition of Sināpa's *shovo* and the subsequent spinoff of Wasinawa's *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal, is sufficient to support the assertion that the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition exists.

At their root, these *shovo* are formed by the relationship between men and their sister's children. In Marubo society, this relationship, that between kokavo, is extremely important. One's mother's brother is in the alternate section of one's own exogamous descent group. In the ideal Marubo marriage system, a man should marry his mother's brother's daughter—the daughter of one's koka. Thus, when individuals reside with their kokavo, they also reside with their ideal marriage partners. In such a situation, if a brother-sister exchange can be effected on the sister's son's generation (as it has been at Paulino's), the second descending generation resides with its own ideal marriage partners, too. Once established, such a system generates the Kariera-type system ideal: a self-replicating, self-contained four section system ensuring perpetual expansion.

In practice, numerous forces deter the ideal pattern from taking shape. Most common among these is the tendency for a man to chose to marry a woman of an inappropriate descent group. The incest taboo bars one's own exogamous unit, and the kinship ideals endorse one other exogamous unit as 'correct'. Because there are eleven exogamous units in Marubo society, four-section exchange systems leave nine exogamous units which a man can marry into, but should not. José's marriage with Satanáwavo women is an example. It was convenient for him to marry Satanáwavo women, and he did. Subsequently, he formed a *shovo* with classificatory sister's sons, but because of his non-traditional marriage, the ideal intermarriage format never materialized in his *shovo*. Since there was no possibility of achieving the ideal, a major centripetal force was absent from José's *shovo*.

At Vida Nova, three *shovo* are interacting to produce the ideal self-replicating four-section system. However, these people make no attempt to put the four sections

under one roof, so that the pursuit of Kariera-type kinship does not, at Vida Nova, result in avuncular patterns of *shovo* composition.

At Sināpa's, the *shovo ivo*'s first wife had five sons and one daughter. Sināpa was disinclined to marry his one daughter to any of his nephews. Hence, the bond of mother's brother's daughter marriage never served to cement the relation between Sināpa and his sister's sons. Sināpa chose to pursue an agnatic pattern of *shovo* composition and status transmission. On the other hand, Wasinawa did become his sister's son's father-in-law, and his *shovo* continues to have the avuncular composition that Sināpa's *shovo* formerly had.

The strength of the avuncular pattern of *shovo* composition is its perfect fit with Marubo social structure; its weakness the extreme difficulty of producing and maintaining the appropriate social network. When all the elements fit together, the prospect of a sustainable, multigenerational, marriage exchange network acts as a centripetal social force binding the residential group together. When even one key element is missing, however, numerous centripetal pressures tear at the avuncular *shovo*. Despite its rarity it must be considered one of the three normative patterns of *shovo* composition in Marubo society.

4. Anicular pattern of *shovo* composition

The categories of agnatic, uxorilocal, and avuncular patterns of *shovo* composition are sufficient to classify 25 out of 27 *shovo* in the analyzed sample. For the remaining two, I propose an etic category that Marubo elders would probably not

recognize as normative. At the *shovo* of Mashkāpa, at Vida Nova, the key relationship is that between the *shovo*-owner and his mother-in-law. At the *shovo* of Mene at Aldeia Alegria, the crucial relationship is between the *shovo*-owner's mother and sisters. There are elements of this pattern to be found at the *shovo* of Kamāpa, of Akōpa, and at the *shovo* of Mashēpa at Aldeia Maronal. To name this pattern I have coined the term "anicular" from Latin aniculus, 'old woman'. In this pattern of Marubo *shovo* composition the focal point of the social network is an older woman.

The focal point of the *shovo* of Mashkāpa at Aldeia Vida Nova on the upper Ituí is the elderly Mayewa, approximately 60 years of age. Mayewa is Mashkāpa's mother-in-law. Mashkāpa and his wife have six children, a substantial nuclear family. But his *shovo* consists of 20 inhabitants. We must ask through what type of social relationships does Mashkāpa's *shovo* burgeon demographically beyond the extent of the *shovo*-owner's nuclear family? In this case Mashkāpa has no brothers nor any married children, whether viri- or uxorilocal. He does have a sister's son residing with him, but that is only a single person. The remaining eleven people, comprising 55% of the *shovo*, are his wife's relatives—wife's sisters, wife's sister's children, wife's brother, and of course, wife's mother. Mayewa, her children, and her children's children comprise 90% of this *shovo*—everyone except Mashkāpa and his sister's son.

An important fact concerning the composition of Mashkāpa's *shovo* is that except for Mashkāpa's wife, none of Mayewa's children are married. Mayewa is a widow. Her son Mese, who lives with Mashkāpa, is unmarried. Her eldest daughter Meto, age 41, has six children, all of them living at Mashkāpa's. Her ex-husband lives at Aldeia Paraná according to informants, though I was unable to identify him in my census data. Finally,

Mayewa's 29-year old daughter Vó is unmarried and has a ten year old son by 'unknown' father. I conclude that the attracting force that binds this *shovo* together is the close relation between Mayewa and her children. All her unmarried children have the option of marrying and residing elsewhere, but all choose to live here with their kin rather than elsewhere with affines. The centripetal attraction of the uterine family, focused on the mother, is the main determinant of social composition at Mashkāpa's. By residing with her married daughter, Mayewa creates a focal point that attracts the rest of her kin, who are unmarried or in unstable marriages.

The *shovo* of Mene at Alegria exemplifies the anicular pattern of *shovo* composition through the role of the *shovo*-owner's mother, rather than mother-in-law. The *shovo* of Mene is a recent splinter from Panípa's. Mene's mother, Tome, is the widow of the celebrated Marubo shaman Veo, who lived at Vida Nova in the *shovo* now belonging to Pekōpapa. Tome is also the sister of the two Alegria *shovo ivorasi*, Panípa and Tekāpa. Mene, who was raised at Pekōpapa's but as Tome's son is also Panípa's sister's son, married uxorilocally into Panípa's *shovo*. However, the death of Veo brought Tome back to reside with her brother and son at Alegria. Tome brought with her the rest of her children also—one son and four daughters. One of these daughters is married, and her husband and two children also reside here. Thus, Veo's death and Tome's subsequent decision to move to Alegria with her entire uterine family and an uxorilocally married son-in-law, was very consequential as far as adding numbers to Panípa's *shovo*. Shortly thereafter, the entire group consisting of Tome's children, children's spouses, and children's children moved into its own newly made *shovo*, a short walk away from Panípa's. It was Tome's actions, not Mene's, that put this group of

coresidents together, and it is Tome's decision to reside here that gave Mene the critical mass of coresident kin he needed to have his own *shovo*. Though 26-year old Mene is the *shovo ivo*, 52-year old Tome has been the focal point of this *shovo*'s social composition.

We may identify an anicular element in the composition of Kamāpa's *shovo* in the role of Kamāpa's sister's daughter Wanīshavo Peko. Peko, an elderly woman aged 70-75, is the mother of Raomayāpa, identified earlier as the essential uxorilocal component of Kamāpa's *shovo*. Peko's daughter—Raomayāpa's sister—Vó also lives here, with neither husband nor children. It is of great interest to note, however, the presence of another daughter of Peko, Meto. Meto is another widow of Veo, the shaman whose death triggered the formation of Mene's *shovo*, as mentioned above. Like Tome, Meto lived virilocally at what is now Pekōpapa's *shovo*. However, upon Veo's death, Meto, like Tome, chose to return to live with her kin. In this case, that meant moving where her mother Peko and her brother Raomayāpa lived. Meto brought her five children, including four adult sons, to Kamāpa's with her. Meto's daughter came with two children of her own, though no husband. In total, Meto's move added eight members to Kamāpa's *shovo*. It is the coresidence of Raomayāpa with his elderly mother that makes this *shovo* an attractive place for other of Peko's children who are in unstable residential situations. Mathematical evidence of Wanīshavo Peko's significance as a focal point in social composition at Kamāpa's can be found in the comments to Table 4.6.

Elements of anicular composition may be discerned at the *shovo* of Akōpa at Água Branca. Akōpa's sister is Sherōewa, the ex-wife of Paraná *shovo ivo* Sherōpapa. Divorced from Sherōpapa, she now lives with her brother Akōpa. But she adds more than just herself to Akōpa's *shovo*, as she has with her one of her sons, her son's wife,

and her son's five children. Her decision to live here upon divorce from her husband thus adds considerably to her brother's coresident network at the expense of her ex-husband's. Akōpa's wife serves as an additional key link in the composition of this *shovo* through the presence of her sister's son with his wife and three children. Akōpa's own nuclear family amounts to only 27.8% of this *shovo* (since reduced to 23.5% by the devastating loss of his wife to malaria on February 6th 1998). The remainder of the *shovo* is composed through the aforementioned links via Akōpa's sister (age 52) and wife (age 40) to his sister's son and wife's sister's son. The link through Akōpa's sister could be termed avuncular but since the crucial link is between the *shovo ivo* (age 44) and his older sister, rather than between the *shovo ivo* and his sister's son, I think it more accurate to term Sherōewa's contribution to *shovo* composition anicular. It is similar to abovementioned examples in that it involves an older woman moving towards kin away from affines after a marital arrangement dissolves.

A final example of anicular *shovo* composition suggests that this is a pattern of which women are aware of as a distinct possibility in life, and a desirable one should other arrangements fail. Mashēpa's *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal is an agnatic-type *shovo* with a small anicular component. Mashēpa runs the *shovo* with his classificatory brothers (in fact bilaterally parallel cousins), Tamāpa and Mayāpa. Mayāpa's wife and Mashēpa's wife are sisters, the daughters of a woman named Meto by her first marriage. Meto's first marriage ended in divorce. She remarried but, just a few years before my fieldwork, divorced again. By the time of her second divorce, her daughters by her first husband were married at Aldeia Maronal. After her last divorce, Meto wandered from kin to kin before settling in with her daughters. She came to Mashēpa's with a son and a daughter

by her second husband. This is the sole example of an anicular element of *shovo* composition I have been able to personally observe. The status she enjoys as mother-in-law is considerable, and through her daughters she exercises considerable influence on *shovo* affairs and is treated respectfully. She is thus in a relatively good situation, despite her multiple divorces and her advancing age. My understanding is that her decision to move in with her sons-in-law, in a pattern analogous to that of Mayewa at Mashkāpa's, represents an effort on Meto's part to ensconce herself in a kin network in which she has high status. This she cannot get as a wife—hence her divorces. But she can get high status as a mother-in-law—hence her current residence.

In common to all examples of anicular *shovo* composition are the following elements:

- (1) An older woman's marital arrangements are dissolved, through widowhood or divorce.
- (2) Rather than remain with her ex-husband or her ex-husband's kin, the woman relocates to live with her kin.
- (3) The woman does not move alone, but brings her descendants with her, making a substantial contribution to *shovo* composition.
- (4) The relationship between the focal woman and the *shovo ivo* varies. It may be the *shovo ivo*'s mother, mother-in-law, or sister, or a more complex relationship as at Kamāpa's.

In addition, we may note that the presence together of two kin—a younger married man and a single older woman—can act as the attracting focus for other kin whose marital arrangements may be unstable. Through anicular arrangements,

unmarried, widowed or divorced women find comfortable residential arrangements in old age, often free from the stormy relationships that plagued their reproductive years.

D. Implications of *shovo* composition patterns: distribution of status within *shovo*

The social composition of the *shovo* determines the distribution of status within the *shovo*. However the *shovo* is composed, so too is status distributed. In agnatic-type *shovo*, the status is centered primarily on the *shovo ivo*; the secondary roles fall to his brothers, and then his sons. For example, at Alfredo's *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal, when Alfredo is travelling, his brother Miguel acts as *shovo ivo*. This second place in *shovo* status distribution is the role I call "lieutenant". The individual in this role is literally a *lieutenant* (Fr. *lieu*, place, + *tenant*, holder—the person who holds the place while the actual chief is gone). Beyond the lieutenant, agnatic *shovo* assign status to any other brother-companions of the *shovo ivo*. In the case of Alfredo's agnatic *shovo*, this third status goes to Joãozinho. The fourth and oldest brother-companion at Alfredo's, Zacarias, was travelling during my fieldwork, so I was not able to observe his role in status distribution.

Beyond the *shovo ivo* and his brother-companions, status in an agnatic-type *shovo* falls to the sons of the founding brothers. At Alfredo's, the two older, virilocally married sons of Zacarias had high status. Both these young men were in their mid-30s with substantial families. One in particular—Iskōpa—frequently played a leadership role in terms of initiating agricultural activities, taking action to tackle health problems, and

discussing relations with non-indigenous people. One of Alfredo's sons, though not yet married, also enjoys high status due to his special role as mediator with CIVAJA, the indigenous political organization.

The agnatic *shovo* is based on the relationship between a man and his brothers and sons; in such a *shovo*, after the *shovo ivo*, status devolves upon his brothers and sons.

In uxorilocally-patterned *shovo*, the second status, and sometimes the first, goes to the uxorilocally married *shovo ivo*'s son-in-law. To distinguish this role from that of agnatic lieutenant, I have called it 'uxorilocal lieutenant'. This role is very visible along the upper Ituí. At Kamãpa's, the uxorilocal lieutenant is the *de facto* leader. This man, Raomayãpa, is in the process of having his own *shovo* constructed, which will effectively pass his father-in-law into retirement and move him into the select ranks of the *shovo ivorasi*. At Vimipa's, Wakanawa is *de facto* leader despite his father-in-law's having *shovo ivo* status. The third-highest status at Vimipa's goes to Vimipa's son-in-law's son-in-law. Other uxorilocal lieutenants include Eduardo at Aldeia Liberdade, Simão at Txumãpa's, and possibly Kanãpa at Tekãpa's.

In the avuncular *shovo* of Paulino, the second status goes to the *shovo ivo*'s sister's son. Paulino himself is a firm and strong leader and a respected elder. However, he has with him no brothers. He has, from my own observations, an excellent relationship with his sister's sons Valdir and Zézinho, who play the roles of 'lieutenant' in this *shovo*. Paulino's eldest son, Kono (Votëpa) has lower status than Paulino's sister's sons. Thus, once again, as the *shovo* is composed, so too is status distributed.

Anicular *shovo* assign greater status to the key women than do other *shovo*. Mayewa, Wanñshavo Peko, and Tome are all in situations where no-one can boss them

around and where, *au contraire*, they are in positions of relative authority over the *shovo ivo*, who is son-in-law in the first case, son in the second and third. The anicular pattern involves relocation of women from unstable affinal situations to stabler kin-groups. At Kamāpa's, we noted that Meto moved to live with her mother and brother rather than remain with her ex-husband's kin. Meto will enjoy higher status as Raomayāpa's sister than she would as the widow of a dead brother-companion of the *shovo ivo*, where she would most likely be relegated to a secondary status. the same goes for Tome, formerly married to that same now-dead shaman. Rather than remain with her dead husband's kin, she returned to Alegria, where she is now the essential anicular focus of her son's *shovo*. Anicular *shovo* represent women's strategies for happiness in old age, once marriage itself has failed to bring it.

In summary, the agnatic *shovo* is based on brothers and sons, and assigns status after the *shovo ivo* to brothers and sons; the uxorilocal *shovo* is based on a son-in-law, and assigns status after the *shovo ivo* to the son-in-law; the avuncular *shovo* is based on sister's sons and assigns status after the *shovo ivo* to sister's sons; and the anicular *shovo*, based on the actions of old women, assigns relatively high status to these essential women.

E. Implications of *shovo* composition patterns: Requirements for leadership

Each pattern of *shovo* composition requires different actions from those endeavoring to enact it. To start and maintain an agnatic *shovo*, the primary requirement is marriage. There is not a single case of an unmarried *shovo ivo*. There are three *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal consisting only of a single nuclear family. If the *shovo* is to be founded by an individual with no grown sons, a brother-companion is required. There are thus several possibilities:

- (1) A man marries and has children; with the assistance of his sons, he builds a *shovo*, which expands as his family grows;
- (2) A man marries, and has children. He invites a brother or brothers to start a *shovo* with him. His brother is also married, with or without children. Together, the man and his brother build the *shovo*. The *shovo* expands as the owner's family grows, as his brother(s) has(ve) children, and as the sons and brother's sons marry virilocally and have children of their own.
- (3) A *shovo ivo* decides to move the *shovo* elsewhere, but a set of brothers refuses the move; instead they choose to found their own *shovo* in their own location.

To compose a *shovo* uxorilocally, a man must marry and have daughters, then attract a man to marry his daughter(s), and retain this man as a coresident. This requires a man to control his daughters—the premarital pregnancies so common in Maruboland must be avoided, and any unapproved liaisons prevented. The composition of such a *shovo* depends on the *shovo ivo*'s daughters belonging to the son-in-law, since it is the attraction of the marriage that brings the son-in-law and keeps him in residence.

Mixed uxorilocal/virilocal *shovo* require a double juggling act on the part of the *shovo ivo*. The attribution of status to the son-in-law renders the *shovo* a less attractive place for the adult son. At Kamāpa's and Vimipa's, this structural conflict has resulted in the departure of the *shovo ivo*'s sons, while at Aldeia Praia it is the son-in-law that has relocated. To expand a *shovo* by uxorilocal marriage of daughters and virilocal marriage of sons requires that the *shovo ivo* resolve this conflict.

Individuals who came to *shovo ivo* status through the role of uxorilocal lieutenant, inheriting the status from their father-in-law, do not necessarily replicate the strategy their father-in-law used. There are examples of the former uxorilocal lieutenant developing the *shovo* into an agnatic pattern rather than replicating the uxorilocal pattern. At Vimipa's, the uxorilocal pattern has been repeated for four generations; at Paraná the pattern has shifted from uxorilocal to agnatic.

Avuncular *shovo* may be the most difficult to create and to perpetuate. The main attraction of such a pattern is the presence of appropriate marriage partners within the *shovo*. This requires each individual to marry into the correct clan, and also an element of luck in that each marriage must produce adequate proportions of children of the right clans, who must marry in the correct patterns. Failure of the *shovo* to follow correct marriage patterns results in a weakening of the centripetal attraction, an excruciation of centrifugal tendencies, and dispersal of the *shovo*. To achieve this type of *shovo* composition, a *shovo ivo* must rigidly adhere to traditional marriage alliances, and go to great lengths to ensure that all members of the *shovo* do so, as well. Brother-sister exchanges should be practiced on successive generations, creating a dual organization with increasing quantities of options for participants. If this is not possible, a

replacement marriage partner from another location but of the proper clan must be sought. This is a task often falling to the *shovo ivo*. He must also prevent amorous liaisons with women of the wrong clan from becoming marriages, and direct his personnel towards the correct marriage partners. The *shovo ivo* and elders are also essential in communicating the value system that causes younger generations to accept the avuncular pattern's restrictions on potential marriage partners.

Anicular *shovo* are created by the actions of women rather than of male *shovo ivorasi*. Women who found anicular *shovo* have been married and have children, often also children's children. They are widowed or divorced, by choice or circumstance. Either way, they leave the residential arrangement pertaining to their now-dissolved marriage, and move to reside with a married kinsperson—typically a married son or daughter. The woman brings with her any children she can. The presence of this group of kin together then acts as a centripetal focus attracting other members of the uterine family who find themselves in unstable residential situations. The key move is the residential relocation of the elderly woman whose marriage is dissolved.

F. Implications of *shovo* composition patterns: centripetal and centrifugal forces in Marubo society

This chapter has focused on discovering what it is that holds groups of Marubo together in cohesive, stable residential groups. The analysis has revealed a number of strong cohesive forces operating in Marubo society, as well as the structural weaknesses of each social pattern.

The agnatic *shovo* is a highly cohesive pattern. It is based on the strong bond between men and their brothers, and between men and their sons. All the key individuals in the *shovo*'s social structure have been raised together. Furthermore, the relationship of brother-companions is typically one of choice. It is the brothers that get along the best in the first place that stay together their whole lives. For example, of the four sons of João Tuxáua, Alfredo and Zacarias have remained together while José and Pedro have lived independently since José's marriage. In contrast, the four Varináwavo brothers have stuck together. Hence the bond of brother-companionship is very strong and often lifelong. The bond between father and son is also quite strong, especially if the son derives status from the father and if virilocal marriage is practiced. The relationships upon which the agnatic *shovo* is based are thus very strong and long-lasting.

More brittle than the agnatic relationships is the bond between man and wife. The *shovo ivo*'s marriage, *shovo ivo*'s brother's marriage, and son's marriages must all be successful for an agnatic *shovo* to grow to full potential. Successful *shovo* have successful marriages. Less successful *shovo* do not. At Aldeia Paraná, the *shovo ivo*'s own marriage collapsed, and his new wife is young with two very small children. The *shovo ivo*'s sons by his first wife are dispersed. However, because he has a number of coresident siblings, including a successfully married brother-companion, Paraná *shovo ivo* Sherópapa has managed to retain a *shovo*. Nevertheless, this *shovo* has actually lost absolute numbers of people since 1974 and its percentage of the total Marubo population has gone down considerably (see Chapter Eight). The cohesive agnatic forces of this type of *shovo* are thus opposed by the potential brittleness of marriage.

The agnatic pattern implies virilocality. Women are attracted to live with the *shovo ivo*'s sons and brother's sons. Thus, the agnatic core of brothers and sons remains together. However, in a place that is 98% virilocal, as Aldeia Maronal is, virilocality signifies the dispersion of the women even as it ensures the retention of the men. The *shovo ivo*'s sisters and daughters go elsewhere to become wives to another agnatic core. Women's tendencies to resist this pattern will be explored in the next section (This chapter, Section G)

The uxorilocal pattern of *shovo* composition is based on the attraction of a man to a good marriage situation. Most of these marriages are polygynous, a desirable situation and a difficult one to obtain. In addition to polygyny, the son-in-law is attracted by the potential of high status. Uxorilocally married sons-in-law tend to be higher in status than their brothers-in-law, and inherit control of the *shovo* upon their father-in-law's retirement. The dual attractions of a wife and of high status tie the son-in-law to the father-in-law. These relationships are often very long-lasting. There are several examples of *shovo* based on this pattern that have lasted several generations and continue to prosper.

The uxorilocal pattern creates a centrifugal force tending to dispersion of the *shovo ivo*'s sons. Because status transmission bypasses the sons for the son-in-law, the sons may find residence more attractive elsewhere. The most successful and long-lasting examples of uxorilocality—Kamãpa's and Vimipa's *shovo*—are also those where dispersal of sons has been near-total. Dispersal of sons may be countered by a shift to agnatic pattern of composition. In some cases, uxorilocality of daughters and virilocality of sons is successfully combined. The internal dynamics of such *shovo* remain unknown.

Finally, in one case it is the polygynous son-in-law that dispersed rather than the sons. This case—the move of Wasinawa to Curuçá and ultimately into his own *shovo*—remains unexplained.

Avuncular *shovo* retain personnel by placing them in a successful four-section marriage exchange system operating entirely within the confines of the *shovo*. When Shanenáwavo men and women marry Tamaoavo men and women, the following generation consists of Iskonáwavo and of Varináwavo. If these intermarry in correct proportions, Shanenáwavo and Tamaoavo recur on the following (3rd) generation. An avuncular *shovo* thrives and expands by enacting this process. The main centrifugal force that tends to oppose the avuncular pattern is the tendency of people not to choose the right marriage partner. Maintaining a four-section exchange system is a delicate matter, and one or two incorrect marriages, especially if they result in a number of children, can disturb the *shovo*'s dual organization. When this happens, the prospect of intermarriage and the growth and prosperity derived therefrom disappear along with the perfection of the dual organization. No longer having the ideal marriage partners in coresidence, virilocality or uxorilocality or some other form of residence will be required. With the main centripetal attraction gone, such *shovo* split into agnatic, uxorilocal, or avuncular subunits, abandoning the effort at strict four-section exchange.

Anicular *shovo* represent the re-formation of uterine families years after their break-up. They signify a triumph of consanguinity over affinity as a principle governing coresidence. The bonds that hold these *shovo* together are those of the uterine family. A small nucleus of coresident kin, including an old woman and one of her married children, acts as a focal attraction point. From that point, anicular *shovo* accrete personnel by

exerting a stronger attraction over the old woman's children than is exerted by those children's affinal residential situations. When other marriages break up, the people involved seize the opportunity to move in with kin, leaving affines. Such conditions provide a more comfortable and satisfying old age to the women involved.

G. Residence of Unwed Minors

In this section, I present the available data on location of residence of unwed children and youth relative to their parents. The tables show how many children live with both their mother and father; how many with the mother only; how many with the father only; and how many with neither father nor mother. These data suggests a clear tendency towards the norm (both parents) but a substantial number of exceptions. Analysis of the exceptions reveals certain consistent centrifugal patterns that cause dispersal of Marubo residential groups.

The primary site analyzed is Aldeia Maronal on the Curuçá River. This is where I lived during most of my fieldwork, so that I was able to obtain ages for all individuals listed in the census. The tables for Maronal are therefore very precise. Maronal is also the site of most observations that will be presented in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, so that acquiring an accurate understanding of the types of social forces at work is essential. It is equally essential, however, to study another location as a check on the typicality of the Maronal data. The preceding analysis of social composition showed that Maronal, with its nearly pure agnatism, is not typical of all Marubo society. As a check on the typicality of Maronal data, a village on the upper Ituí will be analyzed. Data

for Ituí are unfortunately less detailed than those for Maronal, and specific cases less well known. Thus, the Ituí tables are less precise.

Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá

Data from Aldeia Maronal shows that most Marubo youth there live with both parents, but with many exceptions. Taking the totals of both sexes, we find that 75.2% (85/113) of unwed children age 19 and under live with both parents, leaving 24.8 % who do not (28/113). Numerical data thus reveals that, while the ideal of living with both parents holds for 3 out of every 4 children, yet a substantial number live under conditions that deviate from the norm. We thus have a numerically confirmed norm and a substantial number of deviations. Armed with this knowledge, we may proceed to ask, what forces act to cause deviation from the norm? These forces may be divided into four categories, as follows:

- (1) Non-marriage;
- (2) Divorce;
- (3) Death;
- (4) Parent-child link broken.

An examination of specific cases will expand our understanding of the dynamics of social dispersion at Aldeia Maronal.

TABLE 4.15.: Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Maronal.Males ages 0-19.

Lives with	Age 0-4	Age 5-9	Age 10-14	Age 15-19	Total
Both M&F	14	13	18	7	52
Mother only	1	2	2	1	6
Father only	0	1	2	0	3
Neither parent	3	2	0	0	5
Total	18	18	22	8	66

Females ages 0-19.

Lives with	Age 0-4	Age 5-9	Age 10-14	Age 15-19	Total
Both M&F	9	16	6	2	33
Mother only	6	2	1	0	9
Father only	0	0	0	1	1
Neither parent	0	1	1	2	4
Total	15	19	8	5	47

Both sexes

Lives with	Age 0-4	Age 5-9	Age 10-14	Age 15-19	Total
Both M&F	23	29	24	9	85
Mother only	7	4	3	1	15
Father only	0	1	2	1	4
Neither parent	3	3	1	2	9
Total	33	37	30	13	113

Totals in percentages.

Lives with	% of males	% of females	% of total
Mother and father	78.8%	70.2%	75.2%
Mother only	9.1%	19.1%	13.3%
Father only	4.5%	2.1%	3.6%
Neither parent	7.6%	8.5%	8.0%

Table 4.15.: Comments

Non-marriage

The most frequent type of deviation from norm is the category I am calling “non-marriage”, to distinguish it from divorce, which is less frequent. In cases of divorce, the individuals are married for a number of years prior to separation. In non-marriage, the individuals involved never marry, or refuse to go live with, or promptly abandon, the other parent of their child. There are at least 12 cases of non-marriage at Aldeia Maronal.

Meto is the 27-year old daughter of the respected elder Misael, a widower. Meto is unmarried and lives with her father. She has two children, 8-year old daughter Peko, and (in 12/97) five-month old son Txuma. Meto’s *shovo* is involved in a traditional-style exchange system with that of Txumãpa at Vida Nova. Misael’s son Simão is married to Txumãpa’s daughter Txoko; Misael’s son Ako is married to Txumãpa’s daughter Peko; and Txumãpa’s son Mesha is married to Misael’s brother’s daughter Mema. Meto was married off to one of Txumãpa’s sons, in accordance with this pattern. Peko is the product of this marriage. However, Meto left her husband and returned to live with her father. For unknown reasons, the issue was not forced and Meto remained at her father’s. Some time later, Meto bore a son, apparently the result of a casual liaison with a man from downriver, with no intention of marriage. Thus, Meto accounts for two of the cases of children with mother only. She exited a marriage to live with family, and since has remained unmarried.

The case of Vinãewa also suggests a strong centripetal attraction of kin opposing potential marriage links. Vinãewa is a salaried schoolteacher as well as a trained malaria diagnostician and women’s health assistant. She also has two children and considers

herself married, but her husband lives downriver in another village. She refuses to move downriver and he refuses to move upriver. It is clear that Vinãewa feels more comfortable with her kin. She has a very valued and productive role in the community, extremely supportive parents who encourage her to pursue education and paid jobs, and she has her salary as village teacher. She refers to her husband's village as an unpleasant place full of rats, aggressive mice, and excessive numbers of blackflies. She does not like life at her husband's village. Furthermore, it would seem that she would have to take a dive in status were she to move to her husband's. Vinãewa's prominent role in village life depends on her father's support, because many other elders feel it inappropriate for women to play such roles. She fears being turned into a simple wife, prevented from using her education and skills. Thus, her kin group exerts a much stronger attraction than does her potential affinal situation.

If Vinãewa and her father intend to compel uxorilocality on the part of Vinãewa's husband, they have not succeeded any more than that unfortunate fellow has succeeded in getting his wife to move in with him. At the time of my departure from the field, Vinãewa remained with her parents, raising her daughter alone, and pregnant with a second (a boy born after my departure from the field).

A third case of single mother is related to incest. P., a Satanáwavo woman, has had a son by R., a Rovonáwavo man. Because these two clans are kokavo, this is an incestuous liaison. P. refers to R. as koka while R. refers to P. as ewa. This liaison raises all sorts of difficulties. The child of a Satanáwavo woman is Rovonáwavo; such is the case for the child of P. But R. is Rovonáwavo too. Thus, the child is in the same clan as his father. Such a liaison confuses the kinship terminology, giving people extra reason to

decry it. In fact both P. and R. were extremely ashamed of this. Public pressure prevented them from moving in as a couple, yet the stigma also prevents them from finding any other marriage partners. The inhabitants of P.'s *shovo* deny that R. is the father, claiming it is an 'unknown' father, but the truth is an open secret. The result of all this is that P. and R. do not live together. P. is thus raising the infant son alone.

Nopewa is a woman who married a man of Mayoruna ethnicity, leaving Maruboland to live in Peru. However, prior to marriage, she had a son out of wedlock—Vina. Vina did not go with his mother to Peru, and is being raised at Maronal by his grandmother.

Other cases follow similar patterns. Koroaïvo is an unmarried woman raising a daughter aged three at the time of my census. Replies to census-takers assert that the father is 'unknown' but community rumor has it the father is a married man, N. Clearly this was a casual liaison, and Koroaïvo has no intention of marrying N. Koroaïvo remains in residence with her father, raising Vane as a single mother.

I have little specific information on most of these cases. Rave is the daughter of Txuna-ni, who lives on the middle Curuçá. Txuna-ni's siblings, however, live at Aldeia Maronal. For reasons unknown, 19-year old Rave does not live with her mother, but instead lives at Aldeia Maronal with her mother's brother. Rave herself has a two-year old daughter by a man she never married. Another woman, 26-year old Peko, is the mother of four-year old Witxâpei by a man she never married; Maya is the 22-year old mother of 1-year old Wano by a man she never married; Rami is the 22-year old mother of 1-year old Vimi by a man she never married; and finally 27-year old Voãewa is the mother of 11-year old Voa by a man she never married. All these women were, at the

time of my census, raising their children alone, with no expectation of marrying the father.

A single case of a man raising his son also falls under the rubric of non-marriage. Shāko is 12 years old, and lives with his father Vasho at Maronal, while his mother is on the upper Ituí. This appears to be a case of unsuccessful polygyny, since Vasho married Shāko's mother's sister, subsequently having numerous children. He also had relations with Shāko's mother, evidently. However, after Shāko's birth and before any other children could result, the relation ceased and Vasho remains with one wife alone. It is not known why Shāko lives with his father rather than with his mother.

The cases reviewed suggest recurrent operation of certain social forces. In first place is the force of attraction exerted by a woman's kin outweighing the attraction of a husband or potential husband. The case of Vinãewa and Meto clearly exemplify this trend, and I suspect that in cases for which less information is available, similar forces are at play. In some cases, it does not seem to even occur to the woman to marry the man, in other cases the family does not approve of the liaison, or does not wish for the girl to move. The result across the board is the same: these women remain with their kin, raising children as single mothers.

Non-marriage is a pattern. It is interesting to note that this phenomenon occurs in a number of *shovo* at Maronal: Alfredo's (Rami), Vasho's (Maya, Rave, Peko), José's (Vinãewa), Aurélio's (Voãewa), Mashëpa's (Peko), Wanõpa's (Meto). Thus, in going from hut to hut at Aldeia Maronal it is common to encounter the single mother, along with the recurring response to census inquiries: the father is unknown.

The existence of non-marriage as a pattern forces an adjustment in our understanding of maronal social organization. In the analysis of Aldeia Maronal, it was noted that Maronal *shovo* have an agnatic pattern of composition and practice near-total virilocality (one exception). Despite the virilocality, some women do remain with their kin and raise children that add to the *shovo* in a non-agnatic way. Their contribution of personnel is relatively small since unmarried women have one or two children, whereas married women often have five or more. Nevertheless, unmarried mothers living with kin are a common and evident feature of Maronal social organization.

It should be noted that non-marriage is not always the result of lack of desire to marry. In many cases, it is true, one or the other party does not wish to marry; in one case at least, they wish to marry but cannot agree on location. In the case of P. and R., the couple would marry were it not for the fact that the relationship is incestuous.

Divorce

Although non-marriage is more common, the cases of divorce at Maronal have important consequences for social unity and dispersal. Perhaps the most important is the divorce of Maya and Wanõpa. The Marubo would not call this a complete divorce, but it is a case of separation based on serious differences, a separation that had important effects on residential patterns.

The separation took place when Wanõpa was invited by João Tuxáua to move near to the center of Aldeia Maronal. Wanõpa had been polygynous, but the Mayoruna kidnapped his first wife, and death took his second, so that he had been left with only one wife, Maya. Maya had been a successful childbearer and most of her children were

marriageable or approaching marriageability. At that point, Wanõpa obtained a second wife, the daughter of João Tuxáua. This woman, Peko, was 20 years old at the time, while Maya was 44. By all accounts, Maya was furious, feeling poorly treated. Thus, Wanõpa's re-marriage initiated a conflict with his pre-existing wife. Nevertheless, that re-marriage was effected. A year or so later, Wanõpa decided to move his *shovo* to another locale. At that point, Maya refused to move with him, and so did Maya's sons and daughters, as well as another son of Wanõpa and one of Wanõpa's brother's sons, Mashẽpa, eventual *shovo ivo*. As a result, Wanõpa moved but his adult children and his senior wife did not go with him. I am told that the young men refused to move on account of superior hunting conditions at the old *shovo*. However, it is clear that Wanõpa's conflict with his senior wife played a major role in setting up the schism. As a result, one of Maya's daughters is being raised with mother alone, thus appearing in Table 4.15.

A second case of divorce at Maronal is that of Meto and Ramípa, which curiously has come to affect the same *shovo* as the case just mentioned (of Wanõpa and Maya). Meto was married to Ramípa and bore at least two daughters in that marriage. The causes of the divorce vary according to the reporter, but all agree that extra-marital encounters were involved. A permanent divorce ensued. Some years later, Meto, now living with her kin (sisters) re-married, having another son and a daughter. Meanwhile, her two daughters by Ramípa married virilocally at Aldeia Maronal, one to Mashẽpa, one to Mayãpa (Mashẽpa's father's brother's son and classificatory clan-brother). Meto's second marriage also ended in divorce, her husband Izaquiel moving to Atalaia do Norte (Izaquiel was not a Marubo, but rather a non-Indian who was kidnapped and raised by

Mayoruna). Following this second divorce, Meto re-evaluated her residential strategy, and decided to move to Aldeia Maronal to live with her married daughters and sons-in-law. She brought her two other children with her. Meto's youngest son and daughter thus find themselves being raised by their mother: hence their appearance on Table 4.15.

The third case of divorce to be considered is that of Sheniewa. Sheniewa married Vôshipa and bore one child by that marriage, Sheni. However, she then divorced, relocated to Maronal, and married the Mayoruna FUNAI worker, Nakwa. Her son Sheni thus grew up with mother alone, hence his appearance on Table 4.15.

Parent-child link weakness

There are four cases of parents who have left children to be raised by grandparents. The dynamics of these cases are poorly understood since I did not have the chance to observe them in any detail.

- (1) There is the case of N., who bore a son, Vina, by unknown father at age 15. Years later, she married a Mayoruna man and moved to a Mayoruna village in Peru. Vina stayed behind and is being raised by N.'s mother.
- (2) There is the case of R., who lives on the Ituí river, but R.'s two sons live at Aldeia Maronal with R.'s mother. This arrangement persisted during the entire year I was in the field.
- (3) At the time of the census, Ino the daughter of divorcée Maya (see above) was married and living virilocally at Aldeia São Sebastião; her four children, however, were living at Aldeia Maronal with Ino's mother. A return visit to this *shovo* later in my

fieldwork revealed that this arrangement had ceased. Nevertheless, the children appear as living with neither parent in Table 4.15.

(4) There is the case of P., who lives most of the time with her mother's mother, and not with her parents. This seems an informal, possibly impermanent arrangement, and the dynamics are unknown. Nevertheless, she is recorded as residing with neither parent.

Death

There are three cases in the census of death separating children from their parents. Misael's wife Tsainama died, leaving 19 year-old May with her father only. Jaime's wife Kama died, leaving 6-year old Sese with his father only. And Yove's husband Sebastião died, leaving 19 year-old Vina, 17 year-old Vó, and 13 year-old Same with their mother only.

Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Maronal: Conclusions

The causes of deviation from norm in the sphere of residence of unwed minors may be reduced to three categories, based on lines of weakness that tend to divide children from their parents. The most common divider is the link between man and woman, which often fails to be maintained as a permanent bond, leaving the child or children with a single parent. Including both divorce and non-marriage, these account for 57.1% of recorded cases of deviance from norm, affecting 14.2% of all children at Aldeia Maronal. Almost exclusively, such cases result in children living with their mothers (14/16 examples). These cases most frequently involve couples that do not marry after

an amorous liaison, but occasionally are we find divorce, marriage without coresidence, and incest, in that order of frequency.

The second category of deviation from norm is the weakness in the link between parent and child. Of the cases recorded above, two are transient (3. and 4.) while two seem more permanent. They are nevertheless treated identically for statistical purposes as the objective here is to understand the composition of Maronal at any one moment, in this case, on 13 December 1997. The cases in this category account for 25% of unwed minors who do not live with both parents, or 6.2% of all children at Aldeia Maronal. Such cases result in children living with grandparents. Some cases appear to be infants who cannot be cared for by their parents for contextual reasons; another is a teenager who will not go live with his Mayoruna stepfather.

The final social weak link that separates children from parents is the possibility that their parents may die. This category accounts for 17.9% of cases of deviance herein studied, affecting 4.4% of all children at Maronal.

Out of 28 children representing deviations from the two-parent norm, 15 live with mother only (53.6%), nine live with grandparents (32.1%), and only 4 live with their father only (14.3%).

The data are somewhat skewed to normality by the fact that normative unions between man and woman produce more children than do extra-normative links. Thus, the 113 children under 20 years of age that resided at Aldeia Maronal on 13-12-97 were the results of 51 different man-woman links. Of these, only 32 are normative. Thus, only 62.7% of the relationships between men and women that produced Maronal's unmarried under-20 population are normative, i.e. stable marriages; 37.3 % of the relationships that

have produced Maronal's newest generation are deviations from the norm. It is only when the data considered are the children, rather than the children's producers, that the deviation percentage is reduced to 24.8%. 37.3% of child-producing relationships are extranormative, accounting for 24.8% of all children at Aldeia Maronal.

Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Vida Nova, upper Ituí

Data on residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Vida Nova was tabulated as a check on the generalizability of the Maronal data. There are significant differences between the Maronal data and the Ituí data. Firstly, precise ages were not obtainable for each individual on the river Ituí. Thus, this table cannot provide age breakdowns, and includes unmarried youth as old as an estimated 25 years of age. Secondly, numerical census data from Maronal are complemented by detailed observations of particular cases, whereas this is not the case for Ituí. Nevertheless, the data are complete and can and have been tabulated. The results are figures comparable to those for Maronal: 71.9% of unwed minors live with both parents, whereas 28.1% of unwed minors do not (cf. 75.2/24.8 for Maronal). The data present us once again with a clear norm and a significant number of deviations.

Table 4.16.: Residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Vida Nova.

a.: absolute numbers

Minor living with	Males	Females	Total
Mother and father	39	30	69
Mother only	11	5	16
Father only	1	1	2
neither parent	7	2	9
All	58	38	96

b.: relative percentages

Minor living with	Males	Females	Total
Mother and father	67.2%	78.9%	71.9%
Mother only	19.0%	13.2%	16.7%
Father only	1.7%	2.6%	2.1%
neither parent	12.1%	3.4%	9.4%

There are 27 unwed minors in this sample who do not live with both parents. Of these, twelve are in that situation due to non-marriage or divorce; ten are due to one or both parents dying; four are due to being handed to grandparents to raise; and one case is unclear. There is thus a difference between Maronal and Vida Nova: death has played a greater role at Vida Nova, accounting for 37% of cases of minors missing parents, 10.4% of all children in the sample (cf. 17.9%/4.4% for Maronal). However, the significance of the weak link between men and women parallels that at Maronal. At Vida Nova, non-marriage and divorce account for 44.4% of children missing parents, 12.5% of all children in the sample (cf. 57.1%/14.2% at Maronal). These data are similar to those at Maronal in that roughly a quarter of children do not live with both parents, and the most frequent explanation is a brittle relationship between a man and a woman. Variation occurs in terms of how much impact death has on different villages.

Residence of unwed minors: conclusions

The chief social force revealed by analysis of residence patterns of unwed minors is a certain brittleness in the link between men and women who produce children. Most children do live with both parents, showing that this is the norm. However, although the encounter of two people to produce a third should be the permanent foundation of a family, in many cases it is not. Single mothers of one or two children, living with their parents in a sort of husband-less uxorilocality, are common throughout Maruboland. Divorce is less common, but is a regular phenomenon, and has a greater impact on social composition and residence patterns. Non-marriage and divorce are important features of the Marubo social landscape, creating the conditions in which roughly one eighth of

children in the analyzed sample are being raised. Cases are to be found at fourteen out of seventeen *shovo* at Maronal and Vida Nova. Men and women reproduce but do not marry, or marry but cannot agree on coresidence, or marry and then divorce. The brittle link between men and women represents a potential for dispersal at the heart of any residential group.

The brittleness of male-female links as a centrifugal force should be seen in conjunction with a force noted in earlier in the chapter, namely the attraction to kin over affines. In those cases for which detailed information is available, desire to live with kin is a powerful force causing non-marriage and comes into play in cases of divorce. Together, these forces conspire to confound traditional strategies of *shovo* composition. Agnatic *shovo* keep their daughters without resorting to uxorilocal marriage, uxorilocally married men cannot be confident their wives will move if they do, divorcées and widows give up on marriage and gather the uterine family into an anicular *shovo*. Most often, these difficulties are overcome and solid, long-lasting families established. It should be emphasised that 75% of children live in normal situations. But these data suggest that the permanence of marriage is by no means a foregone conclusion; there are contrary forces which must be taken into account. A successful residential unit must be able to keep these centrifugal forces in check.

CHAPTER FIVE

LEADERSHIP OF RESIDENTIAL MOVEMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter presents data on the leadership of residential movements. In the work of Clastres and Lévi-Strauss it is a major assumption that indigenous Amazonian leaders determine group movements in accordance with the dictates of survival and prosperity. Clastres argued that Amazonian headmen are involved in a system of exchange whereby they are granted headmanship and polygyny in return for certain services to the group. Among those services is that of successfully determining where to move the group for maximum economic prosperity. In this chapter I begin to examine such characteristics of indigenous leadership as Clastres makes a part of his explanation, and specifically leadership of residential movements. I do so in such a way that the data will be relevant to evaluating the validity of Clastres' interpretive framework.

During fieldwork, information was gathered on the ways in which villages become established. There are occasions of fission in which one group splits off from another to start a new village. Such new villages have their own sets of structural leadership roles—*kakaya* and *shovo ivo*—so analysis of incidents of schism indicates how relations among high-status individuals in a single village can result in the establishment of new, independent leadership. Other cases of residential movement history show the accretion of large villages through addition of new coresidents—the

opposite of fission, which we might call *fusion*. These processes are essential data because evidence will be presented in subsequent chapters to support the assertion that a person who *attracts* another person to live with them thereby has more power in certain areas of social life than does the person *attracted*. Close attention must be paid to the configurations of social networks that are attractive, and the configurations which are “explosive” or contain schismatic potential. Subsequently, the role of social attractor will be correlated with the characteristic of repeated victory in observed conflicts of will. This chapter will isolate the identities and social characteristics of that limited subset of the Marubo which have the quality of being an attractive focus for residential movement.

Several types of conclusion may be drawn from an analysis of the motivations behind and sociopolitical contexts for residence changes. In the first place, we want to know how much autonomy people have in terms of choosing a place of residence. To what extent do some have the ability to determine the residential moves of others? This will provide an idea of the distribution of power and autonomy. Lévi-Strauss observed that it was the Nambiquara headman who determined the direction of group movements, thus exercising power in that particular field of social action. It was by connecting the leadership of group movements to the putative loss of power consequent upon a “grant of polygyny” that Clastres managed to explain why headmen, although they seemed to exercise some power, did not *really* have power—they were merely being used by the group that had given them power in the first place. By examining the leadership of residential movements among the Marubo, it is possible to find out (a) whether or not movements are, in fact, guided by headmen, and subsequently (b) whether or not Clastres’ interpretive framework has explanatory value relative to the Marubo case.

Before presenting the results of the research, it is necessary to briefly review the place of residential movements in the theories of Clastres and Lévi-Strauss, so that the applicability of the data to these theories will be clear. Clastres argued that Amazonian societies were egalitarian by invoking the concepts of reciprocity and exchange used earlier by Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss interpreted leader-follower relationships among Amazon Indians in terms of the concept of reciprocity. He saw reciprocity embedded in the cross-cousin marriage systems prevalent in the area; taking this quality of the kinship system, he applied it to the political sphere. The common practice of headman's polygyny upset his notion that the kinship systems were essentially reciprocal. He argued that "the granting of polygamous privilege to the chief means that the group has exchanged *individual elements of security* resulting from the monogamous rule for *collective security* provided by leadership...The chief receives several wives from the group. In exchange, he offers to guarantee against need and danger...to the group as a whole" (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:60; italics in original). In this interpretation, the leader's receipt of the privilege of polygyny obligates him to guarantee group security. Hence the chief must above all be a survival expert: "The Nambikuara chief's skill and ingenuity are... amazing. He must have a perfect knowledge of the territories haunted by his and other groups, be familiar with the hunting grounds, the location of fruit-bearing trees and the time of their ripening... He is constantly engaged in some task of reconnoitering and exploring" (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:55). Having these excellent economic skills and being the appointed guarantor of group security, the abstract 'Nambikuara chief' is said to direct the group's survival activities: "He will determine when, and the place where, the group will settle; he will also direct the gardening and

decide what plants are to be cultivated; and, generally speaking, he will organize the occupations according to the seasons' needs and possibilities" (Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:52). These observations were put together with Steward's observation that hinterland Panoans moved their settlements every two to three years (Steward 1948) and Lowie's assertion that the main cause of settlement shifting among "Tropical Forest Tribes" is soil exhaustion (Lowie 1948), to create the impression of societies constantly in motion, depleting resources in 2-3 years, then moving on. From Lévi-Strauss one gets the impression that the chief is a person with consummate survival skills and the group has him prisoner. He must use all his talents to repay the debt incurred by his polygyny. It is true that Lévi-Strauss implied that the field of interethnic relations was also one which a chief should master in order to render the best decisions for the group's future. But the impression remains of a leader whose role is to determine group movements in accordance with the dictates of survival and of economic wellbeing.

Clastres picked up Lévi-Strauss' method of interpreting social roles as aspects of a system of reciprocal exchange (Clastres 1977[1974]). He identified the elements of the exchange system as (1) polygyny, given to the chief in return for (2) generosity, (3) peacemaking ability, and (4) oratorical skill. But although he did not explicitly include the exercise of superior survival skills in the exchange system, he did specify that this was a quality of the chief: "The leader's main task being to safeguard his group's welfare, the Ipurina or Caingang chief will be one of the best hunters... It is the latter who generally provide the men eligible for chieftainship... By permitting the most effective food providers to practice polygyny, the group—taking out a mortgage on the future, so to speak—implicitly acknowledges their quality as potential leaders" (Clastres

1977[1974]:26-27). Having accepted the notion that Amazon Indian leaders are individuals with superior food production skills, he argued that these skills were an essential characteristic of leaders and a part of the exchange system between leaders and followers: “In the estimation of the tribe, what qualifies such a man to be chief? In the end, it is his ‘technical’ competence alone: his oratorical talent, his expertise as a hunter...The chief is there to serve society; it is society as such—the real locus of power—that exercises its authority over the chief” (Clastres 1977[1974]:175). Once again, we are given the impression that at any given moment in an Amazon Indian society there is one person with superior survival talents, and everyone else relinquishes decision-making power to this natural-born talent. According to Clastres, this inequality nags at the Indians’ culturally inherent antiauthoritarian tendencies, so they prevent the chief from translating food production into power by the device of making polygyny a social debt: “That is why it is impossible for the chief to reverse that relationship to his own ends, to put society in his service, to exercise what is termed power over the tribe: primitive society would never tolerate having a chief transform himself into a despot” (Clastres 1977[1974]:175). It is in this way that Clastres took abstracted qualities of Amazonian leaders, arranged them in an exchange framework, and concluded that there was no power in these societies. It is this framework that must be tested, first by confirming whether or not the qualities of leaders are such as Clastres claims them to be, and secondly by asking whether those qualities are interrelated in the way Clastres claims.

The data presented in this chapter will show that there is no evidence of groups expecting leaders to shoulder the burden of survival decisions and residential movements.

Leaders do have excellent survival and economic skills, but so does almost everybody else. Decisions on movement have to do more with interethnic relations than with food production issues (Lévi-Strauss and Clastres both mentioned this as an aspect of chiefs' skill, but their mode of analysis through construction of social-structure models tended to de-emphasize interethnic relations in an effort to reconstruct pristine indigenous social forms, so the ecological role of the leader seemed over-emphasized). Disagreement with leaders' choices, data will show, is rampant. Such disagreements indicate that people trust their own skills more than the leader's. Disagreements over residential movement leads to fission, which has led to the increase in number of residential nuclei from 17 in 1974 to 37 in 1998. In this environment, where group fission is common, we cannot identify a stable "group" to grant polygyny to a lifetime chief, nor to exchange that grant for security. There is no rationale for such a grant because follower-leader relationships do not have the same degree of permanence as husband-wife relationships. In fact, ease of fission is often cited as a nearly 'essential' quality of indigenous Amazonian settlements (e.g., Rivière 1984), and is correlated with egalitarianism in the sense that if you don't like the chief you just leave. But if fission occurs more than once per generation, and it does, then the trade of polygyny for security is not reciprocal at all. Therefore, Clastres' interpretive framework is flawed. The data in this chapter will suggest that major revisions to the Clastrean model must be made to account for Marubo social reality.

B. Methods

The main method used to produce a set of data on residential movements was a comparison between the 1974-75 census of Dr. Melatti and my own 1997-98 census data. By comparing the location of individuals in 1974-75 with their location in 1997-98, a substantial list of residential movements was obtained. I then elicited statements from informants concerning the circumstances of and motivations for these moves.

A second source of data was the residential history elicited in direct interview. A number of individuals told me the stories of their residential movements along with explanations for their reasoning at each stage.

The third source of data is direct observation of residential movements which occurred during fieldwork. These observations are supplemented by interviews aimed at clarifying circumstances and motivation.

C. Census Comparison

In this section, I will first present the location of Marubo groups in 1974-75, then the location of Marubo groups in 1997-98. I will then explain how the anterior configuration became the subsequent configuration.

1. Residential movements prior to 1974

It is necessary to first establish the background to the 1974-75 situation. This background is more thoroughly explored in Chapter Eight, where the rubber boom oral histories are detailed in an effort to reconstruct the transformations through time of Marubo social organization. Figure 8.1. shows the data on the oldest known ‘Marubo’ residential movements. These movements may be traced to two reasons. The primary explanation for the movements shown in Figure 8.1. is the occurrence of violence between indigenous and non-indigenous people. Each case of movement in that chart represents a violent clash, followed by migration by indigenous survivors towards more inaccessible upstream areas. The second explanation for the movements shown in Figure 8.1. rests in the conscious efforts of João Tuxáua to gather together the remnants of Panoan groups in the Curuçá and upper Javari areas into a single locale. In two specific cases (see Chapter Eight, section C), João Tuxáua is credited with seeking out the remains of decimated Panoan groups, inviting them to come live in the remote location his family had fled to. These invitations were accepted. Two of the five *shovo ivorasi* who existed in the post-rubber boom period (1920-1950) arrived at their places of habitation by this means.

The end result of the rubber boom was the concentration of previously disparate Panoan peoples in the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal and rio Arrojo. This area may be accessed only by land and is extremely difficult terrain to travel. By the time the indigenous people were forced to this final refuge, the boom was ending. Thus, the concentration of people at the headwaters of the Arrojo coincided with the end of violent

encounters with non-indigenous people. During this period, the multiplicity of groups that assembled together by 1920 effectively became a single ethnic group, a transformation cemented by the subsequent adoption of the exogenous term ‘Marubo’ to connote the new supra-entity thus created. The Marubo remained concentrated in their rubber-boom refuge until at least 1960.

The dispersal of the Marubo from the remote headwaters area is shown in Figure 8.2. The first schism occurred during the 1960s and resulted in the movement of a substantial number of Marubo to the Ituí River. It has been noted that by 1950 there were five *shovo* of ‘Marubo’ in the Maronal headwaters area. Three of the five moved to the Ituí River in the schism of 1964-65. Those which remained were mainly the families of João Tuxáua and of Domingo, which were intensely intermarried. Personnel more closely related to Ernesto, Domingo, and Júlio sought out new locations. Two reasons have been claimed by informants for this event. The reason most often cited is fear of the Mayoruna Indians. In 1964 there was a clash between Marubo and Mayoruna. The Mayoruna, according to Marubo informants, kidnapped two women and killed a man while they were gathering turtle eggs. A punitive expedition was organized, and some Mayoruna were shot near their village. The Mayoruna organized a counter-expedition, but it was ambushed by Marubo. A Marubo elder called in the army, which around that time was pacifying the Mayoruna for other reasons (Coutinho 1993). The clashes ended at that point. However, it is claimed by informants that enough Marubo were afraid of ongoing trouble with Mayoruna that they moved to the more-distant Ituí River.

The second reason attributed by informants is an incident of internal conflict. This incident was less frequently cited. Although other fieldworkers (cf. Melatti 1977)

had been told of the incident, it continues to be little-discussed. In my experience, Marubo informants were prone to hide any evidence of internal conflict. This predilection for presenting a unified and nonviolent facade weakened only on certain occasions after many months of fieldwork. On June 1st, 1998 I was discussing with an informant the issue of variations in residential mobility over time. He was saying that there was more residential mobility in the past. He said that in the old days, people would move together at the first invitation, but then move apart at the first instance of ‘bad words’. He cited the move to the Ituí as an example of such ‘bad words’ causing schism. A week later, another informant filled in details of this story. Two youths had experimented with a little-used poison recipe, with devastating results. It was difficult to get a clear understanding of how the poison works. It seems to be manufactured from insect as well as plant parts, heated and turned into a powder. The powder is kept sealed in a bamboo container. The powder is to be thrown in the enemy’s face by surprise or sprinkled onto their face while they are sleeping. Alternately, a fire may be made of which the smoke is toxic. In either scenario, inhalation of particles causes physical disturbances which may be lethal—all according to informants. My informant said that two young men had made this poison and unleashed it on people they did not like. The poison had not affected their enemies but had affected them instead. One of these was still considered mentally deficient, thirty-five years after the incident. He no longer resided in Marubo land, but in Cruzeiro do Sul. The second was said to have been mentally deficient for some time, but had improved and was now a respected elder. Nevertheless, after this incident of near-violence upon them, those who felt threatened departed for the Ituí River.

By 1974, the population of the upper Ituí River was extensive, amounting to 222 people (Melatti 1983), spread out in eight *shovo* and one set of *tapiris*, all organized in six separate population nuclei (the seeds of future Marubo ‘aldeias’, called by Melatti (1977) ‘local groups’).

Two smaller-scale moves had occurred prior to 1974. Note on Figure 5.1. that *shovo* 15 and tapiri concentration 16 are on the main course of the Curuçá River. *Shovo* 15 belonged to Aurélio. The composition of this *shovo* will be explained when its breakup is examined later. This *shovo* had been established c. 1970 to provide easier access to the markets in Acre for its inhabitants. Aurélio’s coresidents carried rubber and animal skins to Cruzeiro, returning with desirable non-indigenous goods. Tapiri concentration 16 was led by Vicente. Vicente is definitely located by informants in the Maronal headwaters in 1964, so that his move to the mouth of the Maronal on the Curuçá River must have taken place subsequent to the Ituí schism but prior to 1974. The reason for Vicente’s move is not specifically known.

In 1974, FUNAI established its first post on the Curuçá River, near the mouth of the Igarapé São Salvador. The first people to move there were Santiago Comapa (a.k.a. *Peruano*), a man of Peruvian descent married to a Marubo woman and a life-long dweller among the Marubo; and his son-in-law Vitor Batalha, a Brazilian man also married to a Marubo woman (at least a half-Marubo woman, but considered Marubo in the matrilineal regime). With them came their mixed Marubo/non-indigenous families, including their Marubo wives and their children. As of 1974, this was not yet a true Marubo village, but a few Marubo did live there.

Before moving on, it is necessary to note here a single datum concerning pre-rubber boom times. One informant told me about what he called a Marubo ‘king’ (*rei*), Txoki, who had lived before the Spanish-speakers arrived for rubber. Txoki made the largest swidden in Marubo memory, according to my informant. This swidden is not an imaginary swidden but an actual location occasionally visited by Marubo today. Txoki is said to have gathered numerous other people by him. He invited people to come live by him, informants say, and they did. However, by the rubber boom those people had dispersed again, and there was no leader analogous to Txoki until João Tuxáua again invited people to live with him on the Igarapé Maronal.

2. Residential movements, 1974-1998

Data on the configuration of Marubo population in 1974-75 are derived from the research of Julio Cezar Melatti, published in his article on Marubo social structure (Melatti 1977). He also made available to me his invaluable manuscript compilation of 1974-83 census data (Melatti 1983), which was essential to the establishment of the residential histories to be explained in this chapter.


Reference should here be made to Figure 1, reproduced from Melatti (1977), showing the locations of Marubo local groups in 1974-75.

After gathering an initial census in 1974-75, Melatti updated the census in a return visit in 1978. In the interval, the establishment of FUNAI posts on the middle Curuçá and Ituí Rivers had a significant impact on the arrangement of the Marubo population. A number of *shovo* experienced schism, and new ones came into existence. During my fieldwork in 1997-98 I obtained data from some of those involved in these movements concerning the motivations and circumstances surrounding them. These data are an important source of information on the variant roles leaders may play in residential movements.

The next census data available were from 1995. A non-indigenous schoolteacher, whom I was only able to identify by first name—Nicole—carried out a census of Aldeia Maronal together with her Marubo informants, César Dólis and Amélia Barbosa. The information contained in this census is, unfortunately, partial but still provides a snapshot of Aldeia Maronal two years prior to my arrival, which allows for greater discrimination in understanding the latest changes to occur, between 1995 and 1997.

The third and final set of census data that is used in determining what residential movements have occurred, 1974-98, is my own complete census of the Marubo, taken in 1997-98. In this chapter, I will explain how the configuration of 1974 became the configuration of 1998. The arrangement of the Marubo population in 1998 is shown in Figures 2 through 5. Certain significant changes have occurred. First, the headwaters area where the Marubo took refuge during and after the rubber boom has been completely abandoned. In its place, on the upper Curuçá is a large village of twelve *shovo* led by the son of João Tuxáua, who had been leader in the headwaters. Second, the FUNAI post on the middle Curuçá has become a full-fledged indigenous village with seven *shovo*. Third, a movement down to the middle Ituí was made, establishing Aldeia Rio Novo.

FIGURE 5.1.: Location of Marubo local groups, 1974-75 (from Melatti 1977).



Ituí River:

- Shovo of Lauro Brasil: (1)
- Local group consisting *shovo* of Raimundo Dionísio (2)
 - José do Nascimento Velho (3)
 - Paulo (4)
 - tapiris of Arnaldo (5)

--*Shovo* of Reissamon (6)

--*Shovo* of Paulino (7)

--*Shovo* of Américo (8)

--*Shovo* of Mariano (9)

N.B. Triangle=mission, rectangle=airstrip.

Curuçá River:

--Local group consisting of *shovo* of Misael (10) and of Domingos (11)

--Local group consisting of *shovo* of João Grande (João Tuxáua) (12)

shovo of João Pequeno (13)


shovo of Miguel (14)

--*Shovo* of Aurélio (15)

--Tapiris of Vicente (16)


--Tapiris of Santiago Peruano (17)

FIGURE 5.2.: Location of Marubo groups in 1998.



Scale: 1 cm=87.5 km. Areas where Marubo dwellings exist are marked with cross-hatches. Marubo dwellings were located in four agglomerations. On the upper Curuçá was the village of Aldeia Maronal, with 12 *shovo*. On the middle Curuçá was the village of Aldeia São Sebastião, with seven *shovo*. On the middle Ituí was the village of Rio Novo, with three *shovo*. On the upper Ituí there were seven villages with 15 *shovo*.

Figure 5.3.: Layout of *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá, January 1998.
Map is schematic and not to scale.




Shovo owners

1. Ivinípapa (Alfredo)—headman.
2. Vasho (Fernando).
3. Anípa (Aurélio).
4. Vanípa (José Barbosa).
5. Wanópa (Guilherme).
6. Nakwa.
7. Pekópa (Jaime).
8. Mashépa (Antônio).
9. Ivápa (Vicente).
10. Mayápa (Jaime).
11. Wasinawa (Isaac).
12. Sinápa (Alberto).

Other structures


- | |
|------------------|
| F—FUNAI |
| M—Missão |
| P—Pista de pouso |

FIGURE 5.4.: Schematic layout of *shovo* on the upper Ituí River, January 1998.



- Aldeia Água Branca: 1. Akōpa (Alberto)
2. Vimipa (Antônio)
- Aldeia Paraná: 3. Sherópapa (Armando)
- Maloca do Paulino: 4. Memápa (Paulino)
- Aldeia Liberdade: 5. Ronípapa (Felipe)
6. Finado Reissamão
- Aldeia Vida Nova: 7. Mashkápa (Miguel)
8. Tamápa (Nicanor)
9 . Kamápa (José Nascimento)
9a. Raomayápa (Pedro)
10. Pekópapa (Cristiano)
11. Txumápa (Abel)
- Aldeia Praia: 12. Waníeshépa (Floriano)
- Aldeia Alegría: 13. Tekápa (Antônio Brasil)
14. Mene
15. Panípa (Lauro Brasil)

FIGURE 5.5.: Schematic layout of *shovo* at Aldeia São Sebastião, middle Curuçá River, March 1998.



1. Casas do Mayãpa (Saide).
2. Maloca do Shetãpa (Sebastião).
3. Maloca do Santiago Comapa.
4. Maloca do Ramípa (José Nascimento filho).
5. Maloca do Tamãpa (Cassimiro).
6. Maloca do Mashëpa (João Aurélio)
7. Maloca do Vanëpa (José Rufino).
8. Maloca do finado Firmino (Kemõpa).

a. Curuçá River

i. *Shovo* of Aurélio

In 1998 Aurélio was one of four *shovo ivorasi* in what I have called the ‘core’ of Aldeia Maronal. This consists of the four *shovo* which are immediately adjacent to one another and to the headman’s, with no intervening forest space. One of these *shovo* is the headman Alfredo’s; two others belong to Alfredo’s brother and patrilateral brother. The fourth *shovo* is that of Aurélio, who is Alfredo’s father’s brother’s son. His stated birthdate was 1930. In 1998 he lived in a *shovo* with his wife, four sons and three daughters. This was, by population, the smallest *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal. Aurélio’s oldest son Pekōpa (childhood name *Ani*) was away most of the time at a school in Benjamin Constant at the mouth of the Javari River.


The 1974-75 census shows that Aurélio was already a *shovo ivo* at that time. His was the *shovo* uppermost on the Curuçá River, by the Igarapé Veado. Note that in 1974, it was not yet common for Marubo to live on the Curuçá River itself. Aurélio’s was the only *shovo* on the main course of the river. Apart from him, there were the *tapiris* of Vicente, and the settlement of Santiago Peruano at the FUNAI post, but no other *shovo*. Since the rubber boom, the Marubo had lived in the upper courses of the Curuçá’s tributaries in order to avoid conflict with non-indigenous people. Since the first departure from that population nucleus was the schism that led to the population of the Ituí River, we can place Aurélio’s departure to settle on the Curuçá between 1965 and 1974.

Informant reports make it clear that the reason for the movement to the upper Curuçá was easier access to markets for forest products in Acre. Inhabitants of this *shovo*

tapped rubber and carried it to Acre along with animal skins and anything else they could sell, returning with the usual commodities—ammunition, shotguns, and salt being particularly valued. Prior to 1974, two non-indigenous people lived here and participated in the trade. One was Santiago Comapa, a.k.a. Santiago Peruano. Santiago's uncle Faustino had lived in the area before him, and Santiago spoke fluent Marubo and married a Marubo woman. Santiago's wife was in fact Aurélio's full sister, explaining why Santiago lived here. Santiago was recorded in 1974 as having three sons and four daughters, all of whom were considered Marubo in the matrilineal reckoning, all of whom grew up among the Marubo. One of Santiago's daughters was married to a Brazilian man, Vitor Batalha. Batalha also lived and worked here.

The arrival of FUNAI fundamentally changed the situation. The background to FUNAI's arrival in the area is the beginning of oil and gas exploration in the area in 1969. The Brazilian oil corporation, Petrobrás, experienced difficulties with the Mayoruna population. The area was so remote that no SPI or FUNAI administration had yet reached it. After initial attention to the Mayoruna resulted in the establishment of a FUNAI post on the Igarapé Lobo, affluent to the Javari, in 1972, attention was turned to the Marubo. The first visits by FUNAI representatives to the Marubo occurred shortly thereafter, between 1972 and 1974. The FUNAI representative, Sebastião Amanso, visited the five *shovo* on the Igarapé Maronal and Surubim as well as the *shovo* of Aurélio and the smaller settlement of Vicente. Amanso's visit was vividly recalled by Marubo elders in 1997-98. It had a profound impact on the distribution of Marubo population.

FIGURE 5.6.: Composition of *shovo* belonging to Aurélio, 1974 (From Melatti 1980).



Informants state that Amanso used every means to convince the headwaters Marubo that they should move to the main course of the Curuçá River. In this he was following the standard FUNAI policy of attraction. He argued, again according to informants, that it was not good for the Marubo to be scattered in distant headwaters. If they moved to the main course of the river they could be accessed by FUNAI, which offered them merchandise, health assistance, and the ultimate promises of education and development. In 1974 FUNAI established its post on the Igarapé São Salvador. This post was at first called a “Posto Indígena de Atração”—P.I.A.—designed to ‘attract’ the Marubo out of the deep forest. The first people hired to work at the post were Santiago Comapa and his son-in-law Vitor Batalha.

Before describing the events that followed the establishment of the FUNAI post, it is necessary to review the social composition of Aurélio’s *shovo* in 1974. This social composition may be seen in Figure 6, which is taken from Melatti’s manuscript census (Melatti 1983). Note the *shovo ivo* Aurélio (1) with his wife (2), daughter (3) and son (4). With him are two sets of sister’s sons. First note Lauro (5) and Saide (6). Lauro and Saide are sons of Aurélio’s sister (101). Both of them were married (7, 8), but only Saide had children—a son and a daughter (9, 10). The second set of sister’s sons were the four full brothers Sebastião (14), César (13), Américo (12) and Wilson (11). César was married (15) with a daughter (16) and Sebastião was married (17), with three children (18, 19, 20). The younger two brothers were unmarried. Thus, if we count Aurélio’s nuclear family and those of his six sister’s sons, 20 out of 28 inhabitants of the *shovo* are accounted for. This is sufficient to classify this *shovo* as avuncular in social composition type (see Chapter Four).

There are elements to Aurélio's 1974 *shovo* that are not avuncular. One of these is Okāpa (21), who lived here with his wife (22) and a grand-daughter (23). Okāpa's presence seems better explained as resulting from a chance personal association, but he is also the patrilateral half-brother of Aurélio's wife, a fact not shown in Figure 6. Aurélio's own patrilateral half-sister (24) lived here. Finally, Rave (25), the mother of Saide's wife, lived here at the time, along with three children by a different man (26, 27, 28). Rave, according to informants (she is now dead) had a tendency to move around from place to place, so her stay at Aurélio's was temporary. Okāpa's family, Aurélio's half-sister, and Rave's family composed the remaining 8/28 inhabitants of Aurélio's *shovo*.

It is equally important to note that all the families composing this *shovo* were at a similar stage of their developmental cycle. Aurélio and his sisters' brothers were married for less than five years each and had few children. For example, when I observed him in 1998, Aurélio had seven children, the oldest a 27-year old with a 10-year old daughter of her own. But in 1974 he had only two children, the oldest only four, the younger one year old. In 1974, Saide had two children aged less than three. In the years after, he had four more children before his wife died. He later remarried and had two more children. Américo and Wilson, who were unmarried in 1974, would later marry and have children. The implication is clear: this *shovo* consisted of recently married young men, in the first decade of establishing their families, moving to a strategic location for working with the Acre *seringeiros*. As such, the *shovo* represents a standard youth activity in Marubo society: spending the years of youth working with non-indigenous people, making money (see, e.g., Jamil and Ronipa, Chapter Six).

Aurélio's *shovo* began to break up before Melatti's census, when Santiago Comapa, Vitor Batalha, and their Marubo wives and children moved to the middle Curuçá River. This process was described to me by José Barbosa. Santiago and Vitor established the FUNAI post and became the first FUNAI employees to live on the Curuçá River. Once the post was established, Saide was offered a job as FUNAI worker, too. Presumably this was a better situation for him than carrying rubber to Acre on his back, so he moved to the Igarapé São Salvador. His brother Lauro moved with him. Soon after Saide and Lauro, the elder of the other four sister's sons—Sebastião—decided to move down to the FUNAI post also. He took all three of his brothers, along with wives and children, with him. Ten out of the 28 recorded in the 1974 census thus departed.

According to my informant José, who lived up the Igarapé Maronal at the time, the departure of his sister's sons damaged Aurélio's ability to perpetuate the work patterns he was accustomed to. Large numbers of people living together, especially young men, creates the possibility of rapidly completing significant work projects, such as swiddens. In addition, to make the rubber trade with Acre worthwhile, substantial work crews were required. With the departure of six young men, both survival and commercial activities became much more difficult for those who remained. After some time had elapsed, Aurélio decided his position was untenable. Aurélio finally went downstream to join his sisters' brothers. Okãpa was the last one left, until he too went downstream. The last two, according to my informant, went very reluctantly, and only because the sudden removal of their immediate social networks had rendered survival itself, let alone prosperity, difficult. When Melatti revisited the area in 1978, the *shovo* was abandoned. Therefore, the moves just described took place between 1975 and 1978.

In this case of residential movement, the individual in the structural position of leadership—the *shovo ivo* Aurélio—did not exercise a directing role. Each of the kin groups composing the *shovo* determined its own movements: first, Santiago Comapa, his son-in-law, their wives and children; then Aurélio’s sister’s Saide, with his brother, their wives and children; then Aurélio’s sister’s son Sebastião, his brothers, their wives and children; only then did Aurélio himself move. Finally, his wife’s half-brother Okāpa moved. There were three types of moving groups: two uterine families, two nuclear families, and one uxorilocal unit. In each of the five stages of movement downstream, it was the elder male of the kin group (each sub-component of the *shovo*) who rendered the decision on residential movement, independently of the *shovo*’s overall leader.

The breakup of Aurélio’s *shovo* may be better understood by relating it to data on the fate of similarly-composed *shovo* examined in the previous chapter, and specifically the three avuncular *shovo* discussed (Chapter Four, section B). Two of those *shovo* developed in very similar economic conditions, then split up along similar lines, as Aurélio’s *shovo*. The *shovo* of Sināpa was established when a set of classificatory brothers tapping rubber on the upper Curuçá joined up with their classificatory mother’s brother to form a single residential unit. Rubber-tapping continued while the *shovo* was together. After rubber-tapping ceased, the *shovo* broke up. Likewise, José Barbosa’s *shovo* was composed when two sets of brothers who were classificatory mother’s brothers/sister’s sons relative to one another established co-residence. Like the *shovo* of Aurélio and Sināpa, this one engaged in rubber-tapping, with work groups including members of both sibling sets. Changing economic conditions affected José’s *shovo*. Rubber-tapping became unattractive and the José’s ‘sister’s sons’ turned to logging. José

developed economic alternatives by educating his children, two of whom were drawing regular salaries by 1998. His ‘sister’s sons’ remained focused on extractive industries. When José moved his residence in 1994 they the *shovo* split, each sibling set going its own way. Both these cases will be discussed in more detail below.

Aurélio’s *shovo* was similar to José’s and to Sināpa’s in two ways: it was avuncular in composition type, and the sub-components of the *shovo* had common economic interests and activities. Aurélio’s *shovo* was split apart by economic forces. Its main *raison d’être* in the first place was to carry on the rubber trade. Aurélio and his kin had pioneered a new location, returning to the upper Curuçá which had been uninhabited since the rubber boom, because it offered convenient access to the Ipixuna River valley in Acre by overland routes. The establishment of the FUNAI post offered new economic opportunity, which was taken up quickly. Aurélio’s son-in-law Santiago and sister’s son Saide became FUNAI employees, making money far more easily than they had by carrying rubber to Acre. The reason adduced by my informant for Aurélio’s and Okāpa’s moves, which finalized the abandonment of the upper Curuçá *shovo*, was also economic: rubber tapping was no longer possible with the reduced labor force, and even subsistence was difficult for the same reason.

Standing in contrast to the three avuncular *shovo* that broke up is the single case of long-term success for this type, Paulino’s *shovo* on the upper Curuçá River. In the other three cases, the sub-components of the avuncular *shovo* assembled under particular economic conditions and in some cases for explicitly economic reasons, then split up after these conditions had changed. In Paulino’s case, such economic conditions did not exist. As explained in Chapter Four, the *raison d’être* of Paulino’s *shovo* is social rather

than economic. It represents an effort to achieve a Marubo social ideal: the self-replicating, self-contained four-section system coterminous with the residential unit. Changes in economic conditions have thus not affected it, and it is still in existence.

From these four cases it is possible to formulate a generalization that explains Aurélio's case: avuncular-type *shovo* whose sub-components stay together for economic reasons are fragile and tend to redivide once economic conditions change. Avuncular *shovo* whose sub-components stay together for social reasons do not share that weakness, and their success or failure depends instead on whether or not the pursuit of the social ideal is successful (assuming economic viability as pre-condition).

Moving on to 1998, I found Aurélio established in a *shovo* on the upper Curuçá River. Aurélio's return to the upper Curuçá River occurred in 1994 or 1995. He was already there when the 1995 census of Aldeia Maronal was taken. The context of this move was explained to me by Aurélio himself in an interview on April 22nd 1998, and by my host José on August 21st 1997. While Aurélio was living on the middle Curuçá he was stricken with a bad back and a fever simultaneously. He went to Atalaia do Norte for treatment, and FUNAI sent him to Manaus because of the seriousness of his condition. He spent a long time recovering. At the same time his oldest son, Pekôpa (Ani) had built a *tapo* (non-*shovo* hut, Pg. *tapiri*) on the upper Curuçá near Alfredo's *shovo*. Once Pekôpa was established upstream, Aurélio's wife followed with her younger children. When Aurélio returned from his long convalescence in Manaus, he found that his whole family was upstream, and he simply followed—this according to his own testimony. Eventually they built a *shovo* and moved out of their *tapo*. It was in this condition that I observed Aurélio and his family. Once again, Aurélio himself did not direct the

residential movement. Instead, his family moved while he was downstream and he followed.

ii. *Shovo* belonging to Domingo

In 1974, Melatti encountered two *shovo* at the headwaters of the Igarapé Surubim, a smaller affluent of the Igarapé Maronal. One of these belonged to Domingo (or Domingos), a Ranenáwavo man with a recorded birthdate of 1879. Domingo's essential place in Marubo history is explained in Chapter Eight (see Chapter Eight, section C). One of the five elders to emerge as survivors and *shovo ivorasi* from the rubber boom, he helped re-produce Marubo society through his multiple marriages and abundant children. The youngest son attributed to him was born in 1968. By 1974, he was a very old man, still living in the headwaters area where he lived since the rubber boom. The establishment of the FUNAI post on the middle Curuçá changed that.

In 1978, Melatti observed that Domingo's *shovo* had been abandoned. At some point between 1974 and 1978, the *shovo* underwent a schism, splitting into three separate units, each of which moved in its own direction. The composition of Domingo's *shovo* prior to its breakup may be seen in Figure 5.7.a. His was an essentially agnatic *shovo*. The main components aside from Domingo and his two living wives were the three sets of siblings that were Domingo's children. Domingo may be seen at top left (#1), with four deceased wives (101, 102, 103, 104) and two living wives (2, 3). His children are in the next descending generation. On the far left are his children by 101 (4, 5, 6, 7, 8).

Next are his children by 102 (9, 10). The third sibling set are his children by 2 (11, 12, 13, 14).

Sebastião Amanso's arguments that the Marubo would be better off moving downstream for easier access to FUNAI assistance and benefits, combined with the establishment of the FUNAI post and the movement of Aurélio's coresidents to the post, had the effect of causing a discussion in Domingo's *shovo* as to whether or not to stay. The result of these discussions was not a unified opinion but rather a difference of opinions. Domingo's eldest son, Cassimiro (9), decided to move to the FUNAI post. His father went with him, along with his wives and children. In 1998, Cassimiro was a *shovo ivo* at Aldeia São Sebastião. Domingo died shortly after the move downstream.

The lines of division of Domingo's *shovo* are depicted in Figure 5.7.b. Four separate units are shown. In diagonal lines is the unit consisting of Domingo, Cassimiro, and their immediate families, plus Domingo's daughter's son Ronipa (15). In horizontal lines is shown the unit consisting of Domingo's son Sinapa (8), his wife (16) and children (17, 18, 19). In vertical lines is shown the unit consisting of Domingo's wife Yaka (2) and her three sons (11, 12, 13). Finally, on the far right in crossed diagonals is Shapopa (20), Cassimiro's son-in-law at the time of Melatti's first census. Each of these four units moved to a different place when the *shovo* broke up between 1975-1977.

Sinapa became a *shovo ivo* by the 1980s. Sinapa's nuclear family abandoned their old *shovo* by 1978, when Dr. Melatti encountered them living at Vicente's tapiris. Sinapa's son Jamil, however, explained to me that that had been a temporary measure, and they stayed with Vicente very little time. From there, they moved to a site on the

upper Curuçá River where they built their own set of tapiris. On the upper Curuçá River, they encountered a group of young rubber tappers led by Ronípa.

Ronípa was born in the headwaters of the Curuçá River about 1964. His mother was one of Domingo's daughters, Rave. His father was a fleeing Peruvian criminal who was captured by Brazilian police when Ronípa was still in the womb. His mother died when he was ten years old, about 1974. When Domingo's *shovo* broke up, Ronípa followed his grandfather Domingo and mother's brother Cassimiro to the FUNAI post. He explains that during that time he was raised by Cassimiro (Pg. *andei com Cassimiro*). At the age of 17 (c. 1981), he went to Cruzeiro do Sul seeking employment. He spent several years working as a handyman for a rancher named Magalhães. He says he became accustomed to life in Cruzeiro, and would have stayed. However, Sinãpa came all the way from the upper Curuçá to his ranch to ask him to return to Marubo land. Ronípa describes this event quite vividly: he was working on his everyday tasks at the ranch, having no thought of ever returning to his homeland, when one of his co-workers told him a "forest Indian" had shown up looking for him. He went to see, and it was his mother's brother Sinãpa come to request his return. He agreed to go back with him. This was about 1986.

FIGURE 5.7.a.: Composition of Domingo's *shovo* in 1974 (Melatti 1980).





FIGURE 5.7.b: Breakup of Domingo's *shovo*.



Once re-established on the upper Curuçá, Ronipa used his excellent Portuguese and his connections in Acre to establish a rubber-trading business. He gathered together a work crew including two uterine brothers and two classificatory brothers. Although loosely associated with Sinapa's nuclear family, Ronipa's work crew lived mostly in small huts closer to the *Hevea* trees. Ronipa's uterine brothers remained only briefly before returning to the Ituí River, where their mother had gone to live while she was still living. However, his classificatory brothers Shinipa and Tae remained with him. Together, Ronipa, Shinipa, Tae, Sinapa and his sons built a *shovo* on the upper Curuçá c.1987. The genealogical relationships among these individuals was explored in Chapter Four, Figure 4.5. Together, they formed a *shovo* that was avuncular in social composition. The *shovo ivo* was Sinapa. Note that in this case, Sinapa played the social role I am dubbing *attractor*, in the sense that he called Ronipa to come live with him.

Shortly after building their first *shovo*, Sinapa and his *kokavo* (individuals of mother's brother's/sister's son's clan) were joined by Wasinawa from the Ituí River. Wasinawa was a son of Domingo, thus a patrilateral brother of Sinapa. Wasinawa and Sinapa were both of the Satanawavo lineage, and so were classificatory brothers as well as true half-brothers. Wasinawa had moved to the Ituí River many years before, after the Mayoruna war (he was nearly killed in an enemy ambush at the age of ten). On the Ituí River, he established uxorilocal polygyny at the residence of his father-in-law. By the late 1980s, he decided to move to the Curuçá River. However, only one of his wives moved with him. When I met him in 1997, that was still his condition: one wife and his children by her were on the Curuçá River, the other wife and her children were on the Ituí River, still residing with Wasinawa's father-in-law.

Following Wasinawa's move to join them, the newly enlarged coresident group built a new, larger *shovo* a short distance upstream from the old one. The old *shovo*, it was explained to me, was too small for all these people; furthermore it had an inconvenient port on the Curuçá and inconvenient access to Igarapés for water and bathing. In contrast, the new site solved the convenience problems and was sufficiently large to accomodate everyone. This event, according to Sinãpa's son Jamil, took place in 1990. The new *shovo* was inhabited and active when I visited in 1997-98. However, as I arrived it was undergoing a schism.

In August 1997, I observed that Wasinawa was building a new *shovo* approximately a 15 minute walk downstream from his former residence with Sinãpa. Assisting Wasinawa were his three classificatory nephews--Ronipa, Shinipa, and Tae—as well as those of his own sons who were old enough for the hard work of *shovo*-building. While the *shovo* was being built, Wasinawa and his family lived in makeshift, wall-less shelters on the construction site. When it was finished in November 1997, Wasinawa's *shovo* became the permanent home for himself, his wife and children, as well as his three classificatory nephews, their wives and children (only Ronipa was still a bachelor). The *shovo* was very close to Sinãpa's and close relations were maintained, but the schism had been effectively consummated.

The reasons for this schism were explored in interviews with Ronipa and with Sinãpa's son Jamil. Two types of reason were adduced for the move: physical and social. Ronipa told me that the old site had more mosquitoes and blackflies than the new one, and this explained why they wanted to move. Indeed, Sinãpa's *shovo* was close to the Curuçá River, while Wasinawa's new *shovo* was some five minutes' walk inland, atop a

hill. Ron̄pa told me that the further inland, the less insects, particularly blackflies, there were, hence their decision to move further inland. This explanation, in my opinion, only explains what criteria influenced the location of the new *shovo*, but does not explain the decision to move in the first place. My personal experience of visiting these two *shovo* did not reveal significant differences in biting insect populations, which were substantial everywhere.

A second reason for Wasinawa's schism may be gleaned from the interviews. To understand the social reasons for the schism, it is necessary to see Sin̄pa's coresident group in the context of its residential history and demographic growth. When their first *shovo* was constructed in 1987, the group was limited in size and compositional content. Sin̄pa had one wife, with seven children aged 3 to 21, none of whom were married. His three nephews were all likewise unmarried. The group thus consisted of twelve individuals. Wasinawa's arrival added considerably to the group. When he arrived he had four children, aged 2 to 16, in addition to his wife, raising the group's size to 18. The new *shovo* to accomodate the expanded group was built in 1990. From 1990 to 1997 this group expanded considerably. Sin̄pa took a second wife and by her had five children. Wasinawa had another daughter. But more importantly, there were numerous marriages in the second generation. Sin̄pa's three oldest sons married, and the oldest had already fathered a son by 1997. In addition, Shin̄pa took a wife and had children, and Tae married Wasinawa's oldest daughter and had children (the luckless Ron̄pa remained a bachelor). There was not only, therefore, an overall growth in population, but also a significant growth in the number of marriages and hence of productive nuclear and

uterine family units. This had an impact because there was not enough space in the *shovo* to properly accomodate so many families.


The schism in Sināpa's *shovo* occurred just as the *shovo ivo*'s sons were marrying and having children. The *shovo* had been large enough to accommodate Wasinawa's presence, and to accomodate the marriages of Shinīpa and Tae. The marriages of Sināpa's elder three children, however, were too much. Ronīpa explained it to me thus: when Sināpa's children started marrying, the *shovo* got cramped, so Wasinawa and the three nephews built their own *shovo*. I should note that this explicit admission that the schism was caused by overcrowding came months after Ronīpa's initial statement that they had moved to avoid mosquitoes (Portuguese: carapanã; Marubo: *vi*) and blackflies (Portuguese: piúm; Marubo: *shiuí*).

The general layout of Sināpa's *shovo*, along with an explanation of the utilization of space therein, may be found in Figure 8, below; the specific distribution of married couples within the *shovo* may be seen in Figure 9. Figure 9 shows that three of the domestic spaces known as *kaya shane*, of which there are six in an eight-post *shovo*, were occupied after the schism by Sināpa's three married sons. These marriages were all recent—under two years old in Poirekōpa's case, under one year old in the other two cases. *Kaya shane* are never occupied by unmarried youth; they are reserved for married couples. Therefore, prior to the marriages of Sināpa's three sons, the *kaya shane* must have been occupied by other people. Specifically, three married couples moved into Wasinawa's *shovo* after the schism. It is highly likely that the *kaya shane* which I observed occupied by Sināpa's sons had previously been occupied by Wasinawa and by Sināpa's married nephews. The marriage of Sināpa's three sons created a dearth of *kaya*

shane for the first time, hence Ronipa's statement that with the marriage of those sons, the *shovo* became cramped. It should further be considered that, as explained in Chapter Four, although the composition of Sinapa's *shovo* was avuncular, the line of transmission of political authority seemed agnatic. That is, Sinapa's eldest son was being groomed for the leadership role, bypassing all the nephews who were in fact older. This must have assisted Wasinawa and the nephews in making the decision to move out on their own.


The process whereby Sinapa gathered together a large, multi-component avuncular *shovo*, only to see it split into two, should be considered in the context of similar experiences at other avuncular *shovo*. As explained above, several avuncular *shovo* on the upper Curuçá formed under economic conditions involving exploitation of the rubber trade, which seems to have fostered the coherence of avuncular groups by creating a need for large work parties. Changing conditions are associated in these cases with breakup of the *shovo*. In the case of Aurélio's and José's *shovo*, the result was a breakup into basic agnatic units. In the case of Sinapa's *shovo*, the result was a split into one agnatic and one avuncular *shovo*. In all three cases, the *shovo* thrives while the marriages that compose it are young. Youth is positively associated in Marubo society with exploitation of commercial opportunities involving non-indigenous people, whereas elders tend to focus more on social goals while their sons engage in commercial activities. Thus, we find a similar pattern in the three cases of upper Curuçá avuncular *shovo* examined. They existed only while the component families are in the early stages of growth and development; none of the three survived beyond the second generation's marriages.

FIGURE 5.8.a.: Layout of Sināpa's *shovo* (schematic—not to scale).



Sināpa's *shovo*, constructed in 1990, had eight main structural posts. This makes it relatively large by Marubo standards. There was only one Marubo *shovo* with ten posts (Alfredo's); there were at least a half-dozen eight-post *shovo*.


FIGURE 5.8.b.: Layout of domestic spaces in Sināpa's *shovo*.



The number of posts determines the number of domestic units the *shovo* can physically accommodate. The spaces marked off by dotted lines and labelled **A**, above, are called *kaya shane*. Each of these is typically allotted to one married couple, or in cases of polygyny, to one wife and her offspring. A married couple is expected to be economically productive. With the assignment of a *kaya shane* each woman gets a fireplace and begins to contribute to communal meals. Thus, a young man grows up sleeping in his mother's *kaya shane*; when married, however, he will want his own space if possible.

In addition, the areas marked **B** in the diagram above may be used as domestic spaces. These areas, of which every *shovo* has four though of varying size, are called the *repā*. I observed these spaces variously used for storage space, for accommodating guests, or by polygynous men as a sort of personal space separate from their wives' areas. I also observed the *repā* used simply as an extra *kaya shane*, accommodating married women and their children.

FIGURE 5.9.: Arrangement of nuclear and uterine families within Sināpa's *shovo*, January-July 1998 (schematic—not to scale).



Legend:

- A. Sināpa's younger wife's hammock.
- B. Sināpa's younger wife's children.
- C. Jamil (Sināpa's 2nd son) and wife.
- D. Pakāpa (Sināpa's 3rd son) and wife.
- E. Poirekōpa (Sināpa's 1st son), wife and children.
- F. Sināpa's elder wife—unmarried children's hammocks.
- G. Sināpa's elder wife.

The uterine family consisting of Domingo's wife Yaka and her sons took its own direction after the arrival of FUNAI occasioned the breakup of Domingo's *shovo*. Yaka was a Tamaoavo woman (still alive in 1998), the mother therefore of Varináwavo children. She had four sons whom I refer to elsewhere (see Chapters Four and Six) as 'the Varináwavo brothers'. In 1974, Yaka lived in Domingo's *shovo* with her youngest three sons (marked with vertical lines in Figure 5.7.b.). The eldest of her four sons, Võpa, was uxorilocaly married in his father-in-law João Tuxáua's *shovo* (see Figure 5.1). By 1998, the Varináwavo brothers had their own *shovo*, numbered 10 in Figure 5.3. In between these observations, the Varináwavo brothers coresided with José and Pedro Barbosa. This trajectory was elicited in interviews with José Barbosa and with the Varináwavo *shovo ivo*, Mayãpa.

The four brothers were initially separated by the schism of their father's *shovo*. The movement to the middle Curuçá did not affect the oldest, Võpa (b.1939) since he had already left his father's residence to reside uxorilocaly with his father-in-law, João Tuxáua. When Domingo and Cassimiro moved to the Igarapé São Salvador, the second and third sons—Mayãpa (a.k.a. Jaime, b. 1960) and Emãpa (a.k.a. Antônio, b. 1966)—went with their father. Their mother Yaka and the youngest son, Potõpa (a.k.a. Darcy, b. 1968), did not move downstream. Instead, they went to join Võpa at João Tuxáua's *shovo*. The 1978 census finds the uterine family thus divided.

Shortly after the 1978 census, José Barbosa, son of João Tuxáua, took his brother Pedro and built his own *shovo* on the upper Curuçá River. Some years after that, probably in 1984, José's brother Alfredo moved away from his father João Tuxáua's *shovo* to build his own at the location of the current Aldeia Maronal. By 1990, João

Tuxáua himself moved out of the headwaters area to join his son Alfredo, and the headwaters were abandoned, remaining so today. Võpa, his mother, and younger brother did not wait so long before making a move, however: by 1984, they had permanently settled at José Barbosa's *shovo*.

The precise timing of the Varináwavo move to José Barbosa's remains slightly mysterious. José told me that Võpa and the young Potõpa helped build his *shovo*. Thus, coresidence was probably the plan all along, c.1979. However, José also told me that Võpa moved in with him "when Alfredo moved down to the Curuçá". It is possible that Yaka and Potõpa moved in with José earlier, while Võpa, more tied to his residence by association to his wife's father, switched residence only when given a clear opportunity—the imminent abandonment of the entire place. Meanwhile, the young Emãpa was sent back upstream to be with his mother and brothers. Only Mayãpa stayed behind at the FUNAI post.

Mayãpa stayed apart from his brothers for a long time. The reason for this is that he began to work for loggers based in Benjamin Constant, just downstream from Atalaia. He told me he worked out of Atalaia for eight years, logging in many different parts of the Javari basin. It should be noted that Mayãpa would have been old enough to work in logging shortly after the move to the Igarapé São Salvador, whereas his younger brother Emãpa would have been too young. This explains why Emãpa moved back upstream when his brother went to work logging.

After eight years of working for non-indigenous people, and after the death of his father Domingo, Mayãpa moved back upstream, moving in with José Barbosa. By that

time, all three of his brothers as well as his mother lived with José. The precise date of Mayãpa's move upstream is difficult to fix, but seems likely to be 1986 or 1987.

José Barbosa had established commercial relations with rubber buyers in Acre by the time Mayãpa moved in. Mayãpa was accustomed to making money by logging; his brothers were accustomed to carrying rubber on their backs to Acre for money and goods. Mayãpa told me he joined the rubber trade for three years. As will be noted in Chapter Six, José's market for rubber dried up, and the effort involved in carrying the balls to market made it difficult to keep his workers' interest in the face of rival money-making opportunities. Mayãpa proved to be a dissenter in this sense. With his extensive knowledge of regional trade and commerce gained during eight years of logging and travelling, he encouraged his less experienced brothers to find alternatives. This combination of factors—market drying up and laborers unwilling to work—led to the end of José's rubber trade. This may have been in 1991. Shortly thereafter, Alfredo issued his invitation to José to move. José decided to move downstream to his current place of residence very close to Alfredo at Aldeia Maronal.

When José moved to his new residence, the Varináwavo remained behind. José attributes this in part to the influence of Mayãpa. José says that Mayãpa “wanted a *shovo* that was just the Varináwavo”. In any case, the Varináwavo brothers stayed behind in the old *shovo* while José, his brother and children built a new one further downstream.

By 1997, the old *shovo* built by José had become too old to be a pleasant habitation (this reason for moving was given to me by José). A *shovo* may last 15-20 years before holes in the roof and erosion around the side render it uninhabitable unless major repairs are made. In this case, it was decided to abandon that site, which was the

uppermost settlement on the Curuçá. Instead, Mayãpa decided to build a *shovo* downstream, closer to Alfredo.

The site chosen by Mayãpa was across the river and a 20-25 minute walk from Alfredo's *shovo*, thus separate from the core where Alfredo's brothers' *shovo* were. Mayãpa guided the building of this *shovo*. The oldest brother, Võpa, did not participate much, travelling instead to the Ituí to visit relatives. Mayãpa built the *shovo* with his two younger brothers, and with the assistance of Alfredo, Alfredo's sons, Alfredo's brothers and brothers' sons. The reason for this assistance is that Mayãpa and Potõpa were both married to daughters of Alfredo, while Emãpa was married to Alfredo's coresident brother Miguel. The ties between the Varináwavo and Alfredo's *shovo* were strong. Furthermore, the Varináwavo move placed them within Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo's village, and hence benefited Alfredo politically. The assistance Alfredo supplied facilitated their move, and ensured that the Varináwavo would lend their support to any future projects for which Alfredo might require their labor. As a result of this, Jaime ended up being the *shovo ivo* even though his brother Võpa was 21 years older.

The fourth and final element of Domingo's *shovo* that can be securely identified in all censuses is the individual marked number 20 in Figure 5.7. This man is now called Shapõpa, and lives in Cruzeiro do Sul. In some ways, he is important in Marubo society. He is married to a non-indigenous woman who is a mission schoolteacher. He lives in a house on the mission headquarters in Cruzeiro, and goes on special missions on their behalf. For example, he once went on a mission boat with mission-supplied gasoline and supplies to visit the Matís Indians to preach the gospel—since it would have been forbidden for non-indigenous people to do the same. He is often given free transportation

on mission airplanes, something no other Indian is allowed. Finally, CIVAJA recently installed a radio in his house in Cruzeiro, giving him the ability to comment on any of the issues discussed by radio, thus making Shapōpa an integral part of the overall Marubo political organization.

Shapōpa's mother was Marubo; his father was a non-indigenous person. His given birthdate is 1956, according to Melatti (1980). By 1974, he is shown in Melatti's census married to Cassimiro's daughter uxorilocally at Domingo's *shovo*. His father had died some years previously, and his mother had re-married. Shapōpa's mother was, in 1974, married to a Marubo man and living on the Ituí River (maloca do Reissamon, Figure 1). Through his mother's remarriage, Shapōpa had three half-sisters and two half-brothers. In 1978, Melatti records that Shapōpa had relocated to the Ituí River, where his mother and half-brothers were. When Shapōpa moved, he did so alone, leaving behind Cassimiro's daughter. This coincided with the move of Domingo and Cassimiro to the Igarapé São Salvador. I had the opportunity to speak to Cassimiro's daughter about the event and she said simply: "He left me" (*eneishna*—to leave, abandon, or drop (=ene)+distant past tense marker (=ishna)). It was not long thereafter that he met his non-indigenous wife. After their marriage, the couple lived on the Ituí River with Shapōpa's mother and stepfather. Shapōpa's wife learned fluent Marubo and acquired skill in Marubo women's crafts. Eventually, however, they relocated to Cruzeiro do Sul, where Shapōpa still lives. Nevertheless, Shapōpa has remained integrally connected to interior Marubo society.

The data on the fate of Domingo and his coresidents, 1974-1998, show that settlement leaders do not necessarily direct the residential movements of coresidents. It

is more common for each uterine family composing a residential group to render its own decisions on movement, and there appears to be considerable individual choice as well. The data on Domingo's *shovo*'s breakup supply a number of examples of these phenomena.

The first example of movement in these data is the move of Domingo and Cassimiro to the Igarapé São Salvador, where the FUNAI post was. The leader of the *shovo* at the time was Domingo, though Cassimiro may have been *de facto* leader due to his father's advanced age. In any case, the decision was more Cassimiro's than Domingo's, according to informants. And also in any case, whoever made the decision did not make it for the entire group. Only a small portion of the *shovo* followed the leaders downstream; the others moved in different directions.

The second example to be examined is the movement of Sinãpa, one of Domingo's sons. Sinãpa directed the movements of himself, his wife and children: this is clear from conversations with his son, Jamil. First, they moved off on their own to live in tapiris (non-*shovo* rectangular huts on pylons) on the upper Curuçá, rather than moving downstream with Cassimiro and Domingo. Then, Sinãpa went to Cruzeiro to invite his sister's son Ronipa to live with him. This last was exactly what it is described as: an invitation. The choice to go or not was Ronipa's. Interviews with Ronipa suggest several possible motivations for his relocation to Marubo land. He told me that in Cruzeiro, he missed being around kin, so that longing to be among kin once more was one of his motivations. This longing may have been more powerful in Ronipa's case since he was an orphan. A second motivation is the desire for respect. Ronipa told me that when he returned with Sinãpa, he had two suitcases full of clothes. He said that at

that time, it was very rare for Curuçá Marubo to have manufactured clothes. When he arrived among his kin, he said, he gave away all of it. I observed this behavior of Ronipa's myself: when I paid him to guide me to the Ituí River, he spent almost all his income on presents for his kin, and only a small portion on tobacco for himself. It is clear that among the non-indigenous people of Acre, Ronipa was just Manoel the ranch-hand, whereas among his own people he could be respected and admired for his superior access to non-indigenous goods. For whatever reason, Ronipa moved back to the upper Curuçá where he was born.

Once located on the upper Curuçá, Ronipa attracted two matrilateral brothers and two classificatory brothers to tap rubber with him, taking advantage of Ronipa's contacts in Acre. His biological brothers stayed only briefly. At least one of them returned to the Ituí River to take advantage of a very attractive offer of uxorilocal polygyny at Aldeia Água Branca. His classificatory brothers remained, and together with Sinapa built a *shovo*.

The reason for Wasinawa's move to join Sinapa and his sister's sons on the upper Curuçá is not known. Wasinawa was living in uxorilocal polygyny on the Ituí River, and upon moving could take only one of his wives with him. His move to the Ituí must therefore have had a motive sufficiently strong to make it worthwhile to downgrade from polygyny to monogamy. Once established on the Ituí, he coresided with Sinapa and with Ronipa and his brothers for some seven years. The reasons for the schism of that *shovo* were described above—essentially, overcrowding combined with the fact that the political succession in the *shovo* was going to Sinapa's son, bypassing numerous older men. The outcome of Wasinawa's move seems ultimately successful: by late 1997 he

had his own *shovo* on the upper Curuçá, thus entering the ranks of the *shovo ivorasi*, the *shovo*-owners.

The movements of the Varináwavo present an even more complex scenario. The Varináwavo ended up in 1998 living as a unit, but the trajectory they took to get to that point was anything but unified. The first to move out from his father's *shovo* must have been Võpa, who resided uxorilocally at the time of Melatti's first census. The second move was the division of the family when FUNAI arrived. The most notable phenomenon in this sense is the fact that Yaka did not move to the Igarapé São Salvador with her husband Domingo. Instead, she and her youngest son moved to join her eldest son Võpa at the latter's place of uxorilocal residence. The specific reasons for this independence are unknown but we may begin to discern a pattern of wifely independence and ability to divorce, which subsequent data will confirm. The ability to determine movements of the young children was divided between father and mother: Yaka took the youngest, Domingo the middle two.

The third Varináwavo movement was the resettlement of Yaka and three of her children at José Barbosa's. My attempts to interpret this movement were somewhat unsatisfactory. While in the field, it seemed to me unusual for *kokavo* to live together, since I knew of no other such *shovo*. José insisted that the social composition of his former *shovo* was perfectly normal. It was only after return to the United States and thorough analysis of the data that I realized avuncular *shovo* were somewhat common, and certainly normal within the parameters of Marubo social dynamics. All that can be said is that when the choice was to be made, José's seemed the most attractive option. The Varináwavo faced the following options: (1) stay with João Tuxáua, where Võpa

lived uxorilocally; (2) create independent residence; (3) move to one of the other remnants of Domingo's coresident network—Sinãpa's, Ivãpa's, or Wanõpa's; (4) move to the middle Curuçá; (5) move to José Barbosa's. Option (4) seems to have been discounted from the beginning, when Yaka decided she was not going to the FUNAI post. Option (1) may have seemed politically disadvantageous. With the line of political succession and the focus of decision-making falling to João Tuxáua's own sons, Võpa would have been but marginally prominent, and his younger brothers not at all. In contrast, at José's they were welcome components in a new *shovo* attempting to engage in rubber trade with Acre. José wanted coresidents and the Varináwavo saw such coresidence as the most advantageous among the available possibilities.

Independent of the other Varináwavo movements was Mayãpa. From an early age, Mayãpa made his own decisions. Coming of sufficient age to work in logging, he did not move back to the upper Curuçá when his younger brother Emãpa did. Instead, he stayed on the lower Curuçá, logging for eight years. Eventually, he moved back to the upper Curuçá, according to himself because he was “tired of working for the whiteman (*o branco*)”, indicating that this was a personal choice. After a few years on the upper Curuçá, José Barbosa decided to relocate, but the Varináwavo chose to remain. In this decision, all informants agree, Mayãpa's opinion was fundamental. Eventually, Mayãpa directed the building of his own *shovo*, where all his full brothers and his mother lived, and where he was *shovo ivo*.

These residential movements invert any expectations about leaders and residential movements we may have from reading Lévi-Strauss or Clastres. According to the Clastrean model, settlement leaders direct group residential movements. This is one of

the responsibilities leaders putatively have, which entitles them to receive a grant of polygyny from the group. In the multiple cases of residential movement associated with Domingo's *shovo*, however, we never get the settlement leader determining the group's movements. On the contrary, the group determines its own movements, and the analysis of Aurélio's and Domingo's *shovo* suggest that the group's subcomponents have independent decision-making ability in this field of social action. Of course, if we asked only who had determined the Varináwavo's final locale, we would be told that Mayãpa did, and he is *shovo ivo* so we might get the impression that Clastres' theory does apply. But the fact is that Mayãpa became group leader by guiding group movements; he was not group leader until he did so. The actual group leader, José, did not determine Mayãpa's movement. This suggests that it is by *violating* the Clastrean model (which suggests a specific group/leader exchange formula) that a Marubo man gets into position to fulfill it. The first step to group leadership is ignoring the group leader. Only one aspect of the Clastrean model seems applicable: Mayãpa did not gain *shovo ivo* status due to his structural position, but rather due to personal characteristics which made him a stronger leader than his elder brother. Nevertheless, any observation that Mayãpa 'directed' his group's movement must be tempered by the context, in which there is another group leader whose directions are not followed.

iii. Shovo belonging to João Tuxáua, Miguel, and João Pequeno

Melatti's 1974 census showed three *shovo* in a cluster on the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal. By 1998 the personnel that once dwelled in these three *shovo* had relocated to the main course of the Curuçá River just upstream from the mouth of the Igarapé Maronal, there forming the core of Aldeia Maronal. The central figure in this series of movements was Alfredo, the 1998 headman of Maronal, and clearly the most powerful Marubo leader alive today. Observations and interviews concerning Alfredo's role in residential movements thus constitutes essential data on Marubo political organization.

João Tuxáua has already been mentioned above as having played an essential role in the movement of Marubo to the headwaters are in the first place. Oral histories, presented in Chapter Eight, tell how his father Tomas fled from the region near the Javari to the headwaters area to avoid kidnappings by non-indigenous people. Subsequently, João Tuxáua actively sought out remnants of proto-Marubo groups throughout the Curuçá River valley, gathering them all together in one small area. João Tuxáua was thus credited with effectively saving the Marubo from extinction; analytically we could credit him with *creating* the Marubo nation, since the Marubo ethnicity seems to have been created by the period of cohabitation of multiple *-náwavo* that followed the rubber boom. At any rate, João Tuxáua is known for his significant influence over residential movements.

João Tuxáua's father had chosen the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal and the Arrojo River as settlement site because it was inaccessible by boats. In fact, it was not easily accessible by land, either. In 1998 this represented a gruelling eight hour walk, and most of it along very well cleaned paths. When FUNAI's Sebastião Amanso visited the Marubo in 1973-1974, he argued that this distance had become a disadvantage. Health assistance, trade goods, and education would be available only if the Marubo moved down to the navigable main course of the Curuçá River. Unlike Domingo's *shovo*, however, João Tuxáua's did not immediately break up following Amanso's invitation.

In 1974, João Tuxáua's *shovo*'s composition was very similar to Domingo's. He lived with two wives and three sets of children; two of his male children were married, with children of their own; and there was one uxorilocally married son-in-law, the aforementioned Võpa. This composition is shown in Figure 10. At top left is João Tuxáua (1), with links to a dead wife (101) and two living wives (2, 3). On the second row are the three sets of João Tuxáua's children that lived with him. On the far left are his Tamaoavo children (of a Varináwavo wife): Zacarias (#4, b. 1921); Alfredo (#5, b. 1937); Pedro (#6, b. 1950), and Gabriela (#7, b. 1945). In the middle are his Iskonáwavo children (of a Shanenáwavo wife): three sons—Vasho (9), Tama (12), and Nato (13)—and three daughters, Kena (8), Txitã (10) and Vo (11). On the right are his Rovonáwavo children (of a Satanáwavo wife): two sons—Tama (15) and Shinipa (16)—and two daughters, Txuna-ni (14) and Peko (17). João Tuxáua's oldest son Zacarias was married to 18 and had four children, numbered 19 through 22, far lower right. Alfredo was married to three women (23, 24, 25) by whom he had at that time five children (26, 27,

28, 29, 30). Gabriela had married but been widowed, and in 1974 was the single mother of one daughter (31). Finally, Kena was married to the Varináwavo man Võpa (32), with one son, who would come to be called Varishavõpa (33).

Adjacent to the main *shovo* of João Tuxáua were two smaller *shovo*. The smaller of the two was that of the so-called João Pequeno, in 1998 called Joãozinho, distinguishing him from João Tuxáua. Joãozinho was classified in Melatti's census as a son of Misael, but by 1998 he had been reclassified as a son of João Tuxáua and thus a brother of Alfredo (in fact, he has a third father that is occasionally referred to). His *shovo* was described to me by José Barbosa as a small *shovo* (Pg. 'maloquinha', referring to a *shovo* with only four posts, whose posts are less than four meters when cut, three meters remaining aboveground). Joãozinho lived with his wife and three children. With him at the time of Melatti's visit was José Barbosa, his two wives and two children.

The second *shovo* adjacent to João Tuxáua's in 1974 was Miguel's. Miguel was classified in 1974 as a son of João Tuxáua's brother. By 1998, he had been reclassified as a son of João Tuxáua. Also by 1998, he no longer had his own *shovo*, but was living instead in Alfredo's *shovo*. This is interesting insofar as, when Miguel was a *shovo ivo*, his professed social relation to Alfredo was that of father's brother's son; when Miguel was cohabiting with Alfredo, his professed relation to the latter was of patrilateral brother. In either case, Miguel is a classificatory brother (*otxi*) of the same *-náwavo* (Tamaoavo) as Alfredo. In 1974, Miguel (1) lived with his wife (2) and children (3, 4, 5); his full brother (6), brother's wife (7) and brother's children (8, 9, 10); and his matrilateral brothers (11, 12, 13), one of whom was married (to 14) with two sons (15,

16). From the perspective of kinship and politics, therefore, the focus of Miguel's *shovo* was the coresidence of five brothers, three of whom were married with children.

By the time of my visit in 1997-98, none of the individuals who owned *shovo* on the Igarapé Maronal were *shovo*-owners anymore. João Tuxáua had died in 1996. His son, Alfredo, owned a very large *shovo* on the Curuçá River which was the center of Aldeia Maronal (Figure 5.3, *shovo* 1). In Alfredo's *shovo* lived his full brother Zacarias as well as his classificatory brothers Joãozinho and Miguel. Closely adjacent to Alfredo's *shovo* was the *shovo* of Vasho (Figure 5.3, *shovo* 2), in which lived also Nato and, until his premature death, Tama, along with their wives and children. A short distance away, also in the core of Aldeia Maronal, lived Alfredo's brother José Barbosa along with his brother Pedro (Figure 5.3, *shovo* 3). Meanwhile, Miguel's half-brother Pekópa (12) had his own *shovo*, in the periphery of Aldeia Maronal (Figure 5.3, *shovo* 7). Miguel's full brother João Aurélio (6) also had his own *shovo*, but downstream at Aldeia São Sebastião (Figure 5, *shovo* 6). Data on the contexts surrounding and motivations behind these residential changes were obtained in interviews with Alfredo, José, and Pedro, and with Alfredo's son Txanópa.

According to José, Alfredo moved down from the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal to the main course of the Curuçá River because the remoter places were inaccessible to motorboat travel—the exact reverse of the motivation that had led the proto-Marubo to the headwaters in the first place. The context for this change in priorities was Amanso's visit, and Alfredo was in the best position to respond for João Tuxáua's three-*shovo* local group. Txanópa explained that his father Alfredo lived as a

FIGURE 5.10. Composition of João Tuxáua's *shovo*, 1974 (from Melatti 1980).






FIGURE 5.11. Composition of Joãozinho's *shovo*, 1974 (from Melatti 1980).



Joãozinho and José Barbosa are “linked by various marriages between their real and classificatory brothers” (Melatti 1980).

FIGURE 5.12. Composition of Miguel's *shovo*, 1974 (from Melatti 1980).



youth with his own father, João Tuxáua, in the headwaters area. As a young man, however, Alfredo visited and worked in Cruzeiro do Sul and, later, Manaus. Upon his return from these journeys, Alfredo planned to travel some more, but his father told him that that was enough travelling, and now he had to marry. So Alfredo married and settled down in his father's *shovo*. Alfredo's recorded birthdate is 1937, and the oldest son of his first wife was born in 1967. His travels probably occurred between 1955 and 1965.

When FUNAI arrived, Alfredo spoke some Portuguese because of his previous travels, and so became the intermediary between his father and Amanso. This became a substantial influence on João Tuxáua's passing the mantle of headmanship down to Alfredo instead of Alfredo's older brother Zacarias. Zacarias explained to me that he was *kakaya* too, but of the Indians; Alfredo, his older brother said, was *kakaya* for the non-Indians. During my fieldwork period, Zacarias was focusing on a pursuit of access to pension monies, for which reason he was visiting the Ituí River. Zacarias had little observable influence on event outcomes, whereas Alfredo had a substantial impact on many dimensions of Marubo life.

Alfredo explained to me that after the arrival of FUNAI, many Marubo headed to the main course of the Curuçá. As described above, Domingo's *shovo* split and some of it moved downstream to the FUNAI post, at the same time as Aurélio's *shovo* (though this latter was already on the Curuçá), began its stage-by-stage movement to the FUNAI post. Another *shovo*, that of Carlos and Misael, also left for the Curuçá (see below). The options taken by these groups abandoning the headwaters in 1974-78 were limited: some moved to the FUNAI post, while others moved to the place where Ivâpa (Vicente) was living at the mouth of the Igarapé Maronal. Melatti's 1978 census records Misael and

Sināpa as living with Ivāpa although both these groups would eventually move on to their own locales, leaving Ivāpa alone again. Alfredo told me that he, like the others, wanted to move to the motorboat-accessible Curuçá, but that he didn't want to move all the way down to the FUNAI post, nor did he want to simply move to Ivāpa's. He wanted a place of his own choosing (Pg. 'queria meu lugar'). He went looking on the other side of the Curuçá and a little upstream from Ivāpa's. There, he found an attractive location—the flat top of a low hill overlooking the Curuçá, with a gentle slope to the river making it suitable as a port and for bathing. In addition, there was a natural well a short distance away. On this location, he built temporary shelters where he lived as he cut and planted swiddens. After he finished his swiddens, he "invited his brothers" to make a *shovo* together. This *shovo* was constructed on the site of his current one, but it was smaller than his present ten-post *shovo*.

When Alfredo says he invited his brothers to come build a *shovo* with him, that does not mean that all his brothers immediately left the Igarapé Maronal location. At first, the only person who moved to help him was Joāozinho, an individual who was not classified as Alfredo's brother in 1974 but was in 1997. In 1974, Joāzinho had his 'maloquinha' adjacent to João Tuxáua. But this mini-*shovo* itself must have been a sign of dissatisfaction with living *in* João Tuxáua's *shovo*; yet neither was it a permanent solution because it was not a full-fledged *shovo*. This indicates that Joāozinho was dissatisfied with his residential condition and prone to move to a new location. He must have seen advantage in moving to the main course of the Curuçá, like everyone else was, and joined Alfredo.

A second *shovo ivo* who later joined Alfredo was Miguel. Scant information was obtained on the fate of Miguel's *shovo*. When I asked Txanõpa why Miguel, who was a *shovo ivo* in 1974, lived with Alfredo in 1998, he replied that Miguel's "brothers and sons" were scattered, and that without them he could not have his own *shovo*. Brothers and sons are the core of *shovo* at agnatic/virilocal Aldeia Maronal (see Chapter Four), so holding them together is essential to maintaining ownership of a thriving *shovo*.

According to Silvio Cavuscens, who visited the area in 1984, Miguel's brother João Aurélio already owned his own *shovo*, at a location intermediate between the upper Curuçá settlements and the FUNAI post. Miguel's brother Pekõpa, meanwhile, married the daughter of Wanõpa, one of Domingo's sons (see below). In 1998, João Aurélio had his own *shovo* at Aldeia São Sebastião. Pekõpa had his own *shovo* too, though it was physically oriented towards his father-in-law Wanõpa's peripheral *shovo* rather than to Alfredo's core. The reasons for the breakup of Miguel's *shovo* are not known to me. The result was that Miguel was left without the wherewithal to form his own *shovo*, and thus became Alfredo's brother-companion (see Chapter Four), an essential component of Alfredo's agnatic *shovo*. At least two of Miguel's brothers became independent *shovo*-owners in later years.

Before returning to Alfredo, it is necessary to note the movements of his brother José, since their paths intersect by 1994. José Barbosa, Alfredo's full brother and the son of João Tuxáua, was my host for the eleven and a half months during which Aldeia Maronal was my home. He delighted in telling me his story, using it to highlight moral lessons on ideal adult male behavior. José was born in 1942, a date he reckons by counting back from the missionaries' first arrival in 1952, when he was ten. José says

that when he was young, he worked in the rubber trade with the Cruzeiro do Sul market; he also worked downstream in Benjamin Constant and on the Peruvian side of the Javari. In this sense, he is like his brother Alfredo, and like many present-day Marubo youths in spending some time working away from Marubo land, making money and learning the Portuguese language. When he returned home from working abroad, he married a pair of sisters—Domingo’s daughters, Sinãpa’s full sisters. At first he lived virilocally in his father João Tuxáua’s *shovo*. This was not satisfactory. He told me he wanted to leave, to have his own place; he didn’t want to live at his father’s anymore. He told me in Portuguese “Eu pensei, assim não presta. Eu quero minha maloca. Eu saí da maloca do meu pai” (“This won’t do at all. I want my own *shovo*. I left my father’s *shovo*”). It was at that point that he moved into Joãozinho’s small *shovo*, which is where Melatti encountered and recorded him in 1974. But he didn’t like it there, either. He said it was very cramped due to its small size. He lived there only one month, he says. From Joãozinho’s, he moved up to the *shovo* of his father-in-law, Domingo. This *shovo* was in the process of abandonment at that time. José lived in a tapiri on the fringe of the patio surrounding the *shovo*. This is common practice in cases of uxorilocal residence. José says he did not like that form of residence either. It became a moot point, as the *shovo* was abandoned during that time. His brother-in-law Sinãpa was the last to leave, making his way down the Maronal to Ivãpa’s, then up the Curuçá where he was a successful *shovo ivo* in 1997. By this time, José had two daughters, Amélia (b. 1971) and Tsainama (b. 1975) and a son, Manoel (b. 1972), with another son, Paulo (b. 1977) on his way. Melatti records José, his wives and children as residing with his father João Tuxáua again in 1978. This was a brief condition, however: shortly thereafter, José gathered his full

brother Pedro and his classificatory uncle/nephew Võpa, and built his own *shovo*. “I went towards the Igarapé Veado and I raised (Pg. *montei*) my own *shovo*”, he said. With the departure of Aurélio to the FUNAI post, José’s *shovo* became the furthest upstream any Marubo lived on the Curuçá. There, he was joined by the Varináwavo brothers and their mother Yaka to form the avuncular *shovo* described in Chapter Four. This *shovo* would undergo schism c. 1994, but was stable in its avuncular form for at least 15 years (1979-1994).

We are now in a position to understand the sequence of moves that led to the creation of Aldeia Maronal, the largest Marubo village in 1997. By 1980, the arrangement of the Marubo population had changed considerably since Melatti’s first visit of 1974-75. On the upper Curuçá was José Barbosa’s *shovo*, where he lived with some and eventually all the four Varináwavo brothers. A little further down was the settlement of Sinãpa, which would eventually become a substantial avuncular *shovo* including Sinãpa’s brother and three ‘nephews’. At the mouth of the Maronal was Ivãpa’s settlement, where Ivãpa was in 1974 and still was when I left in 1998. Finally, some way downstream and on the opposite side from Ivãpa was the *shovo* where Carlos, Wanõpa and Misael lived, the remnants of *shovo* 10 in Figure 5.1. There were thus four settlements already on the Curuçá by the time Alfredo moved there out of the headwaters. Alfredo’s move was not hasty, but carefully considered for maximum advantage. He declined to move immediately, and he declined to move to the FUNAI post. He saw the advantage of being located on a navigable river, however, and decided to move. He spent a considerable amount of time scouting locations before finding a satisfactory one a short distance up-and across-stream from Ivãpa’s. Alfredo built small tapiris, and cut and

planted new swiddens. At that time only Joãozinho was with him. Together with Joãozinho, Alfredo raised his first *shovo*. His father, along with a number of his brothers (Miguel, Zacarias, the Iskonáwavo, and the Rovonáwavo) remained at the headwaters. They had a relatively new *shovo* there, with fruit trees just beginning to produce abundantly, and so had little incentive to move. Furthermore, it was well known that the blackfly populations were much higher by the main rivers than in the deep interior. Blackflies are horrendously noxious animals which constitute severe barriers to the enjoyment of life, so it is no surprise that a strong incentive should be required to move to an area where there are a lot of them (in fact, Aldeia Maronal as a whole has far fewer blackflies than Aldeia São Sebastião, further downstream, does; but the upper courses of the Igarapés are virtually devoid of them). Alfredo consciously strategized to create such incentives.

Once Alfredo was established on the Curuçá River, with a complete *shovo*, productive swiddens, and growing fruit trees, the rest of the Igarapé Maronal population moved down to join him. He was first joined by Miguel and by his full brother Zacarias. Finally, he convinced his father João Tuxáua to join him, and his remaining patrilateral Iskonáwavo and Rovonáwavo brothers followed. The next residential events were recorded in three separate interviews with Alfredo, during which he fused details of actual events with discourses on ideal patterns of *shovo* development. Alfredo said that as more and more people arrived or were born, he made a larger *shovo*—the ten-post *shovo* he currently lives in, largest in Marubo land. The most probable dates of occurrence for this event are 1984-1987. Alfredo said that as his brothers had children, and their children had children, his patrilateral brothers—the Iskonáwavo and

Rovonáwavo—built a second, smaller *shovo* some fifteen meters from the larger one, with Vasho as the *shovo ivo*. The most probable dates of occurrence for this event are 1990-1992. The elderly João Tuxáua lived in the smaller *shovo*, while the larger *shovo* became the domain of Alfredo, Zacarias, Joãozinho and Miguel.

To Alfredo, the process of growth and fission experienced by his *shovo* was close to his perception of the ideal pattern. Alfredo spoke often in abstract terms, of what a “Tuxáua” should do, or what a “*shovo*” should be like. On one occasion, he told me that a *shovo* starts small because there are few children. As time passes, a new *shovo* is built because a lot of children are born and more space is needed. Finally, as the children marry and produce children of their own, the *shovo* reaches its apogee. At this point, a new *shovo* will hive off from the first.

To better illustrate the significance of Alfredo’s statements on *shovo* development, I will briefly compare Rivière’s (1984) observations on the causes of schism in Guiana. The schism of Vasho’s *shovo* from Alfredo’s was, in Alfredo’s perception, normative, whereas among the Trio as observed by Rivière schism is the result of a deviation of reality from the unachievable ideal. The differences between the Marubo situation and that of the Trio are in the social links used to build up the residential unit to the point where it grows too large and hives off another unit. In Guiana, that social link is the in-marrying son-in-law. According to Rivière, the ideal Trio residential unit is formed by cohabitation of sibling sets on the zero-generation, followed by cross-cousin marriage on the first descending, second descending, etc. generations, forming a settlement where all coresidents are also kin. When the proportions of males to females in some generation are inadequate to satisfy the

requirements of the ideal, an in-marrier is used to fill the social space. An in-marrier who is not kin is, politically, a weak link. The accumulation of these weak links causes schism in Guiana. In the process described by Alfredo, however, it is the accumulation of *strong* links which leads to schism. It is not due to conflict or lack of political cohesion that this normative schism takes place. The determinative factor seems to be instead physical crampedness.

The social links used to build up most *shovo* at Maronal, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, are agnatic. The key links that constitute a *shovo* are those among brothers and between brothers and sons. Over 90% of marriages are virilocal, fitting with the requirements of perpetuating and expanding an agnatic *shovo*. Vasho's move to a location immediately adjacent to Alfredo's did not create separate villages, but rather a strong two-*shovo* residential unit based on the agnatic bonds that predominate as 'social glue' at Aldeia Maronal. Marubo *shovo* schism, does not, therefore, necessarily mean the breakup of a village; on the contrary, it can be a viable means for its expansion. A *shovo* with a politically cohesive agnatic composition can undergo schism if its physical size is insufficient to comfortably harbor all of its personnel. Since the schism is based on an overflow of strong, socially centripetal bonds, after the schism the links remain strong. With the *shovo* immediately adjacent to one another, strong demographic growth and successful virilocality, combined with agricultural productivity make the new two-*shovo* settlement seem successful to other Marubo. The schism is not at all, in this case, a sign of failure.

Alfredo, uniquely, applied his vision of ideal schism to explaining the Marubo move to the Ituí in the 1960s. Other informants blamed the move on the fear brought

on by clashes with the Mayoruna, or on the incident in which two young men attempted the use of a poison device. Alfredo, however, said simply: “as the *shovo* on the Igarapé Maronal grew, a lot of people dispersed to the Ituí”. Alfredo thus attributed the Ituí move to the same process of growth and fission he describes for his own *shovo*, and which he seems to regard as the ideal cycle. A corollary concept to be derived from this analysis is that Alfredo does not see schism associated with the *shovo* developmental cycle as a problem. In fact, the *shovo*-owner has by then firmly established an irrevocable reciprocity with the brother, son, and/or brother’s sons who depart, so that the dispersion *spreads* his authority rather than undermining it. This principle will be invoked again to explain the condition of Wanõpa’s four-*shovo* circuit of authority, below.

By 1990, Alfredo was established in the spot that would become the core of Aldeia Maronal. There were two *shovo* in that spot—his and his patri-brother Vasho’s. In addition there were two pre-existing *shovo* downstream—Wanõpa’s and Ivãpa’s. And there were two pre-existing *shovo* upstream—Sinãpa’s and José Barbosa’s. There were two core *shovo* and four peripheral *shovo*. By 1998, however, there were four core *shovo* and eight peripheral *shovo*. This indicates that once established in his new settlement, Alfredo worked to expand it. The crucial projects Alfredo engaged in to render his settlement attractive were the airstrip and the electric generator. These projects are explained in greater detail in Chapter Six, while the organization of labor is left to Chapter Seven. What interests us here is how the airstrip played into the decisions people made to move towards Alfredo’s village.

Two major movements took place in 1993-94. Wanõpa moved from his *shovo* an hour’s walk downstream to one much more closely adjacent to Alfredo. Simultaneously,

José Barbosa abandoned his *shovo* on the far upper Curuçá to move to a new *shovo* less than two hundred meters from Alfredo's. Both of these moves followed direct invitations. In the case of Wanõpa, several informants explained that the aged João Tuxáua went directly to Wanõpa and invited him to move to the new location. By this time, the airstrip was built and the missionaries had established a health care system, including the first consistent malaria treatment available on the upper Curuçá. The details of Wanõpa's move, including the internal social dynamics of his *shovo* which contributed to the final outcome, will be discussed below. The presence of immediate health care for himself and for his aging brother Misael (d. 1999), who suffered from chronic obstructive airways disorder, must have been a strong influence. The result was that Wanõpa moved from his old location near the *shovo* marked #8 on Figure 5.3 to a new location, marked #5 on Figure 5.3. His new location was still peripheral, but he was nevertheless considered to have moved "to Alfredo's village". As a result, he abandoned his claim to being founder of an independent settlement, and instead moved to a settlement founded by another. As will be shown in Chapter Six, since the founder of a settlement is also the "owner", Wanõpa's move gave him a reduced ability to influence outcomes in the field of relationships to non-indigenous people.

Alfredo's brother José moved to Aldeia Maronal at the same time as Wanõpa. According to Alfredo's son Txanõpa, the building of the airstrip was, at least in part, a strategy to attract his brother to move downstream. Txanõpa explained that Alfredo thought, "if I build an airstrip, they will come". He invited José first to work on the airstrip; José and his coresidents contributed their labor to that project. Once the airstrip was built, he invited the missionaries to Aldeia Maronal. Once the missionaries were

established, he invited José to move downstream. The occasion for this was the illness of José's brother's wife.

José's brother Pedro is an essential component of José's coresident group. José explained to me that "my brother and I have always been together. When I started my first *shovo*, he came with me. He may go wandering alone for some time, but we always walk together (Pg. *andamos juntos*)". José and Pedro are models of the agnatic coresident relation I dubbed "brother-companions". Pedro's wife Nāke had a chronic ailment which, while undiagnosed, seemed to be a form arthritic rheumatism which came and went in severe and debilitating attacks. Mild attacks were treated by the healers available within José's *shovo*—Pedro, Võpa and José himself. More severe attacks resulted in invitations to healers to come provide their assistance. On one such occasion, Alfredo was invited to assist in healing at José's *shovo*. It was that moment that Alfredo chose to invite his brother to move downstream. Txanõpa explained thus: "Because spread out it is difficult. When a person has an accident, it is difficult to get to them. That is why my father invited his brothers to live with him. Here [at the current site near the airstrip], it is easy when there is an accident to go look for them suddenly. Now we are together with our kin here". Alfredo explained that he invited José to move downstream by saying that the distance from the airstrip made it dangerous in cases of illness and injury. He says that he had already had to walk up to José's *shovo* to assist in healing rituals several times, and each time it took a full day's walk, and he had to spend the night. He told his brother that it was much better for him to be close where everybody could come help quickly. Alfredo's arguments to José thus focused on the superior conditions of health care available thanks to the mission. However, part of the

argumentation was related to indigenous healing: a concentration of healers was beginning to form around Alfredo's *shovo*, and so Alfredo's location was convenient not just for missionary health care, but for traditional indigenous health care as well. José agreed to move. The move took place in 1993-94, and his new *shovo* was completed in 1994. According to José, his *shovo* and Wanõpa's *shovo* were under construction simultaneously, with Wanõpa's completed slightly before José's.

Both Wanõpa's and José's moves resulted in fission of their *shovo*. In José's case, as explained above, the Varináwavo stayed behind. In Wanõpa's case, several sons, a brother's son, and a wife stayed behind, as will be explained below. At any rate, the result was an increase in the total number of *shovo*. By 1994 three core and five peripheral *shovo* existed on the upper Curuçá.

Once José and Wanõpa were successfully invited to live near Alfredo, the site took on a centripetal impetus of its own. As explained above, Aurélio's son moved upstream from the middle Curuçá; his father followed, and together they built a *shovo*, the fourth in the Maronal core. After this, two of Wanõpa's sons-in-law built peripheral *shovo*. These are Pekõpa, who built *shovo* number 7 in Figure 5.3; and Nakwa, who built *shovo* number 6 in Figure 5.3. Pekõpa built his *shovo* first, in 1996; Nakwa built his *shovo* in 1997. Meanwhile, the Varináwavo brothers were still living in José's old *shovo* on the far upper Curuçá. The Varináwavo had affinal links to Alfredo's *shovo*: two were his sons-in-law, one his brother-in-law, the last his brother Miguel's son-in-law. The *de facto* Varináwavo leader, Mayãpa, moved to a tapiri adjacent to Alfredo's *shovo*, chose a new *shovo* site (number 10, Figure 5.3), and worked with his own labor force as well as Alfredo and his brothers and sons to build the new residence. This new *shovo* was

completed in October 1997. Finally, Wasinawa built his *shovo*, fissioning off from Sinãpa's *shovo*, as explained above. Wasinawa completed his new residence , marked number 11 on Figure 5.3, in November 1997. Wasinawa's fission was the last step in the formation of Aldeia Maronal as I observed it: twelve *shovo* with 220 people, the largest Marubo village.

The series of residential movements which ended with the formation of Aldeia Maronal are notably different from those noted for the *shovo* of Aurélio and Domingo, above. This is particularly so from the perspective taken here, namely that of the role of the settlement leader in guiding group movements. The previous examples showed that the group leader had minimal impact in guiding group movements. Uterine families and separate individuals render their own decisions on residence, independently of the individual who occupies the structural position of leadership. This sets the Marubo data in contradiction to Clastres' interpretive framework, which requires that the leader have superior ability to judge the relative advantages of different options for residential movement, and requires that the group *perceive* the leader as having greater skill in rendering such judgments. In the Marubo case, individuals and subgroups who disagree with the leader's judgment trust their own opinions and make their own decisions—at least in the cases of the *shovo* of Aurélio and of Domingo. But in the case of Alfredo, we get the opposite—very strong leadership in the field of residential movements, wherein a settlement leader (Alfredo) directs the motions of his own group, and also accretes other groups into his, creating a large settlement by processes of fusion.

The data show that Alfredo actively solicited personnel from outside of his residential group to relocate within his settlement area. This is a fundamental datum

suggesting the existence of a political economy of people (Rivière 1984). In Rivière's interpretation, among indigenous Amazonians social networks may be considered the equivalent of monetary wealth in the sense of being something that allows you to get other things. The Marubo do have money, but very little of it. In that money-scarce environment, there is no realistic possibility of obtaining enough money to buy food, shelter, and other requirements of health, survival and well-being. It is human labor that produces these values, and there is not enough money to hire that labor, so the labor force must be produced socially and biologically. It is in this sense that we may describe Alfredo's interactions with non-indigenous people (see Chapter Six) as means of production of the social network. Both cases of accepted invitation in these data were evidently influenced by Alfredo's successful attraction of a health care facility to the upper Curuçá.

In Alfredo's invitation to his brother José to move, the main argument was quicker access to health care (albeit indigenous as well as non-indigenous health care). Alfredo's son confirmed to me that Alfredo believed that construction of an airstrip, followed by establishment of a health care facility run by missionaries, would bring Alfredo's scattered brothers to settle in the village he had established. In the case of Alfredo's father's invitation to Wanõpa to move, access to health care as a motivation was not stated by informants, but must objectively be considered a factor. The only reason informants gave was "João Tuxáua invited him, so he went". But Wanõpa's *shovo* housed three of the oldest people on the upper Curuçá, all of them suffering from different chronic ailments. Access to health care is a likely factor in Wanõpa's decision

to move. The basis for these two invitations to move was the previous construction of the airstrip, organized and directed by Alfredo.

The actions that assisted Alfredo in creating centripetal attraction were:

- (1) construction of the airstrip;
- (2) arrival of the mission, providing:
 - (a) education;
 - (b) health care; and
 - (c) emergency evacuation capacity;
- (3) cutting and selling logs to trade for an electric generator;
- (4) getting a television and satellite dish from an Italian film crew in return for access to his village;
- (5) getting the FUNAI post moved upstream to his village;
- (6) securing beneficial FUNAI *chefes de posto*;
- (7) establishing a generator-driven electric light system.

Alfredo explicitly connected his community improvement projects with the notion of rendering his village attractive to others. In a conversation in January 1998, he explained that he wanted to hold a reunion of elders and politically active youth to plan a project to obtain a saw for cutting boards from logs. He said by selling boards they would make enough money for a bulldozer or a tractor. With that, they would cut nice roads between the *shovo*. Then, Alfredo concluded, the youth can get motorcycles to play with if they want. In another conversation in June 1998, Alfredo told me he wanted to obtain a loudspeaker and amplifier (a public address system), so he could set it up to play tapes of traditional myths and shamanic singing. He said he wanted his place to be

like a city, having everything. Then, Alfredo said, the people who came from the Ituí River to visit would look and say, 'I want to live here'.

It should be clear from this that the keystone of Alfredo's efforts to render his settlement attractive to others was his ability to organize labor for large-scale communal projects. This ability will be analyzed in a subsequent chapter. It is necessary here to examine a hypothesis Alfredo himself proposed to explain his ability to organize labor: the denseness of settlement. Alfredo said that on the Ituí River, everybody is spread out, no one works together, and nothing gets done. Here at Maronal, he said, we have a 25 h.p. outboard motor, a generator, an airfield, and we will have a board-cutting saw. Everybody lives close together, Alfredo said, and thus they work together and get a lot done. In fact, Alfredo's hypothesis cannot be accepted. The distance from Aldeia Alegria to Aldeia Liberdade, on the upper Ituí, is approximately equivalent to that between the most downstream and most upstream *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal. In that space on the upper Ituí are nine *shovo* with 297 people, whereas in an equivalent area of the upper Curuçá are twelve *shovo* with 220 people. The difference is not in concentration or density, but rather the political atomization of the Ituí, where there is no recognized multiple-*shovo* leadership, nor any regular multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor. Explanations for these differences between Ituí and Curuçá must await subsequent chapters. Here it is sufficient to note that Alfredo can engage in large-scale community projects unavailable to other villages; and the results of his ability to command labor are such as to make his village look appealing and cause visitors to wish they lived there.

These observations on Alfredo's methods for attracting coresidents are necessary if we are to understand why Alfredo is the one leader in the cases thus far examined

whose actions result in residential fusion instead of fission. The *shovo* of Aurélio and of Domingo split up as each social sub-group took its own path. At first, the departure of Alfredo from João Tuxáua's *shovo* must have seemed to be an example of the same pattern. Instead, Alfredo deployed an effective, conscious strategy to attract others to live near him. Over time, the strategy worked. Alfredo thus became much like his father in gathering up scattered Marubo to live together in a single place, arguing that greater health and prosperity for all would result.

To conclude this analysis of how João Tuxáua's headwaters village became Alfredo's Aldeia Maronal, and of what this tells us about Marubo motivations for moving, it is necessary to compare and contrast the attitudes towards moving of Alfredo and of his brother José, in order to resolve an apparent contradiction between their statements and the observations. According to the view expressed by Alfredo as 'normative', a *shovo* fissions due to over-accumulation of strong social links. The immediate cause of the fission is physical crampedness, and the division spreads rather than diminishing the leader's range of authority. The village expands. This motive—physical crampedness—was also a motive in the fission of Wasinawa from Sināpa's *shovo*, though a political aspect related to exclusion from the line of political authority, and a social aspect related to the *shovo ivo*'s not marrying his daughter to his sister's son, were also involved. But a second motive for moving was expressed at different times by both Alfredo and José, and by José depicted as normative: the desire for independence.

Recall that Alfredo, explaining his reasons for founding Aldeia Maronal, said that he wanted to move to the Curuçá River, but not to the FUNAI post, nor to Ivāpa's settlement. He wanted *his own* spot (Pg. *meu lugar*). José, likewise, after marrying left

his father's *shovo* for Joãozinho's, then left Joãozinho's for his father-in-law's, then returned briefly to his father's, before finally constructing his own *shovo*, where he would live for the next fifteen years. There was a marked desire for independence in this process: in José's words, living with his father "*não presta*", it just won't work. He, too, needed his own place, and built it. On the occasion of a marriage in 1998, José expressed a normative picture of social action encompassing and justifying his own path in life. The son of Ituí *shovo ivo* Paulino had come to Aldeia Maronal to request one of José and Alfredo's patrilateral sisters in marriage. The formal request for marriage involves an assembly of elders. In the process of considering the request and, after its approval, in the process of advising the groom, the elders produce discourses on the proper behavior for the young man to engage in. On this occasion, José said that when a young man marries, he should found a new residence. First, he should cut a large swidden; then, build a *shovo*; finally, throw a large feast at which he invites all those he formerly lived with. This, indeed, is the path José took, but it is a path rarely taken. This creates a contradiction between a statement of norms and the observed reality.

José argued that a man should build his own *shovo* upon marriage, and expressed a personal desire for his own place. Alfredo also expressed this desire for his own place. Yet a look at Alfredo's *shovo* composition tells us that most do not pursue this route. Alfredo's coresident brother Zacarias had two married sons, one aged 36 with five children as old as 15, the other aged 33 with three children as old as 12. Alfredo's oldest son, age 30, was married, with two children; one other son of Alfredo had recently married. A 29 year-old son of Alfredo's brother Miguel was also married, with two children, the elder seven years of age. All of these married men lived patrilocally, years

after marriage. Such examples are very common in the census data, and indeed the agnatic character of Aldeia Maronal, as described in Chapter Four, would be hard to imagine if postmarital neolocality were a frequent practice. But why is neolocality appealing enough to be stated by an elder as an ideal, and if it is appealing why is it rare?

Two reasons why neolocality is appealing may be considered, the first negative, the second positive. From a negative standpoint, discontent with the *shovo ivo*'s authority may lead to a desire for neolocality. The role of *shovo ivo*, when performed normatively, involves frequent words of moral teaching, direction of labor patterns, and a general guardianship over the *shovo* residents' behavior which may interfere with the desires of a resident, particularly a recently-married polygynous young man with a strong will, as José was. The irritability caused by the *shovo ivo*'s authority is very variable, however, and depends on the *shovo ivo*'s personal style and his wards' characters; the presence of such irritation is always a possibility but never a essential structural feature. The opposite is often the case: a *shovo ivo* is well liked because his actions lead to well-being for all his coresidents. Nevertheless, when such irritation exists, it is a source of desire for residential change.

From a positive standpoint, desire to be a *shovo ivo* can also be conducive to neolocality. I have heard a *shovo*-owning elder disparage another elder by saying "he doesn't even have his own *shovo*", in a context of discussing whether that other elder should legitimately be accepted as an elder. To have one's own *shovo* is tantamount to inclusion in the community of respected elders, if not immediately, certainly as the *shovo ivo* ages.

If neolocality has a certain appeal, we must explain why it is not more frequently pursued. Our sample cases of neolocality—José and (albeit not immediately postmarital) Alfredo—are success stories. Both are independent, successful elders according to most criteria internal to the Marubo way of evaluating successful leadership, as well as according to objective demographic and economic indicators. We might expect to see their example followed. But none of the married sons of Alfredo or of his brothers have pursued neolocality (as of July 1998). The simplest explanation for this is that the task of constructing new residence is daunting. Young men who marry virilocally do tend to cut new swiddens as soon as possible, so as to become full contributors from an economic standpoint. But cutting a swidden is less complicated than building a *shovo*. *Shovo*-building demands substantial labor input, often for six months or even longer, and it demands considerable powers of organization of labor, as well as the ability to maintain essential survival activities—agriculture and hunting—while the building proceeds. It also, ultimately, brings total responsibility for one's own subsistence. The *shovo* any given young man grows up with, particularly if it is, as most are, more than a single nuclear family he resides with, operates economically as a food-pooling system. Since every married couple works to produce enough food for themselves at least, and every social-compostion sub-component is expected to contribute to every meal, any given married person's deficiencies at any given moment are covered by others' success. When one is *shovo ivo* alone, however, no food means no food. My hypothesis to explain the rarity of neolocality despite its appeal is that the labor required is intensive, and the abilities required for a new *shovo ivo* to succeed are highly demanding (for similar hypothesis concerning Mundurucú, see Murphy [1960]). It is easier in most cases to

remain in the residential group one is raised in. The desire for independence is then expressed in building a new tapiri on the outskirts of the patio surrounding the *shovo*, as Alfredo's brothers' sons have done; but not in building a new *shovo*.

Superficially, Alfredo's actions resemble those of a formulaic Clastrean leader more than do those of Aurélio or Domingo. In actuality, there is a subtle but important difference. Part of the role of Marubo *shovo ivo* is to organize the labor of his coresidents in a way conducive to the presence of full stomachs and good health, phenomena which are explicitly connected in Marubo thought and action. It is this ability of Alfredo's—organization of labor conducive to health of coresidents—which has enabled him to attract coresidents. He did not *direct* the residential movements of the people I observed living in Aldeia Maronal. He moved on his own, then attracted others by issuing invitations. But in between his movement and the invitations was the exercise of skilfull organization of labor, which rendered his invitations potent and the movements that resulted, permanent. The key ability in explaining observed phenomena in this case is not the leader's ability to determine group movements for maximal survival value. It is the leader's ability to organize labor for maximal prosperity. The leader's ability to organize labor causes others to make independent decisions to move in the same direction as the leader. But the leader does not actually direct the group's movements.

iv. *Shovo of Carlos & Misael*

In 1974-75, Melatti recorded a *shovo* adjacent to that of Domingo, on the Igarapé Surubim. In his manuscript census data, Melatti records the *shovo ivo* as Carlos; in his

later published data (Melatti 1977), he records Misael as the *shovo ivo*. It is likely that this *shovo* was in a process of political succession. This *shovo* was also in a process of transition from avuncular/uxorilocal to agnatic composition. The *shovo*'s founding core are Carlos, his wives, and his sister's sons, who are married to his daughters. But Carlos was an ageing widower by 1975; the demographic expansion of the *shovo* was due to the actions of his daughters and sister's sons. It has been noted that in *shovo* of uxorilocal composition, the political leadership of the *shovo* passes from the *shovo ivo* to his son-in-law. Carlos' *shovo* is no exception: political leadership passed on to his sister's son (and daughter's husband) Misael. By 1998, even Misael had grown too old for effective leadership--his brother Wanõpa was *shovo ivo*. The social composition of the *shovo* in 1974 is shown in Figure 5.13.

The 1998 census revealed that the core of Carlos' 1974 *shovo* remained close together, albeit in multiple *shovo*. Carlos was by then the oldest living man at Aldeia Maronal. He suffered from bouts of dissociation and was long retired from active leadership. Misael and Wanõpa still lived together. Misael was suffering from chronic obstructive airways disorder, and also retired from active leadership. Misael's younger half-brother Wanõpa, however, was an active and effective leader. He and Misael lived in a small *shovo* near the mission compound. A set of their sons lived a 45-minute walk downstream. One of Wanõpa's sons-in-law had a small *shovo* about ten minutes' walk from Wanõpa. A second son-in-law finished a *shovo* in 1998, just a few hundred yards from Wanõpa. There were thus four *shovo* that could be considered descendent from Carlos' 1974 *shovo*. These four *shovo* constituted a distinct social entity within Aldeia Maronal. Wanõpa clearly and actively endeavored to exercise leadership over all four


shovo; even when he did not empirically succeed, his claim to leadership over these four *shovo* was not in dispute. I called these four *shovo* ‘Wanõpa’s circuit’. The centrality of Wanõpa in these four *shovo* could be seen in the investment of labor in path-cutting. From the three subsidiary *shovo*, excellent paths, frequently used, led to Wanõpa’s *shovo*, while only overgrown and seldom-used paths led directly to Alfredo’s. Wanõpa’s circuit may be seen as a unique case of embedded multiple-*shovo* leadership. Alfredo was headman over all twelve Maronal *shovo*, but Wanõpa had, within that sphere, authority over four *shovo*.

The first residential movement-event to be explained in this case is the departure from the locale recorded in 1974. On 10 August 1997, I asked Misael through an interpreter about the causes of this movement. Misael replied that the decision to move was made in response to the arrival (Pg. word *surgiu*, ‘emerged’) of FUNAI in the area. When FUNAI first ‘discovered’ the Marubo, they made a post on the Igarapé São Salvador. FUNAI told the Marubo they had to gather at the post, that living at the post would be better. However, not all agreed with this. Wanõpa’s father Domingo, along with Wanõpa’s patrilateral brother Cassimiro, moved downstream, but Wanõpa and Misael did not. They thought it very difficult to move since the post was far away and they lacked adequate transportation. They first moved to where Vicente (Ivãpa) lives near the mouth of the Igarapé Maronal. This is where they are recorded as living in Melatti’s 1978 update of his census. However, Misael told me through the interpreter that they felt cramped living in Vicente’s area, and wanted to move to their own land. They wanted their own land and did not want to share a small area with another *shovo* ivo. Hence, Vicente’s was but a temporary stop. From there, they moved about a forty

minutes' walk downstream, and on the opposite (west) shore from Vicente. The *shovo* they built there was still standing in 1998. The walls had deteriorated but it was still used as a storage space. In the late 1980s, a brand new *shovo* was built by Wanõpa and Misael and their coresidents. By 1990, the entire group that had resided at Carlos' *shovo* in 1974 was still substantially intact under Wanõpa's leadership, as both Carlos and Misael were too aged for effective leadership.


In order to understand the division of Wanõpa's 1990 coresident group into four separate *shovo* by 1998, it is necessary to understand the marriages that took place in this group. The central figure in this sense is Carlos. Carlos was kidnapped and raised from infancy by a Peruvian rubber tapper named Heliodoro Vargas. He returned in his youth to Marubo society after Vargas died prematurely. In Figure 5.13., it can be seen that he married three classificatory sisters of Satanáwavo lineage, two of them daughters of the respected elder Domingo. Domingo, in turn, married Carlos' sister, Rami. Rami and Domingo produced Wanõpa. Rami also bore Misael, by another father. Rami, like her brother Carlos, were Iskonáwavo/Shonoískovo; Misael and Wanõpa were thus both Txonavo. On Wanõpa's generation, the Iskonáwavo-Satanáwavo marriages were replicated as Txonavo-Rovonáwavo marriages, in accordance with Kariera-type social ideals (see Chapter Eight). Wanõpa married his mother's brother's daughters, as did Misael.

FIGURE 5.13.: Composition of Carlos' *shovo*, 1974-75




- | | | |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Carlos | 10. Panã | 19. Meke |
| 2. Wanõpa | 11. Sheta | 20. Txana |
| 3. Misael | 12. Nea | 21. Nopewa |
| 4. Tae | 13. Wasishavo | 22. Ako |
| 5. Tsainama | 14. Rami | 23. Wakanáwa |
| 6. Maya | 15. Pashaivo | 24. Vina |
| 7. Vane | 16. Poya | |
| 8. Shonõpeko | 17. Ino | |
| 9. Meto | 18. Peko | |

FIGURE 5.14.: Shovo of Wanõpa, October 1997 (*shovo* no. 5 in Figure 5.3.).




1. Rami
2. Wanõpa
3. Misael
4. Peko (daughter of João Tuxáua)
5. Rao (age 4)
6. Mema (age 6)
7. Shonõpeko (Figure 5.13., no. 8)
8. Ako (Figure 13, #22; full brother of no. 5 in fig. 5.15., below)
9. Mae
10. Meto
11. Paishi (age 16)
12. Isãtapa (age 12)
13. Vote (age 9)
14. Peko (age 8)
15. Txuma (b. 8 July 1997)

FIGURE 5.15.: Shovo of Mashēpa, October 1997 (shovo no. 8 in Figure 5.3.)




1. Carlos
2. Wanōpa
3. Misael
4. Maya (fig. 5.13., no. 6)
5. Mashēpa (brother of fig. 5.13., no. 22)
6. Txana (fig. 5.13., no. 20)
7. Poya (fig. 5.13., no. 16)
8. Topa
9. Vó
10. Mashēwa
11. Meto
12. Vōko
13. Iove
14. Mashe
15. infant
16. Tae

FIGURE 5.16.: Shovo belonging to Nakwa, January 1998 (*shovo* no. 6 in Figure 5.3.)



1. Carlos
2. Wanõpa
3. Wanõewa (sister of nos. 6 and 7, Figure 5.13.)
4. Sheta (no. 11 in Figure 5.13.)
5. Pashaivo (no. 15 in Figure 5.13.)
6. Nakwa (Mayoruna FUNAI worker)
7. Tae (age 14)
8. Shavonawa (age 11)
9. Vasi (age 8)
10. Peko (age 7)
11. Shoi (age 2)
12. Nea (no. 12 in Figure 5.13.)

FIGURE 5.17.: Shovo belonging to Pekōpa, December 1997 (*shovo* no. 7 in Figure 5.3.)



1. Carlos
2. Wanōpa
3. Wano
4. Pekōpa
5. Tamasai
6. Naitsainama
7. Txano
8. Txuma
9. Mashe
10. Kena
11. Meke
12. Mani

Wanõpa and Carlos were in the thick of the clash with Mayoruna in the 1960s, a clash which resulted in the kidnapping of Carlos' oldest daughter, Wanõpa's wife. Carlos was leading a group of men, women, and children on an expedition to gather turtle eggs on the Curuçá River (then devoid of Marubo habitations). Some Mayoruna opened fire on them. Carlos and his group dispersed into the forest. One Marubo boy was shot to death, and two Marubo women captured, including Carlos' daughter Tamasai, teknonymically known as Wanõewa. Wanõewa had already borne three daughters by Wanõpa. For about fifteen years after the clash, Wanõewa lived among Mayoruna. She received Mayoruna facial tattoos and bore a number of children by a Mayoruna father. Meanwhile, the kidnapping elicited Marubo reprisals, Mayoruna counter-reprisals, and Marubo counter-counter-reprisals. Eventually, the army intervened formally from Acre, and there were attacks by informal posses mainly consisting of soldiers from Tabatinga and the Javari border garrisons. The Mayoruna were severely hurt in raids by Marubo and by non-indigenous groups. This chain of events led to their eventual acceptance of FUNAI pacification by the early 1970s. Some time thereafter, Wanõewa left the Mayoruna area and returned to the upper Curuçá. At the time that I met her, she was not living with her old husband Wanõpa; rather she was living with her daughters and son-in-law, in Nakwa's *shovo*.

Due to the clash with Mayoruna, Wanõpa lost his first wife (she would never bear him another child). A second daughter of Carlos and wife of Wanõpa, Vane, died in the early 1980s, after bearing three children to Wanõpa. Thus, Wanõpa was, by the mid-1980s, left with one wife when he had started with three. His remaining wife, Maya, bore a number of daughters and one son. By the late 1980s, it was apparent that Maya's

childbearing years were ending, and Wanõpa sought out new opportunities for marriage. Specifically, according to my informant José Barbosa, he went to see João Tuxáua and requested two of João Tuxáua's youngest daughters in marriage. These were Peko, born in 1973, and Kena, born in 1981. João Tuxáua agreed to give his daughters to Wanõpa. As it turned out, however, Kena refused to cooperate, and her father did not physically coerce her into the marriage. When I met Kena in 1997, she was still living in her mother's *shovo*, and refusing to consummate the marriage to Wanõpa, though Wanõpa explicitly claimed her for his own. It was a *de jure* if not *de facto* marriage. The marriage with Peko, however, did take place. A daughter was born to Peko in 1991, and a son in 1993.

Shortly after giving his daughter to Wanõpa, João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to move his place of residence. I was unable to elicit satisfactory reasons for this move. My informants simply stated that "João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to move, and Wanõpa moved". I was unable to find out what Wanõpa thought or felt at this time. The context for the move is presented in the next chapter, which outlines the efforts made by João Tuxáua's son Alfredo to make his village an attractive place to live. It has been noted in this chapter that at the same time as João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to move, Alfredo invited José Barbosa to move. These invitations were effected only after substantial labor efforts had resulted in the building of an airstrip, which in turn resulted in the installation of the New Tribes Mission, who established a health care system. Access to antimalarials and antibiotics must have been a major impetus for moving. Health care certainly played a role in José's decision to move; in Wanõpa's case, this must have been equally so since both Carlos and Misael were by then in delicate health. At any rate, Wanõpa decided to

move. By 1993 he was constructing a *shovo* less than a kilometer from Alfredo's *shovo*, close to the mission compound. This *shovo* was finished by 1994. However, Wanõpa's move did not include the entirety of his coresidents. Instead, a fission occurred. The nature of the fission may be discerned by comparing on the one hand Figure 13, with on the other hand Figures 14 and 15.

Figure 5.15. essentially represents the people who stayed behind when Wanõpa moved closer to the Maronal core. The relative spatial positions of Wanõpa's old (no. 8) and new (no. 5) *shovo* may be seen in Figure 5.3. The *shovo* that once housed Wanõpa and Misael was, when I arrived in July 1997, under the leadership of a young man named Mashẽpa, a son of Misael. Mashẽpa's *shovo* consisted of the following compositional elements:

- (1) Mashẽpa, his wife and daughter. Mashẽpa is a son of Misael.
- (2) Wanõpa's 'wife' Maya; Maya's daughter Peko, and Peko's out-of-wedlock-infant son, Tae; and Maya's son Poya, married to Alfredo's brother's son's daughter, with one daughter.
- (3) Wanõpa's son by his deceased wife Vane, Txana; and Txana's wife, the sister of Mashẽpa's wife.
- (4) The mother-in-law of Txana and Mashẽpa, Meto, whose activities are described in the section on anicular residence in Chapter Four. Meto has with her two children by another marriage.

Mashẽpa's *shovo* thus consists in part at least of three married adult men, all three active hunters and workers. There are a total of fourteen people. Note that the three men, who constitute a formidable economic production unit, are all sons of Wanõpa and of

Misael. In contrast, at Wanõpa's *shovo* upstream, there is a dearth of working adult males. The only male adults at Wanõpa's *shovo* are Misael and Wanõpa, who are both very old and economically unproductive, and Mashëpa's brother Ako. This latter is really the only active hunter at Wanõpa's, and he is not reckoned as good as his younger brother.

My inquiries into the relations between these *shovo* yielded first the datum that the *shovo* where Mashëpa then (7/97) lived was built by Wanõpa and Misael, but that when Wanõpa moved, Mashëpa and his brothers declined to move along with him. Although he was the *shovo ivo*, Mashëpa had not constructed that *shovo*. He had merely decided to stay behind when the former *shovo ivo* decided to move. I asked why they had decided not to move, and was told first that it was because meat was hunted out closer to the Maronal core. Food procurement was easier from the older, more remote location. This was quite true: the large population and long time of settlement of the Maronal core had created a situation where long walks or trips by motorboat were required to find meat. From a remoter base, travel time to game-rich zones is reduced. This is thus a very plausible reason for staying behind.

Despite the explanation, I continued to wonder about this fission. If Wanõpa had been able to move all his personnel with him, he would have a *shovo* of some thirty people including four married adult sons, several daughters, and of course, two wives. But far from considering a move to be with his father, Mashëpa initiated, in November 1997, the construction of a new *shovo*, completed by April 1998. This *shovo* was even further downstream, cementing further the independence he had gained through the original fission from his father and father's brother.

In order to better understand the fission, I focused on understanding the dispersal of Wanōpa's wives. Although he had three living wives, Wanōpa had only one coresident wife—his youngest. I asked José Barbosa, himself a successful polygynist, why Wanōpa's wives were dispersed. His answer: "Wanōpa does not know how to treat a woman". I asked for an explanation. José answered: "A woman wants to be with her man, but Wanōpa only wants to be with his youngest wife". José's implication was clear: to be a successful polygynist, one could not neglect the older wives, or this would cause marital discord. I observed at least two cases of frustrated polygyny, including one in which the elder wife became extremely distraught and even threatening at the prospect of a second wife's arrival. Maya's response to Wanōpa's marriage to a younger woman is thus readily understandable. Maya was 48 at the time of my fieldwork; Wanōpa's junior wife Peko was 24. Such a new marriage by Wanōpa would have had to be handled delicately with respect to keeping his older wife happy. In the event, there was some slight flaw in Wanōpa's strategy, and Maya refused to come along when Wanōpa moved. Maya's agency in the fission is undeniable. Although Figure 5.15. shows only one son and one daughter of Maya's, at various times each of three other daughters of Maya lived there. José's explanation can also account for the elderly Wanōewa's refusal to live with Wanōpa.

The fission that took place when Wanōpa moved thus has a dual explanation. On the one hand, the young Satanawavo brothers were reluctant to move to an area they knew to be hunted out. On the other hand, Maya saw an opportunity to distance herself from a marriage in which she was no longer the main object of attention for her husband. At some moment subsequent to the fission, Mashēpa and his brother were joined by their

mother-in-law Meto, along with another two of her children. The resulting *shovo* presents excellent evidence for the agency of women in Marubo social composition. Although superficially agnatic in composition, the formation of this social configuration has as much to do with the two elder women's actions as it does the three young men's. The phenomenon of female agency in social composition is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, where it is termed 'anicular' social composition, because of the centrality of older women (Lat. *aniculus*) in this type of social formation.

It remains to be evaluated whether, according to indigenous standards, the fission was a sign of unsuccessful leadership strategy. José's comments would suggest that according to indigenous standards, it would have been better for Wanõpa to keep all his wives together with him. From the point of view of meat procurement, another high indigenous value, Wanõpa's *shovo* was less productive than it would have been if the fission had not occurred. But the way in which Wanõpa *did* procure meat provides a clue to an alternative explanation, one consistent with Alfredo's normative concepts of beneficial fission, described above and represented by the fission of Vasho's *shovo* from Alfredo's.

To understand Wanõpa's meat procurement strategy, it is necessary to present the final two elements in Wanõpa's four-*shovo* circuit—his sons-in-law Nakwa and Pekõpa. Nakwa, discussed in detail in Chapter Six, is a Mayoruna man, a FUNAI manual worker, 58 years old at the time of my arrival, but in amazing physical condition. Nakwa was a relentless and intense worker, single-handedly a force of economic production. In addition, his access to FUNAI boats and motors, and his salary and consequent ability to buy gasoline, allowed him to travel further than others for hunting purposes. This was

particularly useful when chasing the more distant peccary herds, which sometimes only Nakwa could get to.

Nakwa was married to Wanõpa's daughter Sheta. Sheta can be seen in Figure 5.13 as number 11. Sheta (age in 1997: 44 years) was, in 1974, married in the Kariera style to her father's sister's son. With this man she had a son, Nea. The relationship was then broken, for what specific reason I do not know. Some time later, Nakwa arrived in the upper Curuçá as FUNAI employee. He married Sheta. Their first son was born in 1983. Nakwa lived adjacent to his father-in-law until the latter's move upstream. For a time, his relations with Wanõpa were rocky—unsurprising since Wanõpa had once sworn to kill any Mayoruna who came near him (recall Wanõpa's central position in the Mayoruna-Marubo clash of 1964). After Wanõpa's move, Nakwa lived in a small hut near the upper-Curuçá FUNAI post. In 1997, he initiated construction of his own *shovo*, which was finished by September 1997. Nakwa's *shovo* was a short few hundred yards from Wanõpa's.

Pekõpa is one of the half-brothers of Miguel mentioned earlier in the chapter. In Figure 12, he is shown as number 238 according to Melatti's numbering. His stated birthdate is 1959. In 1974 he was unmarried. By 1979, he was married to Wanõpa's daughter Wano. Between 1979 and 1994 Pekõpa and Wano had six children. Pekõpa did not follow any of his brothers, at least one of whom moved downstream to the Igaporé São Salvador FUNAI post, while another moved with Alfredo. I did not find out specifically where Pekõpa lived during this time (1979-1994), but since (a) his brothers dispersed, (b) around the time of said dispersal, he married Wanõpa's daughter, and (c), he had, when I observed him, closer relations to Wanõpa than to any of his real or

classificatory brothers, I assume he lived uxorilocally. By the time I arrived in July 1997, however, he had built a new *shovo*. This *shovo*, whose composition is shown in Figure 17, was finished in 1996. It burned accidentally in January 1998. After this painful tragedy, Pekōpa moved in with Nakwa for a time, then went on an extended trip downstream to São Sebastião and Atalaia do Norte, where he still was in July 1998, the end of my fieldwork.

It has been previously stated that Wanōpa's *shovo* had only one active hunter. That *shovo* consisted almost entirely of women, children and old men, and even the sole hunter did not have his own shotgun. However, Nakwa was a very active hunter, and so was his stepson Nea. Pekōpa was an active hunter. And just forty minutes' walk downstream, Mashēpa and Poya were considered among the top hunters of the village, particularly skilled in tracking and killing tapir. Wanōpa actively exploited his position as the ranking elder of all four *shovo* to ensure that he had access meat procured by the three subsidiary *shovo*. The way he did this was by frequent visits and by dispensing words of advice. Wanōpa often walked the distance to his old *shovo*, which he still considered 'his'. There, he engaged in the kind of moral discourse that is the elders' prerogative. In doing so, he reinforced the notions of (a) his rights over the old *shovo* and the area it was in, since he was the founder of that settlement, and (b) the fact that he was still the most respected elder. Wanōpa thus reinforced a social connection that might have otherwise been severed. By regularly reinforcing his role in relation to Mashēpa and his brothers, he ensured that they maintained their sense of obligation to him, and thus that they would send gifts of meat on a regular basis. Similar actions were taken vis-à-vis Pekōpa, whose independence was not allowed to develop too far. But most

important during the time of my fieldwork was the relationship between Nakwa and Wanõpa.

Nakwa, as will be explained in Chapter Six, had a very ambiguous position in Aldeia Maronal. He was a Mayoruna—traditional enemy and cultural inverse of the Marubo—and a FUNAI worker. For both reasons, he was denied a position in the village status system, and was, on the contrary, regularly made the object of efforts to control. He was considered dangerous, and it was not only proper but necessary to contain his influence. Above all, he was not considered to have the ability to discriminate proper from improper behavior, so that it was “necessary” for others to watch that his children be raised with proper indigenous values. For a variety of reasons, Wanõpa made his presence felt at Nakwa’s. Nakwa, in turn, was the top producer of meat in the entire four-*shovo* circuit, due to his access to motor, gasoline and ammunition. All Wanõpa had to do if he had no meat in his own *shovo* was walk a few hundred yards to Nakwa’s, where his own daughters cooked up the results of his son-in-law’s hunting. In fact, despite the lack of prosperous hunting in his own *shovo*, Wanõpa thus had regular access to meat.

We may now continue addressing the question of whether, from an indigenous perspective, Wanõpa’s situation was successful or not. It has been noted that polygyny is valued, and José regarded Wanõpa’s marital status (*de jure* polygyny but *de facto* serial monogamy) to signify less than total success. Meat is also highly valued, and a *shovo* with regular access to meat is certainly considered better than one without. The absence of meat is a sign of poverty or poor leadership. But Wanõpa himself would be unlikely to perceive his situation as one of meatlessness, because he thought of himself as head of four *shovo*, not just of his own, and he had access to a substantial meat catchment. Recall

that Alfredo proposed at one time a theory of fission in which fission expands rather than contracting the range of the leader's authority. The pattern depicted by Alfredo is one of a *shovo* growing steadily by birth and marriages until it is physically cramped, at which point a second *shovo* fissions off, but the social relationships with the new *shovo* remain strong enough that the former leader retains some authority over the newer one.

Wanõpa's *shovo* did not in fact follow this pattern. Prior to Wanõpa's decision to move, his *shovo* had grown to a large size, with excellent potential for further growth due to the presence of young men marrying virilocally and young women giving birth out of wedlock. There were numerous active hunters and workers, and there was Misael and Wanõpa's own high status and excellent reputation as healers and cosmologically knowledgeable people. When Wanõpa moved , he was able to take with him mainly women and children; the economic productivity of his *shovo* was truncated. He himself would not admit that this was a failure, since the situation could be explained as a normative one, in which the division into four *shovo* spread rather than undermined his authority. But the comments of others about polygyny and meat supplies suggest that the fission was not considered a success by others' standards.

There remains to be considered how these data relate to the Clastrean model. Once again, the data suggest that leaders among the Marubo do not determine group movements. The leader does make a decision to move, but the coresidents do not consider the leader to have superior ability in determining group movements. As in the cases of Domingo's and Aurélio's *shovo*, we find disagreement over the correctness of the leader's decision; as a result, each social component of the *shovo* renders its own decision as to the value of the move. In this case, it is startling that the disagreement was

in part precisely over access to hunting grounds. it was clear that Wanõpa's proposed move would result in more difficult access to meat; Wanõpa's sons and brother's sons based their decision to stay behind in part on this, suggesting that they felt themselves to have better ability to determine the survival value of a move than did their socio-structural leader.

v. Aldeia São Sebastião

Aldeia São Sebastião, on the middle Curuçá River, is the third largest Marubo village in terms of population (115), the second largest in terms of number of *shovo* (7). It is a recent settlement, established no earlier than 1994. Aldeia São Sebastião is the result of a movement of people from the site of the former FUNAI post at the Igarapé São Salvador. That site is presently abandoned, all its former inhabitants having established themselves at the new village or at the smaller single-*shovo* site of Tacanal.

I have available less data on this village than on Aldeia Maronal. The extended fieldwork at Maronal allowed me to supplement census data with interviews, detailing the movements of virtually every *shovo*. Data for São Sebastião are less complete. It would also be unnecessary to present such complete data here. Information on villages other than Aldeia Maronal is here presented as a check on the generalizability of Maronal data, rather than as a complete data set in itself.

The origins of Aldeia São Sebastião lie in the establishment of the FUNAI post in the middle Curuçá around 1974. It has been noted in the discussion of Aurélio's *shovo* that the first people to inhabit the FUNAI post were non-indigenous men married to

indigenous women. Santiago Comapa established himself there with his son-in-law Vitor Batalha. Soon, he was joined by Aurélio's sister's sons, Saide and Lauro, and then Sebastião, César, Américo and Wilson. Aurélio himself later joined them. It has also been noted that Domingo and Cassimiro moved down to the FUNAI post. These movements formed the core around which the settlement expanded. Several of the residential units shown in Figure 5.5. are direct descendants of the groups that originally moved to the Igarapé São Salvador. Unit 1, a set of tapiris rather than a *shovo* compound, is the area where Saide lives with his wife and children. *Shovo* 2 belongs to Sebastião (Shetápa), the sister's son of Aurélio. His full brothers César and Américo live in tapiris immediately adjacent to his *shovo*. Sebastião is considered the headman of São Sebastião. Santiago Comapa owns the *shovo* immediately downstream from Sebastião (no. 3 in Figure 5.5.). Domingo died some time ago, but Cassimiro still has a *shovo* on the middle Curuçá, no. 5 in Figure 5.5. Vitor Batalha was killed by Marubo after taking someone else's wife for his own. His widow and children have moved to Atalaia.

Shovo number 6 in Figure 5.5. is the *shovo* of João Aurélio, full brother of Miguel, the disintegration of whose *shovo* is described above. Miguel owned a *shovo* of his own in 1974, adjacent to João Tuxáua's. By 1998, Miguel lived in Alfredo's *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal. One of Miguel's half-brothers, as explained, married Wanópa's daughter Wano, establishing his own *shovo* in 1996. João Aurélio moved, according to informants, to an intermediate location between Maronal and São Salvador by 1984; by 1998 he had his own *shovo*. Details of the context of and motivations for João Aurélio's movements are not available.

Shovo number 7 in Figure 5.5. is the *shovo* of José Rufino. José Rufino's genealogical relations to the rest of the São Salvador settlers are shown in Figure 18. The key event determining the presence of José Rufino at Aldeia São Salvador and later at São Sebastião is the divorce of his mother Rita from his natural father Eliseu. According to José's brother Clóvis, Eliseu left the Curuçá to move to Cruzeiro do Sul. Eliseu settled in the city permanently, where he still lived in 1997. Rita was left husbandless with two sons, José (b. 1959) and Clóvis (b. 1966). Since her full brothers had just moved to the FUNAI post, she moved to join them. It was around that time that she met Antônio Rufino, a non-indigenous logger (at least, he represented himself as 'branco' although he was reputedly half-Tikuna). The role of these events in Clóvis' life and in Marubo history in general is described in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that, as a result of Rita's attachment to Antônio, Clóvis was sent to live with Antônio's sister in Benjamin Constant, went to school, learned Portuguese speech, reading, and writing, and subsequently applied those skills to the foundation of CIVAJA, the political integration of the Javari basin, and the exercise of the role of CIVAJA coordinator. Clóvis' brother José remained somewhat more linked to the interior, and eventually built his own *shovo* at Aldeia São Sebastião.


Shovo numbers 4 and 8 in Figure 5.5. represent movements from the Ituí River to the Curuçá, subsequent to the movement from São Salvador to São Sebastião. Information on the move to São Sebastião is derived from interviews with Clóvis and with Santiago Comapa. On 27 July 1997, Santiago told me that the current site of São Sebastião had been occupied for three years. Clóvis told me it had been occupied for two years. Apparently this represents staggered movement, with different people moving at

different dates. Santiago said that the old location, São Salvador, was downriver some eight hours' travel with a small (3.5 to 5.5 hp) motor. He said that the old site had been occupied for 22 years. When asked why the move, he said that the old site becomes an island surrounded by standing water during the rainy season. This, he said, causes malaria. The new site was on higher ground with better drainage, where standing water does not stay so long. However, when asked the same question, Clóvis answered that the move was due to depletion of nearby swidden areas. Clóvis said that all the areas close to the village had been used up, and with the population growing, the distances being travelled to collect products from the swidden became unacceptable.

On my first visit to São Sebastião on 27-28 July 1997, I noted that all housing had been constructed within the past three years or was under construction. At that time, only three of the *shovo* noted in Figure 5 were finished: those of Santiago Comapa, Cassimiro, and José Rufino. The following were under construction: those of Shetãpa, José Nascimento, and João Aurélio. And one was still in planning: that of Firmino. By April, 1998, the time of my second visit, all seven *shovo* were complete (Saide lived in tapiris).

The information I have about the decision-making process leading to the move from São Salvador to São Sebastião indicates that that movement was not determined by the village leader. The leader at São Salvador had become Shetãpa, eldest of the four brothers who followed Saide and Lauro downstream from Aurélio's (see above). However, Shetãpa had not founded the village at São Salvador. He arrived after Santiago Comapa, the true founder, and after his own classificatory brother Saide. He was appointed leader by general consensus (in the Portuguese of radiograms to FUNAI, 'líder da aldeia'). We have here, then, a situation akin to that envisioned by Clastres in the

FIGURE 5.18.: Some genealogical relationships at Aldeia São Salvador, 1975-1978.



1. Santiago Comapa
2. Iraci (Pg. name)
3. Vitor Batalha
4. Deusina (Pg. name)
5. Aurélio
6. Saiewa
7. Kono
8. Saide
9. Lauro
10. Rita
11. Eliseu
12. José Rufino
13. Clóvis Rufino
14. Domingo

sense that the leader is set up as such by the group, and is thus in some sense held powerless. It is a different situation from that of Alfredo, whose role as village founder affords him a certain amount of power, as Chapter Six will show. Informants stated that the decision to move was not universally accepted nor cheered at first. I did not obtain the exact order of movements but was told that some moved first while others stayed behind, joining the move in the following years. Empirical observation shows that the new site was pioneered by Santiago Comapa and José Rufino, with Shetāpa himself arriving later on the scene. Contrast this with Alfredo's foundation of Maronal. Alfredo himself opened swiddens and erected a *shovo* on that site first, subsequently attracting brothers and affines to live near him. In the case of Aldeia São Sebastião, each social component of the village rendered its own decision to move, and the leader was apparently the fourth to move, arriving after others had already cut swiddens and started building. At the same time as there is cogency with Clastres' ideas, there is thus also incongruence. The leader, held powerless by his appointed nature, does not determine group movements. Quite the contrary: the same consensus that appointed him leader determined the movement. The leader follows along, endeavoring to fulfill his role as purveyor of good words and representative of the village to outsiders.

At least two people on the Ituí River took the foundation of Aldeia São Sebastião as an opportunity to move to the Curuçá River. Firmino, named Kemõpa in Marubo, moved from aldeia Vida Nova to São Sebastião with his family in 1993. Firmino is the son of Américo, one of the first people to move to the Ituí River after the clash with Mayoruna. Américo had a *shovo* on the upper Ituí River in 1974. According to Melatti's census data, he moved to aldeia Vida Nova by 1978. When I asked him why, he said it

had been “para aprender”, to learn, presumably at the mission school. Fifteen years later, he relocated to Aldeia São Sebastião. His explanation for this is that hunting and fishing were very difficult at Vida Nova due to depletion consequent upon long-term settlement. The new settlement at São Sebastião offered the prospect of abundant fish and game because the site was but newly occupied.

José Nascimento (*filho*) is the son of the elder José Nascimento, a *shovo ivo* ‘emeritus’ at aldeia Vida Nova. José was raised and then married virilocally on the Ituí River. His wife was Meto, described above in the section on Wanõpa’s four-*shovo* circuit, and in Chapter Four in the section on anicular residence. He told me he was bitten by a snake and taken to Manaus to heal. When he returned, relations with his wife had soured, and divorce ensued. Because his last daughter by Meto was born in 1983, and his first son by his subsequent wife was born in 1984, I guess that the divorce took place about 1984. He remarried a daughter of Santiago Comapa, virilocally at first. However, when the new village was being established at São Sebastião, Saide invited José Nascimento *filho* to move to the Curuçá (Saide had been married to José N.’s sister since 1992, after his first wife died). José accepted, and moved. When I visited in July 1997, his *shovo* was near completion; but he said he had been at São Sebastião for two years. When I revisited in April 1998 his *shovo* was finished.

The data presented in Chapter Four suggests another reason why José Nascimento *filho* might have wanted to move. In that chapter, his father’s *shovo* at aldeia Vida Nova was examined and found to be uxorilocal in composition. In addition, I observed that the political succession was bypassing José Nascimento the elder’s sons; the new leader was instead the elder José Nascimento’s sister’s son Raomayãpa. It was also noted that in

such situations the departure of the *shovo ivo*'s sons from the *shovo* is a common occurrence. It should not escape notice that at São Sebastião, José Nascimento filho has his own *shovo*, whereas at Vida Nova he seemed destined for a subsidiary role.

In summary, the data on Aldeia São Sebastião reveal both similarities and differences relative to Aldeia Maronal in terms of the role of leaders in group movements. The similarity is in the generalized ability of small social units such as nuclear families and sets of nuclear families related agnatically to move about independently of the individual who occupies the structural role of leader. We see this in the breakup and dispersal of Domingo's and of Aurélio's *shovo* in 1974-78, and in the dispersal of Wanõpa's coresidents to four *shovo* between 1993 and 1998. It may be seen in the manner of establishment of Aldeia São Salvador by the FUNAI post, an accretion of small units which had each rendered an independent decision to move; and in the relocation of that village to São Sebastião, where again the individual occupying the structural role of leader (Shetãpa) moved only after several of the components of his village had already done so. The difference relative to Maronal is in the absence of a powerful residential attractor such as Alfredo. There is no village founder at Aldeia São Sebastião, no central individual who started it on his own and then attracted others to "his" village. At Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo started his *shovo*, then over the next fifteen years attracted a host of others to live with him. The process of attraction was non-coercive in the sense that Alfredo invited people and they chose to go. However, once established in Alfredo's village, those individuals who moved from their own place to Alfredo's were subject to the latter's power in certain social domains, as Chapter Six will demonstrate. The process whereby Shetãpa became leader was quite different. Shetãpa

has never founded a village, nor attracted others to a place he pioneered. He has tended to move after several others already had, then be nominated as leader. My observations and interviews suggested that he did not have the same power as Alfredo to influence outcomes in the field of relationships with non-indigenous people (see next chapter).

b. Ituí River

i. Aldeia Rio Novo

During the fieldwork period of 1997-98, there was a Marubo settlement on the middle Ituí River (see Figure 5.2.), called Aldeia Rio Novo. I did not visit this village, but obtained a census from two men who were visiting the upper Ituí for a feast in December 1997. This village did not exist in 1974 when Melatti first visited. When he returned in 1978, however, the place had been settled. He records it as the P.I.A. Ituí—P.I.A. standing for indigenous attraction post in Portuguese. Melatti recorded the first settlers at the post, all people from the upper Ituí. These data, together, allow the sequence of events that led to the formation of Aldeia Rio Novo to be pieced together, which in turns adds to the generalizability of conclusions about the role of leaders in residential movements in Marubo society. Unfortunately, there is no interview data to supplement the census data in this case.

Because all the settlers of Rio Novo came from the upper Ituí, it is necessary to take a glance at the situation on the upper Ituí in 1974, in order to better understand the social dynamics of the move to the middle Ituí. Figure 5.1. shows that there were six ‘aldeias’, the current term for what Melatti called ‘grupo local’, on the upper Ituí. One of

these was aldeia Vida Nova, which accreted around the New Tribes Mission. Vida Nova consisted of three *shovo* and one set of tapiris. The other five aldeias consisted of one *shovo* apiece. Most of the settlers who remained to form what is today Aldeia Rio Novo came from the *shovo* of Paulo and the tapiris of Arnaldo, though families and individuals moved from at least three other *shovo* to Rio Novo.

The social composition of Paulo's *shovo* in 1974 is shown in Figure 5.19. It was essentially an uxori-avuncular *shovo* consisting of the tetragnous Paulo, with thirteen children and eight grandchildren, and two sons-in-law, both of whom played important political roles, as is frequently the case in uxorilocally composed Ituí *shovo*. Paulo's sons-in-law were his dead brother's sons. Five other children of his dead brother were also present. There were three other components to this *shovo*: (1) Paulo's father's sister's son, married to his son-in-law's sister's daughter, with one daughter of their own; (2) Txumāpa, a man who was classificatory wife's brother and father's sister's son to Paulo, with his wife and three children; and (3) Paulo's father's sister's daughter and her two out-of-wedlock children.


By the time of Melatti's return in 1978, Paulo's *shovo* had undergone two fissions. Firstly, two of Paulo's brother's sons had gone to the P.I.A. Ituí, including one (Joaquim) who was also Paulo's son-in-law. Joaquim's wife (Paulo's daughter) had gone with him. A second, more significant fission had occurred: all those individuals outlined in red had relocated to a separate house (Pg. 'casa'). This group was led by Paulo's other brother's son/son-in-law, Mario (Kanipa). A substantial number of people, including two of Paulo's wives, went to live with Mario. The personnel involved (see Figure 5.20.) included Mario, his wife and two sons; his wife's sister; his mother-in-law and mother-in-

law's sister, both of whom were also Paulo's wives, along with a sister of these two women, the widow of Paulo's brother, and her two sons and one daughter (consequently Mario's patrilateral half-siblings); and finally his mother-in-law's classificatory sister Isko-ni with her two sons. The political context of Mario's move is unknown; nevertheless, the anicular element seems evident. The social backbone of the fissioning group is the core of four sisters numbered 2, 3, 6, and 36 in Figure 5.19. Despite the evident female agency in this residential movement, the leader was stated to the anthropological inquirer as being Mario. Mario's move to a separate house, along with the previous move of Mario's brothers to P.I.A. Ituí, reduced the population of Paulo's *shovo* from 39 to 22. More importantly, the bulk of Paulo's adult male workforce disappeared.

A glance at the composition of Arnaldo's settlement at Vida Nova in 1974 (see Figures 5.21. and 5.22.) shows that it had much less time-depth than Paulo's. All the marriages represented in Figure 5.21 are recent, with at most one child. The marriages of Adilson (no. 12) and José Anastacio (no. 13) to Paulo's daughters had not resulted in any children yet, another sign of recency. This was a settlement consisting of young, married men with their emerging families. When Melatti visited in 1978, Arnaldo, his wife, and his brother José Domingos had moved to the P.I.A. Ituí.


The third main source of residents for the new P.I.A. Ituí (future Aldeia Rio Novo) was the *shovo* of Mariano, further upstream. This *shovo* has been discussed in Chapter Four, where it was presented as evidence of uxorilocal social composition. The relevant

FIGURE 5.19.: Paulo's *shovo* in 1974, following Melatti (1980)



- | | |
|----------------------|---------------|
| 1. Paulo | 25. Txokipa |
| 2. Rokäewa | 26. Mema |
| 3. Venäewa | 27. Roeni |
| 4. Iska | 28. Txumäpa |
| 5. Kenewa | 29. Kanäwa |
| 6. Raöewa | 30. Roni |
| 7. Mario | 31. Txoko |
| 8. Nope | 32. Mesha |
| 9. Vimi | 33. Peipa |
| 10. Nato | 34. Shanekama |
| 11. Võsi | 35. Vane |
| 12. Joaquim | 36. Isko-ni |
| 13. Kena | 37. Tama |
| 14. Kene | 38. Metsa |
| 15. Mapi | 39. Afonso |
| 16. Inomaya | |
| 17. Txoshi | |
| 18. Shaishavo | |
| 19. Peko | |
| 20. Shoi | |
| 21. Kësho | |
| 22. Peko (Wanishavo) | |
| 23. Pana | |
| 24. Toati | |


FIGURE 5.20.: Fissions in Paulo's *shovo* by 1978, following Melatti (1980)



Dotted outline: Individuals who were at P.I.A. Ituí, future site of Aldeia Rio Novo, in 1978 (2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38).


Jagged outline: Individuals who were living in Mario's house (Pg. 'casa do Mario') in 1978 (12, 13, 39).

FIGURE 5.21.: Composition of Arnaldo's settlement, 1974




- A. Mariano
- B. Domingo
- C. Paulo (no. 1 in Figure 5.19)
- D. Kenewa (no. 5 in Figure 5.19)
- 1. Arnaldo
- 2. Nai
- 3. Kene
- 4. José Domingos dos Santos
- 5. Peko
- 6. Mario Peruano (non-indigenous)
- 7. Rave
- 8. Kava
- 9. Ino
- 10. deceased by 1978
- 11. Shañewa
- 12. Adilson
- 13. José Anastacio
- 14. Shao
- 15. Peko
- 16. Edna (full sister of nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, Figure 5.19)
- 17. Koa

FIGURE 5.22.: Movement of Arnaldo, his wife and brother by 1978



Outlined in dotted lines: individuals located at P.I.A. Ituí by 1978.

FIGURE 5.23.: Fission in Mariano's *shovo* by 1978



1. Mastōpapa
2. Mariano (Vimipeia)
3. Sherōpapa
4. Saipapa
5. Sañewa
6. Peko
7. Maya
8. Sai

Outlined in dotted lines: individuals who were at P.I.A. Ituí by 1978.

relationships are shown in Figure 5.23. Note the elder Mastōpapa, no. 1, the former *shovo ivo*. Mastōpapa died before 1978. By the time of Melatti's visits, Mastōpapa had already passed on the leadership. Significantly, the leadership passed to Mastōpapa's daughter's husband, Mariano (no. 2), rather than to his own son Saīpapa. Furthermore, in the interval between Melatti's and my own fieldwork, Mariano died and the leadership passed to Mariano's son Sherōpapa (no. 3). Saīpapa was completely shut out of the line of political succession. Unsurprisingly, by 1978 Saīpapa had left his father's *shovo* and resettled at the P.I.A. Ituí. Saīpapa's move is unsurprising because it is part of a Marubo social trend that has already been noted several times. If a *shovo* is composed uxorilocally through the attraction of daughter's husbands, and if the political succession favors the son-in-law over the son, then the son has a tendency to move elsewhere.

The individuals just discussed, and shown outlined in blue (Figure 5.20.) and red (Figures 5.22., 5.23.) formed the core of the future village of Rio Novo. In addition, three other social components are recorded as having settled at the P.I.A. Ituí by 1978. These were:

- (1) From the *shovo* of José Nascimento velho at Vida Nova, José Nascimento velho's son Nicanor, Nicanor's wife, and three sons. It has been noted that José Nascimento velho's *shovo* was uxorilocal and the political succession favored the son-in-law, Raomayāpa. We also noted above that José Nascimento filho left his father's *shovo* to found his own *shovo* on the Curuçá. Nicanor's actions may be interpreted in similar fashion: in the context of uxorilocal social composition and political succession, the bypassed son departs to form his own residential unit. However, Nicanor did not stay long at the P.I.A. Ituí. He returned to Vida Nova, where he built his own *shovo*. In 1998,


he was still living in his own *shovo* at aldeia Vida Nova, quite separate from his father's *shovo*, which was also at Vida Nova.

(2) From the *shovo* of Raimundo Dionísio, the elderly Júlio. Júlio will be discussed in Chapter Eight for his role in the Marubo survival of the rubber boom. His recorded birthdate is 1910. In 1978, Melatti recorded him as living at the P.I.A. Ituí. Nobody else from this *shovo* moved with Júlio. By 1998, Júlio was deceased. He does not seem to have played a very significant role in the village's development.

(3) Pedro Comapa, eldest son of Curuçá post founder Santiago Comapa. Pedro did not remain at Rio Novo for long. In 1998, Pedro was long established at Benjamin Constant, and had few relations with Rio Novo though he maintained connections to his father at Aldeia São Sebastião.


Nicanor, Júlio, and Pedro Comapa did not stay for long on the middle Ituí. However, Joaquim, Saípapa, Arnaldo, and José Domingos remained at that location and became the core of the future village.

The current situation at Rio Novo is displayed in Figures 5.24., 5.25., and 5.26. These kinship charts are based on censuses obtained from Arnaldo and from Saípapa while they were attending a feast on the upper Ituí. Additional information was gleaned from interviews with Meto, the mother-in-law of Mashẽpa who now lives at Maronal but who is a daughter of Paulo by the woman labelled number 5 in Figure 5.19. The census data obtained in 1997-98 are correlated with the Melatti's census data to extend the time depth of the charts, showing relationships at least two generations back from the oldest living person at Rio Novo, Paulo, who has a recorded birth date of 1918 (in Dr. Melatti's census).

FIGURE 5.24.: Shovo of Paulo at Rio Novo, 1997


- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Paulo | 21. Vo | 39. Mapi |
| 2. Iska | 22. Iska | 40. Tae |
| 3. Kēsho | 23. Sia | 41. Wasi |
| 4. Pakatxana | 24. Itsa | 42. Sina |
| 5. Shoi | 25. Meo | 43. Mema |
| 6. Kena | 26. anema (infant) | 44. Voni |
| 7. Joaquim | 27. Vote | 45. Tīpi |
| 8. Shaishavo | 28. Karo | 46. Estevão Cassimiro |
| 9. Peko | 29. Txana | 47. Wanīshavo |
| 10. Paka | 30. Nāke | 48. Pana |
| 11. Vane | 31. Arnaldo | 49. Tīpi |
| 12. Pana | 32. Nai | 50. Vane |
| 13. May | 33. Kene | 51. Kene |
| 14. Mātxa | 34. Ani | 52. Kamāshavo |
| 15. Mema | 35. Maya | 53. Pana |
| 16. Roni | 36. Txama | 54. Vama |
| 17. Sheta | 37. Mene | 55. Maya |
| 18. Rane | 38. Kena | 56. Vina |
| 19. Mashe | | 57. Metsa |
| 20. Kōshi | | 58. Kena |
| | | 59. Kamākena |

FIGURE 5.25.: Shovo of Mario (Kanipa) at Rio Novo, 1997



1. Mario (Kanipa)
2. Nope
3. Vōsi
4. Vimi
5. Nato
6. Shāko
7. Kani
8. Maya
9. Meke
10. Tsoi
11. Peni
12. Wani
13. Veka
14. anema (infant)
15. Mashe
16. Sina
17. Maya
18. Roka
19. anema (infant)

FIGURE 5.26.: Shovo of Saípapa (João Marques) at Rio Novo, 1997



- | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Saípapa | 11. Peko | 21. José Anastacio |
| 2. Saíewa | 12. Vomaya | |
| 3. Mayápa | 13. Sheta | 23. Rami |
| 4. Pena | 14. Kena | 24. Oki |
| 5. Kene | 15. Kêsho | 25. Nitxokó |
| 6. Txana | 16. anema (infant) | 26. anema (infant) |
| 7. Karo | 17. Vôshi | 27. Sina |
| 8. Tae | 18. Iove | |
| 9. Nomãpeko | 19. Sheta | |
| 10. Nomãmashe | 20. anema (infant) | |

Figure 5.24. shows that at some point subsequent to 1978, Paulo moved to Rio Novo. There, he entered a residential arrangement with his daughter's husband, Joaquim, as he had done previously at Vida Nova. Arnaldo abandoned independent residence, and by 1997 lived in Paulo's *shovo*. Arnaldo had obtained a second wife, the daughter of Joaquim. Thus, Paulo's *shovo* shows a recurrent uxorilocal theme: first, Paulo expands his *shovo* population by the addition of a son-in-law; then his son-in-law attracts a son-in-law. This pattern has previously been noted for aldeia Água Branca on the upper Ituí. Aside from the uxorilocal component, most of the inhabitants of Paulo's *shovo* are children of himself, his children, or his son-in-law and son-in-law's son-in-law.

The family of Estevão Cassimiro requires special note. In the 1974-78 period, Estevão lived with Arnaldo, though because he was not physically present when Melatti passed by, he is not recorded as living there. Already by 1978, he was married to one of Paulo's daughter's daughters. By 1997, he had married his first wife's two sisters, and had a total of ten children by all three. When I elicited census data from Arnaldo, he stated that Estevão and his family were residents of Paulo's *shovo*. However, Estevão was a FUNAI employee, and in 1997-98 resided in Atalaia do Norte. On the two occasions when I visited Atalaia (July 1997 and March 1998) Estevão was in Atalaia with all his wives and children. Therefore, it is not certain whether or not numbers 46 through 59 are in fact permanent residents of Paulo's *shovo*.

The second *shovo* at Rio Novo in 1997, according to my informants, belonged to Mario (Kanipa). The composition of Mario's *shovo* is shown in Figure 5.25. Recall that Mario lived with Paulo as an uxorilocally married son-in-law in 1974, but by 1978 had become protagonist of a fission and established independent residence. By 1997, he had

joined his brother Joaquim at Rio Novo, but there too, Mario had established independent residence. It is important to note that the overall leader (Pg. ‘cacique’) of the village was Mario, not Paulo.

The third *shovo* at Rio Novo belonged to Saípapa (see Figure 5.26.). Saípapa had six sons and two daughters. Two of his sons were married virilocally, with eight children between them. His daughters were married uxorilocally to José Anastacio, a man who had resided in Arnaldo’s tapiris in 1974. He was unmarried at that time. By 1997, he had been attracted to Mario’s *shovo* by the possibility of polygyny.

José Domingos, one of the founders of Rio Novo who moved from Arnaldo’s tapiris by 1978, had gained employment in FUNAI and established semi-permanent residence at Atalaia with his family. He was not reported by informants as a resident of Rio Novo.

Summarizing what the data on Rio Novo tell us about the role of settlement leaders in Marubo residential movements, it may be said that followers have the ability to make choices independently of leaders, and leaders occasionally follow their nominal followers (note that by ‘leader’, I here refer to the individual occupying the position of *shovo ivo*, which is structurally the leadership position for each *shovo*; by ‘follower’ I refer to the coresidents of the *shovo ivo*). Rio Novo was founded as the result of a plethora of independent movements by small social components. For example, Saípapa fissioned from his father’s *shovo* to move to Rio Novo. Arnaldo and José moved to Rio Novo first, without bringing the entirety of their coresident group. Later, one member of Arnaldo’s 1974 group, José Anastacio, went to live with Saípapa for the sake of a polygynous marriage. Finally, Arnaldo abandoned independent residence to join Paulo’s

shovo, while José Domingos and Estevão Cassimiro relocated their families to Atalaia do Norte. In Saípapa's case the settlement leader was his brother-in-law Mariano, who did not direct the movement; in Arnaldo's case it is even more clear, as each component of Arnaldo's 1974 coresident group has drifted away in its own direction.

Paulo's *shovo* represents perhaps the clearest evidence for follower-led movement in the formation of Rio Novo. Paulo's son-in-law Joaquim moved to Rio Novo first; and Paulo's son-in-law Mario moved out of Paulo's *shovo* about the same time, c. 1978. At some point thereafter, both Paulo and Mario moved to Rio Novo. Mario's move downstream must be considered independent of Paulo due to his having moved out of Paulo's *prior* to the move to Rio Novo, and his subsequent founding of his own separate *shovo*. This situation seems analogous to that of Aurélio, whose followers moved downstream group by group until he was forced to follow. Paulo underwent a similar demographic blow in 1978 when his work force went downstream without him. Like Aurélio, Paulo wound up following his followers. By 1997, he had re-established uxorilocally composed residence with Joaquim, and had a very substantial *shovo* in terms of population. But he was not the general leader of the aldeia.

When I asked, I was told that the 'cacique' of Rio Novo was Mario, and Mario was sought out as representative of the village by, for example, FUNAI agents sent to discuss demarcation issues. Thus, Mario's strategy, while not demographically as successful as Paulo's, was politically a success. Mario moved out and away from an uxorilocal polygynous marriage, which is unusual, since the father-in-law tends to oppose such moves and the son-in-law has the incentive of being successor to leadership. Mario was able to succeed to leadership without having to wait for an orderly transference of

authority. Through his residential independence, he was able to remove himself from a subordinate position and become leader. Unfortunately, no interview data for this leadership transition is available.

ii. Aldeia Vida Nova

To understand the political situation at Vida Nova, it is fruitful to compare its origins and expansion to that of Aldeia Maronal. Vida Nova and Maronal are the two Marubo villages with New Tribes missions. In the case of Maronal, as we have seen, a Marubo leader (Alfredo) founded a village, then invited the mission to live where he did. As I will argue in Chapter Six, Alfredo's role as founder gave him substantial political capital. On the other hand, Vida Nova was founded by the mission, which attracted a variety of people to settle in its immediate area. There is no Marubo founder of aldeia Vida Nova, and there is no overall leader of the village. Each *shovo* is independent of the others.

In 1974, there were three *shovo* and one set of tapiris at Vida Nova. In addition, by 1978 a second set of tapiris was erected as Firmino (discussed above under São Sebastião) moved to be near the mission school. The three *shovo* belonged to Paulo, to José Nascimento velho, and to Raimundo Dionísio; the tapiris belonged to Arnaldo. By 1997, there were five *shovo* at Vida Nova: José Nascimento velho, Pekōpapa, Txumāpa, Nicanor, and Mashkāpa (for social compositions, see Chapter Four).

The fate of Paulo's *shovo* and Arnaldo's tapiris has already been discussed. Almost the entirety of those coresident groups ended up moving to Rio Novo. There was

an important exception: Paulo's father's sister's son Txumāpa. Txumāpa, his wife and children remained at Vida Nova when their entire coresident group relocated to Rio Novo. Instead of following that group motion, Txumāpa took the opportunity to establish independent residence. By 1997, he had his own *shovo*, had attracted an uxorilocally married son-in-law, and had several virilocally married sons. By not participating in the move to Rio Novo, he initiated a transition from minor component of someone else's *shovo* in 1974, to respected *shovo ivo* in 1997.

Firmino left his father Américo's *shovo* upstream to relocate at Vida Nova by 1978. When the move from São Salvador to São Sebastião occurred on the Curuçá River, he relocated to the new settlement. His motivations are discussed above. He died of cancer in 1997.

The *shovo* of Pekōpapa, which I visited in January 1998, was a direct descendant of that of Raimundo Dionísio. In 1974, this was a mainly agnatic *shovo*, centered socially on a set of four full brothers. By 1997, two of those brothers, including Raimundo Dionísio, had died. The leadership passed on to one of the brothers, Pekōpapa. This *shovo* did not undergo significant fissions or fusions between 1974 and 1998. There were marriages and births but no major divisions. However, note that the anicular element in the *shovo* of José Nascimento velho (at Vida Nova) and in that of Mene at Alegria, both described in Chapter Four, has to do with the departure of widows from this *shovo* after the deaths of the two brothers.

Nicanor is a son of José Nascimento velho. José's basic *shovo* composition did not change between 1974 and 1998. It was then and is still an essentially uxorilocal/avuncular *shovo* (see Chapter Four). Nicanor, as explained above in the discussion of

Rio Novo, moved to the P.I.A. Ituí by 1978. However, when I encountered him he had his own *shovo* at Vida Nova, consisting only of himself, his wife and children. This *shovo*, represents one of many examples of sons of *shovo ivorasi* leaving the *shovo* when political succession favors the *shovo ivo*'s daughter's husband. Mashkāpa is the younger brother of Raomayāpa, José Nascimento velho's daughter's husband. Mashkāpa's *shovo* has been described in Chapter Four as the prime example of anicular residence. There were thus four fissions from José Nascimento velho's *shovo* between 1974 and 1978: his sons Nicanor and José Nascimento filho (see above, São Sebastião), his daughter's husband's brother (also sister's son) Mashkāpa, and José's matrilateral brother Floriano (see below, Aldeia Praia). However, none of these fissions resulted in depletion of the *shovo*'s key personnel. José, his daughters, his daughters' husband, and numerous daughter's children, along with the substantial anicular component, left José Nascimento velho with a substantial coresident group despite the fissions.

By 1997-98, a leadership change was underway at José Nascimento velho's *shovo*. As José aged beyond the point of effective leadership (birthdate: 1915 or 1923), his son-in-law Raomayāpa started to direct the building of a new *shovo*, which would be known as Raomayāpa's, whereas the then-current *shovo* had been built under the direction of José Nascimento velho and thus was said to be José's. This was not to be a fission, as all the personnel then living at José's were planning to move as soon as the new *shovo* was completed. This was an example of political transition favoring the son-in-law, with accompanying dispersal of sons.

The movements of Mashkāpa and Nicanor and the new housing being built by Raomayāpa reinforce the notion that more often than being directed by the *shovo ivo*,

residence changes are directed by non-*shovo ivo* and result in new shovo ivorasi. In all these cases, non-leaders directed a residential movement and thus became leaders. Residence shifts thus mark, not the exercise of established leadership, but the first exercise of new leadership.

iii. Aldeia Alegria

Aldeia Alegria represents an interesting case of dual leadership. The current social composition is described in Chapter Four. The settlement was already in existence during Melatti's first visit, and is marked number 1 in Figure 5.1. At that time, there was a single *shovo*, with the agnatic core consisting of two brothers, Lauro Brasil and Antônio Brasil. Lauro was named as *shovo ivo*. When I visited this area in 1998, Lauro claimed credit for establishing the settlement, but Antônio also claimed to be "*Alegria ivo*". By 1998, Antônio had built his own *shovo* across a long cleared plaza from Lauro's. In addition, one of Lauro's sons-in-law had built a small *shovo* a short distance from Lauro's. Lauro's *shovo* had thus undergone two fissions. Neither fission resulted in a new village, but rather in the expansion of the existing village. the main fission represented the social tension between the two brothers, neither of whom recognizes the others' claim to village leadership.

iv. Aldeia Praia


Aldeia Praia was founded by José Nascimento velho's matrilateral brother Floriano. Floriano lived with José in 1974 (see Figure 5.27.). Already at that time, two

of Floriano's daughters were married to Wasinawa. At some point between 1978 and 1997, Floriano, his wife and children, and his son-in-law Wasinawa established a new residence together. It is important to note that this new residence was established as a new *aldeia*. Floriano emphasized that he had his own village, that it was not Vida Nova. By 1990, however, Wasinawa had left with one wife to join Sināpa's *shovo* on the upper Curuçá. The composition of Floriano's *shovo* in 1997 is noted in Chapter Four.

v. Aldeia Liberdade

Aldeia Liberdade is the first settlement upstream from Vida Nova on the upper Curuçá. It consists of two *shovo* with, in January 1998, forty inhabitants. The two *shovo* are descended from the single *shovo* of Reissamon, which Melatti recorded in 1974 (see Figure 5.28.). The *shovo* of Reissamon centered on two brothers—Reissamon and Eduardo—who were children of Misael (Wanōpa's brother on the Curuçá). Also of central significance were Reissamon's mother's siblings—his mother's sister, with five coresident children, and his mother's brother Ronípapa. Note that Eduardo was married to his mother's brother's daughters, giving this *shovo* an uxorilocal/avuncular composition. By 1997, there had been one fission. Ronípapa, with his wife and children, and Ronípapa's daughter's husband/sister's son Eduardo, with his wives and children, had formed one *shovo*. Meanwhile, Reissamon had passed away, apparently in 1996. The second *shovo* at Liberdade consisted mainly of Reissamon's widow and children, his children's wives and their children (see Chapter Four for social composition). The two

FIGURE 5.27.: Shovo of José Nascimento velho at Vida Nova, 1974



1. José Nascimento velho

2. Floriano

3. Mashkāpa


4. Raomayāpa

5. José Nascimento filho

6. Nicanor

7. Wasinawa

FIGURE 5.28.: *Shovo* of Reissamon, 1974



1. Reissamon
2. Kemōewa
3. Rane
4. Eduardo
5. Ronīpapa

shovo were very close to one another and continued to form an effective settlement unit (*grupo local* in Melatti's parlance; *aldeia* in present-day terms).

It is notable that when Ronípapa founded his own *shovo*, Eduardo went to live with him rather than staying with his brother Reissamon. Unfortunately, no interview data is available to help explain this. It is evident, however, that Eduardo has an influential role in that *shovo*, particularly since Ronípapa speaks no Portuguese, whereas Eduardo does, making Eduardo the effective intermediary vis-à-vis non-indigenous people. It is possible that Eduardo saw more potential for status and influence at Ronípapa's *shovo*. However, this explanation must remain hypothetical.

It is equally important to note who became overall leader of Liberdade upon Reissamon's death. It was neither his sons (Rane and Txinawa) nor his brother (Eduardo), but rather his mother's brother Ronípapa who was named "cacique". This occurred prior to my fieldwork. The word used by Aldeia Maronal informants to refer to Ronípapa's entry to leadership was "colocaram ao Ronípapa". This signifies that upon Reissamon's death, there was a discussion and the consensus settled on Ronípapa as successor. This is akin to the way in which Shetápa was chosen as headman of Aldeia São Salvador and São Sebastião—installed by general consensus. This is very different from becoming leader through the foundation of a village. The founder of a village has a claim to its ownership which translates into real political power. A leader who is not the village founder has significantly less power to affect the outcome of decisions in key fields of social action such as relationships to non-indigenous people, as will be explained in the following chapter.

From a socio-analytic perspective we may regard the political succession at Liberdade as following the line of avuncular relation, but in reverse. In this sense it should be noted that Ronípapa was five years younger (b. 1943) than his sister's son Reissamon (b. 1938), but older than Eduardo (b. 1950) (following Dr. Melatti's census data). Ronípapa was the most senior remaining elder upon Reissamon's death. The political succession bypassed the agnatic line (brother and sons) entirely, reverting to the avuncular component instead.

vi. Maloca do Paulino

The *shovo* belonging to Paulino is one of the stablest residences in the data set. Paulino's *shovo* was already established in 1974, and remained intact in 1998. It had undergone no fissions and no fusions. The social composition was the same. This *shovo* pursued a social plan very close to the Marubo social ideal, fusing avuncular and uxorilocal relations to approach a pure Kariera-style pattern. The expansion of the *shovo* is described in Chapter Four, where its social composition is carefully examined and genealogical charts presented.

It is interesting to note that although this *shovo* had undergone neither fissions nor fusions nor political succession, it had physically changed places by 1998. In Figure 5.1., it is clearly depicted on the east bank of the Ituí, the bank on which Aldeia Liberdade is located. By 1998, however, it was on the west bank. This is an example of Clastrean-style movement. Since the entire settlement moved, and relocation did not occasion loss

of coresidents, it must be assumed that Paulino's move was a leader-led movement. Such cases are extremely rare in the data on Marubo residential movements.

vii. Aldeia Paraná

Aldeia Paraná is the descendant of the *shovo* that belonged to Mariano on the upper Ituí in 1974. That *shovo* is shown in Figure 5.1. as *shovo* number 9. At that time it was an uxorilocally composed *shovo* undergoing a transition to agnatic political succession. The social composition of Aldeia Paraná, and the changes in composition from 1974 to 1998, are detailed in Chapter Four. Diagrams illustrating the social composition of Mariano's *shovo* in 1974, the changes that occurred in it, and the end result in 1998, are presented in this chapter as Figures 5.29., 5.30., and 5.31.

It is essential to note firstly the political succession, and secondly the correlated residential movements. Figure 5.29 shows a *shovo* whose elder generations fit an uxorilocal pattern of composition. At the top is Kene and his wife Kena; six of their children inhabited the *shovo*, including two sons--Saípapa and Wakanawa. Married to one of Kene's daughters is Mariano. Mariano was considerably older than either of Kene's sons. By Melatti's arrival, Mariano was *shovo ivo*. This is in all likelihood a process analogous to that I observed for José Nascimento velho's *shovo* where the elderly former *shovo ivo* passes on authority to his son-in-law, a pattern common to *shovo* that accrete personnel through uxorilocal marriage. The succession then bypasses the *shovo ivo*'s sons. It has been observed that two of José Nascimento's sons left to found their


own *shovo* in a context where the political succession favored their brother-in-law over themselves. Likewise, in Figure 5.30., it may be seen that both of Kene's sons left between 1974 and 1978. The first, Saípapa, founded his own *shovo* at Rio Novo. The second, Wakanawa, entered into uxorilocal polygyny at Vimipa's *shovo* (aldeia Água Branca). Thus the pattern of *shovo*-owners' sons moving out when leadership passes to the son-in-law is repeated in Mariano's case.

By 1998, Mariano had died and a second political succession had taken place. The new *shovo ivo* was Mariano's son, Sherópapa. This is what I mean when I refer to this population nucleus as making a transition from uxorilocal to agnatic social composition and political succession. Despite this transition, the *shovo*'s history is evident in its current composition, as shown in Figure 5.31. For example, although all of Kene's sons left, two of his daughters have remained, as well as the elderly Kena, Kene's widow. One of these daughters, Sinãewa, is in an uxorilocal marriage with a man by whom she has two children; her dead sister also had three children by the same man, all three of which still reside at Aldeia Paraná, being raised by their mother's sister. The second daughter of Kene to remain is Mariano's widow Itsãewa, and seven children of hers also remain. These seven children are Sherópapa's half-brothers.

Sherópapa himself underwent a divorce before 1998. His former wife as well as his children by her were no longer residing at Paraná when the census was taken in January 1998. However, Sherópapa had remarried and had another two children. His full brother was married virilocally and had two sons. Thus, the agnatic core of this *shovo* was very small. Much of the personnel were results of the previous *shovo ivo*'s


efforts at demographic growth, while the current *shovo ivo*'s efforts have had limited results, particularly due to the migrations consequent upon his divorce.

FIGURE 5.29.: Shovo of Mariano, upper Ituí, 1974



- | | | |
|-------------|---------------|-----------|
| 1. Kene | 13. Mariano | 25. Sheta |
| 2. Kena | 14. Tsainama | 26. Kena |
| 3. Saípapa | 15. Mashe | 27. Shena |
| 4. Mema | 16. Itsá | |
| 5. Sinãewa | 17. Romeya | |
| 6. Sheta | 18. Sherôpapa | |
| 7. Wakanawa | 19. Memi | |
| 8. Itsãewa | 20. Sherôewa | |
| 9. Saíewa | 21. Vimi | |
| 10. Sai | 22. Shero | |
| 11. Peko | 23. Pana | |
| 12. Maya | 24. Sina | |

FIGURE 5.30.: Destinations of residents of Mariano's *shovo*, 1974-1998.



Crossed Diagonals: Current residents of Aldeia Paraná.

Diagonals: Uxorilocally married at Aldeia Agua Branca.

Outlined in dashes: Moved to Rio Novo.


Dotted outline: Virilocally married at Aldeia Maronal.

Dots-and-dashes outline: Virilocally married at Tacanal.

Solid outline: Deceased.

Jagged outline: Current location not ascertained.

Figure 5.31: Aldeia Paraná, *shovo* of Sherōpapa, January 1998



- | | |
|--------------|------------|
| 1. Sherōpapa | 20. Kena |
| 2. Shopäewa | 21. Sina |
| 3. Shopa | 22. May |
| 4. Tama | 23. Shāko |
| 5. Romeya | 24. Tama |
| 6. Vote | |
| 7. Vimi | A. Mariano |
| 8. Txana | B. Kene |
| 9. Itsäewa | C. Américo |
| 10. Vane | D. Maníshi |
| 11. Maya | E. Ino |
| 12. Itsa | F. Sheta |
| 13. Ni | |
| 14. Txano | |
| 15. Roka | |
| 16. Rame | |
| 17. Kena | |
| 18. Sinäewa | |
| 19. Tamäpa | |

viii. Aldeia Água Branca

Aldeia Água Branca is the descendant of the *shovo* that belonged to Américo on the upper Ituí in 1974. It should be noted that Água Branca is an exogenous term applied by Brazilian national health foundation workers to identify this settlement. They do not actually use this name to refer to the village themselves.


In January 1998, there were two *shovo* at the former location of Américo's residence. On the west bank, where Américo used to live, was the *shovo* of Américo's son-in-law Vimipa. On the east bank, directly across from Vimipa's and a mere stone's throw from Vimipa, was the *shovo* of Américo's son Alberto. Alberto did not have a full-sized *shovo*, but rather what is called a *maloquinha* or small maloca in Portuguese. nevertheless it constituted a distinct settlement and, above all, a distinct political unit.

The social composition of the origin *shovo* and its two descendants at Água Branca are displayed in Figures 5.32., 5.33., 5.34. and 5.35. In Figure 5.32, note that Américo was pursuing a double strategy towards demographic prosperity. He was building his followership with both kinship and affinity. He had with him many of his children and grandchildren, including a virilocally married son. On the left hand side of Figure 5.32, however, note the in-marrying polygynous son-in-law Vimipa on the first descending generation; on the second descending generation note the incipient repetition of this pattern as Wakanawa marries two of Vimipa's daughters. Américo thus simultaneously employed two distinct patterns of personnel accretion.

At some point after Américo's death, the group that had formerly been Américo's coresidents divided in two. In January 1998, I found Américo's son and daughter,


Alberto and Ino, living on the east bank of the Ituí with their children, children's children, sister's daughters, sister's daughters' husband, and sister's daughter's children (see Figure 5.35). On the other side of the river lived Américo's son-in-law Vimipa, Vimipa's daughters, Vimipa's son-in-law Wakanawa, Wakanawa's children, Wakanawa's son-in-law José Comapa, José's children, and the wife of one of Wakanawa's children (see Figure 5.34). Vimipa's *shovo* was on the location of the old settlement, and was older, while Alberto's *shovo* was a recently built transitional structure, indicating that it was Alberto who decided to relocate while Vimipa remained in the old location. This is a repetition of the pattern whereby a son moves away when succession favors the son-in-law. Vimipa is considerably older than Alberto (Vimipa's mother was the young girl who survived the raid by slavers on the Kariya—see below, Chapter Eight). Evidently, leadership passed from Américo to Vimipa upon Américo's death, because when I visited, Vimipa was clearly pointed out to me as *shovo ivo*. The succession created tension, not only between Alberto and his older brother-in-law, but also between Alberto and Wakanawa.

FIGURE 5.32: Shovo of Américo, upper Ituí, 1974 (based on Melatti 1980)



- | | |
|-------------|----------------|
| 1. Américo | 20. Kanãpa |
| 2. Maníshi | 21. Txanõewa |
| 3. Vimipa | 22. Mese |
| 4. Võewa | 23. Mashe |
| 5. Ino | 24. Nonato |
| 6. Vo | |
| 7. Nâke | A. Wakanawa |
| 8. Wani | B. Memi |
| 9. Tae | C. João Tuxáua |
| 10. Vina | D. Mema |
| 11. Mani | |
| 12. Tama | |
| 13. Vo | |
| 14. Ako | |
| 15. Alberto | |
| 16. Firmino | |
| 17. Noêmia | |
| 18. Maya | |
| 19. Mema | |

FIGURE 5.33: Destination of residents of Américo's *shovo*, 1974-1998.



Dotted outline: Residents of Vimipa's *shovo* at Água Branca in January 1998.


Dots-and-dashes outline: Residents of Alberto's *shovo* at Água Branca in January 1998.

Solid outline: Deceased.

Jagged outline: Current location not ascertained.


Diagonals: To Aldeia Vida Nova by 1978, to Aldeia São Sebastião by 1997.

FIGURE 5.34: Vimipa's shovo at Água Branca, 1998.



- | | |
|----------------|---|
| 1. Vimipa | 14. Pavo |
| 2. Maya | 15. Sheta |
| 3. Vo | 16. Tome |
| 4. Memi | 17. Ne |
| 5. Wakanawa | 18. Sheni |
| 6. José Comapa | 19. Peko |
| 7. Mema | |
| 8. Vena | A. Américo |
| 9. Peni | B. Maníshi |
| 10. Peko | C. Tamápa (number 19 in Figure 5.31) |
| 11. Mene | D. Masto (deceased daughter of number 1 in Figure 29) |
| 12. Mashe | |
| 13. Maníshi | |

FIGURE 5.35: *Shovo* of Alberto (Akōpa) at Água Branca, 1998



- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Alberto (Akōpa) | 14. Shawānawa |
| 2. Peko | 15. Maya |
| 3. Ako | 16. Kena |
| 4. Panã | 17. Ako |
| 5. Pena | 18. May |
| 6. Ino | 19. anema (infant) |
| 7. Shorípa | |
| 8. Maya | A. Américo |
| 9. Shori | B. Maníshi |
| 10. Pei | C. Maya |
| 11. Imi | D. Mariano |
| 12. Yoshi | E. Sherōpapa |
| 13. Vo | |

N.B. Individuals 8., 14., and C. are all Shawānawavo, indicating a close kinship among them. Unfortunately, the precise genealogical relationship cannot be traced given currently available data.

Although I only remained at Vim̄pa's some twenty-four hours, it was evident that the *de facto shovo ivo* was Wakanawa. Vim̄pa still claimed the title, pointing to his environment and stating: “*e na*”, it is mine. However, I observed Wakanawa organizing labor, directing individuals in daily tasks, and assigning someone to answer my questions. Wakanawa had already attracted a polygynous son-in-law to Água Branca, José Comapa. José assisted Wakanawa in all his tasks, acting as ‘uxorilocal lieutenant’ or second-in-command, much like Eduardo at Ron̄papa’s, Simão at Txumãpa’s, or Raomayãpa at José Nascimento’s. The dynamics of these relationships have been discussed in Chapter Four. The important fact to highlight here is that after the succession from Américo to Vim̄pa, bypassing Alberto, the succession bypassed Alberto a second time, going from Vim̄pa to Wakanawa. There is undoubtedly a correlation between Wakanawa’s incipient leadership and Alberto’s concurrent departure.

In summary, Américo’s *shovo* split precisely along the line separating the two strategies Américo used to accrete personnel. The individuals forming the uxorilocal component of Américo’s *shovo* remained behind, while the individuals forming the agnatic component moved to form independent residence.

When I visited Água Branca in January 1998, I was told that Alberto’s people were about to move to Aldeia Paraná. This has to do both with the internal politics of Água Branca and the intervillage politics of the upper Ituí. The social context that led Alberto to desire a move has been explained, but why should they choose Paraná rather than a new, independent location? Paraná was at that time making a bid to gain equal political influence with Liberdade, Alegria and Vida Nova. These latter were the largest villages on the upper Ituí, and also the only ones with CIVAJA radios. Because of this,

those three aldeias were involved in all the CIVAJA-related decision-making processes, whereas Paraná, Paulino, and Água Branca were left out. Sheropapa resented this situation. He felt that if the population of Paraná doubled he would have a greater possibility of convincing CIVAJA to install a radio there, thus gaining equal access to the means of influencing political outcomes. The prospect of a large, prosperous village with equal influence relative to the villages downstream, was sufficiently attractive that Alberto preferred this to the more difficult option of creating a totally new village. It should be noted however that, as of July 1998, Alberto's movement had not, to my knowledge, taken place yet.

D. Conclusions

The data presented in this chapter contain important differences with respect to the expectations we might have from a reading of Clastres, Lévi-Strauss, and others. The Marubo do not conform to existing models of indigenous Amazonian residential movements. The differences can be presented in three categories. The Marubo vary from the Clastrean model in timing of residential movements, in the causes of residential movements, and in the sociostructural position of those who lead the residential movements.

Conclusions on Timing of Residential Movements

By timing of residential movements, I refer to the length of time that elapses between changes of residence. The original picture of Panoan social organization presented in the *Handbook of South American Indians* presented hinterland Panoans as seminomadic: “Among the hinterland Panoans, Western Tucanoans, and others, [houses] were isolated in the bush for protection from war and slave raids. They were moved every two or three years” (Steward and Métraux 1948:527). The short duration of settlements was attributed primarily to soil conditions: “The impermanence of settlement in a particular locality is usually owing to the exhaustion of the soil, but also to disease and death, especially that of a chief” (Lowie 1948:18). The time from planting to soil exhaustion was specified in the Panoan case: “Cultivation follows the usual slash-and-burn pattern, men doing the heavy work. New clearings are necessary every two or three years” (Steward and Métraux 1948:568). From these statements it is easy to obtain the notion that Panoans move whenever a swidden is exhausted, i.e., every two to three years. Robert Carneiro confirmed and reinforced Steward’s ideas through his research on the Amawaka, who were found to move even more frequently than expected: “Clearing a new plot generally coincides with building a new house, and is done nearly every year” (Carneiro 1964:10). Nevertheless, although the Amawaka confirmed prior suppositions about hinterland Panoan settlement-shifting, Carneiro suggested that the frequent shifting of Amawaka settlements could be the result of specific variables of social organization—village and house type—which in turn could be products of particular historical conditions, rather than of “Panoan culture”:

Amahuaca houses can be built in three days, and Amahuaca families are independent units perfectly free to pick up and move when and where they want to. Thus the Amahuaca, in deciding to move their settlements, do not have to overcome the inertia that would face a society which had a large village, substantial houses, and centralized political authority. In short, since the resistance to moving is small, the forces required to bring it about can likewise be small... The known history of the Amahuaca, imperfect though it is, has been one of external attack by other more powerful Indian tribes and by rubber gatherers, and internal feuding on a considerable scale. Small community size and frequent movement of settlements would have the effect of making communities more difficult to locate. They would thus afford some measure of protection and provide the best chance for survival. Thus, while there is no conclusive evidence for it, the recurrent moving of the Amahuaca may be interpreted as an ecological adaptation to conditions of great insecurity.

(Carneiro 1964:16)

Steven Romanoff (1984), in his study of the Matses, came to conclusions rather similar to Carneiro's. Prior to the establishment of Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) missionaries in their area in 1969, the Matses changed residence every three years in order to stay near the most productive swidden and to avoid game depletion:

Any one house would be inhabited for part of about three years. The motives for moving among fields and houses in this way were to enjoy the garden production at a particular house and to hunt the animals there, allowing animals to 'come back' to the forest around the unoccupied house.

(Romanoff 1984:204)

Despite the frequency of settlement shifting, the Matses have traits that indicate that this is not a 'hinterland Panoan' cultural trait and that the Matses are not necessarily frequent settlement shifters in all situations. Firstly, they retain the use of longhouses, which demand considerable investment in their construction (Romanoff does not specify how much time to build one). Despite the trouble of building new shelter, the Matses often built a longhouse every year or every other year, whenever a new field was cleared. They then changed residence whenever convenient to be near the highest-yielding swiddens. This strategy of moving to maximize agricultural yield tended to coincide with the need to move to new hunting grounds, an ecologically adaptive approach. However,

once SIL missionaries established a presence, the Matses maintained occupation of a central village for at least seven consecutive years in order to maintain access to the benefits of SIL presence. Instead of moving around to access productive fields and hunting grounds, they established outlier settlements which were temporarily occupied, but maintained permanent residence at the central longhouse. The fact that they maintain longhouses and that they can shift to a settlement pattern that involves less frequent moves indicates that both rapid shifting or long settlement are Matses strategies, and that which is used depends on the particular historical conditions and the interethnic relation context:

The Matses, then, do not represent pristine interfluvial culture or aboriginal “backwoods” Panoan culture any more than do other groups of Peru. They have a history. This cuts two ways: aboriginal interfluvial cultures should not be envisaged as the same as modern cultures, and the ethnography of modern groups should not be interpreted in the false light of hypothetical aboriginal conditions. While some aspects of Panoan culture are of pre-Columbian origin, wholesale and uncritical analogy is misleading.

(Romanoff 1984:203)

The data on Marubo residence shifting suggest that Carneiro and Romanoff are correct in their suggestions that rapid settlement shifting was not a Panoan culture trait but rather a product of particular social and historical circumstances. It is true that the Marubo cut new swiddens at least every three years, if not more often. But they do not move the village with every new swidden that is cut. In fact, soil exhaustion is rarely an overtly stated motive for Marubo residence shifts, but even when it is a factor, it is so only after 20 years or more of settlement in one particular place. This timing coincides more or less with the lifespan of the Marubo dwelling, the *shovo*, so that exhaustion of soils (with concurrently increasing distance from *shovo* to producing swidden) and

deterioration of housing can together influence a move some 15-20 years after initial settlement. By that time, many swiddens have come and gone. There are numerous cases of Marubo settlements moving after approximately that amount of time: Aldeia São Salvador after 21 years (1974-1995), José Barbosa's upper Curuçá *shovo* after 15 years (1979-1994), Wanõpa's old *shovo* downstream from his current one, moved after 15 years (1978-1993). There is not one case of a shift of residence brought on merely by the exhaustion of a single swidden. In fact, Marubo do not like to contemplate rapid movements because of the amount of time that must be invested in building a new *shovo*—three to six months, depending on size of structure and size of labor force, among other variables. In addition, fruit trees planted around the *shovo* do not even begin to give fruit until 2-3 years have elapsed. Both these reasons were given to me as explanations for why those left at the headwaters of the Igarapé Maronal were reluctant to join Alfredo when the latter moved to the Curuçá River. The prospect of leaving before the *shovo* deteriorates is extremely unattractive because of the labor invested in each settlement. Thus, the time between changes of residence is much longer among the Marubo than was originally believed to be the case for hinterland Panoans. In fact, we must amend Steward's "moved every two to three years" to "moved every fifteen to twenty years" in this case.

Because a key variable determining the longer-than-expected Marubo length of settlement is the heavy labor investment required to erect a dwelling, and because that dwelling is clearly an indigenous one, there is no reason to suppose that the 15-20 year range is an epiphenomenon of extensive contact with non-indigenous people. The *shovo* has a very popular (i.e., oft-told) origin myth, recounting how a culture hero (*Vimipeia*)

dwelled among beings at the bottom of a river, learning the secrets of *shovo* construction, and brought them back to the Marubo upon his emergence. There is no metal used in *shovo* construction, except in cutting the trees and thatch; all attachments are done with knots tied with various types of liana and bark. Each knot has a specific name and explanation, attributed to Vimipeia. All this indicates that the *shovo* has considerable time-depth in Marubo culture. The data thus indicate that the motives which cause Marubo today to delay moves for 15-20 years are not in any way consequent upon the waves of intensive contact they experienced during the rubber boom (1890-1910) and after the arrival of missionaries (1950s) and FUNAI (1970s). We can take this length of settlement to be an indigenous phenomenon.

Conclusions on Causes of Residential Movements

Intimately tied up with the issue of timing is the issue of causes of residential movements. In the ethnological synthesis of Lowie (1967[1944]), based in large part on Lévi-Strauss (1967[1944]) and later developed by Clastres (1977[1974]), soil depletion and game depletion are major causes of residential movement. It is well known that swiddens become unproductive after 2-3 years, so that villages must be moved every so often to avoid long walks to harvest agricultural products (e.g., Carneiro 1974[1961]). In addition, game can be hunted out of the area of a settlement in a few years, forcing very long walks to obtain meat (e.g., Chagnon 1968:33, Harner 1972:56). Among both Clastres' Guayakí and Lévi-Strauss' Nambiquara, village leaders are also leaders of residential movements because the leader has been installed or accepted by the group in

virtue of a perceived superior ability in determining the best direction of movement for access to good soils and plentiful game:

For six or seven months, the chief will be entirely responsible for the management of his band. It is he who orders the start of the wandering period, selects the routes, chooses the stopping points and the duration of the stay at each of them, whether a few days or several weeks. He also organizes the hunting, fishing, collecting and gathering expeditions...When the band's chief is, at the same time, a village chief...his duties do not stop there. He will determine the moment when, and the place where, the group will settle; he will also direct the gardening and decide what plants are to be cultivated; and, generally speaking, he will organize the occupations according to the seasons' needs and possibilities... These rather versatile duties...are not facilitated by any fixed power or recognized authority. Consent...furnishes the only nature of its legitimacy.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]: 52-53)

This entire framework of interpretation must now be questioned. Specifically, we must question the extent to which Clastres' and Lévi-Strauss' methods determined their results. Ethnographic fieldwork that is centered on a quest for social structure produces an abstraction based on statements of social ideals. It is difficult then to determine when a leader's success is an *a posteriori* phenomenon. We have seen in the Marubo data how many settlement leaders have become so precisely by ignoring a former settlement leader. The research conducted on the Marubo was based on post-structuralist action theory, and produced very different results. It may be argued that the Marubo are not and have never been seminomadic small-band egalitarians like the Guayakí and Nambiquara, so the results of research on the Marubo cannot be used to critique Lévi-Strauss' results, but there is still strong evidence to suggest that analysis by different (post-structuralist) methods produces different results.

David Price (1987) analyzed Nambiquara residential movements, coming to conclusions different from Lévi-Strauss'. Unlike Lévi-Strauss, Price had multiple

censuses to work with as the analysis was conducted after fifteen years of fieldwork among the Nambiquara in his case (a similar technique was used in this research, with twenty-four years of time depth between censuses). The census data allow for construction of a diachronic yet still empirical model, whereas a single fieldwork period offers only the possibility of a synchronic model, a situation more favorable to structural analysis. Price gathered a sample of 127 residential movements. He found that “forty-two of the moves were made by individuals who went by themselves to join another community...The remaining eighty-five moves were made by people who changed their place of residence together with one or more primary kin” (Price 1987:17). Of the individual movers, thirty-three out of forty-two moved to join a new spouse. Of the group moves, “most...came about in the breakup of three communities” (Price 1987:17). Thus, in Price’s observation, headmen expend a lot of energy arranging marriages to extend their groups, explaining why marriage is a major cause of movement; the majority of group movements result when a headman’s system of cooperation has broken down and the village breaks up.

Of the three villages Price observed breaking up, in only one case does the issue of hunting come up. One village broke up after the leader died, and each faction the dead headman had assembled into his village went off in its own direction. A second had accumulated by an SIL settlement; after the expulsion of SIL in 1977, the village that had formed about the mission broke up. In the third case, a large village formed by another mission; “a few years later, when the leader of the dominant faction decided to move to a place that had richer soil and more abundant game, another faction, which had been grumbling for several years, chose to stay behind” (Price 1987:17). Thus, access to hunt

and good soil does play a role in decisions to move; but it is not the major cause of movements, nor does it seem a requirement for headmanship. Since ecological causes are not the primary motives for residence-shifting, the time between moves is not linked to the timing of game or soil depletion: Price observed that “12 per cent. of the sample had moved after the first six years, and after twelve years, 25 per cent. had moved” (Price 1987:10), showing a longer duration of settlement than we might predict if we took only ecological variables into account. Price concludes that Lévi-Strauss “may have exaggerated the rapidity with which groups come together and fall apart (Price 1987:18). In fact, Clastres and Lévi-Strauss may have missed much of the fine detail which post-structuralist political ethnography can produce. The finer detail provides a wealth of new motives and causes for residential movements that must be incorporated into a more complex model with greater predictive value.

If we consider only the data presented in this chapter—entirely consisting of emic statements on motives behind changes of residence—it must be concluded that improved access to game and good soils is not the main goal pursued in Marubo residential movements. There are three cases of ecological factors being a consideration in residential movements. The clearest is the case of Aldeia São Salvador, moved in the 1990s to São Sebastião in response to soil depletion. Secondly, the movement of Firmino and his family from Vida Nova to the new village of São Sebastião had the stated reason of accessing better hunting and fishing areas. Third, one of the reasons stated for Mashẽpa’s fission from Wanõpa was to maintain access to good hunting. Note, however, that even in these cases our expectations about timing are confounded. São Salvador did move due to soil depletion, but not after 2 years, rather after 20 years. Likewise, Firmino

had inhabited Vida Nova since 1978 before moving to São Sebastião in 1993, an interval of fifteen years. The fission of Mashẽpa from Wanõpa followed a counter-intuitive pattern as well. After fifteen years in a location with good hunt, Wanõpa executed a move to a location that was experiencing game depletion. This occasioned the fission, as his brother's son decided to remain near the hunt. But Mashẽpa's decision to remain near the hunt must be considered in the context of the elder Wanõpa's decision to move regardless of game access. The actual settlement leader here—Wanõpa—specifically ignored issues of access to game. Furthermore, Mashẽpa's fission was due to his father's brother's divorce as much as due to the stated ecological causes.

Conversations with informants suggest that access to game has not been a motivation for Marubo to change residence, at least since before the rubber boom. When I asked Pedro Barbosa, approximately 45 years of age in 1997, whether or not Marubo moved to improve access to meat, he said that to his knowledge no Marubo had ever moved for that reason alone. Instead, they moved to avoid rubber traders and slavers, then because of the clash with the Mayoruna. In the 1970s and later they moved due to the arrival of FUNAI and the mission. But he denied that Marubo shifted residence to overcome game depletion. When I pressed him on the issue, he said that he did think his ancestors moved like that, before the rubber boom pressure. Nevertheless, in his experience it was not a common cause of movement. Pedro's statement interested me more after I heard a Kanamari man at a meeting in Atalaia do Norte arguing that they needed a large area demarcated because they, 'as Indians', moved around every five years or so as game is depleted. This was evidence that a neighboring indigenous group did practice hunt-related residential shifting, but the Marubo did not. I then questioned

the chief's son, Txanõpa, on this subject. Txanõpa was explaining his project for agricultural development. He wanted an agricultural technician to spend five years among them, training indigenous people in agrotechnology. He was planning to get FUNAI and the NGOs to seek out funding for a resident agrotech specialist. I told him that if they turned to commercial farming, they would have to clear large areas around the village. Access to game near Maronal was already very difficult, I said; this would make it much worse. Txanõpa replied that that did not matter to him. He said they were willing to trade easy access to game for agricultural development. He said that when they clearcut plantations, they would switch to domesticated animals as a source of meat. Since they would have money, they could buy gasoline, and if they wanted to hunt they would travel a day or two from the village. Txanõpa's mindframe goes a long way towards explaining Wanõpa's move to Aldeia Maronal, away from the better hunting grounds and towards a depleted area. Simply speaking, the advantages to be derived from development are considered greater than the disadvantage of distant game resources. Access to game and avoidance of game depletion are not, therefore, major considerations in explaining Marubo residential movements.

It is true that ecological factors cannot be ruled out as a cause of residential movements until quantitative data on game and soil depletion are obtained. This is because although the reasons given by informants for most changes of residence are not ecological, hypothetically it is possible that game and soil depletion play a role in determining when non-ecological causes become sufficiently potent that a move is actually effected. In other words, there may be a correlation between game and soil depletion and other causes, such that other causes result in actual movements more

frequently when an ecological cause is also present than otherwise. Such a correlation is purely hypothetical given the absence of data, but is a possibility nevertheless. In the absence of such data, however, informant statements on causes of movements are all there is to build a set of explanatory hypotheses on, and in informants' statements ecological causes are quite rare.

If the ecological factors that were expected to play a significant role in causing residence shifting did not in fact do so, then what are the main causes? Several patterns emerged from the data, facilitating the isolation of explanatory categories.

(1) External warfare and conflict. In the oral histories, this is the main cause of Marubo residential movements. The continual pressure from rubber merchants and workers (and from Indians allied to the rubber workers) forced relocations and flight, leading to the isolation of Marubo between the Curuçá and Ituí Rivers for at least forty years. After their missionaries initiated a second phase of contact in the 1950s, an armed conflict with the Mayoruna became a main cause for the relocation of many remaining Marubo to the Ituí River.

(2) Internal conflict. Conflicts among Marubo have played a significant role in generating the current configuration of Marubo population. The main incidence of this is in the incident of conflict which contributed, along with the Mayoruna conflict, to the relocation of Marubo to the Ituí River in the 1960s. There are also the incidents in oral history involving violence among proto-Marubo –*náwavo* during the rubber boom. Finally, I received a second-hand (thus unverified) report of an incident in which a Curuçá man caught his brother with his wife, retaliated violently, then left to live on the Ituí River. These are the only three cases of residential shifting due to physical violence

among Marubo. It has played an important role, nevertheless, because it led to what is still today the major intra-Marubo division: that between the Ituí Marubo and the Curuçá Marubo.

(3) Invitations to move. There are several instances of one person inviting others to move from where they are to where the inviter is. These cases have played a very significant role in Marubo demographic and geographic history. We may discern three major cycles of invitations and resulting demographic concentrations. Firstly, there is the semi-legendary Marubo leader Txoki, mentioned above. Informants said he lived before the rubber boom, had the largest swidden ever, invited everyone to come live nearby, and threw large feasts. After Txoki's death, those who had aggregated near him dispersed. The rubber boom came shortly thereafter. The second phase of invitations and concentration came after the rubber boom. The leader given credit for this is João Tuxáua. João Tuxáua's son José Barbosa told me João had gone searching for survivors of the rubber boom throughout the upper Curuçá, Javari, and Pardo River area, and gathered them together at the inaccessible headwaters of the Arrojo River. It was there that the entire Marubo nation remained in isolation for forty years. The third phase of invitations and concentration is that which led to the formation of Aldeia Maronal. João Tuxáua's son Alfredo built his *shovo*, then invited his father and brothers to relocate from the Igarapé Maronal. Alfredo then invited his brother José to relocate, and the aging João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to relocate. A number of other people have since moved to the area (as described in detail above). There are at least two other instances of invitation: the journey made by Sinãpa to Cruzeiro do Sul to invite his sister's son Ronípa to return

to Marubo land; and the invitation of Saide to his wife's brother José Nascimento filho to come live at Aldeia São Sebastião.

(4) Attraction to non-indigenous presence in indigenous land. There are at least three Marubo villages that are results of attraction to foci of non-indigenous settlement. Aldeia São Sebastião is the result of a recent relocation by the residents of Aldeia São Salvador. São Salvador was the location of the FUNAI post on the Curuçá River, first populated by non-indigenous men married to indigenous women. The establishment of the FUNAI post at the Igarapé São Salvador led to the splintering of the *shovo* of Aurélio and of Domingo, and the departure of Carlos, Wanõpa and Misael from the Igarapé Surubim down to the Curuçá River. The FUNAI presence also influenced Alfredo to relocate to the Curuçá River, to which he attracted all the people then remaining in the Marubo's post-rubber boom headwaters refuge. The second example is Aldeia Rio Novo. Aldeia Rio Novo formed around FUNAI's P.I.A. Ituí. This resulted in the movement of the residents of Paulo's *shovo* and Arnaldo's tapiris to the middle Ituí River, and the fission of Saípapa and his family from Mariano's *shovo*. The third example is aldeia Vida Nova, which formed around the New Tribes Mission on the Ituí River in the 1960s. These 'attracted' villages have distinctive political characteristics, which will be discussed below.

(5) Desire for independence. The desire for independence is most clearly evident in the residential history of José Barbosa, as he expressed this motivation to explain why he left his father's house to Joãozinho's, then to a tapiri by his father-in-law's *shovo*, and then to his own *shovo*, at which point he settled down for fifteen years. Alfredo expressed this motivation when he explained that he did not want to go where FUNAI

was, but rather preferred to develop his own site, which became Aldeia Maronal. The residents of Carlos' *shovo* and some of the residents of Domingo's *shovo* relocated to Vicente's settlement after the breakup of their Igarapé Surubim residences; however, all of these ended up moving to their own sites. Both residents of Sinãpa's and of Wanõpa's *shovo* told me that they had not wanted to live in someone else's (i.e., Vicente's) settlement, but preferred to have their own. We may also cite the fission of the Varináwavo from José Barbosa's coresident group, as a result of Jaime/Mayãpa's desire for independence. Also in this category may be placed phenomena of anicular residence, which are results of the desire for independence on the part of women. For example, Mashẽpa's *shovo* is the residence of two divorced women who live with some of their children but away from their husbands. This is equally the case at Mashkãpa's *shovo* on the Ituí River, and to a lesser extent several other Ituí *shovo*, as has been argued in Chapter Four. Finally, we may also note the instances of divorce and non-marriage tabulated in Chapter Four, results of female dissatisfaction with virilocal marriages. Anicular residence, divorce, and non-marriage all represent female impulses to maximum independence. Socially, this may also be interpreted as representing the strong attraction of the uterine family against weaker bonds of marriage. Much of anicular residence represents a re-formation of the uterine family in one place after years of dispersal due to marriages in multiple localities. In these cases, the focus of attraction is not a male leader but rather an elderly woman who is the mother of multiple adults with children of their own.

(6) Uxorilocality on the Ituí River. Since this chapter has focused on leadership of group movements, postmarital residence, as a typically individual phenomenon, was

not included. Postmarital residence and systems of marriage-partner exchange will be analyzed in a subsequent chapter on the political economy of people. However, uxorilocality on the Ituí River is a social phenomenon that has an impact on residential shifting processes at the group level. In many cases of uxorilocality on the Ituí River, the in-marrier is older than his wife's brothers. The uxorilocally married man often becomes the man with the second highest status in the *shovo*, relegating the sons of the *shovo*-owner to tertiary status (e.g., Eduardo at Ronípapa's, Simão at Txumãpa's, Raomayápa at José Nascimento velho's, Wakanawa at Vimípa's). There are several examples of uxorilocal succession, where leadership of a settlement passes from a man to his daughter's husband (Raomayápa, Vimípa, Mariano). In several of these cases, the son(s) of the original *shovo*-owner fission off to form independent residence, in contexts where succession is passing over them to favor their sisters' husbands (e.g., Nicanor, José Nascimento filho, Saípapa, Wakanawa, Alberto). These multiple cases of relocation of sons passed over by uxorilocal succession have had the effect of leading to at least four independent *shovo* and to the perpetuation of Vimípa's *shovo*. Saípapa and his family, for example, have become an integral part of the social system at Aldeia Rio Novo, with their own *shovo*.

(7) Attraction to superior health, transportation, education, and communications facilities. This category may be distinguished from category (4), above, by the centrality of indigenous agency. Under this category I place the motivations which have made Alfredo's Aldeia Maronal such a successful focus for the relocation of others. José Barbosa and Wanópa relocated to Aldeia Maronal due to a perception that these qualities, built up through Alfredo's community development projects (see Chapter Six), made

Aldeia Maronal a better place to live than where they currently were. Both of these people suffered fission of much of their coresident group when they relocated to Aldeia Maronal, but they relocated anyway. It is difficult for anyone who has moved to Aldeia Maronal to move elsewhere, because Maronal's health facilities are very advantageous, particularly the efficient, MSF-formed malaria treatment system, where indigenous youth are microscopists, diagnosticians, and administrators of remedies. It should be noted that there is another factor affecting the attractiveness of Aldeia Maronal, namely the ability to participate in a large system of labor exchange, so that it is generally possible to add to one's own labor force by inviting others in return for feeding the guest-workers and for assuming a diffuse obligation to return the labor when called upon. These processes, and Alfredo's superior ability in organization of labor, will be discussed in another chapter.

(8) Attraction to members of the opposite sex. The intricate social patterning of postmarital residence will receive its discussion in a subsequent chapter.

The data presented in this chapter thus reveal at least eight categories of causes of residential movements, of which ecological causes are only one. Even the category of ecological causes for residence shifting does not have the expected impact on movement timing, as explained above. Marubo residential movements do show definite patterns, are subject to regularly recurring forces and influences, and thus can be understood and explained, as I hope this chapter has done. The explanation, however, is a multicausal one in which ecological factors play a notable but not predominant role.

Conclusions on Leadership of Residential Movements.

The third category of differences between the Marubo data and the Clastrean model is in the sociostructural position of individuals who lead residential movements. Any statement that headmen determine group movements lacks explanatory power in the Marubo case. The Clastrean model cannot handle these data. The headman's ability to determine group movements is, in Clastres and Lévi-Strauss, related to his superior ability in survival activities. But the determination of where the best soils and hunt are is not a significant factor in Marubo leadership of residential movements. Successful Marubo leaders render decisions based on an intricate web of considerations; their ability to lead movements is more often predicated on skill in the fields of interethnic relations, indigenous social relations, organization of labor, and other skills. True, the ability to organize labor for economic prosperity is one of the key skills a leader must have to attract and lead others, but only one. In the Marubo case, not only is the ability of headmen to lead residential movements not predicated exclusively on survival skills, but the headman does not simply 'lead' residential movements at all. In fact, leadership of residential movements can come from a variety of positions in the social system.

(1) *Follower-led moves.* We have seen at least two examples of what I call "follower-led moves". In these cases, all components of a leader's coresident group leave, and the actual settlement leader follows afterwards. The primary example is the *shovo* of Aurélio, which lost successively Santiago and his family, then Saide and Lauro, then Sebastião, Américo, César and Wilson. Depleted of coresidents and with his labor force gone, Aurélio followed to São Salvador. Some fifteen years later, he went to town for medical treatment, returning to find his eldest son had moved to Aldeia Maronal and

his wife and the rest of his children had followed. Once again, he followed those who are sociostructurally his followers. The second case is that of Rio Novo, where, as we have seen, Paulo's *shovo* was reduced in population and labor force when some of its most significant social components relocated to the new FUNAI post. Eventually, Paulo followed.

Both cases of follower-led movement present similar social characteristics and similar results in terms of the social organization of political succession. Both Aurélio's and Paulo's *shovo* had uxorilocal/avuncular social composition. In Aurélio's case, he had a number of sister's sons, and he also had a brother-in-law married to his sister and a man married to his sister's daughter. In this type of situation, the second-highest ranking male in the settlement is the leader's oldest nephew (in this particular case, Sebastião). When the movement to Aldeia São Salvador was made, Sebastião was made headman by consensus. Thus, there was an inversion of leadership accompanying the movement. In Paulo's case, there is a similar process: Paulo lived with his brother's sons who were also his daughters' husbands. These individuals moved to Rio Novo, eventually followed by their erstwhile leader Paulo. At the new location, one of Paulo's sons-in-law, Kanipa (Mario) became headman. Thus, there was an inversion of leadership accompanying the move to Rio Novo. We may conclude that both cases of follower-led movement took place under conditions of uxorilocal and avuncular social composition, and resulted in accelerated political successions.

(2) *Political successors' moves.* A residential change may specifically mark a political succession. An excellent example of this is in the new *shovo* being constructed by Raomayápa at Vida Nova. José Nascimento velho was living in the same *shovo* in

1998 as he was in 1978 when Melatti visited. In the interval, he had grown too old for effective leadership. Meanwhile, his son-in-law Raomayãpa had aged, and his family prospered so that he had become a widely recognized leader. Several of José Nascimento's sons had left to found *shovo* elsewhere, leaving the line of political succession uncontested to Raomayãpa. By the time of my visit in 1997-98, it was evident that Raomayãpa was the *de facto* leader. He was, in January 1998, directing the construction of a new *shovo* which would be known as his own. This construction did not represent fission, as it was the intention of everybody to move to the new site as soon as possible, the old one being in a state of terminal decay. The new construction simply represented the consummation of a peaceful political succession.

(3) *Subgroup fissions.* Among the most common types of move are those in which one subgroup of a larger coresident group leaves to find residence elsewhere. This is the case in the follower-led moves described above, though those have special characteristics. Better examples are the move of Saípapa and his family from Mariano's *shovo* to Aldeia Rio Novo; the movement of Firmino and his family from his father Américo's *shovo* to Vida Nova; the division of both Aldeia Liberdade and Aldeia Alegria into two *shovo* from their original single-*shovo* situations; the movement of Wasinawa with one wife and several children from Floriano's *shovo* to Aldeia Maronal; and the fissioning of Américo's coresident group into the *shovo* of Vimipa on the one hand, and of Alberto on the other hand. All these cases are explained in detail in the text of this chapter.

(4) *Fission by refusal to move when the leader does.* Like follower-led moves, this could be regarded as a kind of sub-group fission, but its special characteristics and

political consequences require a separate discussion. In the data there are four evident examples of this type of move. When Wanõpa decided to move near to the mission at Aldeia Maronal, a set of his former coresidents decided not to move with him. Those who stayed behind were led by Wanõpa's brother's son Mashẽpa. Following Wanõpa's move, Mashẽpa became a *shovo ivo*; about three years later, Mashẽpa directed the construction of his own *shovo*, moving out of Wanõpa's old *shovo* and thus cementing his role as *shovo ivo*. It should be noted that Mashẽpa, at age 29 in 1997, was the youngest *shovo ivo* on the upper Curuçá and could not have accessed that status so early without staying behind when the sociostructural leader of the settlement decided to move. The second example is in the Varináwavo refusal to move with José Barbosa to Aldeia Maronal. As described above, Jaime (Mayãpa) wanted his own *shovo* and took the opportunity of José's move to fission his brothers off from the avuncular arrangement they were in. Note that, unlike in category (3), above, what is involved in fission here is not going elsewhere, but rather staying put when someone else goes elsewhere. Like Mashẽpa, Jaime built his own *shovo* some three years later, thus cementing his *shovo ivo* status. The third example of this type of fission is in the dispersal of Domingo's *shovo* after Cassimiro's move to São Salvador. Rather than following the leader to the FUNAI post on the middle Curuçá, at least two uterine families stayed behind on the upper Curuçá, both eventually to form their own *shovo* (see Figure 5.7.b). Finally, when Paulo's *shovo* splintered and almost all its residents moved to the middle Curuçá, Txumãpa stayed behind, moved to a nearby site, directed the building of a *shovo*, and established himself as independent *shovo ivo*. It is clear, therefore, that refusal to follow

the leader's instructions vis-à-vis residential movements can lead to one becoming leader oneself.

(5) *Integral moves.* There are three examples of entire settlements relocating from one place to another without splintering at all. All three cases are on the Ituí River, and no interview data exists to supply context on the leadership of the movements. In the first place, Paulino's *shovo* is shown by Melatti in 1974 as being on the east bank of the Ituí, while in 1997-98 it was on the west bank, indicating a move had taken place. Comparative census data indicates that this *shovo* had not undergone fissions or dispersals, so we may assume that whoever led the movement did so with complete success. Unfortunately it is not possible at present to specifically identify the leader of this move, as there are, in addition to Paulino, several other people in that socially complex *shovo* who could have influenced the decision. There is a similar situation in the case of Sherōpapa's *shovo* at Aldeia Paraná. Paraná is the direct descendant of Mariano's *shovo*. In Melatti's 1974 observation, Mariano was upstream from the Igarapé Água Branca, in effect the furthest upstream of any Ituí Marubo. By 1998, there had been an inversion, as Aldeia Paraná was located downstream from Água Branca, and the descendants of Américo's *shovo* were furthest upstream. This indicates that the settlement was relocated at some point, though again specifics on context are not known. The third example is in Aldeia Liberdade. According to an informant, at several instances in the past this entire settlement has been relocated following the deaths of important people. Apparently, the individual responsible for the direction of these moves was Reissamon, the old leader (†1996). However, details are not known. The sparsity of data on these three moves is a result of flawed execution of the methodology of this

research, as the emphasis of inquiries was the explanation of differences between the 1974 and 1998 censuses; when the differences were not socio-compositional but merely geographic, they escaped my notice, until late in fieldwork they were brought to my attention. It should be noted, to be fair, that these cases are more cogent with Lévi-Straussian notions than most others reviewed, so that it might seem that data contrary to my conclusions is being excluded. However, there are only three cases of this type of move in the data, and this is by no means the commonest type, nor the most significant type as regards explaining empirical reality.

(6) *Invitations and attraction.* Under this category is the unique (in these data) way in which Alfredo assembled Aldeia Maronal. This process received detailed description above. Alfredo's pattern of village formation is consistent with patterns described in oral histories for other leaders (João Tuxáua, Txoki); it is also consistent with social norms and ideals expressed to me by elders, including Alfredo himself, on several occasions. It must therefore be considered normative by Marubo standards. But for all its presence in Marubo social ideals, Alfredo's strategy has not been successfully pursued except by Alfredo himself. In the data reviewed above, a leader is successful if he avoids the fissions and accelerated successions that occur so commonly. Thus, Paulino has avoided fissions and at least once managed to relocate the entire group without suffering significant losses. But in the Marubo social game there is quite a difference between avoiding losses and accumulating gains. Paulino, for all his relative success, had still only one *shovo* in his village. Alfredo, after fissioning and establishing his own *shovo*, attracted first his former coresidents, then his brother José and his affine Wanópa; from there a number of other elements accreted until this was the largest of any

Marubo village. In the other three cases of substantial villages accreting around an attractive focus, that attractive focus is either the mission or FUNAI. In the cases of São Sebastião and Rio Novo, it is FUNAI; at Vida Nova it is the mission. Alfredo invited the mission to establish itself at Aldeia Maronal, and this replicated the centripetal force that exists at Vida Nova. But there was a key difference. Alfredo had chosen the place, founded the settlement and invited the mission. Elsewhere, the spot had been chosen by non-indigenous people, to whom the indigenous people had been attracted. This had significant political consequences, as will shortly be explained.

We must distinguish Alfredo's attraction of entire *shovo* to his village from the more common practice of attracting people through marriage. Indeed, in Price's exposition of Nambiquara residential moves (Price 1987), leaders are seen to spend considerable efforts on arranging marriages so as to expand their coresident groups, a situation also encountered in Mentore (1987) and elsewhere. Uxorilocality on the Ituí River is an example of this, and it is a common enough phenomenon in the Amazonianist literature. Yet in attraction through marriage, an individual or two at most are gained. Alfredo's invitations to move are quite different. Alfredo invites the leaders of other settlements to relocate their entire coresident groups to a location adjacent to where Alfredo lives. In cases of marriage, a leader must negotiate postmarital residence with the other leader, often as part of an intricate intergenerational exchange pattern, with a resulting net loss or gain of personnel that is limited in scope.

Conclusions: effects of village formation processes on political power of village leaders

There is a clear correlation in the data between the pattern of establishment of a Marubo village and the extent of its leader's power. A leader who is also the founder of a village has power in certain fields of social action, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. Leaders who are not founders of the village lack the claim to 'ownership' and cannot make a legitimate claim to speak for the entire village. The process whereby a Marubo village comes into existence is thus an essential distinction to consider in seeking for an explanation for variations in the extent of leaders' power. In the available data, only leaders who are founders of the village they lead have power.

The difference may be seen by comparing Aldeia Maronal with aldeia Vida Nova. The founder of Maronal is the Marubo man Alfredo, himself the son of the main post-rubber boom leader, João Tuxáua. In virtue of having founded the settlement and attracted others to live nearby him, he becomes the legitimate mouthpiece and ultimate decision-making authority for the village. Thus, issues which can have only one outcome have the outcome Alfredo wants; empirical evidence for this will be presented in Chapter Six. The contrary example is aldeia Vida Nova, where the founder/attractor role is played by the New Tribes missionaries. There are five *shovo* at aldeia Vida Nova, of which two (Mashkāpa, Nicanor) are offshoots of an older one (José Nascimento velho). The *shovo* of Pekōpapa, Txumāpa, and José Nascimento are results of independent movements by separate groups to be near a non-indigenous focus of attraction. There is no indigenous person at Vida Nova who can claim to have founded the village, to 'own' it (i.e., be the *ivo* in Marubo language), nor to be the sole legitimate mouthpiece. In situations where there are disagreements among the multiple indigenous leaders at Vida

Nova, they tend to neutralize one another so that nobody wins, whereas at Aldeia Maronal Alfredo has a tendency to win conflicts repeatedly.

The difference in power between Vida Nova and Maronal leaders is clearly manifest in the differing relations of authority that exist between Marubo and the mission. At Vida Nova, the mission ‘owns’ the airstrip and determines policy regarding its use. At Maronal, the mission must request permission from Alfredo to initiate modifications because Aldredo is the ‘owner’. Detailed evidence of this difference will be presented in Chapter Six.

The difference between Maronal and Vida Nova is replicated on an even larger scale in the difference between the upper Ituí and the upper Curuçá. Recall from Chapter Four that on the upper Ituí there are fifteen *shovo* with 370 people, while on the upper Curuçá, until the burning of Pekôpa’s *shovo*, there were twelve *shovo* with 220 people. If we consider the distance from Alegria, the lowermost upper Ituí village, to Liberdade, the last village upstream with a radio, we have eleven *shovo* with 277 people. The distance from Alegria to Liberdade is only slightly longer than that from Mashêpa’s *shovo* to Sinâpa’s at Maronal, and the population is comparable. Yet from Alegria to Liberdade are no fewer than eight leaders. There is no unified leadership. Alegria has two leaders, and thus no headman; Aldeia Praia has its own headman/founder/leader; aldeia Vida Nova, as mentioned, has a multiplicity of leaders but no indigenous headman; and Aldeia Liberdade has its own headman. The difference may be attributed to formation processes. The upper Ituí was settled by a number of independent leaders after the incidents of conflict on the Igarapé Maronal c. 1964. Américo, Mariano, Reissamon, the brothers Lauro and Antônio Brasil, and the settlers of Vida Nova all founded new and

independent settlements in a place (the Ituí River) that had not been inhabited by Marubo since the rubber boom. There was not one but many founders. The upper Ituí from its inception has thus been politically atomized, whereas the upper Curuçá has been politically unified. The difference in processes whereby each area was settled explains the differences in political dynamics. These differences in turn have consequences in numerous areas of social life, particularly cooperation in labor. Alfredo has occasionally drawn on the entire upper Curuçá workforce for major community projects, and the results of that labor feed back in to the attractiveness of the village, making him a more effective founder/attractor and causing people to relocate to be nearer to Alfredo. Alfredo thus found himself in 1997-98 in a pattern of increasing village size and expanding influence. On the other hand, organization of labor on the Maronal scale did not occur on the upper Ituí. Multiple-*shovo* cooperation for feasts (hunting, path-clearing, carrying the signal drum, etc.) did occur on the Ituí, but never community projects like the building of the airstrip at Maronal. The consequences of this are discussed at the end of Chapter Six.

The data reviewed in this chapter reveal a third type of leader aside from those represented at Maronal and Vida Nova. Maronal has one founder and one leader. Vida Nova has no indigenous founder and no indigenous headman. At Aldeia São Sebastião there is no indigenous founder but there is an indigenous headman, appointed by the indigenous settlers through a consensus process. If there is a founder at São Sebastião, it is Santiago Comapa, but he is a non-indigenous man who moved to the area to found a FUNAI post. Subsequently, a number of Marubo moved to the FUNAI post, 1974-1978. At some point thereafter Shetäpa, the eldest of a set of four brothers that fissioned from

Aurélio, was appointed headman. The word I translate as *appointed* is the Portuguese word ‘colocaram’, ‘they placed’. The qualities of this leader are not discussed in Chapter Six so a brief discussion is relevant here.

Shetāpa was headman over multiple *shovo*, but he was headman by consensus, not by right of foundation and ownership. This correlates with the range of his authority as headman. He spoke for the village at meetings of the political organization, CIVAJA (CIVAJA co-founder Clóvis was married to two of Shetāpa’s daughters). He was in fact expected to represent and speak for the village in relations with FUNAI, missionaries, and other representatives of the non-indigenous social system. But in several cases of conflict that occurred in the village, he did not assert his authority. For a time, there was a set of people at São Sebastião who traded forest products (especially peccary and tapir meat and salted *pirarucú* fish) and access to the indigenous hunting areas for commodities (salt, ammunition, clothes, tobacco, batteries, liquor) to the roving merchants (*regatões*) whose presence was technically forbidden. From CIVAJA’s headquarters in Atalaia, Clóvis advised his wives’ father that the *regatões* were harmful to the long-term prosperity of the Marubo because they contributed to resource depletion. Shetāpa expressed his opinion and advised those involved of the ill consequences of the relation to *regatões*, but the relation continued unabated because a number of the village’s social components benefited from it. In all this, Shetāpa acted like a classic Clastrean leader: he was leader by consensus; he contributed words containing interpretations of Marubo ethics applied to particular situations (the notion that Indians care for resources while whites deplete them has filtered in through the indigenous political organizations). But he lacked authority to enforce his opinion. There is thus evidence

that Shetāpa did not have the ability to impose his will in cases of conflict. I have no examples of him imposing his will on others, but several of his failing to do so. This distinguishes him from Alfredo, for whom there are several cases of victory in conflicts of will.

The case of São Sebastião is significant because it does closely conform to traditional expectations of Amazonian headmanship, while the case of Maronal does not. The process whereby each village was founded and the differing role of the leaders in those processes seem the determinative factors in explaining this difference. This suggests that the consensus leadership analyzed by Clastres, and which forms the basis for his proposals of an egalitarian *nature* to Amazon Indian society, is but one type of leadership. In the Marubo social system, we observe consensus-appointed leaders like Shetāpa (and Ronipapa at Liberdade) operating side by side with a founder-attractor like Alfredo. Both forms of leadership are cogent with Marubo social organization and social norms. It cannot be said that one or the other is the “essential Marubo structure” and its converse an aberration. Instead both forms of leadership must be seen as surface manifestations of potentialites inherent to the Marubo social deep structure. They are like different sentences constructed with the same social grammar.

We are thus presented with clear evidence for a correlation between type of village formation process, role of leader in village formation process, and power level of leader. Constructing a typology of Marubo leaders based on these criteria is useful in representing a possible explanation for differing levels of power and authority. The types of leaders, classified according to role in village formation process, are:

(1) Founder/attractor. Alfredo founded his village, then attracted a number of others to live there, thus establishing multiple-*shovo* leadership. Alfredo has more power than any other Marubo leader.

(2) Simple founder/leader by fission. These are individuals who either split off from an existing *shovo* (e.g., the individual leaders of the Ituí River after the resettling of the Ituí) or stayed behind when their *shovo* moved (e.g., Mashẽpa, Txumãpa). Their authority is limited to one *shovo*. Paulino is an example of having founder status but not attractor: he founded an independent residence, but never attracted another *shovo* to enlarge his village. He maintains authority over a single *shovo*.

(3) Consensus leader. There are two consensus leaders among the Marubo. At São Sebastião, Shetãpa was appointed headman in avillage with no indigenous founder. At Aldeia Liberdade, Ronipapa was appointed leader after the founder's death. In both cases, the appointed headman has titular multiple-*shovo* authority, and in both cases, that authority is very limited and no 'power' (repeated imposition of will) is observed. It is significant to note that although São Sebastião was founded as the result of attraction to a FUNAI post, resulting in the existence of a village with no founder and hence no leader, at Liberdade the same situation occurred when an indigenous founder died. The existence of consensus-based leadership is thus not necessarily predicated on the founder-less quality of villages formed by attraction to non-indigenous foci. This type of leadership seems to emerge where there is no founder, whether the situation involves interethnic contact or not.

(4) Leader by succession. This applies to uxorilocal successors such as Vimipa at Água Branca or Raomayãpa at Vida Nova, and to agnatic successors such as

Sherōpapa at Aldeia Paraná. In every case, succession is accompanied by fission, as in the fission of Alberto from Vimipa when the latter succeeded Américo; the fission of Nicanor and José Nascimento filho as Raomayāpa succeeded his wife's father; and the loss of personnel suffered by Aldeia Paraná compared to the social composition in the times of the current leader's father.

It should be noted that this typology is not totally inclusive as there are cases of poorly understood leadership transitions (e.g., Rio Novo). However, it goes a long way towards explaining the observed differences in levels of power among Marubo leaders.

The mention of levels of power demands a consideration of the extent to which power has been observed in the field of social action reviewed in this chapter. The answer is, it has not really been observed at all. The residential movements reviewed in this chapter reveal a predominance of individual autonomy over leaders' control. Rarely are residential shifts observed to be directed by the leader and include the whole group. Instead, subgroups within any given coresident group determine their own paths when they disagree with the choice the leader makes. Women are seen to have a considerable amount of independence, too, as the phenomenon of anicular residence demonstrates. In the situations where one leader accumulates large followings, it is by means of invitations to other leaders to move. Those invited leaders render their own decisions based on their own judgment of benefits; no coercion, force, or power is involved in these relocations. But it is in this field of social action that we find the *basis* for power in other fields. The role of founder gives a leader power in the field of relations to non-indigenous people, as the data to be presented in the next chapter will show.

CHAPTER SIX

RELATIONSHIPS TO NON-INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

A. Introduction

The analysis of data on relationships between Marubo and non-indigenous people is a major source of information on Marubo politics. The set of data “relationships with non-indigenous people” is considered in this study a field of choice within which individuals may choose a course of action from among several options open to them. The social structure typically does not determine choices in this field, because said field offers new options to the Marubo much faster than the structural norms can be adjusted to set new rules of behavior. By observing sequences of individual choices over time, I endeavored to construct a picture of the goals and strategies such individuals were pursuing in this field of choice. These data are applied to understanding Marubo politics as follows:

- (1) Is the access of people to the goals pursued equal, or is there differential access to valued goals?
- (2) Are there conflicts of will concerning the pursuit of goals, or the strategies to be used? If so, who emerges victorious, is this a result of the exercise of power, and are there patterns of repeated victory in conflicts of will?

- (3) When multiple individuals make a common decision in this field of choice, what is the basis of such a decision? Are some people's choices based on the exercise of power by other people?

There are at present several groups of non-indigenous people interacting with the Marubo. Each of these groups has its own institutional goals, and the individuals that compose them also have their own individual goals. The goals of different groups of non-indigenous people are often in conflict, but there are also frequent cases of cooperation on particular issues. The Marubo often find ways to benefit from the policies of these groups, but since the policies do not agree with one another, the policy that benefits one person may threaten another, and vice-versa. Marubo cooperate with non-indigenous groups both out of agreement with the group's goals; but also out of agreement between Marubo individuals' goals and the institutional goals of the non-indigenous groups, or its individual members. It is common to find that a Marubo's main strategy for prestige, leadership, and security within his own society is based on contact with non-indigenous groups. This field of choice should be seen as a field of dynamic tensions among multiple goals and agendas, indigenous and non-indigenous, institutional and individual.

B. Options for Interaction with Non-Indigenous People

The options available for interacting with non-indigenous groups may be categorized according to the various groups available for the establishment of relations. Within the indigenous area are two permanently established evangelical Christian missions; a lone missionary acting as schoolteacher; a FUNAI post in a Marubo village, and another in a Matís village some four hours by river from a Marubo village. During the time of my fieldwork, there was also myself and, on the Ituí river, an ethno-musicologist. Less permanent are visits to the area by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and National Health Foundation (FNS) teams and by regional traders. The Marubo can communicate with the outside thanks to the multiple radios installed by CIVAJA and FUNAI, or by travelling to Cruzeiro do Sul by foot (5 days) or to Atalaia do Norte by boat (10 days). Outside the area are such key institutions as the CIVAJA and FUNAI headquarters in Atalaia, mission headquarters in Cruzeiro, schools, hospitals, and markets, all of which are essential aspects of the Marubo sphere of social action. To the Marubo, how to relate to these groups at all levels is a major issue of concern, discussion and action.

1. New Tribes Mission

The New Tribes Mission is the only non-indigenous group with permanent settlements within the bounds of Marubo land. The Marubo were first visited by these missionaries in the 1950s, when they were still living in the remote headwaters of the Curuçá's affluents. At that time the missionaries were temporary travellers staying only a few months. The first permanent mission was established in the 1960s after the Marubo

re-occupied the Ituí. A number of Marubo decided to build their residences adjacent to the mission in order to take advantage of the material goods and health care, and, later, some education, that were available at the mission. The village thus formed focused on the Ituí mission and came to be called aldeia Vida Nova.

When I visited Vida Nova in December 1997 the mission compound was a very substantial feature. There were three pairs of missionaries, each a married couple. Mr. John Jansma was the head missionary, having visited the area since the 1960s and resided at Vida Nova permanently for some 25 years. Jansma's house was technologically outfitted like any normal American house, except that the power came from solar panels and butane gas canisters. There was a refrigerator, modern kitchen, running water, television, computer, and ham radio set. All this elicited considerable commentary among the Marubo, who had none of these things and were thus faced with a miniature-scale reproduction of Brazil's social inequalities.

In addition to Jansma, there was an auxiliary Canadian missionary whom I knew only by his first name—Gerard—and his wife. This man was removed by mission authorities in 1998 after his wife reported alleged repeated sexual encounters with Marubo women. The third missionary couple were Brazilian, the schoolteacher Vanderley Pena and his wife.

When FUNAI established control over the area in 1973-75, the mission was allowed to remain to provide health care and education to the Ituí Marubo, part of FUNAI's mission. As FUNAI's budget shrank over the next 25 years, authority became delegated by regional FUNAI authorities to Jansma, who became the *de facto* FUNAI-authorized controller for the upper Ituí. At the time of my fieldwork, regional FUNAI

had washed its hands of the upper Ituí, allowing Jansma to function as an authority with no oversight, accountability, or interference. Regional FUNAI authorities are happy just to have someone delivering health care and education there, since that liberates them from the need to be concerned about the area. As a result, for example, according to one informant, accusations of sexual misconduct by missionaries, including detailed reports of Gerard's activities, were ignored by the regional FUNAI administrator.

The mission at Ituí had a substantial pharmacy where health care was administered to the Marubo. The missionary model of health care differs greatly from that applied by MSF, and even FNS. The latter models rely on the transmission of information to indigenous people and the training of indigenous health assistants, resulting in indigenous autonomy. The missionary model is far more traditional, with Marubo coming to the mission to receive medicines rather than to be trained in how to administer medicines. For the 1960s, the missionary method was the standard; when compared to modern methods for health assistance to indigenous people, however, it seemed to foster dependency on the mission and maintain the mission's image as a purveyor of technologies beyond indigenous understanding.

The Ituí mission had (at least until I left and presumably still to this day) a schoolhouse where Marubo were given basic literacy training and taken as far as the equivalent of junior high school. The mission was never successful in taking Marubo to the end of primary education, nor in training indigenous schoolteachers. As in the case of the mission's health care practices where no indigenous health assistants were trained, the failure to train indigenous schoolteachers fostered continued dependency on the mission. There was considerable discussion among Ituí and Curuçá Marubo alike, and between

these and the mission, as to the reasons why the Ituí produced no indigenous schoolteachers as the Curuçá did. The mission placed blame on Marubo parents, while Marubo placed blame alternatively with other Marubo or with the mission.

John Jansma ran a small store out of his house at Vida Nova. A panel in an external wall swung open to form a window with a countertop, behind which Jansma had a stock of goods including clothes, percussion caps, lighters, fishing hooks, and a variety of other goods the Marubo found desirable. These goods were available for sale at inflated frontier prices factoring in the cost of the flight from Cruzeiro do Sul. The missionaries paid the Marubo to perform various forms of manual labor in return for minimum wage salaries, at the time of fieldwork the equivalent of four dollars a day. The money most often returned directly to the mission in return for the goods available there. The other missionaries also had their own stocks of goods. These were not always traded for money or labor, however: the missionary Gerard, according to informants, traded goods for sexual access, both directly with the women involved and with the parents of young girls. In addition to pharmacy, schoolhouse, and store, the mission held church services twice a week; held special bible study sessions with particular individuals; and had an airstrip built which received supplies on a fairly frequent basis.

The mission was invited to establish itself at Aldeia Maronal in 1992 by Alfredo, the *kakaya* (headman) of the village. The airstrip at Maronal was built by indigenous labor under Alfredo's direction, a significant difference with respect to Vida Nova. At Maronal there were two pairs of missionaries. The head missionary, Xavier Nunes, and his wife had been trained at Vida Nova by Jansma and both spoke fluent Marubo. The

auxiliary was Anibal Xavier, also married and with two daughters, all dwelling at the Maronal mission.

The Maronal mission had a pharmacy, schoolhouse, and store, held church services, and paid for regular supply and transportation flights to the Maronal airstrip. However, these activities were scaled down compared to Vida Nova. The technological disparities so evident at Vida Nova were lesser here, as the missionaries had not been settled at Maronal long enough to import such amenities. The Maronal missionaries were all Brazilian nationals, as opposed to the multinational contingent at Vida Nova. But the most important difference is the different distribution of authority at Maronal, where by various and often highly symbolic interactions, the Marubo acted to prevent Xavier Nunes from becoming the sort of entrenched authority John Jansma had become on the Ituí river.

To understand Marubo interactions with the mission, a frequent source of conflict and factionalization, it is necessary to consider what the mission's agenda is and what strategies they employed towards those ends. The New Tribes missionaries have a long-term plan for influencing and modifying Marubo culture in particular directions. The Marubo try to understand the mission's goals and strategies and use the missionaries to achieve their own ends. It is a field of social relations rife with political interactions.

The New Tribes missionaries believe first in the truth of their own religion, and as a corollary, in the falsehood of indigenous religion. This is opposed to the indigenous worldview, in which Christianity and indigenous beliefs are compatible. The Marubo syncretize their religion and the mission's, whereas the missionaries separate the two. As a result, the missionaries believe that Marubo healing practices, which involve the

invocation of spirits, are false. The missionaries believe that Marubo shamans, who go into a trance and report back on the nature of the supernatural realm, are either self-deluded or hucksters. Finally, the missionaries believe that the Marubo corpus of myths and legends are untrue and valueless. They feel that they are on a holy mission to eliminate all these Satanic delusions and replace them with their own, ‘true’ beliefs.

Although it never happened during my stay, the Maronal Marubo told me that Xavier Nunes, head missionary at Maronal, had in the past gone to the location of healing rituals to tell those assembled that they were falling under the influence of Satan and would be better off going to church services and praying. The elders resent these accusations profoundly; Mr. Nunes was asked by the FUNAI post chief, Luís Melo, to cease such actions. In addition, the Marubo told me of several incidents in which Ituí missionaries had accused Marubo religious practitioners of being Satanic.

During my stay, I observed subtler, though no less intrusive, methods for cultural colonization being employed by the mission. I have already mentioned that both the teaching and medical assistance procedures developed by the mission fostered dependence on the mission. The mission also used its computer to print out translations of Christian hymns which they distributed to the Marubo. During my stay they also produced a booklet which included quotes from the Bible along with paragraphs of explanation and interpretation. This too was distributed among the Marubo. The missionaries quite aggressively sought to get people to attend their services twice a week as well as their Bible study sessions, telling them their souls could be saved by church attendance. One Marubo came to me in a state of distress after the mission auxiliary had told him that earthquakes and wars were causing widespread destruction outside the

Marubo area, supposed evidence for the mission's beliefs. According to informants, missionaries also told the Marubo that they had to go to church to access heaven, and that the world might end in the year 2000, so that they should all convert and believe in the mission dogma immediately.

The mission's presence a powerful force aggressively attacking indigenous religion, shamanism, cosmology, mythology and healing practices, and proselytizing their own extreme fundamentalist version of Christianity, which they assert to be 'the truth'. Traditionalist Marubo were well aware of this threatening agenda and there was much discussion on this issue.

Despite the mission's stance on indigenous belief systems and religious practices, they claimed that they were great supporters and preservers of indigenous culture. They pointed to their health assistance, without which, they claimed, many Marubo elders would have died from diseases, and the culture might have gone with them. But to understand how the mission could convince itself that it defends indigenous culture, it is necessary to understand that the mission's concept of 'culture' is of material culture. This was revealed in a discussion with Gerard, the Ituí missionary later expelled for sexual misconduct, and with the schoolteacher, Mr. Vanderley Pena.

Gerard claimed to me that the mission was doing all it could to preserve indigenous culture. He pointed out that the mission actively opposed Marubo travelling to the city, a practice they said would lead to eventual assimilation. For example, the mission prevented Marubo from using the mission supply flights to travel to the city, claiming that this would lead to acceleration of cultural change. Gerard said that he refused to loan his circular board-saw to the Indians because they might start building

board houses, which would damage their culture. Hence, the missionaries all had fully sealed board houses while the Marubo had thatch and bark walls easily accessible to *Anopheles* sp. mosquitoes, purveyors, of course, of malaria. This example brings home the essence of the mission's belief about Marubo 'culture'. To the mission, Marubo culture is a set of material practices. The mission 'preserves' this culture by withholding technology and economic development. Yet they see no contradiction with their aggressive efforts to eliminate indigenous religion, which to them is not an aspect of 'culture' that should be preserved.

Even as they opposed technological and economic development, however, the mission maintained stocks of goods for sale which they gave to the Marubo in return for minimum-wage manual labor. This strategy effectively secured permanent access to cheap labor for the mission.

Pena told me that he felt that all indigenous cultures would be assimilated into Brazilian culture within twenty years. I told him that indigenous cultures had been subject to heavy pressure for 500 years and it was very unlikely that they would all vanish in the next twenty. He replied with an odd example. He said that the same thing would happen to Indians as to Africans. He said there was no African culture left in Brazil, only Brazilian culture. The unusual thing about this statement is that Pena himself was Afro-Brazilian. The continued strength of African traditions in Brazil is such a well-known fact that I was very surprised at Pena's statement. I argued with him at some length, to no effect. The important thing to note is Pena's belief that the disappearance of indigenous culture is a foregone conclusion.

In summary the mission as an institution in the Marubo area has the following covert agenda: (1) convert Marubo to the mission's religion; (2) secure presence in the area in order to continue proselytization; (3) eliminate aspects of Marubo culture incompatible with mission dogma. The mission has the following overt agenda: (1) assure health care for Marubo at Maronal and Vida Nova; (2) supply basic educational facilities.

2. FUNAI

Although FUNAI is, in theory, permanently established in the area, in fact there was hardly any FUNAI presence at all during my fieldwork. FUNAI's agenda in the area is institutionally determined. FUNAI began activities in the Javari basin in 1969 after the state-owned petrochemical company Petrobras came in contact with unassimilated Matses. From the beginning, therefore, FUNAI's agenda was to harmonize the fact of indigenous existence with the economic and geopolitical goals of the Brazilian state. FUNAI established several 'attraction fronts', advanced FUNAI posts whose purpose was to attract Indians out of the remote deep-forest areas to the main course of the rivers, where they could be assimilated into the national economic, health care, and education systems, and incorporated into the *Pax Brasiliana*. The phenomenon of warlike Indians above all had to be eliminated. In the Javari basin as in much of Brazil, and indeed other countries (e.g., Dumont 1978) Indians are classified as *bravos* or *mansos*. By the 1970s those which were considered *bravos* were a threat to both national and regional programs of expansion towards the border areas. FUNAI was called upon to resolve the issue.

Attraction posts were established among the Marubo in 1974. As described in the previous chapter, these posts soon attracted a substantial proportion of the Marubo

population. Later, however, the Ituí post was transferred upstream to attract the Matís. The Curuçá post was moved up to Aldeia Maronal when the Aldeia São Salvador was moved to the current location of São Sebastião. When I arrived at Aldeia Maronal on August 2nd 1997, the post chief was Luís Melo. In October he returned to Atalaia. From October 1997 to my departure in July 1998, the Curuçá FUNAI post was unmanned.

FUNAI's grave budgetary difficulties have largely prevented it from carrying out its original mission and grandiose, military-designed plans. FUNAI's ability to deliver on its main responsibilities of health, education, and interdiction of indigenous areas were curtailed. FUNAI regional headquarters in Atalaia was understaffed and underfunded given the tremendous size (8.5 million hectares) of the area assigned to its care. There was a post on the Javari River at the Matses village of Lobo. Another was located on the Itaquaí River, at the Kanamari village of Massapê. One was on the Ituí, at the Matís village, and the fourth FUNAI post was at Aldeia Maronal. Rarely were all four posts manned at once. When they were, the post chiefs' gasoline supplies were insufficient to take care of both health assistance and interdiction. Generally, there was no real interdiction of access to the area. Invasions were not massive, but did occur. Post chiefs did deliver what health care lay within their ability, and took care of removal of emergency patients by water or air.

At Maronal, the post chief, Luís Melo, was well liked by most villagers. However, there were variations. Luís' assistant and a paid FUNAI employee was Nakwa, an indigenous man. Nakwa was the type of person, commonly found in the Javari, that defies ethnic labels. Born among the uncontacted Indians of the Quixito River, he was captured as a child by Matses and raised as such. Later, he married a Marubo woman and

lived with his father-in-law, the Marubo elder Wanõpa. Nakwa, unlike Luís, was a permanent resident of Aldeia Maronal. In addition, a 35 year-old bachelor, Manoelão (Ronipa), was a close assistant of Luís', trading his labor for regular access to packets of Coringa-brand tobacco. This circle of people, including Nakwa's family, profited considerably from Luís' presence. Others complained that they could get nothing out of Luís. One informant told me that Luís never fixed anything he gave him to fix, whereas the mission always helped him fix broken objects like motors and shotguns. However, those more closely associated to Luís claimed the opposite, that Luís was open and generous while the mission was tight-fisted and unhelpful. It was a simple matter of who your alliance is with.

Further down the Curuçá River at Aldeia São Sebastião there were two FUNAI employees, both manual auxiliaries. One was a Marubo man, who retired and began drawing a pension in 1998. The other was a Peruvian man long established among the Marubo.

On the Ituí River the only FUNAI presence was at the Matís village. On the upper Ituí there was a FUNAI radio in the house of John Jansma. Another, more recently installed, was at Aldeia Liberdade, controlled by the Marubo.

The multiple FUNAI radios in the area were often used by the Marubo to communicate among themselves.

FUNAI had responsibility for a certain level health assistance towards the indigenous peoples of the interior. FUNAI carried out emergency removal of critical patients by air and water. This function was carried out numerous times during my stay

for causes ranging from caiman bites and falling tree trunks to terminal cancer. Once in the city, these patients were transferred to hospitals, either nearby or in Manaus.

Patients with less critical illnesses and ailments could transport themselves to Atalaia where they were housed in a facility known as the Casa do Indio while they underwent treatment. This facility was a cause of conflict because the indigenous people found it improperly maintained and attended. Nevertheless many Indians stayed there at any given moment. Indians who were using FUNAI to mediate their requests for pension monies also stayed at the Casa do Indio.

In addition to the operations of the regional FUNAI administration there was, during my stay in the area, a FUNAI boat at the confluence of the Ituí and Itaquaí Rivers. This boat was named *Jacurapá*, and under the command of FUNAI first-contact specialist Sydney Possuelo, it operated as the base for the Korubo attraction front. In 1997 a FUNAI worker was killed by Korubo and the *Jacurapá* scaled back its activities. Nevertheless, the boat provided complete interdiction of the Ituí and Itaquaí, preventing violence between invaders and the Korubo. Indigenous people often worked on the *Jacurapá*, and some Marubo considered this an option.

The FUNAI regional headquarters responsible for the Javari basin was in Atalaia do Norte. In July 1997 there was an interim administrator in place. The permanent filling of the spot became a political issue. A candidate disagreeable to the indigenous people was protested against and a new candidate was put in. Throughout the Javari basin the Indians held meetings to discuss this issue and sent in opinions by letters or over the radio. Some leaders travelled to Atalaia to discuss the issue. The presence of

someone pro-indigenous in FUNAI headquarters was considered of great importance by indigenous leaders.

The new FUNAI administrator who took over with CIVAJA's blessing arranged for the purchase of manioc flour from the interior communities. Aldeia Maronal sent out over two tons of manioc flour which sold for the equivalent of \$10 per 23 kg basket.

Previous to my arrival in the area, FUNAI had asked the Marubo to produce a large amount of crafts, to be shipped to the various FUNAI stores and sold. When I left in 1998, the Marubo had not yet received the payment for these crafts, an issue which elicited considerable resentment.

Based in Brasília there is a governmental organ linked to FUNAI called Projeto de Proteção às Terras Indígenas da Amazônia Legal, or PPTAL. PPTAL operates with budget from the World Bank and Bundesbank and matching funds from the Brazilian government. This money pays for the demarcation of indigenous lands. In February of 1997 PPTAL completed the report on indigenous land usage in the Javari basin, which set the boundaries of the proposed Área Indígena do Vale do Javari. The project was approved by the indigenous leaders in February 1998, by the president of FUNAI in May, and signed into existence by the minister of Justice in December of 1998.

3. FNS

The Fundação Nacional de Saúde, FNS, was an agency of the national health ministry which was responsible for the prevention and control of epidemics. FNS sent out two different types of teams to each indigenous village. A chemical spraying team for mosquito and cockroach control arrived twice at Maronal between July 1997 and July 1998; a vaccination team did likewise. In addition FNS sent out the medicines used by

AIS (Agentes Indígenas de Saúde; see under MSF, below). This contrasted with FUNAI, which sent medicines to the mission.

4. CIVAJA

The Conselho Indígena do Vale do Javari (CIVAJA) is an organization representing the four contacted indigenous groups of the Javari basin-Marubo, Mayoruna, Matís and Kanamari. CIVAJA endeavors to secure indigenous rights to the services theoretically offered all Brazilian nationals, as well as the special rights written into the 1988 constitution. It links together the diverse ethnic groups in the area so they can act as one in regards to indigenous interests.

CIVAJA is a recently formed group staffed by young people, but it is probable that work in CIVAJA will become a pathway to leadership within the Marubo since, in the process of acting as CIVAJA coordinator, it is necessary to form networks of alliances and patterns of influence. CIVAJA has entered into conflict with FUNAI and the mission on several occasions, and cooperated on others. There has also been conflict and cooperation with the Marubo in the interior, a process accelerated after the installation of radios. Data on CIVAJA's conflicts and alliances is highly illustrative of the dynamics of influence in contemporary Marubo society. Before presenting these data, background information on CIVAJA's origins, functions, and external relations must be reviewed.

Data on CIVAJA comes from observations, interviews, and documents. The most extensive interviews were with CIVAJA cofounder Clóvis Rufino Reis. The documents were internal CIVAJA documents which I was allowed to examine and photocopy.

The Marubo founders of CIVAJA, Darcy Comapa and Clóvis Rufino, lived at the intersection point of indigenous and non-indigenous cultures. Darcy's father, Santiago Comapa, is a Peruvian man who lived among the Marubo since before FUNAI's arrival in the area. When FUNAI did set up its Curuçá River post in 1974 they hired Santiago to work for them. Santiago thus left the upper Curuçá to live in the post at São Salvador. With his FUNAI salary, the illiterate Santiago was able to send his sons to school. These are the sons of Santiago with a Marubo woman. Because of the matrilineal Marubo system, they, including Darcy, were considered Marubo of the Ranenáwavo clan.

Clóvis' Marubo parents separated after his birth. Clóvis' mother, Rita Reis, married a logger, Antônio Rufino, who was working the Curuçá River. Clóvis was sent downstream to live with the logger's sister, and spent his first 11 years in the town of Benjamin Constant, where he went to school and learned fluent Portuguese. Clóvis returned to his homeland with increasing frequency during a series of visits from 1977 to 1983.

Clóvis became aware of discrepancies between FUNAI's institutional mission and its workers' actions. For example, Clóvis says that in those days FUNAI workers freely removed forest products from the area and sold them for profit, amongst other moneymaking activities. Simultaneously, FUNAI was adopting a paternalistic attitude, telling the Indians to relocate to easily accessible areas so that health care and education could be administered. However, the promises were not being fulfilled. Clóvis began to hold reunions with Marubo leaders to explain how he felt they were being exploited. Clóvis' activities brought him into conflict with FUNAI workers, creating tensions that continued to exist in 1997.

Clóvis started acting as a watchdog over FUNAI activities in the area, pointing out the dissonance between talk and action, providing critiques of FUNAI plans and strategies. Among the FUNAI workers, this engendered a defensive reaction to being watched, criticized, interfered with. They initiated counter-criticism, telling the Marubo that Clóvis was an ignorant young man who had got it all wrong. According to Clóvis, pressure was exerted on him not to remain within the area.

Around 1984, Clóvis met Silvio Cavuscens, an indigenous rights worker who was trying to bring international attention to some of the most neglected indigenous areas of Brazil. The Javari basin, despite its enormous size and ethnic diversity, was poorly known. Clóvis and Darcy worked with Silvio to enact Campanha Javari, an effort to attract attention to the situation of indigenous peoples of the Javari. In 1985, Clóvis took Silvio up the Ituí River to gather information, photographs, and film for the Campanha. However, when they reached Vida Nova, John Jansma became angered and told Clóvis he was causing trouble and should not come to the Ituí. This was the beginning of a long period of tension between CIVAJA on the one hand, and the mission with its Marubo allies on the other.

Jansma reacted the same way FUNAI workers had reacted to Clóvis' activities: he felt threatened. Many of Clóvis' critiques of FUNAI could be equally applied to the mission: paternalism, disregard for the concepts of indigenous autonomy and independent decision-making, neglect of indigenous land rights issues, claims that they should determine the future for the Marubo. Like FUNAI workers, Jansma initiated counter-critique to Clóvis' words. This was effective, as for many years the Ituí Marubo, influenced by the mission, refused to cooperate with CIVAJA in any way, or to

participate in its activities. This changed in recent years (1996-1998), as Ituí Marubo increasingly saw the advantage of participating in CIVAJA.

When Silvio and Clóvis left Vida Nova, they set out overland for the Curuçá River. Meanwhile, Jansma called the Federal Police to have them removed from the area since they did not have official authorization to be there. When they arrived on the Curuçá, the police were awaiting them. Silvio was removed by helicopter and all his materials confiscated. This example shows the missionaries' use of the military power of the Brazilian state to interfere with the efforts of Curuçá Marubo political organizers.

During this time, Darcy, in addition to continuing his education, was interacting with the newly established bishopric of the Upper Amazon. Within the bishopric was an entity called the Pastoral Indigenista, linked to the nationwide pro-indigenous Catholic organization, Conselho Indigenista Missionário, CIMI. The Pastoral Indigenista assisted Clóvis and Darcy with transportation and logistics for political organization. Darcy became the middleman interacting with these sources of outside assistance—Silvio and the Pastoral. Clóvis mediated between them and the interior villages.

Clóvis received a boost when, during one of his visits to the upper Curuçá, the great leader João Tuxáua gave his support to the strategy of political organization. Clóvis had little success until he received that support. He was criticized by FUNAI workers and missionaries, who exerted an influence difficult to overcome. João Tuxáua, however, was considered to have prophetic and divinatory powers and his word weighed heavily with all Curuçá Marubo. After he started to say that Clóvis' beliefs were valid, the Marubo began to listen. These beliefs—that the Marubo should make their own decisions, that they were being lied to by local FUNAI and mission alike, and that they

should establish a political organization, in alliance with the other Javari peoples, to agitate in their own way for their own self-conceived goals—began to gain currency.

Clóvis attributes the eventual success of his efforts in large part to João Tuxáua's “swing vote”.

Clóvis continued from 1985 to 1990 to travel up and down the Javari and Curuçá Rivers holding meetings, criticizing the current relations to non-indigenous people, and arguing for an indigenous political organization. In 1990, a meeting was held at Aldeia Maronal to plan a subsequent reunion of all the indigenous peoples of the Javari basin. To organize the meeting, Clóvis visited Mayoruna and Kanamari communities on the Javari River as well as Marubo villages. In 1991, the I Encontro dos Povos Indígenas do Vale do Javari was held in Atalaia do Norte. This meeting, at which a strategy was discussed for securing the land rights guaranteed by the Brazilian constitution, elicited a strong threat response from Atalaia locals.

The I Encontro established the Comissão Indígena do Vale do Javari. Darcy Comapa became coordinator, Clóvis vice-coordinator, and Mayoruna and Kanamari counselors were elected. In June 1992, the I Assembléia dos Povos Indígenas do Vale do Javari was held at Aldeia São Sebastião. This assembly established the Conselho Indígena do vale do Javari, the current CIVAJA. Darcy and Clóvis were re-elected. Two Mayoruna and one Kanamari counselor were also elected.

CIVAJA was connected to COIAB, Coordenação Indígena da Amazônia Brasileira, headquartered in Manaus. CIVAJA sends representatives to the assemblies at which COIAB officers are elected. Clóvis was in Manaus as regional coordinator of

COIAB from 1992 to 1994. Later, Darcy served in COIAB as vice-coordinator and ultimately as coordinator.

The II Assembléia dos Povos Indígenas do Vale do Javari was held at Aldeia Liberdade on the Ituí River, a conscious challenge to the missionaries that had attempted to obstruct CIVAJA's founders in the early stages of the organizing process. Darcy left the movement for a time, and Clóvis assumed the job of coordinator. He was re-elected through the year 2000 at the III Assembléia dos Povos Indígenas do Vale do Javari, held in 1997 at Aldeia São Sebastião. Clóvis was the coordinator of CIVAJA throughout the fieldwork period of 7/97 to 7/98. Darcy was coordinator of COIAB in Manaus until May 1998, when he lost a bid for reelection.

In July 1997, CIVAJA consisted of five people. Clóvis was coordinator; Manoel Barbosa, a Maronal Marubo, secretary-treasurer; Gilson Mayoruna, vice-coordinator; Edilson Kanamari and Tumi Matís, counselors. The headquarters was a dilapidated building in Atalaia do Norte. Adjacent to it was an even more dilapidated CIVAJA-owned hut in which CIVAJA workers and indigenous students stayed. CIVAJA owned an aluminum boat, two outboard motors of 60 and 25 horsepower, and a tiny river boat, the Yuraná, donated by the Pastoral Indigenista. The CIVAJA budget was supplied by a Swiss NGO, Terre des Hommes (TDH). Using TDH funds, in 1997-8 CIVAJA had a new headquarters built which was one of the nicest in Atalaia. In March 1998 CIVAJA purchased a larger river boat, named the Ni Oa Oani, which is the largest boat regularly moored in Atalaia. Along with their computer, fax and telephone, these purchases transformed CIVAJA's public image from one of poverty to one of affluence.

In 1996, using a grant from another European NGO, CIVAJA purchased 11 radios and installed them in Atalaia and in villages of all four CIVAJA-member ethnic groups. Three more were installed in 1997, including one in Cruzeiro do Sul and another at aldeia Vida Nova, marking at last the installation of CIVAJA in what was once the mission's exclusive territory.

Thanks to the radios, instantaneous communications between the far-distant villages of the Javari basin became a reality for the first time. Formerly, Indians had to ask for permission to use the few FUNAI and mission radios in the area; this network was owned and operated by indigenous people. The villages were able to respond instantly to events affecting them. Word that an unfriendly FUNAI administrator was to be installed at Atalaia, for example, brought swift and vigorous responses from the indigenous peoples in the form of reunions that generated letters and radiograms, and the preparation of several elders to travel to Atalaia to deflect the potential threat to their welfare. On another occasion, a message over the CIVAJA radio that Manoel Barbosa's appointment to FUNAI was held up resulted in meetings, letters and radiograms within 48 hours. Information coming in over the CIVAJA radio was thus received in the interior villages, discussed, and responded to with varying levels of vigor but often with great efficiency.

In 1994, CIVAJA invited Doctors Without Borders (Portuguese acronym MSF) to the Javari basin to combat a cholera epidemic. MSF was then called upon to combat the malaria epidemics that, according to CIVAJA, killed 25-30 people per year in the mid-1990s. A long-term program was established by MSF to create a sustainable malaria control framework for the Javari basin's indigenous peoples. MSF has trained

indigenous people in use of microscopes to diagnose malaria correctly and apply treatment. The impact of MSF on the area will be described in a separate section.

In 1997-98, CIVAJA was engaged in the pursuit of a variety of goals with differing levels of success. Perhaps CIVAJA's most significant function is FUNAI oversight. With the CIVAJA HQ in Atalaia, the interior villages have access to instant information concerning FUNAI's activities. When the allegedly anti-indigenous Edvaldo was rumored to be next in line to take over as FUNAI administrator, CIVAJA used the radios to rouse the villages, and successfully fended off the threat. After successfully installing the friendly Gilmar instead, Clóvis continually watched over the latter's actions to ensure he did not slip into paternalistic activity patterns. When Manoel Barbosa's hiring into FUNAI was held up, Clóvis again contacted the villages, who took immediate action. The radios give CIVAJA the ability to mobilize the entire contacted indigenous population, an ability that gives the Indians excellent leverage power in many situations.

CIVAJA has created a formal structure that regularly brings into association members of different ethnic groups. Prior to CIVAJA's creation, Mayoruna and Marubo were deadly traditional enemies. Yet after the establishment of CIVAJA, there was a growing realization that all of them are indigenous and the real threat comes from the non-indigenous people. The links to COIAB reinforce this pan-indigenous identity even more. With COIAB funds, CIVAJA sends Javari basin villagers to Manaus to meetings of indigenous schoolteachers, or health assistants, or to the COIAB elections. Through these interactions with other Indians from as far away as Roraima and Rondônia, the Javari participants gain a sense of the common experience of indigenous people. This concept—that they are not merely Marubo, but indigenous also—is not immediately

obvious unless such meetings are held. Thanks to the CIVAJA-organized meetings, both in the Javari and Manaus, there are a number of Marubo who have a sense of the value of indigenous culture and the common identity and struggle of all indigenous people, concepts that were not present before CIVAJA.

CIVAJA pushed continuously for land demarcation, a major goal of the movement since its inception as Campanha Javari. Darcy participated in the FUNAI committee that oversaw the definition of the limits of the Área Indígena do Javari, and was instrumental in forcing an expansion of the area assigned to them near the Pardo River. The area was signed into existence on 11 December 1998.

5. MSF

The most notable impact of MSF on the social structure of the Marubo was the expansion of the role of Agente Indígena de Saúde, AIS. MSF's goal was to create a sustainable health care structure that would effectively deal with the most serious threats to the health of the Javari basin indigenous peoples. The strategy includes as much autonomy on the part of indigenous peoples as possible. Thus, MSF's strategy worked by passing on information to indigenous peoples through education and training so that they could take care of themselves. Those trained were the Agentes Indígenas de Saúde.

The social position, intensity of training, and effectiveness of AIS varied from village to village. At Aldeia Maronal, all AIS were children of Alfredo and of his brothers. All were youths. The elders focused on traditional healing through songs and forest remedies, preferring to delegate the learning of new techniques to their children. At São Sebastião, however, the AIS were adults, including politically prominent men

such as Clóvis' brother José, a *shovo ivo*. On the Ituí the AIS were also married adults, not the leaders but men in the second tier of political prominence such as the uxorilocal lieutenant Eduardo. Evidently the choices made by leaders as to who is to be AIS depend on their perception of the advantages. At Maronal, strategies for the maintenance of authority are well established along traditional lines, so that leaders felt no need to become AIS to enhance their status. They delegated that task to their children. At São Sebastião, the AIS were men who were politically active but lacked the knowledge of traditional healing that the more senior elders did. It was advantageous to José Rufino to incorporate these new skills. On the Ituí, reasoning is a combination of the previous two. Due to the difference in social organization, where at Maronal if the senior elder does not want to be AIS, the position is given to sons, on the Ituí it passes to sons-in-law and nephews.

Many indigenous villages in the Javari basin now have microscopes donated by MSF, which the AIS have been trained to use to diagnose malaria. In addition, MSF donated a set of 5.5 horsepower canoe motors for AIS use.

At Aldeia Maronal the activities of the AIS underwent some change between July 1997 and July 1998. In 1997 the most active AIS was Amélia Barbosa, daughter of José. Starting in November 1997 she handled a malaria epidemic by taking blood samples, diagnosing them under the microscope, and assigning proper treatment. After other AIS received added training, however, Amélia's role became reduced. By July 1998, Amélia's main AIS role was as a specialist in women's problems; she also had specialized knowledge of tuberculosis diagnosis and of the analysis of fecal samples for dysentery. The task of microscopy and malaria diagnosis was taken over by Alfredo's

son Txanõpa. Kanãpa, the son of Alfredo's brother Miguel, kept track of treatment schedules and distributed medicines according to the guidelines established through MSF training.

In addition to its educational activities, MSF politicked for the creation of a Distríto Especial Indígena de Saúde (DSEI) (Beauregard 1999). In 1997-98, health assistance to indigenous peoples was divided among five different groups. Two of these were governmental agencies, FUNAI and FNS. Three others were MSF, the New Tribes Mission, and the Pastoral Indigenista. "The result of all this was a low performance because of all difficulties to coordinate the different health actions" (Beauregard 1999). MSF successfully coordinated a number of these agencies into participating in a jointly planned entity, the DSEI. However, this was not implanted until after the end of fieldwork in 1998.

MSF paid for and directed the building of a new Casa do Índio to house and attend to sick indigenous people in Atalaia do Norte. This new complex was designed with indigenous input, featuring a separate house for each ethnic group as well as separation of the truly sick from the recovering and their kin, and improved sanitary and cooking facilities.

6. *Os Regatões*

River merchants who carry stocks of goods upstream and return with forest or river products are known in Brazil as *regatões* (sg. *regatão*). This type of person played a significant role in the second phase of Marubo contact with non-indigenous people. The first phase was the rubber boom and involved conflict with and among the Marubo.

This was followed by a period of isolation. The second phase of contact begins in the 1950s with the missionary presence, sporadic at first, but culminating in a permanent presence on the Ituí. Simultaneously, relations were established between Maronal Marubo and rubber buyers in Acre. Under the direction of Carlos, a Marubo raised by Peruvian rubber tappers, some Maronal Marubo learned to carry balls of rubber overland to the nearest non-indigenous settlement, returning with shotguns, ammunition, salt and other amenities. On the Ituí and Curuçá Rivers loggers fronted goods to teams of Marubo workers who then cut and delivered wood to the buyers waiting downriver. This process was extremely unequal towards the indigenous people, who assumed considerable debts for the goods they received up front, and generally could not escape those debts.

Most *regatões* were forbidden access beginning with FUNAI's presence in 1974 (Melatti 1983). However, some were allowed to operate as late as the 1980s. The process by which the *regatões* were removed will be briefly discussed below.

7. Pension Monies

Marubo over the age of 65, like any other Brazilian, may begin to draw certain state pension monies. Few Marubo could satisfy the paperwork requirements without a middleman. On the Curuçá River the main middleman was Maurício, the FUNAI worker in Atalaia. On the Ituí River the main middleman was Mário Peruano, a non-indigenous person raised among the Marubo and now dwelling in Cruzeiro. There were enough pensioners on the Ituí for Mário to make a decent living charging percentages to manage Marubo pension accounts. Older Marubo were assiduous in their pursuit of pension monies as soon as they qualified.

8. Atalaia do Norte, Cruzeiro do Sul

Atalaia and Cruzeiro represented the two main options for Marubo interested in bringing products to market, purchasing manufacture goods, seeking work or pursuing an education. Each had its own advantages and disadvantages. Atalaia do Norte is further away from the Marubo villages on the upper courses of the rivers, who often favor Cruzeiro do Sul, while the Marubo at São Sebastião and Rio Novo favor Atalaia do Norte. The trip to Atalaia and back is very long. It takes some 8-10 days to travel by canoe or boat from Maronal to Atalaia, and 8-13 days back. The trip is dangerous in the rainy season because of the prevalence of malaria. However, the advantage is that very large amounts of goods can be carried back, including heavy items like motors and 30-kilo sacks of salt and sugar.

Because Marubo land is within the municipality of Atalaia do Norte in the state of Amazonas, the FUNAI agency responsible for the Marubo is based in Atalaia. Hence, any interactions with FUNAI, including political meetings and demands, receipt of health care, or procurement of pension monies requires a trip to Atalaia. CIVAJA is also located in Atalaia, and the permanent, autonomous indigenous presence that it signifies acts as a magnet especially for kin and close affines of CIVAJA members, who frequent Atalaia and often go to school there.

Cruzeiro do Sul is a five day canoe and overland journey from the villages of the upper Ituí and Curuçá Rivers. This trip is frequently made to trade crafts and forest products for manufactured goods or to seek work on the prosperous *fazendas* of Acre. A number of Marubo have also received education in Cruzeiro and the outlying town of

Guajará. The New Tribes Mission headquarters is in Cruzeiro. A converted Marubo man married to a non-indigenous woman lives in Cruzeiro near the mission HQ, and the CIVAJA radio for Cruzeiro is located in his house. Cruzeiro do Sul is a larger town than Atalaia, and has far better-stocked markets, but anything bought there has to be carried back on foot. Even the rare possibility of hitching a ride on a mission supply flight, rare because it is seldom allowed by the missionaries, creates severe weight and volume restrictions that do not apply to goods brought in by river.

C. Interactions with non-indigenous people: decision-making, conflict resolution, and access to desirable goals

1. CIVAJA

Since its inception, the coordinators of CIVAJA have been Marubo. In the course of creating and operating CIVAJA, they entered into relations of conflict and cooperation with both indigenous and non-indigenous people. Conflicts with non-indigenous organizations often engendered conflicts with that organization's indigenous allies. The resolution of these conflicts represents essential data on the Marubo political system.

a. CIVAJA vs. FUNAI

The CIVAJA-FUNAI conflict has its roots in the early days of Clóvis and Darcy's political organizing. The cognitive dissonance between what FUNAI was supposed to do

and what FUNAI was observed to do allowed some Marubo to become conscious that they were being exploited. Clóvis made every effort to ensure that the Marubo were aware of this exploitation.

Clóvis first elicited FUNAI wrath through his accusations of exploitation. Recall that Clóvis was raised among non-indigenous people, and began visiting his homeland only after the age of eleven. By the time he was fifteen, he was actively criticizing FUNAI. Clóvis says that during his visits to the Marubo area he saw FUNAI selling government-donated food marked “not for sale”, or trading it for forest products. He says the *chefes de posto* made as much money off forest products as they could. Clóvis endeavored to explain FUNAI exploitation to his kin. However, his village, São Salvador, was built around the FUNAI post. FUNAI had attracted a number of Marubo to the post through offers of material goods, access to health care and education, and even, for some, employment as FUNAI workers. The Marubo at that time still believed that FUNAI would deliver on all these promises. FUNAI thus had support among the Curuçá Marubo. The *chefes de posto* told the elders that Clóvis was an ignorant youth, that he had it all wrong. Clóvis’ kin believed that Clóvis was endangering their access to potential FUNAI benefits. Clóvis experienced great pressure, and did not remain in the Marubo area. Throughout his teenage years, he travelled back and forth from downstream to his homeland and back. Every time he did return to his homeland, Clóvis explained to his kin that FUNAI was exploiting them. In doing so, he elicited the resentment of FUNAI workers.

Clóvis aimed to replace the FUNAI *chefes de posto* as the primary source of information concerning non-indigenous affairs. Clóvis reiterates this function of his

repeatedly. He says he wants to help the Indians understand how FUNAI uses them, help his people understand the whites, and act as interpreter for the Marubo leaders. Clóvis says FUNAI never respected the Indians: “They wanted to be our father. They never taught the Indians to be independent. They wanted the Indians in a ‘tent’ they could dominate.” Clóvis says that from his first visits to his homeland, he became the interpreter of the white world to the Marubo leaders. He expressed ideas and made proposals. At first, this was at pre-existing meetings. Eventually, however, he became the one to organize meetings and set ideas in motion. In doing so, Clóvis initiated social change.

Before 1981-83, events and issues were only discussed at meetings that were already underway for another reason, as when elders gather to take tobacco snuff after dinner. Clóvis was the first to organize meetings with the sole purpose of discussing issues. Once he linked with Silvio Cavuscens in 1983, Clóvis began to tell the Marubo that Indians in general and they specifically were going to make their own decisions about the future, and not leave it up to the whites to decide for them. These stances engendered conflict with the then-dominant FUNAI. FUNAI was supplying the Marubo with information, but Clóvis called this information inaccurate and worked to supplant FUNAI as its main supplier. FUNAI was planning and executing the Marubo’s future within the Brazilian nation, but Clóvis said FUNAI would make docile children of them, and worked to convince the Marubo to plan and execute their own future. Thus, Clóvis threatened FUNAI authority.

According to Clóvis, the crucial event that swung the balance of influence in his favor was gaining the support of João Tuxáua. When they first came up the Curuçá

arguing for the creation of a political organization, from 1984 on, he and Darcy were seen as unruly children. No one listened to them, and in fact the elders felt threatened by the CIVAJA organizers' activities because they did not want to offend FUNAI. One day, João Tuxáua, the most respected of all Marubo leaders and considered to have prophetic powers, said that Clóvis and Darcy were in fact proposing the right path of action, and they should be listened to. From that point on, Darcy and Clóvis began to enjoy support on the Curuçá. They eventually succeeded in establishing the indigenous political organization, CIVAJA, by 1992. However, CIVAJA-FUNAI conflicts continued to play out as conflicts among Marubo.

From my arrival in August 1997 to his departure in late October, Aldeia Maronal FUNAI *chefe de posto* Luís Melo continually criticized Clóvis and CIVAJA. He particularly resented Clóvis' criticism of FUNAI. As noted above, Clóvis' criticisms of FUNAI activities and the resentment this engendered among FUNAI workers are the root of the FUNAI-CIVAJA conflict. Luís' anger was rooted in the pride he took in his work. Luís had to work out of reach of his family, he had very little logistical support, and did the best he could given the demanding conditions of the job. From his point of view, any criticisms addressed to him by CIVAJA were unwarranted because they were sitting in their offices in Atalaia pointing fingers while he was in the interior trying to handle health care and access control with insufficient resources.

Luís' feelings about CIVAJA criticism were common among FUNAI workers. The criticisms angered them because they felt that they took concrete actions to assist Indians, such as removal of patients and treatment in the city. They felt that CIVAJA did nothing but criticize. Luís' feelings spread at Maronal to include his immediate social

network. Nakwa, Luís' assistant, repeated Luís' arguments that CIVAJA criticized while FUNAI acted.

Associated with the resentment of CIVAJA criticism was criticism of CIVAJA's spending. A great deal of misinformation about CIVAJA's budget and spending circulated about Aldeia Maronal. For example, Clóvis was accused of embezzling money to buy a motorcycle. The motorcycle in question, however, did not belong to Clóvis but to CIVAJA and had been legitimately budgeted, purchased and accounted for. Nevertheless, CIVAJA's efforts to build an infrastructure in Atalaia were interpreted by FUNAI associates to be expenditures without benefit to the interior villages. CIVAJA knew about this grumbling and tried to counteract it with an open book policy towards their accounts.

From Clóvis' perspective, FUNAI was playing political games at the Indians' expense. FUNAI officials created anti-CIVAJA factions in the interior villages and obstructed CIVAJA organizing. As an example, Clóvis mentioned a *chefe de posto* who refused to allow CIVAJA members to visit a Mayoruna village. CIVAJA had to force his removal, a moment of high tension with FUNAI.

In summary, it can be said that Clóvis and Darcy overcame FUNAI resistance to their initial organizing efforts and succeeded in creating CIVAJA. Particularly difficult was overcoming Marubo fears of offending FUNAI. This initial stumbling block, along with FUNAI workers' resentment of Clóvis' criticisms, prevented Clóvis and Darcy from gaining support for their proposals. However, after the most influential Marubo elder, João Tuxáua, became convinced that Clóvis and Darcy's arguments were valid, the two received increasing support. With a base of support on the Curuçá River, as well as

participation from Mayoruna and Kanamari Indians, CIVAJA was successfully established.

b. CIVAJA vs. the Mission

Clóvis and Darcy encountered as much opposition from the mission on the Ituí as they did from FUNAI on the Curuçá. In 1985, Clóvis, Darcy, and a Curuçá Marubo, César Dólis, who was kin to them both, took Silvio Cavuscens and his wife up the Ituí River to gather information for the Campanha Javari. By then indigenous peoples throughout the Amazon were forming political organizations under the umbrella of COIAB. Silvio had assisted the Tikuna, just downstream from the Javari along the Amazon River, in building an organization and wanted to help do the same for the Javari. As well as gathering information, this group thus sought support for their ideas wherever they went. They explained the concept of an indigenous political organization and how it could benefit them.

Clóvis, Silvio and the others reached Vida Nova on the Ituí River, where they held a meeting to explain their ideas. According to Clóvis, they held a second meeting in the mission church. According to Cesar, Jansma became very angry at them. Jansma confronted them, telling them that they had no business on the Ituí River.

From the Ituí, the group of organizers walked overland to the Curuçá. When they got there, Brazilian federal police were waiting for them. Jansma had reported them to FUNAI as unauthorized intruders on indigenous land, and FUNAI had called the police to have them removed. Silvio and his wife were taken away by air. According to both Clóvis and Cesar their equipment, including all their photographs, was confiscated and

never returned. Cesar reports being ordered at gunpoint to sit down and keep quiet. He became angry because he was being told what to do on his own land. Clóvis says that they were forced to walk through the forest to the nearest village for 3 days with no food because all their supplies were taken away.

The mission proceeded to impede efforts to organize the Ituí into CIVAJA by telling the Ituí Marubo that Clóvis' and Darcy's proposals were wrong. Eventually Clóvis and Darcy gained some support from a village upstream from Vida Nova on the Ituí, but for the most part they organized CIVAJA with no Ituí support. After CIVAJA's establishment in 1992, relations with the Vida Nova Marubo began to improve, and one even became a CIVAJA counselor for a few months. Once the CIVAJA radio was installed at Vida Nova in 1997, CIVAJA information could reach Vida Nova as easily as any other village. By 1997, Vida Nova indigenous leaders participated in CIVAJA-organized conferences to discuss the Marubo's future and follow developments in land demarcation. Vida Nova had accepted and become integrated in the organizational framework created by CIVAJA, even if many Ituí Marubo remained suspicious of CIVAJA motives. The demarcation of the A.I. do Javari in December 1998 provided final, concrete proof that political organization could bring tangible benefits.

As in the case of FUNAI on the Curuçá, Clóvis and Darcy overcame the resistance of an entrenched non-indigenous institution and successfully enacted their vision of a politically organized Javari basin. In the case of the mission, resistance proved harder to overcome and acceptance longer in coming, because the mission was more entrenched than FUNAI. Jansma had been a permanent resident of the Ituí for some time and had already developed a network of alliances cemented by controlled

access to his stocks of goods and by his control of health care. Like FUNAI on the Curuçá, Jansma and the Ituí missionaries responded to Clóvis and Darcy's ideas by feeling profoundly threatened.

The CIVAJA-mission conflict relates to the issues of indigenous autonomy and cultural pride. CIVAJA argues for indigenous autonomy in every sphere. In particular, ideas for the future should be generated from within the Marubo. They should not allow non-indigenous people to plan their future for them, because they would be inevitably exploited. From Jansma's perspective, Clóvis was saying the Marubo should not listen to him. In addition, CIVAJA argues that indigenous culture is the best way for indigenous people, and they should not trade their ways for the white man's. The mission maintained a contradictory point of view on this subject, on the one hand refusing to assist technological and economic development in order to preserve material culture, on the other hand proselytizing their religion and working to suppress indigenous religious practices. CIVAJA perceives this as cultural aggression and questions the legitimacy of the mission's activities. The mission protects itself by denigrating CIVAJA and working to maintain a secure area of influence on the Ituí River. The mission's aggressive territoriality will be described below (see "the mission incident").

Although CIVAJA eventually overcame mission resistance to incorporate the Vida Nova Marubo into their organization, the mission remains on the Ituí River, and also spread to Aldeia Maronal. Clóvis says he disapproves of what the mission is doing, but has not fought to remove it. He says although he thinks it is wrong, it is ultimately a choice his kin at Vida Nova and Maronal have to make. He will argue to convince them that they should throw the mission out, but he will not make the decision for them. He

says he could probably use his understanding of the system to have the mission removed on a technicality, but refrains from doing so out of respect for his elders and kin who want the mission there for their own reasons.

c. CIVAJA vs. *Os Regatões*

CIVAJA efforts to rid the Marubo area of exploitative non-indigenous merchants led to conflict with those Marubo who benefited from the merchants' presence. Merchants called *regatões* (sg. *regatão*) had been a feature of the Marubo landscape since the end of Marubo isolation in the postwar period. Their modus operandi was fronting goods and money to indigenous people, who then worked to cut logs and tap rubber from a position of permanent and inescapable debt. The indigenous middleman had to pay his own work crews. It was an impossible and unfair juggling act for the indigenous man caught in the middle trying to pay off both his boss and his workers. In congruence with their policy of indigenous autonomy and liberation from dependent relations, CIVAJA opposed the *regatões'* presence.

To leaders who based their strategy for high status on interactions with *regatões*, CIVAJA's policy was very unwelcome. Such a leader was Lauro, from Aldeia Alegria. Lauro's relationship to a *regatão* was for a time successful (Melatti 1983). When observed by Melatti in 1983, Lauro had a work crew including eleven 'employees'. He cut wood for a merchant named Raimundo Cabral from Benjamin Constant. Cabral fronted Lauro various forms of merchandise. Lauro had a 'store' in which he sold clothes, ammunition, soap, batteries, and other items. Although Lauro was in fact in a continual state of debt, he was satisfied with the situation. It made him the center of a

social network, much as Alfredo's successful interactions with non-indigenous people would later make him the center of a social network-a leader. People came to Lauro for merchandise, brought him forest products, and worked for him.

Raimundo Cabral was the last *regatão* to operate openly on the Ituí River. When FUNAI set up posts in 1974, they prevented the *regatões* from coming up the rivers to trade for forest products. Lauro personally petitioned the military commander in Tabatinga to lift the ban on Cabral for an additional five-year period. Cabral was allowed informally to access the Ituí, and Lauro's business continued.

Melatti's observations were carried out prior to the organization of CIVAJA. Clóvis and Darcy, organizing CIVAJA from 1984 to 1992, called the relationship with *regatões* exploitation. They argued that it had to stop. At first, they had little influence. But once CIVAJA was established and speaking for a reasonable proportion of Javari Indians, they were able to exert more pressure. After Cabral's retirement no more *regatões* were allowed up the Ituí. Clóvis claimed credit for this in an interview on July 4th, 1997. He said that Marubo were being subjected to very hard labor, and only to pay back their perpetual debts. In doing so, Clóvis said, they neglected agriculture and family life. Thus, Clóvis worked hard from within CIVAJA and succeeded in having all logging in the area cease. It is probable that other forces, such as the environmental agency IBAMA, were responsible for putting pressure on logging to subside, but Clóvis' opposition was important. Given that my data on this subject are exclusively Clóvis' words, and in the absence of documentary sources, it is difficult to evaluate precisely to what extent Clóvis forced the government's hand.

Lauro was nostalgic for the days when he had access to material goods. As I will explain below, Lauro at first resented my visit to Ituí because he felt it was very difficult to make money now because all the opportunities have been blocked off. He wanted to find a way to profit from me directly. In a later conversation on January 1st 1998, Lauro told me that in the old days he always had plenty of gasoline and other things, but now that the *regatões* are gone he has nothing.

Despite his complaints, Lauro remained a leader due to his successful family-building (see Table 4.10.). Combining uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons, he managed to build a large and longer-lasting social network than that which he had built through his relationship with the *regatões*. Lauro survived the end of the *regatão* period. But on the issue of *regatões*, Clóvis exerted more influence than Lauro. It should be noted, however, that Clóvis had the formal backing of the state, whereas Lauro had had to rely on informal bending of rules by the state.

2. Aldeia Maronal: Core *Shovo*

a. Alfredo Barbosa, kakáya

Decision to accept my research.

My application to carry out research among the Marubo was sent to FUNAI in August 1996. In February 1997 FUNAI-Brasília sent word to the regional administrator to ask the Marubo's permission for my research project. The administrator in Atalaia sent word to Curuçá River *chefe de posto* Luís Melo at Aldeia Maronal. Luís, in turn,

asked Alfredo his opinion. Alfredo discussed it, though with whom and for how long is unknown. Then he returned the verdict: the project was unacceptable.

FUNAI-Brasília then requested an explanation for the refusal from Atalaia. Once again, the regional administration of Atalaia sent word to Luís to ask for an explanation. Luís asked Alfredo to provide an explanation. This resulted in a new discussion which rendered the decision to accept my project provided I brought medicines along. Accordingly, I supplied myself with an excellent medicine kit and reserved money to purchase more essential prescription drugs in the field. These events were described to me later by Luís Melo and by Alfredo's son Txanõpa.

I arrived in Atalaia do Norte on July 2nd, 1997. On July 4th 1997, I went to CIVAJA headquarters to introduce myself. Clóvis was unhappy that he had not been a part of the decision to accept my research. He said he had to call the leaders to ask their opinion. On July 5th I was called to the CIVAJA radio in the morning. Clóvis was conversing with Alfredo, who was at Aldeia Maronal. Alfredo spoke at considerable length. Once Alfredo was done, Clóvis reported that Alfredo agreed for me to go to Maronal provided I brought medicines. In the next days, I purchased \$1250 of medicines that ended up as a donation to the mission pharmacy at Maronal. I was also politely requested to supply a 200 liter drum of diesel to power a generator at Maronal. This drum of gasoline ended up under the control of Alfredo, who also controlled the generator.

I arrived at Aldeia Maronal on August 2nd 1997. On August 4th, a meeting was held to discuss my research proposal. I was presented to the assembled elders and youth by Manoel Barbosa, CIVAJA secretary-treasurer and Alfredo's brother's son. I gave an

explanation of what my research would consist of, and Manoel translated. Alfredo stated an opinion in a long speech, often taking tobacco snuff, which is associated with speaking skills. Alfredo's brother José, Manoel's father, spoke briefly. Then Alfredo spoke again. Once Alfredo was done talking, Manoel explained what he had said. Alfredo said that I had to make copies of anything I could and leave them behind because other anthropologists had promised to return copies but never did. He also said my use of the camcorder had to be limited and by his permission only. He forbade videotaping of certain activities. However, within the parameters he had just set, I was welcome at Maronal and free to carry out my research.

At each step in the process just described, the deciding voice in my acceptance was Alfredo's. In the case of the meeting (*reunião*) at which I was present, there were many people in attendance, but only Alfredo gave an opinion of any substance. He determined whether I would be allowed to proceed and with what limitations and expectations.

Alfredo's motivations in accepting my research are not self-evident. The medicines and fuel alone were not sufficient incentive, as Alfredo was leery of outsiders and especially anthropologists. I can only infer, but a number of Alfredo's other actions were driven by a thirst to understand "the white man". In his farewell address to me, Alfredo said no one else he had known had ever supplied them with as much information about the white world as I had. I believe that Alfredo thought that through me he could gain a profounder understanding of and a new perspective on non-indigenous people.

The Airstrip.

The airstrip at Aldeia Maronal was said to be ‘owned’ by Alfredo because he had organized and directed the labor that produced it. This was prior to the coalescence of the current Aldeia Maronal, when the *shovo* were more spread out. Alfredo’s brother José lived in the *shovo* farthest upstream, 6 hours’ walk from Alfredo. Alfredo invited the residents of José’s *shovo* (see Figure 4.4.) to help cut the airstrip, and they did. Alfredo also gathered labor from other peripheral *shovo* and contributed his own and his brothers’ sizeable work forces.

After completing the airstrip, Alfredo invited the New Tribes Mission to establish itself at Maronal. His son Txanōpa told me that Alfredo had decided to build the airstrip so that the same benefits that accrued to the Ituí thanks to its airstrip would accrue also to Maronal. Once the airstrip was built, he invited the missionaries to Maronal in order to have access to health care and educational facilities.

The fact that the Maronal airstrip had been built by the cooperation of multiple *shovo* under the guidance of Alfredo had substantial symbolic and political value. To Alfredo, the ability of multiple *shovo* to cooperate on such projects as the airstrip is a distinguishing feature of Aldeia Maronal. Thanks to this, the Indians at Maronal own their own airstrip. This is contrasted with the situation on the Ituí River, where the airstrip was built by paid workers in the employ of the mission. The Ituí airstrip was thus considered to be mission property, not indigenous property.

The ownership of the airstrip affects the balance of authority between Alfredo and the mission. This may be seen in an interaction between Alfredo’s son and the mission that ended up having more symbolic than practical impact. On May 1st 1998, Alfredo

went to Cruzeiro to undergo treatment for psoriasis. He used an airplane that was returning empty after bringing supplies to the missionaries. Once in Cruzeiro, he was examined, diagnosed and treated in a hospital. After treatment, Alfredo sought to take advantage of another mission supply flight in order to return to Maronal. Txanõpa went to talk to the missionary Nunes about this possibility. Nunes replied that the flights they were hiring were going to be filled with supplies for the mission, and there would be no room for Alfredo.

Txanõpa had to negotiate with MSF to convince them to allow Alfredo to fly to Maronal in an MSF-hired airplane. Meanwhile, the mission supply flight came and went, and Alfredo was stuck in Cruzeiro. On May 31st, 1998, Txanõpa told me that Alfredo was angry at the mission. Alfredo made the runway with his own unpaid labor force and now the missionaries use it all the time, Txanõpa said. But now, they won't help him get on an airplane from Cruzeiro to Maronal.

While Alfredo was in Cruzeiro, the mission decided it wanted to extend the Maronal airstrip in order to allow for greater weights to be flown out. The mission hired several Marubo to cut trees and underbrush and pull up roots. Txanõpa told me he was going to have that work stopped. He said that if they extend the airfield, they will lay claim to it. But that airstrip is Alfredo's; the only person who should order it extended is Alfredo. Txanõpa said he was going to tell the missionaries about Alfredo's decision. However, the work was halted anyway. The workers said the airstrip could not be extended in the desired direction because of poor terrain.

On June 8th, 1998, another airplane came to supply the mission. Once again, Alfredo was not invited to fly in by the mission. Alfredo's brother José complained

about this. He said he himself helped build the airstrip, in the dry month of August under the hot sun. They hacked out and pulled up 367 meters of roots with machetes. But, José continued, whenever there is an airplane the missionaries prevent Marubo from getting rides. José said that if he could get rides he would not so much resent having cut the airstrip for free. But as it is, he is very unhappy about it. Alfredo returned to Maronal on June 16th, 1998, on an airplane hired by MSF to retrieve a health training team.

The issues surrounding the airstrip illustrate Alfredo's essential role in decision-making. Alfredo was able to gather together sufficient labor to make an airstrip, thus creating new opportunities for interaction with non-indigenous people. Once this opportunity existed, he exercised his decision-making abilities to inviting the mission, once again transforming the state of relations with non-indigenous people. All informants agree that the decision to invite the mission was his. Finally, having organized the labor that made it, Alfredo considers the airstrip his own, and reserves the right to decide on any additions or changes to it. By challenging the mission's right to lengthen the airstrip, Alfredo, through his son, highlighted his superior authority with respect to the missionaries.

The Generator.

After the airstrip was built, Alfredo organized labor once again to cut wood to trade for a generator. This event was described to me by Alfredo's brother José. José was not yet living near Alfredo, but was in his old *shovo* upstream.

Alfredo directed the cutting of 100 "toras" of wood. A "tora" is a log of a certain girth and length. A single tree could be cut into 3-4 toras. The trees were cut in the deep

forest and had to be cut into parts where they fell, then physically pushed and rolled overland to a stream, whence, after a strong rain, they were guided to the Curuçá. The terrain over which the logs were pulled is traversed by steep muddy gullies, rendering this extremely hard labor. José says he and his family contributed four of the 100 toras.

Alfredo succeeded in having 100 logs cut for the project, and in getting them to a buyer. The logs were worth the equivalent of \$1000. Alfredo received an electric generator in return. The generator malfunctioned and had to be sent back to Atalaia to be fixed. Once fixed, it was loaded aboard the same boat that took me to Aldeia Maronal, from July 20th to August 2nd 1997. On August 7th and 8th, electric poles were set up, a small hut was built for the generator, and wires were run out to three huts: Alfredo's and his two brothers'.

The Television.

Prior to my arrival in the field, Alfredo acquired a television and a satellite dish. These were acquired in exchange for allowing an Italian television crew access to Aldeia Maronal for a documentary. When the producers asked for permission, Alfredo made it conditional upon the purchase of the TV. The money was paid to CIVAJA, where Manoel Barbosa took it to Manaus. From Manaus the TV and satellite dish were sent up to Maronal. When the generator arrived in working condition in August 1997, the TV and dish were set up. The first TV broadcasts to Aldeia Maronal took place.

Alfredo's son Txanõpa explained to me the rationale behind the choice of the television as payment. He said they wanted to understand white people and how the white's world works. He said, outsiders think we are frivolous buying a TV set, but my father has a plan. He wants to understand how white people are so he will not be taken

advantage of. He wanted to bring these images in to his village so he could see and understand. It is part of a long-term plan, not at all a frivolous choice.

Authority to determine whether the mission can stay.

At the Marubo village of Maronal, healing rituals for critical illnesses involve the gathering of elders with healing skills from throughout the village together in one place. Such assemblies function as impromptu councils at which political issues can be discussed and decisions made. The healing songs (*shōki*) are a type of speech which only certain male elders know. At Aldeia Maronal, most hut-owners (*shovo ivorasi*; sg. *shovo ivo*) are also healers who know the *shōki*. While minor ailments are treated by one or two healers, major problems occasion the gathering together of most or all *shōki*-knowledgeable elders. This category of individual is called *kexitxo*. Ritual healing assemblies thus become at the same time councils of *kexitxo*.

The event I am calling ‘healing ritual’ centers on the act of singing the special songs known as *shōki* (Montagner 1985). The patient lays in a hammock while the singer sits on a wooden bench, his head above the patient’s body so he is singing over the patient. By means of the song, the healer summons a healing spirit to his aid, washes the body of evil influences, and expels the pathogenic agent. There are many different songs for different ailments. Each song is tailored to expel a particular pathogenic agent (spirit). Thus, each *kexitxo* has an extensive repertoire of songs for different situations. If one song seems ineffective, another song attacking a different pathogenic agent will be tried. Each *shōki* lasts approximately one hour. A patient may be sung over several

times in one night; in critical situations patients are sung over constantly, though always with a break between songs.

The fact that knowledge of *shōki* is restricted to certain elders requires emphasis. There were in 1997-98 ten *kexitxo* at Aldeia Maronal, all of them either a *shovo ivo* or the brother of a *shovo ivo*. No members of the younger generation have learned *shōki*. The *shovo ivorasi* and their brothers constitute the political leadership of the village; since all *kexitxo* are either a *shovo ivo* or the brother of a *shovo ivo*, where there is an assembly of healing experts there is *ipso facto* a gathering of the political leadership of the village. They are rituals of political organization as much as of healing.

Healing rituals follow a fairly standard sequence of events. Those who are going to sing sit down on the benches at about 7 p.m., an hour after dark. Singers are often accompanied by elders who are not there to sing but rather to observe the proceedings and participate in conversation. Once the healing assembly has gathered on the *kenā* (guest benches), consumption of Banisteriopsis tea (*oni*) begins. In addition, all present consume native tobacco snuff (*romejoto*) in substantial quantities. *Romejoto* is associated with a spirit that taught the Marubo to speak and controls issues of talking. Whenever speech is going to take place, Marubo men take snuff to ensure they can speak eloquently.

In August 1997, a young woman's critical illness occasioned the gathering together of eight *kexitxo*, including owners of five out of the nine *shovo* then in existence at Maronal. The affliction of Xaponê (the name of the girl) coincided precisely with the denunciation of the mission by an anti-mission faction. The Missão Novas Tribos Brasil had been invited to Aldeia Maronal by the headman, Alfredo, several years before these

events. Alfredo first organized the construction of an airstrip with indigenous labor. Once the airstrip was built, missionaries began flying in supplies and established themselves permanently. The advantages provided by the mission are: health assistance; the possibility of emergency evacuation via airplane summoned by radio; and a literacy program. The disadvantage is the conflict created by the missionaries' demonization of indigenous religious practices. The missionaries openly denounce indigenous religious beliefs as false and satanic. Despite the great advantages offered by their presence, some traditional-minded Marubo are unhappy with the missionaries' talk.

A few days before the affliction of Xaponê, some discontented Marubo went to the mission headquarters in the city of Cruzeiro do Sul to denounce the mission's presence at Maronal. The FUNAI post chief, Luís Melo, told me that Missão Novas Tribos headquarters was threatening to remove the mission from Aldeia Maronal. It was believed that the opinion of those who had denounced the mission was a generalized one among the Maronal Marubo. Had the denouncers spoken in the name of the entire village? Following this event, the missionaries wanted "the community" to clarify its position. The mission had to be reassured or it would be removed.

Alfredo had invited the mission and he was not prepared to have it go on account of the rebellious actions of a small group. I was never told explicitly who had denounced the mission, but as time went by it became easy to identify the individuals responsible as the sons of one of the other *shovo*-owners. It was therefore no coincidence that the father of these youths was invited to assist in the healing of Xaponê and was therefore present when Alfredo expressed his views on the issue.

The healing assembly began at approximately 7 p.m. on 14 August 1997. The guest benches (*kenã*) on either side of the doorway filled with the assembled healers and observers, as well as the ayahuasca-pourer. When I entered the *shovo*, the village headman, Alfredo, was speaking animatedly to the assembled audience. The initial topic of Alfredo's speech was the behavior of the current FUNAI administrator, Severo. Severo was a temporary administrator and his permanent replacement was a serious issue for the Maronal Marubo. After a time, Alfredo's son Txanõpa started speaking. Txanõpa added further detailed information on two boating accidents the consequences of which Severo had had to manage. Thus, upon arrival at this critical healing ritual I noted (1) a higher number of elders and shovo-owners were gathered together in one place than I had ever seen before; and (2) the headman and his son were explaining both fact and opinion concerning the FUNAI administrator to the assembled audience, which simply listened.

Following the exposition of FUNAI affairs Alfredo expounded on relations with the mission. Alfredo explained precisely what Aldeia Maronal's relationship to the mission should be. This relationship had just recently been called into question by an anti-missionary faction, so that Alfredo had to set the record straight. Alfredo told the assembled elders and young men that the mission could be beneficial provided the village stood together. Dissenters should not take independent action. He was aware of problems with the mission, but any decision to expel it had to be taken by the village as a whole. His message was clear: ultimately, he set policy on the mission. If anyone disagreed, they should talk to him, but he would tell the mission whether to stay or go.

As Alfredo spoke, there was frequent backchanneling, occasional brief commentary, and several questions from the assembled elders and young men. He

accepted a cup of Banisteriopsis tea and frequently took native tobacco snuff. None of this interrupted the flow of his discourse, however; from beginning to end he expressed his opinion without any real interruption. What is interesting is that there was no disagreement from any of those assembled. There were no arguments or contrary opinions voiced: when Alfredo was done everyone assented to his opinion. One of the assembled elders was the leader of the anti-mission faction; he too gave his assent to the content of Alfredo's discourse. Upon concluding his discourse on the mission, Alfredo got up and walked to where the young woman, Xaponê, lay in her hammock, sat on a low carved wood stool and sang. The singing, involving all the assembled elders at various times, lasted for three days, but the political conversation never resumed over Xaponê. He was joined by two women who engaged in a form of ritual lamentation.

The presence of the mission is an integral part of Alfredo's plan to create an attractive place to live. By bringing health care and education to his village, Alfredo has been able to convince several other elders to move there. He has thus increased the size of his village to the point where it is the largest Marubo village, comprising about one fourth of the total population. This bolsters his claim to general leadership over the Marubo nation. As will be noted below, Alfredo has complex and ambiguous feelings regarding the mission, but he certainly wants it to remain.

Having secured the attendance of the rebellious youths' father, Alfredo took the opportunity to reintegrate his village behind a single point of view-his own. During his discourse on the mission incident, Alfredo invoked an ethical code that all *shovo ivo* hold very dear, the Marubo code of social ethics called *ese*. From the point of view of *ese*, the *shovo ivo* is responsible for the actions of the people living with him. All important

decisions must ultimately go through the *shovo ivo*. Alfredo was hinting that for the other man's sons to take unilateral action against the mission was an affront to the authority of all *shovo ivo*. The *shovo ivorasi*, gathered together as they were at that moment, should be making the decisions. Alfredo did not directly address the issue of whether or not the mission should be there. Instead he spoke of the proper way to approach the mission issue. To this discourse, the dissenting youths' father agreed. Note that there were no accusations made against this man, no open conflict occurred. Alfredo simply stated his opinion, and the other man agreed. Everyone present knew the subtext. By the time Alfredo got up to sing the *shōki*, the conflict was over.

The result of this event was exactly as Alfredo intended. From then on, the youths' father kept his sons in check. Although they continued to oppose the mission and speak out on its perceived dangers, they never again took any action against it. The sphere of effective decision-making on this issue became restricted to the village elders, where Alfredo could control outcomes through his effective use of political rhetoric. Having secured the assent of the other elders and *shovo ivorasi* to his point of view, Alfredo was able to tell the missionaries that the entire village stood united behind him, and that the mission should stay.

This incident demonstrates the following facts: (1) There is disagreement over whether the mission should be present or not; (2) The anti-mission Marubo claimed to speak for the community, but in the end it was Alfredo who spoke for the community; (3) Alfredo communicates the situation to his brothers and to the *shovo ivorasi* before he makes his decision and takes action; (4) Alfredo uses speech to bring his opponents

around to his point of view. By this means, he is sometimes able to secure a broad consensus prior to acting, though this not always the case (in this case it was).

*Organization of labor, relationship to non-indigenous people,
and definition of social status: correlations.*

. Alfredo says that because Maronal has a “tuxáua”, they have a generator, TV, and airstrip. Alfredo points to the Kanamari and the Ituí Marubo as examples of people who do not have what Maronal has, because they have no “tuxáua”.

“Tuxáua” is an Amazonian Portuguese word for leader. In this context, it refers specifically to leadership over multiple *shovo*. In Marubo, this position is called *kakáya*, and when Alfredo uses the word “tuxáua” he clearly gives it the attributes of the Marubo role of *kakáya*. Alfredo’s father João was such an exemplification of this role that he became more commonly known as João Tuxáua than by his real surname.

The existence of a tuxáua creates greater opportunities for multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor than would otherwise exist. This is because part of a *kakáya*’s structural role is the organization of labor. Alfredo says that at Maronal, multiple-*shovo* cooperation is the norm. As tuxáua, he encourages this. In addition, the concentration of many people in one place under one leader makes this cooperation easier. On the Ituí River, there are 370 people spread over 15 *shovo*. However, there is no tuxáua over the Ituí *shovo*. In contrast, at Maronal there are 220 people in 12 *shovo*, with a single tuxáua. It is this difference, Alfredo says, that has allowed Maronal successfully to complete the airstrip and obtain the generator. On the Ituí, there is no multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor, no generator, and no indigenous-owned airstrip. According to Alfredo, the *shovo*

work separately, with no tuxáua. Thus, although they are more numerous than Maronal, they have less. The Maronal Marubo are very proud of this fact.

Maronal obtained the airstrip and generator thanks in large part to Alfredo's leadership, and specifically his ability to organize labor, an essential facet of leadership. Alfredo's transformation of Maronal's relationship to non-indigenous people, successfully establishing communications when before there was isolation, depended on this skill in labor organization. Success in these enterprises validates Alfredo's claim to being tuxáua. The validity of this status is established through successful completion of projects involving the cooperation of multiple *shovo* for the common good, and also comparatively by pointing out that nobody else has this ability to organize labor.

The Edvaldo Issue.

In September 1997 a decision was made at Aldeia Maronal to support one candidate over another for the position of regional FUNAI administrator at Atalaia. One candidate, Edvaldo, was linked to local political and business interests considered unfavorable to the indigenous people. The other, Gilmar, was well liked both by indigenous people and by local FUNAI employees. Maronal decided to support Gilmar. Unlike the interactions previously reviewed, in this case Alfredo was not the focal point of decision-making. Alfredo approved a course of action proposed by CIVAJA.

The Marubo followed any changes in the regional administration of FUNAI with great interest. At the time of Edvaldo's candidacy, the administrator's post was a revolving door. Txanõpa explained to me that no administrator stayed in office long enough to set and enact policies, so that little was done by FUNAI. At the start of my

fieldwork in July 1997, there had been a temporary administrator in Atalaia. In August, Gilmar arrived and took over the job of interim administration. In mid-September, Gilmar was awaiting confirmation as regional administrator. He made a proposal to purchase rubber-extraction hardware for the indigenous communities, which the indigenous people looked very favorably upon. In addition, Gilmar had a reputation for efficient administration and budget control which made him popular among the FUNAI *chefes de posto*. His confirmation as permanent administrator was very much looked forward to.

Gilmar's accession to the administrator's position was impeded by Edvaldo's candidacy. The information that Edvaldo was to be made FUNAI administrator in Atalaia was first heard by a Marubo FUNAI worker, then passed on to CIVAJA personnel. CIVAJA promptly alerted all indigenous villages with radios. At Aldeia Maronal, this information was received by Alfredo's son Txanõpa. The same day he received the news, Txanõpa organized a meeting to discuss the issue.

The meeting to discuss the FUNAI administration was held on September 17th 1997. The featured speaker was Alfredo. Fortuitously, the Edvaldo issue coincided with a large feast hosted by Aldeia Maronal. On the 17th, a large number of guests from Aldeia São Sebastião were present at Maronal. Thus, attendance at the meeting included the headman and the senior elder of São Sebastião as well as several *shovo ivorasi*, their brothers from Maronal, and Alfredo himself.

The meeting was introduced by Txanõpa. Txanõpa was at that time the CIVAJA radio operator for Aldeia Maronal. Txanõpa had received the information from CIVAJA, and for the time being he was the only one who had that information. At the meeting, he

explained to those assembled that Edvaldo was to be installed as administrator, how this situation had arisen, and why Edvaldo was undesirable. He said they should decide what they wanted and write a radiogram to Atalaia, to be passed on to FUNAI in Brasília (a radiogram is a written statement which is taken down word for word by the operator at the other end and eventually typed to become part of the official record).

After his son's introduction, Alfredo began speaking. He spoke a total of ten times and gave two long speeches. He never merely commented on or backchanneled others' statements, but always made his own. He weighed in for Gilmar and against Edvaldo. The headman of São Sebastião agreed with Alfredo's position. Three other elders from Maronal agreed also. No disagreement was voiced. The decision was made to write a radiogram opposing Edvaldo and supporting Gilmar.

The radiogram was written by Alfredo's son with my technical assistance, and sent to FUNAI on the following day. It stated that the leaders of Maronal reject Edvaldo due to his links to politicians and activities contrary to indigenous interests. They accepted only Gilmar. They rejected the continuous change in administrators, which rendered any projects unfeasible. They wanted Gilmar's projects to be enacted. The signers included the headman and two elders from Aldeia São Sebastião, and the headman, four elders, and a young man from Maronal.

On this occasion, the path of action was set by CIVAJA, with Alfredo giving his informed assent. Maronal was not alone in holding a meeting; throughout the Vale do Javari, meetings were organized, radiograms sent, and indigenous leaders made plans to travel to Atalaia to protest Edvaldo. There was no support for Edvaldo, and total support for Gilmar among indigenous peoples. Edvaldo was considered a serious threat to

indigenous interests, particularly to the integrity of their land and resources and to the beneficial application of FUNAI resources.

Although the course of action was not set by Alfredo, Alfredo's was the key voice defining the position of Aldeia Maronal with respect to the Edvaldo candidacy. In fact, only five voices from Aldeia Maronal were heard at the meeting. As important was the fact that there was no dissent. With Alfredo weighing in for Gilmar and approving of CIVAJA's analysis of the situation, it was possible to send a message stating "we the leaders of the Marubo assembled at Aldeia Maronal" (Portuguese *nós lideranças Marubo reunidos na Aldeia Maronal*) support Gilmar and oppose Edvaldo.

On the 22nd of September, guests from the Ituí River arrived for the feast. On the following day, a second meeting was held, this time gathering together elders from five Ituí villages as well as both Curuçá villages. The Edvaldo issue was discussed again, and the same conclusion reached. A second, more vehement radiogram was sent specifying certain accusations against Edvaldo and making it clear he would not be accepted by the indigenous peoples. This second radiogram represented the opinion of the entire Marubo nation.

Word came in over the radio that Mayoruna and Kanamari leaders were traveling to Atalaia to protest Edvaldo's installation. Alfredo made plans to travel to Atalaia, as well. On November 4th 1997 Alfredo went downstream by boat to Atalaia to hold conversations with FUNAI. He wanted to explain the indigenous point of view and the unacceptability of Edvaldo. He also wanted to claim the proceeds from the crafts Marubo sold to FUNAI, and supervise the sale of manioc flour through FUNAI.

The Marubo were successful in deflecting Edvaldo from the administrator's position. Although he was formally installed, Edvaldo never became the *de facto* administrator. Gilmar controlled the administration while the issue was reviewed and Edvaldo was eventually removed. It should be noted that Gilmar and Edvaldo were never personal enemies. Gilmar could claim that the Indians were demanding his installation, thus deflecting the blame for the political rivalry and depersonalizing it.

b. Txanõpa

Txanõpa is the second son of the second wife of Alfredo. Despite his distance from the primogeniture, Txanõpa is the most politically active of Alfredo's sons. He acts as an informal leader of the younger generation.

Preserving Indigenous Culture.

Txanõpa has an active desire to preserve indigenous culture. This desire manifested in a series of projects and actions throughout the fieldwork period. Txanõpa requested that my recording devices be applied to preserving his elders' knowledge; he organized a course in traditional medicine; he watched over the mission in an effort to control its cultural impact. Txanõpa was 'conscientizado', signifying that he had a sense of identity as both Marubo and indigenous, and took pride in this identity and the distinct culture that came with it. He actually used the Portuguese word "*cultura*". He learned this word and some of its significance in political meetings organized by COIAB in Manaus. His application of the word seemed consistent with the generally accepted meanings of the word, covering at different times obvious phenomena such as arts and

crafts, but also rituals such as the feasts and healing rituals, indigenous cosmological and religious beliefs, discourse genres, kinship, and subsistence strategies.

Txanōpa's will to apply technology to the preservation of his culture revealed itself quickly. I arrived at Maronal on August 2nd, 1997. On August 5th, Txanōpa came to me to express his concern that the young men were not learning the stories known by their elders. He asked me if I would tape record the songs the elders would sing when they gathered together for the *Tanamea* feast the following month. I agreed. We made plans to make copies of these tapes on one of the three tape-to-tape boom-boxes in the village.

On August 10th, Txanōpa called me to the schoolhouse with my recording equipment. He had invited the most knowledgeable elders to answer questions, and he wanted me to record the answers. Gathered together were Misael—Txanōpa's mother's father and considered the most knowledgeable Marubo alive; Wanōpa, Misael's brother and a *shovo ivo*; and Miguel, the former shaman. There were also several more junior elders, and a large number of young men. Txanōpa sat next to the elders and asked questions about the origins of indigenous peoples, the Marubo theodicy, the origins of domesticated foods, and the Marubo naming system, as I recorded. The motivation Txanōpa expressed to me for this project was that he worried that the old people would die before the new generation has learned their words. In this, he was somewhat successful: Misael died in June 1999, and Txanōpa does have a copy of the cassette we made that day.

Txanōpa's sense of the value of his own culture came in part out of his encounter with the Christian religion. He described the evolution of his indigenous consciousness

in a conversation on January 31st 1998. He attended classes at the Catholic seminary in Tabatinga. There, his room was around the back of the church in between the bishop and the priest. One day, out of curiosity, Txanõpa went to an Assembly of God service. The priest saw him there. When he got back to his room, the priest confronted Txanõpa. The priest said that if he was going to be a Protestant, he would have to leave. But Txanõpa explained that he merely wanted to know which was the true religion. The bishop arrived. According to Txanõpa, the bishop asserted that because the Catholic church was the oldest, they were the true church. However, Txanõpa remained unconvinced and confused.

In November 1997 Txanõpa attended a CIVAJA-organized meeting of indigenous peoples at the Matís village on the Ituí River. There, he met a man from CIMI, the Catholic indigenous-support organization. The man told him that God had given each people their own law, and that no one's beliefs should be traded for another's. This solution was much more satisfactory to Txanõpa. He says that encounter is what led him to realize that his culture should not be destroyed nor traded for another. He said, now he did not want to destroy his culture.

Txanõpa's newfound conceptual framework led him to become concerned with the activities of the New Tribes mission at Aldeia Maronal. The New Tribes mission has a far less respectful attitude towards indigenous religion than does CIMI. Txanõpa had personal experience of missionaries calling indigenous religious practitioners "Satan". To Txanõpa, the mission seemed to be trying to destroy indigenous culture. He wonders if this is so, and why. He often went to the mission to express one concern or another, sometimes about things the mission was saying, other times about issues like the

educational curriculum or the mission's expansion projects. He kept close tabs on the mission's activities, and an ambiguous attitude. He said the mission would be evaluated after a five-year period, and at that point they would judge based on the educational progress made whether the mission would be allowed to stay or not.

That Txanõpa should have gained what seems to be an enhanced sense of indigenous identity due to an encounter made at a CIVAJA meeting is not unusual. Such meetings are often designed at least in part to do just that. In March 1997, Txanõpa attended a meeting in Manaus organized by COPIAR, an association of indigenous teachers from Acre, Amazonas, and Roraima. CIVAJA procured the funds for his trip. At this meeting, he came in contact with individuals who had been working on issues of indigenous education for years. An oft-discussed problem in this area is that of the incorporation of indigenous culture into the curriculum. It is felt that by removing the youth from traditional information-transmission contexts, education was having a negative impact on many indigenous cultures. Traditional knowledge should be incorporated into the curriculum in order to soften the impact of education on indigenous culture, according to this point of view. Txanõpa listened to these ideas and incorporated them into his own opinions, since both education and cultural preservation were important goals of his.

Exemplifying Txanõpa's concern with the issue of combining traditional knowledge with modern technology and education is his organization of a *Mukayosia* (medicine-learning), what he called the First Course in Marubo Traditional Medicine. In March 1998 he invited some Ituí Marubo to come to Maronal to learn Marubo traditional medicine. Individuals came from Aldeia Alegria and Aldeia Liberdade. I taught

Txanõpa to use the camcorder and he videotaped much of the proceedings. Txanõpa's father's brother's son Kanãpa learned to use my tape recorder, and recorded the event. Several different elders were invited to lead walks through the forest during which they paused at intervals to explain the properties of different plants. Attendance from Aldeia Maronal was very high. The audiocassettes were copied at Aldeia Maronal, while the videotapes were copied in the United States and returned to Aldeia Maronal later.

Through this sequence of experiences and actions, Txanõpa grew not only to think about but to take action for preserving his culture. Thus, he stood for indigenous autonomy, and agreed with voices of suspicion concerning the motives of FUNAI and the mission. This position was important due to his influential position in the flow of information at Aldeia Maronal.

Attendance at political meetings.

A notable feature of Txanõpa's pattern of relations with non-indigenous people is his frequent attendance at political meetings. He is sent to these meetings by his father as representative for Maronal. Through his participation at these meetings, Txanõpa gains first access to information affecting the indigenous people of the Javari basin, setting himself up to become the transmitter of that information back to his home village. He also gains an understanding of the political meeting as a genre of social event and how to conduct one, a skill he applies to great effect when he is at Aldeia Maronal.

On August 18th, 1997, Txanõpa left Aldeia Maronal, walking to aldeia Vida Nova on the Ituí River where CIVAJA was holding a meeting on land demarcation. He returned on September 8th. An anthropologist working with the indigenous movement,

Terry Aquino, had come up the Ituí to attend, along with Clóvis. At the meeting, the current status of efforts to demarcate the Javari basin as indigenous land was discussed. Aquino provided information on budgetary issues, including the fact that demarcation would not be funded by FUNAI but through a special program with foreign money. Txanõpa became the only person from Aldeia Maronal to possess this important information, which he disseminated to his village upon return.

In late October Txanõpa left again, this time overland to the Ituí and then by river to Rio Novo, to attend a meeting at the nearby Matís village. This was a general CIVAJA assembly gathering together Marubo, Matís, Kanamari, and Mayoruna. A wide range of issues from health care and education to demarcation and CIVAJA policies were discussed at this meeting. From Rio Novo, Txanõpa went to Atalaia do Norte where he stayed for more than a month, returning to Aldeia Maronal in early January 1998.

On February 28th, 1998, Txanõpa travelled by boat down the Curuça and Javari Rivers to Atalaia, arriving on March 4th. On March 5th he was present at a meeting organized by FUNAI, at which anthropologist Walter Coutinho presented the map for the proposed Área Indígena do Javari. Again, representatives of all four ethnic groups were present. The entire process of demarcation was described in detail. The demarcation proposal was voted on and approved. He was back at Maronal by early April.

In addition to the three meetings just described, Txanõpa had attended meetings prior to the start of this fieldwork. The COPIAR indigenous teachers' meeting in Manaus, previously described (this chapter, above), is one example. In a conversation on February 17th, 1998, he told me that when he was in the city studying, he went to all the political meetings and reunions, of indigenous people, of students, even a union meeting.

Through his frequent travels to attend meetings, Txanõpa became the most knowledgeable person at Maronal concerning the topics addressed at these meetings. In addition, there were many informal exchanges of information at these meetings, between people from far distant villages who normally had little interaction. Txanõpa ended up holding a great deal of information on Marubo external relations and development projects. Txanõpa felt that it was important for young people like him to “place ideas before the elders”, to “present the reality of the situation” to the elders. Otherwise, the elders just wanted to plant new swiddens, order hunts, and throw traditional feasts. But the youths have been to the city and returned, have seen the reality and learned. Only if they put ideas before the elders will the elders take steps in directions such as education and economic development; otherwise they focused on traditional goals. Thus, Txanõpa saw his role as transmitter of information for elders to act upon. By supplying the elders with information, he influenced the types of goals which the elders chose to pursue. Through his influence, he attempted to make the elders see the value of the paths of action suggested by CIVAJA for the economic and political development of the Marubo nation.

Radio operation, political meetings, and political influence.

Txanõpa operates the CIVAJA radio and retransmits the information to the villagers at Maronal. The retransmission of information may take place in informal conversations, or when Txanõpa attends an informal elders’ gathering. Other times, Txanõpa calls a formal political meeting at which he presents the information, requests

that it be discussed, and asks for a decision to be made about a common response. By operating the radio and holding political meetings, Txanõpa exerts political influence.

Txanõpa controls the CIVAJA radio whenever he is present at Aldeia Maronal.

There are several reasons for this. First is his own close association with CIVAJA.

When he was downstream for his studies, Txanõpa became *conscientizado* through his association with CIVAJA. He attended meetings and absorbed their ideas. He became an active part of the *movimento indígena*. By the time he returned to Maronal he saw himself as a part of a pan-indigenous movement. He is the grassroots base of the movement in his village, linking it to CIVAJA in Atalaia, which links to COIAB in Manaus, which links to CAPOIB in Brasília. He is conscious that his efforts on the village level are part of a nationwide movement for indigenous rights and indigenous cultural pride. He is considered a probable candidate, at some future date, for a formal position in CIVAJA. Because of these affiliations and because of his excellent command of the Portuguese language, Txanõpa is the main CIVAJA radio operator.

Through his control of the radio and his travels to meetings, Txanõpa manages to obtain a large quantity of recent information and new ideas. He then consciously endeavors to present this picture of reality to his elders, so that they will take actions beyond the scope of traditional politics. He feels that, left to themselves, the leaders will take the actions that help them gain prestige among themselves, such as planting large swiddens, ordering young men on hunts, and throwing feasts. Txanõpa feels that his role is essential in propelling the elders to take action in such spheres as economic and technological development and political relations with the non-indigenous world. In this

he is not alone: others feel as he does about the key role of youth in mobilizing the elders to action (see Manoel Barbosa, below).

Txanõpa's role in coordinating with CIVAJA and mobilizing the elders to action can be seen in his actions in the Edvaldo Issue (discussed earlier this chapter) and during the hiring of Manoel Barbosa as FUNAI *chefe de posto*. In each case, he received information from CIVAJA, transmitted it to the elders, received their response, and executed their decision, in each case a radiogram stating Maronal's position on an issue. In each case, he agreed with CIVAJA's ideas and the elders agreed with his, so that rapid and coordinated action was taken at CIVAJA's behest.

At other times, Txanõpa would transmit information without CIVAJA mobilization. For example, he often discussed possibilities for economic development with me. He then discussed these discussions with his elders, who spent several informal gatherings discussing the issues thus raised, although no actions were taken as a result.

Txanõpa plays a key role in information-transmission and decision-making patterns, and thus in the dynamics of influence, at Maronal. He receives information from CIVAJA, from myself, or from his travels; he transmits this information to his father Alfredo, who then retransmits it to the other elders; or Txanõpa himself transmits it directly to all the leaders at a political meeting; or he transmits the information informally to other youth, who then trickle the information up to their elders, who only then discuss it during their endless rounds of informal councils. Alfredo may then direct one of the youths to act, as when he tells Txanõpa or Amélia to write radiograms; or he may mobilize the other elders, who then mobilize the youth, as when the airstrip was constructed. Decisions to act may also be taken by councils of elders in Alfredo's

absence, whether formal (a political meeting that requested Manoel as *chefe de posto* while Alfredo was in Cruzeiro) or informal (an informal council, at a healing session, that decided to accept an extension of my fieldwork while Alfredo was in Atalaia). Whenever a decision is made or accepted by a council of elders, and especially if that council included Alfredo, the decision is voiced as “we the leaders of Aldeia Maronal met to discuss...and we decided that...” It becomes, as far as the outside world is concerned, the opinion of ‘Aldeia Maronal’.

Health Care

Txanõpa applied considerable energy to becoming a microscopist trained by Doctors Without Borders (MSF). When first observed in July 1997, Maronal’s leading *Agente Indígena de Saúde* (AIS) was Amélia. However, after attending a training course in Atalaia in November, Txanõpa became the leading microscopist, while Amélia took charge mainly of women’s health issues. Over the next few months Txanõpa gained considerable experience as the number of malaria cases was very high. An FNS (Fundação Nacional de Saúde) evaluator rated his accurateness at 99%.

Txanõpa became an essential contact for health care organizations operating at Maronal. For example, when MSF AIS-training team came to Maronal on February 6th, 1998, it was Txanõpa, in his “community” 25 h.p. outboard, who took Dr. Beauregard for a visit to the uppermost *shovo*. When an FNS vaccination team arrived on February 19th, Txanõpa visited that uppermost *shovo* in order to invite its inhabitants to come for vaccinations; he went to Nakwa’s *shovo* to bring an old man in for vaccination; and he also went to Ivãpa’s *shovo* to warn them to be ready for a vaccination visit. When the

Pastoral Indigenista health care team came to Maronal in April, he accompanied the team on their *shovo-to-shovo* visits. In May he received microscopy assessment and training with an FNS malaria-control team. With each visit he added to his training and experience.

By April of 1998, Txanõpa became unhappy with the division of medicines into two locations. Medicines purchased by FUNAI were sent directly to the mission. Such medicines were typically sent aboard airplanes hired for other reasons. In addition, the mission purchased medicines on its own. Medicines purchased by FUNAI and the mission were held in the mission pharmacy, controlled and administered by the missionaries. On the other hand, as the AIS training continued, the AISes became capable of administering an expanding range of medicines for problems including malaria, dysentery, and headache. These medicines were contributed by FNS and MSF, held in an AIS pharmacy, controlled by the AIS and generally administered by Kanãpa, Txanõpa's father's brother's son. Txanõpa told me that this was causing problems because some people go to both: first to one, and then, if they do not improve, to another. Txanõpa held conversations with the missionaries as to how to resolve this issue. Later, he told me that when his father's brother's son Manoel arrived as *chefe de posto*, he would ask for FUNAI medicines to be consolidated in a single hut with MSF and FNS medicines, under indigenous central control. Indigenous control was a recurring goal in Txanõpa's interactions with non-indigenous people.

Interactions with the Mission

Txanõpa acted as an agent for his father in interactions with the mission.

Alfredo's position on the mission was nuanced: on the one hand, accept the mission's presence, taking advantage of education and health care opportunities; on the other hand, mitigate the mission's cultural impact and prevent the missionaries from becoming a separate source of authority. Txanõpa worked within the parameters set by his father's policy. He was suspicious of the mission's motives; he endeavored to reinforce the distribution of authority that placed his father above the mission; he claimed the authority to expel it. But he also respected his father's desire to have it there in the first place.

The mission issue first came up when the authority to decide if the mission can stay came under discussion (see under Alfredo, above). On this occasion, some Marubo in Cruzeiro do Sul had claimed that the mission was not wanted at Maronal, causing the mission to threaten to withdraw. The issue was resolved quietly and quickly among the elders, who had gathered together to sing *shōki*. Once resolved, Txanõpa minimized the importance of the event: mere rumors, easily dealt with, he called it. Following his father's lead, Txanõpa supported the mission's presence, and wished to project an attitude of community unity on this issue.

Txanõpa clearly stated the indigenous authority over the mission that, he felt, distinguished Maronal from Ituí. On the Ituí the mission was permanently entrenched. True, many are dissatisfied with the Ituí mission and expulsion talk is rampant. But there are enough people who find the mission's presence beneficial that expulsion talk has no chance of success. Jansma has been there long enough, and learned Marubo ways well enough, that he has established a system of relating to Marubo that successfully

establishes himself as an independent and often superior authority at Vida Nova. Here at Maronal, Txanõpa said in January 1998, the relation to the mission is different. They will evaluate the mission and the Nunes in another year, after 5 total years of presence. If we are not happy with their work, we'll expel them, he said.

Jansma has developed, on the Ituí River, a system of relating to the Marubo largely on his own terms. In particular, he has avoided being swept up into the indigenous economic exchange system, involving frequent loans and gifts in accordance with precepts of generalized and balanced reciprocity (Sahlins 1972), and frequent feasting and mutual eating and drinking invitations. Instead, Jansma maintained tight control of a stock of Western trade goods which he exchanged for labor, money, and allegiance. He passively opposed indigenous economic and technological development, refraining from assistance in these areas. Simultaneously, he worked to spread his religious beliefs to others, accumulating a following of regular churchgoers with self-identities as Christian believers. His educational and health assistance policies, while not explicitly thus designed, had the effect of perpetuating indigenous dependency by neglecting the training of indigenous health assistants and schoolteachers. He regularly influenced the Ituí Marubo on issues totally unrelated to his mission, preventing Ituí's integration in CIVAJA for years, and convincing the Ituí Marubo to impede my own research. Through this elaborate system of control he maintains enough support and allegiance to be highly secure so that no anti-mission coalition could succeed in expelling him. A consensus of Vida Nova *shovo ivorasi* would be required, and that is extremely unlikely.

Maronal Marubo are aware of Jansma's control system and concerned that it not be replicated at Maronal by Xavier Nunes, who learned the system in several years working with Jansma at Vida Nova. Txanõpa said that the Nunes are difficult to handle because they got Jansma's method of relating to Marubo. He preferred Aníbal, who never spent time with Jansma. Txanõpa says he prefers the inexperienced missionaries who don't know Jansma's method. Then the indigenous people themselves can influence the new missionaries' attitudes and consequent actions. With those trained by Jansma this was impossible, Txanõpa said: they were firmly set in their ways, and their ways were unfavorable to the Marubo. He feared that those who learn from Jansma will tell other incoming non-indigenous people how to relate to Marubo, with results such as Gerrard's use of trade goods to establish illicit sexual relationships.

Txanõpa expressed concern over the long-term impact of the mission on the Ituí River. In the first place, he felt that they were trying to destroy indigenous culture, though he did not fully understand the motivations. Secondly, he worried about the mission creating divisions among Marubo, citing the example of an Ituí Marubo who had taken to throwing feasts just for believers. Thirdly, by January it was well known that the missionary Gerrard had engaged in sexual misconduct with Marubo women, and Txanõpa worried about this too.

Txanõpa's opinion of the mission is largely colored by his feelings about indigenous culture. Before his change of consciousness, he was as attracted to the mission belief system as he was to any other. It was when he acquired a sense of the value of indigenous culture that he began to question the negative cultural impact of the New Tribes mission. He thus came to share his father's dilemma: keep the mission but

mitigate its cultural impact. These efforts at mitigation manifested as symbolic contests of authority at which the higher position of Txanõpa, as his father's representative, was reiterated. The goal was to prevent Nunes from establishing a system of control to match Jansma's.

The contests of authority involved myself, the medical depot, and the airstrip. In each case, Txanõpa reinforced indigenous autonomy and missionary dependency. He says the Nunes asked him about my presence and activities and tried to tell him how he should relate to me. Txanõpa replied that they had different ideas and Nunes should not be concerned about how I am handled. Txanõpa denied Nunes even the opportunity to advise, let alone guide or control Marubo relations to me. In a second incident, Txanõpa reported that '*os Nunes*' (the Nunes) had told him Maronal should get a license to cut cedar. Txanõpa replied that he and the elders did not feel logging to be a good solution, but preferred the idea of agricultural development. This interaction reinforced the notion that Marubo could make decisions about their future more wisely than could the missionaries.

Other incidents proved clearer contests of authority. In April, without consulting Alfredo who was in Cruzeiro, the Nunes payed Marubo labor to cut wood to construct a corral so they could build up their flock of sheep. Txanõpa said this was their land and their wood, and they were the ones who needed economic development. He said they would not accept the Nunes' doing this. He went over to discuss the issue and apparently came to a compromise because the corral was built. Later that same month, Txanõpa started saying that once they had an indigenous *chefe de posto*, medicine storage would be consolidated under indigenous control, a move to seize control of a key resource. It is

unknown whether this plan was ever executed. Finally, in May while his father lingered in Cruzeiro, Txanõpa said Alfredo was angry at the mission. He had made the runway with his own unpaid labor and now the missionaries use it all the time, but they won't help him get on an airplane from Cruzeiro (the previous flight had been a supply flight, and the missionaries did not allow Alfredo on board). Now, the mission was paying labor to extend the runway from 367 to 500 meters. Txanõpa said "I will have that work stopped". If they extend the field, they will have a claim on it. But the field is Alfredo's; if anyone extends it, it will be him. In this case, the extension proved physically unfeasible and the work was stopped before any confrontation could occur.

Txanõpa's mode of relating to the mission must be seen in the context of the different mode of relating that is prevalent on the Ituí River. On the Ituí River, the distribution of authority clearly favors the mission. No single indigenous authority could expel the mission, no matter what the offense. Jansma remained influential and uncontrollable. Txanõpa's interactions with the Maronal mission aimed to establish and retain a distribution of authority that favored indigenous people. Hence the comment that the Nunes would be evaluated and possibly expelled: here the indigenous people are firmly in control.

Relations with FUNAI.

The same effort to establish and maintain a favorable distribution of authority may be discerned in Txanõpa's interactions with FUNAI. However, the FUNAI *chefe de posto* was present at Aldeia Maronal only until October 1997, so that there were far fewer observed interactions with FUNAI than with the mission.

A symbolic contest of authority occurred in September 1997. It is symbolic because although it was about a minor issue, it carried with it associations with previous and future contests that gave it added importance. On September 6th 1997 a critically ill patient was removed by airplane from Maronal to Tabatinga. Txanõpa was then walking back from a meeting at Vida Nova. He arrived on September 8th. On the morning of September 9th, Luís was using the FUNAI radio early. FUNAI radio hours commence at 9 a.m., while the CIVAJA radio operates from 7:30 a.m. until about 8:30. On September 9th, 1997, both Luís and Txanõpa were using their radios simultaneously for the same purpose: to obtain information about the sick man. The result was interference, and the FUNAI radio drowned out the CIVAJA radio in mid-conversation. Txanõpa wrote a note and had a child carry it over to Luís. The note simply requested that Luís “refrain from interfering with the CIVAJA radio hours as we are trying to define the state of emergency”.

Txanõpa’s note made Luís angry. He called it ‘frescura’, sauciness or freshness. He placed the issue in the context of the FUNAI-CIVAJA tension. He said it was one more example of CIVAJA criticizing while doing nothing. He said FUNAI did the removal by air and took care of the hospitalization, but now CIVAJA is claiming it has control of the situation. When an Indian is in danger, FUNAI pays to have them removed, but CIVAJA won’t do anything, he said. These statements were not at all novel; they were examples of the standard criticisms often levelled at CIVAJA by FUNAI workers. FUNAI believed itself to be a ‘serious’ agency, while CIVAJA was not. CIVAJA criticism of any sort made them feel unappreciated and self-righteous, triggering defensive reactions. Luís’ reactions were conditioned by years of tension with

CIVAJA: a minor issue like Txanõpa's note tapped into a pool of anger and caused a reaction quite out of measure with the incident that apparently produced it.

The incident may be analyzed as a message from Txanõpa to Luís concerning relations of authority. José Barbosa once told me that CIVAJA had told Alfredo that he needed to direct the actions of FUNAI *chefes de posto* because they worked for the Indians. Thus, CIVAJA had argued to Alfredo that a distribution of authority favoring indigenous people should be established in relation to FUNAI field agents. Txanõpa's message to Luís shows that he envisions the distribution of authority as favoring himself over Luís.

In September 1997, Txanõpa took an active role in organizing opposition to the candidacy of Edvaldo for regional FUNAI administrator. Basing himself on discussions with CIVAJA, he organized meetings at which he (and others) garnered support for organized action to oppose Edvaldo. These meetings resulted in prompt statements of opposition from representatives of most of the Marubo nation. In this situation, to a greater degree than in the case of the note to Luís, Txanõpa was working to establish a distribution of authority favorable to indigenous people. He was helping to coordinate an effort to exercise indigenous control over the administrator's position. This effort was successful. In 1998 the sequence was repeated in Txanõpa's role in the installation of his father's brother's son as *chefe de posto*.

The recurring feature in Txanõpa's interactions with FUNAI is a belief that FUNAI exists to serve indigenous interests, and should be made to operate in accordance with this goal. Through his actions, he works to establish indigenous influence over the way FUNAI works in relation to Marubo. This fits the *movimento indígena*'s philosophy

of indigenous people's control over their own future, and an end to the days when FUNAI presumes to paternalistically 'guide' the Indians (by *movimento indígena* I refer to the indigenous organizations under the umbrella of COIAB and CAPOIB).

The Anthropologist.

In a conversation in January 1998, Txanõpa told me that he wants to understand what anthropologists do and ensure that they support the community and the indigenous movement. This summarized his attitude towards me in the course of fieldwork. In the first place, he actively requested that I work in certain directions I would not otherwise have worked in. For example, taping the singing at feasts or the words of Misael, supplying videotapes and audiocassettes to record his traditional medicine course, and correcting the grammar in his radiograms were not a part of my original methodology. This was work undertaken directly at his behest and in service of his agenda, though it suited my agenda too as it allowed me to be present at and record a number of events I would not otherwise have presumed to record. In addition to directly imposing certain tasks on me, Txanõpa tried to ensure that none of my self-initiated tasks contradicted his agenda. I became aware of these parameters quickly but I found that there was no conflict between my research goals and Txanõpa's interests. Thus, our relationship was one of cooperation rather than conflict for the duration of my stay. Nevertheless, the distribution of authority was always made clear to me. It favored the indigenous people.

Education.

Txanõpa's interest in education is described here in order to build evidence for the assertion that education is a common goal among Marubo. In his first conversation with me, before even mentioning his concerns over cultural preservation, Txanõpa expressed concern over the difficulties indigenous people from remote communities must endure in seeking education. One of the main goals of inviting the mission had been to secure educational access, and the mission's divisive proselytizing was tolerated as long as Marubo children learned to read and write. The only other choice was to go into the towns to seek education, but this was very difficult due to the problems of securing access to places in schools and to adequate housing, as well as the financial difficulty of obtaining supplies, proper clothing, and food. Txanõpa had been to Tabatinga to study but made it only to the equivalent of 7th grade. He studied at the Catholic seminary run by the archbishopric of the Alto Solimões, and was housed in a small room next to the priests' quarters. He did small jobs for a priest for money. He learned to read and write Portuguese quite well (the education was monolingual in Portuguese). This was part of a pattern of He also studied in Atalaia, but encountered difficulties not only with supplies but with a surge of anti-indigenous sentiment and violence in 1995-96. His difficulties are exemplified by the day his teacher told the students to get carbon paper for the following day. Txanõpa could not, and the teacher would not allow him to participate. He was told to go to FUNAI for help, but they did not help him. Such incidents are profoundly embarrassing to indigenous students, who are thus singled out and often laughed at by other students. Although he had not been to school for several years,

Txanõpa several times expressed an interest in traveling to Cruzeiro do Sul to seek educational opportunities. However, his numerous projects kept him at home.

Impact of Economic Development on Hunting.

It has been noted that Txanõpa saw his function in the political system as bringing ideas before the elders, which they might not otherwise have. The range of ideas in Txanõpa's sphere of influence included economic development. In this, as noted, he favored the idea of agricultural development along the lines of the Acre *fazendas*, rather than logging. I asked Txanõpa how his plans for agricultural development might affect access to meat from hunting. He said that at the same time as they clearcut plantations they will switch to domesticated animals. With the money, they will buy motors and gasoline so they can go hunting a day or two from the village. Thus, the plan was to remain completely sedentary and invest in transportation and domesticated animals rather than relocating villages to ensure access to wild meat. Too much had been invested in the current location of Aldeia Maronal to consider shifting for meat.

It should be noted that this plan is many years from fruition.

c. José Barbosa

José Barbosa is Alfredo's brother. José moved away from his father's *shovo* soon after marrying, as noted in Chapter Five. His wives' father's *shovo* broke up and he formed a new residence with a set of his wives' patrilateral brothers. This *shovo* was located in the upper Curuçá so as to have convenient access to rubber markets in Acre. José engaged in the rubber trade. About 1993 he accepted an invitation to move to his

brother's village. He now lives in the core of Aldeia Maronal and is among the most influential elders there. He has two wives and eleven children. His oldest daughter, Amélia, is the schoolteacher at Maronal, while his oldest son Manoel worked as CIVAJA secretary-treasurer for several years. Through his own political influence and through the activities of his children, José plays a significant role in determining the shape of relations between Marubo and the non-indigenous world.

Education.

José's sustained long-term efforts to educate his children are the most salient feature of his pattern of interaction with non-indigenous people. These efforts are described here for the following reasons: (1) To build evidence for the assertion that education is a common goal among Marubo, an assertion that will be taken for granted in subsequent analysis; (2) To render comprehensible the background and social relationships of his family, which is a major force in Marubo politics; (3) To begin composing a picture of José's influence on Marubo society, part of the overall picture of the dynamics of influence which this chapter is intended to present.

José took credit as the first Marubo on the Curuçá River to get an education for his children. After the establishment of the mission on the Ituí River, Marubo there gained access to education, while those who remained in the headwaters between the Ituí and Curuçá maintained their previously existing knowledge-transmission patterns. The headwaters area was partly abandoned in 1977-78. José established his residence on the upper Curuçá River, where he initiated commercial relations with Acre. His daughter Amélia was born in 1973; Manoel was born in 1975. José says that at first he taught

them what little he himself knew of writing and mathematics. Once this knowledge was exhausted, he found an *Acreano* in a *seringal* who was willing to teach for food, lodging, coffee and tobacco. José describes this man as “meio díodo”, half-crazy. Nevertheless, the man could teach more writing and math than José could alone. José invited him to live in his *shovo*. José then invited other youths from the upper Maronal area to live there and learn. A number of his brothers’ sons, including Txanõpa, received their first education in this way. Education had come to the upper Curuçá, entirely through indigenous initiative.

After the *Acreano* could no longer add to his children’s education, he went to Cruzeiro do Sul where after numerous inquiries he found a space for his daughter at a Catholic school. Returning to the upper Curuçá, José discussed the issue with his brother Alfredo. Alfredo had a daughter of similar age. José suggested they send their daughters together in order to alleviate their loneliness and alienation. Alfredo, however, took the position that daughters should not be educated at all, only sons. Amélia described Alfredo’s reaction to José’s proposal as ‘shocked’ (Portuguese *se escandalizaram*). To send daughters into non-indigenous cities to receive white people’s education was considered a threat to Marubo tradition. José proceeded alone despite his brother’s opposition. Amélia went to school in Cruzeiro a number of years consecutively, returning to her *shovo* in between semesters.

Amélia’s education in Cruzeiro do Sul continued until she was two years short of finishing her secondary education. During that time, José maintained commercial relations with Acre. He picked up his daughter at the end of each semester and dropped her off at the start of the next, each time a round trip of at least eight days. Amélia

adjusted to the new environment and learned fluent Portuguese. Her education was only interrupted by accident. As José and Amélia travelled to Cruzeiro for the start of Amélia's second-to-last year of school, they pulled to the side of the upper Curuçá to sleep on the first night. A large amount of rain fell that night; when they woke up they found that the canoe had flooded and all of Amélia's supplies had washed downstream. With no money to buy more supplies, they had to turn back. Amélia did not return to school.

José sent his son Manoel to a different Catholic school in Cruzeiro shortly after Amélia. Manoel, too, learned Portuguese in this way. However, José says there came a time when he lacked the means to keep them in school in Cruzeiro, probably coinciding with the end of his commercial relations with the Acre *seringalistas*. Manoel went on his own to Atalaia to seek out a new educational opportunity but ended up out of both school and work and going hungry. José then travelled downriver to help. He spoke to FUNAI, then to the bishop of the upper Amazon in Tabatinga, who had a history of assistance to indigenous people. The bishop gave Manoel a place in the seminary in Tabatinga, and Manoel returned to school for several years, catching up with his sister. He then left school to join the army, after which he went to work in CIVAJA.

Once he had established it, José took further advantage of his relationship with the bishop. José's son Paulo, born in 1980, went to the seminary in Tabatinga until his leaving at age 15 to marry a Tikuna woman he had met. José's third son Võpa also attended the seminary in Tabatinga for one year, apparently in 1996. Both Paulo and Võpa spoke Portuguese, though Paulo's was much better.

By 1997, Amélia was employed by the municipality of Atalaia to teach at Aldeia Maronal. When I met him in August 1997, José said that at that time, he lacked the means to send his children to study. They studied in the village, with the mission or with Amélia. However, José continued his efforts to educate his children beyond Maronal.

In January 1998 he sent his sons Leonidas, age 14, and Moacir, age 12, to Atalaia, with the idea that they would go to Tabatinga and secure a place in the seminary. By March, however, it became clear that the seminary would not be able to accommodate them. Leonidas enrolled in the school at Atalaia where he underwent the usual traumatic first day of the indigenous student. He showed up with no shoes, only 'hawaiana' sandals, no long pants, no notebooks, pencils or pens. He was asked to leave and return with the appropriate materials, an extremely embarrassing and painful experience. He found a benefactor to buy the materials, however, and remained in school through the end of fieldwork in July 1998. Moacir, on the contrary, returned to his home on the Curuçá River.

Once Leonidas was in school, José often worried that he would be hungry. In April he sold me a spear (a present received from an Ituí elder at the *tanamea* feast in September 1997), the proceeds of which sale he applied to purchasing a basket of manioc flour which he sent by boat to Leonidas. In addition, he tried to secure a domestic pig to send with the manioc flour; however, this proved untransportable. The issue of supporting his children's education was prominent in his thoughts and his actions.

José also tried to secure a place for his son Võpa in 1998, without success. He pursued the possibility of sending him to a New Tribes mission school in Cuiabá, then

considered sending him to Benjamin Constant to another evangelical-run school.

However, neither of these options ended up being viable.

In reviewing these observations on José, it may safely be asserted that education for his children is an important goal which he pursues through his interactions with non-indigenous people. José has exerted considerable efforts to this end, travelling to Cruzeiro and Tabatinga, hosting a teacher himself, eventually becoming the father of the first indigenous Marubo schoolteacher, Amélia. He is seeks out the best possible education for his children, as demonstrated by his reluctance to send them to the school in Atalaia to receive the free government education, and his efforts to find benefactors (usually religious) who will allow his children to attend what he believes are better schools. His efforts have been sustained over many years: they are a coherent long-term strategy.

José's strategy for interaction with non-indigenous people has had a significant influence on Marubo society. In the first place, he chose to educate his daughter, a choice which a number of other Marubo, though by no means all, are now taking. Secondly, he was the first to introduce organized education to a considerable portion of Marubo, when he invited the half-crazed *seringeiro* to teach them reading and arithmetic. Thirdly, he has pioneered the notion of education by indigenous initiative. He is very proud of the fact that all the education his children have received has come through his and their own efforts. This sets them apart, in their perspective, from the Ituí River where the education has been supplied directly by missionaries. José's pride is understandable given the fact that he had to go to much greater efforts to educate his children, and those efforts were successful to a great degree.

José's strategy has also had an impact through the formation of his son Manoel and his daughter Amélia, both of whom play important roles in the Marubo political system.

José's pragmatism in pursuing the goal of education should also be noted. He sent his children to Catholic schools and secular schools, but also considered sending them to evangelical schools, all this despite the fact that he himself thought Christianity to be of dubious value. His goal was education for his children, and the belief system of the education provider was not an issue for him.

Commercial relations with Acre.

José's commercial relations with non-indigenous people began in his youth when he travelled to Benjamin Constant to work for wages in the area. That is when he picked up his first elements of Portuguese and Spanish. When he married and established his own *shovo*, in the mid-1970s, he began to move rubber to Cruzeiro. His work crew included himself, his brother Pedro, two members of the Varináwavo group that helped build the *shovo* and lived there, and one non-indigenous Acreano. Together, they carried as much as one metric ton of rubber in a year, on their backs, to Cruzeiro. They returned with shotguns, ammunition, salt, and other desirable items. José said that he worked through a middleman who lived near the source of the Curuçá River. The middleman would take José to Cruzeiro to speak to the buyer. The buyer would front merchandise to José on the middleman's assurance that José would deliver the product. José would deliver rubber to the middleman who would sell it to the buyer, paying off José's debts and making a profit for himself. Based on comparison with other similar patterns of

interaction throughout the Amazon, it is safe to assume that the relative prices of rubber and merchandise were manipulated so as to keep the indigenous workers in a state of perpetual debt.

Several factors combined to force a halt to José's commercial relations with Acre. In the first place, the distance to Cruzeiro, and the brutality of the long walks with balls of rubber up to 50 kilos carried on their backs, combined to decrease morale in his work crew. Their production tapered off. Then the Varináwavo component decided that they preferred to engage in the logging trade with Benjamin Constant rather than the rubber trade with Acre. Left with just himself and his brother to work the rubber trade, José gave up. In addition, he says, the market in Acre was drying up and the buyer was saying he could no longer handle the rubber he used to. Finally, FUNAI, probably pressured by CIVAJA, increased the rigor of interdiction, forcing the rubber middleman out of the indigenous area. For all these reasons, José's commercial relations with Acre ceased.

Tolerant Opposition to the Mission.

José was very tolerant of other people's interest in Christian beliefs even as he personally rejected the mission belief system and argued for the superiority of indigenous beliefs. José does not impose his point of view even on his own family, but rather allows each individual to explore any set of beliefs at their own pace. He does not discuss the mission belief system with anger, but rather with irony and condescension. By refusing to treat it as a serious threat, he takes importance from it symbolically. Nevertheless he is concerned about the impact of the mission on young people, arguing that they focus too much on white people's words at the expense of indigenous words.

José's highest level of categorization of types of speech is the division between **nawāvana** and **yurāvana**, or non-indigenous and indigenous words, respectively. The nawāvana come from the mission, from the music cassettes bought by youngsters in visits to the city, and the short wave radios and television. The youth, he complained to me on 27 August 1997, do not want to listen to Marubo songs, only *náwa* (non-indigenous) songs. Some come to listen to the *shōki*, but though they express curiosity, they lack the will to learn.

The failure to learn yurāvana has negative consequences because of the association between yurāvana and *ese*, the Marubo ethical code. Marubo have *ese*, non-Marubo do not. Marubo elders control behavior in part through the regular performance of *ese vana*, speeches that express concepts of proper behavior. Elders watch over their wards' actions, keeping them within the bounds of propriety by ensuring that they know where those boundaries are. When the youth receive nawāvana, according to José, they develop a point of view lacking in *ese* and are thus more likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior, such as inappropriate sexual or work habits.

The majority of dwellers in José's *shovo* attended church services twice weekly. His brother Pedro, his brother's wife, and most of his own children including Amélia went to services Wednesday and Sunday. In addition Pedro and Amélia attend extra Bible study sessions. Only his wives and infants remain at home with him during services. José is the *shovo ivo* and he disapproves the ideas and actions of the mission, yet he does not interfere with his family's attendance at services. He expresses his disagreement through speech, and through the habit of never attending services.

I recorded at least four instances in which José critiqued the missionaries' belief system at healing sessions and tapir feasts. On these occasions he directed his critiques at those present, seeking to point out the numerous inconsistencies in mission ideology. His tone was not angry but rather joking: his method was to make fun of the mission. For example, at a tapir feast in a peripheral *shovo* on June 1st 1998, he joked that the primary characteristic of the missionaries' god is *washika*, possessiveness/stinginess-a response to the missionaries' strict adherence to non-indigenous economic behavior and lack of participation in the system of reciprocity. He went on to argue that the missionaries want to end the practice of *sai iki*, the semi-ritualized feasting so highly valued by Marubo. He gave a litany of valued aspects of Marubo culture that he felt the mission disapproved of, underlining the mission's threat to practices cherished by all. He ended by pointing out the value of the Marubo song of the afterlife, *vei vai*, and arguing that children should learn it. This was a characteristic expression of José's attitude towards the mission. José disagreed with the mission, and expressed himself in argumentative but humorous public speeches.

José was in full agreement with his brother Alfredo as to the importance of maintaining indigenous authority over the mission. For José, the Ituí River situation was a model of what had to be prevented at Maronal. José said that for years Jansma had acted like the leader of the Ituí Marubo, the final authority on actions taken in the area. He said that now, Alfredo was arguing that the Ituí Marubo should not ask for Jansma's approval of anything. He shared his brother's son Txanõpa's belief (see above) that Jansma had developed a pattern of relations unfavorable to the Marubo. Jansma passed this pattern on to those he trained, such as Mr. Nunes. New missionaries were better

because the Marubo themselves could tell them how to act towards them. He complained that contact with Jansma typically results in a sudden refusal to loan or give out objects except in direct exchange for money or labor, a strictly non-indigenous economic behavior. José argued that the Maronal Marubo had to prevent the missionaries here from becoming like those on the other river. Indigenous predominance should be carefully maintained.

José's relation to the mission took on a personal economic dimension when he and his brother agreed to build a large house for a missionary couple. They began work on January 16th 1998 and finished on May 1st. During this time they often worked six days a week, neglecting the hunt for extended periods and relying instead on systems of reciprocal exchange with other *shovo* to get meat. They had to subcontract some of the work to other Marubo, thus forfeiting a part of the final payment. José suffered two injuries, the second a serious back injury, from carrying the construction materials to the site. For this they were paid \$300 each. They had agreed to build the house for this price, but after three and a half months of work, two injuries, and subtracting the subcontractors' salaries, it was apparent that their labor had been worth much more. Yet they were handed the wages promised them at the beginning, not those they felt they subsequently deserved. When José got his final payment of \$190, he was outraged. Later, he recalled that he himself had worked in the hot August sun, for no wages, to cut the airstrip for the mission to use, yet they would never let him use the airplane without paying. He said he would never work for the mission again.

The significance of these data are in revealing how a *shovo ivo* responds to a belief system he disagrees with. José does not try to forbid his children's and brother's

attendance at mission services, even though he is the highest authority in the *shovo*. He responds in the first place with speech. He criticizes mission beliefs and points out the value of indigenous beliefs, both to his own *shovo* and to assemblies gathered at other *shovo* on special occasions. He also responds through his personal non-cooperation with mission activities. But he does not directly interfere with his family's interactions with the mission.

The Anthropologist.

Upon my arrival at Aldeia Maronal, José invited me to stay with him. I remained in a hut outside his *shovo* for most of the next year. During that time I entered into a relation of generalized reciprocity with him. I provided him, within reasonable bounds, with free access to my stocks of ammunition, fishing hook and line, and other useful goods. Correspondingly, I was fed and housed for an entire year. This exchange continued for the duration of my stay. There was never any explicit verbal agreement relative to these exchanges. Beyond the confines of José's *shovo* my relations were of balanced reciprocity rather than generalized. I assiduously avoided entering the money-economy paradigm during fieldwork, unlike the missionaries who operated exclusively with a money-economy exchange system.

José, as has already mentioned, favored the perpetuation of traditional Marubo discourse genres, and identified the influence of non-indigenous speech forms as a threatening influence in this sense. Being for the preservation of traditional speech, José approved of Txanõpa's efforts to make me apply my technology to the preservation of spoken forms. He thus felt that the relations of authority were favorable to the

indigenous people: they were telling me what to do. He was particularly emphatic about this during my visit to Ituí. Since the Ituí Marubo seemed to resent the prospect of my videotaping them, I asked José if it would be alright for me to simply observe the feast. José was insistent: I must record the feast, and subsequently supply them with copies. That is what they want from me and that is what I had to do. Ignore the Ituí Marubo opinion, he advised me. Subsequently, when the opposition to my presence threatened to prevent the videotaping, José invited those opposed to a meeting. At that meeting, José alone managed to convince everyone that it was good for me to be there and to videotape the feast. José's persuasive technique was to focus on relations of authority between indigenous and non-indigenous people.

José's primary argument was that I was there because the Maronal Marubo wanted me there. Jansma had suggested to the Ituí Marubo that my primary motivation was to obtain an abundance of audiovisual records which could be sold for profit in the United States. José correctly argued that the only reason I had my camcorder there was because they had told me to. With this argument, José displayed his superior authority relative to me. His secondary argument was that the Ituí Marubo had not made the decision to oppose me. The decision had been made for them by the mission, which called a meeting and told them what to do. This combination of arguments was profoundly embarrassing to my opponents. Highlighting these differences in relations of authority between indigenous and non-indigenous people proved to be an effective rhetorical strategy. The Ituí Marubo agreed that, since I was under indigenous instructions, I could be let in to the Ituí area.

Indigenous-non-indigenous sexual relations.

José opposed sex between indigenous women and non-indigenous men. His reasoning was that there were few women, and those that there were were needed by Marubo men, to increase the number of Marubo. He decried the cases of women who had willingly run off with Mayoruna husbands, because they and their offspring would not contribute to the growth of the Marubo. The same applied to non-indigenous people: any woman taken away or impregnated by a non-Marubo was thereby removed from the pool available to Marubo men. José was held up by one informant as exemplary of the difference between Marubo who control sex with outsiders, and those who do not. According to this informant, the key variable explaining differences in patterns of sexual relations to outsiders is the presence or not of an elder with the beliefs José has, beliefs which are derived from his father, João Tuxáua, and originated in the context of extreme demographic pressure resulting from the rubber boom, wherein demographic growth was among the highest values. This informant said: “Here (at Aldeia Maronal) the elders are explaining how things should be. José says that Marubo women are for Marubo men. They have to be kept in Marubo land. We are growing, but we are still few and we cannot grow if women are taken away by *nawa* (non-indigenous people). In other villages there are no elders telling us how to do things, so they do things differently.” Since overall demographic increase is a value dear to José, the removal of women from the available pool makes him unhappy. This shows that José considers women a precious resource (as we will see, this does not mean he thinks of them as objects).

José argued that elders’ control over Marubo behavior should manifest itself in terms of control over sex with outsiders. José, like other politically prominent *shovo*

ivorasi, was conscious of his role in securing his coresidents' adherence to correct Marubo behavioral patterns. From José's perspective, this includes securing the bases for demographic growth. Thus, among the tasks of the traditional *shovo ivo* is securing proper marriage partners for his coresidents, and occasionally also for non-coresident kin. José explicitly attributed to Marubo custom the exercise of control over female sexuality; he once said: "The Marubo have *ese*. We watch over our women to prevent them from having sex with outsiders". *Ese* is the Marubo word for 'law', 'custom', or 'ethics', showing that to José this was a key value. If women *were* sleeping with outsiders, it was a violation of proper conduct. In addition, he tried to find a woman for a classificatory brother who was still unmarried at age 26, and he refused to let his daughter Amélia finish school in Atalaia because, according to Amélia, there were too many sexually overactive young men. Thus, Joé sought in general to guide sexual propensities towards proper patterns of Marubo demographic growth.

José's interpretation of Marubo values was not shared by all Marubo. Although the stated basis of his opposition to female sex with outsiders was the precarious demographic condition of the group, he seemed to oppose that type of sex in general, whether or not it resulted in the loss to the Marubo of a woman's reproductive potential. This is not a distinction all Marubo make. For example, one Ituí *shovo*-owner's brother's son (I will call him Z.) told me that a non-indigenous person (I will call him Q.) who passed by the area had hired him as an interpreter. To show his appreciation for the salary, Z. said he gave his daughter to Q. to sleep with while Q. was in Vida Nova. I was asked to move to Z.'s *shovo* in order to hire him and given the distinct impression that if I did I would receive the same welcome, an offer which I politely refused. In all this, there

was no question of anyone leaving with Z.'s daughter. She was being used as bait for sources of money; she was not being offered in marriage. The alliances Z. sought to create were temporary, not permanent, though I am left to wonder what effect Z.'s use of his daughter as a prostitute for moneyed visitors might have on her future marriageability. His explanation was simple: "She is mine, so I can do with her as I please". This example illustrates the distinction between José's attitude that neither marriage nor sex with outsiders was acceptable, and a second attitude that existed among some Marubo, that marriage was out of the question, but sex was acceptable. The similarity is that in both cases the males exercised control over female sexuality. I do not think Z. would have approved of his daughter's sexual activities if he were not directing and profiting from them.

To question why José had a stricter interpretation of Marubo values than some other Marubo requires interpretation because I have no direct statement. It is not really surprising that José should conflate marriage and sex: the establishment of sexual liaisons with non-indigenous people has an evident connection with the involved female's removal from the pool of marriageable women because most women who had children out of wedlock at Aldeia Maronal were not subsequently marrying. In addition, I believe that José's attitude towards non-Marubo sex with Marubo women is further colored by his opinions on relations of authority. It has already been noted that José values and works for relations of authority favorable to indigenous people, as demonstrated by his arguments that the Maronal Marubo should tell the mission what to do and not vice-versa. On the Ituí, Z. seemed to feel that by allowing sex for profit he could get something out of outsiders. He did not, apparently, feel that proper relations of authority

were threatened. On the other hand, José seemed to feel that letting outsiders have access to their women was allowing them control over something that was properly his (and the other male elders') to control.

Attitudes towards FUNAI.

Given the attitudes previously examined, we might expect José to support a distribution of authority with FUNAI that favors indigenous people, and in fact he does. For example, José participated in the reunions to discuss the Edvaldo-Gilmar issue, at which he made a number of statements as well as commenting on and backchannelling others' speeches. He added his name to the signature list supporting Gilmar. In so doing, he helped constitute indigenous control over the process of hiring FUNAI agents who will interact with the Marubo. José believed strongly in achieving this type of indigenous control. When he told me the story of a Marubo takeover of FUNAI headquarters in Atalaia some years previously, resulting in a change in the FUNAI administration, his point was that the Marubo could remove FUNAI administrators from office if they proved unfavorable to Marubo interests. Ultimately, force was a viable option if necessary.

José's personal relations with FUNAI field workers were not close. Although Luís Melo, the Aldeia Maronal post chief through October 1997, had a network of close associates, José was not one of them. Luís' mode of relating to the Marubo economically involved generalized reciprocal exchange of labor and material goods. Luís requisitioned labor from his associates, and in return supplied access to gasoline, tobacco, ammunition, radio communications, and his considerable mechanical expertise.

Participation in Luís' corvées was not widespread, however. José complained that he could never get Luís to help him fix anything, and thus did not participate in his work crews. Probably Luís felt that since he could not get José to work for him he should not bother helping him fix things.

Despite José's rejection of personal association with the FUNAI *chefe de posto* at Aldeia Maronal, he was poised to acquire a signal level of influence over this position when the fieldwork period ended. His son Manoel had been hired by FUNAI and was being trained to become the first indigenous *chefe de posto* in the Vale do Javari. This event will be discussed in more detail below.

The Mission Incident.

When New Tribes missionaries attempted to prevent me from carrying out research on the Ituí River, the Marubo took sides and the issue was resolved among and by Marubo. At first, the mission used bureaucratic procedures to impede my access to the Ituí River. Once I had overcome these hurdles, the mission incited the Ituí Marubo to physically block my access to the Ituí. This situation engendered a face-to-face encounter between Maronal and Ituí Marubo. The result was acceptance of my visit to the Ituí. The purpose of describing this event is to follow the formation of indigenous opinions, how decisions are made and conflicts resolved among the Marubo.

In October 1997 I prepared to visit the Ituí River to gather census data. I hired a guide, a bachelor named Ronípa. On the day that I was scheduled to depart by land, Ronípa told me that the Maronal missionary Aníbal was calling for me. Aníbal informed me that Jansma had questioned my authorization to visit the Ituí River. He would not

allow me to use the mission radio to discuss the issue with Jansma since he said it was not official mission business. Furthermore the *chefe de posto*, Luís, was no longer at Maronal, having flown out a few days before. Luís' assistant, Nakwa, was running the FUNAI radio. I asked him to let me talk to Luís to resolve the matter. The following day, I spoke to Luís, who asked Gilmar. Gilmar said that because my authorization did not explicitly authorize me to visit Ituí, I could not do so. Both the mission and regional FUNAI interpreted my authorization to apply only to the Curuçá River.

I asked a number of Maronal Marubo for their opinion. Txanõpa was at that time at the mid-Ituí village of Rio Novo participating in a CIVAJA meeting. Over the CIVAJA radio, I explained to him that I had been bureaucratically prevented from going to the Ituí River. He said that people on the Ituí River did not understand the work I was doing and did not want a researcher in the area. Since I had already worked with Txanõpa for three months, I asked him to explain my work to the Ituí Marubo. He spent nearly an hour talking to the upper Ituí Marubo about this issue, convincing them that I should be allowed to see the Ituí.

Alfredo's brothers were of the opinion that Jansma was blocking my access because he did not want to be reported on. Alfredo's brother Pedro told me that Jansma was scared of me. Jansma had a large house filled with machines, tools, and Western technology, but the Marubo there had nothing. Jansma had promised to teach the Marubo how to use technology and make board houses, but the Marubo still had straw huts and the mission refused to share its technology. The mission's efforts in education were equally derided by Pedro, who noted that in thirty years not a single Ituí Marubo had finished school nor been trained as schoolteacher. He doesn't want anybody seeing what

he is doing, Pedro said. By stating that Jansma was trying to remain unobserved, Pedro implied that Jansma was doing something wrong, specifically accumulating wealth and property apart from the Marubo reciprocal economy.

Alfredo's brother José explained that Alfredo wanted me to go to Ituí to see for myself, to take pictures and confirm for myself what the mission was doing. The Marubo area had been parcelled out by FUNAI and the mission. The idea, put forth by the mission and by Gilmar, that the Ituí was a separate area from the Curuçá requiring separate authorization, was irksome to Alfredo and José. Alfredo resented the ability of these non-indigenous people to prevent access to the Ituí despite his own approval. José said that this was their land and Jansma was on it, but Jansma acted like he was the leader of the Marubo. José said the Ituí Marubo used to ask Jansma's approval for everything, and ask his opinion at reunions. Now, José said, Alfredo, CIVAJA, and others have been telling the Ituí Marubo that they don't need Jansma's approval for anything, he is on their land; they should just hold meetings and do things without consulting the mission. Alfredo is angry that a white man has the say so over who is able to go where in Marubo territory. Here at Maronal it is different, José explained: if the missionaries want to do something they have to ask Alfredo's approval, and not vice-versa.

This incident suggested important differences in decision-making and leadership existed between Ituí and Curuçá. It is true that Alfredo never consults the missionaries prior to making decisions, and that he works to retain a distribution of authority that places him over the mission. On the Ituí River, the missionaries were, at least until recently, consulted about many decisions. No Marubo leader retained authority over Jansma as Alfredo did over Nunes and Xavier. The mission was much more influential at

Vida Nova than at Maronal. Furthermore, the incident revealed that other Marubo were dissatisfied with the power of the mission, and both CIVAJA and Alfredo argued that Ituí Marubo should stop consulting the mission.

The next Marubo with whom I discussed this topic was Clóvis. At this time, he was still organizing the meeting at Rio Novo to discuss land demarcation and other issues of importance to the Javari peoples' future. Clóvis told me that he had discussed the issue with the Ituí villages, and they agreed to my visit. To Clóvis, this was an issue of indigenous control. He resented the ability of any non-indigenous group to determine who could or could not enter the area. The Ituí villages had, after talking to Txanõpa and Clóvis, agreed to my visit. To Clóvis, this was all that was needed. He said he would talk to officials in Brasília and to Gilmar to resolve the issue. Clóvis' motivation was to bring access to the indigenous area under indigenous control.

On November 3rd, 1997, a visit by an FNS vaccination team permitted me to write a letter to Professor Melatti in Brasília, who contacted FUNAI and resolved the authorization issue. Meanwhile, Clóvis was telling me to go ahead and visit Ituí, but Gilmar was telling me I had to wait for official authorization via written document. Fearing expulsion, I awaited said document. This authorization arrived on November 18th 1997. It was an explicit statement that my authorization extended to the Ituí as well as to the Curuçá. It was not until the 29th of November that I finally got a FUNAI official in Atalaia to recognize my right to visit the Ituí River. By that time, the CIVAJA meeting at Rio Novo was over.

On December 16th, Paulino, owner of an Ituí *shovo*, arrived at Maronal to invite the village to a *Tanamea* feast in reciprocation for the one thrown by Maronal in

September. Much of the village prepared to go. I renewed my agreement with my guide, Ron̄pa, and prepared to go with them. The journey through the forest was to last a full week. When we arrived in the vicinity of the Ituí River, I discovered that the mission had not given up on preventing my access to the area.

On December 24th we set up camp a few hours outside Paulino's *shovo*. This was the location where guests paused to make feathered headdresses as presents for the feast's hosts. Ron̄pa went ahead at night to see how the feast was proceeding. He returned at 4 a.m. on December 25th. He said that he was met partway to the *shovo* by a group of people who said they did not want me there and they intended to seize my possessions and expel me from the area. When Ron̄pa gave this information to the campsite, there was a general uproar. Immediately, the Maronal Marubo blamed the situation on the mission.

José Barbosa called a meeting to discuss the issue. The 25th was raining steadily, so it was decided to postpone the feast. Paulino's brother came to discuss this and other logistical issues, and José asked him to call those opposed to my presence to a meeting. A few hours later, two young men, Txinawa and Rane, from Aldeia Liberdade, showed up. These were not leaders but politically active youth whose role was akin to that of Txan̄pa at Maronal: while lacking in formal decision-making authority, they exerted influence by speaking Portuguese, acquiring information about the outside world, and acting as a source of information for their elders to base actions on.

José told Txinawa and Rane that I was here under instructions of the Maronal elders to videotape the *Tanamea* and send copies back, thus helping the traditions to outlive the elders. In fact, I had two reasons for being there. Scientifically, I needed to

conduct a census in order to gain a fuller understanding of the Marubo social system—something which I myself had to inform them of, for José focused on why *they* wanted me there. The Maronal Marubo had indeed asked me to videotape the feast. I resisted at first due to the weight of the audiovisual equipment, which proved very tiresome on the arduous weeklong trek to Ituí. I had also told José that I felt uncomfortable videotaping on the Ituí as they clearly did not understand my motives there. Nevertheless, José and the other elders insisted that I videotape. They demanded my technology be put to their purposes: obtaining a permanent record of traditional feasting so that these traditions would never be lost. Despite the physical discomfort thus caused, I carried the camcorder to Ituí. José explained to Txinawa and to Rane that I was acting under Marubo instructions. He also accused them of being like children who sleep through a meal then want to eat: they opposed me only now, when the issue of my visit had been a matter of discussion since October 31st when Txanõpa had first explained my presence to the Ituí villages.

José's words were effective. Once he was done with his lecture, Rane came over to where I lay in my hammock (convalescing from fevers, sinusitis and dysentery) and said that it was OK for me to videotape "for them". He and Txinawa returned to the site of the feast. A few hours later, a group of older men arrived. The new arrivals were Lauro, Benedito and Arnaldo. Lauro, from Alegria, and Benedito, from Vida Nova, had both been cited by Ronipa as foci of opposition to my presence. Arnaldo, from Rio Novo, was neutral and present more out of curiosity than out of combativeness.

Lauro (see Chapter Four for *shovo* composition and the section on CIVAJA's conflict with *regatões* in this chapter for information on his relations with non-indigenous

people) complained about how difficult it was for interior Marubo to make money. He just wanted to get something and not be exploited. José accused him of being put up to this by the missionaries. He said, "your father tells you to do something, and you do it. What did your father tell you?" This was sufficient to shame Lauro, who agreed that Jansma was like their father.

While José was speaking to Lauro, Benedito came to sit by me. He told me that the reason he was here was because the missionary had invited them all to a meeting to discuss my coming. Jansma told them that I was coming to take lots of film and photographs, and that I was going to take it back to my land to make lots of money. He had told them that they needed to exact something from me in return for access to the area. Hence their presence here to discuss my coming.

José disarmed Lauro and Benedito verbally. He began by shaming them for being told what to do by the missionaries. This proved an effective rhetorical method. He continued by exposing the missionaries' arguments as disinformation. Gathering an audiovisual record was superfluous to me. I had no interest in photographs or videotape. The Marubo had to force me to bring and use my camcorder. My goal was to understand Marubo social dynamics, and to that end I needed complete genealogies and census data, my true purpose on the Ituí, which I never hid. José was effective with the men as he had been with the youths. Lauro and Benedito left, agreeing to allow me to visit Ituí and videotape the feast.

The mission incident was over. I videotaped the *Tanamea*, returning a copy to the Marubo in May 1999. I visited each *shovo* on the upper Ituí, recording genealogical and

census data, and took the Rio Novo census from Arnaldo and other Rio Novo villagers who were visiting. I returned to Aldeia Maronal a few weeks later, in January 1998.

While personally difficult, the mission incident proved highly illustrative of Marubo political dynamics. The high degree of influence exerted by the mission on the Ituí River became clear. Jansma had called people from three villages (Alegria, Vida Nova, Liberdade) to a meeting. At the meeting, he gave the Marubo wrong information about me along with a warning that I was there to exploit them. He used misinformation to incite the Marubo to reject me. By the time I arrived near the Ituí River, those Ituí Marubo who had been influenced by Jansma had been excited to the brink of physical violence against me. They were ready to seize my belongings and physically block my access to the Ituí.

The Ituí Marubo were countered in this case by Curuçá Marubo. The fundamental difference between the two sides was in the Curuçá's disregard for mission advice. On the Curuçá River, the distribution of authority between mission and Marubo favors the Marubo. No missionary can tell Alfredo *kakáya* what to do. The distribution of authority that favors Marubo over non-indigenous people was exemplified in their relationship with me: far from telling them what to do, they were telling me what to do. The Curuçá Marubo did not want any non-indigenous people to make decisions for them. In this, they agreed with CIVAJA. CIVAJA, while not actively taking sides, favored my access to the Ituí.

The issue was eventually resolved in a face-to-face encounter through a verbal performance. This relates the mission incident to the healing ritual at which Alfredo resolved the dispute over the mission's presence. In that event (see under Alfredo, this

chapter), Alfredo influenced his opponent through a verbal performance in the course of a face-to-face encounter, resolving the dispute in his favor. In this event, Alfredo's brother José did the same. José was able to overcome the influence of the mission and the resistance of those the mission had influenced. By speaking to Benedito and Lauro, he changed their minds. The conflict was resolved in José's favor. José later told me that he had not been afraid of the Ituí Marubo. He was confident in the effectiveness of his words, because he was the son of João Tuxáua, and his father's words had spread throughout the Marubo nation, even to the Ituí.

With no coercive force or state power behind him, José was able to influence Lauro and Benedito through oratory. Lauro and Benedito had employed threats of coercive force but this proved ultimately less effective than skillful speech.

d. Amélia Barbosa

Amélia is the eldest daughter of José's first wife, born in 1973. She was sent to school in Cruzeiro do Sul by her father. Later she became the schoolteacher for Aldeia Maronal. In addition she received training in microscopy through MSF, assisting with the control of malaria epidemics and with women's health issues.

Education.

Amélia's education has been previously described when discussing her father's emphasis on education. Amélia attended school in Cruzeiro do Sul, coming within two years of finishing secondary education. Transportation and supply difficulties prevented her from finishing. However, she did gain fluency in Portuguese and her level of

education was as the highest of any Marubo to that point. Thanks to her education, she was hired by the municipality of Atalaia do Norte to be the schoolteacher at Aldeia Maronal.

During fieldwork, Amélia regularly exercised her duties as schoolteacher. This involved teaching two one-hour classes twice daily, in the morning and afternoon, for a total of four hours a day, five days a week. She also had to grade assignments and tests, tabulate grades, record attendance, and transmit these figures to Atalaia over the radio. She received textbooks from Atalaia by boat along with minimal supplies of pencils and chalk, supplies which she kept in a hut near her father's *shovo*. In addition to her formal duties, she had to handle relations with parents, a type of interaction I never observed but which she said was very stressful.

Health Care Training.

Amélia actively pursued training as AIS through MSF. At the start of fieldwork she was the primary AIS at Aldeia Maronal, handling slide-taking and microscopic diagnosis and working with the mission to administer proper treatments. As time went on, other AIS received additional training, resulting in a more even distribution of duties. Amélia continued to receive her own additional training, remaining at the forefront of non-indigenous medical knowledge within her village.

Amélia's pursuit of non-indigenous medical knowledge led her to develop an especially close relationship with MSF staff. This relationship was assisted by the fact that she spoke excellent Portuguese and she was the only female AIS at Maronal, along with the fact that during the period of time I observed, all MSF doctors and nurses were

women. Because of this relationship, Amélia was able, for example, to obtain passage up and down the Curuçá in MSF's powerful speedboat *Pirata* in February 1998. MSF training teams, starting with that trip in February, were invited to stay in a hut adjacent to José's *shovo*, in contrast to the previous teams' lodging by Alfredo's *shovo*. This reinforced the close association between Amélia and MSF staff. Through this association, Amélia maximized her access to non-indigenous medical knowledge. Her training continued steadily for the duration of the fieldwork period, and she became one of the most highly trained and effective AISes.

Travel.

Amélia travelled frequently in pursuit of diverse forms of knowledge and training, as well as to secure her teaching position and the salary that accompanied it. During the fieldwork, Amélia was absent from the village for three long stretches of time. Eventually conflicts arose between her own will to continue travelling and others' will to have her in the aldeia so that her training might benefit the community. This conflict is illustrative of the range of individual autonomy a young woman can exercise within the Maronal Marubo political system, and of the level of influence which the village political structure can exercise over such an individual.

On 5 August 1997, Amélia left for Manaus to attend a meeting of AISes organized through COIAB. These meetings in Manaus bring together members of geographically distant indigenous groups for discussion of topics of common interest, in this case AIS training and the role of the AIS. Generally, CIVAJA is in charge of inviting people from the Javari basin and managing the travel funds to get them to Manaus. These meetings are instrumental to the ongoing construction of trans-ethnic

indigenous identity, because by bringing together members of diverse groups, the meetings allow participants to recognize the similar situations they are all in, and so to begin to identify with one another. Because of this, CIVAJA considers participation very important. Travelling first to Atalaia and thence to Manaus, Amélia attended the Amazonian AIS meeting in August. She returned to Aldeia Maronal on 15 September 1997, an absence of some five weeks.

During her absence, Amélia used substitutes to cover her teaching duties. Her brother Paulo, educated at the seminary in Tabatinga, covered part of her duties, while the missionary Aníbal Xavier covered the rest. In this way, education continued in her absence.

Having returned to Maronal on 15 September, Amélia departed once again on 23 September. This time her goal was to attend an AIS training course being held by MSF in Atalaia do Norte. The training course was held from the 6th to the 20th of October. Amélia completed this training course, then awaited passage back home. She returned by boat, as always, arriving back at Maronal on the 12th of November.

Amélia's system of substitution was less effective during her second absence. Although Aníbal had agreed to substitute during her first trip, he was not happy about having this extra work for another seven weeks. Aníbal discussed the issue with Luís Melo, who was still at Aldeia Maronal. This discussion took place on the 25th of September. Luís, adopting the role of supervisory authority, decided that Amélia was in dereliction of duty because her brother's substitute work was inadequate. Basing themselves on absence lists, Aníbal and Luís argued that the older students covered by Amélia's brother were no longer in a position to advance a grade, so the whole

schoolyear should be cancelled. Only the children's literacy classes continued to be held. This was the first hint of conflict between Amélia's individual will and a more generalized 'community will'. However, the conflict manifested as an intervention by non-indigenous authorities. No inter-indigenous conflict ensued.

Following her second trip, Amélia and Luís switched places geographically. While Amélia travelled back to Maronal by boat, Luís returned to Atalaia by airplane in the last week of October. When Amélia returned to Maronal, she found that Luís had reported her for dereliction of duty to the Atalaia municipal secretary of education. The accusation was mainly based on the notion that her brother had not adequately substituted during her long absence. Thus, upon her return on 12 November, she began to review her brother's grading and attendance records, organizing and tabulating them in preparation for arguing that there had not in fact been dereliction of duty.

Amélia's third trip to Atalaia was undertaken while I was visiting the Ituí River between 19 December 1997 and 7 January 1998. When I returned from Ituí she had gone downstream once again. She said the trip was necessary because Luís had denounced her and now she had to justify her actions before the municipal secretary of education. In this she was successful: she explained the situation, argued that Luís had misinterpreted, and was able to retain her paid position. Unfortunately, financial mismanagement by municipal authorities resulted in her being denied a salary.

Amélia remained in Atalaia during January, February, and March of 1998. Having secured retention of her job, she now awaited payment of salary, which should have been available on a monthly basis. However, during these months, not only was Amélia not paid but no other municipal teacher was paid either: no money was made

available for teacher's salaries. By the end of March, Amélia had been forced to sign a legal document allowing someone else to draw her salaries so that the debts she had incurred in her three months in Atalaia could be paid off. When she left Atalaia on April 1st, she still had no money, and this affected her desire to continue teaching.

In February 1998, while Amélia was awaiting her salary, MSF visited Aldeia Maronal in their speedboat to train AISes. Amélia came with them, arriving at Maronal on February 6th. She returned to Atalaia with the departing MSF team on February 12th. Thus, her three-month stint awaiting salary monies in Atalaia was interrupted by a brief visit to her village and some added AIS-training. However, her base for these months was Atalaia.

Amélia's travels during fieldwork, 1997-98

5 August 1997	From Maronal to Manaus to attend AIS meeting
15 September	Returns to Maronal
23 September	To Atalaia to attend AIS training course
12 November	Returns to Maronal
Late December	To Atalaia to secure job and salary
6 February 1998	Returns to Maronal accompanying MSF AIS-training team
12 February	Back to Atalaia with MSF team
1 April	Departure from Atalaia
14 April	Return to Maronal

Amélia's will to continue teaching was negatively impacted by her failure to be paid for her work. She explained these concerns to me on April 4th. Her salary is low to begin with—some \$120/month, and it comes erratically when it comes at all. Despite this, she is expected to exert herself, and she often has trouble with dissatisfied parents who would like her to do things differently. She said that because of the low and erratic salary she did not feel motivated to exert herself. She said she would have quit rather than renewing for another year, but her father José forbade it. In a subsequent conversation she told me that as soon as her younger brother Paulo was qualified, she would pass her teaching position onto him permanently.

Shortly after her return to Maronal on April 12th, Amélia was offered a new opportunity to travel. On April 20th, over the CIVAJA radio, she was invited to a meeting of indigenous schoolteachers in Manaus. This meeting was organized by COPIAR, Coordenação de Professores Indígenas da Amazônia, Acre, Roraima e Rondônia. COPIAR was linked to COIAB and invited Javari Indians to their meetings each year. CIVAJA had the funds to send Amélia to the meeting, and offered to do so. Amélia spoke to Clóvis about it over the radio. Her initial response was that she wanted to go and would begin making arrangements.

Amélia encountered opposition when she attempted to make plans for another trip. A politically influential man who was present at the radio hut when she received her invitation told her that she should not go. This man said that if she travelled back and forth all the time like she did last year, the schoolyear might be truncated again (recall that, by agreement of the FUNAI worker with the missionary, the schoolyear had ended prematurely for the older students in 1997). The man told her that if this happened

regularly, the children would never finish school. After this speech, Amélia's enthusiasm was diminished but she still said she wanted to go to Manaus.

Amélia began to organize her trip. She had only just had to defend herself to the municipal secretary of education on charges of neglecting her duties. To attend the meeting in Manaus, she had to get this individual's approval. She spoke to Clóvis on the radio on April 21st, asking him to deal with this issue. Clóvis agreed to talk to the secretary of education. The meeting was to take place on May 9th. In order to make it, Amélia had to leave by the 26th in order to catch a ride on a boat then moored in the mid-Curuçá, the *São Francisco*.

Amélia's next task was to secure a substitute. Since her brother Paulo had gone downstream to accompany his pregnant wife to a hospital, she had to rely on the missionaries to cover her classes. On the morning of April 24th, she went to the mission to make her request. She returned disappointed: the missionaries would not substitute. They had told her that she had been travelling downstream all year whenever CIVAJA called her, and they did not think it had benefited her. They refused to support her traveling to the COPIAR meeting. After this occurred, she went to the FUNAI radio to speak to her brother Manoel in Atalaia. Her brother put pressure on her to find a way to go. He told her that her attendance was important and that they were counting on her. Caught between these conflicting agendas, she became depressed. She asked me if I would substitute for her. Since I had only nine weeks of fieldwork left and a number of issues yet to resolve, I declined.

Amélia found herself caught between CIVAJA and mission agendas. CIVAJA's conflictive relations with the mission have already been discussed. CIVAJA argues for

indigenous autonomy in planning and decisionmaking. In relations with the mission this can be seen in Txanõpa and Alfredo's efforts to retain indigenous authority over the mission. In addition, CIVAJA efforts are geared towards developing a conscious indigenous cultural identity. Missionaries are often criticized at meetings organized by the indigenous movement. Such meetings are partly aimed at giving indigenous people firstly an awareness of their culture as an abstract concept, and secondly an awareness of that culture's value. In this context, the mission is criticized for its role in undermining indigenous culture. Consequently, individuals return harder to missionize. For example, Txanõpa became aware of the mission's anti-indigenous cultural agenda through his attendance at CIVAJA-organized meetings, and is now highly unlikely to ever convert. Amélia's attendance at the meeting is clearly detrimental to the mission's agenda of proselytization and gaining influence, whereas it is favorable to CIVAJA's agenda of reinforcing the strength of indigenous cultural values. CIVAJA wanted Amélia to go to the meeting because she would be exposed to ideas such as the need to incorporate indigenous culture into the curriculum. CIVAJA hoped she would develop that conscious cultural identity they seek to produce, and subsequently use her position as schoolteacher to help reinforce and sustain indigenous culture. The mission refused to cooperate, part of a long pattern of non-cooperation with and active opposition to CIVAJA.

Amélia felt that the mission was scared that she would be exposed to anti-missionary ideas at the COPIAR meeting. She said that after her AIS meeting in Manaus in August they had thought she would turn against them. They thought that she had become a mission opponent and wanted them gone from Maronal. She said that one of

the missionaries came to discuss it with her and she had had to explain that she had not suddenly become a mission opponent. She continued to attend services twice weekly and Bible study once weekly. Nevertheless, now they opposed her attendance at the meeting. They are scared of being criticized at the meeting, she concluded.

Amélia explained to me that COPIAR had been holding meetings for some ten years, so they had several individuals that were very experienced in handling the difficult issues involved with indigenous education. She said that after Clóvis and Darcy started linking to COIAB and frequenting Manaus, the Vale do Javari was regularly invited to send representatives to the yearly meetings. She felt that she would learn a lot by exchanging ideas with others who have greater experience than she in teaching (she was only 25 years old). She was thinking of quitting because of the regular non-payment of salaries by the municipality, and thought the COPIAR meeting might help her.

By the evening of the 24th, Amélia was isolated. She still wanted to go to Manaus. However, she had no support at Maronal. Her brother was downstream, the mission would not support her travelling in any way, some of her own politically influential kin felt that her travels threatened the village children's education, and preferred her to remain even if they did not disagree with the CIVAJA belief system. Her father, who greatly valued education, did not actively impede her efforts to organize the trip, but he was unenthusiastic.

At 5 p.m. on the 24th, Amélia went to the CIVAJA radio to explain to Clóvis the problems that she was having. Clóvis insisted that he would be able to negotiate the problems. He had a personal relationship with the secretary of education, and felt confident that an arrangement could be reached to alter the school year so as to

accommodate the May 9th meeting. Satisfied with this, she remained set to travel to Manaus. She made plans to leave on the 26th so as to be at the *São Francisco* by its April 28th departure date.

On the 25th, Amélia began to feel ill. By the morning of the 26th she was feverish. Her father, who until then had allowed Amélia decision-making autonomy, now intervened: he forbade her to leave until she was tested for malaria. The test revealed a *Plasmodium vivax* infection. José forbade her from travelling with malaria. The window of opportunity to catch a boat so as to reach Atalaia on time to make the May 9th meeting in Manaus was now gone. It became logically impossible for Amélia to attend the COPIAR meeting. She recovered from the malaria and began giving classes by May 5th. She remained at Maronal, teaching, until my departure in July.

The chance ending to this social drama is ultimately apolitical. However, it is notable that Amélia seemed poised to leave despite opposition from the mission, voices of dissent from the politically influential, and silent opposition from her own father. This demonstrates that a woman may exercise considerable decision-making autonomy under certain conditions. Amélia's father is particularly tolerant of female independence, which facilitates her task. It is probable that the leeway Amélia had may not be available to all women because many elders exercise tighter control over women than José does. If she had not been struck by malaria, Amélia would in all likelihood have been able to ignore opposition and travel to Manaus. The fever, however, gave her father the excuse he had been looking for to impose his authority and forbid his daughter to travel.

Transmission of Information.

Amélia played a role in transmission of information analogous in many ways to Txanõpa's. She was young, she spoke Portuguese, and she frequently travelled outside the indigenous area. She thus had access to up-to-date news about events outside Marubo land, news which she transmitted to her family during her stays in the village in bewteen travels. To her coresidents and, more broadly, to her covillagers, she was an important source of information on the outside world. This function first became evident during the period of time when Amélia was present at Maronal but Txanõpa was not.

Txanõpa was the most active obtainer and redissemulator of information among the youth at Aldeia Maronal, but Amélia often took over that role, though she played it in a more restrained manner. When Amélia returned from Atalaia in November 1997, Txanõpa had gone to the CIVAJA meeting at Rio Novo. From her arrival until Txanõpa's return around December 30th, Amélia became the CIVAJA radio attendant because hers was the best Portuguese in the village. This led to her playing an essential role in the transmission of information. For example, on December 3rd, Amélia went to the CIVAJA radio at 5 p.m., returning to her *shovo* around 6:30. Upon her return, she lay in her hammock and explained to the other people in her *shovo* what the conversation had been. Radio conversation had touched on the activities of MSF, CIVAJA, the Korubo attraction front and the mission. Information on the latest actions of these groups reached the *shovo* elders, José and Pedro, through José's daughter Amélia. She thus played the role we may call *information redissemulator*, accumulating information from outside the Marubo area before redisseminating it within the village. Thus, she is essential to the

construction of the worldview which the elders will subsequently respond to and act upon.

On December 4th, in response to information coming over the radio, Amélia called a meeting of elders. The issue to be discussed was the extension of my authorization to carry out research in the area. My formal request for an extension had been passed on to Brasília some time previously, and FUNAI-Brasília had now requested the indigenous people's opinion. This request had reached CIVAJA in Atalaia, which passed it to Amélia over the radio. Amélia then communicated the information that the elders should meet to discuss the issue of my continued fieldwork. That night, the elders met on the *kenā* at José's *shovo*, where a healing session was scheduled anyway. The headman, Alfredo, was in Atalaia so those present were three of Alfredo's brothers, one peripheral *shovo*-owner, and one of the most prominent of Alfredo's brothers' sons. Amélia sat on the far end of the *kenā* and explained the situation to the assembled elders. They then discussed my fieldwork, each supplying an individual opinion while the others listened, then all participating in a final decision-making conversation. While they spoke, Amélia withdrew to her hammock in the *shovo* interior. Once the leaders had reached their decision, they called her over to listen. She returned to the *kenā*, and they told her that all were agreed my fieldwork should continue. The following day, she wrote a radiogram summarizing the elders' position and passed it on to CIVAJA.

It is instructive to analyze the similarities and differences between Amélia's and Txanõpa's roles. The similarities are that Amélia and Txanõpa both receive information over the radio that requires a response by the indigenous leaders; she informs the leaders of the need for a meeting; she explains what she heard over the radio; she listens to the

leaders' response; she writes the response into a Portuguese-language document which conveys the leaders' response to the appropriate authorities. That response is treated as the indigenous opinion of record by non-indigenous authorities. There are at least two significant differences: in the first place, she herself does not participate in the discussion. She withdraws, allows the leaders to decide, then listens to their answer. This is different from Txanõpa who, although he does allow the elders to make their decisions substantially uninterrupted, occasionally participates in the discussions, expresses opinions, and supplies points of information. By this means, Txanõpa displays an active will to influence decisions where Amélia does not. Secondly, Amélia does not control the meeting's organizational logistics, while Txanõpa does. Txanõpa typically sends out his younger brothers and cousins to invite elders to meet in his hut, or invites other elders himself, unless there is a previously scheduled event such as a healing ritual or feast to take advantage of. Amélia, in contrast, communicates the need for a meeting to her father, who then sends out his younger sons to convey the invitations to meet. Amélia does not herself take charge of the meeting's organizational logistics. It is possible that Amélia's gender and controversial status as an educated woman preclude her from directly summoning elders to meet, though I have no specific statement that might support this suspicion. The reasons for these differences may have to do with gender, but the differences in family attitudes towards gender roles may be equally important: as explained earlier, Amélia's father José approved of female education whereas Txanõpa's father Alfredo did not. Despite all the differences, Amélia and Txanõpa played a very similar role in transmission of information.

In the meeting of December 4th, Amélia came to act as an agent for the elders' strategy for status maintenance. Amélia reported to me that at the meeting, the elders had said that they wanted to take advantage of my presence to record their traditions, the songs, stories and medical lore, because they did not want their traditions to be lost, nor to become like non-indigenous people. The elders' specialized knowledge is a major basis of their high social status, giving them authority and influence over key spheres of social interaction (note that there is a direct link between verbal ability and status in that mastery of a particular discourse genre makes the speaker a generally recognized expert on the field of action the specific discourse genre is concerned with, such that the speaker gains influence over that field of action and so has higher status when it comes to influence and decision-making). They wanted to use my recording technology to give a new level of permanence to their knowledge, which had to that point been purely oral. By using my technology to record their knowledge, they shielded themselves against the disturbing effects which social change might have on the bases of their high status. In addition, Amélia said that if they lost their traditions they would become indistinguishable from the *náwa* (non-indigenous people) and thus lose their basic justification for having stewardship of land as traditional indigenous users. Thus, the elders at the meeting saw advantage in my continued fieldwork. Their opinion was expressed to FUNAI through Amélia.

On April 24th 1998, Alfredo asked Amélia to write a radiogram expressing his opinion on the FUNAI *chefe de posto* issue (see below). this was unusual because Alfredo's own son Txanõpa typically wrote radiograms, and he was present at Maronal

on April 24th. However, Alfredo chose Amélia to write the radiogram instead, probably because of her better Portuguese.

On May 30th Amélia again played an essential role in information-transmission resulting in decision-making. On this date, Alfredo was in Cruzeiro do Sul receiving treatment for a skin condition. Txanõpa went hunting with his brothers early in the morning, leaving Amélia to attend to the CIVAJA radio. That morning, Clóvis, in Atalaia, spoke to Amélia over the radio. He asked her to organize a meeting to discuss certain issues requiring indigenous leaders' opinions. She reported back to her father what Clóvis had said. That afternoon, José sent his brother upstream to invite the *Varináwavo* elders to the meeting, while he sent his son downstream to invite Vicente, a peripheral *shovo ivo*. The meeting was held in Txanõpa's hut.

Whereas in previously observed meetings, Txanõpa had supplied the introduction, on this occasion Amélia supplied the introduction, explaining to the elders the topic to be discussed. However, immediately after Amélia's introduction, Txanõpa stated his opinion. Only then did the elders discuss the issue among themselves (the actual meeting is described in more detail when the issue of Manoel Barbosa's *chefe de posto* position is discussed). Amélia stayed out of the discussion almost entirely, while Txanõpa frequently supplied opinions. Amélia spoke only once, supplying information she had gained while travelling to Atalaia.

In summary, Amélia played a role analogous and complementary to Txanõpa's in the political organization of Aldeia Maronal. She fit into the category of young bilinguals who, due to frequent travels and interactions with non-indigenous people, are repositories of specialized information which the elders do not have. These youth receive

information and pass it on to the elders. They also organize and mobilize the elders to political action and transmit the elders' opinion back to the appropriate entity. Amélia, however, exerts less influence over the actual decision-making process than does Txanõpa.

Txanõpa was aware of the differences between his own and Amélia's roles. In a conversation on 17 February 1998 he said that at meetings Amélia will not comment even though she is more highly educated than he is. In the city, he went to all reunions and meetings, even a union meeting with no direct relation to indigenous issues. She went to no meetings. She was offered the post of CIVAJA secretary but preferred that of indigenous schoolteacher. Txanõpa believes this is because she "does not understand the 'movimento indígena'", i.e., she has less of the consciousness of indigenous identity which Txanõpa has. In fact there is a difference in goals: whereas Amélia is driven by personal goals, Txanõpa merges his personal goals with a vision of the future of his people. Txanõpa wants to teach in order to improve the transmission of indigenous culture to the younger generation; Amélia wants to teach in order to make some money without excessive stress. In addition, it is clear that some male elders continue to be uncomfortable with Amélia's education and multiple talents. The way she is perceived because of her non-ordinary gender role, and the way she believes she is perceived, affect her actions. Because she thinks that the elders would disapprove of her excessive participation in village politics, she does not feel comfortable being outspoken. On the other hand, Txanõpa, as the headman's son, is expected to play an active role in the village's political system. He feels no social pressure to avoid participation, and thus is

able to participate more comfortably than Amélia. Amélia's role is thus more restrained than Txanõpa's, her goals more personal while Txanõpa's are more social.

Effects of relations to non-indigenous people on daily activity pattern.

Amélia's pattern of relations to non-indigenous people is very different from the average Marubo woman's. While it is common for men to have complex and multi-faceted relations to non-indigenous people, it is less common for women. At Aldeia Maronal, women with relations to non-indigenous people are generally limited to interactions with the mission. Women often go to the mission pharmacy to receive treatment for themselves and their children for a variety of ailments. In addition, some women attend church services. However, these interactions with the mission do not have a significant effect on women's daily routines. Women continue to pay attention primarily to harvesting food from the swidden, cooking, childrearing, and beadwork. Amélia's daily routine was a notable deviation from the norm.

Amélia's daily routine was occupied with teaching and AIS activities. For example, on November 21st 1997, before breakfast, she took blood samples from people who had experienced fevers the night before. She prepared the slides and left them to dry. After breakfast, she went to the CIVAJA radio which she was operating in Txanõpa's absence. After the radio session, she administered a test to her students. In the afternoon, she corrected the tests and calculated her students' new averages. She looked at the blood samples under the microscope. This daily routine lasted until her departure in late December. After her return, her AIS duties became limited because Txanõpa became the main microscopist. Even then, however, she gave classes for two hours twice a day, 8-10 a.m. and 3-5 p.m., every weekday.

In contrast, an average woman's routine begins with cooking breakfast. After she has made her contribution to the *shovo*'s typically communal meals, the average woman goes to the swidden to cull bananas, manioc, or maize, or to cut firewood. At least one woman normally remains in the *shovo* caring for infants, occupying herself with beadwork or, occasionally, spinning, weaving, hammock-making or ceramics. Once the day's work is done a second meal, typically served around 3 p.m., is served. There are no non-indigenous-related interactions in the average woman's routine.

Whether Amélia's social role will spread to other Marubo women remains to be seen. At Aldeia Maronal no other woman comes close in education or plays a significant role in the village's political relations to non-indigenous people as Amélia does. Only at Aldeia São Sebastião are some women now approaching Amélia's educational level and adopting some of her role. Clóvis' daughter Artemisia, though she lives in Atalaia, is likely to finish secondary education, as is Clóvis' half-sister. For the time being, however, her role is unique.

The variable that will determine the extent to which women's roles change is parental support for female education. Where elders prefer to maintain traditional female gender roles, women will not be afforded the opportunity to acquire education. Where elders find more advantage in educated women, roles much like Amélia's will emerge.
Amélia: Individual and Society.

Amélia's social role is the product of a certain tension between her own goal-pursuits and the latitude afforded her by her social environment. Her education itself was a source of social tension. The headman, Alfredo, was opposed to any type of women's

education but Amélia was educated anyway, because her father, Alfredo's younger brother, wished it and so did she.

Amélia's desire for learning can clash with the community's desire to make use of her learning. Amélia's desire to learn is frequently expressed. She often discussed her plans to finish her education. When justifying her wish to attend the COPIAR meeting she focused on what she would learn from meeting other indigenous schoolteachers. Her stated motivation for attending AIS training courses was simply to learn, not to 'serve the community'. Amélia's will to learn led to her frequent travels to attend AIS-related events. By April, this had created the perception that she did not take her teaching as a serious responsibility. In fact, she herself, for reasons already noted, was dismayed with teaching. Yet education is a goal broadly held at Aldeia Maronal and Amélia's performance of her teaching duties was essential to ensure many youths' access to this goal. Even so, were it not for a fever she might have bucked the community's will and travelled to Manaus. The important thing to note is that there was tension between her personal goals and her role in the fulfilment of other people's educational goals. She was not able to disentangle herself from this conflict during the fieldwork period and so remained the village schoolteacher even as she sought out opportunities for continuing education.

The social pressure experienced by Amélia is very likely a cause of her restrained political behavior. She has run into social opposition at several stages of her life. First the leaders opposed her education, making her seem like a threat to traditional culture. Then, they saw so much advantage in her ability to teach that they worked to hold her to that role and prevent her from pursuing her individual agenda. Her emphasis on personal

over social goals becomes strengthened each time she encounters that opposition. Thus, she does not identify her own goals with those of her society; on the contrary, she is aware of a conflict between her individuality and her society. Hence her reluctant participation in decision-making processes which her father's brother's son Txanõpa freely participates in.

e. Manoel Barbosa

Manoel is José's second child and oldest son, born in 1975. His role in the Marubo political system was in many ways analogous to Txanõpa's and to Amélia's: superior access to information about non-indigenous people, fluent Portuguese, and a key position in the transmission of information combined to afford a youth influence beyond the norm for his age group. Thanks in part to this exceptional position, he became the first indigenous FUNAI *chefe de posto* in the Javari basin.

Because Manoel lived in Atalaia do Norte during the fieldwork period, direct observation and interview were limited to my stays in Atalaia and one long boat trip with Manoel. These periods were from 4 July to 4 August 1997 and from 24 March to 1 April 1998. At other times Manoel's activities were followed through radio conversations and through conversations with his family.

Manoel began his education, like Amélia, in her father's *shovo* with the Acreano her father had invited. Shortly after Amélia, he went to school in Cruzeiro do Sul. Once the schooling in Cruzeiro became unaffordable he travelled to Atalaia to seek schooling, unsuccessfully. Eventually, he was placed in the seminary at Tabatinga, where he matched Amélia by coming within two years of finishing secondary school. At that

point, he carried out his compulsory military service. Once this was over, he was recruited to work in CIVAJA. By July 1997 he was the secretary-treasurer for CIVAJA.

Manoel's job at CIVAJA involved a considerable amount of work. During each official meeting he had to take notes, and afterwards write the notes up into typed minutes. In addition, he was in charge of keeping track of incomes and expenditures, filing receipts in the accounting books and balancing the spreadsheets. This last duty made him the target of considerable gossip in the aldeias. Some FUNAI workers regularly accused CIVAJA treasurers of embezzlement and mismanagement, accusations which I heard repeated by some Marubo who felt they were not benefiting directly from CIVAJA's policies. CIVAJA's response to these accusations was an open-book policy with regards to accounting. Indeed, they invited me to peruse their books while I was in Atalaia. It was easy to see that the gossip was baseless. For example, a FUNAI worker had once accused Clóvis of embezzling money to buy a motorcycle. When I examined the books, I found that the motorcycle in question had been properly accounted for and did not belong to Clóvis at all, but to CIVAJA as an organization. Accusations of embezzlement had no basis in reality.

Manoel was conscious of the special role played by youth such as himself in the Marubo political system. In a conversation on July 27th, 1997, he said that the elders typically concentrate on traditional life. However, while the elders focus on tradition, the Brazilian bureaucracy continues making decisions that affect them. Indigenous people cannot focus exclusively on traditions, he said, but must obtain knowledge and understanding of non-indigenous people. Though to some it seems as if they are abandoning their culture, this is the only way to preserve it. Elders, he said, do not

understand *indigenista* politics or the *movimento indígena*. Nor do they understand the non-indigenous people's actions. Yet it is essential that the elders understand these things. The elders' exclusive focus on tradition, according to Manoel, was changing because the youth involved in the *movimento indígena* were redirecting the elders' energies. From Manoel's perspective, this was an essential function: without the youth to guide them, the elders would pay insufficient attention to the activities of the Brazilian state, with negative consequences for the very traditions they were trying to maintain.

Manoel admitted that neither the Marubo nor any of the Javari's other ethnic groups were fully supportive of CIVAJA. The youth work for everyone's benefit, he said, but while some want them others do not [meaning that some are supportive of the young indigenous politicians' work, while others are not]. The critics, he said, think that we are trying to do something behind their backs. These criticisms sting because they are exactly the slogans used by politicians and businessmen to sully the image of indigenous people in order to subvert the demarcation process. But, Manoel said, they (meaning young people working in the *movimento indígena*) want the support of the elders for their continuing struggle.

Manoel visited his home village only once during the fieldwork period. On July 20th, 1997, he left Atalaia, arriving at Aldeia Maronal on August 2nd. Within hours of arrival he had organized a tremendous party for the village youth. This was the first time the generator was linked, and also the first time Manoel's large stereo, which he had carefully transported to the village, was turned on. In addition, a large supply of alcohol mysteriously disappeared from a box destined for the mission pharmacy, only to reappear at Manoel's feast. This feast combined the old and the new: on the one hand, it was a

case of a political riser throwing a feast for his age-grade peers, which is completely traditional behavior; on the other hand, the feast was thrown with loud Latin dance music and pharmaceutical-grade alcohol instead of with elders' songs and a slain tapir. The abundant alcohol attracted people to the feast as effectively as the culinary attractions that are more usual in Marubo feasting.

After the feast, Manoel organized a meeting to explain CIVAJA's recent activities and to introduce me formally to the village. At this meeting, the Aldeia Maronal youth and elders listened as Manoel explained the main projects CIVAJA was working on, detailed the budget expenditures, and explained their future plans. He then asked me to introduce myself and translated what I said to the assembly, as well as translating Alfredo's reply. This event shows Manoel's role in transmission of information from outside the Marubo area to his home village.

Manoel also transmitted information over the radio. Often this took the form of discussions with his own family, as on 22 April 1998 when he told his father José of the current status of his move to become FUNAI *chefe de posto*. Such discussions also took place between Manoel and Amélia, and resulted in information spreading first to José's *shovo*. Other times, Manoel would supply current affairs information to Txanõpa, the usual radio listener, as on 15 January 1998 when he supplied news of the effort to establish a health care system for indigenous people in the Javari basin. In these cases, information spread first to Txanõpa, thence to his father Alfredo's *shovo*. The elders of Alfredo's *shovo* spread news to elders from other *shovo* either by visiting or by hosting visits. Elders then bring the news back to their own *shovo*. Many people at Aldeia Maronal follow news of the outside assiduously, even if they never listen to the radio.

Manoel became involved in the most complex political competition of the fieldwork period when he was nominated by Aldeia Maronal to serve as *chefe de posto* for the Curuçá River. This incident will be described in detail below.

José, Amélia and Manoel: overall picture.

José Barbosa's strenuous efforts to secure education for his children, both male and female, allowed Amélia and Manoel to assume key roles at the intersection of indigenous and non-indigenous society, which in turn affected the entire pattern of interaction and information transmission between indigenous and non-indigenous people. In this way, José influenced Marubo social organization.

José's efforts allowed Amélia to become the first Marubo woman with a relatively high degree of non-indigenous education. Thanks to this special condition+, she became the first indigenous schoolteacher at Aldeia Maronal. Because of her exceptional Portuguese and because she offers outsiders their only access to the Marubo women's world, she was recruited to be an AIS, an opportunity she assiduously pursued. Until Txanõpa and others caught up with her training she was the leading malaria control specialist at Aldeia Maronal. In all these activities she was, as a Marubo woman, entirely unique. Her role was a social innovation.

Manoel's education permitted him to learn fluent written and spoken Portuguese, which led to him being recruited into CIVAJA. Few Javari basin indigenous people can take notes during a meeting, write them up as minutes, and keep track of financial accounts. Manoel's education made him one of the only choices for the position (the hiring for this position was done by Padre Joseney, the Catholic priest that had assisted

CIVAJA's organization from the beginning and who, at least in 1998, participated in the administration of a portion of CIVAJA's budget—see section on CIVAJA at the start of this chapter). Those same skills, improved by two years in CIVAJA, made him one of the only possible choices when an indigenous *chefe de posto* was decided upon.

Because of their relatively higher degree of education, José's children were the first or among the first to enter into the new roles created at the intersection of indigenous and non-indigenous societies. By this means, José initiated change in Marubo social organization, permanently expanding the range of social roles each individual may consider available.

f. Pedro Barbosa

Pedro is José's younger brother. José and Pedro lived together, and had done so since José began building his first *shovo* some 25 years prior to the start of fieldwork. Pedro was, during my fieldwork, different from his brother in one very significant aspect: he enjoyed a close association with the Maronal mission. Although José was the senior authority in the *shovo* and disagreed with the mission belief system, he did not interfere with Pedro's interests. Because of José's tolerance the *shovo* maintains links to the mission independently of the *shovo* owner.

Pedro attended church services twice weekly and also attended special Bible study sessions. He read every pamphlet and hymnal the mission produced. His main interest was to secure knowledge of the Christian cosmological system. He was very interested in concepts of God, the creation, heaven and hell, the flood, and the main stories of the Bible. This fit in with his existing preoccupation with Marubo cosmology. Pedro also asked other elders with more knowledge to explain details of Marubo

cosmology that he was unclear in. During my stay, he asked me to write down for him a list of thirteen places visited by fleeing people in one of the Marubo myths I had taped, because he wanted to memorize him. Marubo or Christian, Pedro wanted to accumulate as much cosmological knowledge as possible.

Despite his regular association with the mission, Pedro continued to believe in the value and efficacy of Marubo healing practices, and especially the *shōki*. The missionaries told him that the spirits he summoned to heal the sick were evil spirits connected to the Devil. The missionaries told him that Marubo and Christian beliefs were incompatible, that all Marubo beliefs were false and all Christian beliefs were true. They told him that the Marubo creator, Kanavoā, was not the true creator, and that the *rewepēi*, spirits that bring various types of information to the Marubo, are not the same as angels. Pedro seemed immune to these assertions. He accumulated Christian beliefs without abandoning any of his. He insisted that Kanavoā was the same as the Christian god, that *rewepēi* were angels, and that the Marubo healing songs had been sent to them by God through the *rewepēi* so as to heal people. Pedro continued to assert that Marubo and Christian beliefs were completely compatible and mutually reinforcing. Pedro saw the similar patterns in Christian religion (a creator, an evil being, a flood story, angels) as confirmation of the validity of his own beliefs. Where there were discrepancies, he attributed them to incomplete knowledge on the part of the missionaries. For example, he agreed that hell existed, but believed that the Marubo tales of afterlife hell were more accurate and more detailed than the Christian version, in part because their own shamans had visited the place in trance-states to provide first-hand accounts. Although he found the Christian version flawed, to Pedro the very fact that Christians had a concept of hell

at all validated his pre-existing indigenous conception of a place of trial and potential imprisonment in the afterworld. Pedro's studied the mission belief system without compromising his indigenous beliefs.

Pedro derived small material benefits from his association with the mission. For example, he was able to send broken objects by airplane to Cruzeiro to be fixed. He appreciated this possibility, and used it to fix his shotgun and a Briggs & Stratton 3.5 hp motor. It was because of Pedro's close links to the mission that he was offered the job of building missionary Aníbal Xavier's new house at Maronal. This job, which at first seemed very attractive, took longer than expected and left Pedro and José feeling underpaid. Nevertheless, it shows that money came to José thanks to his brother Pedro's association with the mission. Thus although José himself avoids any regular relationship with the mission, thanks to his tolerance of his brother's interests, he is able to derive certain benefits from the mission anyway.

g. Aurélio

Aurélio is Alfredo's father's brother's son. Aurélio's father was a renowned shaman who played a key role in the Marubo-Mayoruna clash of the mid-1960s. Born in 1930, he is older than Alfredo and José. His pattern of relations to non-indigenous people is quite different from those of his father's brother's sons Alfredo and José because he does not participate in most forms of local political organization, such as the feasts and the political meetings.

Aurélio's relationships to non-indigenous people have affected his residence patterns. In 1974-75 he was living in a *shovo* far up the Curuçá where he and his

coresidents tapped rubber and sold other forest products to the markets in Acre. When FUNAI established its post on the middle Curuçá his coresidents relocated, and some time later he followed. He lived on the middle Curuçá for some 15 years until an illness forced him to a long period of convalescence in Manaus. When he returned, he moved to Aldeia Maronal.

Aurélio's illness was an experience that affected his system of relationships to non-indigenous people and consequently his role in the Maronal political system. He told me this story on August 9th 1997. When he fell ill, he began to receive treatment from the *kẽxítxorasi* (plural of *kẽxítxo*) who endeavored to sing the correct *shōki* to cure him. Despite the efforts of the *kẽxítxorasi*, he did not improve. At that point he decided he wanted to go to a hospital instead. According to Aurélio, the *kẽxítxorasi* did not want him to go to a hospital. Nevertheless, he managed to get to a hospital although he was skin and bones and near death. In the hospital, he slowly recovered. This experience made him skeptical of the abilities of the *kẽxítxorasi*.

Aurélio was once an active *kẽxítxo* himself but stopped singing in the course of fieldwork. He simply did not believe in the efficacy of his own singing. He participated in two healing rituals for critical illnesses, one in August and one in September, 1997, though at neither did he play a prominent role, singing only occasionally. After September and until the following July he did not participate in *shōki*-singing. By avoiding the singing, he avoided also the regular decision-making events that take place at healing rituals, thus removing himself from a large part of the village's political activity.

Even as he distanced himself from the indigenous religion he drew closer to the mission. He attended services and Bible study. The effect of the missionaries on his outlook increased. For example, on one occasion he came to me full of concern because the missionaries had told him that wars and natural catastrophes were ravaging the world outside the rainforest. He wanted to know if it was true. On other occasions, also, he repeated mission ideas. It should be noted that his attitude was not one of uncritical acceptance, but he did consider mission beliefs likely to be true, especially since his own experience led him to accept the missionaries' premise that indigenous healing by spirit-invocation was ineffectual. The ultimate effect of following the missionaries' ideas was avoiding participation in feasting. At two village-wide *akoya* feasts held in 1998, Aurélio's *shovo* was the only one that did not send any representatives. Aurélio was the only *shovo ivo* present at Aldeia Maronal who did not attend the *akoya* at Sinãpa's *shovo* on 25 January 1998. When I asked other informants why this was, I was told that it was because of his Christian religious beliefs. Apparently, having accepted the mission's assertion that *shôki*-healing should be negatively valued, he accepted their negative valuation of other aspects of indigenous culture, as well. As a result, he withdrew from a second context for political decision-making—the large feasts—in addition to the healing rituals he had already ceased participating in. These two choices led to a near-total withdrawal from village politics on Aurélio's part.

The strategies used by Aurélio in pursuit of money and education were coherent with his increasing closeness to the mission. In seeking money, Aurélio had previously walked to Cruzeiro do Sul to sell bows, arrows, and spears. However, during my fieldwork he focused his attention on completing the paperwork for obtaining pension

monies. There are a variety of options open to Maronal Marubo for this purpose: Maurício at FUNAI-Atalaia handles some (e.g. Wanõpa, Misael), the middleman Mario Peruano on the Ituí River handles others (e.g., José Barbosa's full sister Peko and full brother Zacarías). Aurélio, however, had the missionary handle the technical issues for him, using the mission-associated Shapõpa, a Marubo man living in Cruzeiro do Sul, as middleman.

Aurélio's son Pekõpa, born in 1973, attended school in the town of Benjamin Constant, downstream from Atalaia at the mouth of the Javari River. The school he attended was operated by an evangelical Christian group. Pekõpa was in school when I arrived at Maronal. He returned in late November, spent two months with his family, then left for another year of schooling in February. Like Aurélio's strategy for obtaining pension funds, the means whereby his son was being educated was congruent with his general pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people.

These observations on Aurélio allow us to discern a form of political inequality based on religious practice. Because Aurélio does not participate in the indigenous religion anymore, he is not present at the informal councils where so many decisions are made. Also associated with his personal religious beliefs, is his non-participation in the cycle of large feasts. These village-wide feasts typically unite members of all *shovo* in one place, but Aurélio and his *shovo* tend not to join in. Because of the distinctive practices associated with his beliefs, Aurélio participates in few village decisions and thus has far less influence than his father's brother's sons. We may go further and assert that, as long as healing rituals are also informal political councils, full political participation requires active participation in indigenous religion.

h. Vasho

The fourth *shovo* of Aldeia Maronal's core, along with Alfredo's, José's, and Aurélio's, is that belonging to Vasho. Vasho is Alfredo's patrilateral brother. This *shovo* originally housed three full brothers: Vasho, Mesēpa, and Sebastião. Sebastião died prior to the start of fieldwork, however; and Mesēpa had gone to the Ituí River to access pension monies through the middleman Mario Peruano. Only Vasho was left in residence here. However, even Vasho was not often present. When fieldwork commenced he was undergoing treatment for tuberculosis in Atalaia. He returned in January, but in June it was determined that he had to undergo additional treatment, so he returned to Atalaia. Thus, during much of the fieldwork period, the two elders of this *shovo* were away from their homes engaged in interactions with non-indigenous people. Vasho participated actively in village politics while he was present, but most of the time this *shovo* had minimal impact on village politics because of the lack of elders.

3. Aldeia Maronal-Periphery

In the forest surrounding the Maronal core there were in July 1998 seven more *shovo* belonging largely to affinal relations of the core-dwellers. The core *shovo* belong to men who are descended from João Tuxáua or from his full brother. The peripheral *shovo* belong mainly to the descendants of Domingo, another deceased rubber boom-generation elder whose family is extensively intermarried with João Tuxáua's. When fieldwork commenced in 1997 there were only five peripheral *shovo* at Maronal. During the ensuing year four more were built, one burned down, and one was abandoned, leaving a total of seven. Regular interactions between periphery and core take place, such as

healing rituals, feasts, smaller eating and drinking invitations, and mutual assistance in agricultural tasks and *shovo*-building. These social practices provide Maronal with its political organization and serve to mitigate tensions that occasionally arise between core and periphery.

a. Sināpa

Sināpa is a son of Domingo, with an estimated birthdate of 1942. Two of his full sisters are married to José Barbosa. A leading elder, he has two wives and fourteen children, including three virilocally married sons. He is fully versed in *shōki*, in plant medicine, in *ese*, and in Marubo cosmology. He himself has few direct interactions with non-indigenous people but, through his sons, plays an active role in molding the overall pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people at Aldeia Maronal.

Sināpa is a leader, and a very traditionalist one. Sināpa participates actively in the entire system of political organization. Since he is skilled in healing arts, he attends the most significant healing sessions, and is thus present at the discussions among elders that take place at the sessions. Since he is wise in traditional knowledge, he often adds his opinion. He attends all the feasts and himself issues invitations to eat and drink, and sends gifts of food home with visitors. He attends political meetings and is often one of only three elders who almost always express an opinion, along with Alfredo and José. In addition, he is one of the village's foremost practitioners of *ese vana*, often delivering lengthy lectures on social propriety and impropriety to listening *shovo*, both his own and others'. Because of all this, he is considered a leader (Portuguese *liderança*; although this word refers to 'leadership' in Portuguese, the Marubo use it to signify 'leader')

instead, as in *eu sou liderança*, ‘I am a leader’), added his name to most radiograms that listed the leaders, and does in fact have a certain influence over affairs at Maronal.

Since Sinãpa’s leadership is based on playing a social role very close to the norm for a traditional leader, it should come as no surprise that he weighs in on the traditionalist side in any case of cultural conflict. For example, he derides the mission’s assertions that the indigenous cosmologico-religious belief system is erroneous. It is common for indigenous people in the Javari to laugh at non-indigenous people who think that indigenous people are unintelligent. Alberto said that this was a frequent experience of his. Missionaries treated him as if he lacked intelligence, which to him was evidence that they themselves lacked intelligence. He had other reasons for suspecting that the missionaries were not as all-knowing as they claimed to be: their religion conferred no healing abilities upon them, whereas his did. Since successful healing sessions validated his indigenous belief system, while the missionaries had no such direct validation, he could be confident that when they asserted that he was erring, they themselves were erring. Sinãpa never attended services, nor did anyone who lived in his *shovo*. It is unlikely that he would have restrained anyone had they wanted to go, but he lived at a considerable distance from the church, and there seemed little interest among his coresidents in church attendance.

Sinãpa's son: Jamil.

Jamil is Sinãpa's second-oldest son by his first wife, born in 1971. Jamil was the most active of Sinãpa's sons in the terms of relationships to non-indigenous people. Sinãpa's oldest son, Sina (b. 1969), was developing a more traditional role for himself by learning myth-songs and the ritualized greetings delivered at feasts, and by hosting feasts without the assistance of his father. Another son, Kene, was absent during the entire fieldwork period, working and attending school in Cruzeiro do Sul. Jamil, on the other hand, focused much of his energy on obtaining money and buying goods. While Kene's education may some day bring him to play a role akin to that played by the previously discussed youth (Txanõpa, Amélia, Manoel), Jamil's role is entirely different. Since his goals are different, his patterns of relationship to non-indigenous people are different; hence, his conception of self-interest is different, and his response to key issues and events varies accordingly.

Jamil's statements of what his goals are often expressed desire for access to manufactured goods and the money to buy them with. This desire motivated him, manifesting as a series of actions aimed at securing access to his goal. As Jamil learned from each successive experience, these strategies became increasingly effective with the passage of time.

Jamil returned from a long trip through Acre in late August, 1997. He had wanted to make money to buy a small motor for canoes, which would give him autonomy of travel in the Javari basin. He went first by foot to Cruzeiro do Sul, then by various means he travelled to Xapuri and other outlying locales, before traveling to the large capital of Acre, Rio Branco. Everywhere, his goal was to find employment. Unfortunately, he was

often unemployed and homeless; when he did find employment, he discovered that daily food and transportation expenses prevented him from saving any money. The result of his experience in Acre was, from his perspective, a lot of hard work and very little money. He did not succeed in saving enough money to buy a motor, and soon gave up. What he abandoned, however, was the strategy, not the goal. He continued to plan to obtain a motor.

From September until December, 1997, Jamil remained at Aldeia Maronal. His days were employed mainly with subsistence tasks-hunting and agriculture. In several conversations during this time period, he expressed dissatisfaction with that state of affairs. He described his condition in Portuguese as “parado”, stopped, referring to the state of his money-making efforts. As the months went by, the supplies of salt and ammunition he had previously obtain ran out, and he had no means of buying more. He began to plan his next action. Since his experience with working in Acre had proved unsuccessful, he decided to manufacture and sell spears, bows, and arrows. In a conversation in late September, he told me he was planning to make 360 spears to sell, repeating that with the money he wanted to buy a motor. He asked the missionary Aníbal Xavier to find a market for spears in Acre. On October 2nd, 1997 Aníbal spoke over the radio with Shapōpa in Cruzeiro do Sul to inquire into the market for spears. The market for spears in Cruzeiro, Shapōpa replied, was glutted, but he would check his connections in Rio Branco. Nothing more was heard of this Rio Branco connection, however. This strategy to obtain the desired motor proved unsuccessful.

Jamil next planned to go to Cruzeiro do Sul himself to sell his crafts. While he planned his journey, he manufactured a large amount of crafts for sale. On a visit to his

hut on December 9th, I was shown 19 bamboo knives, 10 spears, some 40 bows and 40 arrows. All these objects had been made specifically to be sold for money. Jamil then spoke to Aníbal in order to secure a ride on an airplane, so he could take the heavy crafts to market. The mission hired airplanes to fly in supplies every other month. Such airplanes typically flew back to Cruzeiro empty. Since the supply flight had to be paid in advance by the mission, theoretically anyone should be able to ride back to Cruzeiro at no charge since the cost was already paid. However, the mission's policy was to discourage air travel to Cruzeiro by Marubo. To accomplish this they charged \$15 for a ride to Cruzeiro on a mission supply flight, even after it was already fully paid. Jamil complained about this several times. Since he had to go to Cruzeiro to sell his crafts to make money, he evidently lacked the money for the passage up front. He negotiated with Aníbal to trade a set of spears for passage to Cruzeiro.

The difficulties encountered in obtaining air passage to Cruzeiro created resentment of the mission. It was well known that supply flights were fully pre-paid, and that the Marubo payments for passage did not go to the pilot or his expenses but to the mission. This was an issue of goals and interference with goals. Jamil, and a number of other Marubo, desired access to the Cruzeiro markets and resented the fact that the mission would not provide assistance even when it could. Such non-cooperation on the part of the missionaries contributed to their being perceived in general as stingy and tight-fisted (the difference in economic behavior, with missionaries functioning in the money-economy paradigm while Marubo maintain extensive reciprocity, also contributed to this perception).

Jamil flew to Cruzeiro do Sul on 15 December 1997. He returned overland during the first week of January, 1998. He had had plans to sell his crafts at three separate locations, but none of these options proved viable. He had to leave the entire load of crafts on consignment at the CIMI-Cruzeiro office, where he would have to wait for it to sell before collecting any money. He then set about trying to find work. His brother Kene loaned him a bicycle and Jamil rode about Cruzeiro seeking employment. He received an offer to become a chainsaw operator but the minimum expected one-year service did not fit his plans. Having sold but a few crafts and made relatively little money, Jamil returned to Aldeia Maronal overland. This story was related to me in a conversation on January 24th 1998. By the end of February he was already well into the execution of yet another money-making plan.

On February 20th, 1998, I conversed with Jamil again. He said he and his brothers were finishing work on an eight-meter canoe. With this canoe, he is planning to travel to Atalaia to try selling crafts there. He described his situation using the same language as he had during October and November: "*ficar parado não presta*" (being stopped is no good). Unless money-making action was taken on a regular basis, his household would run out of goods since no one there drew a regular salary. He did not wish this to happen and felt a need to take action rather than remain inactive.

I observed Jamil's activities in Atalaia in March. When I returned from a visit downriver to Manaus, he, his older brother, and a classificatory brother had arrived in the new canoe with a borrowed motor. His main load was a bundle of 300 hand-crafted spears. He sold a number of these to a bar-owner at \$2 apiece, for retail to tourists. He sold 255 spears to CIVAJA for \$250 to become part of a future crafts museum and shop.

In addition, he had brought down a smaller quantity of forest products which he partially succeeded in selling, adding another \$50 or so to his earnings. Within a few days of arrival, Jamil thus found himself with over \$300 to spend.

I expected that Jamil, after purchasing some goods, would buy gasoline for the return journey. Instead, he decided to spend all the money he had made and hitch a ride on someone else's boat. He bought clothes, ammunition, soap, salt, and a variety of other objects, which he stored aboard the canoe. When I asked him why he had chosen not to return home, he replied that he was still dissatisfied with his lack of progress towards obtaining a motor. He wanted to do everything possible to accomplish this goal, and would not leave until he was sure that this had been done. The motor is the thread of continuity through all his interactions with non-indigenous people. In seeking this goal, he burned his bridges in Atalaia, spending his means of returning home, forcing himself to try harder.

Jamil met a Peruvian man who offered to trade a motor for domestic pigs. He agreed to bring his herd of eleven pigs down from Aldeia Maronal to trade for the Peruvian's motor. He also told me he was planning to go hunting on the nearby Quixito River in order to obtain meat to sell to raise money to buy more goods for himself and his family. Finally, he planned to sell the canoe he and his brothers had made the previous month. Since they had already decided to ride with someone else, they would not need it. I was surprised at this decision, but Jamil's brother told me that it was no concern: they would make another one when they needed it. At that point, I left Atalaia for Aldeia Maronal. Jamil sent a large amount of the goods he had purchased upriver under my care. These goods reached Jamil's family in April.

Upon his return home in late May, Jamil began work on his end of the agreement with the Peruvian. In the end, he had agreed to return to Atalaia before the end of June with a fixed amount of pigs and manioc flour. This work involved his entire *shovo*. His brothers worked in the swidden pulling the manioc while the women of the household peeled it. It was then ground, toasted, and basketed. Jamil's mother—Sināpa's first wife—directed her three daughters-in-law. The process was reminiscent of an assembly line. Most often, manioc flour is made one step at a time, one batch at a time. On this occasion, however, several steps were enacted simultaneously in order to accelerate the production process. For example, even as finished flour was being basketed, other flour was being ground, still more pulled from the swidden and peeled. The production process was continuous. The only people who held aloof from production were Sināpa, the *shovo ivo*, who occupied himself with solitary hunting and fishing, and his second wife, who was recovering from childbirth.

On June 26th, 1998, Jamil and two of his brothers went downstream in a borrowed canoe with a borrowed motor. Aboard were all the necessary pigs and manioc flour baskets to trade for the motor. Since I left on July 2nd, I was not able to find out if Jamil, after a year and a half of efforts, finally obtained his motor.

Jamil's actions were highly consistent during the year over which he was observed. His objective was to have reliable access to money so that he would not lack goods which he considered essential—ammunition, soap, salt, clothing, etc. Through all his efforts to make money, the consistent theme was the elusive motor. With the motor, he would have reliable transportation to markets downstream, which would enable him to sell his products and buy goods at will—essentially his goal. His initial efforts, seeking

employment in Acre, produced insufficient income at any given moment to purchase a motor. He then shifted strategies, producing crafts for sale instead of only seeking employment. This strategy proved unsuccessful when applied in Cruzeiro do Sul, so he changed strategies again, now seeking to exploit the downstream markets. Finally, he discovered that pigs and manioc flour could be traded for a motor in Atalaia, and seemed poised to finally obtain the object of his desire when the fieldwork period ended.

Comparison with other youth shows the extent to which Jamil's goals affected his pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people. Txanõpa, for example, showed far less interest in money than in cultural and political issues. During the time in which Jamil was travelling downstream and making manioc flour, Txanõpa was organizing his course in traditional medicine, inviting people from the Ituí River to attend and securing the elders' participation as teachers. Txanõpa occasionally commented that he needed to suspend his political activities to make some money, but he never did during the time he was observed. Jamil was just the opposite: he never attended the political meetings nor participated in the formation of village policy vis-à-vis non-indigenous people; instead he focused on making money. This shows the way differing goals may determine differing strategies for interaction with non-indigenous people.

Jamil's set of goals and strategies influenced his outlook on other issues. In a sense they supplied him with a structure of self-interest. His strategies required that a certain number of elements, such as adequate transportation and markets, be in place in order to be successful. Such elements as were required for the success of his strategies became a set of interests to protect and secure. This partially explains his opinions on and interactions with FUNAI, the mission, and CIVAJA. His opinions are further

explained by his social position as second son of a peripheral *shovo ivo*. His strategy was of self-sufficiency; he derived little benefit from the organizations which others seemed to derive benefits from. His opinions reflected his situation and his strategy of self-sufficiency.

Jamil was critical of the mission, but in a different way from Txanõpa. Whereas Txanõpa criticized the mission for cultural reasons, Jamil did so for economic reasons. Where Txanõpa's most typical critique of the mission was that it threatened the indigenous culture, Jamil's typical critique was that no economic benefit could be derived from the mission. The mission paid the minimum legal wage for Marubo labor in such tasks as cutting wood stakes or clearing forest. The prices for the goods they offered for sale were inflated due to the added cost of the supply flight. Working for missionaries could not satisfy Jamil's goals of access to goods. Furthermore, the mission consciously obstructed the Marubo from travelling freely on airplanes to and from Cruzeiro by imposing the \$15 fee for passage. From Jamil's perspective they were unhelpful and even obstructive. This was the crux of his opinion of the mission. He rarely expressed dissatisfaction with the mission's cultural impact, which was Txanõpa's main concern. These differences in concern reflect the different patterns of relation each individual has as well as their different social positions. As the headman's son, Txanõpa was socially positioned near the center of decisionmaking at Aldeia Maronal, and could be expected, based on his personal characteristics as well as his social position, to inherit an influential role in decision-making; hence his active pursuit of political goals, including the retention of indigenous autonomy and self-determination, an aspect of which is the retention of indigenous culture despite mission influence. Jamil, on the other hand, was the son of a

peripheral *shovo ivo*, and played a minimal role in decision-making. His goal was economic autonomy, hence his valuation of the mission in terms of its potential for satisfying economic goals.

Jamil's relation to other non-indigenous groups reflected the same set of concerns as his relation to the mission. CIVAJA's budget expenditures, focused on building infrastructure and political organization, offered no apparent improvement in economic opportunities. What seemed to him to be large amounts of money went through CIVAJA, with no direct benefit to him. From this perspective, he criticized CIVAJA's largely political orientation, arguing that it should work to provide economic benefits. Jamil's goals and social position contributed to the formation of this opinion. In terms of social position, those involved in CIVAJA during my fieldwork were all children of Alfredo and José Barbosa, core *shovo ivorasi*, and all had a relatively high degree of education. Jamil had not been to school, and although he spoke excellent Portuguese, he could not read or write well. This precluded him from ever working in CIVAJA. Jamil's goal was economic autonomy, and CIVAJA did not seem to him to offer any route to his goal. Thus, for most of the fieldwork period he had a dim view of CIVAJA. However, after his sale of 255 spears to CIVAJA I never heard him criticize CIVAJA again.

Jamil's critiques of FUNAI likewise focused on its ineffectiveness in providing economic opportunity. Prior to the fieldwork period, FUNAI had solicited and received a large amount of Marubo crafts which had not yet been paid for as of July 1998. Jamil roundly criticized FUNAI on this issue, though he was certainly not alone in doing so. In addition, he expressed reluctance to participate in the manioc flour sale organized by FUNAI in October 1997, because he feared the same slowness in payment. He did

participate in the end, but only with the flour he already had made. In contrast, when making manioc flour to trade for his own motor, he worked continually and enlisted his entire *shovo* in the work. This reflects Jamil's emphasis on self-reliance and economic autonomy. Focused on his own strategy for economic success, he invested little energy in relationships with FUNAI, CIVAJA, and the mission, and thus had little use for these groups.

The relationship between social position and relationship to non-indigenous people is further underscored by Jamil's relation to FNS vaccination teams, which also serves to reveal Jamil's position and role in the village political system. The standard procedure for vaccination was to have FNS vaccinate in the center of the village. Peripheral *shovo* were invited to receive their vaccinations in the core, either in Txanõpa's radio hut or in the schoolhouse. FNS scheduled its visits by village, so that they paused in each named *aldeia* and awaited outliers there. In a sense, whether or not one's *shovo* is considered a separate village or a part of someone else's village is reflected in FNS vaccination logistics. If they schedule a stop, it must be a recognized village. In a conversation on August 29th 1997, Jamil told me that he felt that FNS should visit his *shovo* separately because they are a separate village. He said he had discussed the issue with his father and his father agreed. On this occasion, he merely expressed his opinion, without taking any action to achieve this goal. Luís Melo, the FUNAI *chefe de posto* who was still at Aldeia Maronal, disagreed fundamentally, saying they could call themselves a separate village, but they had to get their vaccinations in the Maronal core like everybody else. Thus, the inhabitants of Sinãpa's *shovo* came down to the core for vaccinations on this occasion.

The issue of who lived in what village relates to the residential histories previously described. Sināpa was already living along the Curuçá River when Alfredo created the current Aldeia Maronal. Thus, unlike, for example, the three other core *shovo*, whose inhabitants moved from elsewhere to live near Alfredo, Sināpa's *shovo* pre-existed, and Aldeia Maronal grew to envelop it. Nevertheless Sināpa was considered to live in Aldeia Maronal, and Maronal had a single headman, Alfredo; hence Jamil's dissatisfaction. As the son of a peripheral *shovo ivo* he was peripheral to the headmanship, which seemed destined for Txanõpa. In the current system he had little political influence. By making his a separate village, he could create an alternate decision-making process independent of Alfredo, one in which he and his more traditional-minded older brother would have more influence. If his was a separate village, it would have to be separately consulted on key issues, and he could play a role in such decisions where currently he did not--only his father did.

After his initial declaration of intent to be a separate village, the next move was to communicate this intent. Clearly, Jamil communicated his plan to his own brothers, for at the feasting held to inaugurate the Varináwavo *shovo* in October, Jamil's younger brother Pakāpa showed up with the words "MARONAL-ALEGRIA" painted on his arms in *nane*-plant paint. This, he told me proudly, was the name of their village. This is interesting because it was a new creation. No one had ever heard of Maronal-Alegria before.

On the 20th of February, 1998, FNS returned to vaccinate again. Jamil came downstream from his *shovo* to ask that FNS go up to Sināpa's to vaccinate. He said it was difficult for them to go down because there were so many children that the logistical

problems involved in bringing them down by canoe and feeding them adequately during the day's visit were daunting. On this occasion, the FNS team did go visit Sināpa's *shovo* separately. It is interesting to note that the argument used on this occasion was a practical one, whereas in September his argument had been political. Despite this shift in tactics, the underlying political motivation for asking FNS to visit separately remained.

In spite of Jamil's incipient schismatics, Sināpa's *shovo* remained integrated in Aldeia Maronal during my stay. This is because Jamil's individualism was counterbalanced by his father's participation in village politics. Sināpa had close relations with both Alfredo and José, visited the core regularly, participated in the healing rituals, and attended political meetings where he regularly voiced opinions and influenced outcomes. At healing rituals, talk among elders frequently focused on common values and interests; Sināpa's attendance helped Alfredo reinforce the bonds among the elders, bonds consisting of common values and aspirations, and thus to reinforce the integrating social bonds that hold Aldeia Maronal together. It was Sināpa's relation to other elders that kept his *shovo* integrated to the rest of the village.

In summary, Jamil's relationship to non-indigenous people, and consequently his role in village politics, were very different from those of comparable youth from Maronal-core (comparable in the level of interaction with non-indigenous people). Txanōpa, Amélia, and Manoel all played key roles in transmission of information which afforded them considerable influence in a society theoretically led by male elders. They played important roles in the village decision-making processes; their interactions with non-indigenous people involved issues of interest to the entire village. In contrast, Jamil's interactions with non-indigenous people centered on a personal quest for

economic autonomy. His interactions with CIVAJA and FUNAI were minimal; his decisions and actions had little impact on the village as a whole, whereas Txanõpa, Amélia, and Manoel's actions did affect the entire village, as when Amélia chose to receive AIS education and for a time became the leading fighter against malaria in both the core and periphery of Maronal, or when her decision to attend a meeting in Manaus threatened to impede the village children's education. This portrait of Jamil, aside from revealing some of the tensions between core and periphery, serves as an important check against making hasty over-generalizations about the role of youth in the Maronal political system. Youth play a very important role, but a non-uniform one.

Education.

Although Sinãpa's children were not as advanced in education as his brother-in-law José's were, he seemed to be taking steps to remedy the inequality. During the entire one-year fieldwork period, Sinãpa's fourth son Kene, born in 1974, was studying in Cruzeiro do Sul. His sixth and seventh sons were studying with Amélia and with the mission, respectively. This required considerable effort, since Sinapa's *shovo* was a 50-minute walk from the schoolhouse, and on the other side of the Curuçá. Thus, Sinãpa's young sons Vay and Mashka had to stay in other people's *shovo* while classes were in session, five days a week. During this time twelve-year old Vay stayed at José Barbosa's *shovo*, where Sinãpa's sisters were José's wives, or at Wanõpa's. Mashka always stayed at José's. This shows that Sinãpa, like many other Maronal Marubo, put considerable effort into the education of his children.

Knowledge, tradition, and influence.

Sinãpa's high status is based partly on his large polygynous family and his successful leadership at the *shovo* level, but partly also on his great amount of traditional knowledge in fields ranging from medicinal leaves, barks and roots to details of cosmology. For these reasons his opinion was listened to and he frequently gave it. The influence he endeavored to produce was coherent with his perspective as a leader following the traditional social role of leader. On all key issues he weighed in for indigenous autonomy. He supported Gilmar over Edvaldo and supported his sister's son Manoel for FUNAI *chefe de posto*. He had no direct alliances with any non-indigenous organization, allowing instead his son Jamil to pursue his strategy of non-aligned self-sufficiency.

Sinãpa's view of non-indigenous people was colored by his knowledge. It was clear to him that no non-indigenous person approached his own level of knowledge of that particular area of rainforest. He complains that politicians tell lies in order to justify the theft of Indian land. To Sinãpa, his knowledge validated his claim to the land. Because he knew the plants, animals, and spirits of the forest and their names, and this knowledge was passed down to him by his own elders, and because the 'whites' lacked this knowledge, he was confident that the Indians were correct in claiming the land, and the 'whites' were making invalid claims. In other areas, too, he was confident that indigenous knowledge was correct, non-indigenous claims to the contrary notwithstanding. For example, he was confident in the validity of his religious beliefs and the lack of validity of the mission's claim that indigenous religion is wrong. Sinãpa was a great practitioner of *ese vana*, the communication and interpretation of Marubo

ethics in long monologues, and was very confident in the value of the Marubo ethical system. In his speeches, Sināpa emphasized that many non-indigenous people were of dubious morality, ready to lie to obtain whatever they want. For this reason, their goodwill should not be assumed and indigenous vigilance should be unceasing. For example, he criticized those who allowed women to seek mission assistance alone. They should be watchful or they would be taken advantage of, he said.

Sināpa: overall picture.

Sināpa did not have the political connections outside Marubo land enjoyed by certain other *shovo ivorasi*. He had no sons or sons-in-law in CIVAJA, nor friends or family in FUNAI. He did have a son that was highly active in relating to non-indigenous people, and through this son his *shovo* was enacting a progressively more effective strategy for access to money and goods. His own influence in affecting the pattern of relations to non-indigenous people at Aldeia Maronal was in his statements of opinion at political meetings and his regular speeches underlining the value of indigenous ways of doing things.

b. Wasinawa

Wasinawa is the *shovo ivo* of the *shovo* closest to Sināpa's. As described in the previous chapter, he hived off his own *shovo* from Sināpa's in 1997. Wasinawa's relations to non-indigenous people were affected by his long period of residence on the Ituí River, where he married. One of his wives was still on the Ituí, and some of his children attended school at Vida Nova. In February 1998, Wasinawa was called back to the Ituí by Mario Peruano, the pension money middleman. Mario told Wasinawa by

radio that if he came to the Ituí, and thence to Cruzeiro, he could get the paperwork done and secure his pension payments in short order. On February 22nd, 1998, Wasinawa and two of his sons left for the Ituí River. As of July he had not returned. He became the third Maronal elder to remain on the Ituí for a long period of time awaiting the successful completion of pension paperwork with Mario Peruano for middleman.

c. The Varináwavo Brothers

There were three peripheral *shovo* on the east bank of the Curuçá River upstream from the mouth of the Igarapé Maronal. The two furthest upstream belonged to Sinãpa and to Wasinawa. The third was the *shovo* belonging to four brothers of the Varináwavo clan. This *shovo* was completed in October 1997. The four brothers were sons of the rubber-boom elder Domingo and thus patrilateral brothers of Sinãpa and Wasinawa. They were Maurício, born in 1939; Jaime, born in 1961; Antônio, born in 1966; and Darcy, born in 1968. Although Maurício was the oldest, and was reputed to have the most specialized indigenous knowledge (i.e., healing, oral history) of the four, Jaime was the *shovo ivo* because it was he who had directed and motivated the building of the *shovo*.

Jaime followed a slightly different path from that of his brothers. When FUNAI set up its post on the Igarapé São Salvador, Jaime's father Domingo moved downstream, occasioning the breakup of his *shovo*. The Varináwavo brothers moved in with José Barbosa, except for Jaime, who went with his father. In the ensuing years, while Antônio and Darcy joined José in the rubber trade with Acre, Jaime engaged in logging with businessmen headquartered in Benjamin Constant and Tabatinga. Jaime told me he

worked for eight years in the area, interspersed with another three years working the rubber trade for the Cruzeiro do Sul market. Eventually, he said, he tired of working for the white man and moved back upstream to José's. At that time, José was planning his move to a new location nearer Alfredo. Jaime convinced his brothers not to follow but to wait and build their own *shovo* instead. They did, and Jaime became *shovo ivo*.

José told me that at the height of his logging, Jaime had quit wage labor in order to cut 250 'toras' (lengths of log) to trade for a 25 horsepower outboard motor. This amazing feat outshines Alfredo's directed cutting of 100 toras for a generator. Alfredo had a larger labor force to call upon, and was assisted in assembling the work force by the fact that the goal was to benefit the entire village. Jaime, on the other hand, worked with a small kin-based work group that supported him on a less regular basis. With this small crew, he cut 250 logs, pushed them to water, and delivered them to the buyer, who delivered the motor to Jaime. At the time of fieldwork, it was in storage in Atalaia.

From August to October, 1997, Jaime lived in a small hut (Pg. *tapiri*) outside his father-in-law Alfredo's *shovo*, while his own *shovo* was under construction. This tapiri had a unique construction at Maronal: it was built to resemble a store. There were two entrances. The first led to a small room sealed off from the rest of the hut except for a hinged window that swung open to leave an opening in the bark wall. Through the open window, one could see a row of shelves on the back wall, though at the time all they contained was three liters of motor oil. The other door led to the sleeping quarters, whence a side passage led to the space beyond the window. This setup seemed designed to allow for the storage of goods and their sale or trade through the window. This role--the indigenous merchant--was pursued by a number of Marubo in the 1980s and early

1990s until extractive businesses were halted by combined CIVAJA-federal government action. The shape of Jaime's tapiri, along with his prior efforts in moneymaking and his extraordinary efforts to secure his own motor, suggest he was pursuing that role when it no longer became viable. Only then did he settle down to construct a *shovo* of his own. He was tired of working for whites, he said.

During fieldwork, the relation of the Varináwavo to non-indigenous people was mainly a personal, commercial one. There were no individuals in the *shovo* educated enough to obtain work as a schoolteacher or in CIVAJA, nor were any employed in FUNAI. They avoided wage-labor for the mission. Instead, they carried forest products and crafts to Cruzeiro to sell and trade for goods. The problem with this was the difficulty of carrying large weights overland. One time Maurício came to me, embarrassed, to request some salt. He had gone to Cruzeiro and had the money to purchase salt, but had been unable to carry large amounts home. Nevertheless, the Varináwavo managed to remain stocked with ammunition, one of the most significant goods that had to be purchased.

Jaime's relations to non-indigenous people resembled Jamil's in many ways. Jaime participated little in the cultural and political issues that so occupied much of the Maronal-core youth. Instead, he focused on securing economic autonomy. Both he and his elder brother Maurício were considered leaders in the village, and Maurício did participate in meetings and often expressed his opinion, particularly at informal elders' councils. Nevertheless, neither played a central role in any of the events that occupied the village political life. Their energy was more focused on personal goals rather than on influencing public policy.

d. Ivãpa (Vicente)

The fourth *shovo* on the east bank of the Curuçá River belonged to Vicente, another son of Domingo, born in 1934. Vicente was married to Alfredo's brother's daughter and consequently maintained a regular schedule of mutual eating invitations with Alfredo's *shovo*. He was, like Sinãpa and the oldest Varináwavo brothers, considered a village leader. He participated in the meetings to decide village policy on the Edvaldo candidature and on the hiring of Manoel Barbosa as *chefe de posto*. On the radiograms sent to FUNAI to express village policy on these issues, his name was included on the list of approving leaders (Pg. *lideranças*). In both instances, he agreed with village policy.

Vicente had at some point in the past successfully completed his government pension paperwork, and begun receiving payments. His middleman was an old childhood friend, Eliseu, a Marubo man who had in 1997 been living in Cruzeiro do Sul for at least 20 years. Unlike the previously mentioned Mario Peruano, who was middleman for a dozen Ituí Marubo, Eliseu only handled Vicente's business. He drew Vicente's pension checks and spent them on goods which he saved for and passed on to Vicente. Vicente, however, did not simply wait in his *shovo* for goods to arrive. He visited Cruzeiro do Sul twice during fieldwork to retrieve money and goods. Eliseu was often tardy with his shipments of goods, and my personal impression was that Vicente was getting but a fraction of what his pension was worth. Vicente thus had to undergo the long journey to Cruzeiro repeatedly in order to secure his access to goods. Nevertheless, Vicente did enjoy steady access to goods, owned a 5.5-horsepower canoe motor, and could regularly purchase gasoline, oil, ammunition, clothes, and other items of value. This was

supplemented in December 1997 with the sale through FUNAI of 17 baskets of manioc flour, with the proceeds of which he purchased gasoline, oil, a fuel hose, soap, and salt.

Vicente's focus in his relations to non-indigenous people was obtaining goods for his own and his *shovo*'s consumption, rather than influencing village policy. Although he did participate in meetings and support the various initiatives for expanded indigenous self-determination, he put little effort into expounding points of view and influencing others. On the other hand, he put considerable amounts of effort into obtaining desirable goods.

e. Wanõpa

Wanõpa was the ranking elder for all the peripheral *shovo* on the west bank of the Curuçá River. As described in the previous chapter, there was only one *shovo* there as recently as five years prior to fieldwork. That *shovo* belonged to Wanõpa. However, his move to a new location nearer the core occasioned a schism, with a substantial group led by his brother's son staying behind at the old site, and then building themselves a new *shovo* further downstream. In 1996-97, two of Wanõpa's sons-in-law built their own *shovo* near Wanõpa's. Wanõpa was considered the leader of all four *shovo*, an example of embedded multiple-*shovo* leadership. Alfredo was headman over the entire village, but Wanõpa had his own circuit of four *shovo* wherein he had authority. This was reduced in 1998 when one of his son-in-laws' *shovo* burned down.

The crucial feature in Wanõpa's pattern of relations to non-indigenous people is the fact that his son-in-law is a Mayoruna Indian who worked for FUNAI for many years. Thus, Wanõpa was able to take advantage of FUNAI infrastructure and facilities much more readily than most Marubo. His informal alliance with FUNAI workers became, to

him, a valued relationship. He also had direct means of access to money and goods: government pension checks. Because his son-in-law had such a significant influence on his pattern of relations to non-indigenous people, it is necessary to examine first that son-in-law's role in village politics and in the intersection of indigenous and non-indigenous people.

Wanōpa's daughter's son: Nakwa.

Nakwa was a man of Mayoruna ethnicity married to a Marubo woman, Wanōpa's daughter. A FUNAI worker for many years, in July 1997 Nakwa was the assistant to Luís at Aldeia Maronal. He was also building his own *shovo*, completed in September of that year, within easy walking distance of Wanōpa's. Nakwa played a role in information-transmission analogous in some ways to Txanōpa, Amélia, and Jamil, acting as the main source of information for Wanōpa concerning affairs outside Marubo land. He was different, however, in that the ideas he transmitted often originated in FUNAI workers, and thus had a different influence from, for example, Txanōpa's CIVAJA-based ideas.

While present at Aldeia Maronal, Luís Melo maintained close relations with Nakwa. Nakwa was, after all, Luís' employee and Luís had him work on a variety of projects, though never to the point of disturbing Nakwa's agricultural and hunting pursuits. Through his close association with Luís, Nakwa came to share many of Luís' views, including Luís' point of view on the CIVAJA-FUNAI conflict (see earlier this chapter). For example, in a conversation on August 29th 1997, Nakwa told me that MSF was ineffective. His argument was identical to Luís': when it came time to provide

emergency assistance to actual individuals, FUNAI did all the work. MSF never helped anybody sick, Nakwa argued echoing Luís' opinions, whereas FUNAI not only removed patients from the area, but treated and repatriated them as well. This fit into the overall pattern of FUNAI workers' critiques of CIVAJA, which centered on the assertion that all CIVAJA did was criticize, while FUNAI took concrete measures in favor of the Indians. Nakwa's opinion reflected Luis', which in turn reflected a generalized attitude of long-time Javari basin FUNAI workers. The politics of the regional FUNAI workers thus manifested themselves at the village level.

After Luís' departure in October 1997, Nakwa controlled the FUNAI radio at Aldeia Maronal whenever he was present in the village. FUNAI radio operated twice daily, at 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., hours designed to fit into the Atalaia base schedule but which were inconvenient to Nakwa's subsistence work. Through the FUNAI radio he had access to a set of information sources and a communications network quite distinct from CIVAJA's. There was a FUNAI radio at aldeia São Sebastião operated by a Marubo FUNAI worker, Saide. Another radio was located at Aldeia Liberdade on the Ituí River, operated by the youths Txináwa and Rane. A third radio was located in John Jansma's house at Vida Nova. It was often possible to request a conversation with a given Marubo at Vida Nova in the morning, so that during the day Jansma would have a message sent to that person, and a conversation could take place in the afternoon. By this means it was possible for Marubo from the middle and upper Curuçá to communicate with one another and with the Ituí River without resorting to the CIVAJA radio, which was crowded, run by people with a different set of political affiliations, and afforded less privacy.

Communication was further facilitated by the presence of as many as four Marubo FUNAI employees in Atalaia at any one moment.

The FUNAI radios in Marubo villages operated as an alternative communications network for those with access to them, i.e., those with closer ties to the FUNAI radio operators than to the CIVAJA radio operators. The three radios operated by indigenous people (Maronal, São Sebastião, and Liberdade) could be freely used by Marubo in their own language to conduct personal business or communications with no relation to FUNAI activities. At Aldeia Maronal, it was individuals from the four *shovo* led by Wanõpa who were the main users of the FUNAI radio, unsurprising since it was controlled by Wanõpa's son-in-law. This usage of the FUNAI radio is exemplified by two radio sessions in February 1998.

On February 12th, at 9 a.m., Nakwa opened up the radio hut. With him were his father-in-law Wanõpa; Ronipa (see section on Ronipa below); Nakwa's son; Wanõpa's brother's two daughters, and Wanõpa's wife's sister's husband. All these were individuals who lived in Wanõpa's or Nakwa's *shovo* or were at that time working on Wanõpa's new canoe and so temporarily staying with him. No inhabitants of core *shovo* were present. Nakwa spoke to his former boss Luís, who was in Atalaia. FNS was sending a vaccination team upstream, and Nakwa asked Luís to send up a 200-liter drum of gasoline for him. He also asked Luís to send a 60-liter canister up for Wanõpa. Then Ronipa took the radio to ask Luís to send up a box of batteries for him.

On February 20th, at 9 a.m., Nakwa again opened up the radio. This time, with him were his two sons; Pekõpa, another of Wanõpa's sons-in-law; and Votëpa, the aforementioned wife's sister's husband of Wanõpa. This latter individual was from the

Ituí River, and for reasons too complex to explain here, was helping Wanõpa build a canoe. On this occasion, he used the FUNAI radio to speak to his brother at Aldeia Liberdade. After conversing for some time, they tried to agree on a time to speak again. His brother suggested they speak again at the CIVAJA radio at 5 p.m. However, Pekõpa commented that "there one cannot speak, here is just fine". What he meant was that CIVAJA radio was much more heavily used and more difficult to get conversation time on, and it was listened to by a greater number of people. In contrast, at the FUNAI radio they could speak at leisure and in a greater semblance of privacy, since CIVAJA radio was 'public', whereas FUNAI radio was available for Marubo personal use only on an informal basis and while Nakwa was radio operator.

These two radio communications events suggest how valuable the connection to FUNAI through Nakwa was to Wanõpa and those dwelling in his sphere of influence. It provided them with their own communications system independent of the core-controlled CIVAJA radio. In addition, the connection with his former boss allowed Nakwa to place large orders for goods such as gasoline. Wanõpa took advantage to order gasoline of his own, showing he profited directly from this connection.

As long as he was the lone FUNAI employee at Aldeia Maronal, Nakwa had responsibility for the two FUNAI-owned outboard motors and an aluminum boat. These two motors, of 15 and 25 horsepower, were theoretically for locomotion of the sick or injured and for controlling access to the area, but their main use was for Nakwa to hunt with. He did not neglect FUNAI business, but there was very little of it, and in the intervals he was free to use these motors as he wished. Since Wanõpa lived nearby and was Nakwa's father-in-law, he often received gifts of meat and invitations to eat when

Nakwa's hunt was successful. Thus, the advantages derived from association to FUNAI involved access to fast river transport as well as the gasoline to run it with and the communications system and personal connections to ensure a regular supply of gasoline. Thanks to this system, this group of people was often able to circumvent the dearth of game near the village, obtaining meat more easily at greater distances and bringing it back with the motorized boat.

Although he was a very useful connection to Wanõpa's peripheral *shovo* network, to the core leaders Nakwa seemed a much more ambiguous and potentially dangerous person. This seemed at root a cultural issue, exacerbated by Nakwa's role as FUNAI employee. Maronal elders on the whole disliked the idea of Marubo women going to anyone other than Marubo men: I heard at least three elders express this opinion. Nakwa was not only not Marubo, he was Mayoruna, the traditional enemies of the Marubo. As enemy groups the Marubo and Mayoruna have developed an elaborate set of unfavorable prejudices about one another. I was told that some elders found Nakwa's presence disturbing because he 'did not know how to do things', meaning he did not practice strictly Marubo social responses and roles, and thus may be unable to pass on correct behavior to his children. But not only was he disturbing for being a *mukanáwa* (dangerous forest Indian), he was also a FUNAI official. As such, prevailing policy on relations to FUNAI applied to him as well. In 1997-98, there was a trend towards establishing indigenous authority over FUNAI, enacting the idea of FUNAI as 'serving' indigenous people. In accordance with this conception of indigenous-FUNAI relations, Nakwa should be at the disposal of the indigenous leadership in areas of FUNAI responsibility. Thus, for two reasons, that he is an extracultural presence and that he is a

FUNAI employee, Nakwa was someone who had to be kept in a relation of inferior authority with respect to Marubo elders.

Alfredo exercised his authority over Nakwa, for example, in demanding he operate the FUNAI radio. As mentioned above, the FUNAI radio hours interfered with Nakwa's subsistence activities. Whereas Luís listened to the radio every morning and afternoon, Nakwa often ignored it. On October 30th, I sought to listen to the FUNAI radio but Nakwa did not arrive to unlock the hut. I mentioned this in passing to Alfredo and he responded that he would talk to Nakwa in the morning. On the 31st, before breakfast, Alfredo walked over to Nakwa's. He told Nakwa that as a FUNAI employee he had to ensure that the radio was operated on a regular basis. After breakfast, Nakwa did indeed go open the radio hut and operate the radio. This event demonstrates that Alfredo maintains a relation of authority with respect to Nakwa in which Alfredo is superior, in virtue of Nakwa's being a FUNAI employee. Alfredo, as we shall see, had the direction of labor as an aspect of his social role. CIVAJA argued that indigenous leaders should direct FUNAI employees as to what work needed to be done. On October 31st, Alfredo simply enacted this relation of unequal authority. I should note that when organizing labor involving other Marubo elders, Alfredo issued invitations, not commands. His treatment of Nakwa was different from his treatment of Marubo *shovo ivorasi*, whom he never attempted to coerce as directly as he did Nakwa on this occasion.

A second incident demonstrates that the October example of unequal authority between Nakwa and Alfredo was not a fluke, and also that some of Alfredo's authority in this relationship was shared by his son, Txanõpa. The exact date of this second event was not recorded, but was it took place between 24 and 30 May, 1998. During the afternoon

CIVAJA radio session, Nakwa arrived and asked Txanõpa for permission to move the FUNAI radio to a position immediately adjacent to Nakwa's *shovo*. The FUNAI post had been uninhabited since Luís' departure in late October, and was becoming increasingly dilapidated. In the interval, Nakwa had built a new *tapiri* outside his *shovo*. Nakwa explained that children playing with the antenna and mice biting the wires presented a continuing threat to the radio. Txanõpa agreed with Nakwa. The old FUNAI post was decrepit, he said; take the radio to your own place, and take good care of it because FUNAI won't. What is interesting about this incident is that Nakwa did not have the authority to transfer the FUNAI radio without asking permission from the village's central authority, represented by Txanõpa. It is equally telling that Txanõpa had the authority to give permission for this move without consulting any elders, indicating the extent to which Alfredo feels comfortable allowing his son leeway in managing relations to non-indigenous people.

From a strictly socio-structural point of view, Nakwa also had a relation of unequal authority with his father-in-law, Wanõpa. This inequality could be seen in many social interactions, from the lectures Wanõpa gave to secure Nakwa's understanding of Marubo ethics, to his self-invitations to eat at Nakwa's when the meat was more plentiful there. From the point of view of analyzing the effects of patterns of information transmission on the direction of influence in a social system, however, an argument could be made that Nakwa profoundly influenced Wanõpa. Nakwa was Wanõpa's source of news and information, and simultaneously a harbinger of strong pro-FUNAI sentiments. This affected Wanõpa's reactions in the case of Manoel Barbosa's candidacy for FUNAI *chefe de posto*, as will be explained below.

Pension checks and travelling.

Although his connections to non-indigenous people through his son-in-law were valuable, they were not Wanõpa's only means of access to manufactured goods. Wanõpa received monthly pension checks from the Brazilian government (his given birth date was 1923). Unsurprisingly given the information just reviewed, he chose to use FUNAI-Atalaia as his middleman to collect checks and maintain paperwork in order. This meant that he had to travel to Atalaia to get money and buy things. This he did on a regular basis. He had an advantage in that, thanks to his regular income, he had been able to purchase a Honda 5.5 horsepower canoe motor, and thanks to his FUNAI connections, he had access to fuel. However, he often took advantage of contextual opportunities to travel to Atalaia and back.

Wanõpa was first observed travelling on November 4th, 1997. On that occasion, Nakwa was taking the FUNAI boat *Comandante Jaminez* downstream with a large load of manioc flour to be sold through FUNAI. Although ostensibly travelling to provide support for the indigenous point of view on the Edvaldo/Gilmar issue, he also obtained money and bought goods. He was back at Maronal by early January, 1998.

On February 26th, 1998, a meeting was held to announce that FUNAI had invited all indigenous leaders to a meeting on demarcation to be held in Atalaia. Of all those assembled, only Wanõpa wanted to go. In the end, he was the only elder to travel to that meeting from Aldeia Maronal. This was not surprising, since he was also the only Maronal elder in good health who had pension monies available in Atalaia. Interest in the political meeting was not enough to convince any other elders to travel to Atalaia.

Only the elder who could get money and goods in the process showed interest. He left on February 27th returning to Aldeia Maronal in the first week of April.

Wanõpa travelled to Atalaia a third time, this time explicitly to handle pension issues. On 16 April 1998, Wanõpa, his brother-companion Misael (b.1919) and his father-in-law Carlos (b. 1926), the three Maronal elders whose pensions were managed by FUNAI-Atalaia, were advised over the FUNAI radio that they had to present themselves in Atalaia in person or to renew the documents authorizing FUNAI to draw pension monies on their behalf. This time he used his own canoe and motor. Leaving on April 23rd, he returned to Aldeia Maronal on May 25th. In total, Wanopa employed three and a half out of the eleven months during which he was observed travelling to and from Atalaia.

Wanõpa: conclusions.

Wanõpa was an important leader at Maronal, yet his pattern of relations to non-indigenous people was markedly different from the headman's. Wanõpa's source of information conveyed to him opinions and interpretations diametrically opposed in some ways to those conveyed to Alfredo by his sources. Wanõpa employed a different communications system that did not rely on the CIVAJA radio, adjacent to Alfredo's *shovo* and controlled by Alfredo's son. Instead he used the FUNAI radio operated by his son-in-law Nakwa. Wanõpa's system for access to non-indigenous goods involved FUNAI connections combined with pension checks, as opposed to the core elders' strategy of educating children who then seek work teaching or in CIVAJA or FUNAI, or Sinãpa's son's strategy of remaining aloof from any alliances with particular groups. Wanõpa's

strategy gave him an interest in maintaining the status quo that afforded him such privileges.

f. Ronipa

The case of Ronipa serves to demonstrate that a relatively higher degree of interaction with non-indigenous people, and of access to information about them, does not necessarily lead to a relatively higher status compared to one's peers. We have seen how individuals' social positions related to their choices in terms of patterns of interaction with the non-indigenous. Ronipa's social position was so unusual that he was perceived by some as external to the sociopolitical structure of the village, and so excluded from the semi-formal dynamics of influence. Empirically, he exerted some influence simply by his transmission of information: his excellent Portuguese and his FUNAI connections allowed him access to information which he reconveyed on a regular basis. However, his influence was perceived by many elders as something to be contained rather than allowed to spread. From a formal standpoint, Ronipa's social personality demonstrates the existence of social inequalities in the field of political influence. Elders held a monopoly on the linguistic communication of ideal norms for social behavior; Ronipa's life was in many ways an effort to reconcile his personal desires with his social restrictions, but, unlike the elders, he lacked the authority to manipulate the field of ethical philosophy so as to justify his actions.

Ronipa was born about 1964 in the headwaters of the Curuçá River. His father was a Peruvian man fleeing from Brazilian authorities. Before Ronipa's birth, his father was captured by police and removed to prison in Tabatinga. Ronipa never saw him. Ronipa's mother, a daughter of the prominent elder Domingo, died when he was ten

years old. Shortly thereafter, Domingo's *shovo* broke up. Ronipa moved to the FUNAI post with his grandfather and his uncle Cassimiro. For the next few years he was raised by Cassimiro.

It should be recalled, from the analysis in Chapter Four, that situations such as Ronipa's are not normal in Marubo society. At Aldeia Maronal, 8% of unwed minors lived with neither parent; at aldeia Vida Nova, 9.4% of unwed youth lived with neither parent. Furthermore, not all these cases are orphans. Ronipa's social condition from the beginning was extranormative.

Before and after his stint at the FUNAI post, Ronipa was raised, he says, by old Carlos. Carlos was a Marubo who was raised by Peruvian rubber tappers lingering on the Curuçá River after the rubber boom's heyday. He later rejoined Marubo society. In the 1950s he reintroduced rubber tapping, establishing commercial relations between the Marubo area and Acre. It was from Carlos that Ronipa first learned about the trade of forest products for manufactured goods.

Around the age of seventeen, Ronipa left to seek work in Cruzeiro do Sul. He found work in the employ of a rancher named Magalhães. He says he did any type of labor he was asked to do, a sort of all-around handyman (Ronipa not only has the balance and dexterity typical of Marubo, but also unusually high muscular size and strength, making him a great asset to any rancher). He says he was valued by Magalhães because he could do anything and wasn't lazy. He found a girlfriend and became accustomed to life in the city. He remained there for five years. Then his mother's brother Sinapa travelled to Acre to ask hm to return. He packed up his suitcases and returned to the upper Curuçá.

Once established on the upper Curuçá, Ronipa became the focus of a an indigenous work group that traded rubber with Acre. He says he would carry the balls of rubber, some as heavy as 50 kg, on his back to just outside Cruzeiro, return with merchandise. He worked with two of his matrilateral brothers, as well as two classificatory brothers who are mother's sister's sons. After rubber prices fell, however, he switched his orientation to logging and trade downstream. This is the only phase of Ronipa's set of relations to non-indigenous people which he failed to discuss in our conversations. However, when we visited the Ituí River together, he showed me the remains of a boat that had been his during that time. The boat was of the type known as *batelão*, with a diesel engine permanently set in the center as opposed to the separable outboard type. It had a cabin which housed the motor but could also keep merchandise dry. With this boat, Ronipa cruised the Curuçá, Ituí, and Javari Rivers for several years, bringing forest products downstream, returning with merchandise which he traded for more forest products. He says that in the end he was unable to maintain the boat, because expenses ran ahead of income. He sold the boat to Vasho, who could not afford to maintain it either. When I saw it, it was a rusted and rotten husk beached on the upper Ituí. Simultaneously with his financial mishap, the CIVAJA-FUNAI-Federal crackdown on trade in forest products occurred. When I encountered him, that was his siuation: his entire previous pattern of relating to non-indigenous people had been eliminated by the enforcement of law. He was in search of a new system of relations that would return him to regular access to money and goods.

When fieldwork observations commenced in August 1997, Ronipa had a close association with FUNAI *chefe de posto* Luís Melo. The relationship was a sort of

generalized reciprocity in which Luís could count on Ronípa's assistance on most major work projects, while Ronípa could count on Luís to supply items he thought of as important, such as smoking tobacco, batteries and ammunition. Ronípa helped Luís in such projects as clearing grass around the post, or building a new hut. The typical work party for FUNAI business consisted of Luís, Nakwa, Nakwa's oldest son, and Ronípa. As a result of this relationship, Ronípa could count on access to many essential goods. Another result was him coming to share some of Luís' opinions, particularly as regards the relative merits of CIVAJA and FUNAI. Ronípa developed the habit of frequenting the FUNAI radio and avoiding the CIVAJA radio. Ronípa thus obtained his information in much the same way, and with similar biases, as Nakwa.

During his frequent travels through the village core while in transit between peripheral extremes, Ronípa would often stop to listen to the radio, then disseminate the news thus heard through the *shovo* he visited. He kept particularly well informed of the state of affairs in FUNAI-Atalaia, news of which Marubo listened to raptly.

His orphan status was not the only thing that made Ronípa socially extranormative. He was also twice-divorced, and in his mid-thirties, the oldest unmarried heterosexual in the village. His lack of a wife or of coresident sisters meant that he had no one to cook for him, so he had to give his hunted meat away to other men's women to cook. Likewise, in the Marubo division of labor women wash clothes, and Ronípa had no one to wash clothes for him. Being unmarried is a serious difficulty for a mature man in Marubo society. He began to develop a close relationship with Wanõpa, in whose *shovo* lived a young girl he regarded as a potential future wife. As this relationship developed, he became more drawn into the FUNAI-friendly sphere linked to Wanõpa and Nakwa.

Like others who lived in the *shovo* where Wanõpa had authority, he used the FUNAI radio preferentially for conducting private business, for example to discuss family affairs with his ex-wife and mother-in-law on the Ituí River.

After Luís' departure in late October, 1997, Ronipa associated for a time with me. I hired him to guide me to the Ituí River and back. Prior to my scheduled departure, I visited Cruzeiro do Sul to purchase added supplies. Ronipa asked me to advance his salary and give him a ride on the airplane to Cruzeiro so he could purchase goods himself. I agreed. He spent the week in Cruzeiro spending my advance and working for further money. He spent almost all of it on goods, many of them not for himself but for his kin/allies in Wanõpa's sphere of influence. After returning from Cruzeiro, the mission incident (see above) occurred, delaying departure to Ituí until late December. As we had agreed, Ronipa guided me there and back, and to every *shovo* on the upper Ituí. After this, I no longer had the resources to employ paid guides, so Ronipa had to find a new source of money.

In the next six months, Ronipa developed a series of ideas for finding employment, but never settled on a particular strategy. On January 7th, he said that he wanted to return to Cruzeiro to work for a businessman who had offered him employ when he had visited in October. He said he wanted to make a lot of bows and arrows, like Jamil. He said he was unhappy remaining in the village because he makes no money. A few days later, he told me that Luís had found a job for him, and he was planning to go to Atalaia. On the 30th of January, he said his plan was now to go work on the *Jacurapá*, the headquarters boat for the Korubo contact front (see section on FUNAI, this chapter). He said he liked the idea of working on the *Jacurapá* because it spends all

day moored in the shade. By then, he had begun work on Wanõpa's canoe, one aspect of his realignment from his old dwelling with Sinãpa to his new affiliation with Wanõpa. His plan was to go downstream once the canoe was finished. This occurred in late April. Instead of leaving he decided not to go because "the canoe was too heavily loaded already". In May he began working on odd jobs for the mission, earning minimum wages and spending them at the mission. He complained about the low wages relative to what he made in Cruzeiro in October. By late June, he had another idea, this one to return to residence near Sinãpa, cut a very large swidden, then cut a new path to the road to Cruzeiro, decreasing transit time to two and a half days. He never settled on a single strategy, though his goal was uniform: access to money and a place to spend it.

For a number of reasons, Ronipa was excluded from decision-making processes that might result in the formulation of village policy. He did not attend any of the healing rituals and shamanic sessions at which issues were informally discussed. He was unmarried, with no fixed residence, and minimal economic output in Marubo terms (i.e., steady food production and family expansion). He did not have the cosmological knowledge and discourse skills of the elders, and so lacked the attribute of *ese*, Marubo ethical knowledge and correct conduct validated through a successful social role-play. Those who are *eseya* are analogous to those we would consider "wise" and thus worthy of listening to. Lacking this quality, Ronipa was not someone whose opinion weighed heavily. His lack of education may have assisted in his marginalization, since education tends to be associated with participation in CIVAJA-related political issues, and the potential to work in CIVAJA or in a secretarial position at FUNAI, which in turn involves one in the discussions which determine policy at the intersection of indigenous

and non-indigenous worlds. Ronipa entirely lacked access to the type of non-indigenous connections that conferred social status during the period of observation, since the main village authorities were more interested in CIVAJA's plans for an autonomous future, while FUNAI, which was Ronipa's main contact, was falling out of favor. In summary, Ronipa was relatively powerless and uninfluential, despite his fluent Portuguese and abundant experience in interacting with non-indigenous people.

4. Relationships to non-indigenous people at Aldeia Maronal: Implications concerning the political system

Issues of political inequality.

The information just reviewed has been aimed at answering the questions posed in the introduction to this chapter, to wit:

- (1) Is access to the goals pursued equal, or is there differential access to valued goals?
- (2) Are there conflicts of will concerning the pursuit of goals, or the strategies to be used? If so, who emerges victorious, is this a result of the exercise of power, and are there patterns of repeated victory in conflicts of will?
- (3) When multiple individuals make a common decision in this field of choice, what is the basis of such a decision? Are some people's choices based on the exercise of power by other people?

Sufficient data have now been presented to address these questions. The answer to most of the yes/no questions is yes. Access to goals pursued is *not* equal: therefore there *is* differential access to valued goals. There *are* conflicts of will and patterns of repeated victory in conflicts of will. As to the third question, there is a certain ambiguity. It is easy to find examples where a person is *prevented* by another from executing their preferred strategy. This is a case of the exercise of power, because one person forces another, against the latter's will, to give up a certain course of action. This was the case when Alfredo quashed an embryonic anti-mission movement, and when Lauro Brasil was forced to stop dealing with *regatões* after CIVAJA imposed its will on the issue. However, it is more difficult to discern any case of a person being forced to do something against their will. The cases of Amélia and Pedro Barbosa demonstrate the ample autonomy of choice that some Marubo enjoy, and other data suggest this level of autonomy is widespread.

Examination of the field of social action involving relationships to non-indigenous people has permitted categorization of some of the social goals that are pursued in that field. The predominant goals identifiable are: 1. Money and manufactured goods; 2. education; 3. health care; and 4. influence. The first three are fairly straightforward: people are observed in direct, overt pursuit of money, education, and health care. "Influence" is a more analytic category. It refers, for example, to CIVAJA efforts to establish its influence over the pattern of relations to non-indigenous people, or young people's ability to influence policy due to the large amount of information at their disposal.

Access to goals is unequally distributed. In each category, there are some who have a lot and some who have virtually none. In the money category, for example, certain individuals and groups outdo others. José's *shovo* has two salaried youths and José himself, through his brother's contacts with the mission, made still more money. Wanõpa had some access to the money and goods of his salaried son-in-law, in addition to the pension checks coming for himself, for his brother-companion, Misael, and for his father-in-law, Carlos, each month. These were the only regular sources of income in the village: elsewhere individuals and groups had to engage in trade activities or seek temporary employ, as in the case of Jamil or the Varináwavo brothers. In Alfredo's *shovo*, for example, the main source of income in 1997-98 was manioc flour sales—a minimal income.

Education, also, is unequally distributed. José's *shovo* is far more advanced educationally than any other Maronal *shovo*. Others, such as Alfredo's, Sinãpa's, and Aurélio's, are catching up but are not close yet. José's superior access to education was accomplished through sheer intensity of personal desire and effort, as described in the section on him, above. There was a conflict of will concerning educational strategy: he and his brother Alfredo disagreed over the education of women. José educated his daughter in conflict with prevailing opinions that women should not be educated. The education at José's gave his children access to salaried positions and influence, and through his children José had considerable influence himself. His daughter, as explained in the section on her relationships to non-indigenous people, exerted a key role in transmission of information from the outside to the village. Because of this, José was often one of the first to receive news concerning events which the village had to respond

to, and so he was always near the center of village decision-making regarding relationships to non-indigenous people. When Alfredo was not in the village, José even organized meetings in his stead, as in the case of the December 4th meeting reported in the section on Amélia. Thus, a key basis for José's ability to influence the direction of relationships to non-indigenous people was the fact that he had highly educated children who spoke Portuguese and occupied key roles at the intersection of the indigenous and non-indigenous spheres. What José did *not* get was any kind of power based on control over education. It could conceivably have been the case that once José had a daughter who was a schoolteacher, and once the village relied on his daughter for education, then education would be a resource controlled by José, which he could use to control others. However, I have no evidence of this type of control. In fact, as was explained in the section on Amélia, her educational work was not considered a privilege which the rest of the village should be grateful for; instead it was considered a responsibility which she was expected to carry out. This became a way for village authorities to control *her*: she was told that if her individual desire to travel interfered with the village's desire for education, then she could not travel but must instead stay to educate the children. The influence gained by José thanks to his children's education was therefore indirect, based not on direct control over education as a resource, but rather on his children's Portuguese skills and ability to receive and transmit information, which put José in a position to be influential in decisions regarding relationships to non-indigenous people.

In the category of health care, it is true that people at Maronal have access to the same facilities: mission, and AISes in the village, FUNAI treatment downriver. What is notable, however, is the development at the indigenous/non-indigenous intersection of a

new role involving specialized medical knowledge, access to medicines, and Western medical procedures—the AIS. At Maronal, all AISes were children of Alfredo or of Alfredo's brothers, and all AISes lived in one of two core *shovo*: Alfredo's or José's. The AIS infirmary and pharmacy was adjacent to Alfredo's *shovo*. This reinforced the core's centralization of authority and influence in the entire field of relations analyzed. Policy was ultimately set by and in the core. The AISes' social position reflected the core's access to CIVAJA and CIVAJA's access to MSF. The core's privileged access to certain relations with non-indigenous people allowed it to monopolize the AIS positions.

Analysis of the field of relationships to non-indigenous people reveals consistent inequalities in influence. Specifically, CIVAJA and Alfredo have created the conditions within which others only respond. For example, it was Alfredo's initiative that brought the airstrip and mission, and Alfredo who ultimately determines policy on how to deal with the major non-indigenous groups. CIVAJA has managed to overcome contrary efforts by FUNAI- and mission-affiliated Marubo over the years to establish itself as official political organ of the Javari basin indigenous groups. CIVAJA brought in radio sets and MSF training teams, affecting the pattern of relations to non-indigenous people far more profoundly than most Marubo individuals. Among the youth, those who had good Portuguese combined with education and access to CIVAJA exercised a level of influence far beyond that of other youths. Those with excellent Portuguese and intense interactions with non-indigenous people, but less education, such as Jamil, had a strong localized impact on their own *shovo* and immediate kin group, but little influence on the overall direction of village policy. On the opposite extreme were some youths who were marginalized almost completely from decision-making and influence, typically due to a

lack of Portuguese education, lack of non-indigenous economic connections, and a greater emphasis on traditional economic production.

The methodological focus on relationships to non-indigenous people led to observation of several conflicts of will and their resolution. These observations suggest repeated victory in conflicts of will by Clóvis at CIVAJA and by Alfredo. For the most part, Marubo individuals enjoy great autonomy of action, but that autonomy ends where it threatens to interfere with that of another who has more authority or access to power.

In each of the three cases of conflict observed, CIVAJA prevailed. FUNAI workers have attempted to obstruct CIVAJA by influencing Marubo to oppose the organization, but this did not halt the organizational efforts, nor the spread of the CIVAJA ideology through which Maronal Marubo have sought to invert the relations of authority that once submitted them to FUNAI ‘guidance’. CIVAJA has also spread its organization to the Ituí, where the Marubo have become active participants in CIVAJA-organized political meetings. Through CIVAJA, the entire Marubo nation has come to have a single decision-making process in some cases. For example, in the Edvaldo issue multiple meetings were held simultaneously in different villages, then larger meetings at the feast-hosting Aldeia Maronal. These meetings were requested by CIVAJA which wanted indigenous support for its opposition to Edvaldo. The outcome of the meetings was a consolidated, unanimous opinion: opposition to Edvaldo, support for Gilmar. Ituí Marubo’s participation in this process may be seen as a long-term victory for CIVAJA. Finally, the issue of the *regatões* shows that CIVAJA may in some cases impose its will against that of Marubo elders such as Lauro Brasil. Lauro supported the presence of *regatões*, Clóvis opposed it. Clóvis was able to use his superior understanding of and

connections to the Brazilian state to impose his will on this issue. These cases show a consistent pattern of victory for CIVAJA in conflicts of will.

Alfredo shares with CIVAJA the quality of repeated victory in conflicts of will within the field of relations with non-indigenous people. This is demonstrated by his successful establishment of policy regarding whether the mission can stay (see under Alfredo, above), being on the winning side on the Edvaldo issue (see under Alfredo, above), and imposing his will in regard to the operation of the FUNAI radio (see discussion on Nakwa under Wanõpa, above). Conclusive evidence that Alfredo has the ability to impose his will in cases of conflict will be presented below (the *chefe de posto* issue).

José Barbosa won a conflict of will with Ituí Marubo regarding my access to the Ituí *shovo* (see ‘the mission incident’, above). On this occasion, the Ituí Marubo did not want me to go, José did. With two face-to-face encounters in which he verbally engaged his opponents, José was able to change their minds and so impose his will. It should be noted that this is the same method used by Alfredo in imposing *his* will on the mission issue. On that occasion, Alfredo used effective rhetoric to convince the father of the mission opponents to rein in his sons. There was no further opposition once this was accomplished.

For each winner, there is a loser. FUNAI workers and missionaries convinced those Marubo associated with them to oppose CIVAJA, and yet CIVAJA still emerged as the legitimate representative of the Javari basin indigenous peoples. CIVAJA opponents were presented with a *fait accompli*: with Curuçá River and Mayoruna and Kanamari Indian support, CIVAJA became established and became the focal point for decisions

which affected even its opponents. Opponents of CIVAJA policy thus became forced to accept CIVAJA's existence and participate in the decision-making process. In this sense, there has been a steady increase in the influence of CIVAJA and a steady decrease in FUNAI/Mission influence. CIVAJA opponents have consistently failed to obstruct CIVAJA's plans. In addition, there is the case of the mission opponents, whom I have not identified to protect their privacy, but who clearly lacked Alfredo's ability to determine policy.

Despite the considerable amount of data on this topic, there are in fact few examples of conflicts of will and forced imposition. A great degree of autonomy is present in this field of social action. For example, Amélia was able to pursue her interests unimpeded despite a growing sense of concern over her travels' impact on village education. José Barbosa, despite his personal opposition to mission beliefs, did not impede any of his coresidents from attending services and Bible study. Such attitudes of tolerant opposition towards contrary beliefs and practices was common. Even in cases of direct conflict the mode of resolution was usually the verbal confrontation. In the more frequent cases of disagreement, verbal action was also the primary means of seeking to sway others. The best example of this is in José's continual critiques of the mission belief system. Dissenters are assaulted with occasional barrages of words, but nothing more. Nevertheless words may be highly effective at changing the addressee's behavior.

The exception to the verbal conflict-resolution pattern is the manipulation of the Brazilian state to impose one's will. This is the means whereby CIVAJA was able to impose its will on the Marubo associates of the *regatões*. In this case, CIVAJA

employed a direct appeal to weapon-wielding authorities (federal police, environmental enforcement agency), overcoming any possibility of resistance on the part of *regatão* supporters. Analogously, access to CIVAJA has become essential among Marubo who wish to set policy on relationships to non-indigenous people. When a decision is made at the village level, it is transmitted to CIVAJA over the radio, and thence to the appropriate non-indigenous authorities. Whoever controls the radio has the ability to control the message sent over it. CIVAJA gives its radios to the leader of each village, who assigns someone to be the regular operator. In the case of Aldeia Maronal, the reception of and reaction to information coming over the CIVAJA radio is in the hands of Alfredo, delegated to his son Txanõpa. Only on occasions when Txanõpa is not present does some of that responsibility fall upon Amélia and her father José.

The primary manifestation of unequal influence in this social field is not the imposition of will by the more powerful on the less powerful. Rather, it is the determination of policy which others must follow. Multiple individuals do make common choices in this field of social relations. In some cases these are individual decisions, but in others they are group actions determined by leader-figures. An example of acephalous common decision-making is in the multiplicity of individuals focusing on making money. Many have chosen to make this their central goal in relating to non-indigenous people, yet there is no single policy-setter arguing for this goal: each individual from Jamil to Ivãpa, Ronipa, and each Varinawavo brother, has chosen his goal independently, and this may be seen in the multiplicity of individual strategies. On the other end of the spectrum are the activities of the highly organized work groups led by Alfredo which had such a profound impact on the pattern of relationships to non-

indigenous people at Aldeia Maronal (see under Alfredo for discussions of the airstrip, the generator, the television, and correlations between organization of labor, relationships to non-indigenous people, and definition of social status). In these cases, Alfredo engaged large groups of people in pursuing a goal he had determined by means of a strategy he had conceived. Such cases of large groups working together with single goals and strategies are much rarer than the typical situation of individual autonomy. The second such case that stands out in the data is when Jamil engaged the services of his entire *shovo* in his effort to produce sufficient manioc flour to trade for a canoe-motor (see under Sinãpa, above). This latter case is unusual in that a youth determined the *shovo*'s labor pattern. It was, however, clearly done with the approval of Jamil's *shovo ivo* father Sinãpa.

There is a clear difference between those who can determine the actions of others and those who can only determine their own. Alfredo is able to engage large amounts of people in projects of his own device. Others who were observed to do this on a smaller scale were Jaime (the Varinawavo *shovo ivo*), Jamil, Clóvis, and Wanõpa. The difference is not only visible in the organization of labor, but also in access to decision-making processes. Some are able to make their influence felt by participating in the decisions made at informal talking sessions and formal political meetings. Once again, a minority is specified: *shovo ivorasi*, their brother-companions, and those few youth with sufficient access to information are the only categories of people who can determine policy by these means. Decisions are thus made by a certain stratum of elders and heads of family, with others excluded. Although the children of core *shovo ivorasi* and of their brother-companions could participate in this process, the sons of peripheral *shovo ivorasi*

did not and so tended more towards individualistic patterns of behavior. At the opposite extreme from those who organized the labor of others and determined policy by participating in decision-making are those who did neither, such as Ronipa and Aurélio.

The issue we are left faced with is, what is the basis for these common decisions? Is there coercion or power involved, or are these simply accumulations of individual choices? The answer varies from case to case. In the case of Alfredo's work parties, for example, the decision-maker (Alfredo) drew on traditional patterns of labor organization to enact his plan for an airstrip, mission, and generator. Most of the work was done by his own sons, brothers, and brothers' sons. Other *shovo* did some work, though not as much. When other *shovo* are invited to work, it is part of a system of reciprocal labor exchange, again simple use of a pre-existing labor-organization system. Likewise, in the case of Jamil's organization of his *shovo* to make manioc flour, there is willing cooperation rather than coercion. However, this is not always the case.

Taking a look at the current overall situation of relationships to non-indigenous people, we could claim that all Marubo have 'made the choice' to avoid entanglements with *regatões*. In fact, some have been forced to avoid such relations due to the increasing influence of CIVAJA. However, although we may find in the data cases where one is forced to *avoid* a certain relationship, there are no evident cases of being forced to *engage* in a relationship. That is the boundary between Marubo autonomy and power in this field of social relationships: power is imposed to prevent someone from pursuing a course of action contrary to one's interests, but not to force someone to pursue a course favorable to one's interests. It is much easier to coerce non-action than action.

Information, status, and decision-making.

Based on the data presented in this chapter, it is possible to describe the social basis for decision-making and influence at Aldeia Maronal. Decisions as to how the village as a whole is to relate to non-indigenous people were made, during the 1997-98 fieldwork period, in two main settings: ritual healing assemblies and formal political meetings. At these meetings, elders discuss issues and decide on courses of action. There is often a component of young people at these meetings, supplying the information for the elders to discuss. Thus, while formal decision-making rests with elders, youth often determine the agenda as well as affecting and executing the outcome.

At Aldeia Maronal, full participation in all decision-making processes is a characteristic of a restricted group of elders. These elders all have a common characteristic: speaking ability based on traditional indigenous knowledge. Most specifically, the ability to sing *shōki* is essential to inclusion in informal decision-making. It is at the numerous *shōki*-singing sessions where elders, together on the *kenā*-benches for hours on end, discuss issues. Exchanges of knowledge take place, with elders listening to one another talk about the aspects of cosmology and healing each knows best. Only individuals with such knowledge would speak and be heard on a regular basis at these events. Such elders numbered fifteen at Maronal, of which only nine were regular participants. These men were all *shovo ivorasi* or brother-companions thereof.

Several men in their thirties and forties were occasional attendants at informal councils and were respected enough to have their voices heard at those times. One example is Iskōpa, Alfredo's brother's second son. He was married, with four children. owner of substantial and thriving swiddens, and an AIS-in-training. At the meeting to

decide on my request for an extension (see under Amélia, above), he was present, expressed an opinion, and was listed on the radiogram as a ‘leader’ (*liderança*) who approved of my research. However, he was not listed on *all* radiograms, unlike the more prominent elders. Nor was he present at most of the healing rituals. His participation in decision-making was occasional.

A role akin to Iskōpa’s was played by Jaime, the Varináwavo *shovo ivo* who was a respected man and a father, but due to his lack of healing and speaking ability was not a regular participant in informal councils. There were eight such men that I counted, middle-aged married men with children and robust economic lives, but without the specialized verbal and healing skills of the older generation.

The third group of participants in decision-making processes were young people with access to information about current events among non-indigenous people. The crucial skills for inclusion in this category are (1) Portuguese language ability, and (2) education sufficient for good reading and writing in Portuguese. Five people in the analyzed sample fit this category: CIVAJA founders Darcy and Clóvis, Manoel and Amélia Barbosa, and Alfredo’s son Txanōpa. Together, these five have exerted a substantial influence on Marubo affairs. Clóvis and Darcy’s actions in organizing CIVAJA have had a profound impact, by establishing a formal political organization; creating a framework for decision-making processes involving multiple Marubo villages; enabling such decision-making processes by spreading radios throughout the interior; and disseminating a philosophy of indigenous autonomy and self-determination that has come to affect how Maronal Marubo relate to missionaries, FUNAI officials, and anthropologists. Clóvis and Manoel stimulated a number of decision-making events

during the fieldwork period: reunions to discuss Edvaldo's candidacy, land demarcation, health issues, and Manoel's application for FUNAI employment were all held at the request of Manoel or Clóvis. These latter transmit information to Amélia or Txanõpa at Aldeia Maronal. One of these information-receivers then communicates the information to an elder or elders, and a meeting is called. At the meeting, information received from CIVAJA is verbally reconveyed by the youth to the elders. The decision-making event then takes place. Policy thus determined is written into a statement by Amélia or Txanõpa, then sent back to CIVAJA. CIVAJA is then able to present its own arguments as being the will of the indigenous people. Youth who have learned reading, writing and Portuguese thus play a crucial role in Marubo political organization.

There exist data to suggest that the special role of youth in Marubo political organization is not a historically contextual aberration, but rather is reproduced socially across generations. Alfredo (d.o.b. 1937) is not the oldest son of his father, João Tuxáua. His older brother Zacarias (d.o.b. 1921) was slated to become headman upon his father's retirement, but did not. João Tuxáua began to transfer responsibilities about the time FUNAI began interacting with the upper Maronal Marubo. By this time, Zacarias was 53 and Alfredo 37. It is important to note that from Zacarias' birth until his mid-thirties the Marubo were in near-total isolation from non-indigenous people. In contrast, by the time he was in his teens Alfredo had encountered the first missionaries in the area and Alfredo's wife's father's wife's father Carlos was organizing the first post-rubber boom-indigenous rubber-tapping work parties. Alfredo, and later his younger brother José, travelled to Acre and Amazonas in the 1960s, working and learning Portuguese. When FUNAI arrived, Alfredo acted as the intermediary for his father, playing a role in

decision-making somewhat like Clóvis' and Txanõpa's combined. It was this ability, combined with his excellent skills in organization of labor, that made Alfredo headman over his older brother, the same set of skills likely to make Txanõpa leader over *his* elder brothers.

D. Presence and extent of power in Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people

1. Introduction

The evidence presented in section C, above, showed two individuals with patterns of repeatedly winning conflicts of will: Clóvis and Alfredo. The basis of Clóvis' power was his superior access to the Brazilian state's policy-setting and enforcement organs, which he knew how to invoke when necessary, an access based on his and Darcy's organization of CIVAJA (see sections on CIVAJA above, this chapter). It is more difficult to discern the basis of Alfredo's power. We may only speak of Alfredo's repeated victories as signifying that he has power **if** these victories are not random events, but are instead derived from essential characteristics of his social persona. In this section I will present additional evidence to show that Alfredo does have the power to assert his will in cases of conflict within the village and within the field of relationships to non-indigenous people. In the course of presenting this new evidence, the data will be analyzed to elucidate the **basis** of Alfredo's ability to win political contests.

Once Alfredo's ability to win contests of will is established, I will show that conclusions about Alfredo cannot be generalized to form a picture of "the Marubo

headman". A set of data on Ituí River Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people will be presented to show that contests of will among Ituí *shovo ivorasi* or among village headmen may end in stalemate, a result not observed in Maronal politics. At Aldeia Maronal the result of conflicts of will is that one side prevails; on the Ituí River it is possible for disagreement to result instead in *neither* side prevailing. Thus, based on the data presented in this chapter I will argue that power does exist but is not an essential structural feature of the role of headman.

2. The *chefe de posto* issue

In 1998, a decision-making meeting at Aldeia Maronal set the policy of demanding an indigenous FUNAI *chefe de posto*, but this policy did not become reality without opposition. The opposition had to be overcome not once but repeatedly. In the end the policy that was originally determined did become reality. Manoel Barbosa became the first indigenous *chefe de posto* in the vale do Javari. The eventual success of this policy was due in large part to Alfredo's support.

The issue arose in January 1998 while I was in the forest returning from the Ituí River to Aldeia Maronal. Upon my return, Txanõpa told me that a meeting had been held to discuss the *chefe de posto* issue. Luís had left in October, and since then there was no *chefe de posto* on the Curuçá River. This situation coincided with problems between Javari River Mayoruna and their *chefe de posto*, and with the temporary absence of the *chefes* on the Itaquaí and at the Matís village on the Ituí. A request went out from Maurício, the Marubo FUNAI worker in Atalaia, to all indigenous villages within radio reach to discuss the situation. Discussions took place throughout the vale do Javari. For

the Curuçá River, Aldeia Maronal and Aldeia São Sebastião agreed on requesting an indigenous *chefe de posto*. They further agreed to specify Manoel Barbosa as their top choice to fill the position. In choosing to request the appointment of an indigenous person the Curuçá River was not alone: Matís, Mayoruna, and Kanamari all requested indigenous *chefes de posto* as well. These decisions were made in the first week of January 1998. The decisions were transmitted by radio back to Maurício.

By late January 1998, no action had been taken on the request for an indigenous *chefe de posto*. Alfredo decided to write a radiogram reiterating Maronal's decision. This radiogram was written by Txanõpa on January 25th. It stated that Manoel Barbosa should be installed as *chefe de posto* as soon as possible. The radiogram was passed on to FUNAI on January 26th. By February 15th, word came back that the request for Manoel had been approved. Gilmar (the acting FUNAI administrator) had requested the employment papers, known as a *portaria*, for Manoel. Manoel was to leave CIVAJA and enter FUNAI's employ. The *portaria*, however, was delayed for several months. February, March and April passed in waiting.

On April 22nd, Manoel called his father José on the CIVAJA radio. He explained that the *portaria* had been held up because Gilmar had been told that Alfredo was in fact opposed to Manoel's installation as *chefe de posto* and preferred that Luís Melo be re-hired instead. José returned bewildered by this conversation. He told me he did not know where the rumors came from. He had never heard Alfredo say what people in Atalaia claimed he had said.

Since Amélia was recently returned from a trip to Atalaia, she was able to explain what she knew about the origin of the rumors. When she was in Atalaia, she had been

told by the son and the son-in-law of the headman of another village that Alfredo and Txanõpa were unhappy with the success of José's children. This headman's son had a rivalry with Txanõpa. On other occasions, he accused Txanõpa of trying to control too much. In this case, he attributed to Txanõpa jealousy of Manoel's and Amélia's accomplishments. Supposedly, Txanõpa felt that Manoel and Amélia had too many of the positions in the interethnic contact structure, and some should go to him. From the rival headman's son the idea reached the son-in-law, who had a direct personal connection to Gilmar. Thus, a rivalry between Alfredo's son and another headman's son produced the rumor that Txanõpa, and by extension Txanõpa's father Alfredo, was resentful of Manoel's acquiring an important position. This rumor reached Gilmar's ear as a claim that Alfredo opposed Manoel's appointment as *chefe de posto*. This was Amélia's explanation for why Gilmar had heard that Alfredo opposed Manoel's appointment.

As it turns out, Alfredo had not said the things he was accused of saying. The night of April 22nd, an informal council of seven elders gathered at Alfredo's *shovo* to sing *shōki* and to discuss the *chefe de posto* issue. At the council, Alfredo expressly denied ever having opposed Manoel's appointment or spoken badly of José's family. He reasserted support for his brother and brother's son. Alfredo said that the origin of the claims was another village.

Despite their inaccuracy, the rumors that Manoel lacked Alfredo's support delayed his appointment as *chefe de posto*. Once the Maronal elders were apprised of the delay, they took action to correct it. On April 23rd, José had a letter written to Gilmar reaffirming the village's support for Manoel. The signatures of all seven elders who had

been present at the previous night's council were added to the letter, as well as two other elders' names. Since Wanõpa was at that time preparing to travel to Atalaia, the letter was given to him to deliver. The following day, Alfredo told Amélia to write a radiogram to be passed over the FUNAI radio demanding Manoel's immediate assignment as *chefe de posto* for the Curuçá River. Unlike the letter, which was voiced "we, the leaders of Aldeia Maronal, meeting to discuss the *chefe de posto* issue, decided that...", this radiogram was voiced "I, Alfredo Barbosa, general leader of the Marubo nation..." The radiogram made it extremely clear that Alfredo supported Manoel.

With two messages sent to Gilmar unambiguously expressing support for Manoel, Maronal's leaders began to wait for Manoel's *portaria* again.

In order to understand events to this point, it is necessary to understand the motivations of those involved. Alfredo and José were the most active supporters of Manoel's. For José this is easily understandable: Manoel is his son, and great advantage could be derived from one's son being *chefe de posto*. In Alfredo's case, it is necessary to consider the validity of the accusations made against him. Had he really opposed Manoel? In fact, he had not. Alfredo, too, would enjoy a relation of authority over Manoel. Manoel was a desirable candidate for Alfredo because as a youth he had lower status than Alfredo, and could be counted on to be receptive to Alfredo's directions. As demonstrated by his relationship to Nakwa, Alfredo had already adopted the CIVAJA-suggested attitude of directing the labor of FUNAI workers. Furthermore, Alfredo could influence José in face-to-face encounters, then wait for José to influence Manoel, a similar pathway of influence to that he used to control dissent against the mission. In either case, Alfredo would have a way to influence policy. Manoel's appointment was

advantageous to Alfredo; hence his strong support, expressed in the radiogram of 24 April. On the other hand, Manoel's appointment was less advantageous to the rival headman's son. When he told Amélia and Manoel of Alfredo's supposed resentment, he also suggested they leave Maronal to start a new village downstream. Such a move would have removed Manoel and José from Alfredo's sphere of influence. In the current setup, the advantages to be derived from Manoel's employment would be enjoyed primarily by Aldeia Maronal. By driving a wedge between Alfredo's family and José's the rival headman could prevent Alfredo from having Manoel as one of his political resources. If Manoel was not a resource for Alfredo, then he could be a resource for others, hence the advantage to be derived from creating tension between Alfredo and José.

The tension was resolved at the informal council of April 22nd. As noted (see under Alfredo, this chapter), Alfredo excels at defusing tension by invoking common values. Alfredo can make the political issue irrelevant and instead focus on the social issues involved. In regards to mission opponents, for example, he did not argue that the mission should stay; he argued that elders should make decisions themselves, and not allow fractious youths to set policy. As a result, the appropriate elder corrected his sons and subsequently discouraged them from taking independent action on the mission issue. On this occasion too, Alfredo did not discuss the pros and cons of Manoel's appointment, but rather the common interest everyone shared in getting an indigenous *chefe de posto*. The meeting re-established the bond of solidarity between the two brothers, which had been shaken by the rumors. José had come to consider Alfredo an opponent and the rival headman his ally, but after the meeting he saw just the opposite.

Although the issue seemed resolved with Alfredo's unambiguous April radiogram, Manoel's appointment was still not immediately forthcoming. The rest of April and the entirety of May passed with no sign of the expected *portaria*. On May 30th, Amélia was operating the CIVAJA radio when Clóvis told her that he wanted Aldeia Maronal to hold a meeting to resolve the *chefe de posto* issue. He said that there were still people in Atalaia saying that Aldeia Maronal would prefer a non-indigenous *chefe de posto*. Do they want an indigenous or a non-indigenous *chefe de posto*? A final decision should be made. After closing the radio, Amélia told her father José. As he had been on April 22nd, José was surprised. The village had expressed its opinion in January (twice) and again in April. Why was the issue still under discussion in Atalaia? Despite his surprise, he took immediate action.

At the time this occurred, Alfredo was in Cruzeiro do Sul receiving treatment for a skin condition. In the morning, when Clóvis spoke over the CIVAJA radio, Txanõpa was out hunting, so Amélia had operated the radio. Amélia told her father José. After the day's work, José set about organizing a meeting. He sent his son to Ivãpa's *shovo* to invite Ivãpa to the meeting, and he sent his brother Pedro to the *Varináwavo shovo* to invite the *Varináwavo* brothers. This was an extraordinary effort to gather together elders from the periphery together with those from the core. Sinãpa was already residing at his brother-in-law José's *shovo* to secure faster access to health care for his pregnant wife; Wasinawa had gone to Ituí to secure his pension monies; Wanõpa had just returned from Atalaia but was quarantined downstream with a flu. Thus, all periphery elders who could be invited were.

Whereas the crisis of April 22nd had been handled in an informal council consisting of elders already gathered for healing, this crisis was handled with a formal political meeting. José Barbosa specifically planned to ensure as much participation from the periphery as possible. This was in order to ensure that the end decision was indisputable. Those present at the meeting were: from José's *shovo*, José, his brother Pedro, and daughter Amélia; from Alfredo's *shovo*, Alfredo's brother-companions João and Miguel, and his son Txanõpa; from the periphery, Sinãpa, Ivãpa, and Võpa (the eldest of the *Varináwavo* brothers), and myself.

Since Amélia had received from Clóvis the information upon which discussions were to be based, she rather than Txanõpa introduced the meeting. She said that the other ethnic groups in CIVAJA had gone back on their demands for indigenous *chefes de posto*. In the months since their original demand in January, Kanamari, Mayoruna, and Matís had all accepted the re-appointment of their old non-indigenous *chefes de posto*. Only the Marubo remained firm in their demands for an indigenous appointment. Amélia said that Clóvis had said that there was a lot of conversation taking place in Atalaia to the effect that the Curuçá Marubo wanted Luís back, liked Luís, and felt that Manoel should not be hired. Having watched the other ethnic groups go back on their demands, Gilmar expected the Marubo to do so as well. Hence the need for another meeting to quell the effects of the “conversations” that were taking place in Atalaia.

The known facts were thus that Gilmar had again heard that the Maronal Marubo opposed Manoel's appointment; that this time, Gilmar had heard specifically that they wanted Luís re-hired; and that Manoel's *portaria* could not be officialized until the matter was resolved. Once again, the rumors that impeded Manoel's appointment had

been produced through extra-official channels. Even though Alfredo's opinion and that of many other elders had been sent to FUNAI via radiogram, and even though Alfredo had been consistent in his support for Manoel, Gilmar still doubted the Maronal Marubo's resolve on this issue.

To understand the subtle politics of the meeting of May 30th, it is necessary to understand how José categorized the other elders at Maronal. A few days after the meeting, on June 4th, he explained to me that he thought the older elders could be bought. This was a direct reference to elders whose primary concern in relating to non-indigenous people is the acquisition of money and goods. José specifically interpreted Wanõpa and Ivãpa as being focused on money. The Varináwavo brothers, with their relative lack of education and their focus on trading forest products and crafts for goods in Acre, could also be placed in this category, though less so because none of the Varináwavo were active recipients of pension monies, whereas Wanõpa and Ivãpa were. Those whose primary concern was money, José believed, were susceptible to affiliations with non-indigenous people in which they give allegiance in return for access to goods. This, he implied, was the modus operandi of the FUNAI worker: gaining the allegiance of elders by becoming suppliers of goods.

In contrast to the money-oriented elders, José categorized himself, Alfredo, and Sinãpa as being more concerned with Marubo autonomy, self-determination, and social and cultural survival—hence, José's personal emphasis on education, an emphasis shared (albeit belatedly) by Sinãpa and Alfredo who both had sons in school in Acre in 1998.

José's goal in inviting Ivãpa and the Varináwavo to the meeting was to shame the money-oriented elders into agreeing with Manoel's appointment. The Varináwavo were

not, politically, a concern because through their close relations with Alfredo's *shovo* (two of the Varináwavo were Alfredo's sons-in-law) they had come to develop a close alliance with Alfredo and could be counted on to support him. Ivãpa, however, was considered a possible source of support for the FUNAI 'old guard'. The first elder to speak was Miguel, Alfredo's brother-companion and 'first lieutenant'. Miguel, a former shaman, was an authority on ethical issues. He said that he could not speak any covert bad words. Someone is speaking behind the others' backs, he said, contradicting the openly-spoken words and the decisions made at meetings. Who could it be, Miguel asked—probably a rhetorical question.

Ivãpa replied that it was not him. I cannot say such things, I want an end to the conflict, he said.

After Ivãpa's denial, Sinãpa and Pedro Barbosa spoke. Each gave speeches focusing on issues of indigenous autonomy and self-determination. Sinãpa argued that conflictive talk (*kekashnana*) was associated with the non-indigenous people, whom he compared to biting dogs. This is our land, he said. Do we really want a non-indigenous person rather than one of us to be *chefe de posto*? Pedro then argued that *náwa* (non-indigenous people) tell us what we should do. They tell us, we know nothing. They say, you have a meeting and then you forget what you have said. But we are Indians and we do things our own way (*akishokoshó*=doing things our way). The *náwa* lack *onisi*, he said—a word roughly equivalent to 'solidarity', implying a sharing of concerns. Because of this, they have different thoughts; when they tell us what to do, it is not our way.

After Sinãpa's and Pedro's speeches, Ivãpa spoke again. By this time he had been subjected to a battery of rhetorical techniques. First Miguel had applied shame by

depicting opposition to Manoel as ‘speaking behind others’ backs’. Thus to admit opposition to Manoel would have been to admit complicity in behavior which Miguel had just derided. In addition, Pedro and Sinãpa had made arguments that were difficult to refute. Manoel’s appointment was equated with indigenous self-determination; opposition was equated with letting the *náwa* tell them what to do. If Ivãpa had ever considered publicly favoring a return of the FUNAI old guard, he changed his mind. After Pedro, Ivãpa spoke again. He said that we should try keeping the *chefe de posto* position among us Indians before we accept reliance on *náwa*. He made a reference the ceramics which FUNAI had taken and not yet paid for (see section on FUNAI, earlier this chapter). We have to care for such things not to happen by having our brother watch over us, someone who is *onisi*. We should have someone who listens to the elder’s words, which the *náwa* do not. With this speech, Ivãpa publicly expressed his support for Manoel.

Once Ivãpa expressed his support for Manoel, the meeting had reached a condition of solidarity. All those present agreed that it was better for Manoel to be the next *chefe de posto* rather than to bring back Luís Melo. At this point, José Barbosa spoke. He said that in the old days all elders spoke good words. But Luís Melo’s association with Nakwa and others had changed that. Luís was given information about the Marubo social reality primarily by Nakwa. Luís’ secondary associate, Ronípa, was also socially marginal. Neither Nakwa nor Ronípa had a good grasp of *ese* (Marubo ethics). Therefore, José argued, Luís got an errant point of view and a mistaken understanding of what the Marubo wanted and were like. Conversely, when Nakwa and Ronípa supplied information back to the elders, José said, these were not *yurãvana* but

nawāvana (for more of José's comments on this issue, see section on José, this chapter).

But the Marubo, José said, had *ese*. The example he gave was that 'we watch over our women to prevent them from having sex with outsiders' (quoted earlier in section on José). This symbolized the difference between correct Marubo ethics and what the *náwa* would make them do if they could, providing emphasis to his argument that *nawāvana* were detrimental. By removing Luís, he suggested, there would be a return to the predominance of *yurāvana*. Appointing Manoel constituted removal of a source of ethically disturbing *nawāvana* and replacing it with a person who could be influenced by *yurāvana*. As a result, they would no longer be taken advantage of by the *náwa*.

Txanōpa then closed the meeting. He suggested that someone who wanted goods from Luís had flattered him by telling him he was wanted as *chefe de posto*, echoing José's assertions that FUNAI workers essentially purchase allegiance. Txanōpa continued by saying that there was an urgent need for a *chefe de posto* to control access to the area, develop improved educational and health infrastructures, and care for the radio (for information on the politics of FUNAI radio usage, see under Wanōpa, above). The *náwa chefes de posto* never listened to us and never did what we needed done. For these reasons we should ask for Manoel to be installed immediately. Ivāpa gave his agreement once more, as did Pedro and Sināpa. Since all were in agreement, the subject was dropped. The following day, Txanōpa wrote another radiogram re-stating Aldeia Maronal's support for Manoel. In addition to all the elders present, Txanōpa knew he had his father Alfredo's complete support, since they were in regular contact over the radio. Between Alfredo's radiogram of April 24th and the broader-based radiogram of May 31st, almost the entire village of Maronal had thrown its support behind Manoel.

The decision-making process on this issue had marginalized a very significant component of the village political system: Wanõpa (see section on Wanõpa, above). Wanõpa had been busy preparing for his trip to Atalaia on April 22nd when the informal council to discuss the Manoel issue was held. He left on April 23rd and returned on May 25th (as explained in the section on Wanõpa). Unfortunately, he returned with a flu and so imposed a quarantine on himself, remaining at an old semi-abandoned *shovo* downstream. He was still in quarantine when the meeting of May 30th was held. His signature was not added to the letter of April 23rd, nor to the radiogram of May 31st. Although Wanõpa's marginalization from these decisions seems to have been by circumstance rather than by design, it was a recognized fact that he had benefited materially and politically when Luís was *chefe de posto*, because Luís' assistant Nakwa was his son-in-law. Since Luís had departed to Atalaia, Wanõpa had had more uninhibited access to the FUNAI radio, motors, aluminum boat, and gasoline, all through Nakwa. Wanõpa had constructed, through Nakwa and the FUNAI infrastructure, a mode of communications and relations to non-indigenous people that was independent of the core-controlled, CIVAJA-oriented system. A takeover of the *chefe de posto* position by Manoel Barbosa would signify an end to Nakwa's control over the FUNAI infrastructure, and therefore of Wanõpa's access to it. Instead, all those benefits would revert to the core, which already largely controlled communications and determined the pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people. For these reasons, Wanõpa could be expected to favor a return of the old guard or the continuation of the status quo.

In José's interpretation, Wanõpa's attitudes were determined by economic rationality, whereas his own economic rationality was tempered by concern about self-

determination. In a conversation on June 4th, José pointed out to me that Nakwa and Ronipa had relationships with Luís through which they derived access to desirable goods. This access will be cut off if Manoel replaced Luís as *chefe de posto*. Nakwa and Ronipa are also Wanópa's source of information on non-indigenous affairs. The opinions they expressed to Wanópa were congruent with their points of view: they supported Luís and felt threatened by Manoel's appointment. Since Wanópa benefited directly from his son-in-law's line of access to money, goods, communications and transportation, he shared their opinions. José's belief was that Nakwa relays this information about Wanópa's opinion to Luís over the FUNAI radio. Luís then gets the impression that "Maronal" wants him, and tells Gilmar so. Thus, Gilmar once again hears that "Maronal does not want Manoel after all, they prefer Luís".

José's next comment was the most significant of all. Gilmar had heard that "Maronal" wanted Luís. But Maronal is Alfredo's, not Wanópa's, José said. Alfredo, Sinápa and I all think alike on this issue, he concluded. This statement expresses the ultimate basis for Alfredo's superior decision-making power: the fact that he started the village, and everybody else lives in it. As noted in Chapter Five, Wanópa moved to Aldeia Maronal at the behest of João Tuxáua, Alfredo's father. José, too, moved to Maronal from another location. Meanwhile, Alfredo had invested large amounts of time and labor in the airstrip, generator, and television, and attracted the mission to provide health care. It was clear to those who moved there that they were living in Alfredo's village. This means that Alfredo is the **legitimate** spokesman for Maronal. He is empowered by this to speak for the village, others are not. Furthermore, he is **recognized** as headman by CIVAJA and by non-indigenous organizations.

The *chefe de posto* issue raised the corollary issue of legitimacy. In the April 22nd incident, someone had told Gilmar that Alfredo did not want Manoel's appointment. This error was easy enough to correct, as Alfredo did by sending a radiogram on April 24th. But in the May 30th incident, someone had told Gilmar that **Aldeia Maronal** did not want Manoel's appointment. Hence, the issue was raised of who has legitimacy of claim to speak for Maronal. Nakwa and Ronipa, lacking the quality of *eseya* (ethical wisdom), could not speak for Maronal. Alfredo, of course, could. What is interesting is that in Alfredo's absence the other core elders, with support from peripheral *shovo ivorasi* can speak for Maronal, provided a formal or informal council is held to confirm whatever decisions are made. But a single peripheral *shovo ivo* or a peripheral faction without core support cannot speak for Aldeia Maronal. The only individual who can speak for the village is Alfredo, and in some cases Txanõpa (when acting as his father's representative). He has unique resources which no one else at Maronal has: legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of outsiders.

These data suggest that as a result of having established a village and successfully attracted a large number of coresidents, Alfredo has the power to determine village policy in regards to relationships to non-indigenous people. This power may be seen in his pattern of repeated victory in contests of will, culminating in the one just described. I refer to his ability to assert his will as power because it is an inherent aspect of his role as founder and headman of a large village. The relationship between attractor (founder) and attracted (those who move to an existing village) determines the fact that the founder is the "owner" of the village. As noted by José, this signifies that the founder can speak for the village because "it is his"; others cannot, because it is not theirs but the founder's.

Wanõpa could state that he and his kin and associates wished to maintain the status quo, but he could not state that “Aldeia Maronal” wishes to maintain the status quo. Alfredo, on the other hand, could and did speak for the village, though always after consulting with his fellow elders. Since the outcome of the issue was determined by who has the legitimate claim to speak for the community as a whole (Gilmar wanted to do what ‘Aldeia Maronal’ wanted), Alfredo won.

3. Resolution of conflicts of will on the Ituí River

Observations of political processes on the Ituí River suggest that the type of power exercised by Alfredo at Maronal—based on his having founded the village and being recognized as founder outside of it—does not exist on the Ituí River. It has been noted that Maronal Marubo allow one another considerable autonomy except in the rare cases of conflict where one person’s will interferes with another’s. In the field of social relations analyzed in this chapter, such impositions by one person on another were rare. On the Ituí River, they were even rarer because the inequalities that existed within Aldeia Maronal did not exist among Ituí *shovo ivorasi*, who considered themselves all equal. Multiple-*shovo* leadership is virtually unknown on the Ituí.

The differences between Maronal and Ituí may be explained by reference to differences in the residential and political organization. Aldeia Maronal was a single village with a single headman. Maronal had twelve *shovo* and 220 inhabitants before Pekõpa’s *shovo* burned down; all of these *shovo* formed part of a single political organization bound together by internal political-integrative ritual (feasting, healing assemblies, decision-making meetings, radiograms stating common will) and external

recognition. In contrast, the upper Ituí River has fourteen *shovo* and 360 inhabitants. However, these *shovo* are divided into seven separate villages several of which have no recognized headman. Because of this, decision-making processes on the upper Ituí River do not always arrive at a single outcome, whereas those at Maronal do.

The residence pattern on the Ituí River originates in the 1960s schism, which resulted in Marubo leaving the remote headwaters where they had hidden since the rubber boom. Shortly thereafter, the Missão Novas Tribos established itself at the site now known as Vida Nova. The mission thus became the attractive focus for the largest village on the Ituí. In 1997-98, Vida Nova had five *shovo* and 152 inhabitants. Yet it was noted in the above discussion of the *chefes de posto* issue that the basis of Alfredo's power is his role as founder/attractor, through which the other *shovo ivorasi* may be considered to be in "Alfredo's village". Because the central attractor at Vida Nova is a missionary, there is no Marubo to play the same role as Alfredo. The Vida Nova *shovo ivorasi*, three of whom also have influential 'uxorilocal lieutenants' (see Chapter Four), are all equal in status. There is no possibility of anyone's using the resources Alfredo has in order to impose his will on others, because nobody has such resources. It should be noted, however, that the Maronal Marubo joke that Vida Nova has no headman—except for John Jansma. Indeed, as seen in the section entitled 'the mission incident', above, Jansma has been known to operate in a manner resembling Alfredo's: calling a meeting, conveying information, subtly coercing a particular decision-making outcome, in the same way that Ivãpa was subtly coerced by the threat of shame into supporting Manoel (see discussion of *chefes de posto* issue, above).

Alfredo's power to determine policy vis-à-vis the mission is another difference between Ituí and Maronal (see see discussion on ‘authority to determine whether the mission can stay’ in section on Alfredo, above). In the example described in this chapter, there was a disagreement between Alfredo and some inhabitants of a peripheral *shovo*. The outcome was the reintegration of the conflicting groups into following a single policy—Alfredo’s. In that incident, Alfredo clearly imposed his will on others, though only after the others tried to impose their will on him. On the Ituí River, relations to the mission are determined individually by each *shovo ivo*. Hence, the multiplicity of villages. Aldeia Liberdade was so named because it is ‘free’ from the mission. Aldeia Alegria was established downstream partly to avoid the mission’s FUNAI-authorized control over *regatão* access. Aldeia Praia also considers itself politically independent of Vida Nova. Yet the distance from Alegria to Liberdade is approximately equal to that from the lowermost *shovo* at Maronal to the uppermost. The explanation for this political dis-integration is not, therefore, simple spatial distance; rather, it is the settlement pattern. Maronal was created when a number of people moved to live near Alfredo and the facilities he had created. On the Ituí River, settlements were created by individuals moving *away* from the main attractor—the mission—thus specifically establishing independence. Because of this there are no unequal status distinctions among Ituí *shovo ivorasi*.

The clearest example of equality among elders is in the internal political dynamics of Aldeia Alegria. There is time depth to our understanding of Aldeia Alegria thanks to the published work of Júlio Cezar Melatti (Melatti 1983). Melatti observed that there were two elders at Alegria: Lauro and Antônio. These were full or half brothers,

depending on who was asked and when. When observed by Melatti, the brothers already had divergent styles of social role-playing. While Lauro focused on relations to *regatões*, Antônio focused on traditional leaders' activities. Thus, Lauro accepted merchandise from the *regatão*, stored it in a locked hut, organized work parties paid with the merchandise, and transferred the products of the work back to the *regatão* to start the cycle again. Antônio, in contrast, stayed aloof from this process and focused instead on subsistence, feasting, invitations, and mastery of discourse genres. Lauro's strategy was impeded by CIVAJA in the 1990s (see discussion of CIVAJA-*regatões* conflict, above), and he too was forced to focus on traditional practices, though he remained on the lookout for money-making opportunities. When my census was taken in 1998, both brothers had done very well from a demographic standpoint. Antônio's *shovo* had 31 inhabitants; Lauro's had 21, but his son-in-law had an adjacent *shovo* with 12 inhabitants, so his sphere of influence included at least 33 people. Antônio and his brother Lauro were thus approximately equal in terms of the size of their followings.

Antônio and Lauro could not agree on who was the headman. When I met Antônio at Paulino's *tanamea* feast on December 27th 1997, he informed me in no uncertain terms that Alegria was 'his': *Ea Alegria ivo. Alegria e na. Americano nam riivi* (Literal translation: I Alegria owner. Alegria me+possessive (mine). American negative possessive+emphatic (American=John Jansma; Antônio is emphasizing his political independence from the mission)). However, when I met Lauro at a healing ritual a week later, he told me that Alegria was his. He said he had scouted out the location for the village when nobody else was living in the area. He said he had founded the village and therefore it was his. It is interesting to note that Lauro called on the same

legitimizing/unequal status-creating resource as I noted Alfredo drawing on: the role of founder. In Lauro's case, however, it was to no effect: his brother did not recognize the claim. Since the entire village had only three *shovo*, and Lauro's brother's had almost half the inhabitants of the village, Lauro's claim was ineffective in terms of producing actual power.

Lauro and Antônio clashed in March 1998 over the hiring of a schoolteacher for Aldeia Alegria. Education was a difficult issue for those who desired political independence from the mission. On the Curuçá River there were two indigenous schoolteachers in addition to the mission. On the Ituí River, however, the only education available was at the mission. In March 1998, the secretary of education for the Atalaia municipality informed the Marubo that money was available to hire indigenous schoolteachers for the Ituí River as well, provided suitable candidates could be found. Antônio invited Txanõpa to take the position of schoolteacher at Alegria.

Txanõpa had the bare minimum of education required to become schoolteacher. If hired, he would have taught only basic literacy and math to small children, up to 10-11 years of age. It would have been a paid position, which Txanõpa was attracted to, but it would have required him to move from Maronal to the Ituí River, which he did not want to do. The biggest difficulty was not Txanõpa's reluctance, however, but Lauro's opposition.

Lauro was of the opinion that indigenous schoolteachers were inferior to non-indigenous ones. He took the position that to hire another Marubo as teacher was to provide his children with a skewed education. He would accept only a non-Indian as schoolteacher. Because of the disagreement between the two brothers who were Alegria's

top elders, Txanõpa did not think it wise to accept the job at Alegria, because he could not be certain of his welcome.

The incident just described demonstrates that at Alegria there is no process for making a single opinion out of multiple ones, as there is at Maronal. The key variable in creating this distinction seems to be the absence of status differences among Alegria *shovo ivorasi*. As noted above, Alfredo's role as founder gives him the quality of owner which supplies him with the ultimate decision-making authority. At Alegria the role of founder and owner is in a state of perpetual dispute, so no one has ultimate decision-making authority. The result of the conflict between Lauro and Antônio was that neither won: Alegria got no schoolteacher for the year. Instead of resulting in the victory of one over another, the political process at Alegria resulted in mutual neutralization.

Mutual neutralization as an outcome for political processes is commonplace on the upper Ituí. Because extended fieldwork was not carried out on the Ituí River, I must rely on secondhand reports to confirm this; it is possible that Maronal informants overemphasize the occurrence of mutual neutralization on the Ituí, but I think the phenomenon referred to is real. For example, after Lauro and Antônio disagreed, Txanõpa's comment was simply, "it's been that way for a long time at Alegria", implying that it was common for disagreements to occur but also for the outcome to be no action instead of common action. A second example, also from secondhand reports, is the possible establishment of a FUNAI post on the upper Ituí. Some years before this fieldwork occurred, according to informants, FUNAI offered to build a post on the upper Ituí, and asked the Marubo to determine where it should be located. There ensued a series of discussions in which Alegria, Vida Nova, and Liberdade each argued the post

should be built in their village. The villages could not come to an agreement on the issue. The result was that no post was built, although a FUNAI-frequency radio was given to Aldeia Liberdade. Unfortunately, I do not know what forces other than the disagreement among villages might have precipitated the end result. A third example is the absence of large-scale labor cooperation on the Ituí River. At Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo was capable of mobilizing labor from all *shovo*—12 with 224 people—for projects of mutual interest. As a result, Maronal had an airstrip under indigenous ownership and control. On the Ituí River, from Alegria to Liberdade are 11 *shovo* with 265 people, but divided into four villages, two of which—Vida Nova and Alegria—have no recognized headman but are instead assemblages of *shovo* whose *ivorasi* have equal status and full autonomy from one another. As a consequence, large-scale cooperation in labor does not occur. This is further evidence that the power Alfredo has to determine outcomes in the field of relationships to non-indigenous people is not shared by Ituí headmen or *shovo ivorasi*.

We may conclude that the power which separates Alfredo from the other Maronal elders is not at the present time a normal feature of Marubo politics. It should be emphasized that the power suggested for Alfredo here is limited in scope. Rarely is individual autonomy impinged upon, even when a person with higher status disapproves of what a person with lower status is doing. Interference with another's affairs is not the norm. Power is exercised in cases of conflict where multiple outcomes are not possible. Observations suggest power is exercised only in cases of direct conflict where should one person's strategy be successful, another's will necessarily fail as a result. Nevertheless it is a fact that the Maronal political processes can yield a single opinion. That opinion is always congruent with Alfredo's, and the reason why this occurs has to do with essential

features of Alfredo's social role and relations to others. In contrast, the result of decision-making processes on the Ituí River is often a multiplicity of opinions. The Ituí political process has no means of producing a unified opinion. Thus, the autonomy that reigns at Maronal **except** in cases of direct conflict between individuals with differential power reigns on the Ituí River **even** in such cases. Thus power exists in Marubo society but it is not an essential structural feature of the role of headman. In fact, the role of headman is not an essential structural feature of Marubo villages.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS OF FIELDS OF CHOICE

This chapter will summarize the data on four fields of social action in order to render conclusions on what goals are pursued in Marubo society, what patterns of conflict and of cooperation occur, and what the outcome of these events is. The field method of analyzing fields of choice, used to obtain the results that are presented in this chapter, was derived from action theory in political anthropology (Vincent 1978). The idea is to take a field of social action where social actors have to make choices among different possible actions. Studying the choices people make allows the researcher to discern what goals are being pursued through social action. It becomes possible to consider how one person can influence another's choice, as well as what is perhaps the most important aspect of any political system—the way in which conflicts are resolved. The fields of choice that I will analyze are (1) participation in healing rituals; (2) feasting; (3) organization of labor; and (4) organization of and attendance at political meetings.

The analysis of healing rituals revealed that the ritual and political spheres in Marubo society intersect. The main purpose of individuals participating in healing rituals was clearly healing. However, there were several secondary purposes observable. The rituals provided a context for elders to display their differing skill levels in ritual knowledge and practice, and thus allowed them to highlight relative status distinctions. Healing rituals serve as contexts for the transmission of knowledge about indigenous

cosmology and the beliefs that underly ritual practice. This transmission occurred between elders and non-elders, but also among elders with varying levels of knowledge. Most significant from my perspective, however, was the evident function of healing rituals as political organization and the link thereby created between ritual and decision-making. Healing rituals brought together many of the key individuals in Maronal's agnatic political structure, and thus served as the context for political discussion and decision-making. This was by no means a main purpose of healing rituals; but because of the effect of healing rituals on political organization, the occasional use of this context as an informal political council seems inevitable. Through a careful analysis of healing rituals, it is therefore possible to obtain information on conflicts of will and their resolution, which in turn sheds light on the dynamics of influence and power at the village level.

The analysis of feasting demonstrated that feasting is linked to the acquisition of higher status in Marubo society, and this link provides strong evidence that Marubo society cannot be considered egalitarian. Fried's definition of egalitarianism requires that, given equality in age, sex, and personal characteristics, everyone has an equal chance to succeed to whatever statuses may open; an egalitarian society "does not have any means of fixing or limiting the number of persons capable of exerting power" (Fried 1967:33). The highest Marubo indigenous political status—*kakaya*—is always open because there can be as many *kakaya* as there are people who are capable of taking on the characteristics of a *kakaya*. One of these characteristics is the ability to organize large feasts, particularly the largest type of Marubo feast, the multivillage *tanamea*. To organize such a feast requires the organization of multiple work groups, including

sufficient women to process food for as many as 300 people at a time. A certain social network is therefore essential for anyone seriously seeking *kakaya* status. Men with all the personal characteristics required for feast-organization cannot compete for *kakaya* status if they have not previously constructed or inherited a substantial social network. Even given equality of age, sex, and personal characteristics, not every Marubo has an equal chance to succeed to whatever statuses may open; therefore the Marubo are not egalitarian. They have an established “means of fixing or limiting the number of persons capable of exerting power” (Fried 1967:33). People with the age, sex, and ability to satisfy all the requirements of the *kakaya* role cannot achieve the status if they have no access to a substantial social network. Since the number of people in Marubo society is limited, the number of people who can construct a social network permitting them to compete for high status is also limited, and the competition for status takes on the qualities of a zero-sum game where one man’s gain is another man’s loss (in definitional egalitarianism one man’s gain does not become another’s loss). Although *kakaya* status is theoretically open, the requirements for *kakaya* status create *de facto* limitations. Marubo society therefore goes beyond simple egalitarianism in determining who can and cannot compete for high status.

Like feasting, organization of labor is a characteristic of the role of *kakaya*, the highest Marubo political status. Observations of organization of labor at Aldeia Maronal showed that the *kakaya*, Alfredo, had a larger labor force than anyone else. This is in large part due to his inheritance of a large social network from his father, João Tuxáua. Because his labor force is much larger than anyone else’s, Alfredo is able to loan labor out to coresidents who need it. Alfredo loans labor more frequently than he borrows it—

by a factor of eight to one during fieldwork. Because he loans labor more often than he borrows it, Alfredo maintains an ability to borrow labor from people he has loaned it to. Alfredo borrows labor occasionally for large-scale community projects that make the village more attractive to prospective coresidents. He has used organization of labor to obtain an airstrip, missionary health assistance, and an electric generator. The ability to organize labor on a multi-*shovo* scale, resulting in demonstrable increases in material possessions and visible wealth, is due to the presence of a *kakaya* with a large labor force and the ability to organize it. Alfredo was thus using his status and his associated ability to organize labor in order to develop and expand inequalities on an inter-village level, creating inequalities in material wealth correlated to the presence of higher-status individuals. This process is one in which differences in status were becoming linked to differences in access to resources, a distinctly un-egalitarian phenomenon. Differences in status and wealth among villages as well as individuals were emerging. Furthermore, Alfredo's ability to create these differences is partly due to inherited wealth (a social network constructed by his father), again suggesting serious deviations from the egalitarian model of political organization because in this case, not everyone has an equal chance to succeed to the status of *kakaya* even given equality in age, sex, and personal characteristics.

The analysis of political meetings shows that Marubo political decision-making varies from the common models of egalitarian consensus decision-making. The indigenous council in societies with no centralized power is often thought to operate on a consensus basis. Clastres states that: "humble in scope, the chief's functions are controlled nonetheless by public opinion... The leader possesses no decision-making

power... This permanent fragility of a power unceasingly contested imparts its *tonality* to the exercise of the office" (Clastres 1977[1974]:28). Lowie says of the Kayapó and Canela that "a common check... appears in the assembly of adult men" (Lowie 1949:342). Boehm, echoing the classic theorists, states that

The typical tribal unit in the Americas and elsewhere is a local group that meets to make decisions, with everyone (in theory) having an equal say... This scenario is well documented for New Guinea..., but a consensus-seeking style of public meeting seems to prevail everywhere... Consensus-seeking is an integral part of any egalitarian political arrangement... The locus of authority is carefully kept with the entire group, so a reverse dominance hierarchy is in effect.

(Boehm 1999:113-116)

A careful analysis of Marubo political meetings shows that the meetings serve rather to reinforce the authority of a few high-status individuals. The organizer of the meetings sets the agenda and conveys suggested courses of action. In every single case of political meeting at Aldeia Maronal, the headman's suggested course of action was approved by those present. Very few people actually speak at political meetings; often the meetings are dominated by long speeches from the headman. Although there is an idea conveyed to outsiders that decisions represent everyone present, in fact the vast majority of people have no effect on the process. A select few set the agenda, make the decisions, and get the rest of the community to silently approve these decisions silently by attending meetings. Empirically, this is not at all consensus decision-making, although it might appear as such to superficial analysis. The organization of meetings is a powerful means of influencing others and as a means of influencing is very unequally distributed. Analysis of feasting thus complements the other analyzed fields of action in showing significant deviations from models of egalitarian politics.

A. Participation in Healing Rituals

I observed two types of healing rituals among the Maronal Marubo. The type of ritual enacted depends on the protagonist(s) of the ritual, of which there are two types—*kexitxo* and *romeaya*. The *kexitxo* are individuals who can cure by singing *shoki*. The *shoki* are songs used to invoke a healing spirit to clean out the body of the sick person. The typical length of a *shoki* is 45 minutes to an hour. These songs were taught to the current generation of elders by the generation of rubber-boom survivors. João Tuxáua is credited with being the primary teacher, and thus mainly responsible for the perpetuation of this form of healing from rubber boom times to the present. *Romeaya* are individuals who heal by entering a possession trance in which they become occupied and controlled by a spirit with healing powers; in this condition, the *romeaya* can suck foreign objects out of the bodies of sick people, as well as advising the *kexitxo* about which *shoki* will prove effective for a particular patient. *Romeaya* may be quite young, and the ability to enter possession trance can leave them before their deaths. The quality of being *romeaya*, therefore, is somewhat transient, and I encountered a former *romeaya* who is capable of singing *shoki* but can no longer enter possession trance.


There were ten active (twelve total) *kexitxo* at Aldeia Maronal in 1997-98. All *kexitxo* were either *shovo ivo* or the brother of a *shovo ivo*. The distribution of *kexitxo* at Aldeia Maronal is shown in figure 7.1. It should be noted that *kexitxo* are divided equally between core and periphery. Thus, Alfredo and his consanguines have no advantage in this sense over their affines. It should also be noted that the set of *kexitxo* is virtually identical to the political leadership of the village. Every *kexitxo* is, due to his position in

the agnatic social system at Maronal, also a political leader; very few political leaders are not also *kexitxo*.

In 1997-98, there was only one *romeaya* in the entire Marubo nation. That individual was José Nascimento Filho, whose relocation from Vida Nova to São Sebastião was described in Chapter Five. Alfredo's coresident brother Miguel had been a *romeaya*, but had lost the ability to enter trance and so was inactive during the time of my research. Another shaman, João Pajé, had died just a few years previously at aldeia Vida Nova. Zé Nascimento was thus the last remaining Marubo shaman. Zé was relatively young (in his 40s), recently moved to São Sebastião (in the past two years), and spent much of his time in Atalaia recovering from diverse injuries, the most recent being a severe foot injury. Thus, although he was considered a leader, he was not among the most influential of Marubo leaders. The close correlation between leadership and healing ability observed for the Maronal *kexitxo* does not apply to the position of *romeaya*, at least in the ethnographic present of this writing (1997-98).

The political aspect of *shōki*-singing by the *kexitxo* will be examined first. There were two basic types of *shōkiya* (*shōki*-singing events). In the first place are *shōkiya* for chronic or minor ailments. An example of this is the chronic rheumatism afflicting Pedro's wife Nāke (in José's *shovo*), which caused her considerable suffering but only very rarely seemed to threaten her life. For the most part, her husband Pedro sang over Nāke alone. His brother José usually stayed up to accompany him, but did not sing.

**FIGURE 7.1.: Distribution of *kexitxo* at Aldeia Maronal, upper Curuçá, 1997-98
(Schematic—not to scale).**



Core shovo

1. Alfredo's *shovo*. 3 *kexitxo*: Alfredo and his classificatory brothers Miguel and Joãozinho.
2. Vasho's *shovo*: No *kexitxo*.
3. Aurélio's *shovo*: 1 *kexitxo*, inactive. Aurélio ceased to sing after September 1997 due to changing beliefs.
4. José's *shovo*. 2 *kexitxo*: José and his brother Pedro.

Peripheral shovo

5. Wanópa's *shovo*. 2 *kexitxo*, one inactive. Wanópa was active; his brother Misael could not sing due to chronic airways obstruction.
- 6., 7., 8. Wanópa's sub-periphery: no *kexitxo*.
9. Ivápa's *shovo*: 1 *kexitxo*, Ivápa himself.
10. Jaime/Mayápa's *shovo*. 1 *kexitxo*, Jaime's older brother Vópa.
11. Wasinawa's *shovo*: 1 *kexitxo*, Wasinawa himself.
12. Sinápa's *shovo*: 1 *kexitxo*, Sinápa himself.

Occasionally a few visiting *kẽx̃itxo* from other *shovo* stopped by for conversation. But only on the rare occasions when Nãke's suffering reached critical levels would more than one person sing. Other examples of these non-critical *shōkiya* were cases of infants with diarrhea or fevers. Since these conditions were very common, and since treatments administered by the mission or by indigenous health agents were usually effective, their occurrence did not arouse too much concern. Still, when a *kẽx̃itxo*'s infant had diarrhea or fever, he almost invariably sang *shōki* in addition to seeking non-indigenous medicinal treatment. José, Alfredo, and Sinãpa were all observed singing over their infants in non-critical situations. The main characteristic of non-critical rituals is that there is only one singer, although two or three others may be in attendance.

Shōkiya for critical illnesses had a much more evident political dimension than did non-critical *shōkiya*. One example of this has already been presented in Chapter Six. Between 14 and 17 August 1997, a *shōkiya* was held in Vasho's *shovo* for Vasho's brother's daughter Xaponê. Earlier (Chapter Six), I explained how Alfredo took the opportunity presented by this ritual to influence other elders on the issue of relations between Marubo and the mission. Here, I will present the *shōkiya* for Xaponê as an example of how healing rituals for critical illnesses become forms of political organization and intersect with arenas of political conflict.

According to the missionary, Xaponê's illness was most likely a gall-stone problem. She suffered from intense and debilitating pains in her belly, occurring for three days before subsiding. The problem recurred once a year or so. She never sought to obtain surgery in the city, a process that most likely would have removed her from the village for a year or more. On the night of 13 August 1997, Xaponê's symptoms began

to express themselves. On the morning of the 14th, I saw José head off to Vasho's, saying he was going to sing *shōki*. I was not able to observe the singing that day. In the evening, at about 8 p.m., Pedro went to Vasho's to drink ayahuasca (*Banisteriopsis* tea, or *oni*). I went with him. At Vasho's were already gathered Alfredo, Joāozinho, José, Aurélio, Sināpa, and Wasinawa (note that Wasinawa's own *shovo* was still under construction in August 1997, so that he was still coresiding with his brother Sināpa), in addition to four young men from Alfredo's *shovo* and the newly arrived Pedro. It was at this moment that the event described in Chapter Six took place, as Alfredo used words to exert a definitive influence on the outcome of a conflict over mission-Marubo relations. All the male elders from Vasho's *shovo* were away, Vasho in Atalaia receiving medical treatment, his brother on the Ituí River securing pension monies. After the political discussion ended at 9 p.m., Alfredo went to sing *shōki* over Xaponê. After he was finished at 10 p.m., all the other *kēxītxo* went to sing. Pedro left to sing alone over his wife Nāke back at José's *shovo*. I left to sleep. The first night of healing thus saw the gathering together of four *shovo ivorasi* and three brothers thereof, with a heated political discussion resulting in the resolution of a conflict of will.

Singing continued at Vasho's all through the night of the 14th. At 10 a.m. on the 15th of August, I returned to Vasho's to find that Alfredo, Joāozinho, José, Sināpa, and Wasinawa were all still sitting on the benches, drinking *Banisteriopsis* tea and inhaling tobacco-leaf powder. Aurélio spent the day working, as did Pedro. The other five, however, sang *shōki* over Xaponê at regular intervals. The missionary, Mr. Xavier, entered in between songs to administer paregoric and apply intravenous rehydration packs, demonstrating the non-exclusiveness of indigenous and non-indigenous modes of

medical treatment. There was a break from singing in the late afternoon and evening as the *kexitxorasi* bathed and ate. At 7 p.m., all seven *kexitxo* who had been there the previous evening assembled at Vasho's again. That night, Pedro provided me with the essential clues concerning the connection between the level of criticality of the illness and the order of political organization effected by the healing ritual.

I asked Pedro what factors determined who came to a healing ritual and why. He answered that the first people to come were those socially closest to Xaponê—the *kexitxo* from core *shovo*. The best *shoki*-singers, Pedro said, were Misael and Wanõpa, followed by Ivãpa, and finally those then present at Vasho's. He said the best singers would only be called if those singers then present proved unsuccessful and Xaponê's illness worsened. The people who were present every night at this ritual were thus (a) the *kexitxo* who lived in the core and were therefore close kin to the ill woman, and (b) the two most junior peripheral *kexitxo*, Sinãpa and Wasinawa. The older affinal *kexitxo* would not show up unless the crisis deepened.

From my observations to this point and from Pedro's comments one can discern the role of the critical *shokiya* in political organization. Firstly, the *shokiya* brings together prominent men from the core and the periphery. *Kexitxo* who are descendants of João Tuxáua or of his brother and who live in the core join with *kexitxo* who are descended from Domingo and are affinally related to the core group. As a social practice, the critical *shokiya* is thus clearly a mode of political organization since it serves to foster group cohesion and unity by bringing together the leaders of what might otherwise be atomized social units (the individual *shovo*). Secondly, the critical *shokiya* serves as an informal council where political discussions may occur and decisions can be

made. Third, there is a connection between criticality of illness and level of organization created by the ritual. The more critical the illness, the more *kexitxo* are present, with only the most serious illnesses bringing together the highest-status *kexitxo* from peripheral *shovo*. Thus, the more serious the illness, the more the healing ritual acts to bring dispersed groups together for a common purpose, and the more it establishes group unity and cohesion. A fourth aspect is the highlighting of relative status distinctions among *kexitxo*, such that the best singers are the last to be called.

As Pedro explained the social organization of the ritual to me, Alfredo, Joãozinho, Aurélio, and Sināpa sang *shōki* over Xaponê. After the first *shōki*, Alfredo continued directly into a second while the others rested. Pedro left to sing over Nâke at José's. I returned to my hammock to sleep.

I returned to the scene of the *shōkiya* on the 16th of August at 9:15 a.m. Alfredo, Joãozinho, José, Sināpa and Wasinawa were still sitting on the benches, consuming *oni* (Banisteriopsis tea, commonly known as *ayahuasca*) and *romejoto* (tobacco-leaf powder). At 10:15 a.m., they all got up to sing over Xaponê. This ceased at 11:15 a.m. There was more *oni* and *romejoto* consumption, then another song from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. The *kexitxo* then dispersed to bathe and eat. At 7 p.m., they assembled at Vasho's again. This time, there gathered not only the seven who had been present to that point, but Ivāpa too (see figure 7.1.). The *shōkiya* had now occasioned the assembly of four *shovo ivorasi* and three brothers thereof. Although Ivāpa was present that night, he did not participate in the singing since Xaponê's symptoms began to improve. Singing continued through that night, but ended at 6:10 a.m. on 17 August 1997. The medical

crisis subsided with Xaponê's improvement, the *shōkiya* ended, and the *kēxītxo* dispersed back to their individual *shovo*.

Over the three days of the healing ritual for Xaponê, the intensity of political activity decreased steadily as the *kēxītxo* focused more and more on healing. On the first night, political discussions occurred, as Alfredo and his son explained recent events in the FUNAI administration in Atalaia, then dealt with opposition to the mission's presence. On the second night, Alfredo again dominated the discussions on the *kenā* benches, but this time instead of inter-ethnic relations he discussed indigenous social relations, a topic which I could not yet follow in August 1997. By the third night, all the *kēxītxo* were tired from the disruption of sleeping patterns. Alfredo lay on his side on the *kenā* and slept, getting up only to sing. The other *kēxītxo* carried on conversation among themselves, in a more evenly distributed manner. This demonstrates that *shōkiya* are **not** overtly political events. The critical *shōkiya* does play a crucial role in village-level political organization, and was observed to be the scene of political conflict resolution, but the main focus of participants is healing. The greater the criticality of the illness and the longer the *shōkiya* drags on, the more political issues recede into the background, giving way to discussions of the nature of the illness and the proper indigenous diagnosis and remedy, issues which themselves occasion discussions of cosmology and non-empirical ("spiritual") realities.

In the *shōkiya* for Xaponê, we find that conflict is expressed, then replaced by cooperation. The issue over which there was conflict is reduced in importance to a level inferior to the more important issue of cooperating to save Xaponê's life. That cooperation involves bringing up commonly-held worldviews, cosmological,

mythological, and moral beliefs. In these ways, the *shōkiya* has the effect of creating a sense of unity. Keep in mind that the context is a village of twelve *shovo*, often with different political agendas. We are thus left with the question, how do these twelve *shovo* remain part of one village despite the multiplicity of agendas and the occurrence of conflicts? The occurrence of critical *shōkiya* is one part of the answer, as these rituals operate to gloss over the importance of conflictive issues and emphasize the power of combined effort instead. This power of combined effort, as I will explain below (see “Organization of Labor”), is a major element of the ethical code endorsed by Alfredo, and designed to maintain village integrity.

The primary goal pursued through the practice of *shōkiya* is to cure sick people. However, several other goals can be pursued through *shōkiya*, with no damage to the primary goal. Firstly, status can be reinforced through the practice of *shōkiya*, as relative abilities and skills are discussed and exhibited, so that the ritual highlights relative status distinctions among *kēxītxo*. Secondly, the *shōkiya* may be used to reinforce the indigenous belief system. Elders take the opportunity to discuss the cosmological system and explain it to others. On one occasion, a critical *shōkiya* was held for a senile man whose daughter had been captured as a young girl by Mayoruna and, while living among the latter, had adopted Christian beliefs and practices (although she never *completely* abandoned indigenous beliefs). The woman complained to Alfredo that indigenous healing was worthless. Alfredo and the other *kēxītxo* nevertheless sang through the night and into the next day, until the old man’s attack subsided. Alfredo then used this incident to highlight the value of indigenous healing practices and the dubious quality of mission criticisms. Thirdly, elders may use the opportunity afforded by the critical *shōkiya* to

influence other elders on key issues of village policy, as when Alfredo successfully used the *shōkiya* for Xaponê to influence others on the issue of the mission.

The set of hypotheses developed through observation and interpretation of the ritual for Xaponê were confirmed in observations of subsequent occurrences of critical *shōkiya*. One more example will serve to exemplify the role of *shōkiya* in Marubo political organization. From 27 August to 6 September 1997, *shōki* were sung over Firmino in José's *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal. This ritual became the most intense medical crisis observed during one year of fieldwork, and confirmed the existence of a correlation between criticality of illness and level of political organization.

Firmino (Marubo name: Kemōpa) was a resident of Aldeia São Sebastião when he arrived at Maronal for treatment. His residential history, from Américo's *shovo* to Vida Nova and finally to São Sebastião, is described in Chapter Five. In July 1997 he was in Atalaia do Norte undergoing medical tests to diagnose a stomach ailment. The preliminary diagnosis was ulcer, but he was asked to stay on for additional tests. Dismayed by the decrepit housing for sick Indians at Atalaia and the long delays in getting his tests done, he chose instead to return to São Sebastião. He rode on CIVAJA's boat (with myself) from 19 July until he was dropped off at Aldeia São Sebastião on 27 July. On 14 August, I was at the CIVAJA radio at Maronal when it was reported that Firmino's symptoms had gotten worse. He grew thin and weak and could not eat. On 21 August he was removed by Health Foundation helicopter to Cruzeiro do Sul. There, he was diagnosed with terminal stomach cancer. They stabilized his condition and returned him to Marubo land. He was asked to choose between the two villages with airstrips—Vida Nova and Maronal. He chose Maronal due to the greater quantity and higher status

of the *kẽxîtxo* there. On 27 August, he was flown to Aldeia Maronal. He was housed in the *shovo* of José in the core area.

When Firmino arrived, his condition was not considered serious. Due to a lapse in communications, Aldeia Maronal was not told by the Cruzeiro hospital of the cancer diagnosis. The belief persisted that he had an ulcer. Furthermore, his condition had been stabilized and he looked healthy. Thus the *shōkiya* for Firmino did not at once take on a critical quality. This is an example of a *shōkiya* starting out non-critical, then becoming critical.

The expansion and intensification of the *shōkiya* for Firmino can be followed in Table 7.1. Table 7.1 details attendance at Firmino's *shōkiya*; by correlating with figure 1 it is possible to discern how the ritual occasioned an increasing level of political organization as time went on and the illness' criticality increased.

The ritual began on the night of 27 August 1997, after Firmino was flown in from Cruzeiro. Although he was dying, the *kẽxîtxo* did not know this. Firmino was housed at José Barbosa's *shovo*; José and Pedro sang one song each over Firmino that night. Sinãpa's presence was an accident, as he happened to be visiting his sisters' husband José. Sinãpa returned to his *shovo* upstream the following day. On 28 August, every *kẽxîtxo* from the Maronal core gathered at José's; however, only two people sang over Firmino, and only one song each. On the following day, José and Pedro both left to carry out other duties. José left to Aldeia São Sebastião to invite that village to a feast he was organizing (see below, this chapter, under "Feasting"), while his brother Pedro went into the forest to clear a path for guests from the Ituí River. Pedro was away for only one night, but José would be gone for the rest of Firmino's *shōkiya*.

TABLE 7.1.: Attendance at *Shōkiya* for Firmino (note: average length of *shōki*=1 hr.)

	Day	Time	Singers	Others in attendance	Comments
27-8	night		Sinãpa José Pedro		One song each
28-8	night		Alfredo Joãozinho	Pedro José Miguel Aurélio	One song each
29-8	night		Alfredo Joãozinho	Miguel Aurélio	Pedro goes to cut a path; José goes to São Sebastião
30-8	night		Alfredo Joãozinho Pedro		One song each
31-8	night		Alfredo Joãozinho Pedro		
1-9	night		Alfredo Joãozinho Aurélio Sinãpa	Wasinawa Ivãpa	<i>Kexitxo</i> from peripheral <i>shovo</i> arrive; Pedro path-cutting again
2-9	12:45 p.m.		Alfredo Wasinawa Sinãpa		First daytime singing Wasinawa joins singing
	2:45 p.m.		Alfredo Wasinawa Sinãpa		
	4 p.m.		Sinãpa		Alfredo attending radio
	10:15 p.m.		Alfredo Aurélio Sinãpa Wanõpa	Wasinawa Misael Ivãpa Miguel	Wanõpa joins singing
3-9	12:45 a.m.		Alfredo Sinãpa Ivãpa	Wasinawa	Ivãpa joins singing

<u>Day</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Singers</u>	<u>Others in attendance</u>	<u>Comments</u>
3-9	6:45 a.m.	Sinãpa Wasinawa Ivãpa		Alfredo attending radio
	11:05 a.m.	Sinãpa Ivãpa	Wanõpa Misael	
	1:15 p.m.	Alfredo Wasinawa Sinãpa Ivãpa	Wanõpa Misael	
	3:45 p.m.	Wasinawa Sinãpa Ivãpa		Alfredo attending radio
	8 p.m.	Alfredo Wasinawa Sinãpa Wanõpa	Ivãpa Aurélio Joãozinho Misael Miguel	
4-9	1:30 a.m.	Wasinawa Ivãpa	Sinãpa Alfredo Joãozinho	
	morning	n.a.	n.a.	Break from singing
	12:45 p.m.	Wasinawa Sinãpa Ivãpa Joãozinho		
	3:45 p.m.	Wasinawa Sinãpa Ivãpa Joãozinho		
	6:50 p.m.	Wanõpa Joãozinho Sinãpa Ivãpa	Misael Wasinawa	

4-9	8:30 p.m.	Alfredo Joãozinho Sinãpa Ivãpa	Pedro Misael Wanõpa Wasinawa	Pedro back from path-cutting
	11:10 p.m.	Alfredo Pedro Sinãpa Wanõpa	Joãozinho Misael Aurélio Ivãpa Wasinawa	
5-9	2 a.m.	Alfredo Joãozinho Pedro Sinãpa	Wasinawa Ivãpa	
	11 a.m.	Wanõpa Ivãpa Sinãpa Joãozinho	Alfredo Pedro Misael	
	1:05 p.m.	Alfredo Joãozinho Ivãpa	Wanõpa Sinãpa	
	3:30 p.m.	no data	no data	Firmino agrees to removal by air; I assist in arrangements
	night	no data	Alfredo Joãozinho Pedro Sinãpa Wanõpa Ivãpa Miguel Aurélio	Singing proceeds, but I sleep
6-9	9 a.m.	Ivãpa Sinãpa	no data	
	10:35 a.m.	Ivãpa Sinãpa	no data	Airplane arrives at 10:40 a.m. Firmino removed to Tabatinga

From the 29th to the 31st of August the *shōkiya* was limited in scope. Each of these nights, attendance was limited to a few *kēxītxo* from the core *shovo* immediately adjacent to José's; the ritual drew no attention from the periphery. For these nights, singing was limited to one song per night. This began to change on the 1st of September, the sixth day of singing. Firmino's condition began to deteriorate. The *kēxītxo* who had been singing over Firmino realized that they had not been successful. The night of 1 September, three *kēxītxo* from peripheral *shovo* arrived, including the highly regarded Ivāpa. Four *kēxītxo* sang over Firmino simultaneously, the most I had observed singing to that point. Despite the increasing criticality, it was not yet apparent that Firmino was dying. Pedro left the following day to continue clearing a path for guests to his brother's planned feast.

On 2 September 1997 the *shōkiya* for Firmino took on all the characteristics of what I am calling a critical *shōkiya*. That date, *shōki* were sung during the daytime for the first time, as they had been a few weeks earlier for Xaponê. This is a sure sign that the illness is considered critical. Daytime singing is an indication that the patient's condition is deteriorating so rapidly that he or she might die from one night to the next if not correctly sung over. Firmino received three daytime *shōki* that day. That night, Wanōpa and Misael attended the ritual for the first time. Recall that during the *shōkiya* for Xaponê, Pedro had told me that Wanōpa and Misael were considered the best *kēxītxo* at Maronal, and would be called only if the patient's condition deteriorated. In Xaponê's case, this never occurred. In Firmino's case, however, it did; on the seventh night of singing, the two most highly regarded *kēxītxo* arrived to contribute their skills. With the arrival of Wanōpa and Misael, the illness of Firmino had occasioned the maximum level

of village-level political organization, bringing together the highest-ranking men from core and periphery in a context where all their conflicts took on a trivial air next to the immediate need to attend to a dying man.

With Wanōpa and Misael in daily attendance from 2-9-97 on, the *shōkiya* began to take on the secondary function of highlighting relative differences in status, knowledge and ability among *kēxītxo*. The essence of success in *shōki* is correct diagnosis. To discuss Marubo diagnostics it is necessary to have a word to refer to the causative agents in the Marubo conception of disease. The Marubo term for these disease-causing agents is *yoshī*. The best translation for this term seems to be “harmful spirit”. *Yoshī* are named after natural phenomena; they are external to the patient; they enter the patient, causing illness; and they are not visible except to *romeaya* in trance. Their presence is known from the symptoms of the disease. Each *yoshī* causes symptoms which have some sympathetic analogy with the natural phenomenon it is named after. Thus there is *txi yoshī*, named after fire (*txi*) which causes a heated and dried body and a drying up of the spittle. Another was named after the regional fish-poison (Port. ‘timbó’), which had a *yoshī* named after it that was said to cause a heating of the body with concurrent illness of the stomach. Some *yoshī* were named after manufactured objects such as ceramic pots. The issue of whether or not *yoshī* were actually the spirits of the objects they were named after, in the same sense as some Euro-Americans believe a human being to have a soul—that is to say, the issue of whether or not this represents genuine Marubo animism—is a deeper one which I cannot answer based on available data. What is certain is that there are hundreds of kinds of *yoshī*, all with their own symptoms, and a *kēxītxo* has to know them all. To cure an illness by *shōki*, the *kēxītxo* has to first correctly identify the

causative agent, then sing the corresponding *shōki*. If a *shōki* is sung to expel the fire-*yoshī*, but the patient is actually afflicted by a different *yoshī*, then the patient will not improve. Therefore, to cure by *shōki* the *kēxitxo* must be adept at indigenous diagnosis—knowing the causative *yoshī* based on observation of the ill person’s symptoms. This in turn requires the *kēxitxo* to have encyclopedic knowledge of the *yoshī* and their effects on the human body.

As the *shōkiya* for Firmino continued with no improvement in his condition, the Maronal *kēxitxo* had to abandon their diagnoses and try new ones. This caused lively discussions among the *kēxitxo* as they searched their memories for rarely-occurring *yoshī* that could conceivably be causing Firmino’s deterioration. This allowed the *kēxitxo* to display their knowledge to one another. They did this in a specialized discourse genre for which I was unable to obtain a Marubo name. When *kēxitxo* are gathered together on the *kenā* benches, drinking *oni* and inhaling *romeputo*, it is common for them to engage in rhythmic monologues, spoken faster than normal conversation, with phrases of equal length. These monologues cover the speaker’s knowledge of a specific area of healing and cosmology—e.g., the nature and effects of a specific *yoshī*. When I asked Alfredo what these monologues were, he said the speaker was teaching the listeners, and that this was clearly distinct from normal conversation. Based on Alfredo’s description, I dubbed this discourse genre “teaching words”. Alfredo explained that on the 2nd of September, Wanōpa had explained to them by means of ‘teaching words’ how to heal an illness caused by the internalization of a *yoshī* named after a toad. Alfredo said that when this sort of talk commences, no one talks and everybody listens. He said that Wanōpa was older and had more knowledge than the core *kēxitxo*, so when Wanōpa teaches him

something, Alfredo stops talking and listens. In this way, relative differences in healing knowledge and ability are made visible during an extended critical *shōkiya* such as the one for Firmino.

It is interesting to note that although the *shōkiya* allows peripheral *kēxitxo* such as Wanõpa to confirm and display their reputation as healers, this does not allow for an inversion of actual power relations. As Chapter Six clearly showed, in conflicts of will pitting Alfredo against Wanõpa, Alfredo won. The critical quality for victory in these conflicts was Alfredo's status as founder of the village to which Wanõpa had been attracted. That status made Alfredo the legitimate speaker for the village and consequently, the ultimate decision-making authority in certain cases. Although Wanõpa could use the *shōkiya* to show that his status on the scale of healing ability was higher than Alfredo's, this higher status could not be translated to empirically observable power. Despite its role in the expression of status differences the *shōkiya* cannot, therefore, be regarded as an arena wherein political power may be contested. I never observed a *kēxitxo* trying to use a *shōkiya* to make some sort of prestige display as part of a bid to upset the status quo. On the contrary, expressions of conflict tend to be very muted during *shōkiya* as the assembled healers combine their knowledge in an effort to find a cure. The expression of knowledge is in the context of a cooperative effort; it is not used as a political weapon.

On 3, 4 and 5 September 1997 the *shōkiya* for Firmino proceeded with extreme intensity. By 3 September, his condition began to deteriorate rapidly. He vomited after every meal, so that he had effectively not eaten for a week. On the 3rd, an airplane was scheduled to take an MSF team to aldeia Vida Nova; Firmino was asked if he wanted the

plane to make a stop so that he could be returned to a hospital. Firmino refused, saying he wanted the *shōkiya* to go on longer. The opportunity for removal by air thus came and went, and Firmino remained. Throughout the 3rd, the *kēxītxo* remained in continual attendance over Firmino, inquired into his symptoms, discussed them among themselves, and tried various *shōki* (see Table 7.1.). Although it seemed Firmino's condition could get no worse, it did, as an excerpt from my field notes makes clear:

Now rapidly losing weight as his body consumes muscle tissue to maintain essential functions, unable to walk, unable to eat he commences to moan and cry out. His spine juts out, his stomach caves in, his skull line marks off the bounds of his head, his ribs emerge starkly, his limbs draw in relentlessly to his bones. Terrified, I go discuss the situation with Aníbal [the missionary]. Aníbal explains that Firmino refuses to take medicines or accept IV support, so that there is nothing he can do. He believes Firmino a prisoner of an erred belief system... It takes all my self-control to resist being drawn into an argument with him.

(Field notes for 4-9-97)

By 4 September it was clear that Firmino was dying. On that date, Pedro returned from clearing the path through the forest. Every available *kēxītxo* gathered at José's *shovo* to sing or supply information. The most knowledgeable of all *kēxītxo*, Misael, was in attendance throughout the critical phase of the *shōkiya*, providing 'teaching words'. Although he himself was too sick from bronchial disease to actually sing, his knowledge was very much in demand. For example, on 4 September, after the 8:30 song, Alfredo went to Firmino's hammock to ask him if the latest *shōki* had had any effect. He asked Firmino what his current symptoms were, then returned to the *kenā* benches to tell the rest of the *kēxītxo*. They discussed the symptoms but could not interpret the causal agent. Alfredo went back to Firmino, requested clarifications, then returned to the *kenā*. Another discussion ensued in which the *kēxītxo* made various suggestions, but they could not agree on an interpretation of the symptoms. Alfredo returned to Firmino a third time.

He asked questions and felt various parts of Firmino's body. When he returned to the *kenā*, he suggested to the assembly that the *kāpo yoshi* could be responsible. He asked Sināpa for an opinion, whereupon Sināpa uttered a string of 'teaching words', and agreed that *kāpo* could be the cause. Alfredo then asked for Pedro's opinion. Pedro got up and walked to where Misael was resting in a hammock. He crouched next to Misael and asked to be taught about *kāpo yoshi*. Misael proceeded with a lengthy string of 'teaching words' to which the assembled *kēxitxo* listened carefully. Once Misael's teaching words were done, four *kēxitxo* proceeded to sing the *shōki* that would expel the *kāpo yoshi* from Firmino's body. This shows that Misael was the highest authority at Maronal with respect to information on *yoshi* and their consequences. But once again, this did not translate empirically into power. Alfredo clearly took the initiative in diagnosis and interpretation of symptoms. Alfredo made suggestions to the assembly which were discussed and approved or rejected by consensus. Misael was asked for his opinion, and that opinion was carefully listened to, but the *shōkiya* did as much to highlight Alfredo's leadership as it did Misael's wisdom. These observations of Misael's role in the *shōkiya* confirm conclusions made earlier based on Wanōpa's role. These two were considered the strongest healers at Maronal—stronger in that aspect than Alfredo—but they could not translate ritual power into empirical power.

On 5 September Firmino agreed to removal by airplane. The plane was called by radio, and arrived on the following day, the 6th. At 10:40 a.m. I helped carry him on an impromptu stretcher from José's *shovo* to the waiting airplane, which removed him to Tabatinga. There, his condition was temporarily stabilized. This time, he was told that

his condition was terminal cancer. On 11 September, he was flown to Vida Nova to die with his kin. Firmino died on 18 September 1997.

Observations of the *shōkiya* for Firmino confirm and extend previous conclusions on the political functions of Marubo healing rituals. On occasions of critical illness, the highest-ranking elders assemble together to sing *shōki*. Thus, critical illnesses and *shōkiya* play an essential role in village-level political organization. Leaders of scattered *shovo* gather in one place. These leaders are on opposite ends of the core/periphery division so apparent in Maronal's social and spatial organization. They have disagreements on issues of policy towards non-indigenous people (see Chapter Six), but critical illnesses provide them with a common goal to work towards. Conflicts subside over the course of the ritual as discussion focuses increasingly on diagnosis and treatment. During the *shōkiya* the assembled elders use a common system of belief, interpretation, and reaction to illness. The ritual thus invites and presents a common value system. Critical *shōkiya* thus have the effect of reducing the significance of intra-village disagreements and highlighting the common values and practices that have allowed the Marubo to survive as a group.

The Maronal Marubo place an extremely high value on *shōki*-singing. This practice was taught to the current generation of elders mainly by João Tuxáua, who received his own knowledge partly from his father, but also in part directly from the teacher/messenger-spirits called *rewepéi*. Ultimately, information on indigenous healing technique is believed to originate from Kanavoã, the creator. It is transmitted to *romeaya* in trance by entities called *rewepéi* which have messenger duties similar to that of Europeans' 'angels'. The Marubo credit their survival of the rubber boom in part on a

cultural emphasis on healing practices and health, as opposed to warfare and malevolent magic. They believe that *shōki* have been sent to them by Kanavoã through the *rewepei* in order that they might have health and prosperity. From the rubber boom to the present day, *shōkiya* has thus been an essential feature of Marubo social organization, and explicitly linked to social survival. In this context, it is fascinating to note that in addition to the overtly beneficial function of physical healing, *shōkiya* rituals have the covert functions of politically integrating the village, creating a communion of values, and emphasising common action.

The *shōkiya* for Xaponê demonstrated that these rituals can become informal political councils; however, a *shōkiya* is never called for specifically political purposes. Xaponê's illness coincided temporally with a political incident. Since the illness was critical and occasioned a substantial gathering of leaders from core and periphery, it was an appropriate context for Alfredo to resolve the conflict. As noted, in subsequent days the level of political speech decreased as the focus on healing increased. In Firmino's case, there was even less political interaction among the *kexitxo*. It is true that relative status in the hierarchy of healing knowledge is put on display, but only in the context of an intensive co-operative effort in healing. The intensity of that common effort can be seen from the duration of the ritual and the quantity of singing. When Firmino's illness entered the critical stage, all the *kexitxo* in the village interrupted their work patterns, moved almost full-time into the *shovo* where Firmino lay, and focused entirely on the healing process. They lay on the hard wood *kenã* benches dozing, then got up to sing for an hour, rested a while, then sang more. Each song lasts long enough that an untrained singer would go hoarse, yet the *kexitxorasi* sing day after day. They also sing throughout

the night. Work, sleep, and eating patterns are completely disrupted, yet far from being resentful the *kexitxo* took pride in their ability to expend so much effort on healing, gently taunting those who slept too much. The *shōkiya*, while opportunistically used for political discussion and decision, are cooperative healing efforts, **not** conflictive political meetings.

The main conclusions that can be drawn about the role of *shōkiya* in the political system are the following:

- (1) Critical-level *shōkiya* play an essential role in village-level political integration. The occurrence of these rituals is one reason why disparate *shovo* can maintain a regular series of social interactions and an identity as a single village with the ability to cooperate on common purposes. Critical *shōkiya* have the effect of establishing group unity and cohesion, a classic definition of political organization (Turner 1957).
- (2) *Shōkiya* operate as informal political councils. Because the knowers of *shōki* are also owners of *shovo* or brothers thereof, any gathering for *shōki*-singing is also a partial gathering of the political leadership of the village. The most critical illnesses occasion the fullest gatherings of the political leadership. Decisions can be made and conflicts resolved on these occasions.
- (3) Although *shōkiya* may occasion political activity, they were never observed to degenerate into political squabbling. On the contrary, the more critical illnesses mute political conflict, replacing it with a highly energetic cooperative healing effort in which common values and beliefs are continually communicated back and forth among participants.

The political aspects of the action of *romeaya* differ considerably from that of the *kẽxitxo*. In the first place, the abilities demanded of a *romeaya* are much rarer than the abilities of the *kẽxitxo*. To be a *kẽxitxo* it is sufficient to memorize the *yoshī* and their symptoms and learn to sing a *shōki* for each *yoshī*. A *romeaya*, however, must have the ability to enter a possession trance (PT). To enter PT a *romeaya* has to develop a personal relationship with the healing spirits, and that relationship is always highly tenuous because the spirits demand a wide variety of behavioral and alimentary restrictions, the violation of which can cause them to leave and never return. To obtain the assistance of these spirits in the first place is also very difficult, requiring months of arduous sexual and alimentary restrictions. Even then, there is no guarantee of success. When a *kẽxitxo* sets out to memorize a new *shōki*, there is very little chance of failure. A man endeavoring to become *romeaya*, however, has very low chances of success. As a result, there are in fact very few *romeaya*. During the fieldwork period, there was only one: José Nascimento Filho (henceforth Zé N.), resident at Aldeia São Sebastião (for residential history, see Chapter Five).

The activities of the *romeaya* were observed only once during the fieldwork period, when Zé N. visited Aldeia Maronal. These events, which I will call ‘shamanic session’, were different in important ways from the *shōkiya*. At a *shōkiya* the *kẽxitxo* sit on the *kenā* benches, consuming roughly equal quantities of Banisteriopsis tea (*oni*) and tobacco-leaf powder (*romepoto*). At a shamanic session, a hammock is slung between two posts, one behind each of the benches, so that the hammock is centrally located, spreading along the space between the benches. The *romeaya* lies on that hammock. At the first shamanic session I observed, on 12 June 1998, six male elders (José Barbosa and

his brother Pedro; Võpa, the elder of the Varináwavo brothers; Vasho, owner of the *shovo* next to Alfredo's; and Joãozinho and Miguel from Alfredo's *shovo*) sat on the *kenã* benches in José Barbosa's *shovo* while Zé N. lay in the hammock between the benches, above them. A host of people from *shovo* both peripheral and core who were suffering from non-critical ailments also gathered there. Joãozinho acted as a sort of assistant to Zé N., blasting *romeputo* into the latter's nose through a long reed tube and offering him cups of *oni*. Zé N. consumed more *romeputo* at one sitting than anyone else I had seen in a year of fieldwork. While he did this, he would offer 'teaching words', such as I had earlier observed Wanõpa and Misael uttering in the *shôkiya* for Misael. When his physical and mental condition was sufficiently altered, he began to sing in his hammock. Shortly, he grew quiet, then appeared to be hit by a heavy weight. This is the moment when the spirit arrives, hits the *romeaya*'s body, and possesses it. The *romeaya*'s own conscious self goes on an out-of-body shamanic journey while the spirit possesses and controls the body.

When the possessed *romeaya* speaks, it is considered to be the words of a powerful and beneficial spirit with healing powers—the spirit that has possessed the *romeaya*'s body. In this state, the shaman explains to the assembled *kêxîtxo* what are the causes of the illnesses suffered by those attending. This helps the *kêxîtxo* select the proper *shôki* to sing in the future. Then the *romeaya* treats the sick people one by one, by sucking mysterious objects out of their bodies. After several rounds of singing and sucking objects, the spirit left and Zé N.'s conscious self returned to his body. Speaking as himself, the *romeaya* then related to the *kêxîtxo* what he had seen whilst engaged in his

out-of-body journey to the place we could call ‘the spirit world’ (Montagner 1985)—a place coterminous with the afterlife world for the Marubo.

The most salient feature of this ritual from the politico-analytic perspective is the central place the *romeaya* occupies in the transmission of cosmological knowledge. In fact, most of the knowledge held by *kexitxo* is the result of journeys by shamans in the past. Through their shamanic journeys, the *romeaya* obtain the knowledge which *kexitxo* learn. *Romeya* claim firsthand knowledge of the spirit world, the basis of Marubo cosmological and religious beliefs. Since these beliefs underpin a variety of significant moral and ethical stances and thus translate into important social practices, (e.g., the maintenance of the *shokoya* as social practice, with all its consequences for political integration) we must see the *romeaya* as a central figure in influencing social behavior. That influence, however, is very indirect: he spreads a belief which underpins a practice, and thus causes actions in another person. He does *not* simply tell other persons what to do. In fact, despite his access to highly valued knowledge with profound ethical significance, the *romeaya* I observed did not have any more power than those with less knowledge.

In seeking to explain why Zé N. did not translate his unique ability into political power, I must conclude that the basis of power is social and not shamanic. To demonstrate this I will describe a conflict of will between Zé N. and another man, showing how the differences in social position explain the outcome. Zé N. was a relatively young man—40 to 45 years of age. He had been married to Meto, but divorced (see section on anicular residence, Chapter Four). He had not retained the coresidence of his children by Meto, who ended up in an anicular arrangement by 1997. Instead, he

remarried and started a new family. He then relocated to Aldeia São Sebastião, where he constructed his own *shovo*. However, he was newly arrived in the village, had a relatively new and small family, and was not consistently involved in leadership decisions. In contrast, Vasho had all the trappings of purely social success without the shamanic powers. Vasho had his own *shovo* at Maronal, and this was a socially complex multi-family dwelling including his living brother's family, his dead brother's family, and one of his brother's sons' family, in addition to several unmarried women with children. Vasho's ability to retain the coresidence of his dead brother's wife is particularly notable since there is a definite tendency for such women to return to the place of residence of their consanguines following the death of their husbands. The population of Vasho's multi-family *shovo* was 29, fluctuating up to 33, whilst the population of Zé N.'s single-family *shovo* was 8. Thus, Vasho had recognized ability in the maintenance and expansion of a social group—the very essence of Marubo leadership. His social success was proof of his ability in economic production, organization of labor, and moral guidance. Despite these abilities and the general recognition of him as a leader, Vasho had no shamanic healing abilities, neither of *kexitxo* nor *romeaya*.

On June 14th, 1999, the MSF (Doctors Without Borders) team whose airplane had brought Zé N. to Maronal, found that Vasho had a continuing problem with tuberculosis and recommended strongly that he return to Atalaia for treatment. Vasho was very upset because he had spent months in treatment in Atalaia already and he did not want to be away from his home and family. Without him around, the *shovo* has no moral guide, and work is not done as effectively. From his perspective and that of the elders, this was very

important: every *shovo* had to have a person with the *eseya* quality (ethical knowledge) to maintain the correct behavior of the inhabitants. A trip downstream by canoe would take as much as two weeks in the dry season. Vasho's response to the situation was to demand he be given Zé N.'s place in the airplane. Zé N. would have to take a canoe at a subsequent date. Vasho argued that his situation was more important—he had a serious disease and he was responsible for the moral well-being of more people. Vasho was extremely emphatic that he should be given the seat. Zé N. was not pleased but neither was he argumentative: he did not seem to have strong feelings on the subject. After the issue was discussed, Zé N. agreed to give his seat to Vasho. Vasho flew out with the MSF team. This incident illustrates the fact that the *romeaya* cannot translate his access to restricted information and abilities into power in concrete cases of conflict of will. Zé N. was not regarded with any sort of supernatural awe by the shamanically unendowed Vasho. It seemed clear that Vasho had sufficient social status and significance to claim the seat from Zé N. This gives us an important indication that the source of power in Marubo society is not shamanic but social.

B. Feasting

Feasting is the second field of choice analyzed for what information it can provide on the political system. Feasting occasioned large gatherings—much larger than those for *shōkiya*. I observed the actions of individuals before and during feasts along with their interactions in the context created by the feast, and integrated these observations with analysis of the social relations of participants. The purpose of these observations was firstly to find out *why* people feast: what goals are they pursuing through these

actions? In second place, given these goals, are there any conflicts which arise over their pursuit, and if so, who wins? This section will show that feasting must be considered, along with healing, to be a major feature of Marubo political organization—perhaps even more significant than healing.

The results of research on Marubo feasting are consistent with results of research in other parts of lowland South America. Probably the most famous analysis of indigenous lowland South American feasting is Napoleon Chagnon's analysis of a Yanomamö feast (Chagnon 1968:97-117). Chagnon argued that Yanomamö feasts had an essential function in the establishment of alliances between potentially hostile groups. Against a backdrop of intergroup violence, feasts establish alliances which may be necessary to the allies' demographic survival. Chagnon used an explicitly Maussian interpretation: the feast itself is a form of exchange and is the context for other exchanges, which are "calculated to challenge the guests to reciprocate with an equally grandiose feast" (Chagnon 1968:102). Yanomamö feasts thus bring together spatially removed groups and create alliances among them where hostile relations might otherwise result. In analyzing the tapir-feasts of the Panoan Uni of Peru, Erwin Frank also emphasizes that feasts play an essentially political role: "tapir-feasting in pre-contact Uni society should best be looked at as a cultural means in the hands of ambitious personalities seeking to further their private intra-local and inter-local political ends" (Frank 1987:180). Marubo feasting can be interpreted in similar terms. Among the Marubo, feasting is emically recognized as contrasting with violence: in ritualized discourses during and before the *tanamea* feast Marubo elders contrast the hunger associated with rubber boom violence to the prosperity displayed in current feasting. The

tanamea feast is a Maussian total social fact with an extensive exchange of prestations and ramifications on all social levels. Like the Yanomamö feast, it serves an evident etic purpose in bringing together groups that have few other encounters, and creating good relations between groups that might otherwise be at odds with one another. Marubo feasts also resemble Uni feasts (Frank 1987) in serving as means whereby ambitious personalities seek to further political ends. Since feasts bring together disparate residential groups, they serve as the backdrop for explicitly political meetings at which participants decide on common courses of action regarding relationships to non-indigenous people. Furthermore, I will argue that Marubo feasting is directly linked to status so that successively higher statuses may be sought by displaying increasingly high levels of prowess in organization of labor and in economic productivity, both of which are displayed through increasingly large feasts. This is another phenomenon that can be interpreted in Maussian terms: where status is linked to the size of the giveaway, agonistic relationships are played out as series of reciprocated feasts at which each feast seeks to outdo the previous one (Mauss 1990[1950]:6).

There were at least three different types of feast observed during fieldwork. The first type could be called ‘feasts of plenty’. These occur when there is a large amount of a particular food on hand, and other *shovo* are invited to share the plenty. Foods that occasioned such feasts include tapir, corn, and pupunha fruit. At Aldeia Maronal, feasts of plenty typically involved two to five *shovo*. The second type of feast is the *akoya*. This feast is held on the occasion of manufacturing a new signal drum (*ako*). I observed three such feasts at Aldeia Maronal and each one involved the entire village. The third type of feast is the *tanamea*. This is the largest Marubo feast, bringing together multiple

villages. Feasting thus has the effect of political integration on multiple levels. Again using Turner's notion of political organization as that which generates group cohesion and unity (Turner 1957), an effect which I prefer to call political integration, we may assert that feasting has the effect of political integration at the sub-village level, the village level, and the multiple-village level.

The most significant type of feast as regards the Marubo political system—and whether or not one can consider the Marubo egalitarian—is the *tanamea*. The principles derived from analysis of the *tanamea*, however, are applicable to feasting in general. The essence of egalitarianism definitionally is that except for differences of age, sex, and personal characteristics, all have equal access to whatever statuses may open in the social system (Fried 1967). The ability to throw very large feasts is considered to be an essential feature of the role of the *kakaya*; it is a *sine qua non* if a person is to be considered even a potential *kakaya*. Therefore, the study of who throws feasts and how feasts are thrown is essential to the resolution of the central issue of this dissertation, because it relates to how the highest political statuses in Marubo society are filled.

A detailed description of the ideal behavior of the *kakaya* as regards feasting was provided to me by Alfredo, himself a *kakaya*, on 27 August 1997. The statement was unelicited. Alfredo and I were sitting on his *kenã* benches when I remarked how impressive I thought the *ako* (signal drum) was. Alfredo began to explain its significance in feasting. Speaking to me in Portuguese, he employed the word “tuxáua”, but I feel certain that he was referring to the Marubo role of *kakaya*:

A tuxáua does thus [Port. *faz assim*]: a tuxáua decides who to send hunting, and tells them where to go, like a foreman [Port. *capataz*]. The tuxáua does not go himself but sends other people out. When the hunters bring back plenty of meat of different kinds, he uses the *ako* [signal drum] to invite people to feast. He fills the

kenāshesha [the space between the *kenā* benches] with food, and people fill the *shovo*, eating, and then dancing. When the *ako* is sounded, every *shovo* at Maronal hears it, and everyone who hears is invited. After the feasting, people go home. Next day, if there is still meat, he sounds the *ako* again, and everybody returns to feast. This is done until the meat is gone.

(Alfredo's words, author's translation from Portuguese; from field notes for 27-8-97)

In the same conversation, Alfredo went on to describe the *tanamea* feast in the same terms—that is to say, as something which an abstract “tuxáua” (i.e., Marubo *kakaya*) does. Based on these statements from Alfredo, confirmed by other informants, I feel safe in saying that the ability to throw a feast is an essential aspect of the social role associated with the status of *kakaya*.

The nature of the *kakaya* role in Marubo society was previously examined by Melatti (1983), who obtained a statement of social norms from César, the brother of Aldeia São Sebastião’s headman:

Kakaya is he who invited people to work and all came, he threw a feast and invited everyone, not leaving out anyone. Today, if someone calls people to work, if someone calls people to feast, not all come. To be *kakaya* is to have a large house, the ability to organize feasts, to go invite the other *malocas* to the feast, and to bring the guests back with him.

(Melatti 1983: 186; my translation from original Portuguese)

The *kakaya* is the highest level of Marubo social status. The lowest level of political leadership can be identified as the group of Marubo referred to by the Portuguese word “lideranças”. These are the individuals identified as leaders in radiograms directed to FUNAI and CIVAJA (Conselho Indígena do Vale do Javari). This category includes essentially every adult male who is married or has been married in the past—mainly the owners of *shovo*, their brothers, married sons, and sons-in-law. A

higher level of leadership is represented by the *shovo ivo*, the headman of each *shovo*.

There were 37 *shovo ivorasi* (the plural of *shovo ivo*) at the time of my research. *Kakaya* is more exclusive still. Although every *shovo* has a *shovo ivo*, very few are considered to be *kakaya*. This is because to be *kakaya* an individual had to meet a host of expectations above and beyond those of a simple *shovo ivo*. Melatti's informant told him that only two people could be considered *kakaya* at that time (1978): Paulo and Alfredo. What is most interesting is that in 1978 Alfredo was not a *shovo ivo*: he was in his father João Tuxáua's *shovo*. But Melatti's informant specified that while Alfredo's father exercised the role of moral guardian, dispensing words of advice based on his unrivalled knowledge of traditional myths and healing songs, it was Alfredo who directed the *shovo*'s labor, particularly as regards organizing people to receive guests for a feast. This is an indication that one must not necessarily be a *shovo ivo* to be *kakaya*. However, ability in organization of labor, displayed through feasting, is a necessary feature, and typically, no one has the manpower or status to organize labor on such a level, except for a *shovo ivo*. In Alfredo's case, there was a condition of managed succession, as the aging João Tuxáua passed the reins of leadership on to his son Alfredo. By allowing Alfredo to take over organization of labor, João Tuxáua was ensuring that his son would be *de facto* as well as *de jure* leader once the father passed away. Alfredo thus had his father's full support in organization of labor, which gave him access to the same possibilities of labor-organization as a *shovo ivo*. By the time of my research in 1997-98, there was only one person every Marubo would agree on calling a *kakaya*: Alfredo. Paulo had retired from effective leadership. There were some who occasionally were called *kakaya* by some people or under particular circumstances, such as the leaders of Alegria, Liberdade, São

Sebastião, and Rio Novo, but only Alfredo was *generally* recognized as such. The main point here is that the *kakaya* is the highest level of Marubo political status, reserved for leaders who display extraordinary abilities in organizing labor and feasts.

The status of *kakaya* is open: there can be as many *kakaya* as there are individuals who have the necessary characteristics. This appears to be an egalitarian quality on the surface, but it is necessary to consider the nature of those characteristics before concluding that the process of filling the *kakaya* status is an egalitarian one. Two essential characteristics of the *kakaya* role have been isolated in the discussion thus far: organization of labor (to be discussed in the following section) and feasting.

The fact that feasting is an essential aspect of the role of *kakaya* may be inferred not only from the above-quoted statements of Alfredo and of César, but also from the following information given by Firmino to Delvair Montagner in 1982 and cited by Melatti (1983:187): “He [Firmino] mentioned Abel as a near-*kakaya*, who did not reach *kakaya* status because he stopped throwing feasts.” Taken together, these data strongly suggest that no person aiming to be considered *kakaya* will be taken seriously if he cannot organize feasts that are well attended. Therefore, what is required in order to successfully throw a feast is also a requirement for becoming *kakaya*. In order to elucidate these requirements it is necessary to describe a feast.

The largest Marubo feast I observed was the *tanamea* held by José Barbosa at Aldeia Maronal in September 1997. Preparations for José’s *tanamea* began in August. First, a path was cleared from Aldeia Maronal eastwards so as to render the guests’ arrival more comfortable. Path-cutting began on 23 August 1997. José led a work group of eight men from three *shovo* (his own, Alfredo’s, and Vasho’s) that day. Work

continued on 24, 25, and 26 August with as many as twelve men from the three aforementioned *shovo*, directed by José. On 27 and 28 August no *tanamea*-related activity was observed. On 29 August, José headed by canoe downstream to Aldeia São Sebastião to invite that village to his *tanamea* and to lead them in a hunting and turtle-egg gathering expedition.

When José went downstream, his brother Pedro took over the organization of *tanamea* planning at Maronal. On 29 and 30 August, Pedro led a work party of five men from three *shovo* (José's, Alfredo's, and that of Jaime (Pekōpa—number 7 in figure 1)). That day, the distance reached by the path-cutters was such that they stayed overnight in the forest rather than return to their *shovo*. The path-cutters came back to the village on 30 August, but on 1 September, Pedro led them back into the forest, this time for three days and two nights. They returned to Aldeia Maronal on 3 September. A total of nine days of labor, always involving cooperation by multiple *shovo*, were involved in path-cutting. Work ceased on 4, 5, and 6 September as the elders concentrated on the *shōkiya* for Firmino (see above).

On 7 September, Pedro began to organize work parties to accumulate food for the feast. On that day, he led a work party of eleven men to gather plantains. From this point onwards, all those who participated in work parties organized by Pedro were fed at José's *shovo*. Hence, as large amounts of food began to come into José's *shovo*, the women were compelled to increase the quantity and frequency of cooking in order to feed the large work parties. Although the description focuses on men's work parties, women were heavily involved in processing what the men gathered. On 8 September, Alfredo sent his own sons to gather plantains from Nakwa's swidden, bringing them to José's *shovo*.

Simultaneously, Pedro led a work party of thirteen men from four *shovo* (José's, Alfredo's, Nakwa's, and Mashēpa's) to gather plantains elsewhere. On 9 September, Mashēpa brought a tapir he had killed as a gift to Pedro. That day, individuals from at least six *shovo* were feasted on tapir-meat and plantains at José's *shovo*.

I do not know if Pedro received individual credit for his organization of labor, or if this was attributed to José. I do know that Alfredo played a significant role in encouraging people to contribute, for even though it was his brother organizing the feast, Alfredo's reputation stood to benefit because the entire village's economic prosperity would be on display.

On 10 September, Pedro organized the *vina atxia* ('wasp-grab') ritual, preliminary to sending the hunters out to bring meat for the feast. The *vina atxia* could best be described as a ritual of sympathetic magic aimed at bringing success in the hunt. First, someone locates the nest of a particular type of wasp, located half-way up a tree. This wasp is thought to have hunter's skills because its activity pattern resembles that of a hunter. To gain the ability of the wasp it is necessary to be stung. To that end, the tree upon which the wasps make their nest is cut down and a hole in the nest is made with a stick. The young men who wish to have their hunting skills enhanced run to the nest, reach inside, and attempt to grab the wasps' eggs. In the process, they are invariably stung. Upon returning to the village, the hunters went to the *kenā* benches at José's *shovo* where the elders flagellated their arms with a type of thorn branch. Once the arms are red and swollen, the elders took small amounts of the wasps' eggs and rubbed them over the hunters' arms. These painful procedures were aimed at enhancing qualities of the hunters' blood that were considered beneficial to hunting. This practice is remarkably

similar to a Kayapó ritual reported by Darrell Posey (1981). Posey reported that the Kayapó he worked with also purposely damaged a certain wasp's nest because "the Kayapó had learned the wasps' secrets by carefully observing the behavior of wasps and had learned of their 'power' which could be gotten through their potent stings" (Posey 1981:172). A similar pattern of sympathetic reasoning operates among the Marubo and Kayapó: from a wasp's activity pattern to the benefits of being stung.

By the time the hunters had been stung, flagellated and rubbed with wasps' eggs, it was dark. At that point, the children and young women impersonated animals, which the young men 'shot' with miniature model bows and arrows. The children pretended to die when shot and the young men carried them back to the *kenã* benches, where they presented them to the elders as 'meat'. This was repeated numerous times with both children and young women impersonating every type of animal the hunters wished to bring back. Upon completion of the sympathetic imitation phase of the *vina atxia*, an elder (Ivāpa) sat on the *kenã* and sang songs. The hunters circumambulated the *shovo* interior counter-clockwise, responding to each of the elder's verses with an exact imitation. The singing ended only at dawn on 11 September. The hunters then took up their shotguns and headed into the forest. Hunters included young men from six *shovo* (José's, Alfredo's, Vasho's, Nakwa's, Mashēpa's and Sināpa's).

On the same day as the hunters went into the forest Pedro set out overland to the Ituí River. The protocol for the *tanamea* demanded that invitations be issued personally to *shovo ivo*, so Pedro had to visit every *shovo* on the Ituí River. Pedro took with him only three men, from three different *shovo* (José's, Alfredo's, and that of Jaime/Pekōpa). He left early on 11 September and did not return until 20 September.

On the day after Pedro's departure (12 September), José Barbosa returned from Aldeia São Sebastião. With him was Cassimiro (see Chapter Five, figure 5.5—owner of *shovo* number 5), Cassimiro's son-in-law, and a few women and children. José said more had stayed behind to hunt another day. That night, Cassimiro sang myths from dusk to dawn, with a small group of young men circumambulating the *shovo* interior and responding to each verse. From that point on, singing proceeded every night, all night, until the conclusion of the feast.

On 13 September the headman of Aldeia São Sebastião, his brother, and a third elder arrived, bringing tapir and peccary meat and turtle eggs. The following day, more guests from Aldeia São Sebastião arrived, bringing more meat and turtle eggs. It thus took José 17 days (from 29 August to 14 September) to go to Aldeia São Sebastião, invite his guests, lead them back upriver hunting and gathering eggs, and return with the meat, eggs, and guests.

On the 14th of September people from every *shovo* at Aldeia Maronal as well as from Aldeia São Sebastião were feasted on the food and drink that had been accumulated at José's *shovo*. That night, large crowds gathered to dance and sing at José's. Three elders—Okāpa and Cassimiro from Aldeia São Sebastião and Ivāpa from Aldeia Maronal led the all-night singing. The singers slept from dawn to early afternoon; also, since there were three of them, at least one if not two could sleep while the other(s) sang. Nevertheless, someone was singing all night every night. This level of feasting continued day and night on 15, 16 17, 18, and 19 September. Every day, José had to organize work parties to cut wood; the women cooked and served food all day, and also occupied themselves bringing cooking water from the river and creeks.

On the 20th of September, Pedro returned from the Ituí River. He had left the guests from the Ituí back a ways in the forest so they could prepare their ritualized entry. On the 21st of September, the guests from Ituí stayed in the forest, preparing feather headdresses to present to José as gifts. Fresh plantains and bananas were taken from the village to where the guests were, about two hours' walk.

The climax of the *tanamea* took place on 22 September 1997. In the morning, a group of young men and women from both Aldeia Maronal and Aldeia São Sebastião took ceramic pots filled with a fermented corn drink out to the most distant of four clearings that had been made when the path was cut (23 August to 3 September 1997). When they arrived at the clearing, they waited; after an hour or so, the guests from Ituí arrived. They were offered, and accepted, corn drink. Then, the hosts returned to the village. Shortly after the return of the first party, a second party was organized to bring more corn drink out to the guests. This time, elders from Aldeia Maronal and Aldeia São Sebastião went out along with the young men and women. The result was a large encounter of Marubo from both rivers and nearly every village. Again, corn drink was offered and accepted. This time, the elders engaged in a ritualized dialogue called *tsai iki*, the significance of which is described below. When the encounter was finished, the hosts withdrew back to the village. A third party was put together, this time bringing a full meal of meat and eggs as well as potfuls of corn drink. The guests were served the food in a third clearing, after more ritual dialogues. The hosts then withdrew a third time. A fourth and final group was put together, again consisting of both youth and elders, again from both Aldeia São Sebastião and Aldeia Maronal, but this time bringing only corn drink, as had been the case at the first two clearings. Guest and host elders engaged

in a prolonged session of *tsai iki*. Then, the hosts withdrew a final time. The guests prepared to enter the host village.

The guests were ferried across the river in motorized canoes. When the guests had gathered together in a group, the hosts came in a group and a final round of *tsai iki* took place. The guests then walked from the port to Alfredo's *shovo*. There, most of them began dancing in a circle around the *shovo* while a few men, armed with large digging sticks, tore up the well-maintained dirt plaza. The guests repeated the dancing and floor-ripping at Vasho's *shovo*. Finally, they headed to José's *shovo*. On their way there, the men who had digging sticks continued to tear up the ground, while a few young men pulled out machetes and began cutting down the plantain trees around the *shovo*. The youth ran through the plantain field, cutting them down. The men with digging sticks simultaneously uprooted the host's pepper bushes. Meanwhile, the bulk of the guests danced in circles around the host *shovo*. With the digging sticks, the guests tore up the walls of José's *shovo*, then entered and tore up the *kenā* benches, then cut down the signal drum, carried it out of the *shovo*, and splintered it to pieces. Finally, the guests entered the *shovo* in a large group, occupied the center of the *shovo*, and circumambulated counterclockwise, singing, for some 45 minutes.

The reasons for this destruction were difficult to elucidate. I was just told that that is how a *tanamea* is done. Alfredo explained that the perpetrators of the destruction were mainly young nephews of his and José's (census data did not support this statement) and they were here for a party, to have fun, so it was alright. It was the attitude of a tolerant uncle towards well-liked but unruly nephews. I should note that the destruction is reciprocated, as the guests at this *tanamea* responded several months later by throwing

a *tanamea* on the Ituí for their erstwhile Maronal hosts. From an analytic perspective, the ability to allow youth to destroy one's property and to remain unconcerned and tolerant while this happens, can be seen as a form of largesse by which the feast-organizer displays total confidence in his economic abilities, for he is as well as saying 'I can easily recover, go ahead and take your best shot'. Furthermore, the ritualized violence among geographically disparate groups is a theme found in several other phases of the *tanamea*. In the forest clearings where the guests and hosts meet, hosts and guests seek one another out, pick one another up, and carry one another around. Sometimes there is resistance to being picked up, and a lighthearted wrestling match ensues until, inevitably, the resister is picked up and carried around. This seemed to me to be a mock kidnapping. Furthermore the ritualized dialogues (the *tsai iki*—see below) discuss the theme of violence and why it should be avoided. Therefore, the climactic destruction of the host's property is one of several symbolic and controlled expressions of violence among residentially distinct groups that take place during this feast. I believe it to be a dramatized representation of rubber boom relations among warring Panoan groups, aimed at highlighting the difference between the bad old days and the good new ways. However, this interpretation is highly preliminary.

Once they were done singing, the guests were seated where the *kenã* had been. All the food that was left—mainly turtle eggs, manioc, plantains, monkey and tapir meat—was served to the guests from the Ituí River. While the guests were eating, José and Pedro gathered up the gifts of feather headdresses, spears, bows, and arrows that had been brought by for him. With this final exchange of food and gifts done, the *tanamea* was over. It had taken 31 days since the start of path-cutting and had brought together in

one place Marubo from nearly every village and both rivers under one roof and into a single process of mutual assistance in labor and exchange of prestations.

From the above description we may put together a list of the requirements and qualifications for organizing a *tanamea*, which are at the same time requirements and qualifications for the role of *kakaya*. In the first place, considerable personal ability in organization of labor is required. For the *tanamea*, this organization of labor must be on a multiple-*shovo* scale. The organizer has to be able to call on and successfully direct the labor of several different *shovo* to cut the path for the guests, gather bananas and plantains, and hunt for meat. The timing and direction of these activities is the task of the organizer, who thus displays his ability in this area. Secondly, the need for women must be highlighted. Women are required in order to process all the raw food into cooked dishes that can be served to the guests. The *tanamea* organizer must have a substantial number of women in his *shovo* in order to satisfy the huge demand for food, because for the duration of the feast everybody is fed at the host *shovo*. Therefore, a *tanamea* organizer must not only be married, but have other women such as daughters, brother's wives and children, son's wives and children, or brother's son's wives and children, or any combination thereof. And thirdly, the *tanamea* organizer must have the physical space to accomodate the singing, dancing, and eating guests. Enough space, for a *tanamea*, means that the organizer must have a *shovo*. This is likely to be his own *shovo*—and indeed, in all the cases I observed or heard of, the organizers of the *tanamea* were owners of their own *shovo*. Not only must there be a *shovo*, it must also be of sufficient size to accomodate the large crowds that attend. Generally, this signifies that the host has an extended family. Single nuclear families that make *shovo* generally do

not make them large enough to accomodate a feast of this size. All those whom I know to have thrown *tanamea* feasts are long-standing *shovo*-owners with large extended families. In my limited (one year) observations, no one who has been *shovo*-owner for less than ten years has thrown a *tanamea*.

If an egalitarian society is one in which the only criteria for admission to new status are age, sex, and personal characteristics, then are the Marubo egalitarian? This depends, evidently, on the meaning of ‘personal characteristics’. By this, Fried (1967:34) seems to have meant (a) physical characteristics such as speed and strength that one cannot change or modify; (b) luck, both good and bad. The ability to organize labor may be conceded as a ‘personal characteristic’, but the presence of an extended family with enough women to process the food required in a *tanamea* is not a personal characteristic. It is a social characteristic, and a determinant one. Individuals with coresident extended families rich in women can hold *tanamea* feasts, and can therefore be considered legitimate contenders for *kakaya* status. Individuals without such a social network cannot contend for that status. This gives a first indication that social networks are a valuable resource, and that a certain size and configuration are necessary as a basis for political competition. This theme is further explored in the following chapter.

The information presented in this section has demonstrated that (1) throwing feasts is an essential aspect of the role of *kakaya*, (2) therefore, in order to be a *kakaya* one must throw feasts, (3) the largest feasts demand that the organizer have excellent skills in organization of labor and call upon a substantial social network, both coresident and non-coresident. It may further be asserted that there is a correlation between the size of the feast one is capable of throwing and the status one may be considered for.

As explained above, there are three types of feasts. The *tanamea* is the largest, involving the invitation by one village of several other villages. The next smaller feast is the *akoya*. The *akoya* feast is held on the occasion of making a new *ako*, or signal drum. The *akoya* I observed were village-level events. Each *shovo* has one or at most two *ako*. A *shovo* is not considered complete without an *ako*, so *akoya* are typically held after the completion of any *shovo*. The master of ceremonies in these cases is the new *shovo ivo* (*shovo*-owner). It is safe to say, therefore, that virtually any *shovo ivo* will mark his entry into that status by holding an *akoya*. There were a few *shovo* that had no *ako*, but these were considered impoverished. They were the smaller *shovo* consisting of single nuclear families, which lacked the resources to throw an *akoya* (since this involves feeding the whole village for several days). Most *shovo*, and all the larger ones, had an *ako* and thus had a *shovo ivo* capable of organizing an *akoya*, a village-level feast. There is therefore a clear correlation between *shovo ivo* status and the ability to hold an *akoya*. In the absence of a *shovo ivo*, the second highest status male can organize an *akoya*; this is a clear statement of his **ability** to be *shovo ivo* should the need arise.

The smallest types of feast were the ‘feasts of plenty’. For example, tapirs were never eaten alone by the *shovo* of the hunter. The killing of a tapir always occasioned the invitation of adjacent *shovo* to share in the meat. The range of an invitation to eat tapir could be from two to as many as seven other *shovo*. The harvesting of large amounts of peach palm fruit also occasioned series of invitations and counter-invitations, ranging from one to four or more other *shovo*. Excess of virtually any food resource commonly led to such invitations at Aldeia Maronal—from turtle eggs and tree frogs (an edible species of which swarms seasonally) to black spider monkey troops and corn harvests.

These feasts could be organized by any married man with a space in a *shovo*. It did not have to be the *shovo ivo* himself, but could also be organized by his brother or other coresidents. But only people with a woman to cook the raw food can organize even this smallest of feasts—hence the requirement that an individual be married to hold even a small feast. By organizing such a feast, a man displays his abilities in economic production and gains recognition as a productive adult male. The three feasts thus relate to admission to three statuses: feasts of plenty, for consideration as adult male; the *akoya*, for recognition as *shovo ivo* or potential *shovo ivo*; and the *tanamea*, to be considered for *kakaya* status.

The correlation between organization of feasts and admission to statuses returns us to the fundamental questions of this chapter: what are people's goals, and what are the strategies used to achieve those goals? Through the analysis of feasting, it has been concluded that among the goals held by adult men, are those of admission to the statuses of productive adult, *shovo ivo*, and *kakaya*. Since the ability to organize feasts is an essential aspect of each of these roles, individuals who wish to display their qualifications for a status can do so by successfully organizing the requisite-sized feast. A man who wishes to be recognized as productive adult can do so by organizing feasts of plenty, inviting others to share his excess food; a man who has just built a *shovo* announces his admission to this select status (4.2% of total population) by organizing an *akoya*; a man who wishes to be known as a *kakaya* must have the ability to organize a *tanamea*. The organization of these feasts is not the only strategy for obtaining these statuses, but it is a common and effective one. To use these strategies, however, the feast-organizer must have the ability to call on an appropriate social network for labor. It is true that

admission to certain statuses may be secured by organizing feasts, but this requirement itself has its own requirements, the most essential of which is the ability to call on women for their cooking abilities.

The three levels of feast have different numbers of guests; the higher the number of guests, the larger the number of women required to cook all the food. To organize a feast of plenty, such as a tapir feast, one woman—the organizer's wife—is necessary. These feasts typically have only one main ingredient and one woman can cook all of it. To organize an *akoya*, one must be able to feed a whole village. In the case of Aldeia Maronal, that meant feeding over 200 people for two to three days. This required a labor force coterminous with that required to build a *shovo*: at minimum, a mature family, and hence one with daughters as well as a wife, and often also a brother's wife and her daughters. To organize a *tanamea*, one had to be ready to feed not only one's own village, but large numbers of guests from other villages also. The *tanamea* described above involved feeding the host village for sixteen days (from 30 to 200 people a day, increasing in amount from the start of food-gathering when only workers were fed, to the final week of the feast when the whole village was fed); feeding guests from Aldeia São Sebastião for eleven days, including at least fifty people at least twice daily for nine days; and feeding the 65 guests from the Ituí River on the final day of the feast. This huge amount of food could only be cooked by the women of a prosperous extended family, and even then, only when the women called on their kin for assistance. This shows that if a man wants to organize a feast to obtain a certain status, he must develop a social network that includes sufficient women. He must first marry, to enter the status of productive adult by organizing feasts of plenty; then, have a growing family, to build a *shovo*,

organize an *akoya*, and enter *shovo ivo* status; finally, a man who wishes to become *kakaya*, to organize a *tanamea*, needs to have developed an extended coresident family by any of the means available in Marubo society—uxorilocal, agnatic, and/or avuncular (see Chapter Four).

In addition to female labor, successful feasting requires that the organizer direct the labor of men in a number of tasks, but mainly in food-production. The *tanamea* requires that the organizer direct work parties in cutting paths through the forest, and the *akoya* requires that the organizer direct the manufacture of a signal drum, but the centerpiece of all feasting is the food. Although the organizer participates in much of the labor, the amount of tasks required to hold a *tanamea* or an *akoya* is too great for one person to participate, and much of the time the organizer truly directs work parties which he himself does not join with. At other times I have observed the organizer accompanying workers, for example during path-cutting, but letting the youths do almost all of the work. Hence, this is true direction of labor, not mere leading by example. By organizing a feast, a man displays his ability in food production, displays his ability to produce more than enough for himself and his coresidents, and hence displays his ability to organize his own life and those of his coresidents in a way conducive to prosperity. The importance of group prosperity and health and their relationship to feasting and food cannot be underestimated. To understand the motivations behind Marubo feasting it is necessary to understand the value system underlying it. That value system is most clearly exemplified in the ritual dialogues conducted during the *tanamea* feast—the *tsai iki*.

The *tsai iki* is a ritualized expression of the system of values underlying the practice of *tanamea*. Examination of the content of *tsai iki* shows that feasting is

explicitly linked to group survival and group prosperity in Marubo ethics. When the elders from the two rivers meet in the clearings outside the host village, they face off in pairs. One in each pair will commence a speech, and the other will listen, then make a speech of his own. This can go on for several turns; sometimes, the elders then switch off and engage in *tsai iki* with a second partner. The *tsai iki* has certain set elements—rhythm, verse structure, archaisms of vocabulary, and general subject matter—but within those parameters, there is room for elders to display variations in skill. Elders delight in delivering *tsai iki* and listening to those of others. They may practice for hours in the days leading up to a feast, planning variants for different possible dialogue partners. In the delivery of the *tsai iki* they display their carefully practiced ability with words.

What is most relevant here is the subject matter of *tsai iki*. According to my main informant on this subject matter, Pedro Barbosa, in the course of the *tsai iki*, the elders recall how internecine violence among their ancestors led to hunger in the past, and contrast that condition with the current condition of prosperity and plenty, displayed in the act of feasting. The violence referred to in these speeches is that of the rubber boom. Oral histories of that time indicate that there was considerable violence among pre-Marubo groups; that violence ended only when a small group ended up at the headwaters of the Arrojo under the leadership of João Tuxáua. Pedro told me that João Tuxáua had been a great believer in feasting, organizing feasts himself and encouraging others to organize them, under the guiding principle that continual feasting would help people be healthy and help children grow strong. The backdrop to this was the extinction of numerous exogamous units (see Chapter Eight) and the clear danger of social extinction. The condition of prosperity and growth linked to continual feasting is thus contrasted

with the conditions of hunger and violence that existed during the rubber boom. It is that value system that is expressed in the *tsai iki*: in a nutshell, the idea that feasting is beneficial to group survival and prosperity. Therefore, in organizing feasts, Marubo are doing more than just pursuing personal aggrandizement or higher status. They are pursuing some of the highest values in their cultural system, values that they believe assist the entire Marubo nation in its delicate demographic recovery from the rubber boom.

From an analytic perspective, there is a notable correlation between the latent and manifest functions of feasting. A manifest function, according to Marubo informants, is the fostering of group health and prosperity in explicit contrast to the past of violence. From the latent/analytic perspective, we cannot ignore the function of feasting in political organization. Feasts of plenty bring together multiple *shovo* on a regular basis; *akoya* feasts bring together entire villages, or on the Ituí River multiple villages; *tanamea* feasts bring together multiple villages. Feasting thus has a clear effect of generating group unity and cohesion on every scale from small to large. Without such rituals, political and even cultural atomization could occur as the Marubo population spreads out. With feasting given such high value in Marubo ethics, and with the essential role feasting plays in status-seeking, there is little danger that such atomization will occur. Hence, from an analytic perspective as well as from the emic perspective, feasting is beneficial on a group level.

In conclusion, it can be said that feasting intersects the political sphere in the following ways:

(1) Feast organizing is a necessary prerequisite for admission to the highest status in Marubo society, that of *kakaya*. To be considered even a potential *kakaya*, a Marubo man must show the ability to organize a very large feast. In organizing a feast, the ambitious man displays all the ideal qualities of the Marubo leader: abilities in economic production, ability in organization of labor; ability to create and maintain a family and a broad social network; ability to foster health and prosperity in that group; adherence to the most cherished traditional values and ethics.

(2) Although not absolutely essential for either, there is a high degree of correlation (a) between admission to status of productive adult and organization of feasts of plenty, and (b) between admission to status of *shovo ivo* and organization of *akoya* feasts.

(3) Feasts have the effect of political integration on multiple levels—sub-village level, village level, and multiple-village level. The higher the status an individual is seeking, the higher the level of political integration they must be able to effect through their feast-organizing.

These observations on feasting allow us to discern a locus of inequality in access to resources in Marubo society. There exists a gap between feast-throwers and those who cannot throw feasts. The essential resource for organizing a feast is a social network: a wife for a small feast, a mature family for an *akoya*, an extended coresident kin group for a *tanamea*. Whoever has access to the requisite social network can organize the feast, and thus access the status linked to that feast. The most basic operation in this subsphere of the political system is the act of entering into a durable marriage that produces offspring. An unmarried man cannot rise in status, and cannot hope to do so in the future.

The best example of this at Aldeia Maronal was Ronipa (see Chapter Six for details of relations to non-indigenous people for this individual). Ronipa had had the misfortune of being twice divorced. Both his wives had left him and remarried; both his children lived elsewhere. This was a matter of extreme concern to him, since he was a skilled hunter but had no wife to cook for him. He told me he wanted to find a woman to remedy this problem. He tried to get his daughter to move back in with him, an endeavor that put him in conflict with his ex-wife's kin, and proved unsuccessful in the end (see Chapter Nine). He then keyed in on a young girl who would be available for marriage in a few years; to position himself as that girl's future husband, he began to reside with and work for her father. In both these efforts, his explicitly stated goal was that he wanted to remedy the problem of not having anyone to cook for him. Other informants stated that when he was married, Ronipa threw excellent feasts all the time, because he was a hard worker and a good hunter. But when he lost his wives, he could no longer organize feasts and so his promising rise in political status ended. His opinion was not taken very seriously by the village's political leaders because he had never been able to create the social network that would permit him to display his economic production skills. It was known that he had the skills to organize feasts; he just lacked the essential social resources to do so. He could not compete effectively for status. He was aware of this, and openly yearned for a return to the days when he could translate his superior hunting prowess into political status. This example serves to demonstrate the significance of marriage, reproduction, and the formation of social networks in Marubo society. Success or failure in these tasks is an important determinant of access to higher status. This means that Marubo society is "one in which positions of valued status are somehow limited so that not all

those of sufficient talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve them" (Fried 1967:109)—the very definition of a rank society. I point this out not because I wish to argue that Marubo society is a rank society on the order of the Tikopians or Nootka, but rather in order to point out that the Marubo are not, definitionally, egalitarian. In addition, since it is a stretch to label the Marubo a rank society, yet they are one by strict definition, I must conclude that Fried's typology cannot be used meaningfully to classify the Marubo political system.

C. Organization of Labor

Like feasting, organization of labor is an essential aspect of the roles of *kakáya* and *shovo ivo* in Marubo society. For Alfredo at Aldeia Maronal, it is more than a duty arising from his social position. Alfredo's ability in organization of labor is a means of production of the social network—a tool he uses to attract and retain residents to his expanding village. He uses his labor force in large-scale projects that render the village more attractive to those who are considering a change of residence; he uses it to assist new residents in the establishment of their new homes; and he uses it to facilitate difficult agricultural tasks for those who are lacking in available labor. In his discourse, he communicates a value system explicitly linking cooperation in labor with social wealth and well-being. By communicating those values, he maintains a system that benefits himself by benefiting others.

The basis of Alfredo's superiority in labor-organization is not merely some quality of personality, but also sheer numbers. Alfredo's *shovo* has the largest population

of able-bodied adult men of any *shovo* at Maronal, by far. Thanks to this large adult male population, Alfredo does not need to borrow labor from others for his own normal subsistence tasks. In fact, Alfredo loans out his labor force more frequently than he borrows others'. Thanks to these regular loans of labor, others are in his debt in that regard. This enables Alfredo to occasionally call on relatively large pools of labor for community projects, because many owe him labor. These community projects facilitate Alfredo's attraction of new residents to the village, so that Alfredo's organization of labor has the ultimate effect of increasing the total amount of labor potentially at his disposal—a positive feedback loop. This system of labor exchange and organization is highly valued by Alfredo and by others at Maronal; Alfredo has embedded these practices in his value system, asserting that labor-organization is the role of the true *kakáya*, and the mark of a successful Marubo leader. To understand how Alfredo used labor as a political resource, I will analyze instances of multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor at Aldeia Maronal, together with statements of the value system that underpins such cooperation. Aldeia Maronal burgeoned from nine *shovo* in July 1997 to twelve by December. After fire took one in January 1998, eleven *shovo* remained. For this analysis, I will use the December 1997 configuration.

The basis of the system of labor exchange is the existence of inequalities among *shovo* in total labor available. The distribution of able-bodied adult men at Aldeia Maronal is presented in Table 7.2. These data show that Alfredo's workforce is more than twice the size of anyone else's. Alfredo has 15 able-bodied men in his *shovo*, whereas no other *shovo* has more than six. This correlates with the observation that Alfredo often loans his labor force out, but rarely borrows anyone else's labor. In eleven

months of observations (August 1997 to July 1998), I found that Alfredo's work force assisted other *shovo* eight times, whereas other *shovo* assisted Alfredo only once. To understand the political significance of these labor exchanges, it is necessary to review the instances in which Alfredo's personnel are involved in multi-*shovo* cooperative projects.

Alfredo's workforce assisted Mayāpa's three times in 1997-98. These instances are significant because it shows that Alfredo can use his labor force to facilitate the relocation of others to Aldeia Maronal. Mayāpa is the leader of the Varinawavo *shovo*, a peripheral *shovo* upstream from Alfredo. The establishment of Mayāpa's *shovo* was discussed in chapter Five, and his relations to non-indigenous people were discussed in Chapter Six. It is an agnatic *shovo*, centered on four full brothers of the Varinawavo clan. The four brothers coresided with José Barbosa until the latter moved to Aldeia Maronal circa 1994. When the old *shovo* decayed beyond repair, Mayāpa initiated construction of a new one, closer to, and forming part of, Aldeia Maronal. This *shovo* was under construction when I arrived in July 1997; it was finished in October 1997. Throughout August, Alfredo with his brothers, his sons, and his brother's sons worked with Mayāpa and his brothers on the new *shovo*. In September, work was interrupted as José Barbosa's *tanamea* feast proceeded; work was resumed in late September and the *shovo* was completed in early October. On the occasion when I observed the work, there were at least five young men and two elders from Alfredo's *shovo* assisting in construction and path-cutting for Mayāpa's new *shovo*. Since the total workforce available to Mayāpa was five, and Alfredo contributed at least seven, Alfredo more than doubled the workforce available for constructing the new *shovo*.

There are two obvious reasons why Alfredo assisted Mayãpa. First, close affinal ties link Mayãpa and his brothers to Alfredo's *shovo*. Mayãpa is married to Alfredo's daughter. Mayãpa's brother Potõpa is also married to a daughter of Alfredo. Emãpa is married to the daughter of Miguel, one of Alfredo's coresident brothers. The oldest of the four brothers, Võpa, is married to Alfredo's patrilateral sister. Thus, every one of the Varinawavo brothers has a direct affinal link to Alfredo or Alfredo's brother Miguel. Because of these close ties, it is reasonable that Mayãpa should call on Alfredo for labor assistance, in the sense that one would expect a person to call on those with whom one has the closest links. Recall from Chapter Five that one of the reasons for the breakup of the *shovo* where the Varinawavo coresided with José Barbosa was that the two component groups did not intermarry. In fact, the Varinawavo intermarried with Alfredo and his coresidents, establishing long-lasting ties with them by this means.

Aside from the issue of helping out his close affines (and thus helping out his daughters and sister and brother's daughter), Alfredo helped Mayãpa because by doing so, he made his own village larger and therefore more successful. We have seen in Chapter Five how Alfredo deployed a deliberate long-term strategy to create a village and enlarge it. In Chapter Six, the main strategy he used to render his village attractive to others was described. The strategy focused on construction of an airstrip and purchase of an electric generator. After these projects were completed, Alfredo issued invitations to others to move to Aldeia Maronal. These facts demonstrate that Alfredo wanted to make his village larger, and he knew that a large labor force wisely organized can be used to render the village more attractive to people who are considering a move. But the way he assisted Mayãpa in moving adds another element to the equation of Alfredo's success.

TABLE 7.2.: Distribution of able-bodied men at Aldeia Maronal. All ages as of 12/97.A. Core shovo.

Alfredo's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 15.

Alfredo—age 55.

Sons by first wife: Shor̄ipa, age 30.

Txana, age 20.

Sons by second wife: Ravēpa

Txanōpa, age 20.

Yopa, age 19.

Alfredo's full brother Zacarias, age 76—too old for effective labor.

Zacarias' sons: Topāpa, age 36.

Iskōpa, age 33.

Vina, age 18.

Alfredo's half-/classificatory brother Miguel, age 64.

Miguel's son Kanāpa, age 29.

Alfredo's half-/classificatory brother Joāozinho, age 60.

Joāozinho's sons: Peo, age 23.

Sina, age 22.

May, age 18.

Vasho's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 6.

Vasho—age 38. Vasho's oldest son is 12.

Vasho's full brother Mesēpa, age 41. Mesēpa's oldest son is 12.

Vasho's patrilateral brother Eshēpa, age 28.

Vasho's deceased full brother's sons: Tsainamāpa, age 23.

Vina, age 19.

Aurélio's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 3.

Aurélio, age 67.

Aurélio's sons: Pekōpa, age 24.

May, age 16.

José's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 6.

José, age 55.

José's sons by his first wife: Manoel, age 23.

Vire, age 16.

Mene, age 14.

José's son by his second wife: Paulo, age 18.

José's full brother Pedro, age 45.

B. Downriver periphery.

Wanõpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 2.

Wanõpa: age 74, too old for effective labor. Oldest coresident son aged 4.
Matrilateral brother: Misael, age 78. Too old for effective labor.

Misael's son: Panõpa, age 38.

Panõpa's son: Paishi, age 16.

Nakwa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 3.

Nakwa: age 58.

Nakwa's wife's son: Nea, age 24.

Nakwa's son: Tae, age 14.

Pekõpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 1.

Pekõpa: age 38. Oldest son is 13, not yet a full worker.

Mashẽpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 3.

Mashẽpa: age 29.

Mashẽpa's classificatory brothers: Tamãpa, age 24.

Mayãpa, age 24.

Ivãpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 3.

Ivãpa: age 63.

Ivãpa's son: Vasõpa, age 29.

Son of Ivãpa's deceased ex-wife: Wanõpa, age 39.

C. Upriver periphery

Mayãpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 5.

Mayãpa; age 36. Oldest son is 6 years old.

Brothers: Emãpa, age 31.

Potõpa, age 30.

Võpa, age 58.

Võpa's son: Varishavõpa, age 31.

Wasinawa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 5.

Wasinawa: age 45.

Son by first wife: Rane, age 18.

Son by second wife: Kene, age 14.

Daughter's husband: Venāpa, age 25.

Sister's son: Ronīpa, age 33.

Sināpa's shovo. Total adult male workforce: 6.

Sināpa: age 55.

Sons: Poirekōpa, age 29.

Táwaivo, age 26.

Pakāpa, age 25.

Kene, age 23.

Vino, age 17.

Alfredo did not merely invite people to move to his village; he could more than double the labor force of anyone choosing to move to Maronal, thereby greatly facilitating the task of relocation. If a *shovo* is deteriorating and a new one must be built, and if you have a choice between moving to a place alone, or moving to a place where labor contributions will reduce your own workload to less than half what it would otherwise be, then there is a strong incentive to move to where the labor assistance is.

After the construction of Mayāpa's *shovo* (August-October 1997), Alfredo loaned his labor force to Mayāpa at least twice more. From 13 to 15 January 1998, Alfredo lent his workforce to cut a new swidden for Mayāpa. And in February, Alfredo loaned his workforce to assist Mayāpa in planting his new field with manioc. I participated in this latter event and was impressed with the vast quantity of work such cooperative work parties can accomplish. Four of Mayāpa's five adult men were working; in addition, eight men from Alfredo's *shovo* assisted, plus myself. Five men went to gather manioc stems. Three men dug holes in the ground. An elder sat and chopped the manioc stems down to appropriate size for planting. Two men, including myself, carried baskets of cut stems and tossed them into the holes. Two men went behind us tamping the holes down with dirt. As a result, the entire swidden was fully planted in one day. We may assume that if Mayāpa did not have the cooperation of Alfredo, it would have taken three or more days. At any rate, Alfredo loaned his labor force to Mayāpa three times in the one year I observed them, always in the context of facilitating Mayāpa's relocation and establishment in Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo's village.

Alfredo loaned his labor force out regularly to anyone organizing a feast. This occurred three times between August 1997 and July 1998. The first occasion was José's

tanamea feast of September 1997. From 23 August to 3 September, six men from Alfredo's *shovo* assisted José in cutting a path towards the Ituí; from 7 September to 16 September, ten men from Alfredo's *shovo* assisted José in gathering food for the feast. Alfredo's workforce was subsequently loaned to Nakwa for the *akoya* feast held on 7 February 1998. Three men of Alfredo's *shovo* helped cut a path through an old swidden so the *ako* drum could be carried through; seven men of Alfredo's *shovo* assisted in the manufacture of the *ako*; and three men of Alfredo's *shovo* helped to physically carry the *ako* to its resting place at Nakwa's *shovo*. The third occasion on which Alfredo loaned his workforce for the organization of a feast was the *akoya* of José Barbosa, held on 25 June. This event was closely observed because I lived with José and because I understood the interactions better, having been in the field for ten months by then.

On 15 May, 1998, José made public his intention to hold an *akoya*. A number of elders were gathered at night on the *kenã* when he told them. The condition of the village was discussed: is there enough food available? Do too many people have malaria? After a discussion, it was agreed that the *akoya* could go on. There was a significant factor in this decision-making: Alfredo was in the city of Cruzeiro, receiving treatment for a skin condition. Therefore, the decision was made by consensus among elders, with no final authority. On the following day, 16 May, José went to visit Alfredo's son Txanõpa. Recall (from Chapter Six) that, although Txanõpa had older brothers, he was the one who was clearly slated to succeed Alfredo. In Alfredo's absence, Txanõpa had been left a series of instructions as to tasks that needed to be accomplished in his father's absence. Txanõpa was then left in charge of organizing and directing labor in accordance with Alfredo's instructions. Clearly, Alfredo was making sure that Txanõpa learned how to

organize labor, a *sine qua non* of successful Marubo leadership. At 5 p.m. on 16 May, José asked Txanōpa if he could spare some manpower on the morrow to help him cut and carry *shikomani* (a tasty variety of banana) from a field owned by Mashēpa. Txanōpa assented, saying that on the following day he would not be needing his full workforce.

On 17 May, José went to Alfredo's *shovo* and returned with two of Txanōpa's brothers and two of Alfredo's brothers' sons. Along with personnel from Vasho's *shovo* and from Mashēpa's, José was able to bring a large amount of bananas into his *shovo*. On the following day (18 May 1998), José's brother Pedro took a group of men from Alfredo's and Vasho's *shovo* on an early morning hunting expedition, which produced two agouti and one deer, all of which went to José's *shovo* so that it could be given away at the imminent feast. That same morning, several women temporarily moved into José's *shovo*. Wasinawa's wife and daughter moved into an empty space, set up their hammocks and a cooking-fire, and began cooking a large pot of the corn drink *waka*. The second wife of Sināpa, Vó, also set up her hammock and a cooking-fire in José's *shovo* and began cooking *waka*. Wasinawa's daughter was active in the arduous tasks of fetching cooking-water from the river and carrying firewood. Thus, José's wives had considerable assistance in processing all the food which the men were bringing in. Towards midday, still on the 18th, a gift agouti was brought from Alfredo's son Ravēpa . At about the same time, Mashēpa, who had already contributed *shikomani* from his swidden, came by with word that he had killed a deer he would contribute to the feast.

On the afternoon of 18 May 1998, José called for a *vina atxia*, the ritual of hunting prowess described earlier in this chapter. All but two of the *shovo* at Maronal participated in this *vina atxia*. On the day after the *vina atxia*, the hunters set out

downstream by canoe to get meat for the feast. The hunters included three men from José's *shovo*, two from Alfredo's, one from Vasho's, four from Mayãpa's, and one from Wasinawa's. They returned on 22 May with forty-four monkeys and one tapir. That same day, Alfredo's second wife and the widow of Vasho's brother set up hammocks and cooking-fires in José's *shovo*, and commenced to help with cooking the monkeys and the tapir. Later that afternoon, José organized a group of four men from Alfredo's *shovo* and one from Vasho's to cut, carry, and stack a large pile of firewood.

By 23 May, the feasting was in full swing. That day, Aurélio's wife and Joãozinho's wife both installed hammocks and cooking-fires at José's *shovo*. This means that six adult women were cooking full-time, in addition to the three adult women already residing at José's. Later that day, Nakwa brought in a tapir he had killed, and contributed to the feast. Meanwhile the *ako* itself was being cut and hollowed in the forest. I did not observe that process closely, but it involved at least members of three *shovo* other than José's. The following day, 24 May, José had to organize another work party to cut, carry, chop and stack firewood, since that which had been cut on the 22nd was depleted. This work party included men from Alfredo's, Vasho's, Nakwa's, and Mashẽpa's *shovo*. During all these days, the entire village was fed at José's *shovo*. The final task involving multiple-*shovo* cooperation during José's *akoya* was the carrying of the *ako* from where it was cut and hollowed to José's *shovo*. The carrying of the *ako* took place on 25 May 1998. Sixteen men from eight *shovo* helped carry the signal drum. The contributions of other *shovo* to José's *akoya* are presented in figure 4. Although all *shovo* contributed in some way to the feast, Alfredo's *shovo* played a significant role, particularly when bananas and plantains were being brought to José's *shovo*. We may conclude that

Alfredo, through his son Txanōpa, provided considerable labor assistance in terms of gathering and processing food so as to make the feast more plentiful in terms of food available.

The common point in the organization of all three feasts was the intense contribution of labor from Alfredo's *shovo*. The presence of Alfredo's work parties allows Maronal's feasts to achieve a higher level of grandeur than if it were absent. In the case of José's feasts, the contribution of Alfredo's sons and brother's sons was essential in food procurement; in the case of Nakwa's *akoya*, Alfredo's sons and brother's sons took care of most of the heavy physical tasks of cutting and carrying. In all cases, anyone who is going to throw a feast knows he can count on contributions from other *shovo*, and especially from Alfredo's substantial workforce. Feasting is considered enjoyable in and of itself, but it is also a public display of economic prosperity as well as a strategy for gaining prestige. Therefore, Alfredo's large labor force, and his habit of loaning out that force, allow the adult men at Maronal greater access to the means of competing for prestige, and allow everyone in the village to enjoy greater feasts. These contributions help to create a sense that it is beneficial to live near Alfredo.

Two further contributions of labor from Alfredo's to José's *shovo* were observed during fieldwork. José had cut and planted a new swidden, the corn from which was about ready for harvest in May 1998. To get the corn, José had to clean the swidden of the undergrowth and weeds that were clogging the paths. On 12 May, José went out by canoe with his son and son-in-law, returning a day later with 12 black spider monkeys and one collared peccary. On 14 May, José invited Alfredo's brothers to help him clean the swidden. Joāozinho and Miguel came to help José, who fed them with the monkey

and peccary meat he had obtained. José then held his *akoya* (16-25 May). Once the *akoya* was complete, José wanted to clean his swidden further. He sent his son, his brother, brother's wife, daughter, and daughter's husband to hunt and gather wild fruit. He said that once his brother returned with the food, he would invite people to help him work. They returned on 7 May with a sizeable catch of *pirarucu* fish and a tapir. José issued his invitation to work, but got poor results. On 8 May, he told me that two other men were engaged in swidden-cleaning, and no one wanted to defer their own job until someone else's was done. Nevertheless, José got Joãozinho and Peo to help him clean his swidden on 9 and 11 June. In compensation, they fed on the abundant fish and meat at José's.

Counting all these examples, we find eight instances in which Alfredo's *shovo* contributed labor to tasks involving multiple-*shovo* cooperation. In contrast, I observed Alfredo requesting assistance from others only once. This event occurred on 2 February 1998. Alfredo and his sons had been cutting and carving an eight-metre canoe some distance into the forest. When the carving was done, Alfredo and his son cut a path from the canoe's location to the nearest *igarapé*. They also cut rollers and lay them down the entire length of the new path. On 1 February, Alfredo went to Aurélio's, Vasho's, and Mayápa's *shovo* to request assistance in labor for the morrow. Everybody who was invited went. There were seven men from Alfredo's *shovo*, two men from Vasho's *shovo*, two men from Aurélio's *shovo*, and one man from Mayápa's *shovo*, for a total of seven men from Alfredo's and five men from other *shovo*. The work party pushed the canoe to the *igarapé* successfully, in one day (2 February 1998). This was the only occasion on which I observed Alfredo requesting labor from others.

TABLE 7.3.: Contributions of labor for José's *akoya*.

From the core *shovo*:

Vasho's shovo: Hunting, gathering agricultural products, cutting wood, cooking, carving the drum, carrying the drum.

Alfredo's shovo: Mobilization of labor (by Txanõpa), hunting, gathering agricultural products, cooking, carving the drum, carrying the drum.

Aurélio's shovo: Cooking.

From the peripheral *shovo*:

Sinãpa's shovo: Cooking, carrying the drum.

Wasinawa's shovo: Hunting, cooking, carrying firewood and cooking water, carving the drum, carrying the drum.

Mayãpa's shovo: Hunting, carrying the drum.

Wanõpa's shovo: Carrying the drum.

Nakwa's shovo: Hunting, cutting firewood, carrying the drum.

Mashẽpa's shovo: Hunting, contributions of meat and agricultural products, gathering of agricultural products, carrying firewood, carrying the drum.

The essential conclusion to draw from these data is that Alfredo loans his labor out more frequently than he borrows others'. From August 1997 to July 1998, I observed Alfredo's labor being borrowed eight times, but Alfredo only borrowed labor once. The reason is obvious: Alfredo's workforce is large enough to handle virtually any task. He does not have to borrow labor from anyone, whereas others do have to borrow his if they are to complete tasks in a timely manner. Therefore, Alfredo has his entire village in a state of continual labor-debt: they owe him, and he owes no one in this regard. On the instance in which he did request labor, everyone assented. It is very likely that those who contributed to pushing Alfredo's canoe knew that by doing so, they retained the ability to call on Alfredo's labor in the future. The presence of Alfredo's labor force thus becomes an asset to the entire village, but one which Alfredo has used to put himself in a position where his calls for labor are quickly obeyed.

To fully understand the political significance of these data on organization of labor, it is necessary at this point to recall two instances in which Alfredo called on others' labor prior to the start of fieldwork. These events have been previously discussed in Chapter Six. Some time before my arrival at Maronal, Alfredo had organized the entire village to cut an airstrip so that missionaries and health supplies could be flown in. Subsequently, he organized multiple *shovo* in cutting down enough trees to trade for a generator. In general, Alfredo calls on labor infrequently and for unique projects. In contrast, others call on Alfredo's labor force for frequently recurring tasks—agricultural, construction, and feasting-related. Because his labor force is twice as large as anyone else's, Alfredo does not need to borrow labor for recurring tasks. Since others borrow his labor for such frequently occurring tasks, Alfredo has them in his debt. He then calls his

debt in for exceptional projects such as his canoe (large canoes are not frequently built, they are considered exceptional efforts), or large-scale community projects like the airstrip. He calls on others' labor for large projects exclusively, whereas others call on his labor for more mundane tasks.

Another fact of Alfredo's organization of labor must be highlighted before proceeding: that he organizes labor in such a way as to increase the attractiveness and demographic size of his village. In other words, organization of labor is to Alfredo a means of production of the social network. He used it to attract the missionaries and create a health care system, a feature he subsequently used to convince others to move to and remain in his village; he also used his labor force to facilitate the relocation of others at Aldeia Maronal, as in the case of Mayāpa; and he used his labor to make life easier for them once they had moved to Maronal, by facilitating agricultural tasks and contributing to the organization of feasts.

To back up the observed system of labor-exchange at Maronal, Alfredo has developed a system of ethical thought in which the way things are done is the way things should be done by proper Marubo. He communicates his system of ethics to others, making sure that all those who live in his village understand the benefits of mutual assistance in labor. This system of thought, as it applies to justifying and propelling a set of actual social behaviors, could be called a philosophy insofar as it is a set of related ideas which have a high degree of logical consistency. The significance of presenting Alfredo's thoughts on organization of labor is in the insight it will provide into the goals Marubo people pursue. It will tell us why the Maronal Marubo engage in mutual assistance in labor, and in so doing tell us what Marubo people value, the basis of

political analysis throughout this dissertation. Once we know what is valued, we can ask whether there is an equal distribution of access to what is valued.

There are several components to Alfredo's philosophy of labor-exchange. Firstly, he compares himself to other indigenous groups and to other groups of Marubo in order to highlight what is distinctive about Maronal. He then clearly points out the material benefits of the way things are done at Maronal. Finally, he explains that he does as a *kakáya* should do, giving a socially normative aspect to his philosophy of labor exchange.

The fundamental pieces of Alfredo's philosophy of labor-exchange are the comparisons he makes between Maronal and others. On 15 August 1997 (only my second week in the field), Alfredo explained to me how he had the airstrip cut, how he managed to obtain an electric generator, and eventually got a TV and a satellite dish. Then he told me that other Indians, and he explicitly named the neighboring Kanamari, do not have any of these things. This, he said, is because they have no tuxáua, so they are like children. Now, he concluded, they have nothing. This statement shows that to Alfredo, the presence of a tuxáua means someone can organize labor for community-level projects. Alfredo highlights the material benefits of this scale of organization of labor. He points out that the Marubo are distinctive from neighboring Indians in this sense, and ridicules those others as 'children'.

According to Alfredo, not all Marubo have Maronal's beneficial system of work. In particular, he compares Maronal to the upper Ituí Marubo, highlighting the differences in organization of labor, the benefits of Maronal's ways and the detrimental effects of the Ituí ways. An excellent example of this discourse occurred on 18 January 1998 while Alfredo was directing his workforce in the cutting of a new swidden for his son-in-law

Mayãpa. This was a three-*shovo* effort involving Alfredo's, Mayãpa's, and Wasinawa's *shovo*. That evening, after the work was done, Alfredo told me that “that is how we work at Maronal. Each *shovo* working on its own is no good (Port. *não presta*). When there are just three or four people, they eventually get the job done, but it is difficult and takes longer”. Alfredo specifically cited Ivãpa's and Wanõpa's *shovo* as ones that could not subsist if they had to do all their work themselves. Because it is so difficult for single *shovo* to finish large work projects, Alfredo said, here at Maronal multiple *shovo* work together on single projects. Alfredo emphasized that they do so for only food in payment (although I note that there is also a diffuse obligation to repay in the future-a form of generalized reciprocity). Alfredo then said that on the Ituí River everyone lives spread out, no one works together, and so not as much is accomplished. “Here at Maronal,” he continued, “everybody lives close together, thus they can cooperate and get a lot of work done. Here at Maronal, they have a generator and an [indigenous-owned] airstrip. Ituí's style doesn't work (*não presta*), he said. Maronal has all these good things, but on the Ituí they have nothing, they are poorer.” Alfredo then returned to the role of the tuxáua in these processes: “Here we all live together with one tuxáua. One tuxáua is good. Over there [Ituí] they live all spread out, with each *shovo ivo* claiming to be a tuxáua. On the Ituí, when one *shovo* invites another to work, the other won't come.” Alfredo concluded that the reason why Ituí *shovo* do not cooperate with one another is because they want money for work. Alfredo ridicules that notion and says that Maronal's system is much better.

I should emphasize that these are statements by the leader of one village about other villages, not statements of empirical fact. I do not have observations that would

permit me to confirm or deny Alfredo's statements. I do know that the Ituí missionaries have for years been attempting to convince the Ituí Marubo to always work for money. The missionaries have a strict rule against giving things away. They told me that the Marubo had a strong cultural work ethic. If they were to give the Marubo gifts, it would get them used to handouts, and so damage their work ethic. Hence, they always make the Marubo work for material goods. According to Alfredo, however, the mission's activities have the opposite effect to that intended: the emphasis on wage labor is detrimental to the accomplishment of large-scale community projects, which are accomplished through processes of generalized reciprocity rather than through the hiring of wage-labor.

It is clear from Alfredo's discourse that he associates his style of organization of labor with the proper role of a Marubo *kakáya*. As described in the section on feasting, one of the aspects of a *kakáya*'s normative role is to direct food-procurement activities prior to a feast. A high degree of skill in organizing food-procurement is necessary to be considered a *kakáya*. In addition, through his discourses Alfredo asserts that the ability of Maronal Marubo to cooperate on large labor projects is due to the presence there (and nowhere else in the area) of a *tuxáua*, the word Alfredo uses to translate the Marubo *kakáya* into Portuguese. When I asked Alfredo why he had succeeded to the headmanship instead of his older brother Zacarias, Alfredo's reply was: "He doesn't know how to tell people to work; I do" (Port. *Ele não sabe mandar trabalhar, mas eu sei*), implying that skill at labor-organization is a *sine qua non* for entering the status of *kakáya*. There is evidence also that people other than Alfredo have the same ideas. His brother José told me in June 1998 that the most distinguishing feature of a *kakáya* is that he tells people

what work to do. “You go there to do that, you go to another place to do another thing, the *kakáya* is always telling people where to go and what to do.” He also said that a true *kakáya* uses *tsai iki* to tell people what to do, encouraging them to throw feasts. Similar notions were expressed by Ronípa, an affine of Alfredo’s who told me once that at Maronal they are all one community with one “cacique”, whereas Ituí had no cacique. Because of this, Ronípa explained, the Ituí people were poorer since they did not know how to work properly.

Alfredo presented two explanations for the presence of multiple-*shovo* cooperation at Aldeia Maronal. His first explanation is the degree of concentration of the population, which he says facilitates cooperation among *shovo*. His second explanation is the presence of a tuxáua (himself) at Maronal. His first explanation cannot be accepted as having explanatory power. From Aldeia Alegria to Aldeia Liberdade on the Ituí, there are eleven *shovo* with 277 people. The distance between these *shovo* is not much greater than that between the two most distant *shovo* at Maronal (Mashëpa’s and Sinãpa’s), judging from the walking time since I took no physical distance measurements. At Maronal there were, after the fire of January 1998, eleven *shovo* but only 220 people. Thus, the upper Ituí is equally if not more concentrated than Maronal since there are more people in an equal space. Yet from Alegria to Liberdade are four separate villages (mean village size 69.25) totalling eleven *shovo* whereas Maronal is *one* village with eleven *shovo*. The determinant factor here is the presence of a tuxáua; and as argued in Chapter Five, a tuxáua exists as a result of particular village formation processes. Therefore, the explanation for Maronal’s distinctiveness is not to be sought in demographic concentration, but rather in village histories and correlated leadership styles.

The data on organization of labor show that there is a correlation between strong leadership, multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor, and the execution of large-scale labor projects. Alfredo (the strong leader) has secured the agreement of an entire village to a system of mutual exchange of labor. That system is different from the systems used by different groups, Marubo and non-Marubo (or at least, the Maronal Marubo **say** they are different). Furthermore, those who buy into the system find it beneficial, even if it is ultimately a political asset for Alfredo. The result is that Maronal has an airstrip and a generator, both obtained, not as gifts, but through Marubo cooperative labor under Alfredo's direction.

The fact that Maronal's system of labor-exchange benefits Alfredo politically may seem counter-intuitive if considered through a Clastrean interpretive framework. In Clastres' view, the headman must give away everything he has to his followers. This seems consistent with the observation that Alfredo loans his labor force out more often than he borrows others'. This is a situation where the headman is giving away more than he is receiving. But that is only part of the story. Alfredo's frequent loans of labor do not impoverish him at all. He loans his force out because it is twice anyone else's size and he can maintain his own economic position even while loaning out half his workers. Furthermore, his loans create a debt, and when he recalls the debt, it is for large projects which enhance his political position and the attractiveness of his village. I should emphasize that this debt is an etic construct. I never heard Alfredo refer to his requests for labor as 'calling in debts'. He referred to it simply as 'calling people to work'.

These data, like the data on feasting, show that Marubo social organization is not egalitarian. Alfredo's system of labor exchange can be interpreted as a strategy to

develop and expand inequality on a social scale. He explicitly cites the material benefits of his system, pointing out how it makes Maronal materially wealthier than Ituí. Furthermore, this is due (in Alfredo's discourse) to the presence of a higher-status individual at Maronal: a *kakaya*, which the Ituí does not have. Thus, two goals which Alfredo has pursued and achieved through his organization of labor are (1) a higher status than anyone else in Marubo society, and (2) access to material resources which others do not have. If differences in social status are correlated with differences in access to resources, then the social organization is not egalitarian at all, but rather displaying elements of ranking (although I will not argue that they are a rank society but rather that the whole system of categories in Fried's political typology cannot meaningfully classify Marubo political organization). Furthermore, if Marubo society were egalitarian, then anyone with the **ability** to organize labor could enter *kakaya* status. But it is not merely the ability that makes one *kakaya*. It is also **access** to a labor force. Not everyone with the ability has the access. Alfredo's workforce is in part due to his being the son of a prominent leader. His father, João Tuxáua, had eight wives and an abundance of children; as a socially and economically successful leader, he managed to retain the coresidence of many of his sons, and through his relationship with the hexagynous Domingo, he set up an exchange system that allowed all his sons access to wives. As a result, Alfredo had access to more brothers and brother's sons than anyone else. His ability to organize labor cannot therefore be regarded as a solely personal characteristic. It is also due to the fact that he has inherited his position from a previously successful headman. He is building on a position created by his father, starting from a position that is already unequal and making it more unequal. That is why not everyone with his

simple ability could enter his status: they do not have his **starting social position**. This shows that not everyone has an equal chance to accede to whatever statuses may open in this society; therefore it is not egalitarian.

These data further reveal an **inverse correlation** between the development of Marubo social inequalities and the degree of contact with non-indigenous society. The more contact there is, the less developed are social inequalities; the less contact there is, the more developed are social inequalities. The settlements where there is no *kakáya* are those formed by attraction to non-indigenous settlements—FUNAI posts and the mission. These villages do not display the style of leadership and the incipient ranking of Maronal. On the contrary, they have leaders who operate by consensus with no coercive authority. In contrast, Maronal was formed through purely indigenous social processes. The significance of village formation processes in determining leadership styles of villages has been previously noted (Chapter Five). In the Marubo case, where a village is formed by attraction to a non-indigenous settlement, the leadership more closely resembles a classically egalitarian Clastrean headman. Where the village was formed by attraction to an indigenous settlement, the leadership takes on qualities of command and authority that the Clastrean model does not predict. The deviation from egalitarianism at Maronal is not, therefore, an epiphenomenon of the contact situation; on the contrary, it represents the outcome of purely indigenous processes. Because of the effects of contact on village formation, where contact is more extensive, leadership is more egalitarian.

D. Political Meetings

As a field of social action, the Marubo political meeting lends itself more directly to political analysis than do the other fields analyzed in this chapter. The other fields thus far analyzed are non-political fields wherein the political must be extracted by analysis. The political meeting, in contrast, is political from both emic and etic viewpoints. Goals are openly stated, conflicts openly resolved, and outcomes explicitly stated. Here we are interested in the distribution of access to control over outcomes—what goals are pursued through political meetings, how do these goals lead to conflict and cooperation, what are the outcomes of these events, and who ultimately controls those outcomes. Considerable information on political meetings was presented in Chapter Six, and the reader is encouraged to review the sections on CIVAJA, Clóvis, and Txanõpa before proceeding.

The political meeting must be distinguished from what I have termed the informal council. The informal council occurs when elders who are in one place for a non-political meeting (e.g., healing) engage in political discussions and generate decisions. The political meeting, in contrast, is organized explicitly to render decisions on particular issues.

According to informants, political meetings did not occur among the Marubo prior to the 1980s. Informants agreed that the ‘traditional’ context for decision-making was, in the past, the informal council. Political meetings were first organized by Clóvis Rufino when he was endeavoring to organize CIVAJA. Clóvis called meetings to explain to the elders how they were being exploited and why they should organize and support CIVAJA. Clóvis says that the elders were unsure how to react since they were

accustomed to making decisions only in the informal councils. Elders were slow to adopt the practice of meeting solely to discuss political issues. During the fieldwork period, many major decisions were made in informal councils, especially during healing sessions. It was mainly the youth of Aldeia Maronal who organized political meetings. In fact, Marubo political meetings have long (since the mid-1980s) been a means by which the young can influence the old.

The main holder of political meetings at Aldeia Maronal—the headman's son—explicitly stated that he had to organize meetings to get the elders to work on non-traditional goals. He said that if the elders were left to themselves, they would devote themselves exclusively to traditional goals such as organization of subsistence, feasting, and healing. In contrast, the youth have been in the towns and cities, and have a greater awareness of the current economic and political realities of the non-indigenous world. They utilize the political meeting to present said realities to the elders, and to suggest important goals such as the formation of a political organization (CIVAJA), the struggle for land demarcation, or the demand for adequate health care.


This section will present data on political meetings in order to determine whether the processes of conflict resolution thereby revealed reflect an egalitarian social order. In particular, I will seek to determine whether those processes include power or not, and if so, if there is a threat of coercive force involved in the use of that power.

During fieldwork I observed seven political meetings. Five of these were at Aldeia Maronal; one in Atalaia do Norte; and one near the Ituí River. The meetings held at Aldeia Maronal were best observed, and constitute the main part of this analysis.

Political meetings at Aldeia Maronal were invariably held in the *tapo* of the headman's son, Txanõpa. Recall that the *tapo* (Port. 'tapiri' or 'jiraus') is a small rectangular hut on pylons, built on the edge of the cleared plaza around any given *shovo*. Many adult men have their own *tapo*, where they can keep valuables and spend time with their wives in privacy. The area around Alfredo's *shovo* is depicted in figure 7.2. Txanõpa originally built his *tapo* for the same reasons everybody else did—a little privacy when he wanted it, a place to keep valuables secure, a place to spend time with friends. However, as noted in Chapter Six, Txanõpa has a great interest in political issues and became involved with CIVAJA while he was a student in Atalaia do Norte. When CIVAJA installed a radio at Aldeia Maronal, it was installed in Txanõpa's *tapo*. This was probably because he spoke fluent Portuguese, was adept at handling the radio technically, and interested in operating the radio twice a day. As a result of the radio installation, Txanõpa's *tapo* changed from a private space to a public space. Twice daily, interested parties gathered there to listen to the radio or talk to geographically distant kin. When the generator was installed in 1997, Txanõpa's *tapo* became in addition the television hut, so that on occasions when the generator was powered, Marubo of all ages and sexes gathered together there to watch TV. Txanõpa's *tapo* thus became a sort of communal assembly hall.


The first political meeting I observed was held in Txanõpa's *tapo* on 3 August 1997, the day after my arrival. This meeting had two purposes. Firstly, I was to be presented to the community, and my research explained. Secondly, a CIVAJA representative was present to explain CIVAJA's activities over the previous year. The

FIGURE 7.2.: Layout of *tapos* around the core *shovo*, Aldeia Maronal, 1997-98.



- | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| A1. Alfredo's <i>shovo</i> . | A15. Alfredo's brother. | |
| A2. Alfredo's brother's son. | A16. Alfredo's brother (same). | |
| A3. Alfredo's brother Zacarias. | A17. Zacarias' son. | |
| A1. Alfredo's brother Miguel. | B1. Vasho's <i>shovo</i> . | |
| A5. Miguel's son. | B2. Vasho's brother. | D1. Aurélio's <i>shovo</i> . |
| A6. Alfredo's wife. | B3. Vasho. | D2. Aurélio's son. |
| A7. Alfredo. | B4. Vasho's brother's son. | D3. Aurélio's daughter |
| A8. Alfredo's son. | B5. Vasho's brother. | E1,E2, E3: FUNAI post |
| A9. Alfredo's son. | C1. José's <i>shovo</i> . | |
| A10. Pharmacy. | C2. José's son. | |
| A11. Utility storage. | C3. José's son. | |
| A12. Schoolhouse. | C4. José's son. | |
| A13. Txanõpa's <i>tapo</i> . | C5. José's brother. | |
| A14. Alfredo's daughter's husband. | C6. José's daughter's husband. | |

FIGURE 7.3.: Txanōpa's *tapo* at Aldeia Maronal.



background to this meeting was my arrival by canoe on 2 August accompanied by CIVAJA secretary-treasurer Manoel Barbosa. I had spent thirteen days in two boats with Manoel, and I arrived at Maronal with him. He introduced me to his father, José, who offered to host me during my stay. On 3 August I was called to what I believed to be a ‘meeting-hall’ (in fact Txanõpa’s *tapo*), where I explained the research I wanted to do to a large assembly. I was not able to carry out participant analysis because I could not yet recognize the participants or their social relationships. After my explanation, Manoel translated for the audience. The headman, Alfredo, then initiated a lengthy commentary on my proposal and on anthropologists and fieldwork ethics in general. He set out a series of guidelines and restrictions, specifically requiring his authorization for recordings in any audiovisual media. Manoel translated Alfredo’s speech back to me. Alfredo had introduced the concept of the ‘contrapartida’, a Portuguese word meaning roughly *reciprocation*. Alfredo wanted copies of any audiovisual media or any other copiable data that was removed from the area. This fit into his concern over cultural preservation; as an elder who benefits from tradition, he wished to see those traditions continue; he wanted to harness my technology to the reproduction of the social system he derived status from. With the conditions of restricted recording and ‘contrapartida’, Alfredo accepted my presence and my research plan. After his translation, Manoel gave the assembly a report on CIVAJA’s recent-past activities and future plans. After this, the meeting ended.

The goals that were being pursued at this meeting were three: (1) I was attempting to convince Alfredo to allow me to do research; (2) Alfredo was endeavoring to harness my presence to the preservation of cultural traditions he valued, and establishing the right

to exercise veto power over my activities; (3) Manoel was trying to establish support for CIVAJA in his home community. The first two goals were successfully reached. The third is more difficult to evaluate. What is most interesting is that there was no conflict, nor even any real discussion over the issue of my presence. Alfredo was the only person to speak at length; his brother José gave a brief opinion, and nobody else spoke except for Manoel and I. The decision to accept my presence was almost entirely Alfredo's; his goal of establishing restrictions and veto power over my research were also achieved with no conflict. It may be concluded that this political meeting served as a means for Alfredo to establish his control over the social situation created by my presence.

A second political meeting was held in Txanõpa's *tapo* on 14 September 1997. the occasion for this meeting was the arrival of guests from Aldeia São Sebastião for the *tanamea* feast (see above, this chapter). Txanõpa had the generator started and invited the guests to a meeting. It was a small meeting because most guests had not arrived. However, Alfredo and his brother José were present, along with Txanõpa and José's bilingual daughter Amélia. From Aldeia São Sebastião, the headman Sebastião, his brother Wilson, the *shovo ivo* Cassimiro, and Cassimiro's daughter's husband Antônio were present. Since it was the second meeting, I was able to discern a common pattern of spatial distribution within Txanõpa's *tapo*: Txanõpa and other young bilinguals sat at the desk upon which the CIVAJA radio rested (see figure 7.3.). The men sat on the benches which ran along three walls of the *tapo*. The women, except for Amélia, sat on the threshhold, just outside the door. These distributions reflect the groupings' different roles in decision-making processes: youth transmit information to elders, elders discuss it and make decisions, women are excluded from the formal side of the process. The meeting

had been called for two reasons: (1) Txanõpa wanted to present certain issues for the elders' discussion; (2) the elders from Aldeia Maronal wanted to explain their opinions on certain issues to the elders from Aldeia São Sebastião. Txanõpa's main themes were the importance of land demarcation and of projects for economic development. These are the types of goals which Txanõpa believes the youth must present to the elders, because the elders will not pursue non-traditional goals if they are not prompted by the youth. In addition, those from Aldeia Maronal explained to the guests why I was taping the singing at the *tanamea* every night. This was the development of Alfredo's plan to use me to preserve selected aspects of his culture—by having me record songs and leave behind copies of the tapes. The explanation of my taping led to a general discussion of the value of preserving *nokevana* ("our words") against the increasing pressure of *nawãvana* ("non-indigenous people's words"). Finally, the threat of sexually transmitted diseases was discussed. This meeting did not result in any major decisions being made. It did serve to assist Txanõpa's plans to influence the elders. It also served to assist Alfredo's plans to maintain the cultural framework within which he was a respected headman because he secured the consent of singers from other villages to be taped. Alfredo wanted me to tape these songs so he could get copies for himself. I did in fact make copies of all my recordings, which I gave to Alfredo's son Txanõpa. Alfredo planned to use these tapes to teach the songs to youths. He expressed concern that youths were not learning traditional songs. Since one of the most important bases of the respect accorded to elders at Aldeia Maronal is their extensive specialized traditional knowledge, the erosion of interest in traditional knowledge represented also the erosion of the cultural system within which Alfredo had thrived and within which he was accorded respect.

Hence, by serving to further his plans to obtain tapes of traditional songs, the meeting served to assist Alfredo in maintaining the cultural framework within which he was highly respected.

Another two political meetings were held during the *tanamea* in September 1997. The context and some of the content of these meetings were described in Chapter Six, in the section on Alfredo under the sub-heading “the Edvaldo Incident”. The regional FUNAI headquarters had been under an interim administrator, Gilmar, who was agreeable to the indigenous people of the Javari basin; however, in mid-September of 1997 CIVAJA found out that a political appointee with connections to regional extractive industry and mercantile interests was going to replace Gilmar. The political appointee, Edvaldo, was opposed by CIVAJA because they felt he would undermine indigenous efforts to maintain the integrity of their lands. CIVAJA responded by passing the information through the radio network to the indigenous communities, asking them to hold meetings, write radiograms, and state their opinions on the issue.

A word is necessary to explain the phenomenon of the radiogram, which may be confusing to readers unfamiliar with FUNAI field procedures. A radiogram is actually a written statement passed over the radio word for word. The radiogram is entirely written before its transmission. Then, a radio link between the emitter and the receiver is established. The emitting individual reads each word slowly over the radio, while the receiving individual writes them down. Once a radiogram is fully received, it is typed out and becomes an official document. Such documents, in theory, all find their way to the central FUNAI headquarters in Brasília, where they become valuable resources for people researching current events in any given indigenous region.

When CIVAJA explained to the interior communities that a politician with ties to loggers was about to become FUNAI administrator, the response was rapid and widespread. Mayoruna, Kanamari, and Matís communities either sent radiograms rejecting the appointment of Edvaldo, or actually sent representatives to Atalaia to protest in person and as a show of support for the indigenous peoples' candidate, Gilmar. The Marubo villages responded similarly. At Aldeia Maronal, the leadership of the entire Curuçá River was assembled for the *tanamea*. At CIVAJA's behest, Txanõpa called a meeting on 16 September 1997. Those present at this meeting included *shovo*-owners from the Maronal core (Alfredo, José) and periphery (Ivãpa, Sinãpa, Mashëpa) as well as *shovo*-owners from Aldeia São Sebastião, including the headman, Shetãpa, and the most senior elder, Cassimiro. Txanõpa supplied the information. Five elders spoke or commented: Alfredo, José, Sinãpa, Ivãpa, and Shetãpa. All those who spoke agreed with CIVAJA's assessment that Edvaldo's candidacy was detrimental to indigenous interests. The leaders concluded that Txanõpa should draft a radiogram in their name, stating that the assembled elders of Aldeia São Sebastião and Maronal rejected Edvaldo, and would accept only Gilmar. The radiogram began "we the leaders" (Port. *Nós lideranças*). At the end was a list of the assignant leaders, which ran: "Alfredo, cacique geral dos Marubo; Sebastião, líder do São Sebastião; Alberto, Vicente, José Barbosa, Lauro Reis, Antônio, Manoel, Mário, Cassimiro". The social positions of those identified as leaders are as follows:

Alfredo: *Shovo*-owner and headman at Aldeia Maronal.

Alberto: A.k.a. Sinãpa, peripheral *shovo*-owner at Aldeia Maronal.

Vicente: A.k.a. Ivãpa, peripheral *shovo*-owner at Aldeia Maronal.

José Barbosa: Alfredo's brother, core *shovo*-owner at Aldeia Maronal.

Manoel: A.k.a. Mesēpa, brother of the core *shovo*-owner Vasho at Aldeia Maronal.

Mário: Son of Alfredo's brother Zacarias. Married with five children, hence no longer considered a youth.

Sebastião: A.k.a. Shetāpa, headman at Aldeia São Sebastião.

Cassimiro: Oldest *shovo*-owner at Aldeia São Sebastião.

Antônio: Daughter's husband and uxorilocal 'lieutenant' of Cassimiro.

Lauro Reis: second-highest ranking man in José Rufino's *shovo* at Aldeia São Sebastião.

These data on the meeting of 16 September 1997 allow us to discern the criteria for being considered a 'leader' (Port. *liderança*) in Marubo society. Being a *shovo ivo* almost automatically qualifies one for inclusion in this category. In addition, men of the second tier of status from each *shovo* are also included in this category. The social position of second-status leaders varies depending on the social composition of the *shovo* they are from—brothers of the *shovo ivo* in agnatic schemes, daughter's husbands in uxorilocal schemes, and sister's sons in avuncular schemes. Thus, not only the *shovo*-owners, but also those men who occupy essential positions in the *shovo* social structure are considered leaders. Finally, even a man in the third tier of status can be considered a leader. Such is the case of Mário (Iskōpa), who is the son of the brother of Alfredo. Mário can be considered a leader because he is married, has multiple children, and forms a fully productive economic unit together with his wife and children. Of Alfredo's

coresident sons and brother's sons (a total of 14 males aged a few months to 36 years), only Mário was included in the *liderança* category.

In terms of the goals and the outcome, several interpretations are possible. On the one hand, the meeting could be seen as a successful assertion of CIVAJA influence over the Curuçá River. The information was supplied, and the path of action recommended, by CIVAJA to Txanõpa, who passed it on to the leaders, who agreed and did just what had been recommended. CIVAJA mobilized not just the Curuçá, but most of the contacted indigenous areas of the Javari basin, behind their agenda. Within days, CIVAJA could count on officially declared support from all the radio-accessible villages of the four member ethnic groups. From another perspective, the meeting was a successful imposition of the will of Alfredo on the Curuçá River. The number of people speaking was very restricted; Alfredo was the main speaker, and he agreed with CIVAJA; when the meeting was over, Alfredo's son wrote the radiogram, speaking for the entire Curuçá River. Thus, through the means of the meeting, Alfredo's son became the mouthpiece for an entire river with seventeen *shovo*, speaking even for those Curuçá Marubo who were not in attendance. Combining this observation with those of the first two meetings, there emerges already a pattern where political meetings become vehicles through which Alfredo and his son exert influence over the community at large. In addition, Txanõpa sees the meetings as a way for himself to influence his father, as explained above, so that from a purely etic viewpoint we may see the meetings as transmitting Txanõpa's influence through his father to the other elders and thence to those other elders' coresidents. Alfredo and his son are often among the only speakers; they formulate the opinions and write them down.

Two mechanisms assist Alfredo's use of the political meeting as a vehicle for the assertion of influence. The first is the monopolization of legitimacy. As the founder and 'owner' or 'guardian' (ivo) of Maronal, Alfredo is the only person who is recognized by outsiders as having the legitimate right to speak for the entire village. No other leader could write a radiogram stating that his opinion is "the village's". The monopolization of legitimacy is compounded by the location in the Maronal core of the CIVAJA radio, where communications can be effectively controlled by Alfredo and his kin. The second mechanism is the creation of a commonality of interests. CIVAJA does this with the radio attendants, the radio attendants do it with their elder kin, the elders do it with the community. By the end of the meeting, it was not a case of one party having imposed its will on another; rather, everybody was in agreement that it was in the general interest to avoid Edvaldo and retain Gilmar. From this perspective, we may see the meetings less cynically. Instead of a unidirectional arrow of influence from CIVAJA to the communities, we may consider that CIVAJA served in this case as a means whereby the entire Javari basin could articulate a single opinion and act on it with considerable effectiveness. Without the radio communications, news of Edvaldo's appointment could have taken months to reach the interior, and the responses would have also taken months, and even then they would have arrived in a disjointed manner. Edvaldo could have successfully entered office in such a situation. But instead, the communities were able to mobilize quickly and synchronously, and use CIVAJA as a vehicle to protect themselves from the potential effects of Edvaldo's appointment (expected to be a loosening of restrictions on logging, fishing, and other invasions by non-indigenous people). Thus, no firm conclusion on the directionality of influence can be made, as it depends on our

perspective. What can be said is that the political meeting serves as a context for the flow of influence **both** ways between the political center (CIVAJA, Alfredo) and the political periphery (everyone else in the interior communities).

The meeting of 16 September was followed by another one on 23 September. Recall from the description of the *tanamea* (this chapter, above) that the guests from the Ituí River entered the village on 22 September. In the days leading up to the feast, they had been walking through the forest towards Maronal; many were not yet aware of the Edvaldo issue. Txanõpa took advantage of the presence of the Ituí guests to organize a meeting that included leaders not only from the entire Curuçá River but also from the Ituí. From Aldeia Maronal, the participants included bilingual youth (Txanõpa, Amélia); core *shovo*-owners (Alfredo, José), their brothers (Pedro, Miguel), and brother's sons (Mário); peripheral *shovo*-owners (Wasinawa, Sinãpa, Wanõpa, Mashẽpa), their sons and brothers. From Aldeia São Sebastião were present two *shovo*-owners (José Rufino, Sebastião) and one influential elder (Okãpa). From the Ituí River were present at least five *shovo*-owners: from Aldeia Praia, Floriano; from aldeia Vida Nova, Raomayãpa, Nicanor, and Txumãpa; and from Aldeia Liberdade, Ronípapa. Note that the elders had not come to Aldeia Maronal *for* the meeting. It is the *tanamea* which plays the major role in political integration of the Marubo nation; once integrated by means of the feast, Txanõpa takes the opportunity to turn the feast into a decision-making body.

As usual, Txanõpa sat at the head of the assembly and started the meeting by supplying information. The Curuçá River had rejected Edvaldo; what would the Ituí River do? There was an additional element at this meeting, however: José Rufino. José is married and middle-aged, but has a social role at São Sebastião analogous to that of the

politically active youth of Maronal. He was bilingual, connected to CIVAJA through his brother Clóvis, and acted to transmit information from CIVAJA to the more traditional elders, thus influencing the latter's actions. After Txanõpa had introduced the meeting of 23 September, José Rufino spoke at length about Edvaldo, his connections in the business of resource extraction, and his political machinations for becoming FUNAI administrator. Following these presentations, the elders discussed the issue. Only nine people spoke during the meeting, including Txanõpa and José Rufino. Aside from these two, the speakers were three *shovo*-owners from the Ituí River, one from São Sebastião, and two *shovo*-owners plus one brother thereof from Maronal. The result of this meeting was an agreement to write a second radiogram to FUNAI (in addition to that which was written after the meeting of 16 September). The second radiogram would have stronger words of rejection against Edvaldo, and would be signed by leaders of both the Ituí and Curuçá Rivers. This more forceful radiogram was written and sent within two days of the meeting.

What is notable about the result of this meeting is that the statement in the radiogram represented the opinion of 81.1% of the Marubo nation ($695/857 = \# \text{ of people}$ at Maronal, São Sebastião, and on upper Ituí divided by total Marubo population), yet the total number of speakers who effectively rendered this decision, including both meetings plus the CIVAJA coordinator in Atalaia, was eleven, or 1.3% of the Marubo population. If 1.3% of Marubo are making decisions for 81.1 % of Marubo, then it becomes necessary to define the decision-making group because that group has a disproportionate amount of political influence. I will refer to the group of people as the Marubo political cupola, a word chosen due to its lack of prior ethnological commitment. The Marubo

political cupola are those Marubo who actually have a voice at the political meetings where decisions are made, and thus have an empirically observable influence on the outcome of social decision-making processes. Many more Marubo attend the meetings, and thus have the possibility of being heard and influencing decisions through rhetoric; but most attendees remain silent while two sets of groups discuss the issues and render decisions: (1) bilingual youth and intermediaries between the indigenous and non-indigenous worlds (Txanõpa, Amélia, Clóvis and José Rufino) and (2) *shovo*-owners as well as the men at the second level of status in each *shovo*.

It should be emphasized that the **decision-makers** are a smaller group than the **radiogram assignants**. The assignants, referred to as *lideranças* in the radiograms, are much more numerous; many of them do not speak at meetings but because they are present and do not object, their opinion is added to the final document. However, just because they share the cupola's opinions does not mean the *lideranças* all exercise influence over decision-making processes. The influence of the cupola, which formulates agendas, dominates discussion, and generates decisions, is much greater than that of the non-cupola *lideranças*, who limit themselves to not objecting while the cupola makes the decisions.

The final political meeting I observed at Aldeia Maronal took place on the 30th of May 1998. At that time, Alfredo was in Cruzeiro do Sul undergoing a medical treatment. In addition, that morning Alfredo's son Txanõpa had gone hunting with his brothers, leaving his father's brother's daughter Amélia to attend the radio. During the radio session, Clóvis (in Atalaia) asked Amélia to organize a meeting to discuss three issues: (1) Do they want Manoel Barbosa as FUNAI *chefe de posto* for the Curuçá River? (2) Do

they accept Darcy Comapa as manager of the new health care facility for indigenous people in Atalaia? (3) How will they respond to the delicate situation of the land demarcation process? After the radio conversation, Amélia informed her father José that Clóvis had asked her to call a meeting. After the day's work, José sent his son to Ivãpa's *shovo* downstream to invite him to the meeting; José's brother Pedro went upstream to Mayãpa's *shovo* and invited the Varináwavo to the meeting. Txanõpa returned from hunting that afternoon to find that a meeting had been organized without him, for the first time in a nine months of observations.

The meeting got underway after nightfall on 30 May 1998. Although he had not organized it, it took place in Txanõpa's *tapo*. Those present included the bilingual youths Amélia and Txanõpa, four elders from the core, and three elders from the periphery, in addition to myself. The main issue to be discussed was that of the *chefe de posto*. The events surrounding Manoel's candidacy for *chefe de posto* have already been chronicled in Chapter Six. Here it suffices to say that the installation of Manoel Barbosa as *chefe de posto* for the Curuçá River was the goal of CIVAJA, and also the goal of Manoel's kin at Aldeia Maronal, and of certain close affines of Manoel's kin. To this goal there was opposition: some of the affines of Manoel's kin were aligned with non-indigenous FUNAI employees, and therefore opposed the changeover to an indigenous *chefe de posto*. There was also opposition from certain groups of people in other villages, who feared that Alfredo's family was accumulating too much influence. Clóvis was asking Maronal to resolve its conflict and return a unified opinion. Amélia initiated the meeting by introducing this topic. Those who spoke were Amélia and Txanõpa; Alfredo's brothers Miguel, Pedro, and José; and the peripheral *shovo*-owners Ivãpa and Sinãpa. In

fact, almost all of these were predisposed to support Manoel, because they were close kin of his. Even the peripheral affine Sinãpa could be counted on, since he was in fact Manoel's mother's brother. Only Ivãpa was unrelated to Manoel, and also aligned somewhat with the FUNAI old guard. It is notable, in this context, that José specifically invited Ivãpa to the meeting. Clearly, José felt that Ivãpa could be influenced to agree with Manoel's appointment, and took steps to ensure that Ivãpa would be present in order to have a chance to influence him. As it turns out, the meeting was successful for Manoel's supporters. A consensus emerged among those present to send a radiogram expressing support for Manoel and asking for his immediate appointment to the *chefe de posto* position. After this was agreed, the issue of demarcation was discussed. The assembly decided to ask me to write a document summarizing Marubo oral histories to justify the land demarcation proposal. Said document was completed before the end of June 1998, under Txanõpa's guidance. Finally, Darcy Comapa's candidacy to the position of manager of the Atalaia health facility was discussed, but no decision was reached. At this meeting, the cupola consisted of seven people making decisions for 220, a ratio 3.2% of Maronal's population being active in an empirically observable way in influencing the outcome of this decision-making event, which affected the entire village.

Meetings were held not only at Aldeia Maronal but in the other villages as well. The most important feature to highlight about these meetings is the importance of the role of organizer. At Aldeia Maronal, the organizer was usually Txanõpa. Interestingly, Txanõpa organized meetings not only in his home village, but during visits to other villages as well. For example, from 18 August to 8 September 1997, Txanõpa visited the Ituí River to attend a meeting on land demarcation organized by CIVAJA. When he

returned, he told me that he had organized meetings in the villages of the upper Ituí. He said he organized a meeting at Alegria quite easily, since there were only two main leaders and they lived very close to one another. Then he went to Vida Nova. He spent two weeks there trying to get the politically prominent men from Vida Nova's five *shovo* into a single place for a meeting. He failed in this, telling me that after two weeks of trying to organize a meeting with the Vida Nova leaders, he gave up. He then moved on to Liberdade, where he organized a meeting successfully. In all these meetings, his main purposes were: (1) raise issues which he would like the Ituí Marubo to act upon; (2) inquire into the concerns, needs, and wants of the Ituí villages; and (3) display the fact that Aldeia Maronal has a relatively advanced level of planning for the future even in non-traditional matters such as formal education and economic development. When Txanõpa returned from the Ituí, he was bitter from his experience at Vida Nova, saying "they don't understand what a political meeting (Port. *reunião*) is". But Txanõpa's statement is inaccurate: political meetings did occur at Vida Nova, but they refused to let Txanõpa have the power of organization.

I obtained solid evidence during my visit to the Ituí River that political meetings were indeed held there. The first bit of evidence emerged during the confrontation over allowing me to be present at the Ituí *tanamea* in December 1997 (described in Chapter Six). While José was talking to another elder, Benedito (brother's son to the *shovo*-owner Pekõpapa) spoke to me. He said that the reason why they were here demanding an explanation for my presence was because the missionary John Jansma had invited them all to a *reunião*, where he had explained to them that my true purpose in coming there was to get rich by filming and photographing them and taking the materials back to the

U.S. to sell them. According to Benedito, Jansma recommended to the Ituí Marubo that they seize my personal belongings as a sort of compensation, then turn me around and set me back on the path to the Curuçá River. The reunion had included leaders from at least three upper Ituí villages—Alegria (Lauro), Vida Nova (Benedito), and Liberdade (Ronipapa). The outcome of the meeting had been decisive in Jansma's favor. The result was that Lauro and Benedito were demanding I be ejected and my possessions confiscated. It was at that point that José Barbosa called a meeting, also described in Chapter Six at length. That meeting, involving only José plus those Ituí Marubo who had been influenced by Jansma to oppose me, resulted in a victory for José. Those Marubo who had opposed my arrival now agreed to it, and I was allowed to visit the Ituí River.

What is significant about this interview with Benedito is that it demonstrates that the power to organize meetings and influence outcomes is held on the Ituí River by a non-Marubo missionary, John Jansma. At Aldeia Maronal, this power is strictly under indigenous control. Thus, a likely interpretation of Txanópa's problems at Vida Nova is that the Ituí Marubo are aware of the power that is wielded by a meeting organizer, and did not want to give Txanópa that power over them. Jansma, however, wielded that power unhesitatingly. Nevertheless, when it came down to a conflict of wills, José Barbosa proved able to defeat Jansma even on Jansma's 'home turf'. This is probably due to José's far superior rhetorical abilities (as compared to Jansma's).

Further interviews with Benedito show that he had ambitions to become a meeting organizer himself. Shortly after the Ituí *tanamea* (held on 26 December 1997), FUNAI officials in Atalaia asked the Marubo to decide whether they wanted indigenous or non-indigenous *chefes de posto*. When I saw Benedito on 29 December, he said he had

organized a meeting for the following day, to include representatives from Alegria, Vida Nova, and Liberdade, for the purpose of rendering a decision on the *chefe de posto* issue. He said that they had once been offered a FUNAI post, but since they had not been able to agree on a location, the project was never effected (this is the process I call **mutual neutralization** in decision-making—where, in cases of disagreement, nobody wins, common in villages formed by attraction to non-indigenous foci since these villages have no indigenous founder/leaders). As it turns out, the meeting held in late 1997 to discuss the *chefe de posto* issue ended in mutual neutralization also. The Ituí leaders were unable to decide on a suitable candidate, or even on the issue of what the appropriate ethnicity would be for the *chefe de posto*.

The results of analysis of political meetings on the Ituí are quite different from the analysis of Maronal, but these differences are consistent with previously noted differences in the political organizations of these areas. At Maronal meetings typically ended with very decisive outcomes. Indeed, while the Ituí leaders were engaging in mutual neutralization, a meeting was being held at Aldeia Maronal to discuss the same issue. That meeting, which I did not observe, ended in a decision to ask for Manoel Barbosa to be installed as *chefe de posto*, a position to which they stuck, despite considerable opposition, until Manoel's actual appointment. Thus, at Maronal the organization of a meeting is a way for the organizers to seek community support for their goals, a way for them to influence others and determine the outcome of social decision-making processes. Meetings at Maronal invariably resulted in everybody doing what Txanõpa and Alfredo wanted done. On the Ituí River, in contrast, meetings were definitely vehicles through which elders *sought* influence, but they did not actually

succeed in doing so because of the dynamics of mutual neutralization. Only a non-indigenous person, John Jansma, actually had the ability to translate organization of a political meeting into empirically observable influence over others' behavior.

In addition to the meetings on the Ituí and the Curuçá, Marubo were often in attendance at meetings outside the Marubo area. These meetings played a very significant role in the dynamics of influence and decision-making among the Marubo. In fact, as explained previously, it is from outside that the political meeting was incorporated as a Marubo social form. Clóvis Rufino and Darcy Comapa take credit for introducing the *reunião*; politically active youths such as Txanõpa perpetuate it. Txanõpa, as explained in Chapter Six, attended every meeting he could when he lived in Atalaia. For example, he attended a meeting of indigenous schoolteachers in Manaus in March 1997. It was at that meeting and others organized by CIVAJA and COIAB that Txanõpa became conscious of his indigenous ethnicity and culture. Txanõpa then utilized the same techniques within his own culture: he organized political meetings where he presented ideas and issues for the elders to discuss. Thus, the meetings he attended outside the area had a significant impact on Txanõpa, who then had a significant impact on decision-making processes at Aldeia Maronal and throughout the Curuçá and Ituí rivers.

In late April 1998, CIVAJA invited the interior villages to send representatives to two meetings to be held in Manaus in May. One was the COIAB general assembly, where Darcy Comapa was up for re-election as general coordinator. The second, to be held simultaneously with the general assembly, was the annual indigenous schoolteachers' reunion. This was the occasion when, as explained in Chapter Six,

Amélia was caught between CIVAJA's desire for her to attend the meeting and the mission's opposition. That incident demonstrates the political significance of attendance at meetings. The mission was well aware that attendance at these meetings resulted in decreased susceptibility to missionization, because of the emphasis on valuing indigenous culture. The mission tried to stop Clóvis and Darcy from organizing meetings during the creation of CIVAJA; they interfered with Txanõpa's organizing efforts on the Ituí; and they refused to cooperate with Amélia's efforts to attend the meetings. All this is evidence that attendance at these meetings has the effect of creating a definite political tendency in Marubo society, one emphasizing indigenous autonomy and cultural vitality and critical of patronizing missionaries and FUNAI officials. In the case of the 1998 Manaus reunions, this effect was clear. The representative for Aldeia São Sebastião returned to occupy the CIVAJA radio for several days, explaining the latest ideas on adapting formal education to indigenous culture and other pro-indigenous political ideas. Thus, once again, a sort of indigenous cultural pride and a set of political ideas related to this pride spread into the Marubo area from the outside by means of the political meetings hosted by indigenous political organizations.

The final example of a political meeting that remains to be described is at the same time the largest. On 5 March 1998, a meeting was held in Atalaia do Norte to evaluate a proposal for land demarcation. This meeting was attended by representatives from all four nuclei of Marubo population. Even the *tanamea* feasts of 1997 had only brought together three out of the four: upper and middle Curuçá and upper Ituí in the case of José's *tanamea*, upper and middle Ituí and upper Curuçá in the case of the December *tanamea* on the Ituí. But the meeting of 5 March had the effect of political integration on

a pan-Marubo level, a unique event in the year of observations this dissertation is based on.

The demarcation proposal was the culmination of a long fight for indigenous land rights in the Javari. The first proposals for demarcation were made in the 1970s, and several efforts at studying the issue were made in the 1980s. From the beginning proposals were for a multi-ethnic area. There was never a proposal to isolate each ethnic group in a separate area: rather, all the groups in the Javari basin were to be put into a single indigenous area. Proposals were halted by military politics until the mid-1990s. Finally, in 1995 a group including FUNAI anthropologist Walter Coutinho, Jr. was commissioned to carry out a study of indigenous land usage and occupation and to produce a map for demarcation purposes. The study was carried out in 1995-96 and the report was written in 1996. The final report (Coutinho 1998) was completed by early 1998. FUNAI then invited the indigenous leaders of all affected ethnic groups to attend a meeting in Atalaia do Norte, where the proposal for demarcation of the Javari indigenous area would be presented for their evaluation.

Indigenous people from every contacted population nucleus attended the March 1998 meeting. The difficulties this entailed should be emphasized. I myself travelled from the upper Curuçá River to attend this meeting; the journey took six days downriver and eleven days back upriver, and I contracted malaria both going and returning. Despite these difficulties, attendance was very good. Five *shovo*-owners from the upper Ituí were in attendance, plus representatives from another one. There were four *shovo*-owners from São Sebastião, including the headman. There were two *shovo*-owners from Maronal, plus Txanõpa as representative of Alfredo. There was one representative from

Aldeia Rio Novo, an important man named Arnaldo whose role in populating Rio Novo is described in Chapter Five. Also in attendance were the two prominent Marubo politicians, Clóvis Rufino and Darcy Comapa (Darcy was at that time still general coordinator of COIAB, the umbrella group for indigenous political organizations of all Brazilian Amazonia). In addition to the excellent Marubo turnout, there was a substantial representation of Mayoruna, Matís, and Kanamari leaders, as well as members of several non-indigenous support organizations. Details of the meeting are not relevant here. The proposal was presented and discussed at length, with input from every indigenous group. But there was no conflict at all. The proposal was highly favorable to the indigenous people, and was unanimously approved. Rather than serving as a vehicle for a subgroup to influence or represent the whole, this meeting served as a means for the indigenous people to express their common will to the outside, in this case represented by FUNAI. The outcome of the meeting was indigenous approval of the demarcation plan, which eventually came to be approved by the Minister of Justice (December 1998) and is at the time of writing (February 2000) awaiting the organization of teams to conduct the physical demarcation process (cutting a swathe through the forest around the entire perimeter of the area).

The data on political meetings has considerable relevance to the topic of this dissertation. The methods of research were aimed at discovering **power** in Marubo politics. But the power that was sought was not merely structurally encoded power. It is easy to ask what structural positions exist and what roles are associated with those positions. This research project was designed to go beyond simple questions to informants. Instead, I aimed to develop a base of empirical observations of individual

and group actions within which I could discern how conflicts of will are resolved. If any one individual were observed to repeatedly win conflicts of will, that individual could be said to have power. Such power might not be coercive or force-based, might not even be empirically perceived, but its existence could be proven with enough examples. The observations presented in Chapter Six showed that only two people satisfied the criteria for empirical power—Maronal headman Alfredo and CIVAJA founder Clóvis Rufino. The data on political meetings confirms and complements the data from Chapter Six, supplying further evidence of Alfredo's ability to repeatedly win conflicts of will and revealing one of the mechanisms whereby he accomplishes this—use of political meetings.

Observations of political meetings at Aldeia Maronal show that the meetings serve to reinforce inequalities in the ability to control outcomes of decision-making processes. The meetings allow Txanõpa to influence the elders, and allow the core elders to influence the village as a whole. Txanõpa explicitly perceives the political meeting as a means of influencing the elders to take actions they would not otherwise take. Additionally, the five meetings observed all served as means for Alfredo's agenda to be enacted, and never clearly served anyone else's agenda (except perhaps Alfredo's immediate kin). This is clear from a review of the meetings. In reviewing the goals of the first meeting (4 August 1997), we may say that the meeting served to further Alfredo's agenda (see above). The three meetings held during the *tanamea* also served Alfredo's agenda, and resulted in a victory—the exclusion from office of Edvaldo—though this victory was not exclusively his, but also CIVAJA's (it should be emphasized that the purpose of the *tanamea* was not to hold meetings and influence people; rather,

the concentration of people at the peak of the feast was taken advantage of as a good opportunity to hold meetings). The fifth meeting clearly served as a means for the core and their closest affines to secure the appointment of Manoel at the expense of certain peripheral sectors that opposed Manoel. The common thread that runs through these meetings is that Alfredo wins, wins, and wins again. Therefore these data confirm the previous suggestion that, from a purely empirical viewpoint, we must accept that Alfredo has power because he alone exhibits the quality of repeated victory in conflicts of will. Discussion of the nature of this power and its basis must await the conclusions of this dissertation.

There is a quality of openness to Marubo political meetings that could be confused with true egalitarianism. This is particularly so if we interpret the meetings in terms of received notions about Amerindian councils being places where all adult men may be heard. Specifically, the category of *liderança* seems to reflect an egalitarian social organization. *Lideranças* are those whose signatures appear at the bottom of radiograms. Typically, any adult male with a family is included in the category of *liderança*. Therefore, if we were to judge based on the radiograms, we would have to say that Marubo decisions are made by a consensus of male heads of family. However, those whose signatures appear at the bottom of radiograms are a much larger category than those who actually made the decisions. Analysis of the speaking patterns at the meetings reveals that decisions are made by a small political cupola. On 16 September 1997, this was 1.8% of the Curuçá population deciding for the whole; on 23 September 1997 it was 3.5% of the population of the Curuçá and upper Ituí making a decision for the whole of these areas; and on 5 March 1998, 2.0% of the Marubo population spoke in approval of

the demarcation plan, in the name of the remaining 98%. Therefore, we do not have here an indigenous society wherein decisions are made by consensus of all adult men. That is only the appearance that is put on for the authorities. The reality is that the meetings serve for a few to make decisions in the name of the rest.

Marubo political meetings are a recognized arena wherein Marubo attempt to influence one another. This may be seen in the attitude of the youths who organize meetings to influence their elders; there are also times when elders influence other elders in the meetings. And there are occasions when elders *attempt* to influence one another but do not succeed. Txanõpa is very aware of that political meetings allow him to influence people by forcing them to discuss certain issues they might otherwise avoid. This explains the reluctance of the Ituí Marubo to allow Txanõpa to organize meetings among them: they do not wish to give him that power. In fact, very few Marubo organize meetings. The list of organizers is restricted to some six or seven Marubo out of the entire population. Therefore, the ability to organize meetings is not only a powerful means of influencing others, but also a means that is unequally distributed. I must conclude that political meetings provide some of the best evidence for overturning stereotypes of egalitarianism in the Marubo case. Marubo political meetings seem like open councils when observed on the surface, but repeated detailed observations over many months show that they serve for a minority (those in attendance) to silently approve the decisions of a smaller minority (the decision-makers) in the name of the whole group.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECIPROCITY IN THE MARUBO KINSHIP SYSTEM

A. Introduction

Although reciprocity is present in Marubo marriage arrangements, there is a political aspect to intergroup variations in demographic growth. The relative proportions among clans remain the same over time, so that clans cannot be used as vehicles to achieve political power through demographic predominance. However, although clanship does operate as a binding force in Marubo society, clans were not observed to be corporate entities. Rather, it is the *shovo*, the Marubo dwelling, which is a corporate unit. Relative population proportions among *shovo* do not remain the same over time. Thus, while Lévi-Strauss is correct in arguing that the type of marriage exchange system we find in Marubo society is a structure of reciprocity operating to maintain demographic equality among groups over time, this does not prevent intergroup demographic inequalities from existing because local units and exogamous units are not coterminous. This is important in that it suggests that a structure of reciprocity can harbor a political economy of people.

This chapter is divided into five sections (six if we include this introduction). This introduction is section A. In section B, it will be argued that Lévi-Strauss'

interpretation of elementary structures of kinship makes specific predictions which may be rendered as testable hypotheses. In section C, it will be argued that the characteristics of the Marubo kinship system and the recent historical context of Marubo society are such that Lévi-Strauss' predictions should apply. In section D, the data on relative proportions of clans will be presented and analyzed. It will be argued that these data support Lévi-Strauss' predictions. In section E, the same test will be applied, assuming the exchanging unit is not the clan but the *shovo/shovo*-cluster centered on a single leader. These data do not comply with predictions of relative-proportion stability. Finally, in section F I will conclude that Lévi-Strauss is correct but his correctness does not preclude the existence of a political game surrounding the construction of demographic inequality.

B. Derivation of relevant hypotheses from Lévi-Strauss' Elementary Structures of Kinship

If Lévi-Strauss' claims are true, then the Marubo marriage system should act in such a way as to prevent any of the exchanging groups from gaining demographic predominance through the accumulation of personnel by strategic marriage. In Lévi-Strauss' view, systems of marriage such as that practiced by the Marubo are manifestations of the principle of reciprocity in the field of distribution of women, a principle which acts to maintain inter-group matrimonial equilibrium and thus ensure the group's survival as group (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]). Thus, if Lévi-Strauss is correct, Marubo society has a powerful built-in determinant preventing marriage from being used

as a means for any one group to gain predominance over others, implying that equality is embedded in the very nature of the kinship structure. By examining his analysis of the bases of exchange, I will argue that Lévi-Strauss (1969[1949]:29-83) makes specific assertions that may be operationalized and tested by reference to data on demographic consequences of fluctuations in Marubo interclan marriage preferences.

The central assertion to be tested is that systems of inter-clan marital preferences within a structure of restricted exchange are mechanisms for the maintenance of inter-group matrimonial equilibrium. Lévi-Strauss makes this assertion as part of his argument concerning the difference between ‘true’ and ‘functional’ endogamy. Lévi-Strauss argues that the establishment of marriage preferences between two exogamous clans, where more than two exist, is not true endogamy because such preferences are subject to fluctuation over time. The rule is merely to marry outside the clan; beyond that, who specifically is married is not a rule but a preference. This is a difference from the true endogamy of upper classes in ancient Peru and Hawaii or caste endogamy in India, all of which are inviolable rules that do not fluctuate over time. To support his argument, Lévi-Strauss cites his own research on the Bororo of Brazil:

Among the Bororo Indians, whom I studied in 1936, the situation is less clear, for marriage preferences seem to make a direct pairing of the clans and not the classes. But then it is the very temporariness of these clans, their presence in one village, their absence in another, and their possible division or subdivision into sub-clans, which enables them to elude the fixity and strict delimitation of endogamous categories. One is tempted to see the clan preferences not as an outline of ‘true’ endogamy but simply as a technique of adjustment to ensure matrimonial equilibrium in the group, the clan itself continually changing to suit the demands of this equilibrium.

(Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:48-9)

Thus, the Bororo data reveals that inter-clan preferences are specific forms rather than essential aspects of matrimonial exchange. Exchanging units may undergo fission, fusion, and changes in preference, but these changes are such as to “ensure matrimonial equilibrium”. But what is meant by matrimonial equilibrium, and why a system of inter-group marriages might function to maintain such an equilibrium, are issues that must be understood in terms of Lévi-Strauss’ argument concerning the ‘system of the scarce product’. The fact that changes in clan preferences are a mechanism whereby matrimonial equilibrium is maintained may be seen as resulting from the action of the system of the scarce product in the sphere of kinship.

The system of the scarce product is the process whereby a group “faced with insufficiency or the risky distribution of a valuable of fundamental importance” (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:32) applies rules to prevent any one subgroup from maintaining a monopoly over the product—a monopoly that would threaten the existence of the group as a whole. To Lévi-Strauss, “the prime rôle of culture is to ensure the group’s existence as a group, and consequently... to replace chance by organization” (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:32); culture acts to place organization in formerly natural domains. Because culture works to ensure group existence, its action is most evident in the organized distribution of products essential to group survival, and most especially of food and marriage partners:

It is impossible to approach the study of marriage prohibitions if it is not thoroughly understood from the beginning that such facts are in no way exceptional, but represent a particular application, within a given field, of principles and methods encountered whenever the physical or spiritual existence of the group is at stake. The group controls the distribution not only of women, but of a whole collection of valuables. Food, the most easily observed of these, is more than just the most

valuable commodity it really is, for between it and women there is a whole system of real and symbolic relationships, whose true nature is only gradually emerging, but which when even superficially understood, are enough to establish this connexion.

(Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:32-3)

Food and marriage partners are thus products whose distribution culture must act to organize since flaws in their distribution could lead to group extinction. Lévi-Strauss argues that rules for the distribution of food and of marriage partners are not in fact separate phenomena, but manifestations of a basic principle: "...the native mind sees matrimonial and economic changes as forming an integral part of a basic system of reciprocity" (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:33). The system of reciprocity is "... a set of procedures which are familiar to primitive societies and necessary to the group if its coherence is not to be continually compromised" (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:32). It is culture's way of distributing scarce products in such a way that the group which bears that culture will successfully survive.

Lévi-Strauss goes on to point out the fundamental similarities between systems for distribution of meat and those for distribution of marriage partners: "there is only one common characteristic between the prohibition of incest and the reciprocal gift, viz., the individual repulsion and social reprobation directed against the unilateral consumption of certain goods" (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:61). Thus, "primitive thought unanimously proclaims that 'food is... something that has to be shared'" (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:33). The common element for systems of food distribution is a rule stating that an individual cannot keep all (or, in some cases, any) of the food he or she obtains. This is analogous to the incest taboo, the basis for systems of marriage exchange. In Lévi-Strauss' interpretive framework, the incest taboo sets the fundamental premise that the family may

not retain and consume its own women; it must give them up and receive someone else's. The specific forms of exchange are culturally particular; the essence of the principle of reciprocity is simply that you cannot consume something because a rule says it must be shared with the neighbors. This principle establishes the phenomenon of exchange; repeated, exchange becomes alliance. In the field of marriage, the principle of reciprocity manifests itself in a variety of historically particular forms, but all of them are structures of reciprocity.

The action of the principle of reciprocity and the system of the scarce product in the field of distribution of marriage partners works to secure group survival by preventing families from monopolizing the means of reproduction:

What would happen, then, if the collective intervention expressed... by the rule prohibiting incest... did not exist? It might be expected that privileges would arise in that natural aggregation called the family, by reason of the greater intimacy of its inter-individual contacts, and by the lack of any social rule tending to limit this family and to establish equilibrium in it. We are not suggesting that every family would automatically maintain a monopoly of its women... We merely postulate... that the specific viscosity of the family aggregation would act in this direction, and that the combined results would confirm this action. As has been shown, such an eventuality is incompatible with the vital demands not only of primitive society but of society in general. (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:41)

It would seem that Lévi-Strauss' argument is circular in the sense that he argues that for society to exist, the incest taboo must exist, and because the incest taboo exists, society does too. Reifying society thus prevents this from being an explanation for the universality of the incest taboo. But this circularity is not necessary to arriving at an integral explanation for the success of systems of reciprocity as templates for human cultural organization. In the sphere of marriage, a small family is more likely to

encounter a chance situation of lack of fertile women than is a group of families, so that groups of Pleistocene language users applying the principle of reciprocity would appear to have had an evolutionary advantage over those that did not. Certainly a larger, cohesive group would have a continual military advantage. Lévi-Strauss seems to support the somewhat different ‘marry out or die out’ theory, that exchange of marriage partners was the only way to prevent internecine violence among Pleistocene bands, so that humanity would not have survived without the incest taboo—again a circular argument. But Lévi-Strauss’ explanation is not so important as his fundamental assertion that reciprocity in distribution is a mechanism ensuring that group survival is not threatened by individual monopolization of such valuables as are considered essential to the production and reproduction of the group. It is in this context that we may understand Lévi-Strauss’ argument concerning changes in clan preferences as a mechanism for the maintenance of matrimonial equilibrium.

Lévi-Strauss’ main point is that culture’s role in assuring the group’s survival as a group manifests itself in terms of rules preventing individuals or subgroups from consuming the values they produce. Since they cannot consume their own products, and others are in the same situation, they must exchange. And since no one, in such a system, may accumulate undue amounts of the key values, the system of exchange operates to maintain an equilibrium of distribution. Lévi-Strauss suggests that changes in form within a given structure of reciprocal exchange may be seen “as a technique of adjustment to ensure matrimonial equilibrium in the group” (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:49).

The principle of reciprocity, acting in the sphere of marriage, produces a system of exchange alliances between groups. These groups may be defined and named exogamous units with clear preferences for other such units. But if a historically specific event decimates one such group, its ally must find another group to exchange with or face a lack of women and possible extinction. Thus, if the preferences are maintained, the equilibrium is threatened. Preferences must change if the equilibrium that is the point of the system is to be maintained. This leads to the second hypothesis based on Lévi-Strauss to be tested: that historically specific changes in form do not change the fact of a structure's being a structure of reciprocity. This hypothesis is formulated from assertions made by Lévi-Strauss in interpreting Bororo and Konyak Naga marriage exchange systems.

The Bororo, studied by Lévi-Strauss himself (Lévi-Strauss 1936) are divided into two exogamous classes, each in turn subdivided into a number of clans. Clans establish preferential exchange relations with one another, but these preferences ‘elude fixity’: the particular clan associations change from village to village and time to time so that inter-clan marriage alliances do not become endogamous categories, because the alliance is subject to change (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:48-49). The Bororo system is thus flexible enough to display this form-changing quality within the framework of an unchanging structure (see also Kracke (1978) on Tupi-Kagwahiv). This phenomenon Lévi-Strauss refers to as the “respective independence of the principle of reciprocity and the temporary institutions in which it is expressed” (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:78).

Referring to von Fürer-Haimendorf's data on the Konyak Naga, Lévi-Strauss argues that structures of reciprocity change form without changing their essential nature.

The Konyak social organization involves systems of alliances between exogamous units called morung. Thus, at any given moment, the structure displays the form of a system of inter-morung alliances, often in dual organization. However, von Fürer-Haimendorf observed incidents of conflict and destruction during which some morung nearly disappeared and others changed alliance partners. Lévi-Strauss argues that “despite incident, conflict and destruction, the structures just considered still remain structures of reciprocity. Their true nature derives from those factors which cause them to survive as such, and not from the spasmodic history which continually forces them to re-adapt” (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:80).

The Marubo kinship structure as well as the vicissitudes of history it has traversed render it an appropriate case with which to evaluate the predictive power of Lévi-Strauss’ interpretive framework. Operationalization and testing of Lévi-Strauss’ ideas in the context of Marubo data will reveal whether or not the kinship system acts to prevent unequal demographic accumulations by particular groups, however defined.

C. Characteristics of Marubo social organization that render Lévi-Strauss’ ideas applicable to it.

The characteristics of the Marubo kinship and marriage system, as well as its historical context, are such that Lévi-Strauss’ interpretive framework, if valid, should apply. The characteristics of the Marubo system, such as (a) bilateral cross cousin marriage, (b) a variant of Kariera-type social organization, and (c) a kinship terminology fusing collateral “lines”, are such as to make it a structure of reciprocity in Lévi-Strauss’ terms. Lévi-Strauss argued that such systems prevent the unequal accumulation of

women by one group at the expense of another, thus acting to preserve matrimonial equilibrium (he makes this argument first concerning moiety systems, then expands the argument to include Kariera systems as a variant of the former (Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]: 155-162)). Data suggest that this is true of Marubo society. Lévi-Strauss argued further that historical vicissitudes may cause rearrangements in the form of the exchange system, but the structure remains one of reciprocity. Data suggest that the Marubo marriage exchange system was subject to severe reorganization between 1870-1930, but the new form that emerged from these changes is one that maintains equilibrium among exogamous groups over time. Thus the Marubo system is a structure of reciprocity and is able to remain so despite major changes in form, a process startlingly similar to the script written by Lévi-Strauss.

To show that the Marubo system is precisely the kind which Lévi-Strauss made predictions about, and can therefore be used as a test of his theory's predictive power, two kinds of data must be presented. First, information on the kinship system will be presented so as to make it clear that that system is indeed relevant to testing Lévi-Strauss' theory. Second, information about the historical context of Marubo social organization will be presented in order to show that this historical context is also relevant to testing Lévi-Strauss' theory.

1. Characteristics of Marubo kinship system relevant to Lévi-Strauss' theory

Lévi-Strauss' conclusions were based on an analysis of kinship systems with characteristics similar to those of the Marubo system. The Marubo rule of exogamy, kinship terminology, and marriage system are phenomena that make this a relevant case in considering the predictive power of Lévi-Strauss' assessments.

The Marubo kinship terminology is of the Dravidian type but incorporating the alternating generation-namesake principle of Kariera-type systems. Matri- and patrilateral cross cousins are terminologically merged, cross and parallel cousins distinguished, collateral “lines” in ascending and descending generations are merged as if to fit a moiety system that does not exist. This type of kinship terminology is compatible with bilateral cross-cousin marriage and this is indeed the ideal norm for Marubo. The terms for ‘cross-cousin’ are charged with sexual significance, displayed ritually during the akoya ritual.

Where the Marubo terminology differs from the Dravidian standard (because of the principle of alternating generations), it resembles the Kariera systems of Australia, a fact first noted by Melatti (1977). Thus, for example, “brother” and “father’s father” receive the same name (otxi), as do “mother’s father” and “father’s brother’s son” (txaitxo). This stems from the unique Marubo descent rule, which stipulates that a person acquires descent group membership from their mother’s mother. Thus, individuals on alternate generations share descent group membership and consider themselves siblings.

The Marubo exogamous unit is larger than the descent group. The exogamous unit is an etic category, never expressly recognized by the Marubo but analytically

evident. Each descent group, typically named after a natural phenomenon, considers itself a separate people, yet maintains an apparently inextricable relationship with at least one other descent group: if I am a sun-people woman, my children are of the tree-flower people, but my daughter's daughters are sun-people. The exogamous unit consists of two descent groups.

The establishment of a multigenerational marriage alliance between two exogamous units is an oft-stated social ideal. It is the only social form that reconciles the descent rule with the naming rule that specifies that a man should give one of his father's clan's names to his child. Repeated exchange between two Marubo exogamous units over several generations creates a Kariera-type system, of which a characteristic is that matrilineal and patrilineal descent rules may coexist without conflict.

It is necessary to establish a precise terminology in order to develop the argument. In traditional parlance, what I call a descent group is called a marriage section, while what I term 'exogamous unit' is called moiety. Because of the differences between Marubo and 'standard' Kariera-type systems, the traditional terms are slightly misleading when applied to Marubo data. In this regard, the most important particularity of the Marubo system is the absence of a name for the exogamous unit consisting of two 'sections'. This unit—the Kariera and Kaxinawa 'moiety'—is clearly not a moiety in this case because there are nine of them. Furthermore, among the Kariera and Kaxinawa, both section and moiety are named and recognized, so that it is valid to refer to the moiety as the descent group, while the section appears to be a technical sub-division of it; at any rate, individuals recognize that although they may belong to section x they also belong to moiety A, to which section y also belongs. The Marubo have no such ideas.

The exogamous unit consisting of two ‘sections’ is neither named nor recognized as a unit. Each ‘section’ considers itself a separate ‘people’ (nawavo), albeit one with a close kinship relation to another such people. Because the exogamous unit, the Kariera ‘moiety’, is a strictly etic category, yet one with relevance to the regulation of marriage, I will refer to it in the following discussion as a class. Because the descent group, the Kariera ‘section’, is an emic social category whose constituents have a clear self-identity as such, and because each such unit has a separate totemic identity in virtue of being named after a natural phenomenon and having an origin myth giving it a separate origin even from its apparently indivisible exogamous-unit partner, I will refer to it in the following discussion as clan. There are nine classes and eighteen clans in Marubo society.

Marubo classes enter alliances through express marriage preferences which are, however, not rules. A Tamaoavo man told me that the Tamaoavo should marry Shanenawavo women. Indeed, all his brothers had done so. He, however, had married Satanawavo women. This is not considered a bad thing, but it is seen as outside the norm, and it creates a problem because by deviating from the Kariera system, a Marubo couple sets up a conflict between naming and descent rules. If the Kariera system is held to, the wife’s mother’s clan and the husband’s father’s clan are the same. Thus, the women’s naming rule (children should be given a name pertaining to the clan to which they belong) and the men’s naming rule (one should give one’s children names from one’s father’s clan) create no conflict. This fact, together with the existence of explicitly stated normative preferences (e.g., Tamaoavo-Shanenáwavo), show that Kariera-type kinship is a common ideal in Marubo society.

Although it has an ideal, Marubo society has great flexibility and no prescribed penalties for failure to fit the ideal. The marriage rule states that a man must marry his pano (real or classificatory female cross-cousin). There are nine exogamous classes in Marubo society. Informal siblingships exist between some of these, whereby the term for sibling is extended by ego to all members of a clan in the other class, who reciprocate the term. Thus, the Txonavo-Iskonáwavo class and the Tamaoavo-Varináwavo class never intermarry. Another limitation is that if female members of a clan are called pano, the members of the other clan in the class are not. Even so, to any given man, the women of 6-8 clans are called pano. There are thus many possibilities for marrying outside a Kariera-type alliance, and it is often done.

Cross-cousin marriage is common in Marubo society and, where the Kariera-type alliance is established and maintained, it is often real bilateral cross-cousin marriage. The flexibility of Marubo social structure is in this sense paradoxical: on the one hand, this flexibility prevents the ideals from ever being universals; on the other hand, this same flexibility allows the system potential for rearrangement which manifests itself repeatedly as historically specific expressions of the ideal.

The Marubo kinship terminology, rules of exogamy, and marriage system are such that they place the Marubo system in the category of systems analyzed by Lévi-Strauss. It is a Lévi-Straussian structure of reciprocity. Therefore, if Lévi-Strauss' assertions are valid, they should have predictive power with respect to Marubo social phenomena. Specifically, Lévi-Strauss' assertion that a system of alliances between social units such as those extant in Marubo society will function to prevent unequal accumulation and maintain matrimonial equilibrium may be put to the test.

2. Historical context of Marubo social organization

Evidence from Marubo oral histories suggests that the form of the Marubo marriage system changed dramatically during the rubber boom and its immediate aftermath, c. 1870-1920. Oral histories report that the traditional alliances between descent groups were broken by their wholesale extinction at the hands of rubber gatherers. In addition, groups speaking different languages seem to have fused to become one society, a historical occurrence also noted in the Northwest Amazon (e.g., Chernela 1993). After the rubber boom, the Marubo reorganized their marriage alliances with the groups available. This historical factor renders Marubo data relevant to evaluating the validity of Lévi-Strauss' assertion that historically specific changes in the form of a social system do not alter the fact of that system's structure being a structure of reciprocity, and that such changes in form may act to preserve an equilibrium threatened by particular historical conditions, such as contact conditions.

An understanding of Marubo oral history is necessary to see how it is relevant to this aspect of Lévi-Strauss' theory. There are two categories of information required in order to acquire the necessary understanding of Marubo history. To understand Marubo oral history, it is necessary to understand their concept of the human group, referred to with the ubiquitous -nawavo suffix. This suffix and the concepts linked to it, in turn, are best approached through an ethnological comparison among Panoan societies closely related to the Marubo since the morpheme nawa is a defining feature of the Panoan language family's ethnology. This comparison will allow for an understanding of the nature of the groups whose interactions will be considered. Once this is understood, the

data on Marubo oral history will be reviewed in order to show that Marubo society has gone through a process of dissolution and reformation causing a reorganization of the patterns of inter-class alliance.

Panoan group identity

The morpheme nawa refers to ‘people’. The Marubo descent groups name themselves after features of the natural and supernatural world, as the Varináwavo (sun-people) or Kamānáwavo (jaguar people). The suffix -vo, or -bo, is a pluralizer. When used with -nawa- it creates the concept of a class of people. It may also be used alone, as in Shipibo, after *shipi*, a small monkey, or Wanívovo, after *wani*, the peach palm (Bactris gasipaes Mart.). Being in a group labelled by a word ending in -nawavo renders that person kin to all Marubo, since in the Marubo kinship universe people are not classified according to genealogical relationship but rather according to descent group membership. In contrast, “Marubo” is a term originally applied by outsiders that has come to be used by those the term was applied to. The Marubo now use the word Marubo to refer to all those who presently speak the old Shaináwavo language and share a rule of descent from mother’s mother. But the Marubo are not alone in having social groups with names involving the morphemes nawa and/or vo.

The Kaxinawa are a Panoan group whose social organization has received attention for its resemblance to the Australian Kariera system. Kashi means bat, in Marubo kāshi, and is the same morpheme commonly used in referring to the Kashibo of Peru. The Kaxinawa have marriage sections with names such as Awa bakübo and Rono

bakübo. Bakü means child; awa is “tapir” while rono is “snake”. Thus, the names of these sections signify “children of the tapir” and “children of the snake”.

The main differences between Kaxinawa and Marubo social structure are three: (1) where the Marubo have 18 clans, the Kaxinawa have four sections; (2) the Kaxinawa have a name for the moiety, the exogamous unit consisting of two sections alternating generationally; (3) a Kaxinawa belongs to the section of her father’s father. In a four-section system this makes little difference because the father’s father’s and mother’s mother’s sections are the same, but it is a significant difference from the 18-‘section’ Marubo system that has descent from the mother’s mother.

The comparison between Kaxinawa and Marubo highlights the different forms taken by assemblages of essentially similar social units in different Panoan societies. The example of the Katukina provides confirming evidence that the precise form taken by Panoan social units is flexible, even when such units are terminologically akin.

The Katukina-Pano of Acre are probably the group that is most closely related to the Marubo. Linguistically, the Katukina are very close to the Marubo, with a fair degree of mutual intelligibility. They share numerous myths, cosmological elements, and medical beliefs and practices with the Marubo. They themselves claim a close relation with the Marubo (Coffaci 1994), and likewise some Marubo claim kinship with some Katukina. The Katukina have six exogamous descent groups. Several of the Katukina clan names are in existence among the Marubo: Satanawa, Varinawa, Numanawa, Kamanawa, and Waninawa, are all names for exogamous descent groups that exist among the Katukina as well as the Marubo (although the Marubo usually call the “peach palm” people Wanívó rather than Waninawa). Furthermore, the Katukina are the only

Panoan society other than the Marubo known to reckon descent group membership through the female “line”. Nevertheless, despite the evident closeness there are important differences between the Marubo and the Katukina.

Coffaci (1994) reports that the Katukina are debating their descent rule. While it appears that recent generations used matrilineal descent, a growing faction today claims that the proper way to reckon descent is patrilineally. There is one apparently incestuous marriage in which both members claim the same descent group. However, they are each using a different descent rule, and thus wind up in the same category. The marriage is not apparently considered incestuous.

In addition to the different descent rule, traces of the alternating generation principle so dominant in Marubo and Kaxinawa social structure are absent in Katukina society. On the second ascending generation, Katukina kinship terminology has only one term for males and one term for females, while on the second descending generation there is only one term for both sexes. The Katukina descent rule assigns membership from the adjacent rather than the alternate generation.

Data on Katukina descent demonstrate that Panoan societies may exhibit the same flexibility as Australian societies in that the human actors in the kinship system may choose to change its form if not its deep structure. The case of the Katukina shows another form that may be taken by an assemblage of social groups with the morpheme -nawa- in their names. It is even more instructive if we assume that Katukina and Marubo societies were one in a not-too-distant past. While the data to prove this hypothesis are, at present, unavailable, the limited evidence that is available makes the Katukina-Marubo connection a very likely supposition. If true, then the differences

between Marubo and Katukina social organization must have arisen in the time it has taken for the languages to diverge. We know that the descent rule can be a matter for debate, choice, and change. If the hypothesis of a recent “genetic” connection between Katukina and Marubo societies is true, this would suggest that an alternating generation principle may be abandoned by its users. The alternative explanation is that an alternating generation principle may be adopted where it does not already exist. This would require a change in the descent rule from receiving group membership from the adjacent generation to receiving it from the second ascending generation. An open question is whether this could be accomplished by the fusion of two previously separate descent groups (perhaps the case in Marubo society, explaining why they lack an appellation for the entire exogamous unit) or only by the simple horizontal splitting of a descent group (perhaps the case among the Kaxinawa, explaining why they do have an appellation for the exogamous unit).

The significance of these ethnological data lies in their allowing us to interpret Marubo oral history by shedding light on the potential range of mechanics of change in Panoan social formations. If nothing else, certain mechanisms must be postulated to explain the observed diversity in the Panoan language family. Before returning to data on Marubo, a brief review of further instances of the morpheme -nawa- in Panoan societies is relevant in that it suggests that a variety of these groups exist in a definite geographical space, and Marubo social organization is flexible enough to incorporate a descent group from outside its social boundaries of any given moment.

The sheer number of names for Panoan groups that early ethnologists encountered proved a confusing obstacle to an accurate perception of this linguistic family (Siskind

1972; Townsley 1988). Loukotka (1968) lists 61 Panoan languages with names such as Tuxinaua, Nehanaua, Nastanaua, Nixinaua, and Paran-nawa. Subsequent research has shown that one group may be given several names by other people; a group may have its own name as well as a set of derogatory names invented by others; and travellers probably confused names of descent groups, or nicknames for local groups, for names of discrete societies. There are also general terms for classes of people, as when the Marubo refer to hostile Indians as mukanawa, stinging-wasp people. From all this, a confusion arose until anthropological fieldwork from the 1970s on clarified which groups really existed and which groups did not. Thus, after carrying out fieldwork in the upper Purús, Townsley reported:

The Purús Panoans, in which the Yaminahua are included, appear superficially to be a more diverse linguistic category than either of the others. There are a host of nahua group names listed for them, giving the impression of a much more heterogeneous category than either Cashinahua or Amahuaca. This impression is largely illusory. These nahua groups have become dispersed as a result of historical events surrounding the rubber boom... and, encountered at different places and different times, they have been given different names. In terms of language or cultural tradition they are no more diverse, however, than either the representatives of the Amahuaca or Cashinahua categories.

(Townsley 1988:12)

Townsley argues for the existence of a group of “Purús Panoans”, including Mastanahua, Parquenahua, Yaminahua, Sharannahua, and Marinahua, which must be regarded as a single group. We may here be confronted with a situation analogous to that of Marubo society prior to the adoption of the term “Marubo”. Without that term to designate the entire assemblage of 18 descent groups, an untrained or casual observer might not perceive a single society but a plethora of tribes. In speaking Portuguese, the

Marubo elders refer to other descent groups as other “tribes” (Portuguese *tribos*). Thus, without a term to supply cohesion, and perhaps without the historically specific moment of geographic concentration experienced by the Marubo groups after the rubber boom (in the period 1920-1965), a variety of what Townsley calls “nahua groups” may exist as a fluid assemblage in a single marriage exchange continuum but without the sharp definition of the Marubo, Kaxinawa, and Katukina systems. Thus the Yaminahua (Townsley 1988) and the Sharanahua (Siskind 1972) may have distinct ethnicities but even so cannot be considered ethnologically (nor linguistically) as distinct societies.

The many group names involving the morpheme -nawa- may thus be seen to represent a variety of different phenomena. Some do not exist, being derogatory terms for other ethnic groups (e.g., Pisinawa, ‘stinking people’, or Loukotka’s suspicious Paranaua category, signifying ‘lying people’ and never documented by any fieldworker). Others do exist and operate as identifiable societies (e.g., Kaxinawa). Still others exist as part of an open, fuzzy-bordered continuum (e.g., the Purús Panoans—Yaminahua, Sharanahua, and the others). Finally, some are descent groups assembled together in a discrete social formation (as among the Marubo and Katukina).

The purpose of reviewing comparative data on the Panoan “nahua group” phenomenon has been to allow for a fuller understanding of the context for the historic rearrangements of the relations between the units that Marubo society is composed of today. It should be kept in mind also that the Marubo are aware of and have some relations with the Purús and Juruá Panoans as well as all the Javari basin Panoans, and their mythology suggests an ancient trade route up the Ucayali. This indicates a wide range of potential contacts within the limited geographic range of the Panoan ensemble.

This would include contacts between groups with names including the morpheme -nawa- (Townsley's "nahua groups") but which might be different phenomena despite the similar name. Specifically, some are exogamous units (as among the Marubo and Katukina), some are not exogamous (e.g., Yaminahua, Sharanahua); and of those that are exogamous, some are in an essential alternating generation relationship with one another (Marubo clans and Kaxinawa sectons), while others stand alone (Katukina nahua groups, Purús Panoans). Yet, in my experience, despite the actual (analytic) variety of forms, many Marubo assume that all groups referred to by the morpheme nawa are similar to those which exist in their own (Marubo) cultural framework—a classic case of ethnocentrism. It is reasonable to predict that diverse Panoans would emically assume a fundamental similarity among themselves and their nawa-groups despite the etically evident differences.

Data from Marubo oral history

Data from Marubo oral history will be presented in order to show its relevance to the claims made by Lévi-Strauss in The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969[1949]). Lévi-Strauss reviewed data on the Konyak Naga showing that specific forms of alliance between exogamous groups, forms displaying the features of dual organization, could be broken by historical incidents such as violent conflict, and yet the extant groups would then reorganize in a new form that is structurally identical to the old one. According to Marubo elders, the exogamous groups that compose modern-day Marubo society have undergone an analogous process of shattered alliances and reorganization. This renders Marubo oral history an appropriate set of data with which to address the question of

whether Lévi-Strauss was correct in extracting a generalizable principle from the Konyak Naga data of von Fürer-Haimendorf.


Marubo society over the past century has undergone a process of contraction and expansion in geographic extension and population. Today there are 37 *shovo* on two rivers, the Curuçá and Ituí (Sui and Txeshe in Marubo). According to Alfredo, kakáya (highest political status) of Maronal, in his childhood there were only 5 *shovo*, and these were concentrated in a small area at the headwaters of the Maronal and Arrojo rivers. Oral histories indicate this concentration was a result of the rubber boom. Prior to the rubber boom, there were -nawa- groups spread out along the Curuçá, Javari, Pardo, Arrojo and Ituí rivers, speaking at least three distinct languages. Fleeing ethnocide at the hands of rubber merchants and workers, these groups evacuated the vicinities of major rivers, hiding in the headwaters of smaller tributaries, in areas inaccessible by boat (save in the immediate aftermath of heavy rainstorms). When the rubber boom ended, they were reduced to the small concentration remembered by Alfredo. After 1965 or so, these people spread out to reoccupy the Curuçá and Ituí. In the course of these events, the system of alliances between exogamous groups underwent a reorganization.

The oral-historical data are stories relating specific events in which groups of people moved from one place to another in order to avoid the violent conflict associated with the expanding rubber frontier. All the stories specify the name of the group(s) of people involved and the river they lived near. Some involve generic explanations for leaving, while others involve specific tales of conflict, ethnocide and forced migration. In all cases except kidnapping, the direction of migration is away from the main courses

of the rivers, towards the headwaters of smaller tributaries—as far away as possible from non-indigenous people.

Marubo oral histories indicate that the groups which today comprise Marubo society spoke three distinct languages in the past. They say that the Inonáwavo, who lived on the Javari river, spoke a different language from everybody else. They add that the language today spoken by Marubo is the language of the Shaináwavo, a descent group that is today extinct. The language spoken by their ancestors, which they call “Asankiki”, is now used only in the healing songs and shamanic vocabulary. Of course, these statements have alternative explanations. Nevertheless, the data are indicative of a linguistic diversity that existed prior to the rubber boom but no longer exists. It is probable that the ethnic identity that exists today did not exist then either.


FIGURE 8.1.: Movements of Panoan groups during the rubber boom according to Marubo oral history



Locations are approximate, based on descriptions by informants.


Key is on following page.

Figure 8.1.: Key



1. Inonáwavo/ Wanívo/Kananáwavo of the Javari River (extinct).
2. Inonáwavo/ Wanívo/Kananáwavo (escaped)—Júlio's people.
3. Iskonáwavo, Noïkoavo, Nináwavo—Tamani Romeya's people.
4. Satanáwavo—Dionísio's people.
5. Nináwavo, Ranenáwavo, Satanáwavo, Rovonáwavo—Ernesto and Domingo's people.
6. João Tuxáua's family.
7. Kapeya (Igarapé Jacaré)—Wanívo, Iskonáwavo, Txonavo.
8. Variwaka—Varináwavo, Tamaoavo, Shanenáwavo, Iskonáwavo, Varikayõvo, Waníkeyapavo, Atashenivo, Shawãvo.
9. Kanãway—Earlier, Satanáwavo; later, Shawãvo.
10. Txunãwaya—Shawãvo, Nomanáwavo, Ranenáwavo.
11. Mapopotatiya—Nináwavo.
12. Tekõya—Shaináwavo, Yenenáwavo (extinct); Rovonáwavo.
13. Shashoya—Shanenáwavo, kidnapped to Palmari.
14. Marubo rubber boom gathering point.

FIGURE 8.2.: Geographic expansion of Marubō, 1965-Present.



The story of Júlio

Júlio was the Portuguese name of Mani, owner of one of the five Marubo *shovo* that existed after the end of the rubber boom (the word I translate as ‘owner’ is the word *ivo*, used in the phrase *shovo ivo*, which the Marubo translate into Portuguese as *dono de maloca*). Júlio was an Inonáwavo man, member of a branch of the Inonáwavo that is now nearly extinct. He was the father of Paulino, currently a *shovo*-owner on the Ituí. Júlio is spoken of as the last of the Inonáwavo of the Pardo river, whose villages were destroyed during the rubber boom.

Although there are currently no known indigenous inhabitants of the Pardo, it is claimed as traditional territory by the Marubo and the Mayoruna. The Marubo say that the area was inhabited by members of four groups: Wanívo, Inonáwavo, Koronáwavo, and Kamánáwavo. The modern-day situation of these groups is that they are all members of a single exogamous class. Because the purpose of presenting these data is to show the movement of Marubo groups during and after the rubber boom, it is necessary to distinguish which are distinct groups and which are alternate appellations. This class is the most terminologically confusing of all. However, Melatti (1977) used genealogical research to determine that these multiple terms all referred to a single class. My data confirm his conclusions and add two generations of depth, showing with greater clarity the differing alternation of appellations in different branches of the lineage.

The children of Wanívo women are referred to by any of three names: Inonáwavo, Koronáwavo, or Kamánáwavo. Furthermore, individuals who genealogically should be Wanívo are referred to also as Variotavo or Wanískovo. At first sight it thus appears possible that this is not a single marriage class at all. However, ancestry of the members

of all these branches is traceable to only two women, Peko and Vane. They had three daughters and seven daughter's daughters. Three of the latter are still alive. While all three are considered Wanīvo, Iska, the living DD of Vane, is alternatively called Variotavo. It is quite common for Marubo descent groups to have several names, so that the existence of two appellations is not *ipso facto* evidence of distinct phenomena. What is interesting is that the living DDs of Peko, and her DDDDs as well, are uniformly identified as Wanīvo, while the DDs and DDDDs of Vane are alternatively called Variotavo or Wanīvo . When I asked about this, I was told that the Variotavo are a kind of Wanīvo also known as Waniískovo, and distinct from other Wanīvo. One individual was identified to me as Waniískovo (Txumăpa), another identified himself as such (Floriano). It is therefore possible that Peko and Vane were in fact members of different groups and that their descendants are recognized as slightly different from one another, with both called Wanīvo but one dubbed a.k.a. Waniískovo or Variotavo.

The kokavo of the Wanīvo are Kamānawavo, Koronawavo, and Inonawavo (kokavo are those in the category of koka, i.e., mother's brothers and all other members of the alternate-generation group within one's own exogamous class). Kamā means jaguar, and Ino is said to be an archaic term signifying jaguar. Koro refers to kamā koro, a variety of wild feline whose precise nature I was unable to ascertain. On the -3 generation from Peko and Vane are found individuals who are labelled by all three terms. On the -5 generation are found, again, Kamānawavo, Koronawavo, and Inonawavo. It should be noted that the appellation Koronawavo is found only in the line of Peko. Peko's daughter's daughter, still alive at aldeia Vida Nova and known as Wanishavo Peko, bore numerous children, all of them labelled Koronawavo. Wanishavo Peko's

DDS and DDDs are all Koronáwavo as well. Elsewhere, the term Koronáwavo is applied to the daughter of a woman named Shori. Shori's mother is labelled Inonáwavo, but Shori's mother's sisters are Kamānáwavo. Nevertheless, Shori's daughter is Koronáwavo. This may be explained, however, because Shori is married to a man whose *shovo* has established an alliance with the Koronáwavo/ Wanīvo line, and his children should be Koronáwavo. Thus, he calls them Koronáwavo, which at any rate is probably still considered an alternate appellation rather than a separate line.

Despite the confusion of terms, the matrilineal descendants of Peko and Vane, who now number 149 individuals, maintain exogamy. None of them has married any other of them.

It should be noted that the appellation Inonáwavo exists in two other classes. In one, the Inonáwavo alternate with Nináwavo. This class has intermarried with the one just discussed. Most notably, an Inonáwavo man of this lineage has married three Wanīvo women, having children labelled “Inonáwavo” like their father. Appearing to be a blatant violation of exogamy, this datum distressed me greatly until I was able to distinguish the different Inonáwavo lines.

Inonáwavo appears in a third class, alternating with the Kananáwavo clan. This, however, is a dying class, because only four men are left.

FIGURE 8.3.: Variant clan-appellation alternation schemes in the class that includes Wanīvo.




Figure 8.3.: Key.





Chart shows the alternation of appellations in the class including the Wanívo clan. In the line of Vane, this latter appellation alternates with the Variotávo/Waniískovo appellation. On the alternate generation, Koronáwavo, Kamãnáwavo, and Inonáwavo seem interchangeable as appellations. The line on the far right is aberrant and currently unexplained. Chart is based on (1) answers to my direct inquiries during census-taking, 1997-8; and (2) Dr. Melatti's census data, 1974-5.

One final datum should be considered in efforts to unravel the Marubo class/clan terminology. One of my chief informants, José Barbosa, was the son of a Wanīvo man. José distinguished his father from regular Wanīvo, saying he was a Waniískovo, classificatory brother of Txumāpa and Floriano. Floriano is the only Marubo who referred to himself as Waniískovo when asked. Txumāpa declined to state his descent-group membership when asked, but said yes when asked if he was Wanīvo. When I asked José about the interrelations of these units, he stated that the Waniískovo were kokavo of the Koronáwavo, but epavo (*epavo*=individuals in father's brother's clan, i.e., alternate-generation, opposite marriage class) of the other Wanīvo. The Wanīvo, in turn, are kokavo of the Inonáwavo. This yields a Kariera-type alliance scheme as follows:



The data at my disposal do not support José's assertions. However, it is interesting for two reasons, to wit: (1) as suggesting that the analytically single exogamous descent group, consisting of descendants in the female line of Peko and Vane, may be a fusion of previously multiple descent groups, and (2) as showing the existence of the notion that 'in the past', exogamous units formed stable Kariera-type alliances.

These data suggest that, when oral history claims the Pardo river as the pre-rubber boom homeland of the Wanīvo, Inonáwavo, Kamānáwavo, and Koronáwavo, it is the class of descendants of Peko and Vane that is referred to. However, these data also raise the possibility that at some point in the past, this was not a single exogamous class, but

rather a pair of classes linked in a Kariera-type alliance. The truth is unlikely to be knowable.

Available data on the past of this class are the following:

(1) The Inonáwavo lived on the rivers known as Roene (Javari) and Tashaya (Pardo). They were known as wakaivovo, “river-owners”, of the Roene. In addition, the Roene and Tashaya were the homelands of the Wanívó, Koronáwavo, and Kamānáwavo.

(2) A village of Inonáwavo and Wanívó on the Pardo was exterminated by Peruvians, leaving only one survivor. The leaders of this village were named Vari and Wanínato. A story, which I heard on several occasions, relates how the men returned from hunting to find Peruvians taking the women and children. A battle ensued in which several Peruvians were killed but the Indians were exterminated. The sole survivor was a man named Mani, or Júlio in Portuguese. This man was invited by João Tuxáua to live near him, and became one of the five *shovo*-owners of the immediate post-rubber boom era.

(3) Júlio told of close relationships between the Inonáwavo of the Tashaya and those of the Roene, considered the Inonáwavo’s traditional lands. However, the Inonáwavo of the Roene never appeared at the rallying-points in the headwaters where the Marubo hid to avoid ethnocide. Since stories tell of their existence but not their fate, they are presumed to have been totally exterminated. That land is today occupied by the Mayoruna, who continue to walk ancient paths between the Roene and Tashaya, seeking shamanic assistance from the Marubo now dwelling on the Curuçá river.

(4) The Inonáwavo are said to have spoken a different language prior to assembling at the headwaters of the Arrojo and Maronal, fusing with the other –náwavo to become the Marubo nation.

The story of João Tuxáua

João Tuxáua is the man credited with preserving the existence of the Marubo by gathering together in a single area the remnants of ‘Marubo’ groups throughout the Javari basin. The stories of João Tuxáua’s one-man cultural revitalization crusade will be reviewed in the section on leadership.

João Tuxáua was Wanívo, and was considered koka (classificatory or real mother’s brother) by Inonáwavo such as Júlio. I was told that J.T.’s family lived between the Curuçá and Javari rivers. They became scared when a nearby village had a violent encounter with Peruvians. Together with that nearby village, they fled across the Curuçá to the headwaters of the Arrojo, near an affluent called the Yapãua, a very remote and inaccessible area with absolutely no boat or canoe access. There, they were able to survive until the end of the rubber boom and beyond. João Tuxáua had at least seven wives and 23 children.

The story of Ernesto and Domingo

Members of the Nináwavo, Ranenáwavo, Satanáwavo, and Rovonáwavo groups lived along a watercourse called Wasiwaya, which flowed into the upper course of the

Javari. The Wasiwaya was tentatively identified by a young Ranenáwavo informant as the Igarapé Hospital (*igarapé* is the Portuguese word for a smaller stream that is the affluent of a larger river).

A story relates that the leader of these people was a man named Mene, with the Portuguese name Chico Tuxáua. Chico had two adult sons, Txano and Sai, and had a wife pregnant with a third son. Sai was married and had a son Ernesto. Chico fought some Peruvians with whom he had a business relationship. The Peruvians kidnapped several women and children, including Chico's pregnant wife and young Ernesto. Seven years later, Txano and Sai tracked their kin down and stole them back. Chico then took his family and led them up into the headwaters of the Arrojo, to the Yapáua, where they were joined by João Tuxáua's family. Ernesto grew up to be one of the five *shovo*-owners of the post-rubber boom era.

The son of that wife of Chico's that had been pregnant when kidnapped had been named Domingo by the Peruvians. In indigenous terms, he was a Ranenáwavo man named Ako. He, too, grew to become one of the five hut-owners surviving the rubber boom. Census data suggests he had at least 6 wives and 23 children.

The story of Dionísio

In addition to Júlio, João Tuxáua, Ernesto and Domingo, a man named Dionísio, the son of a Satanáwavo woman, owned a *shovo* in the headwaters of the Arrojo and Maronal when Alfredo Barbosa was a child, c. 1940-45. This man was a member of a group of people living on watercourses flowing into the Curuçá from the Javari side, not

too far downriver from where the current Aldeia Maronal is located. These people became involved in an internecine conflict with other Satanáwavo over women, which resulted in demographic decimation. Of Dionísio's immediate family, only he and a few sisters remained, orphaned. João Tuxáua, aware of their plight, brought them to live with him at the Yapāua. The others continued fighting and disappeared, according to oral histories.

The Kapeya massacre

Along a watercourse called Kapeya, today known in Portuguese as Igarapé Jacaré (Marubo *Kapep* (silent p)=Caiman=Portuguese *Jacaré*), there were three *shovo*. The owners of these *shovo* were Wanítama, a Wanívo man; Shonovimi, an Iskonáwavo man; and Māse, a Txonavo man. A story relates that when the Peruvians reached this place, they had already had violent relations with other indigenous people, and so resolved to exterminate the Kapeya *shovo*. Offering merchandise to the villagers, they gathered them together in one location and shot them. A man named Yoati is said to have escaped to tell the story. Other Txonavo and Iskonáwavo fled the area, joining the others in the headwaters of the Arrojo.

Tamani Romeya

The longest, most detailed, and most frequently recounted story of the rubber era was that of Tamani Romeya, a shaman who was captured by Peruvians and escaped only to die in a sudden attack some time later.

The story of Tamani Romeya is set in a group of villages along the Kariya watercourse, known in Portuguese as Igarapé Sete Achos, located upstream from the mouth of the Arrojo. Tamani Romeya was a member of a now extinct descent group known as the Noīkoavo. Two other leaders lived there, an Iskonáwavo man named Iskopei and a Nináwavo man named Tamavaněpa.

The story states that a canoe with Peruvians on board came to this area, offered presents, and invited the Indians to come downstream to their boat. Those who accepted, including Tamani Romeya and his nephew Rane, were attacked by surprise and bound by the ankles and wrists. After night came, Tamani Romeya's wife came on board and poured the contents of a bottle of tobacco powder (romepoto) in his mouth. Receiving strength from the snuff, Tamani broke his bonds as well as those of his nephew. The Peruvians fired on them as they leapt overboard and fled overland, but they successfully escaped and returned to their now-decimated villages.

The story continues by recounting the ultimate death of Tamani and escape of Rane. After a few days had passed since the escape, Rane went hunting with his wife and daughter, but forgot something. As he returned to the *shovo*, Tamani could be heard singing in his hammock. Then shots rang out. The Peruvians were returning to finish off the village. According to the story, the populations of these villages were almost entirely

killed. Rane and his family, however, escaped to the Satanáwavo who lived on affluents further up the Curuçá but on the same side. Rane's daughter married João Tuxáua. Her son is now an elder *shovo*-owner on the upper Ituí. He—Rane's daughter's son—is now 78 years old according to his birth certificate, placing the massacre—around the time of his *mother*'s birth—at or near 1900.

Shashoya

Shashoya is the watercourse called in Portuguese Igarapé São Salvador. This is where FUNAI established the first post on the Curuçá in 1974. Oral histories state that the Shashoya is the traditional land of the Shanenáwavo. A story tells that the inhabitants of this area were assaulted by Peruvians, who ran off the men and kidnapped the women. These women were taken, according to this story, to what is today the riverine community of Palmari, upstream from Atalaia. One of my informants, Wilson, who frequently travels up and down the Javari and Curuçá, said that still visible at Palmari are large Marubo-style ceramics made by the kidnapped women and their daughters; that the inhabitants of Palmari recognize him as distant kin in virtue of his being a Curuçá Marubo; and that he returns this recognition.

After this conflict, the Shashoya Shanenáwavo are said to have vacated the area, joining the others further upstream.

Kanāway

The name of a place rather than a watercourse, Kanāway is located on the Wakanoaya, an Igarapé whose mouth is upstream from the Arrojo's. Oral tradition holds that there were two villages here, one under a Satanáwavo headman named Ako, the other under an Inonáwavo headman named Mapi. It is said that the villages were abandoned out of fear of attack when the inhabitants heard that the Peruvians were coming closer and had conducted numerous massacres. The site of Kanāway was subsequently occupied by Shawávo people. The stories assert that these Shawávo were massacred, ending the indigenous occupation of Kanāway; however, no specific story relates this event.

Txunāwaya

Further upstream than the Wakanoaya is the Txunāwaya, known in Portuguese as Igarapé Barrigudo. Oral histories place two villages on the Txunāwaya: a village under a Shawávo headman named Nea, and another consisting of Nomanáwavo and Ranenáwavo, under the headman Nomásai. In addition, a watercourse called Mapopotatiya enters the Txunāwaya some ways upstream from the Curuçá. This was the dwelling of the Nináwavo under a headman named Tama. Oral tradition states that these peoples were attacked and massacred and the remnants fled upstream to the headwaters of the Arrojo and Maronal.

Variwaka

The Ituí river is one of the two currently occupied by the Marubo. Information from New Tribes missionaries indicates that this river was not occupied by Marubo prior to the mid-1960s. At the time when the missionaries first visited the Marubo, all were located at the headwaters of the Maronal. However, two incidents occurred in the 1960s that caused a migration to Ituí: (1) the war with Mayoruna Indians, and (2) the case of poisoning in which three men are said to have used a sort of poison smoke bomb to attack others (the consequences of these events are described in detail in Chapter Five). Thus, from at least 1965 on, Marubo began *shovo*-building on the Ituí. However, although there were no Marubo on the Ituí in immediate post-rubber boom times, the Marubo state that they lived along the Ituí prior to the rubber era.

The indigenous Marubo name for the Ituí is Txeshe, a word denoting black or dark, but also the beads made from seeds of the murumuru palm (*Astrocaryum murumuru*, a spiny palm). This refers to the color of the Ituí, which is a dark brown as opposed to the whitish tan of the Curuçá. The Ituí is also traditionally known as Variwaka, sun-river, because it is the traditional land of the Varináwavo. In addition to the Varináwavo, Tamaoavo, Shanenáwavo, and Iskonáwavo also dwelled there. A group of Shawávo under a headman named Tamonawá also lived there. Furthermore, the Marubo oral traditions record at least three descent groups that no longer exist that lived on the Ituí: Varikayõvo, Waníkeyapavo, and Atashenivo. The greatest of Ituí headmen is recalled as having been called Makatxoai, “skinny mouse”.

The Marubo oral histories relate an incident in which a man named Iskotoke Romeya snuck into a rubber-tapper's house while the latter was out, broke into a locked box, and stole objects. The rubber-tappers retaliated by attacking a Varináwavo village. The Marubo conclude that the Ituí was abandoned for the same reasons previously mentioned: the indigenous people were either killed, kidnapped, or fled.

Conclusions on recent history of Marubo social organization

During the rubber boom, violent conflicts in the Javari basin forced a number of geographically and linguistically diverse Panoan groups to concentrate in a small inaccessible area reachable only by difficult overland paths. There is reason to believe that the process of forced concentration led to a dissolution of the system of relationships that existed among these groups and their rearrangement in a new system. Evidence for this comes from four sources: (1) extinction of descent groups; (2) geographic redistribution; (3) extranormative marriage arrangements; and (4) onomastics.

In an alliance system such as that of the Marubo, the extinction of a descent group necessitates a reorganization of the alliance system. Contemporary observations of the Marubo suggest they prefer to enter into an established multigenerational alliance with another descent group. On numerous occasions this was expressed to me as an ideal, and deviations deplored; furthermore, it is the only way the descent and naming systems work together smoothly. Several alliances recorded in oral histories still, to a certain extent, persist: Ranenáwavo-Rovonáwavo and Inonáwavo- Wanívo are examples. However, I recorded the names of at least nine descent groups said to have existed once but no

longer: along the Ituí, the Varikayõvo, Waníkeyapavo, and Atashenivo; the Tekõya groups—Shaináwavo and Yenenáwavo—said to be the source for the current Marubo language; the Noïkoavo, Tamani Romeya's people on the Sete Achos; the Variisávo and their kokavo, an extinct Iskonáwavo unit; and the Txonakorovo, former epavo of the Txonavo. The disappearance of so many expogamous units must have occasioned a reorganization of the alliance system.

Reorganization of the geographic distribution of Panoan groups in the Javari basin may also have occasioned shifts in the alliance system. In a sense, there has been a geographic inversion. The Inonáwavo are known as ‘owners’ of the Javari, while the Ituí is considered the land of the Varináwavo. However, today the Inonáwavo are concentrated on the Ituí, particularly at Aldeia Rio Novo, while the Varináwavo are concentrated on the Curuçá. Thus, after the rubber-boom concentration, the descent groups spread out in the direction opposite to the one they originally came from. Since geographic proximity as well as traditional preference must be considered a factor in determining the form of the alliance system, such a geographic reorganization as observed in oral-historical data must be assumed to have contributed to a reorganization of the alliance system.

At the headwaters of the Maronal and Arrojo, at least two people, João Tuxáua and Domingo (Ako) contributed to the survival of the Marubo by marrying numerous wives and having extraordinary numbers of children (see Table 8.1.). These marriages were unusual for several reasons: (1) In contemporary Marubo society, no one individual has more than three wives, and there is only one case of this happening successfully. Having six to eight wives is unheard of. According to one informant, there was a

shortage of men at this time: only a few survived the rubber boom to re-produce the indigenous culture. (2) Sororal polygyny, real or classificatory, is the norm where polygyny is practiced. Marriage to multiple women of different groups is unusual.. (3) As previously discussed, an ideal norm of Kariera-type kinship exists. This norm requires strictly sororal polygyny where polygyny is practiced at all. (4) João Tuxáua's marriage to both clans of the Shanenáwavo/Iskonáwavo class is highly unusual. Such phenomena are avoided as disruptive of the kinship and naming system. There is a practice of kin-term application by analogy. Thus, if my father is Wanívo, those whom he calls brother I call father's brother, epa. Since this applies to all members of this descent group, if my father is Wanívo, all Wanívo become epavo, the women natxivo. The kokavo of my epavo are my txaivo, the group into which I must marry. Thus, by marrying both Shane- and Isko-náwavo, João Tuxáua would have caused members of both these groups to consider the Wanívo epavo, a situation clearly contradictory to the social norms and one which would no doubt be bemoaned were it to occur today.

Domingo held to the traditional alliance of his group in three out of six cases, marrying Rovonáwavo women as did, many years later, my Ranenáwavo informant Wilson and his older brother Shetäpa. In the other three cases, however, he married outside the alliance. In João Tuxáua's case, due to the confusion surrounding the Inonáwavo/ Wanívo lines, it is impossible to say what marriages would have been dictated for him by tradition in a rubber boom-less historical context. No matter what such a tradition may have been, however, João Tuxáua almost certainly did not follow it.

These data may be explained by arguing that the necessities of group survival far outweighed the importance of intergroup marital preferences. Other data on João Tuxáua

suggest he consciously executed a plan to ensure his people's survival. It seems clear that he responded to the precarious demographic situation by entering unconventional marriages, which the next generations avoided replicating.

Examination of Marubo onomastics yields the most compelling evidence of a former existence of Kariera-type alliances disrupted by the rubber boom. As is the case among the Kaxinawa, Marubo personal names are linked to the descent-group system. Each descent group has a set of names to be applied to its members. While a few names are used by several different descent groups, others are unique to a particular descent group. Thus, upon hearing a person's name, a Marubo can often identify the descent group membership of the person named. Most interesting, however, is the rule for transmission of names. One might assume it would be: "a child receives a name pertaining to the clan it is born into." However, it is not so simple. The rule was stated to me as follows: "one must give one's children the name of one's epavo." The rule thus plays out in practice as one of receiving a name from one's father's father's clan.

Because the descent rule assigns reception of membership from mother's mother, the naming rule generates conflict. The only way father's father's clan and mother's mother's clan are the same is if marriage is of the Kariera type. If marriage is not with the offspring of a female member of one's father's descent group, the resulting children will not be in the same group as their father's father. In such a situation, if they are named after their father's father's clan, their name will be inappropriate to their actual group membership.

On one occasion, as I reviewed the families of an Ituí *shovo* with an informant at Maronal, I expressed surprise at an unusual name, Imi, "blood". My informant said, oh,

Tamaimi (the sap of a tree), that's a Tamaoavo name. But, I said, the child is Iskonáwavo, the son of a Shawávo woman. Yes, José responded, Shorípa (Imi's father) named him after his own epavo. José then explained to me his belief that such things happen because today, the “tribes” are all “mixed up”. José, an elder raised prior to the indigenous adoption of the exogenous term “Marubo”, considers each descent group to be a separate tribe (Portuguese ‘tribo’), some of which are kin while others, like the Inonáwavo, are not. In the old days (“antigamente”), José said, each tribe lived only with those it married with, all of them one’s kin. Today, such arrangements are no longer made, José complained (in fact, they are), and the result is naming discrepancies, as when an Iskonáwavo child receives a Tamaoavo name. More telling, however, is the assignment to some children of names from extinct descent groups.

A Varináwavo elder, Võpa, assigned to all his children names from his epavo, the now-extinct Variísavo. This group has distinctive names for females (Isáshavo) and males (Isánawa), in either case referring to the patauá nut, Marubo Isã. To understand the significance of this datum, it is necessary to review the Kariera-type cognitive scheme in use among the Marubo.

TABLE 8.1.:

Marriages of Domingo and João Tuxáua, founders of the modern Marubo nation.

Domingo


<u>Wife</u>	<u>Wife's descent group</u>	<u>Children's descent group</u>
Rami	Iskonáwavo	Txonavo
Võshi	Rovonáwavo	Satanáwavo
Maya	Rovonáwavo	Satanáwavo
Vane	Rovonáwavo	Satanáwavo
Tamamaya	Tamaoavo	Varináwavo
Kãna	Kamänáwavo	Wanïvo

João Tuxáua


<u>Wife</u>	<u>Wife's descent group</u>	<u>Children's descent group</u>
Maya (1)	Varináwavo	Tamaoavo
Kemo	Varináwavo	Tamaoavo
Maya (2)	Iskonáwavo	Shanenáwavo
Ino	Shanenáwavo	Iskonáwavo
Vo (1)	Satanáwavo	Rovonáwavo
Vane	Ranenáwavo	Nináwavo
Vo (2)	Shanenáwavo	Iskonáwavo
Mema	*	*

* Mema was the daughter of Rane, grand-niece of Tamani Romeya and mother of Vimipa, currently an Ituí *shovo*-owner. Her descent group is unknown, but may be either Varináwavo, Shawâvo, or Satanáwavo, most likely the latter.

The Marubo kinship universe is divided into four categories into which all other Marubo are placed. For a male alter, these categories are:



For a female alter, this is:



Ideally, one's mother's brother married one's father's sister, and one marries one's bilateral cross-cousin. Because of the classificatory terminology which extends a kin term to all the clan-siblings of the person thus addressed, the terminology is often divorced from genealogical referents. It is sociocentric (d'Ans 1983), basing the assignment of kin terms largely on alter's clan's relation to ego's clan, rather than on alter's personal genealogical relation to ego.

Võpa is the son of Domingo and of Tamamaia, a Tamaoavo woman. Domingo, a Ranenáwavo man, stepped out of his group's traditional arrangement with the Rovonáwavo to marry Tamamaia. Nevertheless, although his father was Ranenáwavo, Võpa did not give his children Ranenáwavo names. This is because the Ranenáwavo have no traditional arrangement with the Tamaoavo. The traditional arrangement of the Tamaoavo was with the now-extinct Variísavo. Tamamaia taught Võpa that although she

married a Ranenáwavo man, this does not change the fact that Võpa's true epavo are the Variísavo. Võpa learned the Variísavo names and assigned them to his children.

My informant José, a Tamaoavo man, added that the kokavo of the Variísavo were called Iskonáwavo. These, he says, are a now-extinct group of Iskonáwavo distinct from the three existing Iskonáwavo classes. Thus, José painted the following cognitive picture:

Kokavo:	Epavo:
Varináwavo	Iskonáwavo
Otxivo:	Txaivo:
Tamaoavo	Variísavo

The fact that a Tamaoavo woman insisted on teaching her son that his father's brothers were not his true epavo, and that that son assigned his children the names of his 'true epavo' even though it was an extinct group, strongly suggests that an actual alliance between Vari-Tama and Isko-Isa classes existed in the past and was of sufficient force so as to be established in individuals' minds as the norm.

Interestingly, the Vari/Tama class has established a new alliance with the Shane/Isko class. This is suggested by yet another statement made by José. José said that although he married a pair of Satanáwavo sisters, he should have married a Shanenáwavo woman as did his brothers Alfredo, Zacarias, and Miguel. Tamaoavo should marry Shanenáwavo, he said. He himself did not, for contextual reasons: the girl he was romancing got pregnant, and he asked her father to marry her. This Shane-Tama alliance may go back to rubber boom times, as the oral histories state that these groups

lived together on the Ituí at that time; however, oral histories assign to the Shanenáwavo the Shashoya rather than the Ituí as their traditional area. And this begs the question of when the Variísavo became extinct. But a resolution of these issues is unnecessary to the point herein being argued: that Kariera-type alliances in existence prior to the rubber boom were violently broken; that the system traversed a phase in which Kariera-type alliances were not possible; and that after the rubber boom, new Kariera-type alliances were set up.

These data point to the Marubo system as having a very fluid system of marriage arrangements among exogamous units. The system tends towards the establishment of a series of stable Kariera-type alliances. However, such alliances are never more than a part of the total marriages. The system is fluid enough to handle rearrangements and vicissitudes of the magnitude of the rubber boom, and still remain a system that tends to produce Kariera-type alliances.

The picture of the Javari basin that emerges from Marubo oral history suggests that the Marubo did not exist as such prior to the postwar period. Individuals above 50 years of age were raised without the concept of a Marubo nation, considering each descent group a distinct people. There was no name connoting all the groups together as a single group. To a certain extent, the youth continue this trend by adopting the word “nação”, nation, to refer to descent groups, where their parents say “tribo”. However, the younger Marubo are clearly aware of their identity as Marubo.

These data thus suggest that the clearly bounded social entity I observed for a year, named “Marubo” and consisting of nine exogamous classes, each divided into two clans, did not exist prior to the rubber boom. “Marubo” as a society is the product of a

historical situation of forced concentration of diverse groups in one place. Prior to the concentration at the headwaters of the Arrojo, the situation would resemble that of the Purús Panoan continuum.

Townsley (1988) has argued that the diverse Panoan “nahua groups” of the upper Purús are in fact a single social and cultural entity (he uses the spelling ‘nahua’, probably in use in Peru, whereas I use the spelling employed by Marubo, ‘nawa’; these groups are always different depending on the sociocultural context anyway, so it might be wise to retain the regional spellings and their local meanings). The Purús Panoan “nahua groups” have different names and consider themselves separate peoples, but have very similar if not identical languages, cultures, and especially, compatible kinship systems. In this sense, it would appear there are three major distinctions between the Marubo and the Purús Panoans:

- (1) Purús Panoan “nahua groups” are not exogamous. Siskind (1972) has suggested they may have been in the past but were forced to abandon exogamy under historically difficult demographic conditions.
- (2) The Purús Panoans have not experienced the forced concentration in a small area, and under a single strong leader, experienced by the Marubo. On the contrary, the rubber boom seems to have dispersed rather than concentrated the Purús Panoans.
- (3) The Purús Panoans lack an umbrella appellation such as “Marubo”.

The data suggest a similarity between pre-rubber boom “Marubo” and the contemporary Purús Panoans: an assortment of “nahua groups” sharing a single culture with no overall identity. The “Marubo” may have been a single cultural and even social entity but could not identify themselves as such, nor be identified as such by outsiders. They would thus appear as a fuzzy continuum, like the Purús Panoan continuum. After the rubber boom, the Marubo emerged as a coherent, bounded society with a definite self-identity.

In the past 35 years, the Marubo have expanded both geographically and demographically, re-occupying most of their former territory except for the upper Javari, which is populated by Mayoruna. The Marubo have returned to the main courses of navigable rivers, which they had been forced to avoid for a century. With respect to the kinship system, the result of the new expansion is a system that allows for stable alliances within a framework of fluid possibilities. Thus, Kariera-type alliances have re-formed, but many marriages follow the dictates of expediency.

The 1960s found the Marubo still gathered at the headwaters of the Maronal and Arrojo, recovering demographically and culturally from the rubber boom. The Marubo say that João Tuxáua’s father Tomas, a great shaman in his own right, invoked certain spirits into a batch of ‘genipapo’ dye, which he then took to the headwaters and poured in the watercourses. As the dye washed downstream, it washed the white man out of the Javari basin, they say. This event would be coincident with the first harvests of rubber from the British plantations in Malaysia. To the Marubo, it appeared as though the non-indigenous people had simply cleared out. There ensued a period of near-total isolation, lasting until the establishment of a permanent mission in the 1960s. It was during this

period of peace and isolation that the children of the 5 *shovo*-owners Domingo, Ernesto, Júlio, Dionísio and João Tuxáua, and a few other men recorded in the genealogies such as Mispa, grew up.

In the 1960s, apparently 1964 (Coutinho 1993), an armed confrontation occurred between Mayoruna and Marubo. Several Marubo women were kidnapped; Mayoruna were ambushed and killed by Marubo in revenge. Around the same time, a number of young men are said to have experimented with a poison smoke-bomb said to cause sickness, fevers, and death. I was told that the smoke affected the poisoners rather than their targets, but the incident was considered a serious conflict-event.

As a result of the war with Mayoruna and of the poisoning incident, a large-scale movement to the Ituí occurred. A number of settlements were established under some nine leaders. These people settled in the upper Ituí, founding the aldeias of Alegría, Vida Nova, Liberdade, Maloca do Paulino, Paraná, and Água Branca. These villages today number 372 inhabitants.

In the early 1970s, FUNAI made contact with the Marubo. According to Marubo reports of this event, a man named Sebastião Amanso visited the villages on the Ituí as well as the interior, informing the Marubo that they would be better off living along the main courses of the rivers where FUNAI could offer them educational and health assistance. FUNAI established its posts at the mouth of the Igarapé São Salvador along the Curuçá, and at the mouth of the Rio Novo on the Ituí. By 1977, these posts had attracted substantial Marubo populations. The settlement at São Salvador was recently moved several hours' journey upstream due to soil depletion, and is now the Aldeia São

Sebastião, with 139 inhabitants. The Aldeia Rio Novo has 105 inhabitants. Neither aldeia has a FUNAI post anymore, but the Marubo remain.

The final movement out of the headwaters was in the 1980s, perhaps c. 1985-8. One of João Tuxáua's sons, Alfredo Barbosa, moved from the headwaters to the mouth of the Maronal. Within a few years, his relatives had followed him to the side of the Curuçá, establishing what is today Aldeia Maronal, with 222 inhabitants.

Over the past 35 years, the Marubo have thus expanded from their small rubber-boom safe haven to occupy the bulk of the upper and middle courses of the Curuçá and Ituí rivers. No one lives in the headwaters of the Igarapés any more, although there are reports of uncontacted Indians in the upper course of the Arrojo river who are rumored to be a group of Marubo that split off from the main group during the rubber boom and chose to remain isolated. Their existence, however, is dubious.

The new demographic and geographic conditions once again permit the pursuit of ideal marital exchange forms. Census data gathered during fieldwork, 1997-8, combined with census data gathered by Dr. Melatti in 1974-5, demonstrate the practice of Kariera-type kinship in contemporary Marubo society.


Figure 8.4. is a genealogical chart of the small *shovo* belonging to Wanõpa at Aldeia Maronal. The ranking elders at this *shovo* are Wanõpa (81) and his brother Misael (85), both Txonavo. They each married Rovonáwavo women and had Satanáwavo children. Misael's son Ako (85) married Peko, an Iskonáwavo woman, classificatory sister's daughter of Wanõpa. Likewise, Misael's daughter Meto (91) was married to Peko's brother Cildo, a Satanáwavo-Iskonáwavo marriage. Meto's offspring are Rovonáwavo, while Ako's offspring are Txonavo. Thus, the same descent groups are

present on the -1 as on the $+1$ generation. The inhabitants of Wanõpa's *shovo* may be schematically placed in a Kariera-type framework:

Txonavo==	==Rovo-náwavo
Iskonáwavo	==Sata-náwavo
Txonavo==	==Rovo-náwavo

FIGURE 8.4.: Kariera-type kinship in the *shovo* of Wanõpa (81)—

Aldeia Maronal, Curuçá River



○ △ TXONAVO

⊖ △ ISKONÁWAVO


⊗△ SATANÁWAVO

⊕△ ROVONÁWAVO

● ▲ RANENÁWAVO
○ △ UNKNOWN

Genealogical chart based on census data recorded on-site, 10/97

Figure 8.5. shows Kariera-type kinship operating on a larger scale, in three intermarried *shovo* at aldeia Vida Nova on the Ituí. The chart focuses on showing the alliance of Satanáwavo/Rovonáwavo with Wanívo /Koronáwavo. A former alliance between Inonáwavo/Kananáwavo and Wanívo /Koronáwavo is discernible in the upper right hand. This is not fully discernible in the chart but Dr. Melatti's census data clearly shows a Kariera-type alliance between these latter. However, the Inonáwavo/Kananáwavo line is in process of extinction, with no living females. Thus, its position in the system has been completely replaced by the Sata/Rovo class. Kariera-type alliance between the Sata/Rovo and Waní/Koro classes is discernible in the chart in the +1, 0, -1, and -2 generations. The alliance may be schematized as follows:




The seven marriages between Wanívo and Satanáwavo on the -1 generation are a reproduction on an expanded scale of the one such marriage on the +1 generation. These (-1 gen.) marriages are recent with as yet few children. We may expect sizeable numbers of Rovonáwavo and Koronáwavo to be added to the -2 generation in coming years. If this interpretive framework is correct, then it is probable that these groups will intermarry at a higher rate than we would expect by chance alone.

FIGURE 8.5.: Kariera-type kinship, Aldeia Vida Nova.

Malocas of Pekōpapa, Tamāpa and Raomayāpa.

From census data recorded by J.C. Melatti, 1974-5, and myself, 27-29/12/97.



3. Conclusions

It has been argued here that the characteristics of the Marubo kinship system and the recent historical experience of Marubo society render these data relevant to evaluating the accuracy of Lévi-Strauss' predictions. If Lévi-Strauss is right, then his ideas should be true of the Marubo as well as the Bororo and Konyak Naga.

Lévi-Strauss argued that the principle of reciprocity acts to ensure group survival by preventing any subgroup from accumulating too much of any of the essential resources. A system of reciprocity is based on a rule stating that you cannot keep a key resource, but must give it away and acquire yours from elsewhere. This rule generates exchange. In the field of marriage, this exchange may take place between named exogamous groups, allied with one another in a system of marital preferences. This was the case among the Bororo and Konyak Naga as interpreted by Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss suggests that, given that the rule prevents unequal accumulation of values, such a system of marital preferences acts to create an equilibrium of distribution among groups.

Given these characteristics, and given that these qualities act to ensure group survival, we would expect them not to obstruct group survival. Thus, if one group is involved in a marriage-preference alliance with another, and that other group becomes extinct, the first group must change preferences or become extinct itself. The system of marital preferences must therefore be fluid and flexible, allowing for a rearrangement of exchange relations between units without changing the basic structure of the system. In this way, the end result of the system—the intergroup equilibrium—can survive historical vicissitudes. The structure can survive the destruction of its form, recurring subsequently

in a new form. Before and after historical vicissitudes, the structure remains a structure of reciprocity.

The Marubo have named exogamous groups involved in a system of exchange and having definite marital preferences which manifest as Kariera-type alliances. These groups were at one time arranged in a particular pattern of relationships that was disrupted by a major historical event, the rubber boom. At that time, entire groups vanished, while all groups were forced by threat of violence to abandon their pre-boom locations to live in close proximity in a remote area, and were forced by demographic disaster to rethink their traditional relationships. After a time, demographic rebound permitted a new geographic expansion, allowing the reestablishment of a stable exchange system, albeit one different in form if not in structure from that prevailing before the rubber boom. It remains to be seen whether the Marubo experience contradicts or supports Lévi-Strauss' theories.

D. Operationalization and testing of hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to be tested is that a structure of reciprocity manifests as a system of fluid inter-group marital preferences which act to maintain an equilibrium of distribution among groups. To operationalize this hypothesis, I argue that if the system prevents any one group from accumulating more than any other group, then relative demographic proportions among exogamous units must remain the same over time. If the prediction of relative-proportion stability holds, then it may be said that the Marubo system has the characteristics of a Lévi-Straussian structure of reciprocity. If true, it would imply that the system does actually preserve the group as a whole by preventing any one part from taking too big a piece of the pie.

It is possible to test this hypothesis by comparing the relative proportions among classes in 1974-5 with those prevalent in 1997-8. Dr. Melatti collected census data in 1974-5 including the clan membership of each individual. I did the same in 1997-8. One generation has passed, and the young people who were marrying and having their first children in 1974-5 are watching their eldest children marry and have children now. A comparison will tell us what effect a generation of marriages and childbirths has had on the relative proportions among classes.

Note that the unit analyzed will be the exogamous unit, which I have called class, as opposed to its subunit the clan.

Table 8.2. shows the changes in number of members by class, 1974-98. For convenience, the morphemes -nawa- and -vo are ommitted from the clan-names. Table 8.3. tabulates the numbers from Table 8.2. as percentages of the total population.

TABLE 8.2.:Number of members of each Marubo exogamous unit, 1974-5 and 1997-8.

<u>1974-5</u>		<u>1997-8</u>	
Class	# members	Class	# members
Shane/Isko	88	Shane/Isko	180
Sata/Rovo	60	Wani/Kamā	149
Wani/Kamā	56	Sata/Rovo	131
Vari/Tama	52	Shawā/Isko	121
Shawā/Isko	48	Vari/Tama	106
Rane/Ni	34	Rane/Ni	72
Txona/Isko	24	Ni/Ino	47
Ni/Ino	19	Txona/Isko	44
Ino/Kana	8	Ino/Kana	4
Total	389	Total	857

TABLE 8.3.: Percentages of total Marubo population represented by each clan.

<u>Class</u>	<u>1974-5</u>	<u>1997-8</u>
Shane/Isko	22.62%	21.00 %
Sata/Rovo	15.24%	15.29%
Wani/Kamā	14.40%	17.39%
Vari/Tama	13.37%	12.37%
Shawā/Isko	12.34%	14.12%
Rane/Ni	8.74%	8.40%
Txona/Isko	6.17%	5.13%
Ni/Ino	4.88%	5.49%
Ino/Kana	2.06%	0.47%

A chi-square test of independence will tell whether the hypothesis derived from Lévi-Strauss is acceptable given these data. The hypothesis predicts matrimonial equilibrium, signifying that no one group may grow at the expense of others. If Lévi-Strauss is right, we would expect the relative proportions among Marubo classes to remain invariant over time. Since the issue is proportions rather than absolute numbers, percentages will be used as data. We thus set the 1974-5 percentages as the null hypothesis:

$$H_0: \text{Clan percentages in 1997-8} = \text{Clan percentages in 1974-5}.$$

	Frequency array			
	Class	f_e	f_o	χ^2
Shane/Isko	22.62	21.00	0.12	
Sata/Rovo	15.24	15.29	0.00	
Wani/Kamā	14.40	17.39	0.62	
Vari/Tama	13.37	12.37	0.07	
Shawā/Isko	12.34	14.12	0.26	
Rane/Ni	8.74	8.40	0.01	
Txona/Isko	6.17	5.13	0.18	
Ni/Ino	4.88	5.49	0.08	
Ino/Kana	2.06	0.47	1.23	
Σ	99.82	99.66	2.57	

A glance at the “Distribution of chi-square” chart tells us that for $d_f=8$, $0.98 > p > 0.95$. If H_0 is true, then we would expect the percentages recorded in 1997-8 to be identical to those recorded in 1974-5. In fact, they are not, but you could get observed frequencies as deviant as those observed between 95% and 98% of the time by chance alone. If the dying Ino/Kana unit, no longer a functional exchange unit, is excluded from the equation, we get a chi-square=1.35 for $d_f=7$, yielding $0.99 > p > 0.98$, an even stronger

result. I must accept H_0 . The sample data support the hypothesis that relative demographic proportions among Marubo exogamous units remain the same over time. Lévi-Strauss' interpretive framework is valid for Marubo data.

These data indicate that the Marubo system is at present a structure of reciprocity as described in Lévi-Strauss (1969[1949]). The essential feature of structures of reciprocity—the operation of the system to maintain matrimonial equilibrium—is found among the Marubo. The nine exogamous units exchange marriage partners in such a way that no one group grows disproportionately to the rest. This is precisely the feature that Lévi-Strauss suggested acts to ensure group survival. The system links each unit's survival to the whole. It ensures that each group will be able to marry its members off, so that under favorable demographic conditions many groups grow large conjointly, thus generating a thriving society.

The Marubo system's survival value is unquestionable. Those groups that today make up Marubo society are but newly recovered from a period of at least fifty years during which they were subjected to systematic ethnocide. The oral history and onomastic data suggest stable alliance systems existed prior to this time. The rubber boom demolished the extant system, causing the extinction of descent groups, the relocation of survivors, and the reduction of the population to a level apparently under 200. Yet from this situation, they reemerged to establish what is now the politically dominant indigenous society in the Javari basin. The various marriage classes have grown larger together and in equal proportions, a situation of benefit to all as no single group could prosper unless its allies do, and if a current ally falters there are seven others to choose from. The Marubo system is not only compatible with survival under extreme,

violent demographic pressure—it actively fosters survival, and more than survival, good health on a social level.

Oral-historical and onomastic data suggest structures of reciprocity operated among the proto-Marubo groups before and after the rubber boom. Mathematical data to demonstrate the pre-boom reciprocity obviously do not exist, but the extant data are extensive and suggestive. Data also show that the structure was severely disrupted during the boom. Finally, data show that the system that emerged from the boom is a structure of reciprocity. These data combine to demonstrate the second hypothesis derived from Lévi-Strauss, namely that reciprocity is a structure manifesting in temporary forms; these forms may be disrupted by historical conditions but the new form will retain the structural properties of the old:

Despite incident, conflict, and destruction, the structures just considered remain structures of reciprocity. Their true nature derives from those factors which cause them to survive as such and not from the spasmodic history which continually forces them to readapt.
(Lévi-Strauss 1969[1949]:80)

I conclude that Lévi-Strauss' framework for interpreting elementary structures of kinship has predictive power because both of the hypotheses derived from it and applicable to the Marubo must be accepted as true given data at my disposal. The data force me to accept the conclusion, however unlikely it seemed at the outset, that reciprocity is embedded in the Marubo social structure. It becomes necessary to ask how this affects the operation of the political system.

E. Applicability of kinship data to political phenomena

The findings just presented would in and of themselves invalidate the political economy of people hypothesis vis-à-vis the Marubo were it not for the fact that Marubo marriage classes are not local, residential groups. The political economy of people hypothesis argues that leadership is based on the accumulation of followers. Leaders and would-be leaders actively endeavor to make their own group grow, if necessary at the expense of others. If the exchange of humans among groups follows a structurally encoded system of reciprocity, then there is no way for any group to grow at the expense of any other. If this is true, then the political economy of people cannot exist. In fact, however, it can, because leaders do not lead exogamous units, they lead residential units, and residential units do not fit the predictions of relative-proportion stability. Some leaders' groups grow while others' vanish. Data on fluctuations in leader-centered group populations over time are compatible with the political economy of people hypothesis, not the Lévi-Strauss reciprocity framework. The existence of structural reciprocity in Marubo marriage arrangements does not prevent the existence of a political dimension to intergroup variations in demographic growth.

The Marubo residential unit, the *shovo* (maloca) is not, indeed cannot be, a single-clan phenomenon. One of the questions I wrote into my methodology was “what type of kin do you prefer to live with?”. I fruitlessly endeavored to determine whether or not they disliked living with mother’s brothers as opposed to only with father’s brothers and clan brothers, while they gave me an answer I refused to accept—what kin do you prefer to live with? Any of them. Any kin is good, they would reply, much to my dismay,

refusing to express preferences. In fact, given the social structure, this is a logical answer. In a perfect Kariera-type world of the sort hinted at in Marubo social ideals, a *shovo* contains an entire self-replicating structure within itself. This means that ideally, one lives among all four of the categories of kin in the Kariera-type universe. The clans themselves are spread out, each appearing in many *shovo* in different villages. A Marubo expressed to me his appreciation of this fact: “The Ituí people are my kin. At São Sebastião I have kin. Up at Maronal, too. Everywhere, I have kin”.

Each *shovo* has a leader, the *shovo ivo*, “*shovo-owner*”. The *shovo ivo* is responsible for the welfare of the people in his domain and most of them actively seek to foster the growth of their group membership, as will be shown in the section on the political economy of people. What is important to note here is that leaders and their *shovo* have varying fortunes in the game of demographic fluctuation. Over the period of time covered by Dr. Melatti’s data and mine, their followings have not grown in equal proportions—indeed, not all have grown.

At the time of Dr. Melatti’s first census, there were fifteen Marubo population nuclei, of which ten were *shovo*. Their varying fortunes are shown in Table 8.4.

TABLE 8.4.: Populations of Marubo *shovo*, 1974-5 and 1997-8.

<i>Shovo ivo</i>	<u>Pop., 1974-5</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Pop., 1997-8</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Paulo	39	10.21	49	5.88
Arnaldo	21	5.5	Broken up	N.A.
José do Nascimento velho	32	8.38	38	4.56
Raimundo Dionísio	22	5.76	55	6.59
Lauro Brasil	17	4.45	64	7.67
Reissamon	26	6.81	40	4.80
Paulino	20	5.24	33	3.96
Américo	23	6.02	38	4.56
Mariano	27	7.07	24	2.88
Carlos	24	6.28	50	6.00
Domingo	23	6.02	Broken up	N.A.
João Grande/João Pequeno/ Miguel	59	15.45	79	9.47
Aurélio	28	7.33	9	1.08
Vicente	8	2.09	11	1.32
São Salvador	13	3.40	115	13.79
Total	382	100.01	605	72.56

Explanations are necessary as to the procedure used to construct the categories in this chart. The starting point, Dr. Melatti's census data, seems straightforward enough. These data are represented in the first two columns of the chart. Even here, however, some explanation is required.

Firstly, the population total used to compile the 1974-5 percentages does not include the twelve Marubo living outside the area at the time of the census, and thus is less than the total Marubo population.

Secondly, on one occasion I have fused *shovo* into one category because they seem to be single leader-centered groups. This is the case of João "Grande" (Tuxáua)'s group. At the time of Dr. Melatti's census, these were three immediately adjacent *shovo*. However, my inquiries into the matter suggest that they were all part of João Tuxáua's network. Furthermore, in the intervening years, Miguel and João 'Pequeno' have abandoned individual *shovo* ownership and moved in under one roof with the son of the now-dead João Tuxáua, "Grande". A subgroup that formerly lived in João Tuxáua's *shovo* then built its own *shovo* immediately adjacent to that of Tuxáua's son's. Thus, the group that was three huts fused into one and split into two but remains a single leader-centered unit.

São Salvador was the original FUNAI settlement on the Curuçá. In 1975 there were 13 Marubo there. A few years ago, the FUNAI post moved upstream to the mouth of the Igarapé Maronal, and shortly thereafter the Aldeia São Salvador was abandoned for the new site of Aldeia São Sebastião. There are now 115 people in seven *shovo* there, nominally under a single leader, Shetâpa, who in 1974-5 lived in Aurélio's *shovo*.

As for the 1997-8 figures, the total used to calculate percentages is 834, which is the total from Table 8.2 minus those Marubo living in Atalaia or Cruzeiro do Sul. It should be noted that the percentages from column 5 do not add up to 100. This points to an important feature revealed by these data: namely, that each leader's share of the total has been decreased by the emergence of new *shovo ivo* in the last 23 years. There are 37 *shovo* and leader-centered hut groups in Marubo land today. Most of these *shovo ivo* were not yet *shovo ivo* in 1974-5, so their fortunes cannot be tracked in the chart. Those that can be tracked show that there is no demographic equilibrium maintained among residential groups as there is among kin groups.

In numerous cases, we find that increases in the population of a given leader's group over the past 24 years have not kept pace with the Marubo demographic expansion. These leaders' share of the total has decreased despite an absolute increase in population: Paulo, José Nascimento, Reissamon, Paulino, Américo, Carlos, João Grande, Vicente (Reissamon, Américo, and João Grande are dead but their groups remain together). Some of these decreases in share have been significant: Paulo, José Nascimento, and Vicente have seen their shares reduced by nearly half.

Other leaders have seen the absolute numbers of their following decrease. Aurélio and Mariano are examples. Mariano died some years ago, leaving however the core of his group intact under the leadership of his son Armando. The population of this group has decreased by 14.8% but their share has decreased by 59.8% since in the interval, Marubo population has gone up. A similar fate has been suffered by Aurélio, a maverick who lost all but his nuclear family over the last 24 years.

The case of Carlos is somewhat special. Carlos himself has aged beyond effective leadership, so that his son-in-law has become leader. This *shovo* has over time become a four-*shovo* continuum, including Carlos' son-in-law's two sons-in-law as well as one of Carlos' grandchildren. However, because these four *shovo*, totalling 50 people, operate as a single local group with a single leader, I lump them together. Hence, I can claim that Carlos' group has more or less retained its share of the total.

Two nuclei have broken up: those of Arnaldo and of Domingo. Domingo's *shovo* broke up after his death, each polygynous family seeking its fortune independently. These families have not remained in close proximity or cooperation with one another and Domingo's former group must be considered non-existent in the present. For its part, Arnaldo's following has merged into another hut that split off of Paulo's some 20 years ago.

The few cases of increasing percentage of total over the past generation must thus be considered exceptional rather than normal. Raimundo Dionísio died leaving his *shovo* in the hands of his brother Pekōpapa; this *shovo* has experienced considerable demographic success (see also figure 8.5). Lauro Brasil's following seems to have increased; however, while the group that was once Lauro's *shovo* has had great success, Lauro has had to watch as his brother built his own hut a short distance away and establish claim to leadership. While the group as a whole has stayed together and is a single local unit, leadership is divided.

I conducted a chi-square test of independence on the data from Table 8.4 utilizing a procedure analogous to that used for Table 8.3. If the flow of personnel among residential groups follows the same pattern of reciprocity noted for exogamous marriage

classes, we would expect the percentage of population represented by any given group to remain the same over time, as it does for marriage classes. Taking all groups for which percentages can be calculated in 1974-5 *and* 1997-8, I set the 1974-5 percentages as expected frequencies, since that is what we would expect to find if the percentages had remained invariant. I set the 1997-8 percentages as observed frequencies. I calculated a chi-square of 49.46 which, for a $d_f=12$, this yields a probability of less than .001 that the observed frequencies could result if the percentages remained invariant over time. In other words, the percentage of population occupied by any given residential group does vary over time. Some groups get relatively bigger than others; some get relatively smaller. This result is exactly opposite to the result of these same calculations for exogamous classes. If reciprocity is a quality of Marubo social structure, it applies to exchanges of personnel among kinship units but not among political units.

The differences between Table 8.4 and Table 8.3 can be explained if we consider that in the realm of exogamous units, no new categories have been created, whereas in the realm of political units, new categories are continually created. Thus it is that while the percentage of the total Marubo population represented by each exogamous unit remains the same, the percentage represented by each political unit does not. Marubo marriage classes grow proportionally to one another; Marubo *shovo* do not. Thus, the embedding of reciprocity in the marriage exchange system does not prevent inequalities in the distribution of personnel among *shovo*. It is possible for a structure of reciprocity to coexist with a political economy of people.

F. Conclusions

Although reciprocity is present in Marubo marriage arrangements, there is a political aspect to intergroup variations in demographic growth. The relative proportions among clans remain the same over time, so that clans cannot be used as vehicles to achieve political power through demographic predominance. However, although clanship does operate as a binding force in Marubo society, clans were not observed to be corporate entities. Rather, it is the *shovo*, the Marubo dwelling, which is a corporate unit. Relative population proportions among *shovo* do not remain the same over time. Thus, while Lévi-Strauss is correct in arguing that the type of marriage exchange system we find in Marubo society is a structure of reciprocity operating to maintain demographic equality among groups over time, this does not prevent demographic inequalities from existing because local units and exogamous units are not coterminous.

The data analyzed in this chapter show a startling fit with the predictions made in Lévi-Strauss' Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969[1949]). Lévi-Strauss predicted kinship systems that operate to maintain matrimonial equilibrium among subgroups, and that is exactly what we find among the Marubo. Lévi-Strauss further predicted systems able to retain the quality of equilibrium production even under extreme duress from conflict. Again, this is the case among the Marubo. Nevertheless, the conclusion that reciprocity is embedded in the social structure cannot be interpreted to mean that political inequality is impossible. Lévi-Strauss' conclusions apply to the sphere of kinship, not politics. They may, however, help to interpret one of the key issues in Marubo

ethnography: their emergence as a relatively strong and politically active society. To do this requires a slight detour into the issue of the incest taboo.

Taking a structuralist viewpoint, we may envision the incest taboo among early *H. sapiens* language-users as a position to be filled by either yes or no. Those who said yes to incest did not form alliances. Remaining within their group, they had a smaller pool of men for women and women for men. Therefore they were subject to threat from chance moments of generation of too many people of one sex. In contrast, those who said no to incest were thereby required to form alliances, creating a larger pool of men for women and women for men, allowing such groups to survive vicissitudes that the *yeas* could not. This should clue us in to what it is about the Marubo system that enabled it to re-produce a thriving society: precisely the 9-class system and its tendency to spread growth evenly among all subgroups. The form that emerges from a dark period such as the rubber boom is not a mere fragment of a society, doomed to extinction by the breakup of its institutions of social organization. What emerges instead is a complete society with a potential for dynamic growth that is in the process of being realized today. The kinship system should not be seen as a single cause of the Marubo's survival, but must be considered a contributing factor.

This analysis of Marubo kinship in relation to Lévi-Strauss' theories has served to explore the consequences of reciprocity for Marubo politics. Lévi-Strauss appears to be correct in analyzing reciprocity as the very basis of certain social structures, including that of the Marubo. However, the application of this interpretive framework to the sphere of politics must be questioned. Utilizing the principle of reciprocal exchange as an explanatory tool, Lévi-Strauss (1944) influenced Lowie (1948) and especially Clastres

(1974), forming a theoretical trend that denied power to indigenous Amazonian headmen. The framework was based on the notion that the chief is given the right to polygyny, which he must repay with all sorts of prestations, material and otherwise, so that all power is negated in a system of reciprocity. However, the data just reviewed do not support the application of the principle of reciprocity to the sphere of politics. The flow of personnel among political units does not follow the same patterns as that among exogamous marriage classes. The principles at work are different, and inequality of distribution seems the norm rather than the exception. We may therefore proceed to inquire into the possible existence of a Marubo political economy of people unencumbered by the fear of doing something illogical and inconsistent with available data.

CHAPTER NINE

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEOPLE

A. Introduction

One of the central objectives of fieldwork among the Marubo was to determine whether or not they had a political economy of people and if so, whether there was power associated with it. This objective fits into the overall conception of this research, which was to apply a new set of methods for the political analysis of small Amazonian societies. The methods were designed to produce detailed empirical data of real political processes, so that these data could be analyzed to determine whether power was a feature of such processes. As proposed by Rivière (1984) and developed by Mentore (1987), the concept of the political economy of people is a hypothesis concerning the way in which small Amazonian societies work which, if true, would imply that power may be exercised by those who control human resources over those who do not. To develop my theoretical framework, I combined the ideas of Rivière and Mentore into a self-consistent conception of a *type* of political economy; I then formulated a method for testing whether or not this type of system exists among the Marubo. The results derived from application of this method in the field are presented in this chapter.

The concept of a political economy of people allows for the existence of power in the sense that it suggests a key resource that may be controlled—the human resource. The basis of the political economy of people concept is that in a society without money or inheritable material wealth, it is people rather than goods that are valued. In money economies, a person can use money to obtain various desirable objects. In Amazonian societies, however, it is only by having an appropriate labor force that desirable objects can be obtained, because such objects are produced rather than purchased. Thus, a single Marubo man cannot hire another to be a cook; only by marrying or by forming part of a social network including a close unmarried female relative (e.g., an unmarried sister) can a man have someone cook for him. Thus, people are the equivalent of wealth in the sense that they are the means of obtaining desirable objectives in a moneyless economy. In addition, Rivière (1984) noted that people were a valued and scarce and resource in these types of society. A resource that is at once valued and scarce, he argued, is a form of wealth. Rather than *scarce* I would say *insufficient*: there are never enough workers to satisfy all the leaders' ambitions, and there are never enough women to satisfy every desire for polygyny. To Rivière's assessment of people as a valued resource, I add that not only is it valued, but it is actively pursued as such. Thus, there exists a set of dynamic social interactions surrounding the pursuit of people as a resource, and it is these concrete social interactions which constitute a political economy of people. The value system is only one aspect: the social manifestation of this system is the other aspect of the political economy of people.

If we identify people as a resource in Amazonian societies, then we must also ask whether there are forms of power based on control over this resource. By controlling a

resource that others want or need, the controller of a resource has the ability to exercise a certain level of control over others by making them work or pay in order to gain access to that resource. This dynamic applies to just about any form of wealth, but in this case we are looking for it in Amazonia, and suggesting that people are the key resource that some may use as a lever to control others. The best-known example of this is the temporary control exercised in many Amazonian societies by a father-in-law over the son-in-law's labor. Control the valued resource, and you control the behavior of those who value it. But instead of seeing control over the son-in-law's labor as an isolated "culture trait" which some societies have for whatever reason, we may see it now as an outgrowth of the social dynamics that occur when people are the primary valued resource.

Before proceeding further, two disclaimers are necessary. First, the suggestion that people are a resource does not create any analogy between the political economy of people and any slavery system. Slavery may be one aspect of a political economy of people, as in the case of the raiding 17th-century Omagua, or the wife-capturing 20th-century Mayoruna. But in the systems we are here concerned with—those of small, isolated Amazonian groups—people are not obtained by capture and certainly not by purchase. In fact, a largely moneyless context is a necessary premise of a political economy of people, so that where there is money and a political economy of people we must hypothesize that the latter developed prior to the former. This makes the political economy of people completely different from Old World slavery systems. The means of production of the social network in a modern Amazonian political economy of people are rather more subtle than capture and purchase, and will be reviewed in this chapter. The second disclaimer refers to the place of women in the political economy of people. Lévi-

Strauss has been criticized for treating women as a resource in his alliance theory of kinship. In this case, however, since both men and women are being analyzed as a resource there is no gender bias.

B. Existence of a Marubo Political Economy of People

1. Premises

To find out if there is power associated with the political economy of people, we must first find out if there really is such a thing among the Marubo. I argue that the existence of a political economy of people can be shown if it can be demonstrated that (a) people are valued as a scarce resource (I will call this premise A), and (b) the active pursuit of that value is an observable social process (I will call this premise B). I will approach this question from two different perspectives, the leaders' point of view and the non-leaders' point of view. This dual approach is useful because different methods may be used to demonstrate premises A and B for leaders than are used for non-leaders. This is because there are certain indicators that exist for leaders which do not exist for non-leaders, rendering analysis of leaders easier than that of non-leaders. There are special indicators for premises A and B among leaders because the ways in which the pursuit of people-as-wealth manifests itself in a leader is different from that of a non-leader. We are looking for different actions, and hence must use different methods.

2. Applicability of premises to Marubo leaders

To test the applicability of premises A and B to Marubo leaders, I observed the behavior of headmen vis-à-vis residence changes affecting their group. Specifically, I observed whether or not the following phenomena occurred: (1) headmen actively soliciting personnel to move to or remain in their area and (2) conflicts, involving headmen, over allocation and re-allocation of personnel. The existence of these phenomena would be evidence supporting the conclusion that Marubo headmen are consciously and actively working to attract and retain personnel, a result which would suggest the existence of a political economy of people.

Of phenomenon (1), headmen actively soliciting personnel to move to or remain in their area, several examples were noted during fieldwork. Marubo informants are proud of these events, and boast of them openly whereas incidents of phenomenon (2), conflict over allocation of personnel, are not boasted of and are often not discussed openly. Hence the primary indicator of the existence of a Marubo political economy of people is the occurrence of phenomenon (1), which takes the specific recurring form of the **invitation to move**. Although none were directly observed, incidents of invitations to move are found in the residential histories which were presented in Chapter Five.

The occurrence of invitations to move among Marubo leaders can be traced back multiple generations in oral histories, because the most successful leaders, and hence those who are recalled in oral histories, are those who issued successful invitations to move. The first of these is the semi-legendary leader Txoki. Txoki lived prior to the rubber boom (in the Javari, before 1888). He is said to have been a master of food-

production and organization of labor, to have cut the largest swidden ever by a Marubo, and to have invited others to come live near him. His invitations were, according to present-day informants, successful and a large village formed about him.

The second occurrence of invitations to move in Marubo oral history is in the career of João Tuxáua. João Tuxáua, father of the present-day Maronal headman Alfredo, is credited with gathering together all the Marubo survivors of the rubber boom at the headwaters of the Arrojo River, then leading them to a successful demographic recovery. These events are chronicled in Chapter Eight. At least three specific invitations to move are referred to in the oral histories: (1) João Tuxáua invited the Inonáwavo man Mani to move to the Arrojo headwaters after his village had been decimated; (2) João Tuxáua invited remnants of the Satanáwavo, led by Dionísio, to move to the Arrojo headwaters after their village had been decimated; (3) João Tuxáua located the survivors of the *Kariya* massacre—Rane, his wife and daughter—and invited them to live in the Arrojo headwaters. These are three specific events João Tuxáua can be credited for, but he is more generally credited by informants with being the focal point around which all survivors gathered towards the end of the rubber boom. João Tuxáua's invitations to move are considered to be one of the main reasons why the Marubo survived the rubber boom.

In modern times, there have occurred at least four significant invitations to move, all of which are described in more detail in Chapter Five. In the first place, there is Alfredo's invitation to his father and brothers to move out of the headwaters area to the current location of Aldeia Maronal. After this invitation was successfully issued, João Tuxáua invited Wanõpa to move into the near vicinity of the Maronal core, an invitation

Wanõpa accepted. Then Alfredo invited his brothers José and Pedro to move to Aldeia Maronal, again successfully. The fourth example is that of Sinãpa travelling to a ranch in Acre to invite his sister's son Ronipa to move back to the Marubo area. At the time that this last invitation was (successfully) issued, Sinãpa was an independent headman because Aldeia Maronal was not yet fully extant.

In addition to the aforementioned invitations to move, which are all invitations by indigenous people to indigenous people, there are significant cases involving non-indigenous people. The most significant of these is FUNAI's invitation to the headwaters Marubo to move to the middle Curuçá, which resulted in the creation of Aldeia São Sebastião; and the simultaneous invitation to the upper Ituí Marubo to move downstream, which resulted in the creation of Aldeia Rio Novo. Finally, we should note Alfredo's invitation to the New Tribes Mission to locate personnel at Aldeia Maronal.


Given these data, it is safe to conclude that Marubo headmen do actively solicit personnel to move to or remain in their areas. This conclusion supports the hypothesis that the Marubo have a political economy of people. Further supporting evidence comes from conflicts over allocation and re-allocation of personnel. One concrete example of this will serve to show how important issues of personnel allocation are to Marubo, both leaders and non-leaders. The incident I will describe to illustrate Marubo personnel-allocation conflict revolved about the fate of a 13 year-old girl named Mema.

Mema is the daughter of Ronipa, a man whose relationships to non-indigenous people are described in Chapter Six. Ronipa had lived his teenage years in Acre, but returned in the mid-1980s to live with his mother's brother Sinãpa. From his base on the upper Curuçá, he began a rubber-tapping enterprise. At that time, he visited the Ituí

River and returned with his first wife, Mema's mother. The marriage lasted only until shortly after Mema's birth. Ronípa returned from Acre to find his wife had returned to the Ituí and taken his daughter (the reasons are not relevant). Some years later, he took a second wife, by whom he had a second daughter. This marriage also ended in divorce. Thus, by 1997 Ronípa was twice-divorced, with two ex-wives and two daughters on the Ituí River. Ronípa himself remained single.

Ronípa was extremely frustrated by his prolonged bachelorhood. In Marubo society, for a heterosexual adult male to have no female companion is considered an extremely distressing condition. This is largely due to the sexual division of labor. Women, for example, are in charge of washing clothes. Teenagers had their clothes washed by mothers, aunts or sisters; adults by their wives, but Ronípa suffered the ignominy of having to wash his own clothes. More important than washing, however, is cooking. Despite being one of the top hunters in the village, Ronípa's prestige and status were very low. This is because, as described in Chapter Seven, the act of cooking is the basis for the practice of feasting, which is one of the keystones of the traditional Marubo political game. As explained earlier, each status—adult male, *shovo*-owner, and *kakáya*—has an associated feast which a man must organize if he aspires to that status. For each successive feast, more and more women are required to do the cooking. But to even be considered a full adult, a man must be able to display publicly his economic productivity, and the way to do this is through invitations to eat, which require at minimum one woman—one's wife. Ronípa could not do even this because he had no one to cook for him.

Figure 9.1.: Genealogical and affinal relations of individuals involved in Mema's flight.



1. João Tuxaua
2. Alfredo
3. José Barbosa
4. Pedro Barbosa
5. Domingo
6. Misael
7. Wanõpa
8. Nãke
9. Wasinawa
10. Sinãpa
11. Vanewa
12. Sheta
13. Ronipa
14. Memäewa
15. Mema
16. Panipa
17. Shonõpeko
18. Vote
19. Txanõpa

Ronipa was keenly aware of the effects his bachelorhood was having. He complained about it repeatedly to me. "I have no woman to cook for me," he would say, "I have to ask my mother's brother's wife or my brother's wife to cook whenever I kill something." My informant José told me that when Ronipa was married, he often threw large feasts, using tapir meat from his hunt and manioc beer made by his wife. In those days, it seemed like he was destined for leadership and perhaps eventual *kakáya* status because he combined knowledge of commercial relations in Acre with traditional indigenous economic skills. But after he lost his wife, all that changed, José said. Now, no one will cook for him so he has to give his meat away and others throw feasts with the animals he has killed. Ronipa's frustration is readily understandable: it is the pathos of a man who knows that he has the ability to compete for the highest statuses of Marubo society, but cannot because he has no woman, so that he cannot translate his ability into actual prestige.

In December 1997, Ronipa saw an opportunity to put an end to his frustrations, and he took it. The occasion was the *tanamea* feast thrown by Paulino (Memapa) on the Ituí River in reciprocation for the one José had thrown at Aldeia Maronal (described in Chapter Eight). I hired Ronipa to carry my equipment to the Ituí River and back. In the weeks leading up to the feast, he expressed to me how discontent he was in being womanless. He said that when he went to the Ituí River, he would invite his oldest daughter to move back with him. His daughter, he said, would live with him at Wasinawa's *shovo* and she would cook and wash clothes for him. Eventually, she would find a husband and marry, but meanwhile he would at least have a woman around to take care of basic female work activities.

Although Ronipa had helped build Wasinawa's *shovo* and he planned to bring Mema there, he was in fact in the early stages of a change in residence. This change was related to his lack of a woman and his consequent desire to have one. In the first place, he was taking an illicit lover at a downstream *shovo*. This led to his spending considerable amounts of time downstream. Secondly, he had unmarried female kin at Wanõpa's *shovo*. He started a habit of bringing them gifts of meat in return for having his clothes washed. Finally, a second attraction bound him further to Wanõpa's *shovo*: a young girl named Vote. She still was too young to marry but Ronipa felt he could arrange to be her husband as soon as she was ready if he could enter into a good relationship with the highest-ranking male in that *shovo*, Wanõpa. Thus, powerful social and biological drives were pulling Ronipa away from Wasinawa's *shovo* and towards Wanõpa's.

Ronipa and I departed from Aldeia Maronal for the Ituí River on 19 December 1997, arriving at Paulino's *shovo* on 26 December. In the clearings outside Paulino's, where the food is given to the guests and the *tsai iki* dialogues exchanged, Ronipa spoke to his daughter, inviting her to move back with him. This invitation was not a formal or overt procedure and was carried on quietly, on the periphery of the clearing amid much activity. On 27 December, Ronipa and I went to stay in a *tapo* outside José Nascimento velho's *shovo* at aldeia Vida Nova; Mema came to stay there on the following day. I asked Ronipa what was going on, and he said that Mema had agreed to return to Aldeia Maronal with us. From 27 December 1997 to 3 January 1998 I conducted a census of the Ituí River. On 4 January we headed back to Aldeia Maronal. Mema came with us. We arrived at Aldeia Maronal on 7 January.

It was only after our return that I found out what Mema's motives for coming to the Curuçá River might have been. An informant told me that back at her own *shovo* she was being prepared for marriage as the second wife of an elder from another village—a man 62 years of age. Mema was opposed to this marriage, and took the opportunity of her father's arrival and his offer of a safe haven on the Curuçá River to flee in order to avoid that marriage. In addition, other informants suggested to me that she was being subjected to unwanted sexual advances from other sources than her prospective husband. The overall impression is that as she matured physically she was being pressured sexually so that the situation was very uncomfortable for her and her father's offer was very appealing. For all these reasons, she fled to the Curuçá.

Although Ronipa's plan had been for Mema to live at Wasinawa's *shovo*, on 9 January I saw her setting up a hammock in José's *shovo*. I asked José about this. José told me that Mema was disappointed in her father. Ronipa had told her that he wanted her to come with him because he had no woman, and he wanted a daughter to cook and wash clothes for him. He had told her also that they would live at Wasinawa's *shovo*. But upon arrival at Aldeia Maronal, Ronipa went to see his lover downstream, then went to stay at Wanõpa's *shovo*. José told me that Mema was unhappy with this and chose to stay at José's rather than follow her father around. When I asked Ronipa, however, he said that he had "left her" at José's because "it was easier" than taking her with him. José attributed agency to Mema; Ronipa claimed she was doing his bidding. To José, Mema had decided to flee the Ituí, then chosen to stay at José's. To Ronipa, he had brought Mema to the Curuçá and then left her at José's.

On the afternoon of 12 January I observed that Mema was gone from the place she had occupied at José's. José told me that Wanõpa had come to take her away to be the second wife of his brother's son Panipa (see Figure 9.1). As it turned out, Wanõpa had formally requested Mema from Ronipa on behalf of Panipa, and Ronipa had agreed to the marriage. According to José, Mema had stated that she did not want this marriage and declared that she would flee back to the Ituí whenever she could. Despite her opposition, the marriage would proceed because the interested parties knew that she was no better off on the Ituí than she was here.

José commented at length on Mema's situation. These comments are important because they demonstrate that Aldeia Maronal *shovo*-owners have different ideas about female agency in marriage, differences that can lead to conflicts over personnel allocation. According to José, the situation was typical of Wanõpa. Wanõpa, he said, had a tendency to go after young women. Wanõpa had originally married three women, back in the 1960s. However, one had been kidnapped by the Mayoruna in the incident that triggered the Mayoruna-Marubo clashes of the 1960s. A second wife died in 1981, leaving Wanõpa with only one wife. He sought adequate replacements—being very tradition-minded, Wanõpa wanted to preserve correct interclan linkages. Eventually he asked for João Tuxáua's two youngest daughters in marriage. João Tuxáua agreed to this, and one of the girls—Peko—agreed but her younger sister, Kena, did not. The marriage of Peko and Wanõpa took place in 1991 when Peko was 18. Wanõpa's age at this point was 68. Peko's sister Kena was 10 years old in 1991. As of my departure in 1998, Kena remained aloof from Wanõpa but the latter maintained that she was his and no one else could have her.

The marriage of Wanõpa to Peko had a detrimental effect on his pre-existing marriage. His remaining wife, Maya, was 41 and she took a dim view of Wanõpa's re-marriage. The re-marriage was very different from his original marriage. Originally, Wanõpa had married a set of classificatory siblings who had been raised in close proximity. This type of polygynous marriage is considered to be more conducive to long-term success because of the good relations among wives. However, the marriage to Peko was different in that it added a younger, unrelated wife, creating a much more volatile relationship among wives. It is possible for such a marriage to succeed, but only if very careful attention is paid to securing the elder wife's good feelings. The potential for conflict is much greater. As an example, I may cite the case of Neuto and Antonina. Antonina was the first wife of a man named Neuto, to whom she bore numerous children. Many years into the marriage, Neuto took a second wife. When I arrived in Atalaia do Norte in July 1997, I met Antonina. She had left her husband at Aldeia São Sebastião and she complained that she would never accept her husband's new wife. My informant, Manoel Barbosa, told me then that while polygyny was common among the Marubo, sororal polygyny was the norm. Such marriages as that between Neuto and his second wife, or between Wanõpa and Peko, were likely to cause discord among wives (though there are exceptions). It is in terms of the different effects of variant patterns of polygyny that we must understand the disagreement between Wanõpa and José.

José said that the forced marriage of a young girl to an older man did not work well (Port. *não presta*). José said that the man had to go get the woman first, so that she liked him. Then he should get his older male kin to ask the woman's father formally. José said that if his daughter wants to marry a man, and the man comes to ask for her,

he'll let her go. But if some prominent elder asked for her and she didn't want to go, he wouldn't force her. José said that some years previously Wanõpa had asked for a girl named Topa who was about 12 years of age, but her father Topãpa had refused. Nevertheless there are men who will give their daughters away in such situations, especially if there is some form of future reciprocation expectable. In particular, this custom is common on the Ituí River where very young girls are given to men in return for permanent uxorilocal residence (see Chapter Four). José's comments revealed the existence of variant approaches to the allocation of females to males. To Wanõpa the issue was entirely to be decided by men, whereas to José the issue involved also consideration of the woman's will. It should be emphasized that José did not conceptualize this, as we might, as a "woman's rights" issue. As far as I could discern, José's argument was very practical: his formula resulted in successful marriages (he had been married to both his wives for 25 years), whereas Wanõpa's did not. To bolster his argument, José pointed out that Wanõpa's older wife Maya had remained behind when Wanõpa moved closer to Aldeia Maronal (see Chapter Five).

The significance of highlighting these differing stances on allocation of females is in showing the underlying **basis** for conflict among elders over personnel allocation. In this case, we have a conflict of opinions between two very prominent Aldeia Maronal *shovo*-owners, Wanõpa and José. Mema had tried to exercise control over her own allocation, first by fleeing with her father, then by going to José's *shovo*. But although he disagreed with the way she was being married off against her will, José did not interfere when Wanõpa came to take her on 12 January 1998.

A second conflict was created by the forced marriage of Mema to Panípa. Panípa's older wife, Shonópeko, did not like the marriage. According to José, she was crying and saying that she would leave if the marriage went ahead. This angered the *shovo*-owner Wanópa (Panípa's father's brother), who harshly accused Shonópeko of deviating from proper wifely behavior. José noted that Panípa had never asked for Mema; it was Wanópa's initiative. This had created conflict between Shonópeko and Panípa, between Shonópeko and Wanópa, and between Mema and everyone who was trying to force her to marry against her will. It had also revealed a (as yet philosophical) conflict between José and Wanópa.

The motivations of Wanópa in this case are easy to discern. When he moved from downstream to his current *shovo* (see Chapter Five), he lost many of his coresidents. The only working adult male in Wanópa's *shovo* was Panípa. Panípa's youngest child was nine years old, and there did not seem any prospects of further demographic expansion. By attempting to get a second wife for his brother's son, Wanópa was looking to the future demographic expansion of his *shovo*. More difficult to discern are the motivations of Mema's father Ronípa. Ronípa clearly felt, as Wanópa did, that the allocation of women should be decided by men. On one occasion (12 February 1998), Ronípa said that it was shameful for women to be unmarried; that Mema was his daughter, and therefore he could and should tell her who to marry. The problem is that Ronípa's actions seem entirely at variance with his stated purpose in bringing Mema to the Curuçá. He said he brought her to the Curuçá because he needed a woman to cook and wash for him, so why did he give her away as soon as he arrived? The answer cannot be known with certainty, and it is a question which occasioned much discussion and

competing theories from the Ituí to the Curuçá. The most likely solution is Ronípa's desire to secure Panípa's daughter for future marriage. Ronípa's fervent desire for a wife has been described above, along with the frustration his lack of marital success caused him. Wanõpa's household operated, as far as possible, on 'traditional' grounds with respect to the allocation of women: in accordance with the Kariera-type ideals of Marubo kinship, Wanõpa sought exchange relationships. Therefore, by offering his daughter to Panípa, Ronípa was increasing the security that he would have access to Panípa's daughter Vote when the latter matured sexually.

In addition to giving his daughter away to Wanõpa's household, Ronípa finished shifting residences so that he permanently resided at Wanõpa's. I recorded his physical movements during this time, and found that between 7 January and 30 January 1998 he spent only one night at his former home (Wasinawa's upstream *shovo*) and instead slept downstream, at Wanõpa's and also with his lover. At that time, Wanõpa initiated construction of a large (8-meter) canoe. Ronípa was enlisted in this project, and worked on the canoe frequently throughout January, February and March, until its completion in early April 1998. This is clearly an issue of sex and power. Ronípa had a burning desire for a woman, and Wanõpa had control over a girl that might become available for marriage in only three or four years. Wanõpa used his control over that prized resource to get Ronípa to work for him. The resource-controller exerts power over the resource-lacker.

Caught up in this web of masculine desire and political games was 13-year old Mema. Throughout January she remained at Wanõpa's *shovo* as Panípa's wife, against her will. On the morning of 6 February 1998, she came into José's *shovo* crying. She

talked to the three elder women of the *shovo*—José’s two wives and José’s brother’s wife. I was not able to grasp all that she said, but she was complaining about being treated in a way she did not want to be treated. She rested in José’s *shovo* throughout the morning, then returned to Wanõpa’s in the afternoon.

On 10 February the conflict over Mema expanded to include interested parties on the Ituí River. At the afternoon CIVAJA radio session, Mema’s Ituí relatives talked to Txanõpa (son of Maronal headman Alfredo). Txanõpa said that Mema’s *ewa*, *txishtxo*, and *koka* (individuals in the categories of mother, mother’s mother, and mother’s brother) were calling for her return to the Ituí. Txanõpa asked me if permission had been asked for her removal from the Ituí. I replied that permission had not been asked. She had simply left. I told Txanõpa that I had been told she was fleeing an unwanted marriage, but that I did not find out until after our return to Aldeia Maronal. Txanõpa said that permission should have been asked of her kin, and if this had been so then there would not be any problems. When a woman acts like that, he said, it just creates complications. What he was referring to was Mema’s efforts to exercise control over her own destiny. Mema was trying to avoid being controlled by others. Those others—on the one hand, her kin on the Ituí, and on the other hand, her father and Wanõpa on the Curuçá—had plans for her, and in trying to avoid those plans she created a conflict between herself and her would-be controllers, but also *among* her would-be controllers. Now, Wanõpa wanted her to be his brother’s son’s wife, but on the Ituí, Mema’s kin were calling the whole operation of her removal and marriage illegitimate because it had been done on the sly, without proper discussions among interested elders.

On 11 February, Mema came to José's *shovo* again. She had a migraine and was treated by visiting MSF Doctor Marie Beauregard. That night, she spent the night at José's for the first time since 11 January. The women of José's *shovo* took care of her and José accepted her presence. On the following morning (12 February), the men of José's *shovo* went out to work cutting thatch for a new hut while the women stayed to work around the *shovo* and Mema convalesced in her hammock, still suffering from her migraine. Ronipa wandered by at 8 a.m. He tried to approach his daughter but the three elder women of the *shovo* sat around her in a protective screen, working on jewelry. Ronipa started to complain about his daughter's behavior being inappropriate. He was not happy about her being at José's—as noted, he felt that women should be controlled by men. But José's brother's wife Nake interrupted him and soundly berated him for inappropriate parenting. Nake embarked on a lengthy speech about the proper way for a man to relate to his daughter, a speech which was clearly intended to shame Ronipa for failing to take good care of his daughter. When Nake was done, Ronipa left quietly. Mema had been completely quiet the whole time. My interpretation of this event is that a contest of authority took place between Ronipa and the women of José's *shovo*, and the women won. Ronipa appraised the situation and realized that to physically remove Mema he would have to physically assault three senior women, wives of prominent elders with much more authority than himself. This he could not do, and so he was forced to leave her there.

From José's *shovo* Ronipa headed to the FUNAI radio to attend the 9 a.m. communications session. Wanopa and others from Wanopa's social environment were present (recall from Chapter Six that Wanopa was closely tied to FUNAI through his

daughter's husband Nakwa). Ronípa used the radio to talk to aldeia Vida Nova. He asked to speak to Mema's kin but the person at the Vida Nova radio said that they were all unavailable at that moment. Ronípa's effort to speak to Mema's kin was a response to pressure from Alfredo on Wanõpa to resolve the issue before it should create conflict between Maronal and Ituí. Recall that on the previous day Mema's kin had asked Alfredo's son for her return. Alfredo did not want to become involved in any way, nor did Wanõpa want to irritate Alfredo over this issue. Wanõpa and Ronípa were trying to use the FUNAI radio to try to resolve this conflict over Mema's allocation. The wild card here was Mema herself. Ronípa and Wanõpa were trying to secure Mema from her Ituí kin, but they didn't even have her secured from the comfortable protection of José's women.

After speaking to aldeia Vida Nova, Ronípa spoke with his brother Ramípa, the shaman at Aldeia São Sebastião. He explained his point of view: a woman should not be unmarried; Mema was his daughter; therefore he should determine her marriage. Wanõpa expressed his approval of this discourse.

After the radio session, Ronípa wandered back to José's *shovo*. He stood on the threshold of the *shovo* and spoke to his daughter, but she did not reply. He left.

That night (February 12), after the 5 p.m. CIVAJA radio session, I returned to José's *shovo* to find that José had expelled Mema for alleged theft of a pack of cigarettes. The truth of the matter was never properly ascertained. A pack of cigarettes disappeared, Mema was blamed and did not deflect that blame. José, understandably upset, sent her back to Wanõpa's. José had been willing to give her the protection of his *shovo* because he did not approve of the way Mema was being treated, and because he had the autonomy

and authority that allowed him to shelter her against Ron̄pa and Wan̄pa. But he had no real vested interest in protecting her and certainly would not put up with misbehavior on her part. Whether she had actually stolen the cigarettes or not, the result of this incident was that she was returned to Wan̄pa's *shovo* to be Pan̄pa's wife again.

The events of 12 January to 12 February 1998 left Wan̄pa's *shovo*, at least temporarily, demographically enriched. He had acquired the coresidence of Ron̄pa, still a young man, very strong and a hard worker, and controllable because of his desire for a wife. He had also acquired the in-marriage of Mema, a young woman who could potentially add numerous children to the *shovo*. The operation seemed successful for Wan̄pa.

On 16 February 1998, an incident occurred which triggered further debate over Mema and related the Mema issue to broader questions of Marubo personnel allocation. That morning, aldeia Vida Nova informed the rest of the Marubo villages that a Canadian missionary had been caught by his own wife in a sexual situation with a Marubo woman in the pharmacy. Apparently this was part of a pattern for this missionary, for as it turns out a number of Marubo were already aware of his sexual activities, but did not denounce him because they were receiving material goods and money from him. It was only when his wife caught him that any action was taken. His wife denounced him to the mission superiors and within a few days he was removed from the area by mission authorities. Subsequent visitors from the Ituí to Aldeia Maronal explained that before his removal he conducted a public confession in which he admitted to having sexual intercourse not only with unmarried adults, but also with married women and even with a girl under 14 years of age. While the missionary could get away with this behavior as long as pro-mission

Marubo defended him, once the incident became part of the public domain, the anti-mission Marubo used this as an excuse to lambast those who had supported the missionary. Txanõpa, controlling the radio at Maronal, told me that the leaders (Port. *lideranças*) of the Ituí had organized a meeting to discuss the issue of single women. He said that when sexually viable women remain unmarried for long periods of time, it causes complications in the villages (Port. *complicações dentro da comunidade*). He said that men should not remain single either. If people do not marry on their own by a certain age, then the elders should marry them off, assigning wives to husbands. That is what their ancestors did, and that is their law (Port. *nossa lei*). So the issue of the missionary's infidelities triggered a meeting at which male elders attempted to take control of the allocation of females to males, claiming that autonomous self-allocation by women leads to social conflict. This is exactly the same issue as was raised by Mema's independent behavior. Independent actions by women, falling outside the established social code, lead to a retrenchment of male positions. The men come to believe that they are being too tolerant, their tolerance leads to social chaos, therefore they claim a need to establish more careful control over women.

From 12 February to 27 February 1998, Mema remained at Wanõpa's *shovo*. On that date, I went downstream to attend the demarcation meeting in Atalaia. I returned to Aldeia Maronal on 14 April. Upon my return, I found that Mema was in permanent residence at José's *shovo*. During José's *akoya* she cooked, cut firewood, and carried water under instructions from José's senior wife, who had taken Mema under her care. Later, Mema started to make jewelry under the instructions of José's wives. In every way, she had been incorporated into José's *shovo*. This remained the situation when my

fieldwork ended on 2 July 1998. Mema had managed to avoid every forced marriage and found the one place where she was allowed to control her own sexuality.

The case of Mema's flight has been recounted here in detail because it is a phenomenon of conflict among *shovo*-owners over allocation of personnel. This forms part of the proof that a Marubo political economy of people exists. The argument here is that a Marubo political economy of people can be demonstrated if it can be shown that people are valued as a scarce resource (premise A) and the active pursuit of that value is an observable social process (premise B). To demonstrate these premises for the sector of Marubo society consisting of leaders, I selected two phenomena which displayed the qualities called for in premises A and B. The first phenomenon was the occurrence of invitations to move. The second phenomenon is the occurrence of conflict over allocation of personnel. In my assessment, the events surrounding Mema's quest for autonomy sufficiently demonstrate that said conflict occurs. Furthermore, this type of conflict shows that people are valued as a scarce resource and that the pursuit of that value is an observable social process. I conclude that premises A and B are applicable to Marubo leaders. To complete the proof that a Marubo political economy of people exists, there remains only to show that premises A and B are applicable to the non-leader sector of society.

3. Existence of a Marubo Political Economy of People: Applicability of Premises to Non-Leaders

The applicability of premises A and B to Marubo non-leaders must be demonstrated in a different way than it was for the leaders. The same markers are not present for non-leaders: neither the invitations to move nor the conflicts over personnel allocation. Non-leaders experience people-as-wealth differently from leaders. A leader has *his* social network, to which he refers by saying *e na* (it is mine) or *ea ivo* (I am the owner/guardian). To a leader, other individuals are potential additions and subtractions from his social network. Therefore, a leader sees value in and pursues the coresidence of individuals. This results in elaborate dramas such as that brought on by Ronipa's efforts to add a woman to his entourage and Wanopa's efforts to add Mema and Ronipa to his social network. In contrast, non-leaders do not play the same political games as leaders. To a non-leader, it is entire social networks that are perceived as things of value and pursued as such. For a leader, another individual may be perceived as a valuable thing that produces other things (much like an expensive machine in the industrial age) but for the non-leader it is an entire configuration of coresidents—a social network—which is perceived as something that produces desirable things (food, health, prosperity, access to members of the opposite sex, access to non-indigenous goods, education, etc.).

To examine the validity of premises A and B as regards Marubo non-leaders I will not ask whether non-leaders see *individual* people as valuable scarce resources, but rather whether they see *groups* of people as valuable scarce resources and pursue said value in observable social processes. My argument is that premises A and B can be demonstrated

for non-leaders by showing that there are more and less valued social networks and that non-leaders make efforts to move from less to more valued networks. For this to be true, there is a sub-premise that must also be true: that individuals can exercise choice over the direction of their movements. If the social context is such that structural norms compel most residential changes, then the political economy of people cannot exist because if it does exist there is a political game surrounding the allocation of residence and if structural norms compel most movements then such a game cannot exist because all the moves are pre-determined.

In the Marubo social environment, structural norms do not compel most residential movements. They do exist and they do limit the range of possibilities, but the application of Marubo structural norms leaves considerable room for maneuver, thereby allowing for the possibility that a Marubo political economy of people exists. Data to support this assertion has already been presented in Chapter Five. It is not necessary to review the entire data set in order to show that there is room for maneuver in Marubo residential choice. A few examples will serve to sufficiently demonstrate the validity of this subpremise, and the reader is referred back to Chapter Five for the raw data which I believe amply supports my conclusions.

The first case of modern residential movement described in Chapter Five is the breakup of the upper Curuçá *shovo* of Aurélio between 1975 and 1978. This event is an excellent example of the flexibility of Marubo structural norms. Aurélio's *shovo* in 1974 was an example of avuncular social composition. This type of composition, according to some informants, is the ideal one should aspire to because it is the only type that contains four marriage sections in a single self-replicating residential unit. But although this ideal

existed, and it was the only form of residence that fully resolves the conflicts between matrilineal transmission of clanship and patrilineal transmission of names, it was an ideal that was rarely practiced. At the time of fieldwork (1997-1998) only one *shovo* adhered to purely avuncular social composition: that of Paulino. Data exist for three avuncular *shovo* that have broken up: those of José Barbosa, of Sinãpa, and of Aurélio. Clearly, at any given moment far more non-avuncular *shovo* exist than do avuncular *shovo*. This in and of itself demonstrates that Marubo structural norms are *possibilities* rather than *constraints*. Hence the exemplification of the ideal does occur in reality, but it does not *necessarily* do so. In fact, it rarely does so because it is difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain. Within Marubo social organization, avuncular social composition may occur, but if it does, it is not a matter of submission to structural coercion; rather it is a matter of sustained conscious effort to achieve the ideal, and hence, a matter of choice.

Data on the ways in which three of the four known avuncular *shovo* broke up supply further evidence of the noncoercive nature of Marubo social norms. In Chapter Five, it was noted that three out of those four *shovo* had strong economic incentives for existing. They had come together partly because their components formed a socio-normatively harmonious assemblage, but largely also because the coming together of those assemblages in those places and times facilitated exploitation of the rubber trade. In all these cases, including the case of Aurélio's *shovo*, once the economic conditions no longer favored group cohesion, the group flew apart. This is evidence that individuals and subgroups can decide a move for economic advantage, over and above any notions of remaining in conformity to a social ideal. This in turn indicates that social ideals are

attractive and are pursued and enacted, but they are by no means coercive constraints. Individuals can and do decide to pursue different residential configurations that, while not ideal, are at least not in contradiction with or violation of social norms (i.e., agnatic and non-avuncular uxorilocal arrangements).

To further bolster the argument that Marubo social norms do not strictly compel residential arrangements we may also consider the evidence on flexibility of Marubo residential arrangements, presented in Chapter Four. The data presented in that chapter showed four basic types of Marubo residential arrangement: agnatic, uxorilocal, avuncular, and anicular. The first three of these are emically recognized as normal. The agnatic and the uxorilocal may not be quite ideal, but they are normal. Within the Marubo conception of the “proper” residential configuration, there is therefore room for multiple possible forms to be produced. To use an analogy between society and language, if we consider the ideas and values underlying social structure to be akin to deep structure, while the actual observable social configurations are akin to surface structure, then Marubo social structure is capable of producing multiple surface configurations all of which are compatible with the deep structure and its rules. To illustrate this concept, I will compare one informant’s statements of ideals to observed realities.

José Barbosa, brother of kakáya Alfredo and *shovo*-owner at Aldeia Maronal, supplied me with at least two statements of ideals of residential arrangement. The first concerned what type of kin should live together in one *shovo*. The question I was trying to get answered was whether any categories of kin are considered more desirable as coresidents than are other categories of kin. I asked him about the breakup of his

avuncular *shovo* on the upper Curuçá (see Chapters Four and Five) because I wanted to know if the relationship between mother's brother and sister's son was considered less desirable than other 'closer' ones such as that between brothers. José's answer was clear, however: to him, the social ideal was for a *shovo* to contain all categories of kin within it. As explained in earlier chapters, this is the only way the contradiction between Marubo descent and naming systems is resolved, and the only way to have a self-contained and self-replicating residential unit that perfectly follows Marubo social conventions. The relationships I as a researcher consider biologically closer are not ranked 'more desirable' in José's way of thinking, although in reality agnatic *shovo* are the rule at Maronal whereas avuncularity as a principle of *shovo* social composition is rare.

José's second statement of residential ideals was made during the marriage of one of his patrilateral half-sisters (these were generally called *txitxo* (sister) though they could be called by other terms depending on their clan membership, since patrilaterality places them in a different clan). When a man formally requests a woman in marriage, there is an assembly on the *kenã* benches in the *shovo* of the girl's kin. The man's elder kin ask the girl's elder kin for approval of the marriage. At that moment, the assembled male elders give discourses of advice to the groom. These discourses are essentially statements of ideal post-marital behavior. I asked José to translate his discourse for me retroactively. José said he told the man that after marrying, he should build a *shovo* and a swidden of his own and invite people to a feast. He says that that is what he did after he married. He wandered after marrying from his father's *shovo* to Joãozinho's and thence to his father-in-law's, which was being abandoned. After this he built his own *shovo* and

cut a swidden and invited people to eat. José thus idealized neolocality and conveyed that value to the young groom.

José's comments give us a basis to compare ideals and reality. Let us consider his ideal of postmarital neolocality. The reality at Aldeia Maronal is that virtually every *shovo* follows an agnatic pattern of composition, which correlates with virilocal postmarital residence. Men stay behind in their father's *shovo* after marriage, extending the *shovo* along agnatic lines, creating assemblages of brothers. In contrast, on the Ituí River uxorilocality is common. In these cases, the man moves away from his birth-kin, to live with one or more women. Both the agnatic and uxorilocal patterns, which are the most common in the sample analyzed in Chapter Four, are based on postmarital residence that differs from José's ideal. Even when José made his statement, he omitted the crucial fact that he built the *shovo* with his brother Pedro and some of his Varináwavo classificatory sister's sons. In fact, José took advantage of the breakup of the headwaters settlements upon FUNAI's arrival to attract enough coresidents for a viable *shovo*. José's neolocal ideal is very difficult to achieve in reality. Thus the ideal exists and is pursued, but there are other forms which, while not ideal, are not contradictory of rules and norms. In fact, Marubo social ideals seem to conflict with material conditions of social production. Such material conditions as the physical difficulty of raising and maintaining a *shovo* conflict with José's stated ideal. Therefore, actual social configurations are middle grounds which reach for the ideals while adapting to reality. The end results are not violations of the norms, but neither are they perfect exemplifications thereof. Within the range of acceptable normal residential configurations are a number of different possibilities, all of them as much a product of the underlying social rules as is any perfect

exemplification of the ideal. I conclude that analysis of the relations between José's statements of ideal and the observed social realities shows that Marubo social norms do not strictly compel most residential moves, but instead leave room for maneuver.

José's statements about the ideal coresident kin configuration support the same conclusion. His statement suggests that an avuncular form of social composition is the social ideal, and as we have seen this is the only form that is perfectly compatible with the Marubo social grammar (i.e., resolves contradictions between matrilineal descent and patrilineal naming). Yet avunculocality is not as common in the analyzed sample as uxorilocality and agnatic composition. Avunculocality is a more complex and tenuous social configuration, more difficult to hold together than either of the more common categories. Uxorilocal and agnatic patterns thus fall in the range of configurations that are not perfectly ideal but are still compatible with the rules and whose conditions of successful production are easier to achieve than are those of the ideal. Again, analysis of the relation between José's ideal and the observed reality shows that Marubo social norms do not strictly compel most residential movements, but rather leave considerable room for maneuver.

Arguments to bolster the assertion that Marubo social structure leaves room for choice in residential movements could continue at great length because the bulk of available data supports that assertion. Ideals, norms, and even rules do exist and do affect the range of possibilities available, but typically leave considerable room for choice among a variety of options. The database is replete with exceptions to rules governing residence, whether these are expressed emically or deduced etically. For example, in analyzing the data on uxorilocal residence, I noted that in arrangements of uxorilocal

polygyny the son-in-law goes to live where his father-in-law lives, contributing his labor, but also later contributing his children to the demographic growth of his father-in-law's *shovo*. This differs from the more common Amazonian practice of *temporary* brideservice. The difference is due to the fact that in return for remaining in uxorilocal residence, the son-in-law bypasses his brothers-in-law in the political succession. Many of the uxorilocal arrangements thereby produced are very long-lasting. These arrangements would not exist if the son-in-law could simply leave with the wives—in these situations, the father-in-law is using the women to expand his demographic wealth, so that if a man in this type of arrangement cannot simply leave, even less so can the women leave. Thus it would be hypothetically possible to deduce a rule such as “if a man receives two women in uxorilocal marriage, he may not thereafter seek another residence independently of his father-in-law, and if he does so, he may not take his wives with him.” But even this rule finds its exception: Wasinawa left a situation of uxorilocal polygyny on the Ituí River to eventually found his own *shovo* on the Curuçá. He brought with him only one wife, while the other remained on the Ituí, and his children travelled back and forth, staying alternately with their father and their mother’s father. Wasinawa thus found a middle ground, an example of the room for maneuver left by the rules of the Marubo residential game. The reader is referred back to Chapter Five, where the data on residential movements were presented; those data, in addition to the subset thereof that has been reviewed in this section, support the assertion that structural norms do not strictly compel most residential movements. Therefore Marubo people have, within the parameters of their social system, a considerable amount of choice as to where they reside.

The fact that Marubo social structure leaves room for maneuver in residential choice means that it is at least possible that a political economy of people exists in the Marubo social system. It now becomes necessary to ask, if it is not because of rules that the Marubo move, why is it? I have argued that the premises necessary to proving a political economy of people can be demonstrated for non-leaders by showing that there are more and less valued social networks and that non-leaders make efforts to move from less to more valued networks (in the category of non-leaders I here include women and children as young as twelve whom I have observed exercising choice in order to improve their coresident social network). The database for addressing this question is the totality of residential moves identified by comparing the 1974-75 census taken by Melatti to the census taken by myself in 1997-98, supplemented by the interviews I conducted to obtain explanations for the differences. These data can be divided into three categories. The first category is that of group movements. All the major Marubo group movements that occurred between 1974 and 1997 are described in Chapter Five, along with the explanations I obtained for the causes of those movements. Here it is necessary only to determine whether they support or falsify the hypotheses that are being tested in this chapter. The second category of data is that of postmarital residence. These are extremely important data for testing the political economy of people hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses. The third category of data are individual moves. Many of these were described in Chapter Five but others, such as the movements of Mema described earlier in this chapter, were not. Such individual movements as were recorded during fieldwork or analyzed out of the data after fieldwork will also be considered here.

The database on residential movements that was gathered during fieldwork consists of 602 instances of persons moving from one place to another. Using correlations between the old and new censuses supplemented by interview data, I was able to isolate with a considerable degree of certainty 45 events of group movements between 1974 and 1997. In these 45 events 445 persons changed their location. In addition, there are 142 marriages and in nearly every case at least one if not both partners have changed location relative to where they were before the marriage. Finally, there are 15 confirmed events of individuals moving from one place to another, independently of marriages and of other individuals. The issue is now how to use the political economy of people concept to organize these data in such a way that they are relevant to the problem addressed in this thesis, namely that of power in a structurally egalitarian social environment. The value of the political economy of people concept, in this context, is that it suggests a framework for understanding such aspects of Marubo social power dynamics as are not immediately obvious if one were to simply elicit normative ideals from informants.

As a preliminary to determining whether or not power exists in association with the political economy of people, I have thus far in this chapter been concerned with demonstrating that a Marubo political economy of people exists and with identifying concrete, observable social interactions to which the term “political economy of people” can be applied. The term can then be said to represent something real, rather than being mere intellectual abstraction. I divided the task of identifying a concrete political economy of people into two parts. First, I showed that leaders valued people-as-wealth and pursued that value actively. I pointed out the phenomenon of the invitation to move

and the occurrence of conflict over allocation of personnel, thus identifying a specific set of social interactions which can be referred to as ‘political economy of people’. I then set out to show that non-leaders value people-as-wealth and pursue that value actively. I first demonstrated that Marubo residential movements are not strictly compelled by structural norms. I went further and suggested that there existed room for choice in Marubo residential maneuvers. What I have not yet done is evaluated the extent to which Marubo individuals can be influenced or coerced into moving by others. I have shown that abstract norms do not compel most residential movements, but does that mean that most residential movements are the result of individuals’ choices? The fact that most moves are made together with groups of kin suggests that individual choice is not the prime motor of Marubo residential movements; instead it is agreement with another individual or individuals who have chosen to move. Evaluating the role of interpersonal power and influence in this sphere of social action remains to be done. But first, I must finish defining the extent of that sphere.

The hypotheses that informed assembly of the database on residential movements were that if there are more and less valued social networks and if non-leaders make efforts to move from less to more valued networks then there is valuation and pursuit of people-as-wealth by non-leaders, and since these phenomena have already been shown for leaders, demonstration of their existence among non-leaders would constitute proof of the existence of a political economy of people in Marubo society at large. I gathered information on 602 residential movements in order to demonstrate or falsify these hypotheses. The result, as might be expected, is mixed. The data clearly show a political game surrounding residential arrangements. Situations arise in which there are different

ideas about how personnel should be allocated, and where people should move. The different possible results in these situations have differing levels of appeal to the separate individuals involved. The efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which the residential outcome conflicts with their goals, can be identified as constituting what we are looking for, namely a concrete set of social interactions bearing sufficient resemblance to our preconceptions (based on Rivière and Mentore) of what a political economy of people should be that we can safely refer to that set of social interactions as “political economy of people.” Data to support these assertions will be presented shortly. First, I must address the fate of the concepts that informed the data assembly in the first place.

The idea that there are more and less valued social networks and that non-leaders make efforts to move from less to more valued networks does not have to be clung to; the political economy of people can be identified without it. It was to test this hypothesis that the data were gathered. Rather than proof or falsification, however, the result of the hypothesis’ encounter with reality is to reveal weaknesses in the concepts. The weakest aspect of the hypothesis is the notion that particular social configurations can be identified as representing more wealth than others, and that this value differential can explain the direction of human residential movements. Attempts to isolate particular forms of Marubo social network as being more ‘valuable’ than others proved fruitless because there is such a variety of different situations which Marubo find advantageous that it is often the case that one Marubo’s advantageous situation is another’s disadvantageous one. This is most clearly seen in the political struggle between men and women, where men hold meetings to advocate firm control over female residential

choices while women flout male control by establishing anicular residential arrangements (described in Chapter Four, these are residential arrangements in which a divorced or widowed woman goes to live with married children, then attracts other of her children—married, divorced, or widowed, and often with children of their own—to live with her). The result is that no valid statement can be made about what ‘the Marubo’ consider a valuable social configuration. But this does not mean that the political economy of people does not exist, simply that its contours must be defined differently. Rather than trying to generate a society-wide definition of value and showing how Marubo non-leaders move towards that value, I will focus on showing how the goals pursued through residential changes create dynamic interactions between individuals and groups that have varying levels of cohesion and conflict as regards their goals. Thus, there exists a concrete set of dynamic social interactions which can be identified as a ‘political economy of people.’ By citing examples of these types of interaction, I will define the boundaries of this social sphere, demonstrate its existence among non-leaders and thus complete its identification in general. It will be seen that the interactions I am referring to have all the characteristics of a political system. Once identified, the system can be evaluated as to the extent to which power differentials exist in it.

In order to identify the contours of the Marubo political economy of people I will go through two of the three categories of data, highlighting in each category such phenomena as are related to the political economy of people. The first category I will address is that of postmarital residence. The most glaring feature of this category is the existence of contrasting patterns of postmarital residence. Virilocality predominates, but uxorilocality occurs frequently in some areas. Close inspection of particular cases shows

that the determination of postmarital residence can be a political issue, often having to do with relative power differentials among kin-groups competing to add personnel.

The numerical data on postmarital residence is presented in Table 9.1. This table confirms the assertions made in Chapters Four and Five, that uxorilocality is rare on the Curuçá River but common on the Ituí. On the Curuçá River, 84.8 % of marriages are virilocal whereas only 4.5 % are uxorilocal. In contrast, on the Ituí River only half the marriages (51.3%) are virilocal, whereas nearly a third (31.6 %) are uxorilocal. A chi-square test of independence conducted on these data indicates that if there is no correlation between river and residence patern, these figures could only be arrived at less than one tenth of one percent of the time ($p < .001$)—showing that there are statistically significant differences in residence pattern between the Ituí and Curuçá Rivers. We must consider the question of what determines postmarital residence to be one of the key issues in Marubo ethnography. I will present some examples to show the interpersonal tensions that can arise when postmarital residence is determined.

If the goal of any Marubo leader is to expand the numbers of his coresident group, then control of postmarital residence is one of the means available to pursue that end. I believe that from a leader's point of view the size of a group is one of the markers of its value. I cannot extend that observation to non-leaders because there exist numerous cases of people moving from large to small groups, and of small groups fissioning from large groups to form independent residences. If size were a significant value to non-leaders, then such phenomena would not occur. However, there is not a single case of a leader taking active steps to make his coresident group smaller. For leaders, therefore, group size is a clearly identifiable value. From this premise it is logical to presume that,

in the sphere of postmarital residence, the acme of success for a leader is to combine virilocality of sons with uxorilocality of daughters. Combining virilocality with uxorilocality in this way provides the maximum expansion of the leader's coresident group. What we deduce logically was also observed empirically: at Aldeia Maronal there were at least two cases of men attempting to combine male virilocality with female uxorilocality.

To secure an uxorilocal marriage for one's daughter at Aldeia Maronal was difficult because the men were accustomed to virilocality. Out of 41 marriages at Aldeia Maronal, 37 were virilocal and only one was uxorilocal. The single uxorilocal marriage, upon closer inspection, is not really a case of a man going to live with his wife's father. In fact, the man was living with his mother's brother when another mother's brother (Wasinawa) moved to the Curuçá from the Ituí. The man married his recently-arrived mother's brother's daughter. When his new wife's father created a new residence, he moved with him, and so ended up in uxorilocal/avunculocal residence. It should be noted, however, that the marriage had not at first been one which required a man to move to where his wife is; his wife and wife's father originally came to him. The two neolocal marriages were probably uxorilocal at first; however, since I do not have definite information that the two men involved moved to their wife's father's place before establishing independent residence (the condition in which I encountered them) I record the marriages as neolocal. Other than these three cases and a single natolocal case, all marriages at Aldeia Maronal are virilocal. The men stay put and the women move to where the men are. Informant statements suggest that men liked this situation and did not relish the thought of leaving their natal homes to live with their in-laws.

In the virilocal system prevalent at Aldeia Maronal, every *shovo* loses its daughters, while receiving other people's daughters as wives for its sons. At the moment in which the system was observed (1997-1998) relative political power and group size differentials made no difference to postmarital residence. The data presented in Chapter Six showed that Aldeia Maronal headman Alfredo had real political power, and the census data indicate that his residence is demographically the largest on the Curuçá River. Yet Alfredo had surrendered several of his daughters to members of the Varináwavo clan, who had their own smaller residence upstream from Alfredo and certainly had less political power than Alfredo. There was almost certainly a diffuse expectation of return on the investment in women at some future generation, but at the moment when the system was observed the flow of women from Alfredo to the Varináwavo had not been matched by a reverse flow. If one of Pierre Clastres' (1977[1974]) main observations was that unequal flow of women puts the receiver in debt to the giver and thus allows the giver to exert some hold on the receiver, then this fact supports Clastres in one sense; in another sense, however, Clastres is inverted because far from being held in debt by this means, the Aldeia Maronal headman is holding others in his debt. More importantly, however, this fact allows us to discount the notion that size and power differentials allow the bigger and more powerful to determine personnel allocation. Instead there seems to be (and this is hypothetical) a general sense that the virilocal system benefits all men and should therefore be retained and expanded. Even the larger and more powerful groups give away their daughters and receive other people's daughters.

The difficulty of securing uxorilocal marriages in Maronal's virilocal environment can now be better understood. One person attempting to do this was Sināpa. Owner of the residence marking the furthest upstream edge of Aldeia Maronal, Sināpa was an affine of Alfredo's and of Alfredo's brothers. Sināpa was one of the top leaders at Aldeia Maronal, one of those who actually participated in decision-making and in the formation of public policy and opinion. His first wife had borne him five straight sons to start with, then a single daughter, then one last son. Sināpa then became polygynous by taking a second wife and had four children by his second wife. By the time of my arrival on-site, his three eldest sons had married (all of them virilocally) and Sināpa had his first grandson. Demographically, politically, and economically (in both food production and contacts with non-indigenous economic interests), this was a successful household. Sināpa's only daughter by his first wife was thirteen years old in December 1997. With her entry into puberty came open discussions as to her eventual marriage. She was considered quite a prize because she was very attractive as well as coming from a valuable family to ally oneself with. Her father considered her very valuable because she was the only daughter he would have to offer in marriage until his second wife's first daughter grew up, and that would be another ten years. From Sināpa's perspective, Maya (the girl's name) was an extremely scarce resource and from the perspective of the young men in the village, she was one of the most desirable women available. In this context, we can understand why Sināpa spread the word that Maya would be available only for uxorilocal marriage. According to one of my informants, several men had shown interest in Maya, both directly and indirectly (by indirectly I mean having an older kinsman talk to the girl's father about the possibilities of arranged marriage). According

to the informant, Sināpa had been able to fend off all the suitors to that point by adding the condition of uxorilocality to any potential marriage. All the suitors had intended to take Maya to their own place of residence, and had no intention of moving in with any in-laws. The situation was complicated somewhat towards the end of fieldwork when one of headman Alfredo's sons began courting her, and she began giving positive responses (i.e., making small presents of beadwork for him). Rumor had it that a strong mutual attraction was developing. However, nothing ever came of it before I left. The situation was interesting just for the potentials it raised: if the headman's son married Sināpa's daughter, would the requirement for uxorilocality be waived? Would Sināpa agree to give up his daughter in return for alliance to the most powerful Marubo family? Or would Sināpa remain intransigent over the issue of uxorilocality? If so, would the headman and his son agree to the uxorilocality, or would the marriage be scuttled? Unfortunately, I left the field before the outcome was decided. But what is clear is that a man's efforts to combine virilocality of sons with uxorilocality of daughters results in tensions and conflicts among the various parties involved. A leader cannot simply secure uxorilocality of daughters by recourse to structural norms; he must make concrete efforts avoid losing his daughter, against the pressure of other men's demands. To understand these tensions better, I will go over another example of incipient uxorilocality at Aldeia Maronal.

In the *shovo* of José Barbosa, full brother of the headman Alfredo, there were two women surrounding whom there were residential tensions. The first was José's oldest daughter Amélia. Amélia's peculiar position in village politics is described in Chapter Six. I have noted that most men found Amélia's deviations from the traditional female

TABLE 9.1. Marubo postmarital residence patterns.

1. Curuçá River

<u>Village</u>	<u># Marriage Links</u>	<u>Viri</u>	<u>Uxori</u>	<u>Neo</u>	<u>Nato</u>	<u>Undet</u>
Aldeia Maronal	41	37	1	2	1	0
Aldeia São Sebastião	22	17	2	3	0	0
Tacanal	3	2	0	1	0	0
Curuçá River—Totals	66	56	3	6	1	0

2. Ituí River

<u>Village</u>	<u># Marriage Links</u>	<u>Viri</u>	<u>Uxori</u>	<u>Neo</u>	<u>Nato</u>	<u>Undet</u>
Agua Branca	8	5	3	0	0	0
Paraná	4	2	1	0	1	0
Maloca do Paulino	6	4	0	2	0	0
Liberdade	7	2	2	3	0	0
Vida Nova	23	17	6	0	0	0
Praia	3	2	1	0	0	0
Alegria	10	2	4	3	0	1
Rio Novo	15	5	7	3	0	0
Ituí River—Totals	76	39	24	11	1	1
Marubo—Totals	142	95	27	17	2	1

Abbreviations

Viri=Virilocal

Uxori=Uxorilocal

Neo=Neolocal

Nato=Natolocal

Undet=Undetermined

gender role to be profoundly threatening. Although men found value in her educational and health-work contributions, they maintained a strong sense of ambivalence. In this difficult social environment, her main support was her father. Amélia's reluctance to move away from her father's household can be understood if we consider that elsewhere, she would be pressured away from her role as educator and into a purer agricultural-labor lifestyle. She had her first child, out-of-wedlock, in 1994. The child's father was a native of Aldeia São Sebastião but had relocated to Atalaia do Norte. Amélia had never made any serious efforts to move to where her husband was. The man eventually married another woman. In late 1997 she became pregnant again, again to a young man from Aldeia São Sebastião. This young man actually made repeated efforts to convince her to move to Aldeia São Sebastião. This, however, she was not inclined to do. Because of her unique gender role, she was under a lot of social pressure outside her father's *shovo*. The young man had shown no signs of supporting her role as educator; instead, he wanted her to focus more on traditional female roles. The prospects of moving to another village and giving up her sources of independent income did not appeal to Amélia. Amélia was helped by her supportive father. Her father was against forced marriage, as I explained earlier in this chapter. Her father would allow her to leave if she wanted to, but he wanted her to remain because he valued her as a bilingual schoolteacher and health assistant. Hence, Amélia had the full support of her father against all pressures to virilocal marriage. Since the young man did not wish to move upstream to Aldeia Maronal, no marriage had been consummated by the time I left; Amélia's second child, like her first, was born out of wedlock. The point of this example is to show that individuals as well as leaders struggle to establish residential arrangements that favor

them. In this case, the individuals involved (Amélia and her young lover) wanted contradictory results. Amélia's father José was clearly supportive of ultimate uxorilocality for his daughter; in this sense he was aiming to combine his daughter's uxorilocality with the virilocality of his married son.

The case of José's second daughter, Tsainama, shows even more clearly the stresses which accompany efforts to combine female uxorilocality with male virilocality. Unlike Amélia, Tsainama adhered to a traditional gender role. She did not aspire to an education or to bilingualism, to salaried professions, or to health-care training. Instead, she was drawn to the prospect of a good marriage and of success in a traditional sense. At an age of approximately 18, she entered a relationship with the youngest brother of the headman of Aldeia São Sebastião. That man—named Memãpa—was approved of by her father José and so the two were married as formally as can be in Marubo society. When I arrived in the field in July 1997, Tsainama and Memãpa were living at Aldeia São Sebastião and that is where I recorded them as being located in the census. But there were circumstances which place this attribution in doubt. Firstly, Memãpa had built a small hut (*tapo*) near José's *shovo*, which he claimed as his place of residence. Secondly, Memãpa himself told me that he lived at Aldeia Maronal with his wife's father. The trouble with the latter statement was that his wife's father said he lived at Aldeia São Sebastião, and that empirically, I observed that Memãpa did not, in fact, reside at Aldeia Maronal until early April 1998. In April, Memãpa arrived at Aldeia Maronal, adopted uxorilocal residence in the *tapo* he had built, and proceeded to contribute economically to his wife's father's household until my departure in July.

Diverse forces tugged at Tsainama and Memāpa, leading them into diverse residential arrangements during my fieldwork experience. Firstly we should consider Memāpa's family situation at Aldeia São Sebastião. Memāpa was the youngest of four brothers of the Ranenáwavo lineage who moved from Aurélio's *shovo* to the FUNAI post on the Curuçá River in the mid-1970s. The oldest of these, Shetāpa (b. 1952) became the consensus-appointed headman of Aldeia São Salvador and of its later manifestation, Aldeia São Sebastião. The middle brothers, Penāpa (b. 1955) and Nākēpa (b. 1960), both resided at Aldeia São Sebastião with their wives and children. By the time the youngest brother, Memāpa (b. 1965) married, the other three already had established families, swiddens, and permanent residences. On the other hand, Memāpa was in a phase of residential flux. As is so common among young Marubo men, he was engaging in frequent journeys downstream with the objective of making money among the *náwa* (*náwa*= non-indigenous persons). Among the activities he engaged in for money were hunting, fishing for *pirarucu*, and piloting boats into indigenous territory. When he married Tsainama, he continued wandering up- and downstream in search of money-making opportunities. It was in that condition that I encountered him. Memāpa could choose among multiple options for residence.

To leaders with a close relationship to him, Memāpa was an attractive prospective coresident. He was a fully adult male in good health, with a young wife who would probably have numerous children over the years. Memāpa was an excellent hunter, one of the deadliest tapir-trackers at Aldeia Maronal. When most men were sleeping after the day's agricultural labor, he enjoyed late-night agouti hunts—a character trait which endeared him to everyone around him. He spoke fluent Portuguese, worked hard at

everything he did, and occasionally made money through his contacts in the non-indigenous world. When he settled at Aldeia Maronal, it was not long before his brothers were asking him to come settle at Aldeia São Sebastião. Speaking over the CIVAJA radio, his brothers told him they were overwhelmed by agricultural tasks and that they needed him at Aldeia São Sebastião. They asked him to come down as soon as he could. But he refused, saying he had to first help his wife's father clean the weeds out of a recently planted swidden that was ready for its first corn harvest. This weeding was a major task. When I asked him about his residential choice, he said that his wife's father José did not want Tsainama to go elsewhere; he wanted Tsainama at home, with his other daughters. This tells us that José was exerting pressure over the couple to maintain uxorilocal residence. Against this was the pressure of Memãpa's brothers to go downstream, and the attraction of the non-indigenous world and its money. As of July 1998, José had won this tug-of-war and Memãpa seemed established in uxorilocal marriage. It is clear that José's pressure alone cannot explain the end result. I do not think José could have prevented Memãpa and Tsainama from settling at Aldeia São Sebastião if that was what they wanted. The couple had a choice, and they chose Aldeia Maronal. In this, I think that Tsainama was instrumental. The case of Amélia, and (earlier this chapter) the case of Mema show that José's *shovo* was a sort of safe haven for women who did not feel comfortable elsewhere. From a female perspective, José had managed to make his *shovo* a very attractive place to be. It is unlikely that Tsainama would prefer to live anywhere else. The strong attraction of Amélia and Tsainama to their natal homes can be understood in the context of a broader Marubo social trend, indicated in Chapter Four—the centripetal attraction of the uterine family and its effect

on female residential movements. The entire phenomenon of anicular residence involves the re-formation of the uterine family by divorced and widowed women. This shows that the uterine family exerts a strong hold on women even after long years of coresidence with the husband's kin. Therefore, José's ability to obtain Memãpa's uxorilocality was almost certainly predicated on his daughter's preference for that outcome. Indeed, Tsainama considered Aldeia Maronal her home and went there when she fell ill with malaria. With Tsainama frequently returning home, José could be assured that Memãpa would frequently return, too. In the end, it seems that Memãpa also came to see Aldeia Maronal as the better place to be. Whether Memãpa would remain uxorilocal or not remains to be seen. The point, again, is to show how individuals find themselves caught in tugs-of-war between leaders, and find themselves with the ability to choose among competing options for residence.

The examples just presented show that individuals can sometimes control their own postmarital residence, but other times their ability to produce a desirable outcome is curtailed. Likewise, leaders can sometimes but not always control postmarital residence to benefit themselves by enlarging the group. Sinãpa exploited the scarcity and value of his sole available daughter, together with his own high political status, to attempt to retain her in uxorilocal marriage when even the headman's own daughters went away into virilocality. This created a barrier around her which only the headman's son had been able to approach piercing. In this way, Sinãpa's efforts to combine uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons produced a slew of frustrated suitors. Amélia's suitor was not able to control postmarital residence, either. This man, whom I will refer to as P., was not able to convince Amélia to move, nor was he able to convince Amélia's

father to pressure her to move. On the contrary, Amélia's father seemed to support her remaining. This is consistent with José's attitude towards Amélia's younger sister Tsainama. In the case of Tsainama, we have Memāpa's explicit statement that José wanted her to stay in her natal residence. This shows that José was actively endeavoring to retain his daughters in uxorilocal marriage, as well as his sons in virilocal marriage. Just as in the case of Amélia, José seemed poised to secure Tsainama's uxorilocality, but in the case of Tsainama, José succeeded in attracting her husband, as well (in contrast, P. did not want to move to Aldeia Maronal). In this zero-sum game, José and his daughters succeeded in controlling outcomes while Aldeia São Sebastião lost residents and potential residents.

The examples covered so far allow us to confirm the existence of interpersonal control mechanisms in the field of dynamic tensions surrounding postmarital residence. I here return to the concept of human being 1 controlling human being 2 by controlling access to something human being 2 thinks they want or need. In this case, the resource that is controlled is a woman, and the human thereby controlled is a man who wants that woman. Under the rubric of 'woman' there are two values to be considered. Firstly, the desire for sex exists, along with social systems for controlling access to satisfaction of that desire. But it is not simply a biological desire for sex which is at stake; it is also a social desire for marriage. We have seen (Chapter Eight) that marriage is not just an end in itself, but also a means—the *only* means—of accessing a number of cherished Marubo social goals. Political power, influence, and status are not available to the unmarried because bachelors are unable to demonstrate their skill as leaders through organization of feasts. Even autonomy is impossible to exercise alone. This is because of the gender-

based division of labor. The minimum independent residential unit (the *shovo*) requires at least a nuclear family; there is no case of a man building and living in a *shovo* alone. There is strong evidence that the ability to exercise residential autonomy is highly valued in Marubo society. In Chapter Five I noted that one of the motives for residential movements was the desire for independence, and I cited examples of people moving because they wanted their own place. To access this basic value, a Marubo man must first marry. It is conceivable that a set of unmarried brothers could raise a *shovo*, or that an arrangement mirroring that between husband and wife (i.e. a brother and sister or even a man and his mother) could substitute for an actual marriage, but the empirical fact is that new *shovo* are built at minimum by a nuclear family, and usually by several nuclear families together. In addition to status and autonomy we should note that women produce children who become a labor force, and since a labor force cannot typically be hired among Marubo due to the paucity of money, the consideration that women are one way to potentially obtain a labor force is a very important one. Access to marriage is thus the gateway for access to numerous other valued goals. Hence my statement that controlling access to a woman desired by a man means more than just controlling access to sexual desire; it means also controlling access to a host of social desires, all of them very cherished. I noted that Sināpa used the value of his daughter to try to break the virilocal pattern of Aldeia Maronal. I also noted that the relationship between a man and his daughter is essential in this sense, because if a woman wants to leave there is little chance of preventing her from eloping. But if a girl prefers to stay in the natal home, then the outcome of postmarital residence is more likely to be determined by her father than by the husband. This control mechanism is far from iron-clad. The ability to control

a man's postmarital residence by having a strong hold on one's daughter is a difficult ability to exercise and one which is definitely subject to challenge and failure. But it is an identifiable control mechanism nevertheless. I will return to this issue later in this chapter when I evaluate the extent to which institutionalized yet non-force-based power exists in the social processes of the political economy of people.

In order to ensure that statements on this matter can be generalized to refer to 'Marubo society', I will now examine significant cases of postmarital residence on the Ituí River. The crucial fact about postmarital residence on the Ituí, as already mentioned, is that the proportion of uxorilocal marriages is relatively high—31.6 % of Ituí marriages are uxorilocal ($n=76$), as against 4.5 % of Curuçá marriages ($n=66$). A chi-square test indicates a high degree of significance for these differences, with $p<.001$. Uxorilocality has political consequences. It introduces a man in between the *shovo*-owner and his sons—the son-in-law—and that man often takes over the political succession, which often leads to the sons' departure. What interests us here are not the *consequences* of uxorilocality, however, but rather the politics of the event itself. We have seen that uxorilocality on the Curuçá River is a rare event, and is an outcome valued by leaders for whom combining uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons represents the acme of success in control of postmarital residence. Why are men willing to enter uxorilocality on the Ituí but not on the Curuçá? To address this issue, I will discuss the social characteristics of uxorilocally married men on the Ituí River.

The prime example of uxorilocal social composition on the Ituí River is the *shovo* of Vimipa at Aldeia Agua Branca. In 1974, this village was led by an elder named Ako. Ako died in the years between censuses. When I arrived in early 1998, Ako's daughters'

husband Vimipa had become the leader, while Ako's sons had formed independent residences elsewhere. Vimipa's marriage to Ako's daughters can be dated to 1960. In the 1974 census, Vimipa is shown married to two of Ako's daughters—Maya (b. 1941) and Inokapi (birthdate unknown). By 1998, however, only Maya remained. I was unable to locate Inokapi or her children in the 1997-98 census data. However, although Vimipa was monogamous by 1997, the data indicate that he was polygynous to begin with. His daughters by Maya, Vó and Memi, were born in October 1960 and February 1963, respectively, which is why Vimipa's marriage can be dated to 1960. In 1960, the Ituí-Curuçá split had not yet occurred and all Marubo lived in the headwaters of the affluents of the Curuçá. According to informants, there were five *shovo* at that time: João Tuxáua, Domingo, Ernesto, Júlio, and Dionísio. This prefigures the Curuçá-Ituí split, as the inhabitants of the first two would mostly stay behind when the split occurred c. 1964, whereas the inhabitants of the latter three mainly wound up on the Ituí. Vimipa is a son of João Tuxáua. Vimipa's mother was the daughter of Rane, the sole male survivor of the Kariya massacre (see Chapter Eight). Available data indicate that Vimipa was that woman's only child. João Tuxáua had at least five wives in addition to Vimipa's mother, and several of them were more productive, so that João Tuxáua had at least 23 children. The most prominent uterine family to emerge from his six marriages was the Tamaoavo lineage including the future headman, Alfredo, as well as José Barbosa, José's coresident brother Pedro, and their older brother Zacarias. These four brothers would become a significant force in Marubo politics. Another of João Tuxáua's wives had three sons, one of whom (Vasho) became a *shovo*-owner in later years. João Tuxáua's last wife, named Vó, had at least six children. The point of citing these facts is to show that Vimipa and

his mother were relatively minor components of one of the largest and most prominent Marubo families. True, records indicate he is the oldest of João Tuxáua's known children (born in 1918, whereas Zacarias was born in 1921; but the dates on birth certificates of older men often are manipulated to make them seem older so that they can obtain pension benefits earlier, hence the three year difference between Zacarias and Vimipa is not completely certain), but the succession bypassed him as other women achieved more prominence. Zacarias and Alfredo married virilocally, but by 1960 Vimipa had married uxorilocalily, and when the Curuçá-Ituí split occurred, he went to the Ituí. What we have here, then, is a case of movement towards greener pastures. At home, despite his seniority, Vimipa was bypassed in the political succession first by Zacarias, who was originally slated to succeed João Tuxáua, then by Alfredo. Instead of benefiting from his father's prominence to enter virilocal polygyny, as Alfredo managed to do, Vimipa had to enter uxorilocal residence to obtain polygyny. In all likelihood, the position of uxorilocal polygyny he was offered seemed very appealing. Not only did he get two wives, which he otherwise probably could not have done, but he also became next-in-line for political succession when his wife's father established independent residence on the Ituí River, since he was much older than his wives' brothers. Vimipa seized the opportunity for polygyny and high status which were not available to him in his natal coresident network.

The two daughters of Vimipa and Maya, Vó and Memi, were married by 1972 to a man named Wakanawa. In the 1974 census, Wakanawa is listed as living in the *shovo* of Mariano (precursor to Aldeia Paraná), with Memi. The older sister, Vó, was living with her father Vimipa in the *shovo* of Vimipa's wife's father Ako, along with two children she had already mothered with Wakanawa. This appears to be an arrangement

similar to that later practiced by Wasinawa. Wasinawa married into uxorilocal polygyny; when he later moved to the Curuçá, he could only bring one wife with him; the other wife and her children stayed behind. Thus, in 1974 Wakanawa had one wife with him but the other wife and his two children remained at his wife's father's place. When I visited in 1998, Wakanawa lived with both his wives and nine children in Vimipa's *shovo*. The final outcome of the marriage was a permanent arrangement of uxorilocal polygyny. To understand why Wakanawa found this arrangement attractive, we should consider Wakanawa's natal coresident network. Wakanawa's father, Mastópapa, had incorporated an uxorilocally married daughter's husband into his coresident network. That daughter's husband—hence Wakanawa's sister's husband—was a respected elder named Mariano (Portuguese name), or Vimipeia (birth name) or Shetápa (teknonymy, not to be confused with later headman of Aldeia São Sebastião). Mariano, born in 1930, was a widower. His first wife had borne Mariano four children, beginning with a son in 1948, before dying c. 1960. Mariano then remarried Mastópapa's daughter; he and his second wife were producing children by 1968. Together with Mariano, into uxorilocal residence with Mastópapa, came the former's children by his deceased wife. The oldest of Mariano's children—his son Sherópapa—was married with a son by 1967. The bulk of the *shovo* came to consist of Mariano's family. Mastópapa's own sons were relegated to the political periphery. Both Wakanawa (born c. 1947) and Saípapa (born c. 1950) were much younger than Mariano. As is common in these cases, as Mastópapa aged, the leadership of the *shovo* passed to his daughter's husband Mariano rather than to his own sons. Mastópapa died by 1983. By then, Wakanawa had gone into uxorilocal residence with Vimipa, and Wakanawa's brother Saípapa had gone downstream to the new Aldeia

Rio Novo by the FUNAI post on the middle Ituí. There are some parallels, then, between the social condition of Wakanawa c. 1974 and that of Vimipa c. 1960. Like Vimipa, Wakanawa was in a position where, despite being the eldest son of the erstwhile *shovo*-owner and leader, he was bypassed for leadership and status in favor of someone else. Like Vimipa, he found a situation of uxorilocal polygyny more appealing than any available or potentially available virilocal arrangement.

The pattern of uxorilocal *shovo* composition continued when two of Wakanawa's daughters were married to a man named Tae (Portuguese name=José Comapa) in 1994. Tae is the son of a woman named Rave and of Santiago Comapa. Rave is an elusive figure in the census and interview data. A daughter of the prominent elder Domingo, Rave defied Marubo social norms by practicing serial monogamy. At first she was formally married to Kamápa (José Nascimento velho), to whom she bore the future shaman, José Nascimento filho. At some point prior to the Ituí-Curuçá split, however, she left Kamápa to be with a non-indigenous man fleeing from a prison sentence. When the military intervened in the Mayoruna-Marubo clashes, they recognized this fellow as a wanted man and took him away to prison. Ronipa (the father of Mema, discussed earlier in this chapter) was the issue of that fleeting union. Rave then had further children by Kamápa. But she does not seem to have become permanently established with her first husband when the latter moved to the Ituí River, for by 1974 Rave was to be found in anicular residence with her daughter and her daughter's husband in Aurélio's *shovo* (anicular residence is the common pattern of Marubo residence involving an older divorced or widowed woman living with her married children after the latter have established residence away from their birthplace—see Chapter Four). In 1978, Melatti

recorded that she had moved downstream to the FUNAI post, where she had a brother. Whether up at Aurélio's *shovo* or later at the FUNAI post I do not know, but at some point she was with Santiago Comapa, and the result of that union was Tae. She had children by other fathers before dying in the late 1980s. Rave was the type of woman most Marubo men will deny even exists: independent to the last breath. The result of her independence was that her children—married and unmarried—were spread out across Marubo land. I encountered children of Rave from Aldeia São Sebastião up to Aldeia Maronal and across much of the upper Ituí. They had a strong identity as a family, and the meetings I observed among siblings seemed warm and even poignant. But the uterine family totally lacked residential cohesion. Unlike families which stay together as coresident groups over multiple generations, the uterine family of Rave lacked definitive male leadership and could not act as a group in arranging marriages. The sons of Rave, except for the eldest who was raised by his natural father, were basically left to themselves as far as finding wives is concerned. This explains, in part, Ronipa's lack of success in marriage. How exactly Tae came to marry Wakanawa's daughters I do not know; but when compared to his older brother Ronipa, Tae's uxorilocal polygyny seems a huge success. Tae is from a scattered, disjointed family with little political power. It is a family with no people-wealth, no residential focus and hence no corporate economic wealth. It is not difficult to see why he should be attracted to uxorilocal/sororal polygyny.

Vimipa, Wakanawa and Tae all took opportunities for high status and polygynous marriage which were not available to them in their natal coresident networks or uterine families. Politically, sexually, and socially, these three were better off where they wound

up than where they started if we consider their pre- and post-marriage conditions. All these movements are from less to more desirable coresident networks. Interestingly enough, this is so from both leader's and non-leader's perspectives. Vimipa was pleased to receive an uxorilocal in-marrier because this permitted him to retain his daughters, obtain an adult male worker, and expand his *shovo* demographically. Wakanawa was pleased because he obtained the highly desirable condition of polygyny and eventually succeeded to *de facto* leadership of the *shovo*. The same process was repeated in the next generation: Wakanawa retained his daughters by finding a man who was willing to move into uxorilocal polygyny. That man, Tae, benefited from a situation that brought him higher status and better marriage than anything his natal coresident group had to offer. Incidentally, Wakanawa also obtained virilocal marriage for his oldest son, so that he combined uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons, thus achieving the maximum level of control over postmarital residence.

The uxorilocal marriages at Aldeia Agua Branca share certain features, which can be turned into a hypothesis as to how such arrangements work, to be tested against further data. Specifically, it seems that men who have multiple daughters *over whose residence they are able to maintain control* can control the postmarital residence of men who, in their own social-residential background, have no way of obtaining multiple wives. This process has to do with manipulation of another man's frustrations and desires. Wanopa used Ronipa's almost pathological desire for a wife to obtain coresidence and labor assistance from him. Likewise, Vimipa, Vimipa's wife's father, and Wakanawa found men who were susceptible to the offer of uxorilocal polygyny. They did not seek to obtain the coresidence of men from main branches of prominent and successful families;

and certainly not of men with any chance at a political succession. Instead, they obtained the coresidence of overlooked men, men passed over by political successions, men from broken families. Could we say that this is a case of the socially wealthy controlling the socially poor? If we say that the presence of two marriageable daughters **adds** to a coresident network's people-as-wealth, that is, makes a coresident network **valuable** and hence **attractive**, and if we say that to a non-leader, a coresident network that contains no prospects for political autonomy or leadership, and no prospects for polygyny, is less valuable and less attractive than a network that does offer those possibilities, then we must conclude, given the available data, that in Marubo society the socially wealthy can exercise control over the postmarital residence of the socially less wealthy.

Unfortunately, while this is true of many cases, it is not true of all. There are many cases which contradict this hypothesis. These contrary cases suggest that while a substantial portion of Marubo postmarital residence cases are determined by the politics of relative social wealth, many other cases have to do with systems of marriage exchange predicated on the Marubo kinship structure. The cases which have to do with relative social wealth are processes in which inequalities among groups can be extended, for in the zero-sum game of postmarital residence when a coresident group manages to combine uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons, they are clearly removed from the exchange system since they are only taking and not giving. The contradictory cases, on the other hand, are processes in which inequalities among groups are levelled or at least prevented from expanding, since they involve the removal of personnel from larger, more powerful groups to smaller, less powerful groups.

A case which contradicts the hypothesis of social wealth controlling social poverty is that of Simão, mentioned in Chapter Four as uxorilocal lieutenant of the Vida Nova *shovo*-owner, Txumãpa. The position of Simão at Txumãpa's is typical of Ituí uxorilocality. Simão is intermediate in age between the elderly *shovo*-owner and the latter's adult sons. He is also intermediate in status. Unlike many other uxorilocal men, however, Simão is monogamous. To see how his marriage is different from those noted at Agua Branca, I will examine the characteristics of the social group he was born into with those of the group he married into. Simão is the son of Misael. Misael was, at the time of fieldwork, ailing (he would die in early 1999) but had been one of the top leaders and most respected elders of the Marubo nation. He had been involved in the Mayoruna-Marubo war, and is credited with a daring raid on a Mayoruna village. The 1974 census recorded Misael as living in a *shovo* with his uterine brother Wanõpa and their mutual father-in-law, Carlos. Both Misael and Wanõpa had been polygynous and had multiple uterine families descending from them. The children of Misael and Wanõpa were just beginning to marry: three were married but there were only two children yet. This coresident network relocated to the Curuçá River after the arrival of FUNAI; by 1978 the old habitations on the headwaters of the Curuçá's affluents had been abandoned, and Misael, Wanõpa and their families lived in a new site on the Curuçá itself. This coresident network remained intact until Wanõpa moved the *shovo* c. 1993. That movement occasioned a schism as some stayed behind, while two of Wanõpa's sons-in-law built independent residences. Nevertheless, from before 1974 until the early 1990s this was a successful, expanding, high-status Marubo group. After 1993, the coresident group split into four *shovo* (see figures 5.13-5.17). These four *shovo* had a total

population of 48 in 1998. Prior to the schism of 1993, the population was probably 38, a figure arrived at by subtracting recent marriages and young children. The population of the same group in 1974 was 24. The point of citing these figures is to show that this was a group undergoing steady demographic expansion from 1974 to 1993.

Txumãpa's coresident network clearly contrasts with that of Simão's father Misael. In 1974 Txumãpa resided with his wife and three children in the large *shovo* of Paulo at Aldeia Vida Nova. In 1978, that *shovo* had begun to break up as portions of it moved to independent residence while others moved downstream to the new FUNAI post on the middle Ituí. Shortly thereafter, almost the entirety of Paulo's *shovo*'s inhabitants moved downstream to Aldeia Rio Novo. Txumãpa did not join in this movement. Instead, he stayed behind and made an independent residence. By then Txumãpa had at least five children: two daughters and three sons. One of Txumãpa's daughters was by then married virilocally to a son of Misael on the Curuçá, a fact I will return to shortly. The rest were not married at the time of Melatti's visits. They were all married when I visited a generation later. The oldest children of Txumãpa's children were seventeen years old in January 1998, putting these marriages in 1980. There are two such marriages. Firstly, Misael's son Simão came into uxorilocal marriage with Txumãpa's daughter Txoko. Secondly, one of Txumãpa's sons, Shāko, married a daughter of Paulo (the owner of Txumãpa's former *shovo*) and retained her virilocally even after her father moved downstream (that marriage is not shown in figure 9.2 because it is not part of the exchange system that figure seeks to represent). Both these marriages produced children by 1980, so the marriages themselves can be dated to 1979 at the earliest (they are not shown in the 1978 census data). Therefore, when Simão arrived into uxorilocality,

Txumāpa's coresident group had a total size of six. It was a new group, freshly split off from a larger group. The group Simão came from, it has already been noted, had a size of 24 in 1974 and 38 in 1993. Therefore, Simão moved from a large, successful, high-status group consisting of multiple uterine families to a small group consisting of a single nuclear family. This case clearly contradicts the hypothesis derived from analyzing the Agua Branca data. In this case, it seems that the socially poor controlled the postmarital residence of the socially wealthy.


To approach an explanation for Simão's postmarital residence it is necessary to place it in the context of the other marital connections which linked Txumāpa's *shovo* to Wanōpa's, shown in figure 9.2. The first of these to occur was the marriage of Txumāpa's daughter Shonōpeko to Misael's son Panīpa (earlier this chapter I noted how upset she became when Panīpa tried to remarry in 1998). Panīpa's virilocal marriage took place before Paulo's departure downstream, when Txumāpa was still part of a larger coresident network. The second marriage to occur was that of Simão, which happened after Paulo's departure. Paulo also left behind a daughter as wife to one of Txumāpa's sons (Shāko). Thus, Txumāpa combined uxorilocality of a daughter with virilocality of a son to begin the expansion of his coresident network. By 1998, Simão had four children and Shāko had five residing at Txumāpa's, so the marriages consummated in 1979 or 1980 had proved a solid basis for demographic growth.

After the initial marital exchange (Shonōpeko to Wanōpa's, Simão to Txumāpa's), further links were established, but only one of these became permanent. Wanōpa's daughter Mema went into virilocal marriage with Txumāpa's son Mesha. Two other links were made. Misael's daughter Meto had, in 1998, an eight-year old daughter

named Peko. Meto was a single mother, living in her father's *shovo*. The 1995 census of Aldeia Maronal records the name of Peko's father as "Cildo", the Portuguese name of Mesha. Yet when I arrived in 1998, Mesha was married to Mema, and their oldest child was four-year old Kama. The most likely explanation for these data is that Mesha first married Meto, but Meto fled the marriage and returned to her natal home. Mesha was then compensated with Mema, with whom he managed to have at least four years of successful marriage by 1998. In addition to the unsuccessful marriage of Mesha and Meto, another unsuccessful marriage existed. When I elicited census data from Simão, I asked about Txumāpa's son Tama. Tama was absent in Manaus, I was told. Was he married, I asked. The reply was that he was married to Wanōpa's daughter. But another informant told me this girl had left her husband. No children of that marriage are recorded. There was an unmarried daughter of Wanōpa named Meto at Aldeia Maronal, and it could be this one that is referred to as 'leaving' Tama, but the attribution is uncertain. What is certain is that two marriage links were attempted but failed because the women resisted. Three other marriage links succeeded, one resulting in a woman going to Wanōpa's, one resulting in a man going to Txumāpa's, and one resulting in a woman going to Txumāpa's. On the other hand, a woman that was supposed to go to Txumāpa's son remained at home, and her child by Txumāpa's son remained at Wanōpa's *shovo*.

Based on these observations, it is safe to say that the movements of personnel between the *shovo* of Wanōpa and of Txumāpa constitute a marriage exchange system. Furthermore, this system has had the effect of levelling differences among groups. Consider that two marriage partners have gone from Wanōpa's to Txumāpa's, and the

FIGURE 9.2.: Marriage exchanges between *shovo* of Wanõpa and of Txumãpa.



1. Misael
2. Wanõpa
3. Wano
4. Txumãpa
5. Txoko
6. Shonõpeko
7. Mesha
8. Tama
9. Meto
10. Mema
11. Meto
12. Panõpa
13. Simão
14. Kama
15. Maya
16. Pena
17. Peko
18. Paishi
19. Isãtapa
20. Vote
21. Vimi
22. Kene
23. Vina
24. Unnamed infant
25. Maya

children of these two marriages total seven, so the positive balance for Txumāpa is nine. On the other side, Wanōpa's group has received one woman who had four children, and has kept a child of Txumāpa's son Mesha, for a positive balance of six. Numerically, Txumāpa's group has received more, and it did so from a starting point of numerical inferiority. But if we consider the *impact* of the exchanges, the positive effect on Txumāpa's *shovo* has been tremendous. By combining virilocality of his sons with uxorilocality of a daughter, Txumāpa has moved from having a tenuous, small independent group in 1980 to having a *shovo* of 21 people filled with growing children (12 residents under 18 years of age). The exchanges with Wanōpa have permitted Txumāpa to thrive as a leader, and have permitted his coresident group to grow.

Analysis of the structural characteristics of the Marubo kinship system should lead us to expect more situations such as that of Txumāpa and Wanōpa, and less situations such as that at Agua Branca. In Chapter Eight I demonstrated that the Marubo kinship system has the property of distributing growth equally among its component exogamous units. In the same chapter, I presented Figure 8.5., which diagrams the results of an exchange system following pure Kariera-type characteristics, covering five generations at Aldeia Vida Nova. Given its formal characteristics, the ideal result of the Marubo kinship system is precisely a set of exchange systems which act to distribute people-wealth evenly. But I concluded Chapter Eight with an analysis of changes in population of coresident groups between 1974 and 1998. I found that whereas the kinship system acted to prevent development of inequalities among exogamous kinship units, it did not prevent the development of inequalities among residential units. Here we can begin to see the explanation for that datum: postmarital residence does not always adhere

to the ideal patterns deduced from the kinship system's formal qualities. True, the types of configurations we might predict from looking at the system's formal qualities do in fact occur—exemplary manifestations of Kariera-type exchange—but they do not constitute the majority of Marubo social configurations. The majority of configurations are variants which, while not ideal, are not violations of the ideal either. They are possibilities exercised in the room for maneuver left open by the structure. The combination of female uxorilocality with male virilocality is quite evidently a deviation from norms of exchange. It is also, as we have seen, a goal pursued by a number of leaders, only some of whom have fully succeeded. Efforts to control postmarital residence form part of many leaders' strategies for expansion of the coresident group.

Deviation from the exchange system can be desirable to some people. On the other hand, adherence to the exchange system can also be desirable. Deviation has benefited Vimipa and Wakanawa; adherence has benefited Txumāpa and the three *shovo* diagrammed in Figure 8.5. Postmarital residence is not rigidly determined by the rules. Many people value the kinship norms very highly and endeavor to adhere to them strictly. Many people find great benefit in the exchange systems which are produced by adherence to kinship norms. But postmarital residence is a field subject to many interpersonal tensions. The desire of one leader to expand his coresident network clashes with the same desire in another leader; the desire of a man to bring a woman home clashes with the woman's desire to stay home; the desire of a father to arrange a marriage and thereby establish an advantageous exchange system clashes with the daughter's desire to avoid the man she is being married off to; or there is the opposite of conflict, as when a man's desire for high status and polygyny coincides with another man's desire to retain his

daughters and attract a son-in-law. The efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of postmarital residence events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which the outcome conflicts with their goals, creates a situation in which control of postmarital residence, far from being automatically determined by structural norms, is subject to being determined by the outcome of specific interpersonal interactions.

Leaders are clearly attempting to control postmarital residence in order to make their groups larger and the inequalities which have developed among groups between 1974 and 1998 reflect differing levels of success in this sense (though there are other means than control of postmarital residence to make one's group larger—see below). Success in the political micro-game of postmarital residence control is a sort of bypass of the limitation of the kinship system, namely that no group can grow at the expense of another. Nobody in Marubo land is trying to violate the explicit rules of the system. The methods displayed at Aldeia Agua Branca, however, are a simple means of accumulating personnel at other groups' expense without violating kinship rules. Thus, situations which contradict expectations based on formal analysis of Marubo kinship occur when postmarital residence is not regulated by norms but rather determined by the result of sets of events involving the resolution of tensions between persons and/or groups with conflicting goals.

The data on postmarital residence thus show two distinct patterns which affect this chapter's hypotheses in different ways. There are exchange systems, and there are non-exchange postmarital residence events. The exchange systems contradict the hypothesis that there are inequalities in power resulting from inequalities in social wealth associated with the political economy of people. These systems are manifestations of the

ideals inherent to the kinship system. There is a set of values which underlies the kinship system, and when those values are strictly adhered to, as I described in Chapter Eight, Kariera-type exchange systems occur. These systems are thought of as highly desirable by those involved in them because by means of adherence to the system they obtain autonomy in marriage partner supply and they secure future group growth. These systems allow the demographically smaller to gain ground on the demographically larger. They allow the socially weak to get something from the socially strong, even if that something must be repaid. Strict adherence to Marubo kinship norms might be expected to produce a situation where all differences among groups are levelled and social wealth never allows one to control postmarital residence of others. But the ideal norms are also difficult to enact; individuals and groups often lack the wherewithal or simply lack the desire to create such a complex and delicate system of social relationships. Many other social configurations can be produced which are not ideal, but neither are they explicit violations of the kinship values. Many of the resulting configurations are not exchange systems at all, but rather agglomerations of unrelated postmarital residence events. Non-exchange configurations do result in exacerbation rather than levelling of demographic inequalities among groups. In the these configurations' formation processes, we can see the socially wealthy controlling the postmarital residence of the socially poor; these cases therefore confirm the hypothesis that there are inequalities in power resulting from inequalities in social wealth associated with the political economy of people.

The observation of two distinct patterns also affects the broader hypothesis of Marubo social egalitarianism. Before we get carried away with the notion that the exchange configurations demonstrate structural egalitarianism because they show that the

system acts to level differences among groups, we should consider the essential premise of exchange systems: control over women. The stricter adherence to an exchange system is, the less room for maneuver is available to women. Hence Wanõpa, who was involved in an exchange system with Txumãpa, firmly believed that men should control women's residential destiny. Ronipa attempted to give his daughter Mema to Wanõpa's brother's son and hoped to receive Wanõpa's brother's son's daughter at some future point; he was thus in a position where he was trying to set up an exchange system and that system would benefit him. Ronipa, too, endorsed male control of female residence. On the other hand, José Barbosa was employing a strategy of encouraging his daughters to be uxorilocal, which required him to support them in decisions not to follow their husbands into virilocal residence (this strategy on the part of José was reported to me by the husband of his second daughter, who told me that he could not permanently remove his wife from Maronal because "José wanted his daughters nearby"). To Wanõpa, a woman who refuses to go where she is told to is a catastrophe; for José it is a boon. It is true that classic definitions of egalitarianism are not falsified by the discovery of inequalities in power between men and women. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that those areas of Marubo society regulated by Lévi-Straussian exchanges where inequalities among groups cannot develop are also those where male control over women is most total; and the areas where society deviates from the exchange system, where inequalities among men occur, develop and are exacerbated, are also the areas where women have the most room for maneuver.

Women's resistance to control over their postmarital residence can be considered another piece of evidence showing that the political economy of people is a reality to

non-leaders. Women's resistance to control was first noted as a broad social pattern in Chapter Four. In table 4.15 I compiled data on residence of unwed minors which showed that a quarter of all children at Aldeia Maronal are children of single parents. In seeking to explain this datum I came across 13 cases of single mothers at Aldeia Maronal, eleven of whom had never married, whereas two were divorced. Now consider this next to the total number of marriages at Aldeia Maronal, compiled for Table 9.1. That total is 41, each representing a distinct woman involved in a reproductive (or potentially so) relationship with a man. The total number of such women in the village is thus 54. Of the total number of women in the village who are involved in a reproductive (or potentially so) relationship with a man, the percentage of single mothers is thus 24% (13/54). Not all single mothers have actively resisted postmarital arrangements. Some had children resulting from brief encounters which were never intended to lead to marriage. But some are cases of active resistance, as for example Meto, the daughter of Misael who was married to Txumāpa's son, had a daughter, but returned to her natal *shovo*, thus disrupting an exchange system which Wanōpa (Meto's father's brother) was establishing with Txumāpa. Another case was Amélia, who resisted her lover's efforts to bring her into virilocal marriage. Anicular residence is also a manifestation of independent female residential choice. Presented in Chapter Four, cases of anicular residence are ones in which women who were once separated from their children by marital arrangements are reunited later in life. For example, at Aldeia Maronal there was a divorced woman who had moved from her husband's old village—Aldeia Rio Novo—to reside with her two married daughters and her sons-in-law (who themselves had attracted the daughters to virilocal marriage). In other cases on the Ituí River, old women

act as foci to attract daughters and sons who are dissatisfied with their marital residential configuration. For example, when I visited the *shovo* of Pekōpapa at Aldeia Vida Nova a resident bemoaned the fact that after Pekōpapa's brother's death, the man's widows left the *shovo* to rejoin their uterine families, and the widows took all their children with them. Pekōpapa's *shovo* was involved in a Kariera-type exchange system, therefore was one emphasizing male control over women, therefore one which women would have an incentive to resist remaining in. Once the marriage is ended by death, they leave; they are immunized by age from being further subjected to arranged marriage. The important thing to note here is that phenomena of women exercising resistance to control over their postmarital residence are also incidents of effort by individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of residence-change events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which the outcome of such events conflicts with their goals, which is exactly the type of event I believe constitutes the political economy of people as a social reality.

The data on postmarital residence support the hypothesis that a political economy of people is a reality to Marubo non-leaders. The political economy of people is a hypothetical set of social interactions. It exists in reality if people are valued as wealth and if people actively seek to attain that value, thereby producing a concrete, observable social system centered on the pursuit of people-as-wealth. To ascertain whether or not this hypothesis could be confirmed for Marubo non-leaders, I first sought to identify what types of Marubo social configuration are considered to have more value than others. I thought that if I could do this, I would *ipso facto* prove that Marubo value people-as-wealth. Unfortunately, the data proved my thinking to be overly simplistic. I have found it impossible to identify any particular Marubo social configuration as being always more

valuable than another. Value judgements regarding the attractiveness of other social configurations are relative to the social context of the person judging, and idiosyncratic criteria seem common. Thus, avuncular arrangements are most consistent with the Marubo kinship structure and the value system underlying it; but if we consider this the highest value then our concept of value has no predictive power because only a tiny minority of Marubo residential arrangements are precisely avuncular. Virilocal arrangements are more common but if we think that because they are the most common then they are also the most appealing we would wrong because I have shown that individuals in virilocal systems attempt to switch over to combined uxorilocality and virilocality, thus suggesting that uxorilocal arrangements are most valuable. Yet the very same man (José Barbosa) who tries to make other men uxorilocal with respect to his daughter would not contemplate uxorilocality himself; he exercised postmarital neolocality for the sake of the political independence and personal autonomy he thus enjoyed. Women seem to like anicular arrangements for the same reasons. And José himself once told me that avuncular systems were the way things should be; he himself had once had an avuncular-type *shovo* but his classificatory sister's sons later chose to exercise residential independence rather than staying with José and his 'ideal' social configuration.

The impossibility of isolating any one of the many Marubo social forms as more valuable than others should not prevent confirmation of the existence of a political economy of people among Marubo non-leaders. My goal has been to show that people are valued as wealth. I argued that for leaders, individuals were prized as wealth, but that for non-leaders entire coresident groups could be considered wealth. The phrasing of my

question (do people value people as wealth?) led me to explore the concept of value, and I found that while the Marubo do have ideas about relative value of different kinds of social configuration, I could not specify any order of value that was commonly agreed upon, nor could I connect ideal values to observed actions. But I argue that the data thus far presented show that the Marubo value certain types of social configuration, even if the relative value scale differs from individual to individual and over time and place. This still begs the question, are they valued in a way akin to the way monetary wealth is in our own society? To resolve this problem, I will consider what it is that monetary wealth does that makes it so attractive to us. This is in my opinion the crux of the political economy of people hypothesis. In our own society money is the means of acquiring things one does not already have but desires. Small amounts of money allow the purchase of specific objects. But more generally, a lot of money ('wealth') allows one personal autonomy, freedom from coercion and control on the part of others. Most people in our society have to follow orders and instructions given by others in order to acquire money, which they need to survive. The independently wealthy are not exempt from work, of course, as the maintenance and expansion of a fortune is often a very demanding task; but they do have much greater freedom from being told what to do, and much greater freedom in terms of the range of actions they can engage in, than do those lacking 'wealth'. And of course, the wealthy can not only buy objects, they can mobilize labor forces to produce objects, and if those objects are desirable to enough people, they will sell well and the wealth increases.

Now let us consider a moneyless economy with a paucity of inheritable material wealth. It is by no means a new idea (e.g., Arvelo-Jimenez 1971) that in such societies

where there is no money, the means of producing or acquiring things is by association with a human labor force. The means of acquiring and producing things are *people*. To a leader, his group is the means of production. Among the Marubo, coresident-group leaders allow the members of their group considerable latitude in day-to-day activities as long as food production remains satisfactory. But it is recognized that the *shovo*-owner is the one to mobilize and direct the group activities when it comes to extraordinary projects such as the acquisition of motors (requiring first the production of things for trade or sale) or the manufacture of a canoe or signal-drum. Having one's own *shovo* does not mean such objects can be produced independently of other *shovo*. They probably could, but Aldeia Maronal *shovo* owners almost always call upon the assistance of other *shovo* for large tasks, and feel that without multiple-*shovo* cooperation in labor the really big tasks, like cutting the airstrip, would be impossible. But what *shovo*-ownership does do is give the owner a type of autonomy akin to the autonomy of the wealthy in our own society: greater freedom from being told what to do relative to people who are not *shovo*-owners, and greater range of actions they can engage in (it is much easier for a *shovo*-owner to mobilize a labor force, and anything that requires a labor force is more easily possible for someone who has a mobilizable labor force than for someone who does not). For the Marubo have-nots, the non-leaders, the path to having begins with an acceptable marriage. One must first obtain a permanent partner of the opposite sex, a spouse; then begin having children.

With a spouse, a man can engage in activities which require involvement from both sides of the gender-based labor division. With children, a man can engage in activities which require organization of a labor force. A successful family man has the

option of raising his own *shovo* and attracting others to it, perhaps by attempted uxorilocality. In the data on postmarital residence we see individuals being drawn from their natal groups to other groups in pursuit of the fundamental basis of Marubo wealth: the marriage partner. Some of these movements are part of established systems in which the direction of individual movements is pre-established. But other movements are the result of efforts by individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of residence-change events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which the outcome of such events conflicts with their goals. In such efforts, the pursuit of value is usually clear. A member of the opposite sex is the basis of wealth (cf. Mentore 1987). To a man such as Tae at Agua Branca, moving into uxorilocal polygyny means moving from poverty to wealth. In most instances of postmarital residence—especially those which are not part of exchange systems—the mover is seeking that highly significant Marubo value, the fertile member of the opposite sex. Where exchange dictates the direction of movement, it is more so the elders who run the system than the individuals who are benefiting, but the game of value-maximization and conflict-minimization is still operating. Anicularity represents a slightly different case. It is difficult to argue that women move towards greater wealth/value if they divorce their husbands to move into coresidence with their sons-in-law. But it is clear that women have a limit as regards the amount of male control they will accept. Women value an economically and reproductively strong marriage, to be sure, but not if the cost in terms of personal autonomy is too great. Women value a coresident group in which they are not abused and are allowed to pursue independent goals (i.e., an education or a lover of their own choice). Many women's residential movements reflect this type of value. Thus, the data can still confirm that

non-leaders think of entire coresident networks as having different levels of value relative to one another and relative to the non-leader's individual goals, even if the definition of that value is not strictly economic or reproductive. I conclude that when efforts are made by individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of residence-change events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which the outcome of such events conflicts with their goals, such efforts demonstrate the valuation of people by people (both as individuals by leaders and as entire groups by non-leaders) and, even more clearly, that that value is actively pursued resulting in a system of social interactions which we can call the political economy of people. Leaders' efforts to control postmarital residence, women's efforts to escape strict male control, and men's efforts to maximize the value obtained through postmarital residence change, all form part of this politico-economic system based on people being drawn towards other people. Residence changes occur not so much because someone sees another *place* as more desirable than the one they are currently located in; rather, they move because of the *people* they live with or are going to live with.

To finish the proof of existence of the political economy of people, I will cover one more category of data, namely that of group movements, in order to determine whether these data support or falsify the hypothetical existence of the political economy of people system. I have already mentioned that the database on Marubo residential movements covers 602 individual moves. Of these, 142 are postmarital residence-change events. Individual moves *not* linked to marriage total 15. Group movements total 45 events which account for 445 persons moving from one place to another. These movements have already been described in detail in Chapter Five. Here it is only

necessary to evaluate their impact on the political economy of people hypothesis.

Specifically, in the conclusions to Chapter Five I summarized the data on why groups of people move from place to place. Are those causes of movement consistent with the existence of a political economy of people?

The data on Marubo group moves show that Marubo groups have repeatedly moved for the same reasons. Those reasons were broken down into categories. These categories were: (1) ecological reasons, such as soil and game depletion, (2) external warfare and conflict, (3) internal conflict, (4) attraction to non-indigenous presence in indigenous land, (5) attraction to superior health, transportation, communications, and education facilities, (6) response to invitations to move by respected elders, (7) desire for independence, and (8) attraction to members of the opposite sex, patterned by systems of postmarital residence. This last category has already received discussion; the others must now get their turn.

Movements which have ecological causes are not part of the political economy of people. Movements linked to ecological causes are made when a physical location is no longer acceptable, and a relocation to a more desirable location is made. It is not a movement from a less to a more desirable coresident network, but rather from a less to a more desirable place. These moves do not show valuation and movement towards human resources; therefore they do not provide support for the political economy of people hypothesis. Seven group movements accounting for 47 person-moves fall into this category. This category incorporates 15.6% of group-move events (7/45) and 10.6% of person-moves in the group-move category (47/445). These values were obtained by first counting the total number of residential changes discernible in census data from 1974 to

1998, then eliciting emic statements of the motivation for those moves. There were 45 events involving the movement of groups and in these 45 events, 445 individuals changed residence. For seven of the 45 events, informants gave ecological reasons (soil or game depletion) as the cause of the move. These seven ecologically-caused moves accounted for 47 people changing residence (out of the total of 445 people involved in group moves during the period in question).

External warfare does not seem to form part of the causes which propel the political economy of people, either. Moves made in response to external conflict may not result in a change of coresident networks. These moves are basically the flight from non-indigenous people during the rubber boom, and the move to the Ituí after the clash with Mayoruna. In both these cases coresident groups relocated as intact as possible from one place to another. Therefore, these moves do not have to do with the qualities of the coresident network moved to or from. These moves do not form part of the numerical database on residential movements because they occurred prior to 1974 and so cannot be quantified due to the lack of census data.

The first category of data that may be consistent with the political economy of people hypothesis is that of residential moves due to internal conflict. Here it is necessary to recall the system suggested by Mentore (1987) for analysis of Amazonian social wealth. Mentore argues that a Waiwai leader's wealth "is deemed to be the reality of his social relationships as they are manifest in kinship and marriage" (1987:517). This web of social relationships, constituting a man's social wealth, can be evaluated by looking at the household in terms of "the size of the household, the categories of people constituting each household, the quality of their relationships, and the household's

subsistence and productive capacity" (Mentore 1987:517). The issue of internal group conflict relates to the issue of quality of relationships. Mentore does not specify what he means by this phrase. But it is clear from my observations of Marubo households that the presence of conflictive relations makes a coresident network unattractive, both to those who are in it and to those who are considering a move. So much do Marubo, in my experience, disapprove of internal conflict that they are very reluctant to discuss it. In fact, I am convinced that cases of internal conflict were highly underreported in my research. The only confirmed case of internal conflict motivating a group movement was in the 1960s split that led to the resettlement of the Ituí River. Interpreting this event in terms of the concepts now at our disposal, it could be said that the Ituí split was a response to an unattractive social network (one containing conflict between its residents) to a more attractive social network (one where internal conflict is absent). If it is true that a household's wealth can be evaluated partly in terms of the quality of the member's relationships, then a move from a network with conflict to create a network without conflict means a move from a poorer to a richer social network. This particular case is unclear for several reasons, namely (1) the move occurred before census data was available, so it cannot be quantified; (2) conflict with the Mayoruna was also cited as a cause of this move, so that as well as the people they were going to live with (people who weren't setting off poison dust-clouds in their huts) the move had to do with the *place* they were going to live in (further away from the Mayoruna, and with fewer blackflies). When residence-shifters move because of the *people* they are going to live with, then the shift is a result of people moving from a less to a more desirable coresident network, which provides support for the existence of a political economy of people. The Marubo

move to the Ituí is only partially supportive of the political economy of people hypothesis. More solid evidence comes from analysis of those residential changes which revolve around attraction to non-indigenous presence in indigenous land.

One of the major reasons why groups of Marubo have relocated over the past 35 years has been to move closer to locations where non-indigenous people have settled on indigenous land. There have been four such locations in the recent past—two FUNAI posts, one on the middle Curuçá, one on the middle Ituí; and two missions, one on the middle Ituí established by the 1960s, another, on the upper Curuçá, not established until the 1990s. The moves to FUNAI posts are most easily quantifiable. Between 1974 and 1990, at least seven groups totalling 56 people moved from the upper Curuçá to the FUNAI post at the Igarapé São Salvador on the middle Curuçá. In the same time period, eight groups totalling 49 people moved from the upper Ituí to the FUNAI post on the middle Ituí. These two categories thus account for fifteen group moves (33.3% of the total group moves recorded) totalling 105 individual moves (23.6% of persons moving as part of groups). The main incentive for these moves was access to money and to non-indigenous trade goods, although the prospect of access to non-indigenous health care was another incentive. That this should be a cause of residential movements is not surprising. Consider the 1974 *shovo* of Aurélio on the upper Curuçá. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Aurélio's *shovo* had been located on the far upper Curuçá in order to facilitate the rubber trade. The residents of that *shovo* carried rubber on their backs to markets in Acre, then returned with desirable merchandise. When FUNAI arrived on the Curuçá, the residents of Aurélio's *shovo* relocated because the FUNAI post offered prospects for easier access to the goods which they were working hard to obtain through

the rubber trade. Informants state that FUNAI painted a rosy picture of perpetual access to trade goods, one which of course would prove false over the long term. But in the short term, that picture painted by FUNAI led to a third of the group relocations recorded in the data.

Among the most striking features of the group moves to FUNAI posts is that these are almost invariably what I have termed ‘follower-led moves’. When the *shovo* of Aurélio relocated to the Igarapé São Salvador, it did not do so as a single unit under its owner’s command. Instead, three groups of people left of their own volition, leaving the owner with an economically unviable residence. After his followers had relocated on their own, Aurélio finally moved. Likewise, when Aldeia Rio Novo was established by the FUNAI post on the middle Ituí, most of its population came from Paulo’s *shovo* at Aldeia Vida Nova. However, Paulo was not the first to move away; in fact at least two groups left Paulo’s *shovo*, eventually to wind up at the FUNAI post, before Paulo himself decided to move. Like Aurélio, by the time Paulo decided to relocate, his *shovo* had been relieved of the bulk of its population. What this means is that the moves made towards FUNAI posts clearly demonstrate the exercise of choice on the part of the movers. This is not a case of leaders determining that large groups will relocate intact. On the contrary, this is a case of non-leaders making individual choices to move to a more desirable situation. Already, members of these social networks were located for easy access to non-indigenous groups; they relocated to make that access easier. To understand the significance of these data, it is necessary to also take into account the cases of groups moving from independent residence to Aldeia Maronal in the 1990s.

As described in Chapter Five, Aldeia Maronal was founded by its current headman, Alfredo, in the 1980s. Alfredo agreed that relocation to the main course of the Curuçá was useful in order to gain access to non-indigenous goods and services, but instead of moving to an existing locus of non-indigenous residence, he founded an independent residence and brought the non-indigenous people to him. After he had the airstrip built, he invited missionaries to come to his village. The presence of the missionaries became a catalyst for at least two group relocations. Wanõpa and José Barbosa each relocated their coresident groups from their previous, independent locations to become part of Aldeia Maronal. These two moves (4.4% of the total group moves) involved 28 people (6.3% of people involved in group moves). What is interesting about these movements is that in both cases the movers decided that it was better to be part of a social network that includes access to non-indigenous goods and services than to be part of a network that is separate from others but has no such access. In other words, to these movers independence was not as important as access to the non-indigenous world. This indicates that one of the qualities of a social network that makes it attractive to potential movers is the quality of containing a means of accessing non-indigenous goods and services. This conclusion, in turn, allows for an interpretation of those moves discussed in the previous paragraph. The moves of the component units of Aurélio's and Paulo's *shovo* to FUNAI posts constitute efforts by these subgroups to form more desirable social networks than those which they had previously been part of. In both cases (Aurélio's and Paulo's *shovo*), the movers aimed for improved, easier access to non-indigenous goods and services, and in both cases the movers gained greater independence by moving than they had in their old networks, because the political structure of the old settlements was

overturned by the follower-led moves. In the cases of Wanõpa and José, they moved from a network that was independent to one that was not independent but did have easier access to non-indigenous goods and services. If we add together the moves to FUNAI posts and the moves to Aldeia Maronal, a total of 17 groups (37.8% of group moves) with 133 people (29.9% of persons involved in group moves) moved, at least in part, to ensure that their social network had the quality of easy access to non-indigenous goods and services.

In the efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of residential-change events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which such outcomes conflict with their goals, access to non-indigenous goods and services is a key element. Alfredo, as leader, clearly used his position of access to the non-indigenous world as a means of rendering his village more attractive to other groups. Thanks to his having that resource (the mission), he was able to ensure that other people's decisions to move benefited him by expanding his village demographically. From the non-leader's perspective, this is one of the most important qualities sought after in a residence-shift destination, as demonstrated by the fact that nearly a third of persons moving as part of groups moved for these reasons. In terms of sheer numbers, this is almost equal to the number of people moving as individuals for access to a member of the opposite sex (133 movers for non-indigenous access; 142 movers for sexual access). Thus, this is one of the goals which molds the political economy of people. The political economy of people, I am arguing, is a set of social interactions surrounding the efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of residential-change events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which such outcomes conflict with their goals. These

efforts show people value social networks as wealth and pursue that value actively. These valuations and their pursuit are definitionally proof of a political economy of people. The particular form taken by a political economy of people is thus determined by the goals people pursue through their residential choices. It has already been noted that those who control marriageable youth can cause the residential movements of others to suit them. It is a matter of controlling a resource others want or need or think they need. Likewise, access to non-indigenous goods and services is a resource which can be used to ensure that residential changes conform to the goals of the resource-controller. The extent and basis of this type of power will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that the data on group moves clearly support the hypothesis that a political economy of people exists and is operational among the Marubo. The fact that some group moves (e.g., those made for ecological reasons) do not form part of this system of interactions means that the political economy of people is not all-encompassing because not all movements of people fit in the contours I have just outlined for the political economy of people; but though not all-encompassing, it still exists.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss two causes of group moves which are in a sense antithetical: invitations to move and the desire for independence. Invitations to move are a keystone of the political economy of people. Invitations to move have been discussed under the heading of ‘leaders’, as they are one of the primary markers showing that leaders value and pursue social networks. But what of those who accept the invitation—what are they moving for? The answer is, they are moving because the target social network has desirable qualities which their own does not. In both of the quantifiable recorded cases, the stated goal was easier access to superior health, transportation,

communications and education facilities, all of which Alfredo had painstakingly put together, explicitly as a means of attracting coresidents. These are definitely movements from less desirable (i.e., lacking certain desirable qualities) social networks to more desirable ones. But in this move, the mover must abandon independence. It is interesting to note that both José Barbosa and Wanõpa lived in other people's social networks at a certain point in the past; they both founded independent residences, and they both told me that they had done so because they wanted to have their own spot, and not live in anyone else's. When they accepted Alfredo's invitations to move, both these *shovo* split. When José moved, his classificatory sister's sons stayed behind to form their own independent residence; when Wanõpa moved, his brother's son and two of his sons stayed behind to form another independent residence. Those who elected to stay behind were in each case much younger than those who chose to move. From these facts it is possible to derive a provisional explanatory hypothesis: in a man's youth, desire for independence is an important motive guiding residential choice; as a man ages, access to health care becomes more important than independence. At any rate, it is clear that one of the qualities many people find desirable is for the coresident group to be *theirs*—i.e., to contain no one of higher status than one's self. Some group movements are guided by this motive; at other times, that motive is overwhelmed by other motives. The important thing to note is that these data show people actively working to create and be in the best possible social network. The data show that these efforts account for a significant portion of Marubo residential shifts, and this in turn indicates that the political economy of people is an important feature of Marubo social dynamics.

4. Existence of a Political Economy of People: Conclusions

The purpose of addressing the issue of the political economy of people in this dissertation is to ask whether or not power exists in that political economy. Pierre Clastres has argued that “the economy in a primitive society is not a political economy” (Clastres 1977[1974]:168), and that in such societies there was an “intrinsic impossibility of competition (in a primitive society what would be the use of being a rich man in the midst of poor men)...[and] the prohibition—unstated but said nevertheless—of inequality” (Clastres 1977[1974]:168). Clastres’ conception was polemicized by Mentore (1987), who based himself on Rivière’s work (mainly Rivière 1984). The concept of a political economy of people allows us to find competition and inequality where before they were not perceivable. This raises the possibility of what I will call *intersitial* power because it is not linked to the social structure. Asking merely what social positions exist, and what are the roles played by each of those positions, a researcher would find a society without power. The political economy of people can only be perceived by digging deeper than the social structure. To see the political economy of people requires extensive observations of actual human behavior over a long period of time, and requires putting together observations on many people into a cogent system of interactions.

The methodology which informed research was strongly affected by the need to test the political economy of people hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, I gathered an extensive database on residential movements covering not just the village I lived in, but

the entire Marubo nation. I then evaluated whether or not the data supported or falsified the idea that a Marubo political economy of people exists.

To demonstrate the existence of a Marubo political economy of people I first endeavored to define the concept. The essence of the concept is that in a society lacking inheritable material wealth people are the equivalent of wealth. Therefore, people are valued as wealth and are pursued as such. This pursuit necessarily manifests as a set of concrete, observable social interactions which occur when people attempt to turn their notions of a good social network into reality. Such interactions were easily and abundantly discernible in the database on Marubo residential moves. To present these results, I divided Marubo society into two sectors: leaders and non-leaders.

Marubo leaders are clearly seen to produce and reproduce a political economy of people through actions aimed explicitly at expanding their coresident social network. The main phenomena I pointed out in this sense were invitations to move and conflicts over the allocation of personnel. The examples I cited were sufficient to demonstrate the existence of these phenomena as well as showing that they were generalized in Marubo society. Invitations to move show leaders actively endeavoring to expand their coresident networks by incorporating other groups into theirs. Invitations to move were seen to occur not only in the present, but also at various points in the Marubo past according to oral histories. The invitation to move is a long-standing Marubo and proto-Marubo tradition, something which great leaders may be expected to do and do successfully. Leaders also attempt to expand their coresident networks through the addition of marriage partners to existing coresidents. Such efforts have been previously noted for other groups. For example, Price (1987) argued, based on a database similar to

mine, that one of the main ways Nambiquara villages are formed is through the efforts of leaders to construct coresident networks through the accumulation of marriage links. But the Marubo invitation to move is demographic accumulation on a higher level, because it is not merely individuals but entire groups that are thereby added to the coresident network. Conflicts over allocation of personnel further demonstrate that leaders make active efforts to expand their coresident social networks. These conflicts show that leaders' efforts to expand their groups do not occur in a vacuum. Together, Marubo leaders form a political system and in their efforts to expand they must deal with the fact that other leaders have the same goals and the human resources available are finite. hence, they occasionally come into conflict over particular individuals, when multiple leaders covet the same potential coresident, or over ideological issues, when leaders are employing different strategies which require different and conflicting ideological bases. The examples cited show that there is a political game surrounding demographic growth. At the end of Chapter Eight, I presented figures demonstrating that Marubo settlements grow at unequal rates. In this chapter, I outline the system of interactions which result in those inequalities. The system of interactions noted for leaders, including invitations to move and conflict over allocation of personnel, shows that leaders value people as resources and pursue that value actively. Therefore, this is a political economy of people. Clastres' theory is not applicable here: Marubo leaders are aggressively attempting to become unequally successful relative to their peers.

Marubo non-leaders are seen to produce and reproduce a political economy of people through actions aimed at improving their coresident network. This can be seen firstly in the numerous cases of postmarital residence which fall outside the bounds of

structurally ideal exchange systems. Women fleeing bad marriages, never marrying at all, or leaving their in-laws after the death of their spouse, are all examples of residential moves designed to avoid leaving the uterine family. These people consider their uterine family a better network than their marriage family, presumably for reasons having to do with sexual autonomy and conflict over gender role ideologies. On the other hand, men frequently leave their uterine families when the prospects for virilocal marriage are not good. Hence, we see cases such as that of Simão who left a strong, expanding uterine network for the sake of marriage, or Tae who left a poor and splintered uterine group for an appealing position of uxorilocal polygyny. In addition, we see subgroups splintering off to achieve independence and autonomy, then rejoining the larger group for the sake of improved health care and communications. We see non-leaders rendering decisions to move independently of their leaders, often with disastrous political consequences for the erstwhile leader, now become follower. These cases were presented above as illustrations of phenomena which are widespread in Marubo society. To show this, the specific cases were supplemented by numerical data showing that the cases can be generalized. These data show that non-leaders are actively endeavoring to maximize the extent to which residential moves suit their goals and to minimize the extent to which residential moves conflict with their goals. In turn, this shows that the quality of one's coresident network is of prime importance to non-leaders, and they move around quite frequently, mostly in small groups rather than as individuals, seeking social networks with particular desirable qualities: sexual access, sexual autonomy, general autonomy and independence, access to non-indigenous goods, access to non-indigenous services, access to a substantial labor force, and absence of conflict are the main qualities Marubo non-

leaders seek to maximize through their movements. This demonstrates that non-leaders value the social network as a centrally significant resource and pursue that value actively, breaking down and reconstructing the social network repeatedly according to changing conditions and potentials for quality-maximization. Since non-leaders value people as a resource and pursue that value actively, this is a political economy of people. Since both leaders and non-leaders are involved in a political economy of people, the entire society is involved. There is a Marubo political economy of people.

C. The Means of Production of the Social Network

Having established that people are wealth, it becomes possible to investigate the distribution of that wealth and of its means of production in order to test the hypothesis that inequality exists. Rivière (1984:87-88) defined political economy as “the ways in which, within a given society, the production and distribution of wealth are ordered”. This chapter has thus far been concerned with specifying the form taken by wealth, a process which Rivière argued is an essential preliminary to analysis of Amazonian political economy: “The first difficulty is in identifying the nature of wealth, and it is perhaps Clastres’ failure to do this that led him to deny Amerindian societies a political economy” (Rivière 1984:88). The difficulty is in bypassing our cultural bias towards perceiving only material objects resulting from economic production, or the monetary equivalent of those products, as wealth. Rivière noted that “scarcity in the region is not of natural resources but of the labor with which to exploit them. It is people who are in short supply” (1984:90). He argued for Guiana that “the political economy of the region

is concerned with the management of human resources" (Rivière 1984:91). Rivière's argument for Guiana reflected the same division, used in this chapter, into leaders who value human resources as individuals, and non-leaders who value human resources as networks. Citing at least three sources, he showed that leaders in indigenous societies of Guiana are concerned with expanding their groups by incorporating and retaining personnel, and that conflicts over allocation of personnel occur (Rivière 1984:91). With respect to non-leaders, he argued that "it is membership in settlements that gives families and individuals their social credentials and access to the wealth of social relations" (Rivière 1984:101). The same conclusions have been arrived at after analysis of Marubo data. Just as indigenous people do in Guiana, the Marubo have a political economy strongly concerned with the management of human resources. To understand the Marubo political economy it is necessary to understand the production and distribution of human social wealth.

It is already known that the Marubo political economy of people produces unequal results. This was demonstrated in Table 8.4, showing changes in population of specific coresident networks between 1974 and 1997. That table shows that different Marubo leaders have had very unequal success in efforts to expand their groups, and Marubo groups have had unequal success in their efforts to thrive. Very few groups have been able to increase their size as a percentage of the total Marubo population. The *shovo* owned by Raimundo Dionísio in 1974 and by the latter's brother in 1997 increased from 5.84% to 6.59%; the *shovo* of Lauro Brasil, a village of three *shovo* called Aldeia Alegria by 1997 increased from 4.51% to 7.67%; and the village of São Salvador, a small settlement around the new FUNAI post in 1974 containing 3.45% of the Marubo

population, expanded to become a village of seven *shovo* containing 13.79% of the Marubo population by 1998. A number of other groups have increased their population totals but their size as a percentage of the population has decreased. That is the case with eight of the groups covered in the table. Thus, eleven groups in total have managed to increase numbers. Of the remaining four, two have decreased in numbers and two have completely broken apart. The data thus present us with some very unequal results. Contrast, for example, the very successful group of Lauro, increasing from 17 people (4.51%) in 1974 to 64 people (7.67%) in 1997; the more moderate success of João Grande's group, increasing from 59 people (15.65%) in three *shovo* in 1974 to 79 people (9.47%) in two *shovo* in 1997; the negligible growth of Vicente's group from 8 people in 1974 (2.12%) to 11 people (1.32%) in 1997; and finally the vertiginous descent of Aurélio's *shovo* from 28 people (7.43% of total Marubo population) in 1974 to 9 people (1.08% of total Marubo population) in 1997. To understand the development of inequalities in Marubo demographic growth, it is necessary to examine the means of production of the social network.

The means of production of the social network are all means whereby a social network is produced, created, attracted, expanded, and/or retained. Hypothetically, the fluctuations in relative size of Marubo group populations could be caused by unequal access to the means whereby social networks are produced. To test this hypothesis, I will examine the various means of production of the social network with a view to determining how they are distributed and whether or not inequalities in distribution can explain the development of demographic inequalities among Marubo groups.

The analysis must begin with the most basic means of producing a social network, marriage. Marriages are the *sine qua non* of social network production. Marriage increases the size of a group by one, but more importantly, it permits future expansion through childbirth, and eventually through the marriage of children and the production of children's children. The means of accessing marriage and the distribution of access must be understood if we are to understand how inequalities are developing in Marubo society. To do this, the different modes of marital arrangement observable in 1997-98 must be considered.

Interviews with informants, combined with observations, lead me to conclude that there are three basic approaches to marriage in contemporary Marubo society. The 'correct' way to approach marriage is indirectly. The young man finds a woman he fancies; he then informs one of his male elder kin of his interest. The male elder kin of the young man then issues a formal request to the kin of the young girl. This is what I call 'marriage by formal request'. In this category, we may distinguish two kinds of procedures: those involving a prior romance by the couple, and those involving no prior involvement by the couple. The former category is exemplified by José Barbosa's marriage. José told me that when he was young, he started seeing a girl in a *shovo* several hours' walk away. They liked each other, and she became pregnant. When the couple realized this, José went to his father, João Tuxáua, who in turn went to the girl's father, Domingo, who approved the marriage. José's opinion was that that was the way marriages should occur. On the other hand, it was not uncommon for men to ask for women with whom they had had no previous sexual relations. One case of this has already been described in detail: when Wanõpa requested Ronõpa's daughter in marriage

for his brother's son. The case of Mema is by no means unique. As explained earlier, the more strictly are kinship structure-based marital exchange systems adhered to, the more restricted are women's choices. There were numerous cases of men deciding women's fate for them. The results of these events depended ultimately on whether or not the woman would cooperate, and if not, if the girl's family will force her or will allow her to refuse. Finally, in addition to the two kinds of marriage by formal request, there are couples who elope without asking anyone. These cases involve girls that are young and whose parents often have particular ideas about where the girl should marry, ideas that interfere with the young man's desires.

Marubo marriage is not heavily ritualized. I never observed or heard of any ceremony to celebrate or mark marriage. The only ritualized feature of the process was the meeting at which the suitor's kin make the request to the woman's kin, the issue is discussed, and advice dispensed to the suitor. Once the permission is given, no further public events related to the marriage take place. Marriage by elopement eludes even this simple rite of passage. Divorce, likewise, is perfunctory, marked simply by someone's departure.

In addition to the three aforementioned categories, it should be recalled that there is another way to divide Marubo marriages. There are marriages which adhere to Kariera-type patterns of multigenerational exchange between exogamous units, and there are marriages which do not adhere to these patterns. The distinction is important because political power affects the individual differently depending on what category the individual's marriage fits. In the Marubo system, ideal normative marriage exchange patterns do not simply occur spontaneously. The pattern of exogamy and incest

avoidance maintains itself spontaneously because no one will marry a member of a proscribed lineage. But from avoiding proscription to following prescriptions is a long stretch. Every Marubo has one or two lineages which they ideally *should* marry into, one or two which they must at all costs avoid, and up to seven lineages which they *can* marry into without violating the incest taboo, but which do not resolve the structural contradiction between patrilineal name transmission and matrilineal descent. Since the number of acceptable partners is larger than the number of ideal partners, and since conditions often do not allow for the ideal to be enacted, there is a tendency for individuals to find partners of acceptable but not ideal lineages. Situations where a number of marriages over several generations repeatedly exhibit strictly ideal lineage interrelations require conscious efforts on the part of the political elite within these groups in order to succeed. Elders who see the group as theirs and who take an interest in its steady, sustainable expansion take an interest in the maintenance of exchange patterns because these provide security from personnel loss through marriage or through lack of marriage. By being involved in an exchange system, an elder becomes clear about where his sons' wives are coming from and where his daughters are going to marry and gains a reasonable certainty that losses to other groups through unfavorable postmarital residence will be compensated by future returns. Therefore, elders involved in such exchange systems educate their children into the values underlying the system and make conscious efforts to prevent their children from going outside the system. The threat of sanction by physical force is very real in this sense. There are cases of women being forced to marry particular people, and there are cases of men being 'given' women they never asked for. The case of Mema shows that elders who are determined to compel a particular marriage

will use force to the extent possible (recall that Mema had to use extreme cleverness to escape the threat of force). On the other hand, elders who are not involved in an exchange system are likely to agree to marriages which are acceptable though not ideal. These marriages are more likely to be arrangements between individuals who agree to marry one another and are then approved of by the elder kin of each party—rubber-stamps of *de facto* marriages. Still, these types of marriage all make individuals pass through a necessary stage of authorization by elders before accessing sexual and economic partnership with a member of the opposite sex. These marriages in turn contrast with cases of elopement, where the individuals exhibit complete autonomy and rejection of control. We may therefore see Marubo marriages as falling in a field of dynamic tension between opposite poles: some fall on the pole of total control, others on the pole of total autonomy, while the majority fall somewhere in between.

Given this information about the *process* whereby marriages are obtained, it is reasonable to ask what the distribution of the end result is. The simplest way to approach this issue is to ask whether there are people who wish they were married but aren't. The method is to seek explanations for cases of unmarried adults. By examining cases of unmarried adults I will uncover forces which prevent marriage, and hence gain clues as to what can produce inequality of access to this most basic of Marubo social goals.

It is difficult to determine from census data alone whether or not an unmarried adult has been unsuccessful in finding a partner or if that is their preferred condition. My long stay at Aldeia Maronal allowed me to understand a number cases individually; these cases are informative. There were eight unmarried men above age twenty at Aldeia Maronal. Of these, three were young men between 20 and 25 years of age who had not

yet found a suitable wife but for whom there was no cause for concern and every expectation that they would find a wife. Another two were openly homosexual men, whom nobody expected to marry at all (homosexuality was not very frequent but when it did occur it was not at all a source of concern; the Maronal Marubo seemed for the most part to think that it was perfectly normal for some men to like other men. This does not seem a recently introduced practice because I was told of a homosexual man who had been the last representative of a matrilineal descent group shortly after the rubber boom. Amazonianists I have spoken to agree that tolerated indigenous homosexuality is rare in the Amazon, but this appears to be a genuine case of it). These two men were known publicly to prefer men to the exclusion of women, and the older of the two was unmarried well into his late 30s. The sixth unmarried man was Pekōpa, the son of Aurélio. Some elders expressed concern over Pekōpa's single status and discussed possible ways of finding him a wife. However, there was evidence that Pekōpa himself was not terribly concerned: he was investing much of his energy in attending school in the town of Benjamin Constant, where he spent most of the year. Thus, it is probable that he was unmarried in large part due to personal choice. The final two cases were cases of men who wanted to be married but had been unable to find a suitable, cooperative partner. One of these was the youngest son of João Tuxáua, a patrilateral brother of the headman Alfredo. This young man was certainly not unmarried due to any low social status of his family. Rumors which I cannot pass on abounded, and the conclusion I draw is that his non-marriage was the result of fortuitous bad luck and nothing to do with social processes. The eighth case of unmarried adult male at Aldeia Maronal is the case of

Ronīpa, which does bear its own brief discussion because of the relevant social forces involved.

The case of Ronīpa has been described earlier in this chapter. He had married twice, and both times his wife left him after bearing a single child. At the time of my fieldwork, he had a lover which, as I remarked above, was illicit. The relationship was illicit because the girl in question was of a family which was involved in an exchange system with another family. Ronīpa came from a lineage which was not a part of this exchange system; his association with that particular girl disrupted the exchange system by removing one of its essential pieces. Since the relationship was more or less common knowledge, the girl was considered taken; by engaging in a relationship with her, Ronīpa had effectively removed her from the exchange system. Because of this, they were both subject to public sanction. For Ronīpa, this sanction took the form of an informal ban on marriage. Women did not want to marry him because he was considered to have a tendency to take lovers, and his latest lover was from an inappropriate social category, which made it doubly distasteful. Likewise, men were reluctant to consider him as a potential husband for their daughters because of his violation of social norms and his history of failed marriages, both of which made him a bad bet for a stable husband. The end result of this situation was that Ronīpa had to take the unusually desperate measures described above (giving his daughter away against her will in the hope of obtaining another girl as future return). What this shows is that inability to obtain a marriage partner in Marubo society can in some cases result from social sanctions imposed for certain violations of social norms. There is little doubt that Ronīpa was being held up as an example of the undesirable consequences incurred by a man who disrupts a properly

functioning, structurally normative marriage exchange system. One elder I spoke to said that he was in favor of allowing Ronipa to marry the girl because, after all, the damage had already been done. But this same elder said that most of the other village elders felt that any disruption of a proper exchange system was intolerable and had to be sanctioned. This shows that Ronipa's inability to marry was not accidental, but rather the result of conscious social sanction.

The imposition of restrictions on his ability to marry made Ronipa controllable. By dangling before him the prospect of a legitimate wife at some future time, Wanopa had been able to command Ronipa's coresidence, labor, and contributions of meat. Because Ronipa lacked options, he also lacked leverage. He had to do what Wanopa asked him to do because he had no other options.

Although it does occur, inability to marry due to social sanction is very rare. In fact, inability to marry in general is very rare. As of January 1998, there were 49 males over 20 years of age at Aldeia Maronal. Of these, only two (4.1% of sample) had been denied access to marriage against their will. The fact that it does occur is extremely important because the mere possibility that one could be denied access to marriage is a strong sanction which channels behavior in the direction of adherence to kinship norms. Nevertheless, the rarity with which the sanction is applied is telling. Only egregious violation of norms will incur this penalty. Distribution of access to females for males is nearly universal. But that universality hinges on general recognition of and adherence to the kinship norms by all men. A woman's father, or other kin of hers, reserves the right to forbid certain marriages and encourage others. Elders often have a vested interest in the perpetuation of established patterns of kinship interaction. In order to obtain women,

young men know they must avoid running afoul of the exchange systems which their elders have established. That is the main discernible requirement for access to marriage: do not repeatedly violate key norms. The only other requirements that I could discern were, firstly, heterosexuality, or at the very least bisexuality (which I strongly suspect existed, based on visual observations that were suggestive but not fully conclusive), and secondly possession of properly functioning genitalia.

Although nearly every man obtains a wife, what they have to do to obtain her varies from case to case. This has to do with variations in postmarital residence patterns, as noted above. Some men stay put and receive women, while others move to where the women are, and still others take the woman and go somewhere new. These processes have been described earlier. Despite all the variations discernible in postmarital residence patterns, the end result is a nearly universal distribution of women to men.

It is more common for women to be unmarried than it is for men. This can be seen in the analysis of Table 4.15. That table shows the residence of unwed minors at Aldeia Maronal; the analysis showed that there are 13 unmarried mothers in that village. Since there are 41 married women in the village, the total number of women who are involved in reproductive (or potentially so) relationships with men is 54. Thus, the percentage of marriageable women who are not married is 24%. In contrast, if we include the homosexual men, those unable to marry, and Pekōpa's unique case, we find only five men who should be married but are not—approximately 10% of the total of 49 men above the age of 20 at Aldeia Maronal. I conclude that a larger number, and a greater proportion, of women are being removed from the potentially marriageable pool than are men. Three of these women have purposely removed themselves from marriages

which they find disagreeable. Most of the other cases (all are listed in Chapter Four) result from accidental pregnancies. Accidental pregnancies do not *always* prevent a woman from marrying, as I know of at least two cases of single mothers marrying several years after giving birth. Nevertheless, the number of single mothers who remain unmarried is higher than the number that do remarry. Processes of divorce, non-marriage, and accidental pregnancy lead to the removal of women from the pool of potential marriage partners, which creates a slight imbalance in the relative proportions of potentially reproducing men and women. In order to find out what effect divorce and non-marriage have on the availability of women to men, I will present data on the percentage of Marubo mothers who are unmarried.

The data on unmarried mothers is presented in Table 9.2. Note that in the above discussions, I have referred to ‘women who are in a potentially reproductive relationship’, a category which includes childless married women and women who have out-of-wedlock children but who do not actually reside with them, but does not include widows. On the other hand, the category of ‘mothers’ does not include childless married women, but does include widows. Widowhood, however, is a different phenomenon from divorce and non-marriage, because a widow typically has not made a deliberate choice to be widowed. Furthermore, elderly widows who live with their children are not usually considered potential marriage partners, and they have already been married and produced children as part of a stable family. Therefore, widowhood does not withdraw a woman from the pool of potential marriage partners; these women have already been removed by their earlier marriages.

TABLE 9.2.: Unmarried mothers.

<u>River</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u># Mothers minus widows</u>	<u># Unmarried mothers minus widows</u>	<u>Unmarried mothers minus widows as percent of mothers minus widows</u>
Curuçá	Maronal	46	12	26.1
	São Sebastião	24	5	20.1
	Tacanal	6	3	50.0
	Curuçá—Totals	(76)	(20)	26.3
Javari	Atalaia do Norte	2	0	00.0
Ituí	Agua Branca	8	1	12.5
	Paraná	3	0	00.0
	Paulino	7	2	28.6
	Liberdade	7	1	14.3
	Vida Nova	26	4	15.4
	Praia	6	3	50.0
	Alegria	13	4	30.8
	Rio Novo	22	4	18.2
	Ituí—Totals	(82)	(19)	23.2
Totals		160	39	24.4

The table on unmarried mothers shows that the phenomena of non-marriage and divorce remove a significant proportion of women from the pool of available partners for men. That proportion varies from village to village, but it is remarkably equal for the two rivers: 26.3% on the Curuçá River, 23.2% on the Ituí River (A chi-square test to determine correlation between river and frequency of non-marriage among mothers indicates that the differences between rivers as regards this datum are indeed insignificant at $p > .99$). Some of these women wish they were married and continue to make themselves available to potential marriage partners, but others have decided that raising children with their uterine family is better than going away in marriage, and these have no intention of marrying. These data are both a solution and a problem. They provide a solution to the problem of why, in a normal society with roughly normal gender proportions (425 men and 432 women recorded in the census), there should be a scarcity of women for men. After all, a basic premise of the political economy of people hypothesis is that desirable humans are a scarce resource. If gender proportions are equal, then how can there be scarcity? Obviously, if fully one fourth of theoretically available women are rendered unavailable by processes of divorce and single motherhood, then there will be scarcity despite the equality in numbers. On the other hand, we are presented with a second problem: if there is a scarcity of women then how is the near-universal distribution of women to men achieved? The answer to this is in age of proper marriage. Women are married much younger than men. The proportion of women who are marriageable is higher than the proportion of men who are marriageable because the age of marriageability is lower for women than for men. Thus, the women who are removed from the pool are replaced by new ones just entering it.

Aside from divorce and non-marriage, a second phenomenon leads to a scarcity of women for men: polygyny. Anthropologists have long assumed that polygyny creates an imbalance, especially in a small society, because if gender proportions at birth are equal and if polygyny is practiced, then there are men who will end up without women (e.g., Clastres 1977[1974]). Clastres suggested that society opposes polygyny in general because of the imbalance polygyny creates. This assumption is based on the notion that there is an egalitarian/reciprocal *ethos* in Amazonian societies which causes people to be repelled by unequal accumulations of key resources. Since the most key resource is women, unequal accumulations of women are antithetical to Amazonian social organization, according to this perspective. The only exception, according to Clastres, were headmen who, because of the extraordinary services they performed for the village, were ‘given’ multiple women ‘by the group’. Once again, the Marubo data bear little or no resemblance to the hypothetical scenario presented by Clastres.

At the time of the 1997-98 census, there were nineteen polygynous Marubo men. Of these nineteen men, seventeen had two wives while two men had three wives. The nineteen polygynous men had forty wives between them. In Table 9.1, I tabulated the total number of marital links in Marubo society. By ‘marital link’ I refer to a connection between a man and a woman. The 142 tabulated marital links involve 142 women, but only 121 men. This means that 21 women who would otherwise be available for bachelors to marry have been rendered unavailable in virtue of becoming another man’s second or third wife. If we combine this figure with that of 39 women who are single mothers, we arrive at a total of 60 women who are unavailable for marriage. In a total

TABLE 9.3.: Women above and below the age of fourteen.

<u>Village</u>	<u>Shovo</u>	<u>Total # females</u>	<u># females <14 yrs old</u>
<i>Curuçá River:</i>			
Aldeia Maronal	All	110	43
São Sebastião	Shetãpa	15	7
	Santiago	3	1
	José Nascimento filho	2	1
	Saide (tapiris)	8	4
Curuçá River—totals		128	56
<i>Ituí River:</i>			
Alegria	Tekãpa (Antônio)	19	10
Praia	All	11	4
Vida Nova	All	63	30
Liberdade	All	22	7
Paulino	All	16	6
Paraná	All	8	2
Agua Branca	All	20	9
Rio Novo	Saípapa	13	8
Ituí River—totals		172	76
Marubo in above sample—totals		300	132

female population of 432, this is a very significant figure: 13.9% of all females. But if we consider the unavailable women as a percentage of women above the age of marriage, the figure is even more startling. Unfortunately, complete data on the age of all Marubo are not available. The only way to arrive at an approximation is to take those villages for which complete data are available, render the number of women above age of marriage as a percentage of all women in the sample, then generalize that percentage to Marubo society. These data are presented in Table 9.3. The age of marriageability I utilize is 14. There are married girls as young as 13 and even 10 years old, but I did not observe reproduction occurring until the age of 14. Thus, I take 14 as a reasonable cutoff point; at and beyond that age most girls are considered marriageable, while below that age a few are but most are not (an emic statement I obtained suggested that sexual contact with women was acceptable when the woman's breasts are fully developed). Out of the total of 432 women recorded in the 1997-98 census, 300 (69.4% of the total) reside in villages for which female age pyramids can be constructed. Out of those 300 women, 168 are marriageable. Thus, of the sampled women, 56% (168/300) are marriageable. If we extend this figure to the whole Marubo population, we find that the approximate number of marriageable women is 56% of 432, or 242. We are now in a position to render the number of unavailable marriageable women as a percentage of the total marriageable women. If there are 242 marriageable women, and 60 of them are unavailable, then processes of polygyny and non-marriage are removing 24.8% (60/242) of women from the pool of available partners.

We now know that a fourth of Marubo women are removed from the pool of available partners by recurrent social processes. We might suppose that this creates a

serious shortage of women for men and a sense of scarcity. But another perspective on these data belies that assumption. Earlier I found that there were 142 married Marubo women; if there are 242 marriageable Marubo women, then there are 100 unmarried marriageable women; we have seen that there are 39 unmarried mothers, so assuming these are removed from the marriageable pool, that leaves approximately 61 available Marubo women at the moment research was done. This figure indicates that despite all the shortage-causing phenomena, there is a substantial pool of available women. However, this means nothing unless we compare the figure of available women to that of available men. To arrive at the latter figure I used the same procedure as for women. First, I compiled data from all *shovo* for which male age pyramids could be constructed. The end result was a sample of 296 males, or 69.6% (296/425) of the total male population. For men, I utilized the age of 20 as the age of marriageability. I was able to locate only a single case of a man marrying younger than this (a 23-year old man with a 5-year old child), but it seemed inappropriate to use 18 as the age of marriageability since the vast majority of men that young are not considered serious marriage prospects. Out of the males in the sample, 166 are less than twenty years of age, leaving 130 above the age of twenty. Thus, in the analyzed sample, 43.9% of all males are marriageable. Extending this percentage to the general population, we arrive at an approximate figure of 187 marriageable males. We already know from the figures on postmarital residence and on polygyny that there are 121 married Marubo men. That leaves 66 unmarried but marriageable Marubo men. From this figure I subtract 8%, which is the percentage of men at Aldeia Maronal who were removed from marriageability by homosexuality and violation of social norms. This yields a final figure of 61 unmarried but marriageable

Marubo men and these 61 men are competing for 61 women. There **is no** scarcity of available women in Marubo society if we consider these data. There are exactly as many women available as there are men looking for them. Of course, if there is just one woman available for every man, there can still be a sense of scarcity because the supply of women for men will be somewhat tight, leaving little room for error. But consider that many of the 39 single mothers are highly desirable; I saw several of them pursued during my fieldwork. Thus, although I am conservatively removing these from my total of ‘available’ women, in fact many of them are considered available and if any shortage were felt they would certainly be considered attractive possibilities. If they are not considered unavailable then we have 100 available women for 61 men. In practice, exogamic restrictions probably make it more difficult than these figures indicate. Every one has a certain set of people with whom marriage is forbidden. Those from demographically large clans have less to choose from, since the incest taboo covers more for them; while those from small clans have more choice because the incest taboo has a smaller range for them. Complicated calculations, irrelevant to this dissertation, would be required to quantify this effect which varies from lineage to lineage. But the point of these calculations has been to demonstrate that by making the age of marriageability lower for women than for men, Marubo society neutralizes the “womb drain” created by polygyny, divorce, and non-marriage; despite the fact that one fourth of Marubo women are rendered unavailable by these processes, there is still a woman available for every man. This explains the near-universality of distribution of women to men, whereby the only men who are unmarried are recurrent violators of cherished social norms, openly homosexual men, and men with sexual dysfunctions.

Although women are distributed almost universally to men, that distribution is not equal. The existence of polygyny demonstrates that there is inequality in the distribution of this resource. Furthermore, I am here looking at marriage not as an isolated fact but as a means of production of the social network forming part of a political economy of people. If marriage is a means of production of the social network, and if some but not all men are polygynous, then some men have unequally superior access to the means of production of the social network. This inequity is easily quantified. Out of 121 married men, only 19, or 15.7%, have multiple wives. This fifteen percent of married men have double and even triple the reproductive potential of other men. More children means a larger group, and eventually a larger labor force which can be used for economic prosperity and the acquisition of high status through feasting. More daughters means it is easier to find wives for your sons, because if you have young girls growing up then another group interested in exchange will be more likely to send its daughters your way because they are reasonably secure the exchange can be reciprocated in the future. All the benefits which ensue from a good social network are easier to produce for a polygynist than for a monogamist. In order to understand how this type of inequality emerges in Marubo society, I will discuss some of the cases I recorded of men describing how they became polygynous. These cases will show that Clastres' framework for explaining how polygyny occurs in an egalitarian society is unsatisfactory as an explanation for the Marubo data.

While it is true that in some cases, men have easier access to multiple wives in virtue of coming from a prominent family, in other cases they acquire wives entirely through their own efforts. The examples of Alfredo and José Barbosa demonstrate this.

Alfredo and José are children of João Tuxáua, the leader who gathered up proto-Marubo groups during and after the rubber boom and thus became the top leader of the Marubo nation. The necessities of group survival under extreme genocidal duress led to extraordinary polygynous arrangements, as shown in Table 8.1. João Tuxáua had eight wives and his primary associate Domingo, six. These figures are extraordinary because no contemporary Marubo has more than three wives. João Tuxáua's wives produced several sets of siblings, of which the oldest and most politically prominent were four sons of the Varináwavo woman Maya. These four sons were Zacarias (b. 1921), Alfredo (b. 1942), José (b. 1945) and Pedro (b. 1955). At the time of Melatti's census the elder of these were already married. What is interesting is that Zacarias had one wife whereas Alfredo had three. This correlates with the fact that the political succession bypassed Zacarias in favor of Alfredo. Alfredo stated that the political succession favored him because he knew how to organize labor better than his older brother. Zacarias was married in 1961 to a woman who was the full sister of one of João Tuxáua's wives. Therefore, the marriage of Zacarias did not require the formation of a new marital alliance, only the extension of an already existing one. In contrast, Alfredo's marriages can be dated, based on his children's birthdates, between 1967 and 1969. Two of Alfredo's wives were full sisters, the daughters of a prominent elder named Misael. Alfredo's third wife was the full sister of Lauro Brasil, one of the two brothers who share headmanship of Aldeia Alegria on the Ituí River. Unlike the marriage of his older brother, therefore, Alfredo's marriages required the formation of a new set of alliances with two separate families. The high status of Alfredo's father combined with the fact that Alfredo was the designated successor to the headmanship facilitated this

arrangement. There is a clear correlation between Alfredo's polygyny and his succession to headmanship. Both these events have to do with his family background and birth status, and there is every indication that his father played a very significant role in obtaining three wives for him.

The process whereby Alfredo became polygynous can be contrasted with the process whereby his younger brother José became polygynous. Whereas Alfredo's polygyny was a matter of family arrangements, José's was accomplished mainly through individual effort. According to José, he was still a bachelor living in his father's *shovo* when he struck up a relationship with a young woman of the nearby *shovo* of Domingo. Eventually this woman, Domingo's daughter, became pregnant. When this became clear, José went to his father and asked the latter to ask the girl's father for her in marriage. Domingo agreed to the marriage, which was in any case a *fait accompli*. According to José, the girl's younger sister then asked to be included in the marriage. José agreed, and all the involved parents agreed, so the marriage was completed as a polygynous arrangement. Shortly thereafter, José initiated construction of his own *shovo*, as described in Chapter Five. It is clear that whereas Alfredo's marriages were arranged by his family as an accompaniment to his political status, the role of the elders in José's marriage was minimal: they merely agreed to an arrangement that José had already created.

In order to formulate accurate conclusions about the ways in which inequality in access to wives develops in Marubo society, I will describe the three other cases of polygyny at Aldeia Maronal, which present interesting counterpoints to those of Alfredo and José. Firstly, I will cover the complex case of Wanõpa. Wanõpa had three living

wives at the time fieldwork was conducted, but only one of them actually resided with her husband. Wanõpa had three wives listed when Melatti conducted his census in 1974-75. His three wives were all daughters of the prominent post-rubber boom leader Carlos. Wanõpa's marriage was thus the result of arrangement, much like Alfredo's and unlike José's. However, one of these women was kidnapped by Mayoruna Indians in the 1960s, leaving Wanõpa with only two wives. A second of Wanõpa's wives died of an illness in 1981, leaving Wanõpa monogamous. At some point in the 1980s, Wanõpa's once-kidnapped wife returned to live among the Marubo, but she did not return to coresidence with her former husband; instead, she struck up anicular residence with her daughters and daughter's husband. In about 1990, Wanõpa, still with only one coresident wife, asked João Tuxáua for his two youngest daughters in marriage. João Tuxáua agreed to the marriage, and so did the elder of the two girls; however, the younger girl refused the marriage and her father did not force her to go. By 1991, Wanõpa thus had three wives again. The eldest one, who had spent years among the Mayoruna, did not live with him. Two women did: the surviving one of his first three wives, and his newest young wife. Shortly thereafter, Wanõpa relocated to a place nearer to the core of Aldeia Maronal. This relocation occasioned a schism in which Wanõpa's older wife stayed behind. When I encountered Wanõpa in 1997, he had only one coresident wife.

The last two cases of polygyny at Aldeia Maronal are those of Wasinawa and of Sinãpa, both patrilateral brothers of Wanõpa. Sinãpa is the full brother of José Barbosa's two wives. Originally, Sinãpa had only one wife, Sinãwa, whom he married in 1968. Together they had seven children between 1969 and 1987. After a time, Sinãpa sought and obtained a second wife, who according to my census data started bearing Sinãpa's

children in 1986. Sināpa's wives were from completely different families. Sināwa was of the Shonoískovo clan, *kokavo* of the Txonavo, with affiliations on the Ituí River: her mother was the wife of Vida Nova *shovo*-owner Txumāpa, while her sister was married to Ituí *shovo*-owner Paulino. In contrast, Sināpa's second wife, Vó, was of the Nináwavo clan, of the *kokavo* of the Ranenáwavo. Vó's father was one of the brothers of Miguel who moved downstream to the middle Curuçá (see Chapter Five). Furthermore, by the time of Sināpa's second marriage his father had passed away. Whatever negotiations took place between Sināpa and Vó's kin must have taken place with Sināpa as his own representative, and these negotiations would have been completely distinct from those undertaken years previously to get his first wife. The negotiations to get his first wife, since they took place when his father, the prominent elder Domingo, was still alive, most likely involved his close elder kinfolk as well as himself. The process whereby Sināpa became polygynous is thus unique relative to the cases previously discussed, in that like Wanōpa he sought a new woman only after the reproductive potential of his initial marriage was nearly exhausted, but unlike Wanōpa he managed to merge his old and new marriages into a single coresident unit, whereas Wanōpa's remarriage was associated with the end of coresidence with his older wife.

Wasinawa is yet another son of Domingo. Wasinawa's marriage was initially a case of uxorilocal polygyny. Born at the headwaters of the affluents of the Curuçá, Wasinawa married two daughters of Wanīshēpa, who at that time lived at Aldeia Vida Nova on the Ituí, in the *shovo* of José Nascimento the elder. Later, Wanīshēpa formed his own *shovo*, which at the time of my census was called Aldeia Praia, or *oninamá* (*oni*=ayahuasca vine; *-namá* is a place or time specifier) in Marubo. Also at some

unspecified point, apparently in the late 1980s, Wasinawa moved to the Curuçá River, where in 1997 he built his own *shovo*. However, one of his wives stayed at Aldeia Praia, while another moved to the Curuçá River with him. Thus, Wasinawa became an independent *shovo*-owner but only half his family resided with him.

On the Ituí River I found twelve cases of polygyny. At José Nascimento the elder's *shovo*, Raomayãpa was in uxorilocal polygyny, while Raomayãpa's son Karo had recently married two women virilocally. Karo's marriage was part of the Kariera-type exchange system diagrammed in Chapter Eight. In the *shovo* of Pekôpapa, I found that the *shovo*-owner had two wives, while his sole living brother had only one. On the other hand, Pekôpapa's sister's son Benedito had three wives, all of them his mother's brother's daughters. At Aldeia Agua Branca, I found the situation, already much discussed in this dissertation, where Wakanawa was married uxorilocally to two of Vimipa's daughters while Tae was married uxorilocally to two of Wakanawa's daughters. At Aldeia Liberdade I found that the headman Ronipapa had two wives, and two of his daughters were uxorilocally married to a man named Eduardo. At Aldeia Alegria I found that one of the co-headmen there, Lauro Brasil, had two wives, both the daughters of a long-deceased elder named Anastacio. I found three further cases in the census data on Aldeia Rio Novo. Two of these are cases of uxorilocal polygyny, while the third was formerly a case of uxorilocal polygyny but subsequently the man, Kanipa, formed his own residence and succeeded in keeping both his wives, an achievement which, judging by the case of Wasinawa (see above), is not necessarily an easy one. I do not have specific information on the processes whereby any of these men entered polygyny.

Before formulating conclusions about Marubo polygyny in general, I will discuss a final case that is extremely important and for which I do have specific information, the case of Clóvis Rufino, the co-founder and, during my fieldwork, the coordinator of the indigenous political organization, CIVAJA. Clóvis' affiliations are with Aldeia São Sebastião. I found only two cases of polygyny at Aldeia São Sebastião. One was the case of Cassimiro. Cassimiro was the oldest of Aldeia São Sebastião's *shovo*-owners. Together with his father Domingo he had moved to the middle Curuçá in the 1970s when FUNAI first established a post there. According to Dr. Melatti's census data, Cassimiro was already polygynous by that time. When the middle Curuçá settlement was moved from the Igarapé São Salvador up to the current site of Aldeia São Sebastião, one of Cassimiro's wives moved with him, while another went instead into an irregular residence at the *shovo* called 'Tacanal'. Thus, in a situation very analogous to that of his brother Wanõpa, Cassimiro had only one of his wives actually coresiding with him. Aside from Cassimiro, none of the middle Curuçá elders, not even the headman Shetãpa, had multiple wives. Only the relatively young Clóvis did.

Clóvis' entry into polygyny is directly linked to his history of travel between indigenous lands and non-indigenous towns. Clóvis' father Eliseu left his wife, Clóvis' mother Rita, to resettle in Cruzeiro do Sul while Clóvis was yet young. Clóvis had an older brother born in 1959 and he himself was born in 1965. Clóvis' mother stayed for a time with her brothers, who were sister's sons to Curuçá *shovo*-owner Aurélio. In 1972, Rita moved downstream to live with a non-Marubo (half-Tikuna) logger named Antônio Rufino. According to Clóvis, this move was made for economic reasons: with two sons and no husband, Rita was having a hard time raising her children. This gives us an

indication of the socioeconomic status of Clóvis' birth family within Marubo society: very low. Rita lacked a kin support network sufficiently strong to support her and had to leave the indigenous area for a time instead. Clóvis was raised by Antônio Rufino's sister in Benjamin Constant. He returned to Marubo land for the first time in 1977, visiting the FUNAI post where most of his mother's brothers had settled after the breakup of Aurélio's *shovo*. From then until 1981, he returned to visit his kin at the Igarapé São Salvador at least once a year. Clóvis says that during his visits he became aware of improper activities being carried out by FUNAI workers, particularly the sale and trade of food marked 'not for sale' by the Brazilian government. He started to tell the elders what he perceived. He says he became the interpreter for Marubo leaders at certain meetings, and eventually began organizing meetings to discuss issues and make proposals regarding relations to FUNAI and non-indigenous people in general. In doing so, Clóvis was critical of FUNAI fieldworkers, and thus began a long conflict between Clóvis and local FUNAI workers. According to Clóvis, FUNAI officials harassed him and pressured him to leave the area. The harassment, by all accounts, was mutual. Despite this conflict, Clóvis settled at São Salvador in 1981. He told me that since he had been abandoned by his father and raised as a stepson, he was drawn back to his homeland where he was just getting to know his extended kin network after years of absence. By becoming an interpreter, supplying information on the non-indigenous world, and keeping an eye on FUNAI activities, he became important and valued by the elders. It was in this context that he obtained his first wife. Clóvis told me that the headman of the settlement, his mother's mother's sister's son (classificatory mother's brother) Shetāpa, wanted him to stay in the area and so gave him his first wife. This event occurred in 1982. Clóvis and

his wife were both very young when this occurred—sixteen and fifteen years old, respectively. Then his wife became pregnant, and he no longer wanted to stay in the area because of the conflict with FUNAI. He wanted his daughter to have a father, and was concerned that his children receive an education, so in 1983 he took his wife downstream and stayed in Benjamin Constant. He met Silvio Cavuscens, fell in with his mother's mother's sister's son Darcy Comapa, and began to devote himself more fully to political organizing. With the assistance of Brazilian Catholic support organizations and of foreign NGOs, he and Darcy worked until in 1991, they organized the first meeting of all the indigenous leaders of the Javari. At this meeting, the first Indigenous Commission of the Javari Valley was formed, with Clóvis as vice-coordinator. In 1992, the Commission became CIVAJA, and Darcy Comapa became cordinator. Clóvis went to Manaus to coordinate with the pan-Amazonian indigenous organization, COIAB. His two-year mandate ended in 1994. At the end of 1994, Clóvis left all the organizations, sold his house in Benjamin Constant, and returned to his wife's father's home up the Curuçá. He fell ill with malaria and became discouraged by the situation. He said he wanted to take his children downstream to study and he wanted to forget about political organizing. He said he was seriously considering leaving Marubo land permanently and finding a new line of work. It was then, Clóvis says, that "the leaders thought I should have a second wife at São Sebastião [the settlement was relocating from São Salvador to São Sebastião, 1994-1997]. So they gave me a second wife. Now one of them stays at São Sebastião while the other lives with me in Atalaia do Norte." His second wife, Ino, was a full sister of his first wife, but 13 years younger. Ino was born in 1979, whereas Clóvis' first wife had been born in 1966. Clóvis' first son by his second wife was three years old in 1998,

and he also had a ten-month old daughter. His second wife and young children were all at Aldeia São Sebastião when I passed through, whereas Clóvis' first wife and his children by his first wife were at Atalaia do Norte. Thus, according to Clóvis, his access to polygyny had hinged on his usefulness to the Marubo leaders. Clóvis attributed his receipt of women from the Aldeia São Sebastião headman to the headman's desire to have Clóvis permanently linked to him. This strategy had given good results for Clóvis' wife's father, since at the time of fieldwork Clóvis was CIVAJA cordinator and so Clóvis' wife's father had direct access to the man at the center of directing official indigenous policy towards non-indigenous people and of mediating non-indigenous assistance to indigenous people.

After reviewing the available data on the means whereby men enter into polygynous arrangements, it becomes possible to render general conclusions about this topic. There are several different recurring methods for obtaining multiple wives. Firstly, one's family may negotiate such an arrangement for one, as in the case of Alfredo and of Raomayápa's son Karo, both cases of virilocal polygyny. To be able to negotiate such a marriage requires a fairly prominent family. In the case of Alfredo, his family was the politically most prominent one, and Alfredo himself indicated to succeed to the maximally high status of Marubo society. In the case of Karo, his father and mother's father were involved in an exchange system involving three *shovo*, and his marriage to two women was a part of this exchange system, arranged and maintained by his elders. Elders who have already achieved some level of prominence on their own can negotiate multiple marriage without mediation: this is the case of Wanõpa's last wife, and of Sinãpa's second wife. Both these men obtained wives later in life once they already had

substantial families and high status. On the other hand, it is possible to obtain multiple wives on one's own. The case of José shows that a man may obtain women first, *then* negotiate with the leaders for approval. All these processes result in virilocal polygyny.

Uxorilocal polygyny is arrived at via an equally wide array of processes. For several reasons, one may assume that for most men virilocality is preferable to uxorilocality. First, we have seen in previous chapters how strong is the Marubo attachment to the uterine family, an attachment which for men is generally conducive to virilocality. Second, virilocality is more common on the Curuçá River, where Kariera-type exchange systems are also less common. On the Curuçá River, according to Aldeia Maronal elders, virilocality has been expanding relative to uxorilocality, which elders say was more common in their youth. Since virilocality is becoming less common on the Curuçá and since exchange systems are less common there also, and since exchange systems are associated with tighter control by elders, I assume that there is a correlation between the degree of virilocality and the degree of male autonomy on the Curuçá River, indicating that where men have more choice, they more frequently choose virilocality. For these reasons, one might expect that men from prominent families will be more likely to seek virilocal arrangements because such men have more leverage to negotiate, whereas demographically poor or spatially broken families have little or no leverage. But in fact, men from prominent as well as broken families enter uxorilocal polygyny. I noted the case of Tae, who was from a spatially disrupted family, and he entered uxorilocal polygyny at Aldeia Agua Branca. This case fulfills the expectation that the socially poor should seek uxorilocality. However, there are contradictory cases. For example, Eduardo, uxorilocal/polygynous daughter's husband of Ronipapa at Aldeia

Liberdade, is the son of prominent Aldeia Maronal elder Misael, father of two of Alfredo's wives. I must conclude that whereas to some men uxorilocality may be undesirable, polygyny is always desirable and so uxorilocal polygyny remains an attractive option even for men from prominent families. Not all men have two daughters available for simultaneous marriage to one man: such opportunities are in fact rare, and I must assume that any man who is unmarried would seriously consider an offer of uxorilocal polygyny, especially since such situations often result in the son-in-law's eventual succession to headmanship bypassing the former headman's sons. As a means of production of the social network, uxorilocal polygyny has questionable long-term value, however. This is because while uxorilocal polygyny succeeds in retaining the women of the group, adding a man, and laying a foundation for future demographic growth, there is a strong recurring correlation between uxorilocal polygyny and departure of the *shovo*-owners' sons; this in turn is caused by the intervention of the sons-in-law between father and son in the political succession, which causes the natal group to become less desirable to the *shovo*-owners' son. For example, Mastōpapa married his daughter to Vimipeia; Vimipeia succeeded to the headmanship of Mastōpapa's *shovo* instead of Mastōpapa's son Wakanawa; Wakanawa left to become Vimipa's uxorilocal son-in-law. Uxorilocal polygyny can thus cause a slowing of demographic growth because the bypass in the political succession encourages the *shovo*-owner's sons to leave.

The case of Clóvis represents yet another means of accessing polygyny, which is neither uxorilocal nor virilocal but both. Clóvis came from a socio-demographically poor nuclear family. His case is unlike all those discussed above: he did not have his family

negotiate multiple wives for him, nor did he negotiate them himself, nor, apparently, did he seek them out on his own and present the girls' kin with a *fait accompli*, all processes which end in virilocality. And, he did not accept uxorilocal polygyny, either. Clóvis' access to polygyny hinged on his key position mediating between the indigenous and non-indigenous worlds. He was given women in order to keep him connected to the Marubo village on the middle Curuçá when he threatened to vanish into the non-indigenous world. His value to the elders came from his superior skills in political relationships with non-indigenous people—he spoke Portuguese, understood non-indigenous people, and he fought for indigenous rights at a time (1983-1992) when few people were doing so in the Vale do Javari. It is unlikely that Clóvis planned to become polygynous; based on the available data, it seems he has had polygyny thrust upon him by circumstances, though he has not rejected it.

The significance of these data becomes clear if we consider how they affect the applicability of Clastres' notions on the role of polygyny in Amazonian society. In Clastres' interpretation, polygyny forms part of an exchange system which links leaders to non-leaders. Leaders must devote themselves to the group: they work harder than the rest to ensure group survival by guiding proper hunting and agricultural activities, and they give away all their possessions; in return they are given two or more wives, a privilege which is theirs and theirs alone: "Nearly all these [non-Andean South American] societies... recognize polygamy; and almost all of them recognize it as the usually exclusive privilege of the chief"(Clastres 1977[1974]:23). Clastres went on to emphasize the restricted nature of polygyny:

But it should also be mentioned that Indian polygyny is limited strictly to a small number of individuals, nearly always chiefs. And it is understandable that the situation could not be otherwise. If one takes into account the fact that the natural sex ratio, or numerical relationship of the sexes, could never be such as to permit every man to marry more than one woman, it is obvious that generalized polygyny is a biological impossibility: hence, it is culturally restricted to certain individuals. This natural determination is confirmed by an examination of the ethnographic data: of the 180 or 190 tribes practicing polygyny, only ten or so do not assign it any limits. That is, in those tribes every adult male can marry more than one woman. They are, for example, the Achagua, who are Northwestern Arawak, the Chibcha, the Jivaro, and the Rucuyen, a Carib people of Guiana." (Clastres 1977[1974]: 24-25)

The first correction we can bring to this picture concerns the idea that generalized polygyny is biologically impossible because of the sex ratio. Any society can overcome this problem by manipulating the relative age of marriage for males and females. As long as the gap between the age of proper marriage for men and for women is maintained, there will be more women than men available for marriage. Hypothetically, a group which retarded age of male marriage to 30 while maintaining age of female marriage at 13 or 14 could have very widespread polygyny (cf. Goodale (1974) on the Tiwi of north Australia). There is nothing biologically impossible about generalized polygyny.

If his statement about biological impossibility of generalized polygyny cannot be accepted, then the conclusion he draws therefrom must be carefully examined. Clastres argued that the biological impossibility of generalized polygyny manifested itself culturally in non-Andean indigenous South America as a near-universal restriction of polygyny to chiefs. Given the available Marubo data, I must do one of two things: either accept that the Marubo are an absolutely unique case, or question Clastres' ethnological synthesis. The Marubo present us with a situation where polygyny is definitely not restricted to chiefs, nor to any particular class of people (such as warriors, shamans, etc.), and yet it **is** restricted to 15.7% of married men. Yet that restriction is not the way

Clastres says it is. Clastres claims it is a socially assigned restriction, so that society has created a category of people, assigned to that category the ability to be polygynous, and everyone in that category takes advantage of the opportunity from which those outside the category are strictly excluded. In contrast, among the Marubo some individuals who start with very low status become polygynous along with the very few prominent men who have polygyny arranged for them by their families. And then there are cases of Marubo men of high status who did *not* have multiple women arranged for them, but sought out and obtained such an arrangement on their own. Finally there are several cases of Marubo settlement leaders who are not polygynous at all. Thus, among the Marubo, polygyny is as much a matter of individual accomplishment as it is of social assignment. Instead of a characteristic constantly associated with a definite social category, polygyny may be better seen as the prize in a system of individual competition in which the odds favor prominent families which can negotiate an actual or potential exchange, and where the odds definitely favor the children of prominent chiefs, but where the competition is in fact open so that anyone who can find a winning strategy is free to do so. One may see chieftainship and social prominence as the most frequently successful strategies for achieving polygyny, rather than as categories with an automatic, socially assigned quality of polygyny. Thus polygyny can be something which almost effortlessly is bestowed upon a high-status Marubo man; on the other hand, it can be a **means** whereby a low-status Marubo man *becomes* high-status.

If we accept Clastres' ethnological synthesis of non-Andean indigenous South American polygyny, then the Marubo are a unique case, because they are neither generalized (wherein a majority of men would be polygynous) nor restricted to any

particular social category. But I think that Clastres' synthesis must be questioned also. He says that his conclusions are based on "the approximate but probable figure of about 200 ethnic groups for all of South America" (1977[1974]:24). Out of these, he says "information available on them attests to the existence of strict monogamy only for some ten groups" (1977[1974]:24). He argues further that "...of the 180 or 190 tribes practicing polygyny, only ten or so do not assign it any limits" (1977[1974]:25). The first problem with these data is that Clastres does not state that he has ethnographic data on 200 groups; he says there exist approximately 200 groups, and out of these, he has found 10 which practice monogamy and ten which practice generalized polygyny. But he never claims to have done a review of the 180 groups remaining, never claims to have analyzed how polygyny is distributed in these groups. In fact, he leaves the impression that such data do not necessarily exist for all these groups. He does not even work with a precise figure, showing that his conclusions are impressionistic rather than the result of an accurate study. Certainly he did not have ethnographies for all these groups; at best, he had isolated data, many of them probably observations by travellers. He did not have access to the numerous excellent ethnographies of non-Andean indigenous South American groups written over the past twenty years. Yet supplementing simple observations and interviews with thick, diachronic ethnographic research has a profound impact on our view of how polygyny is socially distributed, so that results arrived at by more superficial methods must be questioned. Consider how I might perceive the Marubo data if I had *only* census data, not supplemented by interviews. When a low-status individual marries into uxorilocal polygyny, then his wife's brothers move out, then the in-marrier becomes the headman upon his wife's father's death, the result is a

man who is the headman of his settlement and who is polygynous. But he did not start out as a headman, nor was he handed polygyny as a social right. In fact, he became a headman by first becoming polygynous, a state which most of his social equals have not achieved. Thus, for the Marubo, the whole idea of society assigning polygyny to certain social categories and carefully restricting it to those categories and those categories alone must be set aside once we have details on the processes whereby polygyny is actually realized.

If the idea that society assigns limits to polygyny is problematic, then the idea that the group gives the chief his wives is even more so. Clastres' concept of 'group' seems coterminous with 'settlement':

The size of the group varies considerably in South America, depending on the geographic milieu, the way food is acquired, the level of technology. A band of Guayaki or Siriono nomads, peoples without agriculture, rarely number more than 30 persons. By contrast, Tupinamba or Guarani villages, inhabited by sedentary farmers, sometimes contain more than a thousand persons. The large communal house of the Jivaro shelters from 80 to 300 residents, and the Witoto community includes roughly 100 persons. Depending on the cultural area, therefore, the average size of sociopolitical units can undergo substantial variation. It is all the more striking to find that all of these cultures, from the wretched Guayaki band to the enormous Tupi village, recognize and accept the model of plural marriage; moreover, this frequently takes the form of sororate polygyny.

(Clastres 1977[1974]:23-24)

This raises a major problem, namely the fact that a polygynous man's wives do not necessarily come from one's own residential group. Clastres seems to simply assume this and never questions it: "It is evident that for the group, which has relinquished a considerable quantity of its most essential values—the women—for the chief's benefit, the daily harangues and the meager economic goods of which the leader disposes do not

amount to an equivalent compensation" (Clastres 1977[1974]:29). In Clastres' view, the group gives women to the chief. A careful examination of the data on Marubo polygyny reveals no sign of this phenomenon. There is never a cohesive 'group', standing against the leader, which 'decides' as if it were a bounded and unified consciousness, to 'give' its women to the group. Consider the case of Alfredo, who was inheriting the headmanship from his father. Firstly it should be noted that one of his wives came from the Ituí River, not from the Curuçá at all. Secondly, his multiple marriages were arrived at by negotiation between Alfredo's immediate family and the immediate families of the women involved, and since the women involved were of two separate families, this required two separate sets of negotiations. Clastres' idea suggests that the entire Marubo nation got together to discuss what women were to be given to the headman's son. Nothing of the sort occurs. It is only the immediate coresident group of the girl that feels a loss. If a woman goes from a group that is not mine to another group that is not mine, then I feel no loss. In Alfredo's case, the women he married all came from different coresident groups than his. Therefore, Clastres' interpretive framework is not applicable to Marubo data. The political economy of people framework, in contrast, is applicable. Marubo restricted polygyny can be seen as resulting from a situation where polygyny is desirable, but individuals who seek this goal must work to achieve it, and a mix of adroit strategy, inventiveness, luck, and skill are required to obtain and retain the prize, hence a low (15.7%) success rate. Again I should emphasize the significance of this conclusion: polygyny is not a matter of people of high status being *given* multiple wives; it is a matter of people who *want* high status *working* to obtain multiple wives as part of an overall strategy to obtain that high status.

Analysis of Marubo marriage thus reveals inequalities in access to the basic means of production of the social network. Marriage is the most fundamental means of production of the social network. This analysis has shown that inequalities develop not so much in access to marriage, but in access to plural marriage. Plural marriage is restricted to 15.7% of the married male population. I showed that high social status and relatedness to headmen are not necessarily predictors of access to plural marriage. Sons of socio-demographically ‘wealthy’ or politically prominent headmen do have the advantage but sons of low status and of spatially disrupted families also may access polygyny by a variety of strategies. The end result, nevertheless, is that a very few have multiple wives while the majority have single wives. I will take two approaches to evaluating the impact of this inequality. First, I will check for correlations between access to polygyny and relatively high demographic growth. Second, I will calculate the difference in reproductive capacity between polygynous and monogamous groups.

To check for correlations between polygyny and relatively high demographic growth, I will modify the data compiled in Table 8.4. That table shows the populations of Marubo *shovo* in 1974-75 and of the same groups in 1997-98, and renders the population figures as percentages of the total population. As a measure of relative growth, I will use the difference between a group’s 1997-98 percentage of the total population and that same group’s 1974-75 percentage of the total population. The results are shown in Table 9.4. Only three of the local groups in existence in 1974-75 have increased their size as a relative proportion of the total population, whereas eleven have increased their absolute numbers.

TABLE 9.4.: Relative demographic growth correlated with polygyny.

<u>Group</u>	Change in relative percentage of population, <u>1974-5 to 1997-8</u>	#polygynous marriages, <u>1974-5</u>	#polygynous marriages, <u>1997-98</u>
São Salvador	+10.34	0	2
Lauro Brasil	+3.16	1	1
Raimundo Dionisio	+0.75	1	2
Carlos	-0.36	3	1
Vicente	-0.80	0	0
Paulino	-1.35	0	0
Américo	-1.54	1	2
Reissamon	-2.10	2	2
José Nascimento velho	-3.93	4	2
Mariano	-4.28	0	0
Paulo	-4.46	1	1
João Grande/João Pequeno/Miguel	-6.18	2	1
Aurélio	-6.35	0	0

Table 9.4 shows that the groups which have grown the most unequally are not the groups with the most polygyny. The group at that was at São Salvador in 1974-75 (at São Sebastião by 1997-98) has grown the most of all. However, this group started out with no polygynous marriages; the two polygynous marriages I recorded in my census—those of Clóvis and of Cassimiro—were demographically insignificant. The growth of this settlement is to be attributed to other factors, which I will discuss below. Likewise, the settlement of Lauro Brasil, today a three-*shovo* village called Aldeia Alegria, has grown from 17 people to 64, with only a single polygynous marriage (that of Lauro). The group with the most polygynous marriages, that of José Nascimento velho, is in the bottom half of the proportional growth list. In contrast, two groups without polygynous marriage—those of Vicente and of Paulino—stand in the top half of the list. On the other hand, polygyny has *some* effect: for example, the four groups which enjoyed the least proportional growth are groups with one or no polygynous marriages; all the groups which have actually enjoyed an increase in relative proportion of the total population are groups with one or two polygynous marriages; and all the groups with at least two polygynous marriages have enjoyed an increase in absolute if not relative numbers. These figures show that polygyny may have some effect in the development of demographic inequalities among Marubo groups, but it is not the only factor, nor even the most important one; moreover, the numbers involved on a per village basis are too small for statistical tests of significance.

The actual impact of polygyny can be estimated by comparing the growth rates of polygynous families to those of monogamous families. To do this, it is necessary to have an idea of the *end results* of family-building processes. It will not do to include in one

sample recently-married couples with no children along with elders who have had thirteen children by three wives. What I am looking for are data that show the difference in demographic potential between polygyny and monogamy. To this end, I compiled data on men whose growing families can be traced from the 1974-75 census to the 1997-98 census. To be included, a man must have been married in 1974-75, and still be alive in 1997-98. I counted only children who were alive and identifiable in my census. Children who were recorded in the 1974-75 census but who were not alive or not identifiable in 1997-98 were not counted. Tracking children across the two censuses presented a further problem. Marubo of both sexes are renamed regularly in the course of their lives. People who were identified by their childhood names in 1974-75 are now identified by adult names. Since the adult naming system is teknonymic, adults may rename themselves or be renamed, or be referred to by reference to any one of a number of their offspring. Children may be referred to by different names by their mothers and fathers, and may also have one or more nicknames. These difficulties are greater for the Ituí data because I never lived there. On the Curuçá River I came to know many of the families personally and obtain accurate census data. Therefore, in order to minimize errors, use reasonably accurate figures, and still maintain a meaningful sample, I have restricted this particular analysis to men who were on the Curuçá River in 1974-75. I thus compare 21 men who were alive and married on the Curuçá River in 1974-75 and are still alive today. Seven of these men have been or are married to more than one woman simultaneously; fourteen have been restricted to one wife at a time. The results are shown in Table 9.5.

TABLE 9.5.: Number of children of polygynous and monogamous men on the Curuçá River, 1974-1998.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Marital Status</u>	<u># Children</u>
Alfredo	Polygynous	13
Wanõpa	Polygynous	13
Sinãpa	Polygynous	12
José Barbosa	Polygynous	11
Cassimiro	Polygynous	9
Misael	Polygynous	8
Carlos	Polygynous	8
Joãozinho	Monogamous	8
Wasamashëpa	Monogamous	8
Zacarias	Monogamous	7
Shetãpa	Monogamous	7
Saide	Monogamous	7
Võpa	Monogamous	6
Aurélio	Monogamous	6
Ivãpa	Monogamous	5
Panípa	Monogamous	4
César	Monogamous	4
Miguel	Monogamous	4
Menêpa	Monogamous	4
Okãpa	Monogamous	2
Lauro	Monogamous	1

Table 9.5 shows that although polygyny is not the main cause for the development of demographic inequalities at the settlement level, it produces extremely unequal results at the family level. The most children any monogamous man had was eight, and the least children any polygynous man had was eight, so the largest family a monogamous man can hope to have is the same as the smallest family a polygynous man can expect to have. The men who have the largest families are all polygynous; the men who have the smallest families are all monogamous. The implications are clear: polygyny creates inequalities in size of social network at the family level. Men who have multiple wives simultaneously end up with larger families than men who don't. These processes have some impact in producing inter-settlement inequalities, but to fully explain the latter will require analysis of other means of production of the social network. Before moving on to analyze other identifiable means of production of the social network, I will summarize the findings on marriage.

I already have shown that a great deal of Marubo energy is invested in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of social networks, or in efforts by individuals to join a social network; these energy expenditures constitute a political economy of people. Marriage is the foundation of any efforts to form a social network. My analysis showed that virtually any man who wants a wife is able to find one, the only exception being men who repeatedly violate key social norms. On the other hand, a great deal of women, as many as a fifth of the total, do not marry because of out-of-wedlock childbirths. Nevertheless, there is no scarcity of women for men because women marry younger than men, and for a wide-based age pyramid such as the Marubo's, this allows for the withdrawal of women through single motherhood to be compensated by the addition of

new young girls to the pool of marriageable females. Inequalities in access to the means of production of the social network do not develop at this level. Inequalities do develop at the level of polygyny. Only 15.7% of married men are polygynous. These men are far more likely to end up with a large family than are monogamous men. Those who can access polygyny will eventually produce a larger social network than those who cannot. Despite this, polygyny alone cannot explain the demographic inequalities that have developed in Marubo society over the past generation (1974-1998).

Once an individual has married and has reproductively capable children, a second means of production of the social network comes into play: the ability to control one's children's (and other key coresidents') postmarital residence. It does the social-network producer no good in the long term to have a large number of children if those children all leave to marry elsewhere. Given the issue at hand we must ask the question, does differential ability to control children's postmarital residence affect the development of intersettlement inequalities? To address this question, I will sample those coresident networks which existed in 1974-75 and still existed in 1997-98, since it is the unequal demographic developments in these groups, as displayed in Chapter Eight, which require explanation. Table 8.4 showed that coresident networks which existed in 1974-75 and still existed in 1997-98 have had unequal results in terms of demographic development. I have already shown that group expansion is a major goal of leaders and serves as one criterion by means of which leaders' success is evaluated, and that unequal success in group expansion is a mathematical fact. I have also shown through logical argumentation that, given the fact that their group's demographic growth is a goal of leaders, postmarital residence must be a major concern of theirs, and I provided examples to support this

argument. The available census data allows for a mathematical tabulation of the effects of control of postmarital residence on Marubo group growth.

To evaluate the extent to which leaders' varying control over postmarital residence affects their groups' size, I selected the seven groups which existed on the upper Ituí River in 1974-75 and still remained there in 1997-98. There are several reasons for this choice of sample. The most important consideration was that the complexity of the data analysis and time limitations on this dissertation make it impossible at the time of writing to analyze the entire Marubo population sample. Second, Marubo groups on the Curuçá River have been subject to other means of production of the social network which I will discuss below; control over postmarital residence will not explain the development, for example, of Aldeia São Sebastião on the middle Curuçá. Third, the groups of the upper Ituí run the gamut of demographic success (see Table 9.4.), from Lauro Brasil's successful group, now Aldeia Alegria (+3.16% change in relative percentage of Marubo population), to Mariano's unsuccessful group (-4.28% change in relative percentage of Marubo population). And, since many of the marriages on the upper Ituí are with other people in that same area, much (though by no means all) of the variation in control over postmarital residence reflects a zero-sum game being played among leaders vying for control over limited resources. The results of the data analysis are shown in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6 shows that variations in control of postmarital residence have a major impact on the development of demographic inequalities among upper Ituí Marubo groups. The purpose of this table is to tabulate the incidents of reproductive association that have occurred in a group and to determine if those associations have resulted in gains

TABLE 9.6.: Effects of control over postmarital residence on development of demographic inequalities among upper Ituí Marubo groups.

<u>Group</u>		#RA	#RA+	RA+LTE	#RA-	RA-LTE	#RA0	RA0LTE
1. Lauro Brasil 17/4.51→64/7.67		16	5	+14	2	-3	4	+14
2. Raimundo Dionísio 22/5.84→55/6.59		15	6	+24	2	-2	8	+24
3. Paulino 20/5.31→33/3.96		10	4	+10	3	-10	3	+10
4. Américo 23/6.1→38/4.56		16	6	+22	8	-43	1	+2
5. Reissamon 26/6.9→40/4.8		10	4	+19	4	-24	2	+3
6. José Nascimento velho 32/8.49→38/4.56		11	5	+14	4	-44	2	+10
7. Mariano 27/7.16→24/2.88		12	4	+19	7	-38	1	-10

Abbreviations

RA-----Reproductive associations

RA+-----Reproductive associations resulting in gain to group

RA- -----Reproductive associations resulting in loss to group

RA0 -----Reproductive associations resulting in neither gain nor loss to group

LTE -----Long-term effects

The figures under each group leader's name represent the total number of inhabitants from 1974-75 followed by the percentage of the total Marubo population in 1974-75, then after the arrow the total number of inhabitants and the percentage of the total Marubo population in 1997-98.

or losses for the group. The key figure to note is the difference between RA+ and RA-, which is the difference between the gains and losses through postmarital residence. All the cases of RA+ are cases where a member of the group has attracted a spouse. Next to the figures for RA+ are those for long-term effects of these marriages, which I have abbreviated RA+LTE. This figure represents the results of RA+ in terms of children, children's spouses and children's children that have accrued to the group thanks to the marriages represented by RA+. Conversely, the category RA- represents individuals who have left the group to marry elsewhere. Under RA-LTE I have calculated the long-term effect of losses through postmarital residence. This figure represents the total number of children, children's spouses, and children's children produced by individuals who have left the group to marry elsewhere. These are gains which have accrued to other groups, but which could have accrued to the group in question if the marriage had resulted in someone coming into the group rather than going out of it. The category of RA0 is more varied than the previous two. Under RA0 are all reproductive associations which have not resulted in the departure or arrival of either of the two people involved. Many of these are women who have had children out of wedlock. These women do not bring in husbands, but they do produce modest demographic gains for the group. Also under RA0 are some natolocal marriages, some of which are very demographically productive. Finally, there are widows and divorcées who have returned to their natal home. Under RA0LTE I calculated the long-term effects of the associations represented by RA0. Thus, after the death of a man in the group of Raimundo Dionísio, his widow returned with her five children and three grand-children to her natal group, that of José Nascimento. This event is recorded as RA0 for both groups, with a +8 to the RA0LTE

for José Nascimento and a -8 to the RA0LTE of Raimundo Dionísio, because the children produced by the marriage wound up adding to the population of José's group.

The figures in Table 9.6 show that the groups which have gained the most are those for which $((RA+)-(RA-))>2$. These are groups whose gains through postmarital residence are greater than their losses through postmarital residence, and for which this difference is greater than it is for any of the other groups in the sample. Another feature which distinguishes the top two groups is that their RA- is lower than that of groups 3 through 7, and their RA-LTE is small compared to groups 3 through 7. If groups 3 through 7 had been able to control postmarital residence to the degree to which groups 1 and 2 did, then they would not have lost ground in terms of relative proportion of the Marubo population. This tells us that groups which have prospered demographically have managed to maximize the reproductive potential they had in 1974-75 by minimizing the flow of marriage partners out of this group.

The total Marubo population can be likened to the market for a particular product such as soft drinks. In the world economy, corporations compete for a market share whose overall size is limited. Each corporation's market share increases or decreases relative to others, but the total always remains 100%. In the Marubo case, many new coresident groups have emerged over the past generation, and each has come to represent a percentage of the population, which makes it hard for the older groups to hold on to or increase their 'market share' of the population. In Table 9.4 the older groups (the only ones for whom data on change in 'market share' over time are available) are listed in order in terms of the change in their 'market share' from 1974 to 1998. Except for the village of São Salvador/São Sebastião, whose extraordinary growth will be explained

below, the only two groups that have gained ‘market share’ were that of Lauro Brasil (later Aldeia Alegria) and that of Raimundo Dionísio. Table 9.6 shows that these two groups share certain characteristics which set them apart from other groups. Both of the groups that have increased their share have (1) controlled postmarital residence of their members to a greater extent than have other groups, and (2) have maximized the potential for growth inherent to their 1974 composition. Characteristic (1) can be seen by calculating $((RA+)-(RA-))$, which is >2 only among the two groups that have gained the most, showing that the groups that have gained the most are also those who have exercised greatest control over postmarital residence. Characteristic (2) can be seen by looking at the figures for RA-LTE. Each of the upper Ituí groups had, in 1974, a certain potential for growth. In the case of groups which exercised control over the postmarital residence of their members, most of that potential has remained in the group, contributing to their relatively elevated demographic growth. In the case of groups that have exercised less control over their members’ postmarital residence, much of that potential has wound up elsewhere. This effect can be quantified as a figure I call ‘retention of potential’, or RP. This figure is calculated by first adding up all the long-term effects of reproductive associations (RA+LTE, RA-LTE, and RA0LTE), all rendered as positive numbers and added together, signifying the total results of growth from the basic potential extant in 1974, then taking the positive numbers as a percentage of the total. Thus, the total long-term effects of reproductive associations of Lauro Brasil’s 1974 group is $14+3+14$, or 31. Of these, only 3 have accrued to other groups (negative numbers), while 28 have remained with Lauro (positive numbers). By dividing 28/31, we arrive at a RP (retention of potential) figure of 90.3% for this group. Raimundo

Dionísio's group's RP is 96% (48/50); Paulino's group's RP is 66.7% (20/30); Américo's group's RP is 35.8% (24/65), Reissamon's group's RP is 47.8% (22/46); José Nascimento's group's RP is 35.2% (24/68), and Mariano's group's RP is 28.4% (19/67). Thus, the only groups in the sample that have gained population 'market share' can once again be shown mathematically to share a demographic trait: RP>90%. I conclude that control over postmarital residence is a key factor in explaining the unequal demographic success of upper Ituí Marubo groups over the past generation. The groups that have gained in relative percentage of total population are the only ones with $((RA+)-(RA-))>2$ and RP>90%.

Although the most demographically successful groups share characteristics when analyzed mathematically, in fact the leaders have employed somewhat different strategies to achieve that success. The *shovo* of Raimundo Dionísio has been involved in a Kariera-type exchange system with other *shovo* at Aldeia Vida Nova. This system has included several natalocal marriages, several gains to the group, and not many losses. In contrast, the group of Lauro Brasil has not been involved in any strict Kariera-type exchange system; rather, they have successfully combined uxorilocality of women with virilocality of men. These two different strategies have worked very well for both groups, although Lauro's has been somewhat more successful. The Kariera system tends to distribute people equally among groups, theoretically allowing each group to grow at a rate equal to others', which is exactly what happened to Raimundo Dionísio (minimal change of +0.75% in relative percentage of total population). Combining virilocality of men with uxorilocality of women, in contrast, must result in unequally superior gains for the group

which successfully practices this strategy, and that is what happened to Lauro Brasil's group (gain of +3.16% in relative percentage of total population, one of the largest gains).

This type of analysis also reveals strategies that are not so successful, specifically, the strategy of uxorilocality. I have already shown that it is common for upper Ituí leaders to attract uxorilocal in-marriers for their daughters, often in polygynous contexts. I have also shown that this interjects an individual intermediary in status between the *shovo*-owner and his oldest son. Furthermore, sons often leave the natal group when this occurs, because their chances of becoming group leader have been decreased by the presence of the higher-status in-marrier. This strongly affects those groups' potential retention figures. For example, as part of his strategy for group expansion Américo married his daughters to Vimipa; but Américo's oldest son Firmino left to found his own residence. Firmino had 9 children, two children's spouses, and five children's children by 1997, all of which are negative long-term effects for Américo's group. Likewise, in Mariano's group Mariano had married uxorilocal to the former leader Mastópapa's daughter. Mariano became the leader; Mastópapa's sons went to live elsewhere. Mastópapa's son Saípapa has had eight children, three children's spouses and 14 children's children; Mastópapa's son Wakanawa has had nine children, two children's spouses, and three children's children. The departure of Mastópapa's sons has resulted in a relatively low potential retention for Mariano's group. The group of José Nascimento has also suffered relatively low potential retention due to the departure of two married sons of the *shovo*-leader, in a context where an uxorilocal in-marrier had higher status than the *shovo*-owner's sons. Thus, uxorilocal polygyny results in relatively low potential retention, and is relatively less successful in the long term than combining

virilocality of men with uxorilocality of women, or than practicing natolocality and strict Kariera-type exchange.

Before moving on to analyze other means of production of the social network, it is necessary to specify the significance of these results in terms of the effect of an exchange-based kinship structure on the potential for political inequality. In the study of lowland South American groups, the notions of marriage exchange and egalitarian politics have been linked together since the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Lévi-Strauss identified the kinship systems of lowland South America as elementary structures of kinship, and argued that they operated to cause exchanges among groups, and that these exchanges had the quality of maintaining equilibrium among groups. But Lévi-Strauss went further, as I argued in Chapter Eight. Having established reciprocity as a feature of the kinship system he argued that this was a basic organizational principle of such societies, affecting their economic systems, and spreading to the political sphere. This notion is not compatible with the Marubo data, which indicate that reciprocity in the kinship sphere does not correlate with reciprocity in the political sphere. In Chapter Eight I showed that the Marubo kinship system did have the quality of distributing marriage partners equally among all exogamous units, just as Lévi-Strauss' theories predicted. However, I also showed that political units did not have the same properties as kinship units. In this chapter, I have sought an explanation for this distinction. I have shown that although kinship units have all had identical levels of success in growth, political units have had very different levels of success and failure. I conclude that just because a society has an elementary structure of kinship generating reciprocity at the kinship level, that reciprocity does not necessarily operate on the political level. Kinship

units do not vary their relative proportion of the total population; political units do. Leaders actively endeavor to make their groups bigger than others'. The presence of a reciprocal exchange system among kinship units does not necessarily imply political egalitarianism.

Other than control over postmarital residence, the variable that has the most value for explaining the data on development of Marubo intergroup demographic differences is that of type of relation to nonindigenous people. There is clear evidence that among the Marubo, access to valued relations with non-indigenous people serves as a means of production of the social network. Such relations are highly sought after by Marubo groups and certain types of relation to non-indigenous people serve as demographic attraction points. Evidence of this comes from: (1) Aldeia Maronal, where the headman has used an airstrip and mission to attract a large village; (2) Aldeia São Salvador/São Sebastião, which formed around a FUNAI post; (3) Aldeia Rio Novo, which also formed around a FUNAI post; (4) Aldeia Vida Nova, which formed around a New Tribes mission; and (5) the case of Clóvis' polygyny. All these are situations in which relationships to non-indigenous people have served as a means of production of the social network.

The connection between relations to non-indigenous people and production of social networks has already been established in Chapters Five and Six. Here it is necessary only to recontextualize those data. In Chapter Six I analyzed Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people, focusing on Aldeia Maronal. I described how Alfredo Barbosa had an airstrip built, then invited the New Tribes mission to the village. This brought education and health care to Aldeia Maronal. In Chapter Five I described

how Alfredo was able to use the mission's presence to issue invitations to move and attract more residents to his village. Putting these data together, I must conclude that what propelled the transformation of Alfredo's settlement from a pair of related *shovo* to a large multi-*shovo* village was Alfredo's ability to attract the mission, which in turn rendered his village attractive to potential coresidents and allowed him to render successful invitations to move. Subsequent to the attraction of his brother José and of his affine Wanōpa, Alfredo continued to make his village more attractive via relations to non-indigenous people. He had the wood cut to buy the generator, and acquired the television and satellite dish. In interviews, Alfredo stated explicitly that one of his goals was to make his village more attractive so that people would want to move there.

The establishment of Aldeia São Salvador, Aldeia Rio Novo, and Aldeia Vida Nova followed a pattern similar but not identical to that of Aldeia Maronal. In all these cases, types of relationships to non-indigenous people became attractive foci for demographic relocation. These processes were described in Chapter Five. In the case of Aldeia São Salvador, now São Sebastião, the location of a FUNAI post became a focus for the relocation of a number of subgroups from the upper Curuçá and, later, the Ituí River. That is what allowed the village to grow at a rate so unequally fast relative to other Marubo settlements (see Table 8.4.). It was not internal processes such as polygyny and control of postmarital residence that allowed for that growth; it was the fact that FUNAI was promising a never-ending flow of education, health care, and metal goods. Aldeia Rio Novo emerged for similar reasons—the establishment of a FUNAI post. In both these cases the FUNAI post was eventually removed, but the villages did not break up. Access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people was the main reason behind

the changes of residence which resulted in the formation of both villages. That is also the case with Aldeia Vida Nova. Aldeia Vida Nova was formed when the New Tribes mission established itself on the upper Ituí and a number of coresident groups relocated to live near it. These groups became Aldeia Vida Nova. The similarity between these three cases and that of Aldeia Maronal is that in all four cases relationships to non-indigenous people serve as means of production of the social network. The difference is that in the case of Aldeia Maronal the non-indigenous people were brought in by a Marubo leader and then used as a means of attracting others. In the other three cases, the non-indigenous people moved independently, and Marubo groups moved towards them without any invitation by an indigenous leader.

Further evidence making relationships to non-indigenous people a means of production of the social network comes from the case of Clóvis' polygyny. In my discussion of polygyny, I noted that the way Clóvis entered polygyny was unusual in that he came from a spatially disrupted and socio-demographically poor family group. He was not in an exchange system, had no elders to negotiate for him, and no future marriage partners in the group to negotiate with, anyway. Instead, the father of his two wives was (according to Clóvis) motivated to allow polygyny in order to secure Clóvis' valuable relations to non-indigenous people. I noted earlier that polygyny is a somewhat rare privilege (only 15.7% of Marubo men are polygynous), and that polygyny confers upon its practitioners unequal ability to produce a social network, as demonstrated by the fact that the largest family a monogamous man can be expected to have is equal to the smallest family a polygynous man can be expected to have. Therefore, since Clóvis accessed polygyny by means of creating relationships to non-indigenous people that are

valuable to his wives' father, those relationships have helped give Clóvis unequal access to the means of production of the social network.

From these five cases I conclude that the establishment of valuable relationships to non-indigenous people does serve as a significant means of production of the social network in Marubo society. One of the key data from Table 8.4 is thereby explained—the relatively explosive growth of Aldeia São Salvador into the modern-day Aldeia São Sebastião. The emergence of Aldeia Maronal as the largest Marubo village also has a great deal to do with the fact that headman Alfredo was able to provide attractive foci of non-indigenous activity, giving greater appeal to his invitations to move. Control over valuable relationships to non-indigenous people thus allows the controller to attract others as coresidents or in some other way to unequally access the means of production of the social network.

The correlation between valuable interethnic relations and demographic/residential relocations among Amazon Indians can be traced back to pre-Hispanic times through ethnohistorical data. For example, Renard-Casevitz and Saignes report that

The Cashinahua, as one of their myths tells us, were *mitmaqkuna*, voluntary or forced... During [the] great Inca expeditions towards the Mojo they were conquered or "invited", unless they migrated of their own free will... Subjugated by arms **or by desire for metal**, some Cashinahua were for a time under Inca tutelage and installed by them in the vicinity of Opatari, according to a letter of Acosta which provides a notable convergence between historical data and oral tradition.

(Renard-Casevitz, Saignes, and Taylor 1988); translation and boldface by author)

Processes whereby lowland South American groups relocated for access to Inca products were not restricted to the Cashinahua. Renard-Casevitz and Saignes write that, although the movement of highland colonists to the lowlands is well-known,

Less well known is the transference of groups from the lowlands to more elevated sectors of the [Andes'] slopes, whether they were conquered or simply attracted by the 'generosity' of the Inca **and the access to metal**. Garcilaso writes that:

'With those Chunchos who went with the embassy and those who came later was peopled a village near Tono, 26 leagues from Cuzco; they asked permission from the Inca to inhabit this place in order to serve him more closely and they stayed there to this day.'

(Renard-Casevitz and Saignes 1988: 74. Translation and boldface by author)

A Marubo myth which I heard during my fieldwork, entitled *Inka Rura Re-e* narrates a journey by pre-Hispanic Marubo to a visit an ethnic group upriver (probably up the Ucayali) which, although it was not itself Inka, had access to Inka axes. This shows that after relocating in order to access Inka goods, the relocated groups could themselves serve as attractive foci to other groups further inland. Not only access to Inka goods had this effect, but also any key strategic resource, such as salt:

We know that Amuesha, Panatagua, Moco, Sisimpari, Tulumayo, Campa, and many other groups of the Huallaga, the Pachitea headwaters, and even the Ucayali (Shipibo, Conibo) maintained relations which brought them mutually into each others' villages... These...constituted an extensive net of effective alliances... promoting intertribal alliances, uniting foothill dwellers of an immense region.

Under the Inca as under the Spaniard, the attraction of metal oriented the movements of foothill dwellers westwards. The border villages, Moco, Sisimpari, and others now forgotten, the most favored in this competition and at the same time the most exposed, were the points of conversion of these nets, places where allies and friends of the whole interior could concentrate... When the Franciscans reached the Cerro de la Sal, another great pole of convergence, we see all these types of relations in action, regulating the supply of salt in an immense region (Urubamba-Ucayali).

(Renard-Casevitz and Saignes 1988: 197-198. Translation by author.)

The propensity of non-Andean indigenous South Americans to move towards metal was well exploited by the Spanish missionaries who entered the upper Amazon in the first half of the seventeenth century. Figueroa (1986[1661]) wrote that to convince the Mainas to settle in one place, the Spaniards employed a Nieva Indian (one already incorporated to the Spanish *encomienda* system) who was married to the daughter of a Maina leader. This man, Don Antón, was instrumental in convincing the Mainas to move. There is little doubt that whatever rhetoric Don Antón used to convince the Mainas to move included promises of access to Spanish goods, via cooperation with the *encomienda* system, which superficially resembled the Inka *mitmaqkuna* system. Once the Mainas were settled they were ruthlessly exploited for their labor, resulting in the Mainas uprising of 1635. After the uprising, Jesuit missionaries arrived. By 1638, a Jesuit went among the Mainas' neighbors, the Jeberos. Among the missionaries' priorities was *reducción*, the gathering of scattered Indians into a Spanish-style town where their labor could be controlled and indoctrination by the missionaries could proceed unimpeded. After a number of attempts, and by a combination of tactics, the missionary succeeded in convincing the Jeberos to build a large, concentrated village. Figueroa (1986[1661]:179; author's translation from Spanish) states that "without doubt it took a lot of time and effort to reduce them, much attention shown and many gifts, of axes, knives, needles, iron goads [*puyas*], fishing hooks, and other things they value." From the Jeberos mission, the same strategy was employed with regard to other neighboring groups. For example, Figueroa writes that "the Padre sent messages to the principal leader of the Munichis, convincing him to come see him. The leader came to see the Padre with some of his subjects to whom he spoke softly in order that they give

obedience to his majesty and accept indoctrination; and gave them axes and tools (principal show of affection and lure for these people) (1986[1661]:199)." These data strongly suggest that the use of access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people as focal points for residential relocations has great time-depth in non-Andean indigenous South American culture. When some Marubo decided to relocate from the upper Curuçá to the new FUNAI post on the middle Curuçá starting in 1974, they were following a deeply rooted cultural logic. Their ancestors had gone on long journeys to gather Inka products. Close kin of the proto-Marubo such as the Kaxinawa and Shipibo were involved in a system of strategic alliances and relations in which access to Inka goods was one of the primary goals. Kaxinawa groups relocated themselves to become intermediaries between the Inka and inlanders. The Marubo knew of such intermediaries and visited them regularly. Later on, the proto-Marubo lived on the outskirts of the social system created by the penetration of Jesuits into the upper Amazon. In this system, once again, there were sources of non-indigenous goods, and a game of politics and strategy surrounding who could have direct access and who only mediated access to those goods. The process of relocating to access non-indigenous goods, and the process of obtaining direct access to goods, then becoming oneself a focus for other indigenous people's relocation, are not new. The fact that Marubo consciously use relationships to non-indigenous people as a means of production of the social network is unsurprising if we consider the temporal and geographic extent of such behavior among lowland South Americans.

In addition to marriage, polygyny, control of postmarital residence, and access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people, I looked at two types of social behavior as

hypothetical means of production of the social network, behaviors that could cause their emitters to become socially attractive. One such social behavior is the performance of the characteristic role of leader. Since this is the topic of the next chapter, I will not consider the issue here. The second social behavior I looked at in this context is the performance of the role of shaman. Does a reputation for shamanic power function as a means of production of the social network? Available data suggest it does not. The primary shaman on the upper Curuçá for many years was Miguel. Miguel lived in his own *shovo* in 1974-75. However, as described in Chapter Five, his *shovo* broke up and he wound up living in someone else's *shovo*. His brothers and some of his sons all lived elsewhere. Miguel's was one of the stories of least success in terms of social-network construction. Another shaman was José Nascimento filho [the younger]. José had his own *shovo* with his wife and six children. Demographically, this was one of the smallest *shovo* in Marubo land. Having your own *shovo* is a sign of success, but relative to other *shovo*-owners, José's was somewhat small. His reputation for shamanic power did not give him any unequal power to attract coresidents. The third example is that of João Pajé, brother of Raimundo Dionísio. Raimundo Dionísio's *shovo*, as shown earlier, is one of the few that has maintained its share of the Marubo population. João Pajé died shortly before my arrival in the field. After his death, both of his ex-wives, along with almost all their children and children's children, returned to their uterine families. In this case, the shaman's presence does seem to have served as a social glue, because upon his death the *shovo* lost a great deal of personnel. But since there are two counter-examples, I must conclude that reputation for shamanic power alone does not serve as a means of production of the social network.

D. The Political Economy of People: Conclusions

This chapter has revealed one of the most common factors motivating Marubo people to take actions: the desire for a good social network. The social network is a highly valued product which takes considerable effort to produce. I showed that the distribution of the product is unequal, so that there are fundamental inequalities in the distribution of Marubo wealth if we look at social networks as wealth. I then examined how this valuable product is produced. I found that most of the means of production of the social network are as unequally distributed as the product. The one means of production of the social network which I found equally distributed was simple marriage. I found that the Marubo had virtually universalized access to marriage partners for men, despite processes that tended to reduce the number of women available. However, I found that polygyny conferred upon its practitioners an unequal ability to produce large social networks, and that polygyny was restricted to 15.7% of Marubo men. There was also inequality in the realm of control over postmarital residence. Groups with more control over postmarital residence have a greater ability to produce a large social network than do groups with less control, so that control over postmarital residence can be safely said to confer unequal access to the means of production of the social network. Finally, access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people is unequally distributed. Access to such relations also provides unequal access to the means of production of the social network.

If the inequality in distribution of product and means of production in the Marubo political economy of people is quite clear, the correlation of power to the production of inequality is less clear. I found that to a certain extent, in the realm of polygyny inequality leads to inequality, as it is easier for a member of a large social network to negotiate a marriage than it is for a member of a small social network. For example, Alfredo and Wanõpa have been able to enter polygyny through their and their family's skill at negotiating, which itself is partly based on a having something to offer one or two generations down the line. However, polygyny is not assured to anyone no matter how high their status, large their kin group, or good their relationships to non-indigenous people may be. A good social starting point helps, but it is also possible for men of less valued social networks to engage in upward social mobility by accessing polygyny. Such cases result in uxorilocal polygyny. When a man attempts upward social mobility by means of uxorilocal polygyny, the receiver of wives is subject to certain behavioral restrictions imposed by the giver. The receiver is expected to move in with the giver, contribute his labor to the giver's *shovo*, and remain in permanent coresidence, as in the cases of Wakanawa and Tae at Agua Branca. If the receiver does decide to leave, one wife stays with her father while the other stays with her husband, as in the cases of Wasinawa and Clóvis. In a sense, this is an issue of men who control the means of production of the social network having power over those who do not. The man who has two women available to give away in marriage, and sufficient control over the girls to secure their postmarital residence, is able to attract a man from a less-rich social network into coresidence. The paradox is that it is the powerless man who obtains the real prize—polygyny. The man who has power has it in virtue of previous efforts that have produced

a large, high-quality social network including two daughters of the right ages who can be used as leverage to control another, less powerful man. That other man is less powerful in this situation because his social network does not give him the same amount of options as the more powerful man's network gives. The main point, however, is that it is not by exercising power that one obtains access to the means of production of the social network; rather, it is by controlling the means of production of the social network that one obtains power. A number of individually successful events of control over means of production of the social network, leading to the production of a valuable social network, puts a man in a position where he is able to have some power over another man.

In the realm of control over postmarital residence, the role of power is even more difficult to discern. Again it can be seen that control of postmarital residence does not come **from** having more social wealth and power. In Table 9.6 it is clear that the groups with the most success are those that started in the weakest positions (proportion of total population <6%) while those with the least amount of success are those who started in the best positions (proportion of total population >7%). The data show an almost inverse correlation between starting level of social wealth and ability to control postmarital residence. This shows that the ability to control postmarital residence is not premised upon having social prominence and power. Each incident has to be managed individually by the social-network producer, and in this the poor have had more success than the rich. I hypothesize that the poor have a greater incentive to invest effort into controlling every case of postmarital residence, whereas the socially wealthy have less incentive; unfortunately, no clear answer as to why there is an inverse relation between starting social wealth and ability to control postmarital residence can be proposed yet. Nor does

success confer unequal power on the successful. I have argued in previous chapters that a main feature of upper Ituí politics is mutual neutralization by competing leaders. There were several events during fieldwork in which multiple upper Ituí groups competed over a prize, such as a proposed FUNAI post, but in which no leader was able to sway other leaders, and so instead of one person being victorious no one was. These incidents show that superior ability to control postmarital residence does not necessarily correlate with superior ability to control outcomes of political competitions with other leaders.

Where links between wealth and power are clearest is in the production of social networks by means of controlling access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people. In Chapter Six I exhaustively analyzed a field of social relations, that of relationships with non-indigenous people, in order to determine what goals were being pursued in that field, where conflict arose, and if anyone had an unequal ability to be victorious in conflicts of will. I found only two men with the quality of repeatedly winning conflicts of will: Alfredo and Clóvis. Both these are men who have employed valued relationships to non-indigenous people as means of production of the social network. Since the objective of this dissertation is to uncover modes of power and influence that cannot be perceived except by means of these especially designed methods, it is necessary to consider the precise nature of the correlations between power and social wealth in the cases of Clóvis and Alfredo.

Alfredo and Clóvis started in very different social positions and situations, but both ended up in positions where they had superior ability to control certain event-outcomes and public policy-making. Alfredo started in a privileged position, which he maintained and expanded. Clóvis started out from a socially impoverished position, but

used the means at his disposal to change his social position radically. I will examine Alfredo's path to *de facto* power first.

The basis of Alfredo's power was his position as founder of his own large village. Being the founder gave him legitimacy as the ultimate decision-making voice. But founding a village was not a simple act: it required many efforts, described in Chapters Five and Six. The basis of his ability to found Aldeia Maronal was certainly Alfredo's adept manipulation of labor forces, described in Chapter Seven. This, in turn, is both a social characteristic and a personal one. It is personal because Alfredo was considered to have greater ability to organize labor than his older brother Zacarias, showing that just being the son of the great leader João Tuxáua does not automatically predispose a man to success; great personal ability is also required. But it is social because Alfredo was the son of a polygynous leader; he had many brothers, sisters, and nephews; and the combination of his great organizational ability and his excellent social situation made him a force to be reckoned with. What he did with the labor force proved to be the crucial factor. Alfredo used the labor force to create conditions which permitted him to invite the missionaries to Aldeia Maronal. He marshalled work groups to cut the airstrip, then issued an invitation to the missionaries to move to his village. In doing so, he established a type of relationship to non-indigenous people that was unique in Marubo land. Elsewhere, it was the non-indigenous people who settled somewhere, then attracted indigenous people. For example, the villages of São Salvador, Rio Novo, and Vida Nova were all loci of non-indigenous settlement to which Marubo people were attracted. In the case of Alfredo the order was reversed: first Alfredo settled somewhere, then he invited the non-indigenous people to his place. Thus not only the order of settlement but also the

relations of power were inverted. After the missionaries had established a health care program, Alfredo's village became extremely attractive to potential coresidents and he was able to issue successful invitations to move. A variety of subgroups came to live around him and by the time of fieldwork, Aldeia Maronal was the largest of all Marubo villages. In Chapter Six I showed that in conflicts of will regarding public policy towards non-indigenous people, Alfredo was repeatedly victorious over the course of a year of fieldwork, a quality shared by no one else at Aldeia Maronal. I conclude that by employing a labor force to make his village attractive to non-indigenous people, then using the non-indigenous people as a means of production of the social network, Alfredo put himself in a position where he could exercise power in certain spheres of social decision-making.

In my political analysis of relationships to non-indigenous people (Chapter Six) I found that the only person aside from Alfredo who had the quality of repeatedly winning conflicts of will was the CIVAJA coordinator, Clóvis. Clóvis' path to political prominence demonstrates that despite the advantages enjoyed by men who start out in a socially prominent position, Marubo men may, by adeptly managing such means of production of the social network as are available to them, achieve upward mobility in terms of status, power, and social-network quality. Clóvis started out as an exiled stepchild, spending most of his youth away from his kin, living in the town of Benjamin Constant. When he returned to where his kin lived, in what was then Aldeia São Salvador, he became an asset in virtue of his greater ability to deal with non-indigenous people. He married the headman's daughter, and continued to work on the political organization of the Javari basin's indigenous people. According to his own testimony,

his value as a mediator with the non-indigenous world made him important enough that he married his wife's younger sister. Thus, despite coming from a background that was underprivileged even by Marubo standards, with little or no negotiating clout, he managed by age 29 to enter the restricted ranks of polygynous men. Once he became polygynous he definitely acquired unequal access to the means of production of the social network. He essentially used one means of production of the social network—access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people—to obtain a second means of production of the social network—polygyny. This put him in a condition where he had a relatively high degree of control over the means of production of the social network. Together with this high degree of control over the means of production, Clóvis had *de facto* power. This was shown in Chapter Six, where I demonstrated that Clóvis had emerged victorious from a succession of conflicts of will. Clóvis' superior access to and control of the Brazilian machinery of state had a lot to do with this. The link between means of production and exercise of power is quite clear: they are both results of his adept management of relationships to non-indigenous people. In contrast, in Alfredo's case there is a direct causal link: by controlling the means of production, Alfredo created a village; since the village was his, so was the power of ultimate decision-making and policy-setting. In Clóvis' case the link, though not so directly causal, is also clear. There are at least two cases, therefore, where superior control over means of production is linked to superior ability to impose one's will in conflict situations, i.e., *de facto* power.

Having discovered in particular cases a correlation, even a causal link between controlling the means of production of the social network and exercising power, it becomes necessary to ask how widespread this correlation is. To what extent are those

who have an unequal accumulation of the means of production and of the product able to coerce those who do not? The answer is that while it is **possible** for one who unequally accumulates means of production and product to end up in a position of superior power, it is rare. I mentioned that uxorilocal polygyny could be seen as the rich imposing their will on the poor; however, it is just as common for the socially wealthy to give away their daughters (e.g., Alfredo), and at any rate the wife-receiver in uxorilocal polygyny thereby receives unequal access to the means of production of the social network, and so in the act of having power exercised over them, they enter the ranks of those who could possibly exercise that power over others. Thus, if uxorilocal polygyny is an imposition of power, it is one that highlights the ultimate social mobility possible within Marubo society. Further evidence against generalizing the correlation between controlling means of production and exercising power comes from the Ituí River postmarital residence data. Despite unequal results in control of postmarital residence and access to non-indigenous people, the leaders of the upper Ituí repeatedly end up in political stalemates. In the case of the upper Ituí, control over means of production has not given the controller power. And the 25-year time-depth of the census data allows me to state that the groups that started out with the most product have done the least well, while those who started out demographically poor have done the best. Thus, control of the means of production does not in and of itself confer power upon the controller. It is true that the two Marubo I have isolated as having empirically observable power both have either superior social networks or superior control of the means of production of the social network. But the source of Clóvis' and Alfredo's power must be sought in the specifics of how they used their means of production. A simple, generalizable correlation does not exist.

This chapter not only highlighted a valued social product—the social network—the pursuit of which consumes a lot of Marubo human energy, it also sought to explain observed differences in ability to produce social networks and to analyze the means of production, the distribution of the means of production, and the possibility that unequal distribution can result in the exercise of power by the wealthy. The differences in growth rates among Marubo settlements were explained in terms of differential access to key means of production of the social network—control over postmarital residence and access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people. I found considerable variations in the level of control over the means of production of the social network. Thus, there is wealth, it is unequally distributed, and its means of production are unequally distributed. I finally asked whether these inequalities resulted in power for the unequal accumulator. The answer is that it can, but not necessarily. Extremely adept manipulation of key means of production of the social network is an evident characteristic of those two Marubo who could be said to have power. In Alfredo's case certainly, his position of power is premised on his having constructed a social network with characteristics distinct from any others (attraction of non-indigenous people to an indigenous village rather than vice-versa). But control over the means of production alone does not confer power; that control has to be very carefully applied for power to result, and only two Marubo have been able to bring about such a result.

CHAPTER TEN

THE ROLE OF MARUBO LEADER

Introduction

At the core of just about every conception of egalitarianism are ideas not only about the distribution of power in society, but also about the behavior of leaders and the processes whereby leaders emerge (e.g. Fried 1967; Clastres 1977[1974]; Boehm 1999). Since concepts of egalitarianism often rely on interpretations of leaders' behavior, in order for the data on Marubo politics to be relevant to the evaluation of these concepts it is therefore necessary to examine the role of leaders in Marubo society. The purpose of this chapter is to present such information about Marubo leaders as is needed to help make this dissertation relevant to evaluating the applicability of the concept of egalitarianism in certain Amazonian contexts.

A significant problem with the concept of egalitarianism itself is the wide variety of definitions and approaches that have been taken to it. Rather than arriving at a definition of egalitarianism and sticking with it, scholars have sought to add new layers of definitional qualities to an already meaning-laden word (e.g., Boehm 1999). Initial efforts at coping with societies we might now call 'egalitarian' were affected by prevailing structuralist and structural-functional thinking. Hence, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) and later Middleton and Tait (1958) focused mainly on the roles played by individuals occupying positions in the political system, i.e., leaders. Across the

Atlantic, Lévi-Strauss (1944) was carrying out pioneering research on Amazon Indian leaders, research that was used by Lowie (1948, 1949, 1973) to form ethnological syntheses of indigenous American politics. Lowie focused on the same distinction as the Africanist scholars, namely, the association of leadership roles with the use of coercive physical force:

What, then, are the titular chief's positive attributes and functions? The outstanding one forthwith explains the deficiency I have harped on: he refrains from attempting physical force, because many societies conceive of him as primarily a peacemaker. It would be a contradiction in terms for him to mete out punishment when his business is to smooth ruffled tempers, to persuade the recalcitrant, coax and even bribe the justly aggrieved into forgoing vengeance... No wonder then that an appeaser *ex officio* was not associated with warfare, was often—in his official capacity—deliberately divorced from violence and discipline.

(Lowie 1967[1948]:73)

Thus, the presence or absence of coercive physical force in the political system became the baseline for judging whether a society lay on the egalitarian side of the 'Great Divide' (Service 1962) between societies with and without political power. In addition to the absence of coercive force linked to a conflict-resolution function, Lowie specified two other attributes of indigenous American 'titular chiefs':

Besides being a skilful peacemaker, the ideal chief was a paragon of munificence... Thus, a Nambikuara headman constantly shares with his tribesmen whatever surplus of goods he may have acquired: 'Generosity is the quality... which is expected of a new chief...' A third attribute of civil leadership is the gift of oratory, normally to be exercised on behalf of tribal harmony and the good old traditional ways... In my opinion, then, the most typical American chief is not a lawgiver, executive, or judge, but a pacifier, a benefactor of the poor, and a prolix Polonius.

(Lowie 1967[orig. 1948]:74-76)

In summary, Lowie left us a list of traits which non-Andean indigenous South American leaders were, for the most part, supposed to have: (1) absence of coercive physical force; (2) peacemaking and conflict-resolution skills; (3) generosity; and (4) oratory. This is the framework which Clastres adopted. Clastres merely added one further characteristic, polygyny, to Lowie's list: "It is surely by four traits that the chief is distinguished in South America. As chief, he is a 'professional pacifier'; in addition, he has to be generous and a good orator; finally, polygyny is his prerogative" (Clastres 1977[1974]:27). The stereotypical non-Andean indigenous South American leader, then, should have the five qualities listed by Lowie and Clastres. According to Clastres, societies with this type of leadership have engaged in "the ejection of the political function from society... the group thereby reveals its radical rejection of authority, an utter negation of power" (Clastres 1977[1974]:33-34). The notion that non-Andean indigenous South American societies have as one of their essential qualities an active rejection of power is thus derived from an analysis of the roles of leaders, rather than of the distribution of power in society.

The concept of a generalized, active, and conscious rejection of power has come to occupy a central place in more recent studies of egalitarianism (e.g., Lee 1979; Boehm 1999). Christopher Boehm (1993, 1999) has carried out ethnological research resulting in a conclusion that the defining feature of egalitarian societies is the existence of 'levelling mechanisms' whereby the society in question controls political upstarts, creating a sort of reverse dominance hierarchy in which the few and strong are controlled by the many and weak. This generalized conception of the essence of egalitarianism is

remarkably similar to Clastres' conclusions about non-Andean indigenous South Americans. It is also consistent with Richard Lee's conclusions about social control of political actors among the !Kung (Lee 1979). In this chapter, I address the issue of whether or not Marubo politics features a key cultural mechanism for the obstruction of efforts at political prominence, namely the dissociation of food-giving from status-seeking.

Force in Marubo Society

The presence of coercive force is the first element isolated by scholars as possibly creating a binary division among human political systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940; Service 1962). Since then, this approach has been criticized for excessively narrowing the range of phenomena falling into the category of 'exercise of power' (Flanagan 1989). Power may be exercised in many more ways than by the application or the threat of application of coercive force. Early theoreticians of egalitarianism, however, focused on the link between leadership and use of force specifically rather than more generally focusing on the exercise of power. In this dissertation, I have shown how certain individuals exercise power without the benefit of an army or a police force to back them up (see Chapter Six), and I believe it is reasonable to broaden the range of phenomena referred to as 'power.' Nevertheless, to maintain continuity with prior theoreticians I will examine the use of force specifically.

The role of physical force in Marubo society can only be understood in an ethnohistorical context. It is important to take into consideration informant accounts of past violence dating back to the rubber boom. Marubo society has seen changes in the

social distribution of the use of force, changes in the general social valuation of violence, and changes in the contexts wherein violence is considered appropriate. These changes are a direct result of the rubber boom and its demographic impact, which was essentially to wipe out the vast majority of proto-Marubo, leaving only a small group with a single main leader hiding in one of the remotest corners of Brazil's Upper Amazon. It is necessary to understand the opinion of that one leader regarding violence, and how this has changed Marubo society in general. Thus, any conclusions about the role of force in Marubo society today cannot be taken to reflect an underlying changeless essence of their culture; rather, it should be understood in terms of a very specific historical context, within which the current configuration of use of force may be very recent.

Information on rubber boom violence was supplied to me primarily by my host, José Barbosa. José told me numerous stories of indigenous involvement in very violent incidents. Many of these were simple massacres in which non-indigenous people eliminated entire indigenous villages, as in the case of the Kariya incident (see Chapter Eight). In other cases the indigenous people were the instigators, raiding rubber tappers for shotguns, or taking revenge for previous incidents. There were occasions when non-indigenous people stole women from an indigenous village, and these occasions often resulted in violent reprisals by the kidnapped woman's kin. There is a story of a foiled raid on an indigenous village, in which the villagers managed to capture some shotguns and ambush the rubber tappers, with both sides suffering heavy losses. There were also times when rubber tappers established alliances with indigenous villages, arming them and using them to fight rival villages. The rubber tappers evidently learned of divisions among the indigenous groups of the Javari basin and exploited these differences, getting

the rival groups to kill each other. José told me a story of a raid by Indians and rubber tappers on a rival's rubber shipment. The raiders simply waited on the banks for the canoes, loaded with rubber, to pass by; they killed everyone and took all the rubber. Proto-Marubo groups were willing participants in this event. The proto-Marubo were involved in all aspects of the violence spectrum, from innocent victims to conscious aggressors. The incidents of violence pitted them not only against non-indigenous people but against other indigenous people, as well.

It should be emphasized that there was no Marubo ethnicity during the rubber boom. Elders are uniform in stating that they identified themselves and others by their exogamous descent-group affiliation—*Inonáwavo, Satanáwavo, Varináwavo*, etc. The term 'Marubo' came to be applied to these people only after they had moved to a single small area after the end of the rubber boom, necessitating use of the term 'proto-Marubo' to refer to the rubber boom ancestors of modern Marubo. We cannot consider that violence among proto-Marubo groups was intra-ethnic, because the boundaries of ethnic identity were different at that time. The Marubo of today are a synthesis of ethnic groups that were emically discrete in the past (though the nature of the Marubo kinship system—each *náwavo* (see Chapter Eight) is exogamous—makes it clear that close relations among some of these groups must have existed).

The timing of the violence is fairly clear from correlations with historical sources. According to Weinstein (1983), the rubber boom began by 1876, but the Javari basin was not exploited in an organized manner until 1888, when the Belém-based F.M. Marques & Co. became monopoly owner of all Javari basin rubber. Marques & Co. paid rubber tappers for their labor but not, apparently, for the product, which was already owned by

the company. Ownership of Javari rubber was sold in 1899 to a French company, which lost control over the labor force and found itself forced to buy the rubber from independent rubber producers. This created a new atmosphere of competition in the Javari basin, a context fully compatible with the tales of violence in the Marubo oral-historical corpus. Simultaneously, slave traders based in Iquitos were raiding to supply the Putumayo with labor, and the Curuçá River was hit at least once, worsening the already bad conditions of genocidal (and internecine) violence. The violence ended only with the end of the rubber boom, the retreat of the rubber tappers and the end of international demand for Amazon rubber.

Informants agree that violence was not something imposed on the proto-Marubo from outside; the use of force was a way of life for many proto-Marubo. José's brother Tamasaípa gave the example of the family of Dionísio to illustrate the violence of the rubber boom. The father of current Ituí *shovo*-owner Pekópapa, Dionísio was one of those who fled the violence to live in the headwaters of the Rio Arrojo and Igarapé Maronal, and wound up owning one of only five *shovo* that existed for a time after the rubber boom. Tamasaípa told me that Dionísio's family had been finished off (Port. "acabados", Marubo *keyuei*) by other proto-Marubo. He said that relatives of a man named Mashēpa wanted the women of Dionísio's household; in a raid, they killed everyone else, sparing only Dionísio and his sister, who were raised by Peruvians. When João Tuxáua began gathering together the scattered remnants of the proto-Marubo, he invited Dionísio and his sister to move up to the headwaters refuge, an invitation they accepted. Dionísio's sister married João Tuxáua's friend Domingo, becoming the mother of Aldeia São Sebastião elder Cassimiro and of Tamasaípa's wife. Tamasaípa's point in

telling me this story was that violence *among* proto-Marubo was common at that time. João Tuxáua invited all the remnants to the headwaters, but a lot of groups never made it, Tamasáipa concluded.

José told me that in the old days, leaders were far more authoritarian than they are today, and commonly used violence against people with whom they had disagreements. He said many of the Marubo leaders in the immediate post-boom period were prone to use violence to resolve conflicts. But his father João Tuxáua, he said, changed all that, and that is why he and his brothers (recall that João Tuxáua had some 20 children) are all non-violent. José's father would go around singing to all the *shovo*, inviting them to feast at his own *shovo*. He would take children by the hand and sing for them to teach them. He would give crying children choice pieces of meat to quiet them. He would bring meat to the women when theirs had run out but the men still had some (men and women eat in separate groups in different parts of the *shovo*). He would take people out into the forest to teach them healing. That is why he was able to gather a following, José said, because he was like that. He gathered together what José calls in Portuguese ‘uma turma’ (a crew) of 11 adult men, progenitors of much of the modern Marubo nation. “That is why we are no longer like our ancestors were”, José concluded, attributing to his father the start of a profound change in attitudes towards violence.

According to José, João Tuxáua was very explicit about the advantages of peace over war. José told me that João Tuxáua used to say that when the proto-Marubo were making war, all they had to eat was wild fruit and game. Then, José said, João Tuxáua would point to all the maize, bananas, plantains, and manioc they had and say “now things are better.”

João Tuxáua encoded his beliefs about violence in a genre of formalized rhetoric called *tsai iki*. The *tsai iki* is a type of rhetoric containing advice on proper living and other ethical and moral knowledge. During my fieldwork, it was most often used when elders of different villages meet at a feast, or else when an elder arrives at another's *shovo* to invite the other to a feast. However, the *tsai iki*, as I will explain below, is traditionally a function of the *shovo ivo*, who should use it to transmit proper moral concepts to his coresidents. Information on the content of the *tsai iki* was provided to me by Miguel, the retired shaman at Aldeia Maronal, whose father was one of the eleven who composed João Tuxáua's 'turma,' or in some genealogies João Tuxáua himself. Miguel told me once that in 'the old days', everyone used to fight, trick one another, and argue with each other. This was no good, Miguel continued, because everyone was sad, hungry, dying or dead. Then, Miguel said, they received words from God (using the Portuguese word 'Deus' in a discourse that was otherwise in Marubo). Miguel pointed upwards to the sky when he said this. Once they received the words, they stopped fighting and instead produced food, ate, and feasted. A big belly makes people strong so they can work, Miguel said. That, he concluded, is what the *tsai iki* says. It is important to note that the Marubo equate the Portuguese-language Bible's 'Deus' with their own creator-entity *Kanavoã*. Further, the Marubo cosmology includes a set of beings called *rewepet* whose function is to transmit information from Kanavoã to humans. João Tuxáua was reputed to have frequent communication with *rewepet* while in shamanic trances. That is what is signified when Miguel says they received word from god. João Tuxáua went into spirit-possession trances, claimed communion with the *rewepet*, and

through his *tsai iki* discourses communicated a value system emphasizing peaceful ways, food production, and feasting while specifically rejecting warfare and violence.

What made João Tuxáua's ethics stick was the fact of his followers' survival while all the proto-Marubo who did not follow João Tuxáua to the headwaters refuge disappeared (unconfirmed rumors of a band's survival around the middle Arrojo notwithstanding). José was explicit about the consequences of his father's selection of people for coresidence. João Tuxáua, José said, gathered together those among the proto-Marubo whom he thought he could live with in peace and prosperity. Proto-Marubo 'caciques' (José's word) who thought like João Tuxáua, i.e., who shared his ideas about avoiding violence and focusing on feasting instead, joined him in the headwaters of the Arrojo and Maronal. José named Domingo, Júlio, and Ernesto as falling in this category. The others all died out, José said. The '*Marubo bravos*', who kept fighting each other as well as the non-indigenous people, did not follow João Tuxáua; they disappeared, victims of the rubber boom genocide but also, in João Tuxáua's opinion, of their own propensities for conflict.

There is evidence that João Tuxáua was not simply creating new cultural forms but rather drawing on past traditions. The oral history concerning Txoki (discussed in the previous chapter) states that Txoki attracted a large number of people to his village by throwing large feasts. Txoki is said to have lived before the rubber boom. João Tuxáua was thus selecting certain aspects of existing culture for reinforcement. Present Marubo culture has been significantly affected by what he chose to select.

The frequency of use of force to attain personal goals in Marubo society decreased when the Marubo passage through a severe demographic bottleneck coincided

with the presence of a leader with very clear ideas about where force should and should not be used. It is clear from the oral histories that some proto-Marubo leaders during the rubber boom were not only proponents of the use of force against other proto-Marubo, but were actual users of force themselves. However, the proto-Marubo who moved to the headwaters area fled the violence instead of participating in it. The main leader of this group invited others who shared his ideas to come live with him. When the dust settled after the rubber boom, those who had fled to the area where João Tuxáua lived were the only ones who remained, and the ancestors of all Marubo living today. João Tuxáua avoided violence and counselled others to avoid it, with the argument that it had very negative effects on prosperity (food production, good health, etc.). When the Marubo sent a party out to search for the women kidnapped by Mayoruna in the 1960s, João Tuxáua went along in an advisory function but did not participate in the clashes themselves. João Tuxáua's ideas spread to much of modern Marubo society, to the point that a successful *shovo*-owner, Alberto, in explaining the qualities a *shovo ivo* should have, listed refraining from doing harm to others and keeping his coresidents from harming others as well. Surely no rubber-boom proto-Marubo warrior-chief would list such qualities among those of the ideal leader. The relative frequency of ideas about use of force on other closely related Panoans changed with the end of the rubber boom: before that time, many proto-Marubo advocated use of force against even closely related Panoan groups, while after the boom most Marubo were conscious of João Tuxáua's ideas on the negative consequences of violence. At the *tanamea* feasts of late 1997, I observed leaders from every settlement on the Curuçá River performing the *tsai iki*, demonstrating their awareness of the moral system that contrasted past violence with

present peace and prosperity. It is important to keep this historical context in mind so as not to extend current patterns of use of force into the past, understanding instead that these patterns have changed over time.

The use of force among living Marubo can be placed in two main categories: violence against non-Marubo, and violence linked to male-female relations. I will discuss the use of violence against non-Marubo first.

It became clear during fieldwork that Marubo prefer not to use violence on one another but have far fewer compunctions against using violence against non-Marubo. This is not an issue of ethnicity but of kinship. One young Marubo man showed me how to make a simple weapon involving the placement of a series of spikes between the knuckles. As he showed me, he stated that he used weapons only when some stranger who is not kin comes to the village and starts trouble. Here at Aldeia Maronal, he said, he fights with no one because they are all his kin. Based on this statement I concluded that the Marubo avoided violence with kin, but since virtually everyone is kin to everyone else, very few Marubo are in the category of people against whom force may be used, relative to other Marubo.

The clearest case of the use of force is in the clash with Mayoruna Indians that occurred in the 1960s. A group of Marubo gathering turtle eggs was attacked by Mayoruna. One Marubo man was killed and two women kidnapped. The Marubo sent a party to track down the Mayoruna. They discovered the Mayoruna village and attacked it with shotguns, injuring several Mayoruna. At least two elders who were still alive in 1997-98 participated in this attack. After the attack, the Marubo fled back in the direction of their village, which at that time was at the headwaters of the Igarapé

Maronal. The shaman (Aurélio's brother, now dead) warned that they were being followed, so they set an ambush. According to José a dozen Mayoruna men walked into the ambush and were cut down by Marubo shotguns; Steven Romanoff (1984:42) confirms that at least eight were killed. Shortly thereafter the Brazilian army came in to contain the violence. It is notable that according to José, João Tuxáua did not participate in the actual combat, although he did accompany the Marubo raiders.

More recently, some Marubo used force against a FUNAI administrator they disagreed with. I do not have the exact date of this incident, but it took place no earlier than the late 1980s. The story was told to me by José Barbosa. José said the issue was the administration of Gaspar, who ran the FUNAI office in Atalaia. The Marubo perceived him as being unacceptably linked to anti-indigenous and anti-Marubo elements. They demanded his removal, writing letters to Brasília to this end, but he refused to resign. Some young Marubo entered his office one day to confront him. Gaspar went for a revolver in his desk drawer. When he did so, the Marubo men rushed him and took the revolver from his hands. They cut the phone lines, physically expelled Gaspar from the FUNAI office, and barricaded themselves in there, saying they would leave only when FUNAI sent another administrator. They were surrounded by police, who were dissuaded by some indigenous FUNAI workers from simply breaking in to arrest the Marubo. FUNAI-Brasília was notified of the situation, a new administrator was sent, and the Marubo exited the building. I later met several of the participants in this incident, and they were very proud of it. Later, similar attitudes were taken towards another FUNAI administrator whom I will call 'W.' W. was installed as FUNAI-Atalaia administrator with indigenous support, but he was asked to resolve a delicate issue.

Several years before W.'s entry into office, the Marubo had sent several thousand dollars' worth of crafts to FUNAI, and the money had not yet arrived (this high figure was first estimated by Marubo informants, then confirmed to me by a FUNAI worker in Atalaia; I also saw a copy of the manifest listing the quantities of crafts attributable to various individuals at Aldeia Maronal, and saw for myself Marubo crafts on sale in Manaus). After W. was installed as administrator, he started visiting each indigenous village in the Javari basin. When he was expected to visit Maronal, some Marubo were heard to say that if he showed up without the money, they would confiscate his boat and all his belongings and put him on a canoe with just a single oar. W. was too politically savvy to allow this to happen (he was perfectly aware that to show up without the money would be detrimental to his health). But what is interesting in this event is that it confirms that the Marubo will utilize force against FUNAI administrators if they feel the latter are being abusive.

The application of force and threat of force against non-indigenous people is not restricted to FUNAI. In Chapter Six I described how, instigated by the missionaries, a group of Ituí Marubo threatened to seize my possessions and force me to turn back to Aldeia Maronal if I did not do so of my own accord. The issue was resolved by the powerful rhetoric of my host, José Barbosa. That incident confirmed that the application of force or threat of force against non-indigenous people is acceptable in Marubo society, even if the use of force against other Marubo is not morally acceptable.

The use of force against non-indigenous people and the occurrence of violence associated with male-female relations coincided in the killing of Vitor Batalha. This incident occurred in the 1970s. Vitor was a non-indigenous man who was hired to man

the first FUNAI post on the Curuçá River. He ran off with the wife of a Marubo man. Some months later, he was ambushed and killed, an incident which the Marubo are understandably reluctant to discuss.

Violence linked to male-female relations also occurs among Marubo. Informants were very reluctant to discuss these events, and it is reasonable to assume that many occurred which I was not aware of. I did learn that a man on the middle Curuçá River found his wife with his brother. He proceeded to beat his wife, then moved to another village. Another man on the Ituí River inflicted severe harm on his wife when he found her to be unfaithful. In both these cases, the violence that results from infidelity is inflicted on the woman, not on the adulterous male. One informant told me that men were not responsible in these situations; it is the women who lead the men on. This type of belief explains why violence is directed upon adulterous females but not males. In addition to retaliation for adultery, women may be forced into sexual compliance when they are involved in a forced marriage. Such men as believe that women should not exercise sexual and marital autonomy will, according to some informants, force young wives into sexual compliance.

I never observed force or the threat of force used by Alfredo in his exercise of leadership. Alfredo utilized the fact that he was recognized as leader by outsiders (his legitimacy) to impose his will on key issues (see Chapter Six); he also used rhetoric very effectively, used political meetings as vehicles for his will, knew how to control the behavior of others by shaming them or threatening to shame them, utilized his position of economic, political, and labor dominance to ensure that others wished to maintain good relations with him, and controlled fractious youth indirectly through their elders. He thus

had a wide variety of techniques for the exercise of power at his disposal, and never was in a situation that required force, or even where force may have been beneficial.

These data on the use of force in Marubo society are compatible with most traditional concepts of what an egalitarian society is. As in Lowie's idealized version of the native American leader, Alfredo "refrains from attempting physical force" (Lowie 1967[1948]:73). Thus, on the surface of things, and taking a very basic definitional criterion of egalitarianism, we could say that this group is egalitarian because use of and threat of use of physical force are not part of the role of political leader. Furthermore, the Marubo have, as a result of their rubber boom experience, developed a strong and widespread belief that using violence to resolve conflicts among themselves leads to extremely poor living conditions. Thus, the absence of force from social role-playing can be generalized to all men's roles *vis-à-vis* one another. It would seem that this makes the Marubo even more egalitarian as there is no way for a man to force another to do something. Of course, the definers of egalitarianism have made it so the opposite situation is equally egalitarian, that is, when the use of force is generalized to all men, as was allegedly the case for the Yanomamö (Chagnon 1968) or Jívaro (Harner 1972):

Some tribes, like the Yanomamo, are extremely prone to vengeance after a homicide against a kinsman—yet they have not arrived at the highly systematic rules for feuding and pacification that many other tribesmen exhibit... In either case, egalitarianism flourishes at the expense of centralized control. The Yanomamo have no leaders with real authority... There is no centralized coercive power to stop internecine conflict.

(Boehm 1999: 96-97)

Thus, societies that are the complete opposite of one another in terms of the valuation and use of force are considered egalitarian. To Boehm (the most recent synthesizer of these concepts), societies where force is not used, and societies where all men use force, are equally egalitarian. It is the fact that force is not *restricted* to a few men, who would then constitute a central authority, that makes these societies presumably egalitarian. This leaves the issue of how to interpret the oral histories of violent rubber boom proto-Marubo. During the rubber boom, the use of force among proto-Marubo was, if not universal, highly generalized. The use of force was explicitly a quality of the role of many of the rubber boom leaders. The question now is, if I know that my kin can come take my women because they are militarily more powerful, is my society egalitarian? If my kin actually do take my women by brute force, or by the mere threat thereof, is my society egalitarian? The answer is not an issue of fact but of definition and classification. I believe that by classifying rubber boom and post-rubber boom Marubo society as politically identical, the definition of egalitarianism has been extended to the degree that the societies which fall under that rubric no longer form a natural class. Attachment of the word ‘egalitarian’ no longer allows one to make reasonable predictions about how the society’s conflicts are resolved; therefore the definition has been extended too far.

Although the use of force among Marubo men was not common during fieldwork, the use of force by men on women was more widespread, though not overt or rampant. Classic definitions of egalitarianism allow for any level of violence or oppression between the genders and/or between age-grades. Therefore the presence of use of force on women does not affect the political classification of Marubo society.

Conflict Resolution

In Lowie's synthesis, the qualities of refraining from the use of force and of skilfully resolving conflicts are intimately linked in native American leaders. It is because leaders must resolve conflicts among followers that physical force cannot be an aspect of their social roles:

It would be a contradiction in terms for him to mete out punishment when his business is to smooth ruffled tempers, to persuade the recalcitrant, coax and even bribe the justly aggrieved into forgoing vengeance. He is, indeed, a go-between of the Yurok or Ifugao order, but with the essential difference of being the official, recognized, permanent moderator instead of a self-appointed one *ad hoc*. In order to compass his end—maintenance of communal harmony—he might stoop to eating humble-pie and to personal sacrifices. A Sanpoil chief presents each litigant with a blanket; his Cree colleague is expected to give up thoughts of revenge on his own behalf, such as other men freely indulge... No wonder that an appeaser *ex officio* was not associated with warfare, was often—in his official capacity—deliberately divorced from violence and discipline.”

(Lowie 1967 [1948]:73)

During fieldwork, I paid attention to conflicts and to the roles of leaders in settling conflicts. The main focus of my anthropological gaze in this sense was Alfredo, leader of the village in which I resided for 9½ months out of the year of fieldwork. A number of conclusions can be derived from the observations. Firstly, Alfredo does have to resolve tensions among conflicting factions on a regular basis. But these resolutions are not made out of abstract duty to social role, and are not disinterested: the purpose of his efforts is to keep his village together and to keep the means of production of his social network intact. Second, Alfredo is not called upon to resolve many conflicts by his followers. In fact, people did not like to bother Alfredo with their problems at all, if they

could avoid it. A corollary to this is that the main conflicts Alfredo resolved were those in which he had a personal stake, mainly those related to the continued cohesion of his social network. Third, Alfredo was perceived as a peacemaker by non-indigenous visitors far more so than by his own coresidents.

Before presenting my limited observations on conflict resolution, I should note that this was a difficult subject to research. Most of the subjects I was interested in were things my informants seemed to be proud of: polygyny, speaking and singing skills, organization of labor, relationships to non-indigenous people, creation of new residences, oral histories, were all topics concerning which informants spoke willingly and at length. In contrast, informants at Aldeia Maronal were reluctant to discuss conflict. They did not like to point fingers or accuse people of causing conflict. They did not point out conflicts so I could observe them, when I did become aware of conflict they deflected my attention to other matters, and when forced to concede that there was a conflict they supplied no information on it. To me any conflict, no matter how minor, and its mode of resolution were highly significant things because they were bits of data I wanted and I had gone to a great deal of trouble to put myself in a position where I could observe Marubo conflict resolution. When I sensed conflict, I became alert, energetic, and investigative. In contrast, conflicts were minor issues to my informants. They had no importance, their resolution was a foregone conclusion, and once resolved there was nothing to talk about. Better for me to focus on their rich culture and their plans for the future, my informants would say. All these factors undeniably operated to skew the data on this subject. To what extent, I do not know. I do not think that the Marubo were going off to the forest to yell at each other every day, then returning to present a dignified facade for my benefit. I

believe that conflict really was muted at Aldeia Maronal, that for the most part, people got along just fine. This I attribute to the continual feasting, healing, mutual assistance in labor, and food sharing that operated to reinforce the notion that living together was beneficial to all. Nevertheless, I will concede that there could have been more conflict going on than I can report. Since I cannot know what I have not seen or even heard about, however, it is impossible even to speculate about how much more conflict there was than what I saw.

The notion that leaders are resolvers of conflict leaves open the question of how they become involved in conflicts that do not, at first, involve them. Do squabbling individuals bring their problems before the leader? Do third parties denounce the trouble to the leader, who then calls the squabblers to order? Or does the leader himself intervene uninvited? In my personal observations at Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo was most frequently involved in conflict resolution by non-indigenous people, and specifically by the local FUNAI agent and the missionaries, each acting to defend their interests against indigenous critics.

Because of the non-indigenous emphasis on having Alfredo resolve conflicts and the indigenous de-emphasis on conflict, some events I know of exclusively from non-indigenous reports. Among those who most relied on Alfredo to resolve conflicts was Luís, the FUNAI agent who ran the Aldeia Maronal post from my arrival there in August 1997 until October of that year. Luís told me that prior to my arrival CIVAJA had organized a meeting at Aldeia Maronal at which FUNAI and the mission were harshly criticized. According to Luís, who has a vested interest in making CIVAJA look bad because they were continually monitoring and criticizing his work, missionaries were

accused of making profits by trading medicines. A pro-mission Marubo reported the contents of the meeting to the missionaries, who discussed it with Luís, who went to Alfredo. According to Luís, Alfredo held another meeting at which the CIVAJA personnel were confronted and accused of being like children. This entire story came only from Luís, so I have no way of checking its accuracy, but it does show that FUNAI and the mission regard Alfredo as a conflict-resolver, particularly when their own status or reputation is at stake.

A second incident has already been described in Chapter Six. Luís told me that anti-mission Marubo had been to mission headquarters in Cruzeiro do Sul to say they wanted the mission removed from Aldeia Maronal. The missionary at Aldeia Maronal offered, or threatened, to remove the mission. Recall from Chapter Six that the mission was a bit of a headache to Alfredo, because while it was crucial as a means of production of the social network which rendered his village attractive to potential movers, yet at the same time the missionaries were continually trying to invert the power relations at Maronal, which had Alfredo above the mission. Luís told me that he went to Alfredo and that Alfredo had said he was going to call a meeting to resolve the issue. I expected that a political meeting would be held at which the issue would be openly discussed and Alfredo would correct the critics—a scenario Luís led me to expect. I asked Alfredo's son about this, and when the meeting would be held; he told me that there was no meeting planned and that the issue was not important. In fact Alfredo simply explained to the elders, assembled at an informal meeting, that they should make all decisions about the mission together and that the youth should not be independent decision-makers on public issues. I was not even aware that the issue had been resolved, because I was

expecting a formal meeting. Only several months later when I reviewed my notes did I realize that the informal meeting **had** resolved the issue. In this case, the conflict resolved by Alfredo was between some members of his village and the mission. He was specifically expected to play the peacemaker role by the mission and by Luís. But he was not disinterested on this occasion. In fact, the mission's presence is essential to the continued attractiveness of his village to people who are considering a move. Therefore, although in a sense he was resolving a conflict between second and third parties, in another sense the whole issue was a challenge to his authority which he resolved in his favor. Hence my argument that although Alfredo is frequently called upon to resolve tensions among conflicting factions, these resolutions are not disinterested: his purpose is to hold his following together by keeping his means of production of the social network intact. Any conflict with the mission is a conflict with him as long as he retains a vested interest in the mission's permanence.

An incident in which a non-indigenous person wanted Alfredo to resolve an issue serves to illustrate the fact that non-indigenous people see Alfredo as conflict-resolver more so than do his own villagers. A Doctors Without Borders team had come by airplane to carry out health-care training at Aldeia Maronal. They brought with them the shaman, José Nascimento Filho, who had been convalescent with a foot injury in Atalaia do Norte. In the course of her stay, Dr. Beauregard diagnosed the owner of a *shovo*, Vasho, with tuberculosis and asked him to come back to Atalaia with her. The problem was that after the doctors and the pilot were seated, there was room for only one more person in the airplane. Vasho had already spent many months in Atalaia receiving treatment, and he greatly resented the fact that it had been for nothing and he now had to

leave his home again for more treatment in Atalaia's insalubrious FUNAI health facility. He went to the doctors and to the shaman and demanded to be flown into Atalaia, the alternative being the long and gruelling trip downriver. The doctor suggested that the issue be taken to Alfredo. However, the individuals present, both those directly involved and those merely observing, rejected the notion of going to Alfredo. Instead, they discussed the issue among themselves until the shaman agreed to give his spot on the plane to Vasho. This conflict was resolved directly by the conflicting parties, who specifically rejected the notion of bringing Alfredo in to mediate, although the non-indigenous people had the expectation that Alfredo should be the one to resolve the conflict. From this incident I derive the idea that Alfredo is perceived as peacemaker by non-indigenous outsiders more so than by his own village coresidents. This, and the fact that the issues I *did* see him resolve involved his own personal interests, lead me to question the extent to which conflict resolution is really an indigenous characteristic of his social role.

Other incidents of conflict-resolution involving Alfredo support the notion that he frequently performs this function in situations where his personal interests are involved, making it difficult to distinguish 'peacemaking' from 'winning a political conflict.' In this sense, two events stand out in the data: the resolution of the conflict over who should be a FUNAI agent, and the resolution of a conflict over access to key positions of interaction with non-indigenous people. Both these conflicts shared a key characteristic: if allowed to develop unchecked, they could result in a loss of personnel to Aldeia Maronal. They affected Alfredo very personally, because of the great efforts he had made to assemble Aldeia Maronal. In addition, neither conflict generated overt verbal or

physical confrontations between opposing sides. Both were resolved in the same anticlimactic manner in which Alfredo resolved the earlier mission conflict: with a speech act in which his political opponent is told indirectly that he is politically isolated and must retract his position. The indirect manner of expression, where unless you know the subtext you don't know who is being talked to because the culprit is neither named nor directly addressed, at once shames and refrains from shaming the opponent. He is ashamed because Alfredo is telling him he's wrong and the majority of his fellow elders agree; at the same time he is not publicly identified and so can effectively deny that he was ever at odds with Alfredo.

The conflict over the FUNAI position pitted supporters of an indigenous *chefe de posto* against supporters of a non-indigenous *chefe de posto*. This conflict was described in detail at the end of Chapter Six, and a political meeting associated with it was described in Chapter Eight. The conflict played out from January 1998 until after my departure in July. A meeting I did not observe was held at Aldeia Maronal, resulting in a decision to support an indigenous *chefe de posto*, and specifically Alfredo's brother's son Manoel. Alfredo stood firmly behind this position. However, the hiring of Manoel represented a significant shift in the distribution of benefits resulting from links to FUNAI. Access to the gasoline, boats, communications facility, and salaried positions available to FUNAI agents would change hands. Whereas in the previous situation it was Alfredo's peripheral affines who had access to FUNAI benefits, in the new configuration it would be Alfredo's close kin. Hence, some opposition arose. As described in Chapter Six, rumors began to surface in Atalaia suggesting that Alfredo did not support Manoel after all. The FUNAI administrator delayed Manoel's appointment for several months

despite Alfredo's repeated statements of support for Manoel. In May 1998, Alfredo was receiving medical treatment in Cruzeiro do Sul when a meeting was held to discuss the issue. The fine points of this meeting are analyzed in Chapter Six. Here it is sufficient to recall that the supporters of Manoel made sure that any opponents of Manoel would feel ashamed of their position, without being overtly identified. The conflict was resolved in Manoel's favor and Manoel was, after my departure, installed as FUNAI *chefe de posto* for the Curuçá River.

Alfredo's role in the *chefe de posto* conflict, and especially its ultimate resolution, was somewhat indirect but significant nevertheless. The conflict, after all, involved mainly Manoel's immediate kin and the FUNAI old guard, but Alfredo from the beginning agreed that a Marubo *chefe de posto* was better, and a young man the elders could influence was best of all. Alfredo lent his key resource, his legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders, to Manoel and his supporters. At the May 1998 meeting, Alfredo was not present; it was the other village elders who delivered discourses with scathing indictments of anyone who supported the FUNAI old guard. That is exactly the way the earlier conflict over the mission had been resolved, except on this occasion Alfredo's involvement in the conflict-resolving speech act was not direct. At best, this incident leaves considerable ambiguity as to how the leader's role in conflict resolution should be interpreted. It is certain that far from being an impartial judge, he had an active interest in one side's victory. Equally significant is the fact that his personal presence was not required for the ultimate resolution of the conflict. Once his will was known, and hence his opinion legitimized as village consensus, other elders were able to resolve the issue. I

do not think these elders could have resolved the issue without Alfredo's support; but they *could* do so with his support but without his presence.

As explained above, the struggle for Manoel's installation as *chefe de posto* dragged on through early 1998 because rumors began to circulate in Atalaia that Alfredo would prefer to have one of his own sons as FUNAI employee. Although Alfredo had not, in fact, said these things, there was no way to check the rumors' accuracy because Alfredo was at Aldeia Maronal while the rumors were in Atalaia. Some of Manoel's kin believed that Alfredo was really against them, and they began discussing the possibility of moving away from Aldeia Maronal to form a new settlement on the Amburuz River. When they returned to Aldeia Maronal, Manoel's kin spread these ideas to Manoel's father José, who considered the idea of moving for several days. First, however, he went to discuss the situation with Alfredo. The discussion took place in Alfredo's *shovo* where a number of elders were gathered to sing healing songs. Alfredo bemoaned the conflict-making words (*kekashnana*) spread by other villages. These words, he said, do not come from Aldeia Maronal, certainly not from himself. He had been unwavering in his support for Manoel, both through official statements and unofficial speaking. He reminded José of the benefits derived from living together and the selfish motives of those who spread rumors (*kekashnana*). When the discussion was done, the conflict was resolved. José never discussed moving again while my fieldwork continued. The main characteristics which this incident has in common with the others just described are that Alfredo's involvement in conflict resolution is not disinterested because his village's cohesion is at stake, and that the ultimate resolution is carried out through effective public rhetoric.

In summary, the data on Alfredo's role in conflict resolution are ambiguous and preliminary. Conclusions based on these limited observations cannot be considered final. Rather, they are ideas that fit the available data but could be changed if new data are obtained. Despite the limited data, certain conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it is impossible to distinguish conflict-resolution from simple decision-making in Alfredo's role. When he acts to resolve a conflict, he acts to protect his own interests because conflict threatens the cohesion of his village and his large village constitutes the basis and extent of his power. Every time he resolves a conflict, he is at the same time imposing the point of view most beneficial to him. Secondly, the data do not support the conclusion that he is the village conflict-resolver of choice. In my observations, only non-indigenous outsiders turned to Alfredo to resolve their conflicts. Aldeia Maronal villagers avoided involving Alfredo in their affairs whenever possible. Therefore it is highly questionable whether or not conflict resolution is an essential part of Alfredo's indigenous social role. This essential difference between Alfredo's empirically observed role and the abstract 'leader's role' described by Lowie is compatible with Alfredo's repeated victories in conflicts of will. Far from being a humble appeaser, Alfredo frequently uses rhetoric in public forums to impose his point of view by shaming his opponents.

Oratory

If there is one area where the characteristics of Lowie's idealized indigenous leader match those of Alfredo, it is in his verbal performances. Based on my observations, I conclude that Alfredo had above-average speaking skills and considerable

ability to use speech to influence people. For any given discourse genre, there are Maronal elders who are considered to have greater skill than Alfredo, but Alfredo knows all the genres even if he is not the top performer. What Alfredo does better than anyone else is apply the moral content of traditional discourse genres to interpreting current events and situations. Alfredo used this skill to influence others on a repeated basis.

By his own account, much of Alfredo's verbal prowess was learned from his father, João Tuxáua. Alfredo told me that he knew many stories and many “remédios do mato” (plant-based medicinal knowledge), and that all of these had been taught to him by his father. Out of the few proto-Marubo men who survived the rubber boom, João Tuxáua was the one with most knowledge of myth-songs, shamanic healing songs, oral histories and medical knowledge. The four Barbosa brothers—Alfredo, his older brother Zacarias, and his younger brothers José and Pedro, were all trained by their father to perform these discourse genres, and are all particularly adept at singing healing-songs (*shōki*).

His own children were not the only ones trained by João Tuxáua. João Tuxáua's children engaged in considerable intermarriage with the children of Domingo. For example, José Barbosa married two daughters of Domingo, so José's children's grandfathers were João Tuxáua and Domingo; this is commonly the case around Aldeia Maronal, which was largely formed by the intermarriage of these two large families. João Tuxáua trained the children of Domingo as well as his own. José told me stories of how this training was carried out. João Tuxáua was, according to José, a compulsive verbalizer, continually talking and singing, especially for children so that they could learn. But unstructured learning was only one of his techniques. At one point, according

to José, João Tuxáua had a hut where he would isolate himself and his students, sometimes for months at a time. He dictated strict nutritional restrictions, barring certain types of meat during the learning period. He would keep his students thus locked away until they had memorized the songs or other techniques he wanted them to learn. João Tuxáua would examine his students' knowledge continually, and correct them if they made mistakes. That is how mastery of multiple discourse genres was passed on from João Tuxáua to the current generation of Aldeia Maronal elders.

During fieldwork it was clear that the political leaders at Aldeia Maronal were distinguishable by their mastery of multiple discourse genres. Younger leaders did not have the verbal skills of the older generation taught by João Tuxáua. Upon arrival at Maronal, I quickly discovered that in my host *shovo* the owner (José) and his brother (Pedro) knew at least the *shōki* (healing-songs) and *tsai iki* (ritualized dialogues), and José knew *saiti* (myth-songs) as well. In the *shovo* of Alfredo, a similar situation existed: Alfredo and his three coresident brothers (Zacarias, Miguel, and Joāozinho) knew *tsai iki* and regularly sang *shōki*, and Alfredo also sang *saiti* on certain occasions. Alfredo also dispensed *ese vana*, the crucial significance of which I will comment on below. The other two core *shovo* had a lesser concentration of discourse experts, but they were still present: Aurélio knew *shōki*, Vasho knew some *tsai iki* and *ese vana*, and Vasho's brother sang *saiti*. In the periphery, where the political leadership consisted mainly of Domingo's sons, discourse genre mastery was much in evidence: Ivāpa was the main singer of *saiti* at village feasts and also practiced *shōki* and *tsai iki*. Wanōpa was considered the absolute master of *saiti* as far as accuracy is concerned, and also had highly respected *shōki* skills. Wanōpa's coresident half-brother Misael knew all these

genres better than anyone else, but was too old for effective performance. Wasinawa knew and sang *shōki*; Alberto knew *tsai iki*, *shōki*, some *saiti* and also was the second-most frequent dispenser of *ese vana* in the village (after Alfredo); finally, in the Varináwavo *shovo* Võpa knew *tsai iki*, *shōki*, some *saiti*, and was also the recognized authority on oral histories. Aside from the individuals mentioned, no one else had mastery of a specialized discourse genre sufficient as to be able to perform it. All of the individuals who know the specialized genres are owners of *shovo* or the brothers of *shovo*-owners. Many of them played active roles in village decision-making processes. It was clear, therefore, that in 1997-98 at Aldeia Maronal there was a strong correlation between political status and speech ability.

Although most individuals in the upper tier of political status at Aldeia Maronal were distinguishable by their specialized speaking skills, within that category of people there was no direct correlation between level of power/influence and level of speaking ability. For example, Misael was considered to be the most knowledgeable Maronal resident in mythology, cosmology, and song-healing. Alfredo would listen quietly to Misael whenever the latter held forth on these issues. However, Misael had virtually no observable influence on village-level decision-making processes. When political issues were discussed Alfredo had a predominant role in speaking, and Misael virtually none. This may be due to relative age, as Misael was in his waning years (he would die in 1999) whereas Alfredo was going strong in his mid-fifties (according to his birth certificate, which I saw). But it also indicates that skill level in traditional speech genres is not directly linked to actual power and authority.

The areas in which Alfredo's speaking role was most evidently predominant were current events and relations to non-indigenous people. Several examples of this have already been described in detail in earlier chapters. On the first night of the ritual of healing for Xaponê (August 14th, 1997), described in Chapters Six and Seven, Alfredo spoke at length about the proper form of relationship between the Maronal Marubo and the mission, and on who should make decisions about this relationship. This speech act resulted in Alfredo's influencing key elders and reducing the level of dissent concerning the mission's activities. Later, Alfredo had a predominant role in the political meeting where it was decided that Maronal would support Gilmar against Edvaldo for FUNAI-Atalaia administrator (September 16th, 1997). This meeting, too, is described in Chapters Six and Seven.

Three examples that have not been previously described in this dissertation will serve to illustrate Alfredo's speaking role. On October 31st, 1997, I was eating breakfast at the *shovo* of Nakwa when Alfredo walked in. As he was fed, he spoke at length about how FUNAI workers should behave, proper usage of the FUNAI radio, as well as about relations to the mission and the ongoing process of land demarcation. These words were directed at Nakwa, the only FUNAI employee in the village at the time, and at his wife's father Wanõpa, who was also present.

On January 28th, 1998, Alfredo invited José to his *shovo* to drink *oni* and attend a healing session. As usual, the *shöki*-singing was preceded by a long session of *oni*-drinking and *romepoto* inhalations. Present that night were five *shovo*-owners (José, Alfredo, Vasho, Wasinawa and Aurélio) as well three brothers of *shovo*-owners and Alfredo's brother's son Iskõpa, who was becoming active at political meetings and was

often a radiogram assignant. Alfredo spoke for two hours nearly non-stop, explaining the proper way to approach earning and using money. He recommended to those assembled that they practice their skills in traditional crafts, as the last time he visited Atalaia he had been able to sell four bamboo stabbing-knives (*pakapapiti*) for enough money to buy a large load of ammunition. He went on to say that he disapproved of spending hard-earned money on non-indigenous foods. He said he had seen elders return from Atalaia after spending their pension checks, and the food they bought had already run out by the time they returned to the village. Better to buy objects of lasting value that would remain for one's children to use, or merchandise that can be kept in a box and used to get people to work, Alfredo said.

On April 25th, 1998, Alfredo addressed his *shovo* at length on the value of indigenous healing practices and on the proper response to the mission's criticisms of indigenous healing practices. On the 24th and 25th, Alfredo had participated in a *shōki*-ritual for his wife's father's wife's father Carlos. At the start of the ritual, Alfredo had been confronted by some of Carlos' coresidents who were frequenters of mission services. They had told Alfredo that his indigenous healing would not work because it was based in the Marubo cosmo-vision and ultimately on relations to inhabitants of the spirit-world, which the missionaries had told them were ineffectual. Alfredo told his critics they were wrong and proceeded to sing *shōki* anyway. After two days of singing, Carlos' condition abated. Alfredo was able to gloat to his critics about the value of indigenous healing practices. When he returned to his *shovo* that evening, he told his sons that he was going to talk to them about this experience. His son Txanōpa told me that Alfredo was going to give them *ese vana*. He translated *ese* as 'law' though another

informant translated it as ‘custom’, and my own best translation of it is ‘moral/ethical wisdom/knowledge’, or even ‘virtue.’ By 5:30 p.m. Alfredo had laid back in a hammock and begun to talk. He spoke for at least an hour without halt, using the incident to highlight the value of indigenous practices and the proper ways to deal with critical missionaries. After a lengthy discussion by those assembled to listen, Alfredo began another monologue, which continued late into the night. When I left, many people were still sitting on the benches listening to Alfredo speak.

What is notable about this event is not only the fact that Alfredo can engage in an extraordinarily long barrage of *ese vana*, but the application he makes of those words. The practice of *ese vana* is restricted to such elders as have the quality of *eseya*, i.e., ‘having *ese*’, ‘having moral wisdom.’ One other Maronal elder stood out in this sense: Alberto (Sināpa). Alberto actually performed *ese vana* more frequently than Alfredo, but the subject matter was different. Alberto would often sit on a *kenā* bench to lecture a *shovo* on proper behavior. But I never heard Alberto focus one of his lectures on political issues or on relationships to non-indigenous people. Instead, Alberto applied his knowledge of *ese* to interpreting relationships among Marubo, and specifically, relations among kin. He often complained that kin were not behaving properly towards one another, and advised people on how to behave properly. His domain of influence was therefore intra-Marubo relations. In contrast, when Alfredo applied his knowledge of *ese*, it was to address hot-button political issues: the missionaries, and the means whereby Marubo culture may be retained even with missionaries present in the village.

The five examples just described of Alfredo’s speaking role (14-8-97, 16-9-97, 31-10-97, 28-1-98, and 25-4-98) are presented to illustrate the fact that Alfredo has a

predominant role in interpreting current events and in applying the indigenous value system to the field of relationships to non-indigenous people. On all of these occasions, Alfredo directed his speeches at multiple individuals, many of them key elders who themselves could influence others in their social sphere. Sometimes he invited others to his house to drink, eat, or heal, and spoke to them then; other times he went to someone else's house, and spoke from their *kenã* benches; still other times he simply spoke to the inhabitants of his own *shovo*. I observed him interpreting current events on other occasions, too, as for example while leading a work party in agriculture or path-cutting. The interpretation of current events was not exclusive to Alfredo; however, Alfredo was clearly distinguishable from others in terms of the frequency with which he addressed these issues. It could be said of Alfredo that the most evident characteristic of his social speaking role was the application of indigenous values to relationships to non-indigenous people, whereas the same statement could not be made of any other elder. Alfredo's speaking role was therefore unique, and carefully tailored to maintain influence over a key field of social action.

Although the most frequently recurring public speaking role for Alfredo was political, this should not be taken to mean that he neglected other more traditional speaking roles which he had the ability to perform. For example, he is known to have issued successful invitations to move twice: when he invited his brothers to move from the headwaters to his new settlement on the Curuçá River, and when he invited his brother José to move down from the upper Curuçá. He performed *shôki* frequently, and during the *shôki* he would sometimes use 'teaching words', rhythmic packets of speech containing condensed information on a particular spirit, illness, or curing technique.

During Nakwa's *akoya* feast in 1998, Alfredo sang the *saiti* myth-songs, usually the province of older singers. And in April he led a group of students from Aldeia Maronal, Liberdade, and Alegria around the forest, teaching them the medicinal uses of various plants, which also required stylized, rhythmic speech-bursts. Alfredo was adept at the discourse genres his fellow elders knew, but he allowed the experts in each genre to bask in their limelight while focusing on his own specialized domain: how to deal with political issues in an indigenous manner.

Generosity

The fourth characteristic of the Lowie-Clastres synthetic non-Andean indigenous South American leader is that of generosity. This notion is based in large part on Lévi-Strauss' observations of Nambikwara leaders: "A Nambikuara headman constantly shares with his tribesmen whatever surplus of goods he may have acquired" (Lowie 1967[1948]:74). In order to ensure that my research can be applied to evaluating the validity of previous frameworks for the interpretation of non-Andean indigenous South American politics, I will present some information on the flow of goods surrounding Alfredo.

The image of an impoverished leader who gives away all his possessions to his followers as soon as he obtains them does not apply to Alfredo. In fact, the characteristics of the reciprocal economy did not seem to apply to goods that had been purchased with money. This is a distinction that was already observed by Melatti (1983) and by Montagner and Melatti (1986), and is discernible even in the spatial and architectural organization of Marubo settlements. The *shovo* is the traditional indigenous

building, whose every knot and post is discussed in an origin myth. The *shovo* typically has no lock; it is relatively easy to steal from someone else's *shovo*. In contrast, surrounding the *shovo* are the *tapo*, built according to the typical non-indigenous hut design: square, with bark instead of thatch walls. *Tapo* are sometimes slept in by individuals seeking privacy for whatever reason. Since this is a type of dwelling common among non-indigenous people whereas the *shovo* is strictly indigenous, it is tempting to consider the *tapo* an influence of non-indigenous culture on the Marubo; however, since much of the upper Amazon's riverine non-indigenous culture is in fact derived from indigenous adaptations, the origins of this feature are unclear. The *tapo* often have doors that are locked with metal padlocks bought in the towns. Marubo keep their personal possessions and valuables in the *tapo*. Thus, the indigenous architectural space has no measures to avoid theft, whereas the non-indigenous architectural space is used to keep possessions safe. Alfredo was no exception: he had a *tapo* where he kept goods that had been purchased with money, such as his hammer, his shotgun, and his wife's electric blender.

Alfredo's legitimacy as representative of the village to outsiders affected his relation to key material resources. Whenever anything was given by outsiders "for the village" or, more typically, "for the community," it was given to Alfredo. For example, Alfredo had an aluminum boat and a 25 horsepower motor, both of which were "the community's", but which were under his control. The boat and motor were most often used for short trips to other Maronal *shovo*, usually to invite someone to eat or to attend an invitation by someone else. I rarely observed the boat and motor used for the benefit of anyone other than Alfredo's *shovo*, although on a couple of occasions it was used for

the transportation of patients from peripheral *shovo* to the core. The boat and motor were used by Alfredo for both personal and public purposes, but others never used it for personal purposes. It should be noted also that no one else has a motor that large. There was a FUNAI-owned 25-h.p. in the village, but the only privately-owned motors in the village were 5.5 and 3.5 horsepower. Alfredo's community 25-h.p. stood out as the fastest motor in the best shape.

Fuel donations for the village went to Alfredo as well. When I arrived in Atalaia in July 1997, I was asked to buy a 200-liter drum of diesel for the Maronal generator. I complied, and when I arrived at Maronal the drum was given to Alfredo, who controlled its usage. Alfredo occasionally had stocks of gasoline for sale as well, though I never ascertained the origin of this. On at least two occasions, I observed people who wished to go out hunting far up- or down-river purchasing gasoline from Alfredo. On one occasion, José Barbosa's daughter's husband worked for the missionaries for several days until he earned enough money to purchase enough gasoline from Alfredo to go on a hunting trip he had planned. This is fascinating because when José had gasoline he typically gave it away to any kin who asked, whereas Alfredo sold it.

In addition to the diesel fuel, there was the generator running on it. This generator was purchased by Alfredo using lumber cut by the entire community, not just his own *shovo*. But although it was considered "the village's", in another sense it was recognized as Alfredo's. It was located near Alfredo's *shovo*, run most often with Alfredo's diesel, and operated almost exclusively by Alfredo's sons, who in fact had the key to the generator hut. On one occasion, José told me he was thinking of starting a

project to get a second generator that would be more “the village’s,” because he felt that this one belonged to Alfredo.

Although much of what belonged to “the community” was controlled directly by Alfredo, some of it was delegated to others. For example, the 5.5-hp motor donated by Doctors Without Borders for emergency transport of patients was, for much of my fieldwork period, stored in a *tapo* by José Barbosa’s *shovo*, and used and maintained by José and his family. The CIVAJA radio, which was located in Alfredo’s son’s *tapo* during my fieldwork, was moved to José’s *shovo*’s area later. It is possible that these moves were made for political purposes: since there had been some talk that José might start a new village, Alfredo would have a vested interest in making José feel welcome and appreciated at Maronal. And even if they wound up controlled on a day-to-day basis by José, the ultimate authority to decide where the 5.5 motor and CIVAJA radio should be was Alfredo’s. Alfredo could allow them to be kept by José, but José could not have simply taken them on his own. Nevertheless, these two examples show that not all “community-owned” material wound up being used by Alfredo exclusively.

On a mental level, two anecdotes serve to illustrate the fact that Alfredo’s *attitudes* towards material goods were not those we might expect from a reading of Lowie and Clastres. During my visit to Atalaia in March 1998, I purchased a supply of diesel fuel, which from May on I used to power the village generator for Brazilian TV’s once-weekly broadcasts of the National Basketball Association playoffs. On the morning of one of the broadcasts, I went to Alfredo’s *shovo* to talk to his sons about powering the generator. They were all going hunting that day, and could not stay to power the generator. I asked Txanõpa to leave his brother Ravẽpa behind. Txanõpa replied that he

could not, because the shotgun belonged to Ravēpa. Let him loan the shotgun to his brother Yopa, I said. But Txanōpa replied that he could not because their father Alfredo had lectured them about loaning the shotgun out. Ravēpa should not loan it out, Alfredo had told him, because others did not care for it well enough and it would end up damaged, whereupon his food production capacity would be diminished. At this final argument I gave up and accepted I would not be able to watch the NBA playoffs that day. It is enlightening to consider this incident in relation to a discussion that was taking place at José's *shovo* around the same time. José's daughter's husband Memāpa had returned to Maronal after a long absence. On his previous stay in the village, Memāpa had several times borrowed a shotgun from the missionary Aníbal. Aníbal was newly arrived among the Marubo then. The older missionary, Mr. Nunes, had left on vacation as soon as Aníbal arrived. Taking advantage of this situation, Memāpa had developed a relation to Aníbal where whenever peccaries were sighted, he would borrow Aníbal's shotgun, and pay him back with peccary-meat. Then Memāpa left the village, and when he returned, so had Mr. Nunes the older missionary. Memāpa was disgusted because, prompted by Nunes, Aníbal had stopped loaning out his shotgun. Memāpa said that while Nunes was gone, he could influence Aníbal to behave in a somewhat indigenous manner, but once Nunes returned, this was no longer possible. There is an analogy, therefore, between Alfredo's attitude and Mr. Nunes'. That attitude is the exact opposite of the one Lowie and Clastres would lead us to expect an indigenous leader to have.

The second anecdote that illustrates Alfredo's unexpected attitudes towards material goods has already been described (this chapter, under oratory): on January 28th 1998 he explained to a healing assembly how to make and spend money. He

recommended spending money on objects that could (a) last long enough to be inherited by children upon the father's death, and/or (b) be stored in a box for usage in getting people to work. These examples show that Alfredo was thinking of hoarding goods in a box, and hoarding them long enough that his children could inherit them. Both these thoughts are highly contradictory of any expectations we might have, following Clastres and Lowie, of how a non-Andean indigenous South American leader should think.

A look at Alfredo's relation to purely material goods, then, reveals that he does not give away all that he has, he is not materially destitute, and he does not think in a way that might be conducive to his being destitute. He makes money however he can, he buys objects, he keeps objects, and he sells objects he has made, though he does not engage in the resale of purchased goods. His political position is not dependent on giving goods away. Furthermore, labor contributions from other *shovo* have helped him build an airstrip and obtain a generator, both of which are under his control even if they are called "the community's". However, there are some areas in which Alfredo gives more than he receives. Most evident is the area of labor exchange. I showed in Chapter Seven that Alfredo loaned out his labor force more often than he received contributions of labor. This was because his labor force was larger than anyone else's and he did not have to borrow; and further because his labor force's size allowed him to loan labor without compromising his own food production. The effect was that *shovo* with small labor forces could be confident that they could borrow enough labor for major tasks, as long as they lived in Aldeia Maronal where Alfredo's system of labor exchange was in effect. It is a demonstrable fact that Alfredo gave away more labor than he received. Thanks to

this inequality he was able to call on a large labor force for special projects, but he rarely needed to do this.

In addition to the labor itself, it is probable that Alfredo felt that his villagers benefited from the way he organized the labor and the end products of this. His village had educational and medicinal facilities, namely the missionaries who were there at Alfredo's invitation. There were also communications facilities, most significantly the CIVAJA radio. And there was the television and satellite dish, which were unique in Marubo land at that time. These facilities were products of Alfredo's long-term planning and leadership, and they were all things Alfredo could offer to his villagers and potential villagers.

If we look carefully, then, we find that there are some areas in which Alfredo is a giver rather than a receiver, and where his villagers receive merely by asking. At least in the sphere of labor exchange, Alfredo seems at the disposal of the village rather than vice versa. But if we look purely at material objects, these expectations are confounded. Far from giving away everything he obtains, he has a *tapo* where he stores many useful objects, and he instructs his children not even to loan the most valuable and useful objects to others. Generosity in the Lowie/Clastres sense of the word is not an aspect of Alfredo's role.

Shovo ivo and Kakaya

In the remainder of this chapter I will address key aspects of Marubo political roles that do not quite fit into the categories received from Lowie and reified by Clastres. There are two political roles explicitly encoded in the Marubo social structure: *shovo ivo*

and *kakaya*. The *shovo ivo* is the owner of a *shovo*. Almost always, this is the individual who planned and directed the building of the *shovo* in question. The *shovo ivo* status was not related to age but to role in *shovo* construction: Alfredo was *shovo ivo* although his coresident brother Zacarias was older, and in the Varináwavo *shovo* Mayápa was *shovo ivo* though his brother Vópa was considerably older. There are certain expectations as to how a *shovo ivo* should behave. One of the most tradition-oriented *shovo ivorasi* (plural of *shovo ivo*), Sinápa (Alberto) explained these expectations: he must watch over the behavior of his people, prevent them from doing harm to others, and himself refrain from harming others. To do these things properly, the *shovo ivo* should be *eseyá* and *vanaya*. *Eseyá* has already been translated (this chapter, above) as signifying, roughly, ‘filled with moral wisdom.’ *Vanaya* uses the stem *vana* (=word) and the suffix *-ya*, which means something like ‘having the quality of,’ so that *vanaya* could be roughly translated ‘wordful,’ or ‘having the ability to speak.’ What Sinápa meant was that a *shovo ivo* should not only have *ese* but also be able to express it to his coresidents. In addition to these characteristics, Sinápa said that a *shovo ivo* should watch over his people to make sure they do not die when they are sick; he should tell people where to work; and he should invite people to eat and bring them good food to eat.

The characteristics of the *kakaya* according to Marubo informants have already been largely described in Chapter Seven, as well as in Melatti (1983). The main characteristics that have been touched upon are (1) feasting, and particularly the ability to throw the largest Marubo feast, the *tanamea*, and (2) organization of labor, so that everybody is well fed and healthy, the visible mark of the successful *kakaya*. Since the qualities of the *kakaya* have been presented in a compartmentalized form in separate

sections, it is useful here to present a synthesized perspective—that of my main informant, José Barbosa. José said that the main feature of a *kakaya* is that he tells people what to do, explaining to each where they had to go and what they had to do. By this of course he meant they had to organize labor effectively, particularly in the realm of food production (note that my empirical observations showed that the *kakaya* does not micromanage economic activity as if he were a Soviet central bureau; most activity is autonomously directed by the *shovo*'s social sub-units, but the *kakaya* has the ability to direct these affairs when necessary (scarcity, feasting) and does so effectively). In addition, José said, a true *kakaya* is always speaking *tsai iki*, explaining to people how things are and the proper way to act. The true *kakaya* is always throwing feasts, inviting other people to eat. The final characteristic mentioned by José is that a *kakaya* gets women for unmarried men, and tells these men what to do by performing *tsai iki*.

Despite the fact that Alfredo's handling of material goods does not resemble the generous ideal of a Clastrean leader there is a sense in which the *kakaya*'s structural role involves giving, and this aspect of the *kakaya*'s role is sufficiently different from what an egalitarian leader's role should be that it deserves mention here. Richard Lee (1979) has argued that among the !Kung, a social mechanism exists to eliminate the possibility of meat give-aways enhancing an individual's status. When a hunter returns with a good kill, people express disappointment even if the kill is good. They "refuse one who boasts...[and] speak of his meat as worthless" (Lee 1979:246). Hence, the !Kung prevent an association between giving and obtaining higher status. Among the Marubo, the precise opposite is true. The *kakaya* should not really hunt himself, but be able to organize and send out successful hunting parties. Once the meat is brought in, the *kakaya*

should invite as many people as possible and feed them with the meat. Obtaining meat and giving it away are essential aspects of the ideal/structural role of *kakaya*.

An incident that clearly illustrates the link between giving and the *kakaya* role occurred during the *tanamea* feast at Aldeia Maronal. The *tanamea* feast has been described in Chapter Eight. The feast began with the *vina atxia*, an all-night ritual to give hunting prowess, after which the hunters were sent into the forest. On the morning after the ritual, I decided that it would be a good move for me to contribute in some way to this feast, so I called some of the hunters to the hut where I slept, and I gave them all shotgun shells. As I handed shells out, one of the hunters said, referring to me, “*kakaya*.” This indicates that the activity I was engaging in at that moment was mentally associated by that hunter with the role of *kakaya*. Since I was supplying hunters with ammunition to kill meat for a feast, I assume this is something that hunter expected a *kakaya* might do. Indeed, at a later *akoya* feast I observed the organizer giving an entire box of shells to the hunters he was sending out—enough shells to feed his family for a month under normal circumstances. Note that although this was expected of the feast-organizer—and a *kakaya* must, structurally speaking, be a feast-organizer—during most of the time I was there everybody, *kakaya* Alfredo included, was very thrifty with ammunition. But during feasts, such thriftiness is thrown to the winds and extraordinary amounts distributed to young hunters. I have already shown that feasting is closely correlated with status and that high status may be sought or publicly confirmed by throwing certain types of large feast to display one’s skills in labor organization and economic prosperity. Thus, giveaways of meat, and giveaways of ammunition preparatory to giveaways of meat, are both acts which result in praise, admiration, and high status being bestowed upon the

giver in Marubo society. This is a door to political inequality which the !Kung have closed, according to Lee, but which the Marubo have wide open. A Marubo man can get high status by supplying the community with frequent meat-feasts. This is a fundamental difference, at the level of the value system underlying the social structure, between the Marubo and the ideal model of egalitarian society. And since the Marubo link between feasting and status is a common one throughout indigenous America, we may question the extent to which egalitarian social structure exists among societies where this link is made. Egalitarian social organizations may be temporary products of an underlying non-egalitarian structure, resulting from extreme hardship conditions such as genocide, disease, depopulation and forced migration which prevent a society from having the stability necessary for non-egalitarian institutions to develop.

To conclude this section, it is necessary to comment on the relationship between *kakaya* and *shovo ivo* and specifically on the role of *kakaya* in multiple-*shovo* leadership. This is a somewhat contentious issue. Aldeia Maronal is the only place multiple-*shovo* leadership is observable in Marubo land. Observations of the Ituí or of Aldeia São Sebastião would result in different conclusions from observations of Aldeia Maronal. Furthermore, Aldeia Maronal is a recent phenomenon, in existence only since the mid-1980s. The configuration I observed, with twelve *shovo* until Pekôpa's burned in 1998, was even more recent. As described in Chapter Five, Maronal was a dispersed village with two core and three peripheral *shovo* until the 1990s, when an explosion of *shovo*-building caused a rapid increase in the number of *shovo* in the village, to twelve (four core and eight peripheral). So the multiple-*shovo* leadership present at Aldeia Maronal is a recent phenomenon; it is temporally as well as spatially restricted.

The word that is used in Portuguese when discussing whether or not the Marubo have multiple-*shovo* leadership is *tuxáua*. This is a common word for indigenous leader, but its use in the Marubo context is firmly linked to the Marubo social category *kakaya*. It can be problematic in that the associations a non-indigenous person has for the word *tuxáua* are different from those an indigenous person might have. For the Marubo, *tuxáua* is a way to translate their concept of *kakaya*. Another word occasionally used is *cacique*, which also has implications of multiple-*shovo* leadership in that it refers to the leader of an entire village.

Several informants told me that the leading missionary at Aldeia Vida Nova, John Jansma, argues that the Marubo have no multiple-*shovo* leadership. This is a reasonable position based on his experience of the Marubo. He arrived in the 1960s, long before the creation of Aldeia Maronal; and he has stayed on the Ituí river, where there really is no multiple-*shovo* leadership. However, Jansma has had a greater role in this than he might realize himself. I showed in Chapter Five that there was a correlation between village formation process and type of leadership. Where a multiple-*shovo* village forms around a non-indigenous settlement, there is no indigenous founder and therefore no one who can say, as Alfredo can, ‘this is my village’. In such environments, there is either no village leader at all (as at Aldeia Vida Nova) or one without the authority Alfredo has (as at Aldeia São Sebastião). Therefore, by being a focus of attraction for resettlers, Jansma has created conditions favorable to the development of leaderless multiple-*shovo* configurations. Furthermore, it is quite clear that his statements have an ideological content. For example, an Aldeia São Sebastião Marubo, César, told me that he had accompanied Clóvis and Silvio to Vida Nova while they were organizing CIVAJA. This

incident, described in Chapter Six, resulted in Jansma's calling the federal police to have Silvio removed from the area. Jansma was firmly opposed to CIVAJA's organizational efforts in the Ituí, which threatened his own political predominance in the area. César described the encounter to me: "I was there when Clóvis was organizing CIVAJA and he took Silvio and his wife to visit the area. When they got to Vida Nova, Jansma became furious. Jansma screamed at us loudly, "What are you doing here? What have you come here to do?" Jansma got so mad he turned almost purple; he was shaking and trembling. He told me: "The Marubo have no leaders, no tuxáuas."'" In this case, Jansma's statement that there were no tuxáuas was intended to undermine the ability of the CIVAJA organizers to influence the Ituí Marubo. By sticking to that position, Jansma could legitimize his argument that Curuçá Marubo have no right to spread their organization to the Ituí. I conclude that Jansma based his conclusions originally on his observations, but continues to hold the same opinions despite the emergence of new socio-political configurations which contradict them, because those opinions serve a useful ideological purpose by helping him maintain his sphere of influence on the Ituí.

In fact, although there is no recognized indigenous *kakaya* on the Ituí, the Curuçá Marubo say that Jansma acts like the *kakaya* of the Ituí. For example, José Barbosa told me: "Jansma acts like he is the leader of the Marubo on the Ituí, but it's not true. It's our land and he's in it. At first, people used to ask the Americano's [Jansma's] approval for everything they did. If they were going to hold a meeting [*reunião*], they would ask Jansma what he thought. Now, Alfredo, CIVAJA, and others have told the Ituí Marubo that they need to just do things, just hold their meeting, they don't need Jansma's approval for anything. He is in their land, they are not in his."

Jansma's political role on the Ituí River was more than mere perception: he played a very real part in influencing the upper Ituí Marubo to action, even those who openly disavowed his leadership. This can be seen in the section entitled 'the mission incident,' Chapter Six. The lower three villages of the upper Ituí—Alegria, Vida Nova, and Liberdade—are often at odds over political issues. Alegria, with three *shovo*, has two leaders—the brothers Lauro and Antônio Brasil—both of whom claim the leadership of the village. Vida Nova, with five *shovo*, does not even have a claimant to village leadership, though certainly Benedito is the most active in attempting to influence and make decisions for the village. Liberdade, with two *shovo*, has a leader who is consensus-appointed rather than a founder, and so has limited authority. I have previously stated that these villages argue frequently, so that they sometimes neutralize one another over issues such as where the FUNAI post should be built. No one can influence anyone else, and they take no common action. Nevertheless, when I made my way to the Ituí, according to my informant Benedito, Jansma called a meeting of Marubo from all three villages, where he incited them to resist my visit. The result of this was that three political competitors—Lauro from Alegria, Benedito from Vida Nova, and Eduardo from Liberdade—agreed on a common plan of action, which was only defeated by José Barbosa's verbal adeptness. To hold a meeting where he influences prominent men on a key decision regarding relationships to non-indigenous people is exactly one of the roles Alfredo plays at Maronal. It is a role of multiple-*shovo* leadership. Thus, Jansma has the following effects on upper Ituí Marubo politics: (1) he vocalizes and communicates the idea that the Marubo have no *tuxáuas*, a notion with ideological content favorable to his own political aims; (2) he creates a socio-demographic/political

context wherein there is no indigenous village founder and hence no legitimately recognized indigenous leader; (3) having created conditions detrimental to the emergence of indigenous leadership, he himself occupies the role thereby vacated.

Despite Jansma's assertions concerning Marubo politics, Alfredo bristles at the notion that the Marubo have no *tuxáuas*. He points to his airstrip and generator as evidence of what multiple-*shovo* leadership can do. Both these assets resulted from Alfredo's ability to mobilize labor on a multiple-*shovo* scale. Other Indians, Alfredo says, do not have such leadership, and neither do they have such assets. He says Indians who do not have *tuxáuas* are like children, they have nothing. Alfredo explained to me: "That is how we work here at Maronal. Each *shovo* working on its own is no good [*não presta*]. Just three, four people, they eventually get the job done but it's difficult and it takes longer. Everybody working together is how we got the generator and airstrip. On the Ituí everyone is spread out, no one works together, nothing gets done. Here at Maronal we have a motor [the 25 h.p. outboard], a generator, an airstrip. Everybody lives close together, that way we can work together, we get a lot done. The way they do it on the Ituí is no good. Here at Maronal the community has all these things but on the Ituí they have nothing. They are poorer. Over there they work alone, each *shovo* works on its own. Here, we live close together with one *tuxáua*. One *tuxáua* is good. Over there, they live all spread out, each *shovo ivo* says he is *tuxáua*." Thus, to Alfredo the fact that he is a leader over multiple *shovo*, proven by his organization of labor, is a distinguishing, even identifying feature of his village and its political system. Maronal is distinguished from every other village because they have a *tuxáua* who can organize labor and point to tangible evidence of his multiple-*shovo* leadership.

Alfredo is recognized as multiple-*shovo* leader by others, not just by himself. For example, my informant Ronípa told me that the Ituí people have no *cacique*. At Maronal they are all one community and all recognize one *cacique*, Alfredo, he told me. Alfredo's multiple-*shovo* leadership is broadly recognized, by coresidents as well as by outsiders and by Alfredo himself.

Although Aldeia Maronal has a different political organization than do other Marubo villages, Alfredo draws on firmly Marubo cultural discourse to explain his style of leadership. It is clear from informants' statements of structural norms that the organization of labor is a traditional aspect of any leader's role, whether *shovo ivo* or *kakaya*. There is a further tradition of occasional emergence of strong leaders who issue invitations to move accepted by many people and thus become leaders of villages with multiple *shovo* (see Chapter Five—Txoki and João Tuxáua play this role in Marubo oral history). The last leader to issue such invitations prior to Alfredo was Alfredo's father João Tuxáua. When discussing his own efforts at organization of labor, Alfredo emphasized that his father cut a path to travel to Cruzeiro do Sul, a feat he compared with his own building of the airstrip. Thus, Alfredo dug into Marubo oral histories of strong leaders, into stories of his father's actions, and into commonly held notions of what the role of a leader should be to justify his style of leadership. I have no reason to doubt Alfredo's argument, which I might translate in academic language as "Alfredo's strong multiple-*shovo* leadership has clear roots in Marubo social structure and the Marubo political value system." It is unique both relative to the other villages and to the political configurations that preceded it temporally; however, it should be remembered that the other villages have been affected in their political systems by being formed around foci of

non-indigenous settlement, which is detrimental to the emergence of strong leadership, and also that the Marubo are experiencing a demographic rebound from the rubber boom. It should be noted that the Marubo are only now returning to demographic levels that permit the manifestation of political phenomena such as large villages with strong leaders. It should not be surprising that such a village has not existed in the recent past, nor can we conclude that it is not a truly Marubo phenomenon. Quite the contrary, where Marubo social organization is left to develop mostly undisturbed along indigenous lines of political thought and action, it is Aldeia Maronal that results—a village with strong multiple-*shovo* leadership, with a *kakaya* who has real authority.

In short, the *kakaya* I was able to observe personally—Alfredo—had very real authority affecting eleven or twelve *shovo*, each with its own *shovo ivo*. Alfredo could organize labor from all these *shovo* for communal projects, although he rarely did so. His ability to organize labor from multiple *shovo* was predicated on the fact that he loaned his labor force out more than he borrowed labor, thus placing much of the village in his debt. In addition to organization of labor, he had the authority to make decisions regarding relationships to non-indigenous people, as for example whether to let an anthropologist in, who to support for FUNAI positions, or how to relate to the missionaries. It was common for Alfredo to influence the village by first influencing an informal assembly of *shovo ivorasi*. Once he had conveyed his ideas to the *shovo ivorasi*, the latter re-conveyed them to their own coresidents.

The relationship between *kakaya* and *shovo ivo* is not necessarily like that I observed at Maronal. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that someone should lay claim to, and even be recognized as holding, the title of *kakaya*, without having anywhere near the

level of authority which Alfredo has. A man could organize labor from multiple *shovo* for a *tanamea* feast, and thus lay claim through his organizational and feasting skills to the title *kakaya*, without necessarily having any political authority over those other *shovo*. That would be the case if the village formation processes were different from what they are at Maronal. Thus, we should not regard Alfredo's authority as derivative of his structural role as *kakaya*. His authority is derived from his role in founding and enlarging the village, his superior ability to manage exchanges of labor, and his ability to use labor for projects that render his village attractive to others and thus expand his range of authority.

The *shovo ivorasi* always exist in Marubo society. There are always *shovo*, and each *shovo* has a *shovo ivo*. Whether or not there is a *kakaya* is a different matter. Marubo society could exist quite adequately with no *kakaya*; whether or not one or more exist is simply a matter of whether or not one or more *shovo ivorasi* manage to convince a broad enough sector of society that their claim to that title should be recognized. In contemporary Marubo society, Alfredo was the only universally recognized *kakaya*.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions to this dissertation will be presented in two parts. First, I will summarize the main findings of each chapter. Then, I will explain how these findings affect the hypothesis the testing of which was the purpose for gathering the data, and make some remarks on the broader significance of these findings.

The summary of findings has several purposes. Firstly, it is there to gather in one place all the major findings of this dissertation, which the subsequent conclusions are derived from. This obviates the need to re-state these findings as the conclusions are being presented, and also the need to break the flow of the arguments with extensive reference to other places in the dissertation. Secondly, the summary of findings is intended as a service to more casual readers who do not wish to read the entire dissertation. Casual readers may read these summaries, and refer to the body of the dissertation only if they wish to examine, more carefully, the raw data, of which these summaries are a distillation.

Following the summaries, I present the conclusions that can be derived from these findings. These conclusions are presented in six sections. The main conclusions are found in the first two sections. In the first section, “Applicability of the concept of

egalitarianism to Marubo society,” I present my argument that Marubo society cannot be classified as egalitarian. In the second section, “Variability in multiple contexts of Marubo politics,” I argue that Marubo society is one in which both egalitarian and non-egalitarian political forms exist, depending on particular contexts. The Marubo have political ideals that motivate them to produce non-egalitarian political forms, but these require conditions of settlement stability and demographic growth, along with the formation of villages in very specific patterns. Because such conditions do not exist at all times nor in all places, egalitarian forms of political organization may predominate at any particular historical moment, but this should not be taken to signify that Marubo society as a whole is egalitarian.

In the third section, entitled “Possible directions for future research,” I highlight some of the limitations of my research, point out which conclusions should be regarded as potentially subject to revision should new data be produced, and suggest what research is necessary to substantiate (or revise) my claims and to extend our understanding of Marubo politics. I conclude with three sections where I present some of the broader implications of this research on a scientific level (“Effect of method on results in political ethnography”), on a practical level (“Political motives in relationships with non-indigenous people”), and a philosophical level (“Concluding thoughts: Rousseau or Hobbes?”). These final three sections are related to the section in chapter three entitled “Consequences of Changes in Political Classification of Indigenous Amazonians.” They are not meant to be an exhaustive presentation of all the implications of this research, but only to demonstrate that it does have implications beyond the narrow central issue of political typology.

A. Summary of findings

Chapter Four: Residential basis of political cohesion and conflict.

In Chapter Four, I sought to understand what social forces made residential groups come together and stay together as coherent entities, and also what forces operated to break up residential groups. To understand what makes residential groups cohesive, I carried out an analysis of the composition of twenty-seven Marubo *shovo* from the upper Ituí and upper Curuçá rivers. To discover forces that made groups brittle I analyzed the residence of unwed minors, which reveals a certain brittleness in key social relationships.

The analysis of social composition of *shovo* revealed four basic patterns. I named these patterns agnatic, uxorilocal, avuncular, and anicular according to the social relationships each type was most dependent on. In the following discussion, the Marubo term *shovo ivo* is translated as *shovo-owner*, or simply ‘owner’.

Agnatic *shovo* are based on the relationship between brothers, and between men and their sons. When I asked Txanõpa why the former shaman, Miguel, no longer had his own *shovo*, Txanõpa replied that “his brothers and sons have left him”. For owners of agnatic *shovo*, the basic relationships that make up the backbone of the residential group are the relationships with their brothers and sons. The typical procedure is to build a *shovo* with one or more brothers, then expand the *shovo* by arranging to keep one's sons and one's brother's sons in virilocal marriages. Thus, there is a strong link between agnatic *shovo* and virilocal marriage. Relations between brothers who founded a *shovo*

together were very close. I called people thus related ‘brother-companions’. The owners of this type of *shovo* must maintain good relations with their brothers, sons and brothers’ sons. This is the main type of social composition at Aldeia Maronal, but is also found on the Ituí River.

Uxorilocal *shovo* are most common on the Ituí River. In this type of *shovo*, the owner expands his residential network by attracting sons-in-law to marry his daughters. Many of these uxorilocal marriages are polygynous. The in-married son-in-law is often older than the *shovo ivo*’s sons, and once he is married often has higher status than his brothers-in-law. In the cases which I observed, the *shovo*-owner’s son-in-law was second in status only to the owner himself. These sons-in-law were observed to play a key role in *shovo* politics, often handling relationships to outsiders while the *shovo ivo* focused on internal relations. I named this key role ‘uxorilocal lieutenant’. In many cases, the son-in-law inherits group leadership from his father-in-law. The succession thus bypasses the *shovo*-owner’s sons. This is reflected in a high degree of correlation between the uxorilocal pattern of *shovo* composition and departure of the owner’s sons to marry elsewhere. Thus, although he gains a son-in-law, the owner often loses his sons. However, the inheritance of leadership makes Marubo uxorilocality a permanent, lifelong arrangement in contrast to uxorilocality associated with temporary brideservice, found elsewhere in Amazonia (Harner 1972), where the uxorilocality lasts only until the son-in-law can leave to form his own residence. Uxorilocal *shovo* depend in many ways on the maintenance of control over or of good relations with the *shovo*-owner’s daughters, because if they leave to marry elsewhere the arrangement is impossible.

Uxorilocal and agnatic *shovo* are opposites in many ways. In agnatic *shovo*, the owner's sons stay while his daughters marry elsewhere, whereas in uxorilocal *shovo*, the owner's daughters stay while his sons often marry elsewhere. In some cases, *shovo*-owners manage to combine uxorilocality of daughters with virilocality of sons, a high achievement in postmarital residence-control which is found in at least four Ituí *shovo*. In other cases, a *shovo* may shift from uxorilocal to agnatic pattern of composition when a son-in-law inherits group leadership, but instead of replicating the uxorilocal pattern uses the agnatic/virilocal pattern to expand his *shovo*.

Avuncular *shovo* are based on the relationship between the owner and his sister's sons. Many of these are simultaneously uxorilocal, but not always. The ideal marriage pattern in Marubo society is marriage to the daughter of one's *koka*, in other words, to one's mother's brother's daughter. This type of marriage creates ideal Kariera-type marriage exchange systems and resolves the contradiction between matrilineal descent group membership inheritance and patrilineal name inheritance. When uxorilocal marriages involve the father-in-law's sister's sons, avuncular *shovo* result. The key relationship is that between the owner and his sister's sons. In some cases, however, avuncularity is a residential arrangement but is not accompanied by uxorilocality. The *shovo* may consist, instead of a set of brothers, of two sets of brothers who are sister's sons/mother's brothers relative to one another, but where the sister's sons are not married to their mother's brother's daughters. I found that if avuncularity is not combined with affinity, the link becomes brittle and a possible line of fission. The owner's sister's sons must marry his daughters if the link is to become long-lasting, otherwise there is a tendency for the sister's sons to fission. The link also becomes brittle if the *shovo* ivo

wishes to pass authority to his own sons rather than to his (often older) sister's sons.

Avuncular *shovo* are difficult to maintain and thus rare, but are exemplifications of the ideals of Marubo kinship.

I coined the term ‘anicular’, from the Latin *aniculus*, ‘old woman’, to refer to arrangements in which the focal point of the residential group is an old woman. In these arrangements, an older woman—a divorcée or a widow—moves to live with a married son or daughter. Thus, a part of the uterine group is reformed many years after its dissolution. Once this core is established, other sons and daughters of the old woman move to join her, often with their own spouses and children. This arrangement thus represents the re-cohesion of the uterine family after marriages have kept it apart for years. The older women who act as catalysts for these groupings often enjoy higher status in their roles as mothers or mothers-in-law than they did as in-married wives, so it is easy to see why this may be an attractive position for women who are not satisfied with the way they are treated in their husbands’ residential groups.

The type of social composition of *shovo* affects the distribution of status, the requirements for leadership, and the centripetal and centrifugal forces that the *shovo* is subject to. The distribution of status is always focused on the *shovo ivo* to begin with. In agnatic *shovo*, the second status is occupied by the owner’s brothers, and then by his sons and brother’s sons. In uxorilocal *shovo*, the second status is occupied by the son-in-law. In avuncular *shovo*, the second status is occupied by the owner’s sister’s sons, who are often at the same time his sons-in-law, but not always. In anicular *shovo* women, particularly the focal woman, are in a position of relatively great authority compared to other arrangements.

The requirements for leadership vary depending on the type of *shovo* one decides to lead. To have an agnatic *shovo*, a man must first marry and have children; the simplest *shovo* consist only of a single nuclear family. Alternatively, a man may marry, have children, and then invite his brothers to form a *shovo*. After the *shovo* is established, the owner expands it by arranging virilocal marriages for his sons and brother's sons. Another way of achieving agnatic-*shovo* leadership is to stay put when the rest of the group moves, and to keep your brothers with you.

To lead an uxorilocal *shovo*, a man must marry and have daughters, then attract sons-in-law to marry his daughters. To retain the sons-in-law, a man must maintain residential control over his daughter. The perpetuation of this arrangement depends on the *shovo*-owner's ability to maintain the coresidence of his daughters, and his daughter's willingness to remain with her husband. The son-in-law often inherits group leadership, so that uxorilocal marriage can be a path to group leadership. Uxorilocal sons-in-law who inherit group leadership can perpetuate the uxorilocal pattern in the next generation or shift to an agnatic pattern. Combining uxorilocality of daughters and virilocality of sons, a procedure which results in greater gains to *shovo* population than virilocality or uxorilocality alone, is a difficult strategy because it often results in status competition between the owner's sons-in-law and his sons. To maintain combined uxorilocality and virilocality, a *shovo*-owner must resolve that conflict somehow.

Avuncular *shovo* are perhaps the most tenuous of all. To lead an avuncular *shovo*, correct marriages must be secured. Rather than marrying into any lineage that is not taboo, the owner's sons and daughters must marry the one other lineage marriage into which maintains Kariera-type ideal arrangements. To perpetuate this type of arrangement

for more than one generation, the owner must be lucky enough to have children born in the right proportions so that there is no need for anyone to marry outside of the correct pattern. As long as everyone has a partner, avuncular *shovo* maintain centripetal group cohesion because everyone knows that by participating in the system they are assured marriage partners and belong to a thriving group; if correct marriages are not made available, the avuncular relationship becomes a line of potential fission, however. The *shovo ivo* has to make sure his group adheres rigidly to brother-sister exchanges over multiple generations. Thus, the avuncular *shovo*-owner must prevent people from marrying into the wrong lineage, and must communicate to his coresidents the value system that makes them see benefits in adhering to the exchange system. So many things can go wrong with an avuncular pattern that it is no wonder they are rare despite being closer to the ideal pattern than the more common agnatic and uxorilocal patterns.

The anicular *shovo* depends for its formation and perpetuation on a woman leaving her affines to rejoin her kin. The woman then acts as a centripetal focus for the attraction of others of her kin who are dissatisfied with their affinal residential arrangements. The long-term potential of these arrangements (i.e., beyond the death of the aniculus) is unknown.

Each type of *shovo* is subject to different centripetal and centrifugal social forces. Agnatic *shovo* are based on the strong bonds between brothers and between brothers and sons. The bond between brothers who run *shovo* together is so strong that I coined the term ‘brother-companionship’ to refer to it and to distinguish it from other relationships between brothers. The bond between fathers and sons can also be very strong, especially if virilocality is practiced. The bond between men and their wives is more brittle, yet an

agnatic *shovo* requires successful marriages, which can often be a problem. The agnatic pattern also needs virilocality, which requires that men stay together while women disperse. Women's tendency to resist this pattern by refusing to go where they are told, or by fleeing from their affinal residences, is another force that tends to oppose the agnatic pattern.

The uxorilocal pattern is based on the attraction of a man to a good marriage. It is perpetuated by the attraction of a man to high status and to the possibility of inheriting group leadership. However, by introducing a son-in-law in between the owner and his sons, this pattern creates a force that tends to produce the sons' dispersal: status competition between sons and sons-in-law. To counteract the dispersal of sons, the inheritor of such a group may switch to an agnatic basis instead of perpetuating uxorilocality.

The avuncular pattern retains cohesion by successfully creating an ideal four-section exchange system within the confines of the *shovo*. The main problem for this pattern is the tendency of people not to adhere to the ideal pattern. One or two wrong marriages can throw off the system, especially if they have significant demographic consequences. If there are too many 'wrong' marriages, the whole idea of group growth through adherence to the pattern is undermined and the *shovo* can undergo fission.

The anicular pattern represents the re-formation of the uterine family years after its dissolution through marriages. It is a triumph of consanguinity over affinity. The older woman at the core of these arrangements exerts a stronger attraction on her children than those children's affinal situations do. Anicularity creates a concentration of kin; if any of the older woman's children's marriages break up, the persons thus freed from their

former residential arrangement are attracted to this concentration of their kin. The main bonds that hold these groups together are the strong bonds of the uterine family.

In addition to the analysis of social composition, I analyzed the residence of unwed minors as a method for discovering potentially discordant forces in Marubo society. At Aldeia Maronal, I found that there were 113 unmarried youth under 20 years of age, resulting from 51 links between men and women. Of these 51 man-woman links, only 32 were permanent marriages in which both lived together. 37.3% of man-woman links at Maronal were thus extranormative, accounting for 24.8% of unmarried minors. This shows that the link between men and women can be weak. Divorce and failure to marry the father of one's children are the main causes of brittleness in man-woman links, accounting for 16 cases. Out of these 16 cases, in 14 of them the children live with their mother alone. Many of these are cases in which an amorous liaison results in reproduction but not marriage, while others are cases in which a marriage ends in divorce. Incestuous liaisons can also lead to situations in which parents of children are separated. Death can also separate children from their parents. Some children live with their grandparents instead of their parents, for unknown reasons. The results of this analysis for Aldeia Vida Nova were comparable: about one fourth of children do not live with both parents, and the most frequent explanation is a weak link between the men and women who produce those children. However, death as a divider of children from their parents was more common at Vida Nova than it was at Maronal. The analysis of unwed minors' residence patterns thus reveals a brittleness in the links between men and women who reproduce. About 25% of children do not live with both parents. Single mothers are common, and divorce also has an impact on residence patterns. Divorce and non-

marriage affect 12.5% of children at Aldeia Vida Nova and 14.4% at Aldeia Maronal.

The brittleness of male-female links must be seen in combination with the attractiveness of kin over affines as potential coresidents. Desire to be with those of one's kin with whom one is familiar and comfortable is a strong force generating non-marriage. The combination of brittle male-female links with the attractiveness of kin over affines generates forces which can confound many strategies of *shovo* composition. To be successful, a *shovo ivo* must be able to keep these centrifugal forces in check.

Chapter Five: Leadership of residential movements.

In Chapter Five, I analyzed the data on residential movements in order to determine whether the exercise of leadership in this sphere of social action fits received models of egalitarian leadership. The conclusions fit in four major categories: timing of residential moves, causes of residential movements, leadership of residential movements, and effects of village formation processes on the political power of village leaders. I will summarize the findings for each category.

The timing of residential moves among the Marubo did not fit received notions of Panoan residence-shifting. The oldest conception of Panoan residence-shifting comes from Steward (Steward and Métraux 1948), who argued that hinterland Panoans move their settlements every two to three years, movements that were linked to soil exhaustion. This notion was closely linked to the belief that these societies are egalitarian because Steward believed that a suitable ecological basis is necessary for the development of 'higher' political forms. If settlements were frequently moved for ecological reasons,

there could be no real development of hierarchical political organization. Carneiro's research among the Amawaka supported Steward's conclusions in the sense that he found yearly residence changes. However, he attributed this frequency of movement to the small size of Amawaka houses. The Amawaka had been frequently attacked by neighboring peoples, both indigenous and non-indigenous, and needed small houses to help them hide. These small houses enabled them to move frequently without much problem. They were an adaptation to temporary historical conditions of insecurity. Carneiro did not feel that the frequency of shifting, and the small houses, were features of 'Amawaka culture', and if the insecurity were removed they might build more permanent houses and the duration of settlements might increase. Romanoff's research among the Matses confirmed that Panoans could establish long-term settlements if conditions were right. He found that prior to his fieldwork, Matses residences changed every three years for ecological reasons, but when SIL established a mission, the Matses established a settlement that had lasted for seven years when fieldwork ended. This confirms Carneiro's belief that duration of settlement does not reflect essential 'culture' but rather depends on particular conditions. Among the Marubo, I found that new swiddens were cut at least every three years, often more frequently, but settlement duration could be 15-20 years or longer. The frequency of movement reflects not the duration of the swiddens, but rather the lifespan of the *shovo*. This lengthy settlement duration is certainly affected by the fact that the Marubo currently find themselves at the end of some 80-90 years of near-total peace with their neighbors, a time during which they have been able to grow demographically and develop socially free from interference. This shows that hinterland

Panoans, given suitable conditions, can adopt very permanent villages which permit the development of strong leadership.

My findings on the causes of residential movements add considerable depth to old theories about why indigenous Amazonians change residence. The old theory is that moves are due to soil and game exhaustion, and leaders base their decisions to move on an emic analysis of these factors. Price (1987) questioned this framework based on his experience with the Nambiquara. Lévi-Strauss (1944) had argued that Nambiquara leaders move their villages for ecological reasons, in pursuit of game and good soils. Price noted that groups do move to find good soils and game; however, they also move when a leader dies, or when the force that caused the group to cohere is removed. For example, when SIL was expelled, the settlement that had formed around it dispersed as various groups decided to move to separate locations. Thus, Nambiquara groups move less often than Lévi-Strauss predicted, and for a greater variety of causes. Among the Marubo, I found three cases in which a group had moved for an explicitly stated ecological reason: the move of São Salvador to São Sebastião was for access to good soils; the fission of Mashēpa was in order to maintain access to game, and likewise the move of Firmino to São Sebastião was for access to game. However, there were clear counter-examples as well. When Wanōpa moved to Aldeia Maronal, he ignored the fact that his destination had depleted game resources whereas his former locale had better game resources. Pedro Barbosa told me that game depletion was not a serious issue in Marubo considerations of when to move. And Txanōpa told me that although Aldeia Maronal had severely depleted game resources, they would maintain the settlement in its place and move to domesticate animals and hunt from motorized canoes instead. Thus,

although ecological reasons did play a role in Marubo residence-shifting, it was not a predominant role and explanations for moves were multi-causal. The main causes of group movements were (1) external warfare and conflict; (2) internal conflict; (3) responses to invitations to move; (4) desire for independence from one's settlement leader; (5) attraction to non-indigenous presence in indigenous land; (6) the effects of uxorilocality on the Ituí in terms of creating conditions in which the *shovo*-owner's sons move when their inheritance of status is interrupted by the intrusion of an older son-in-law; and (7) attraction to superior health, transportation, education, and communications facilities. In addition, a major cause of individual movements as opposed to group movements was attraction to members of the opposite sex.

The leadership of Marubo residential movements does not necessarily come from the individual occupying the structural position of leader, but may come from a variety of positions in the social system. Moves may be divided into six categories according to the structural position of the move leader. Follower-led moves are those in which non-leaders render and execute decisions to move independently of the settlement leader; the leader finds his settlement thereby depleted and follows his erstwhile followers to the new locale. These moves are often associated with avuncular-type *shovo* and fissions between sister's sons and mother's brothers. These moves often result in inversions of leadership, wherein the sister's son of the former group leader becomes the new group leader. Political successor's moves are moves that coincide with political successions and consolidate the change of leadership. The best example of this is Raomayápa's move to a new location at Aldeia Vida Nova. He inherited the *de facto* leadership from the elder José Nascimento, organized labor to build a new *shovo*, and when he moved into

the new *shovo* the change of leadership from José to Raomayãpa would be consolidated.

The third type of group move are subgroup fissions. These are cases in which a person who is not a village leader initiates a move involving a part of the group. A subgroup of a larger group leaves to find residence elsewhere. The former non-leader thereby becomes a settlement leader in the new locale. The fourth type of move is fission by refusal to move when the leader does. In these cases, the leader renders a decision to move, but only a part of the group follows. A subgroup refuses to go along. By refusing to follow, the refuser thereby becomes the leader of the new, smaller settlement. Integral moves are those in which an entire residential group is moved from one location to another. This is the one type of move that supports the Lévi-Strauss/Clastres framework, in which the leader is leader partly in virtue of being recognized as having superior ability to direct group moves in a way conducive to group prosperity. I found only three examples of this type of move. Finally, there are invitations to move extended by prominent leaders to less prominent leaders. In these cases, one leader moves at the behest of another leader, and fuses his group into a larger settlement. We must differentiate this type of move from the invitation of individuals. Price (1987) noted that Nambiquara leaders often attracted people to their village by controlling postmarital residence or attracting individual stragglers, but in the case of Marubo invitations to move it is entire settlements that are attracted to fuse with larger settlements.

The analysis of residential movements allows for the construction of a typology of Marubo leaders based on their role in village formation. Leaders can be divided into four types based on their role in village formation. Firstly, there are leaders by succession. These are leaders who inherit leadership from a dying or ageing leader. The most

common are uxorilocal successors who inherit villages from their fathers-in-law. These successions are often but not always accompanied by a loss of personnel. These leaders maintain authority over single *shovo*. The second type of leaders are leaders by fission, individuals who are leaders in virtue of founding a settlement by means of fissioning off from another. These leaders also maintain authority over single *shovo*. The third type of leaders are leaders by consensus. There are two main examples of this type. The first case is that of Aldeia São Sebastião where multiple groups converged around a single locale—a FUNAI post—and the leaders of these groups appointed one among them to be village leader. The second case is that of Aldeia Liberdade where the leader of a two-*shovo* settlement died, and the village appointed a new leader by consensus. The fourth type of leader is the founder/attractor. The main example of this is Alfredo, who first fissioned to establish his own settlement, then attracted other groups to fuse with his own village. Alfredo thereby became leader of a multiple-*shovo* village.

The most significant result of the analysis of residential movements is the finding of a correlation between the pattern of establishment of a village and the extent of the leader's power. This is clearly seen by comparing Aldeia Maronal, Aldeia Vida Nova, and Aldeia São Sebastião. Aldeia Maronal was a multiple-*shovo* settlement with a single leader who was at the same time the village founder. Alfredo's role as village founder made him the legitimate mouthpiece for the village. In political issues for which only one outcome was possible, it was Alfredo's decision that was final because he was the only person who could speak for the entire group. At Aldeia Vida Nova, the position of founder/attractor was occupied by the New Tribes Mission. Because there was no indigenous founder, there was also no indigenous person who could claim legitimacy as

mouthpiece for the whole five-*shovo* village. In this context, there was no indigenous leader at all and conflicts resulted not in the leader's determination of the outcome, but in mutual neutralization by multiple leaders in conflict with one another. Aldeia São Sebastião was a settlement originally founded as São Salvador around a non-indigenous presence. Here, there was no indigenous founder either, but instead of leaving the village leaderless a headman was appointed by consensus. This headman was headman by consensus appointment, not by right of village foundation. On key issues over which conflict arose he did not impose his will on others, and the result was that everybody did what they wanted, irrespective of the headman's advice. This case closely resembles the predictions of Clastres regarding leaders who are leaders because the group wants them to be, and who therefore lack authority to impose their will. The key finding is that leaders of multiple-*shovo* settlements who have obtained that leadership by founding a settlement, then attracting others to live in their settlement, thereby have real power in key fields of social action over those who have moved to join them.

The multiple types of Marubo leader, with their varying degrees of power, were all consistent with Marubo ideals of social organization. The powerless leader by consensus was as normal to the Marubo as the powerful founder/attractor. Thus, we cannot establish one of these types as reflecting 'essential Marubo social structure' while the rest are aberrations. Marubo social dynamics are capable of producing powerless consensus leaders and leaderless villages but also villages with powerful leaders by right of foundation. The multiple types are like different sentences constructed with the same social grammar.

In the field of residential moves, we find a predominance of autonomy over leaders' power as seen in the phenomena of follower-led moves, subgroup fissions, and fissions by refusal to follow the leader, as well as in the common establishment of villages with relatively powerless leaders or even no leaders at all. But we also find the basis for the establishment of leaders with real power: the role of founder gives the founder real power to determine outcomes in key fields of social action such as relationships to non-indigenous people, and if the founder is also a successful attractor of other leaders, his power can extend to multiple *shovo*.

Chapter Six: Relationships to non-indigenous people

In Chapter Six, I analyzed the field of social relationships surrounding relationships to non-indigenous people. My goal was to discover forms of interpersonal power that were not explicitly encoded in the social structure. I wanted to go beyond simple statements about what role goes with what position to discover forms of power that could only be perceived by observing actual social interactions over a sufficiently long period of time. My method involved firstly gathering exhaustive data on individuals' relationships to non-indigenous people over the period of fieldwork. Secondly, I analyzed the data to discover what goals were being pursued through relationships to non-indigenous people. In order to begin discerning any patterns of inequality I then asked if access to the pursued goals was equal or if there was in fact differential access to pursued goals. I then asked if, in the pursuit of their goals, individuals and groups came into conflicts of will. Finally, I asked if there were any patterns of repeated victory in conflicts of will. Any such patterns would be taken as

evidence that those who repeatedly won conflicts of will had some sort of real power; I then sought to understand the basis of such power.

I discovered that there were at least two observable patterns of repeated victory in conflicts of will: firstly, by Alfredo Barbosa, the leader of Aldeia Maronal; and secondly by CIVAJA and its co-founder, Clóvis Rufino. The main visible manifestation of their power was in making people give up a certain course of action against their will. For example, Alfredo suppressed an anti-mission movement led by fractious youth. CIVAJA helped force certain Ituí leaders to give up relationships with *regatões*. However, cases of a person being forced to do things against their will were not discernible in this set of data. Instead, ample autonomy was generally afforded to individuals by leaders to engage in a variety of individual forms of relationships with non-indigenous people.

The main goals I observed being pursued through relationships with non-indigenous people were education, health care, money, and influence. There was unequal access to all these goals. Regarding education, at Aldeia Maronal José Barbosa's family had the most access to this goal. This was due to the fact that José had expended more efforts in pursuit of this goal than anyone else, and had done so earlier than anyone else. Therefore, he had the most educated children: Amélia and Manoel, both of whom were within two years of finishing school. Amélia was the schoolteacher at Aldeia Maronal and was thus responsible for bringing education to many of Maronal's children. In this sense, education was not a resource under José's control and he could not use it to get anything out of the other villagers; instead the villagers asserted control over Amélia by making the provision of education into an obligation to the community. What having educated bilingual children did give José was considerable influence over the overall

shape of decisions regarding relationships to non-indigenous people, primarily by supplying him with superior information about the non-indigenous world and by translating his ideas into Portuguese for him.

Relative to the goal of health care, everybody at Aldeia Maronal had access to the same facilities: the mission clinic, the indigenous health agents (AIS) trained by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), and the occasional visits of MSF doctors and nurses, as well as the FUNAI-run health facility for indigenous people at Atalaia do Norte. However, the emergence of the role of AIS at the intersection of the indigenous and non-indigenous worlds signifies the development of considerable inequalities in access to health care resources. All AIS-es were sons or brother's sons of Alfredo. All lived in two core *shovo* at Maronal: that of Alfredo and that of Alfredo's brother José. The AIS-run pharmacy was located in the core and controlled by Alfredo's sons and brother's sons. The AIS-es had a connection to MSF and through that connection received medicines which it was their duty to dispense properly to the community. They also had access to health care training by MSF doctors and nurses. They thus had superior access to information about health care and to health care materials. This concentration of health care resources in the core *shovo* owned by Alfredo and his brothers at Aldeia Maronal was related to the Maronal core's close relationship to CIVAJA. CIVAJA was the mediator between MSF and the Marubo communities, so that by being closer to CIVAJA they were closer to MSF. Their choice of strategy in terms of relationships to non-indigenous people—relating to CIVAJA as opposed to FUNAI—had put them into a position where they could enjoy this unequal access to health care resources and they did so.

Access to money was unequally distributed at Aldeia Maronal. The only regular incomes in the village were in the social networks of José and of Wanõpa. José had two salaried children—his daughter Amélia, employed as village schoolteacher, and Manoel, employed as secretary and treasurer at CIVAJA. In addition, José's brother Pedro's close relations to the mission landed José and Pedro the contract to build a new house for the mission, which landed them a modest, albeit one-time, income. In the multiple-*shovo* network surrounding Wanõpa (his *shovo*, his brother's son's, and his two daughter's husbands') there were several regular incomes. Firstly, his daughter's husband Nakwa had a salary as an employee of FUNAI. In addition, he, his brother, and his father-in-law all received pension checks. These six regular incomes were the only ones at Aldeia Maronal. Beyond that, some *shovo* had people engaged in trade with and temporary employment among non-indigenous people. This was the case with Jamil, the Varináwavo brothers, and Aurélio. These people had to work very hard to obtain minimal incomes. Finally, just about everybody was able to sell some manioc flour and traditional crafts, which produce even smaller and more irregular incomes.

The final goal discernible in the data was influence over the pattern of relationships with non-indigenous people. In this sense, there was one individual and one group that had affected the pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people far more profoundly than most Marubo. Alfredo built the airstrip and invited the mission to Aldeia Maronal, thereby creating the system of relationships to non-indigenous people which the area's other residents had to adapt to. He subsequently determined policy as regards relations to the non-indigenous world among his villagers. CIVAJA had overcome FUNAI and mission opposition to their political organization to become the

recognized mediators between the interior communities and non-indigenous organizations, both governmental and NGOs. Subsequently they brought in the radio sets throughout the Javari basin, and then the MSF training teams, both of which had a major impact in the interior communities. In addition to Alfredo and CIVAJA, many young people had a significant influence on relationships to non-indigenous people. Youth who spoke good Portuguese, had some education, and access to CIVAJA had the most influence; those with good Portuguese, strong relationships to non-indigenous people, but no education had localized influence over their own *shovo* and immediate kin, but no influence on overall village policy; those with no Portuguese, no education, and no non-indigenous economic connections were mostly marginalized from village decision-making processes. Thus, for young people, access to education and Portuguese language skills seemed to lead to decision-making influence.

Having established the main goals pursued through relationships to non-indigenous people and the unequal distribution of access to those goals, I looked at all the instances in which individuals and groups came into conflicts of will. I found two patterns of consistent victory in conflicts of will. CIVAJA was able to overcome FUNAI resistance to their organizing; overcome mission resistance to their organizing; link the entire Marubo nation into a single decision-making process through the radio communications system; and impose their will on the pro-*regatão* Marubo to prevent the *regatões'* access to Marubo land. This shows a pattern of consistent victory in conflicts of will by CIVAJA. Alfredo was able to establish village policy on mission permanence; was on the winning side of the Edvaldo/Gilmar decision; imposed his will on Nakwa regarding the operation of the FUNAI radio; and emerged victorious on the contentious

chefe de posto issue. This shows a consistent pattern of victory in conflicts of will by Alfredo. These were the only entities (individuals *or* groups) who won all their conflicts of will; everybody else lost occasionally during the period of observation.

The patterns of conflict resolution used by Alfredo and CIVAJA differed. CIVAJA's strategy was manipulation of the Brazilian state. In this sense, for any Marubo in the interior to have influence on the pattern of relationships to non-indigenous people, access to CIVAJA was essential because CIVAJA was the mediator between the Marubo and the state. Whoever could control the CIVAJA radio in any given village could transmit messages to CIVAJA, which in turn would deliver the message to the appropriate entity. By this means, the interior Marubo could make their opinion heard by non-indigenous people and have their village-level decisions translated into real influence. Alfredo, in contrast, resolved conflicts verbally. For example, he used effective rhetoric to convince the father of some mission opponents to rein in his sons' oppositional tactics. Others used the same strategy, as when José used face-to-face encounters to win the conflict over my access to the Ituí River.

Conflicts of will are zero-sum games: someone wins, someone loses. There were many cases of this in the data. FUNAI officials and the mission opposed CIVAJA's organization; CIVAJA won. Mission opponents tried to get the mission to withdraw; Alfredo, needing the mission to remain, won the conflict. However, although preventing a course of action was common, forcing a course of action was not. There is still broad autonomy in individual relationships to non-indigenous people, for example when José Barbosa, though he does not like the mission, allows anyone in his resident group to go to services. The boundary between power and autonomy is thus in the difference between

forcing and forbidding. It is easier to coerce non-action than action. Power is imposed to prevent someone from pursuing a certain course of action, but not to force someone to pursue a course of action, at least in the field of relationships to non-indigenous people.

Although I did not observe people being forced to take actions against their will, the inequality in terms of influence over relationships to non-indigenous people did have an impact. Some people were able to determine policy which others had to follow. That is an aspect, in my definition, of political power.

I looked closely at the basis for common choices as regards relationships to non-indigenous people. When groups of people make similar types of choices, is there power involved in creating the similar choices? In some cases there was, for example when people were coerced into abandoning relations with the *regatões*. In many cases there was not, as when Jamil secured the willing cooperation of his *shovo* in making manioc flour, or when Alfredo drew on a system of reciprocity in labor-organization to build groups for his large-scale projects. There was a clear distinction, however, between those able to exert influence over broad sectors of Aldeia Maronal, and those with more limited influence. This distinction was discernible in village decision-making processes and in organization of labor. Owners of *shovo*, their brother-companions, and certain youth with superior access to information were able to participate regularly in group decision-making at informal councils and political meetings. Children of core *shovo*-owners tended to participate in these decisions and so were concerned with molding group decisions, whereas children of peripheral *shovo*-owners tended towards more individualistic behavior. In addition, some people were able to engage others in their pursuit of goals by convincing them to participate in their strategies: Jaime Varináwavo,

Jamil, Alfredo, Clóvis, and Wanõpa fit in this category, engaging their kin and some affines in highly organized work groups concerned with goals determined by the organizer. Others acted more individually. Thus, some organized labor on a large scale and determined policy through participation in decision-making events; others did neither.

Full participation in all decision-making was restricted to elders with specialized knowledge of healing songs. There were fifteen such specialists at Aldeia Maronal, of which nine were regular participants. These were all *shovo*-owners or brother-companions thereof. They participated not only in public meetings but also in the informal decision-making processes at healing rituals. Somewhat less influence was exerted by those who participated occasionally. Occasional participants in decision-making were middle-aged (30-50 years old) men, married with children, with robust traditional economic lives (i.e., agriculture, hunting, invitations to eat), lacking in specialized verbal and healing skills, who frequently participated in political meetings, occasionally in informal councils, and were sometimes written into official statements of village policy as '*lideranças*'. Finally, youth with access to information on non-indigenous people, who spoke Portuguese, and could read and write, also influenced decisions. CIVAJA created a framework for common decision-making by setting up a radio communications system which became the vehicle for the transmission of village decisions to the outside. CIVAJA stimulated decision-making events by supplying information over the radio and requesting responses. These requests resulted in village-level decision-making events, the results of which were radioed back to CIVAJA, often

as formal radiograms. The three above-mentioned categories—fully participant elders, partly participant adults, and selected youth—had the most influence in this process.

The specialized role of youth in decision-making seems traditional. For example, Alfredo told me that in his youth he travelled to non-indigenous areas and learned Portuguese whereas his older brother did not. Once relationships to non-indigenous people became a key aspect of the political environment, Alfredo had the advantage over his brother. Eventually he was made headman by his father, over his older brother. Zacarias still claimed to be *yurākakáya* (indigenous people's leader) while Alfredo was *nawākakáya* (leader for non-indigenous people) but empirical observations suggest that Alfredo is the overall leader, both in internal affairs and external. Furthermore, the myth of *Inka Rura-Re-e*, discussed in Chapter Nine, suggests that youth undertook journeys to foreign lands in search of precious goods as far back as prehispanic times, in a way analogous to one of today's young Marubo going to work on a ranch to save money for a shotgun before he returns to his village to settle down. Because it is a recurring pattern occurring in myths, oral histories, and the ethnographic present of fieldwork, it seems traditional.

Despite the discovery of certain sectors of society whose level of influence is superior to those of more excluded sectors, nobody other than Alfredo and CIVAJA satisfied my methodological/definitional criterion for stating that power exists. The basis of CIVAJA's power was clear: superior access to the Brazilian state. But what of Alfredo? To conclude Chapter Six, I presented further evidence that Alfredo had the power to impose his will in cases of conflict within his village regarding relationships to non-indigenous people. I endeavored to elicit the basis for this power. Finally, I showed

that Alfredo's case was atypical by presenting data on the resolution of conflicts of will on the Ituí River.

The evidence for Alfredo's power was in the case of the decision concerning the FUNAI *chefe de posto*. A January 1998 meeting set the policy in this regard: Aldeia Maronal wanted an indigenous *chefe de posto*, and specifically Manoel Barbosa. On January 25th 1998, Alfredo directed the writing of a radiogram stating this policy. On 22 April, Manoel radioed Maronal from Atalaia do Norte with the news that opposition to Alfredo's policy existed. The FUNAI administrator had heard rumors that Alfredo in fact opposed Manoel's appointment to the *chefe de posto* position and preferred a return of the non-indigenous workers. That night, an informal council was held at which Alfredo stated his support for Manoel and denied the rumors of his opposition. The source of the rumors was identified as a set of political rivals of Alfredo, who were attempting to limit his influence over relationships to non-indigenous people. Despite this, the opposition did not cease. On May 30th, Clóvis radioed Aldeia Maronal from Atalaia do Norte to give the news that people in Atalaia were still saying that Aldeia Maronal opposed Manoel's appointment. This was slightly different from the message of April 22nd: the latter suggested that **Alfredo** opposed Manoel; the former suggested **Aldeia Maronal** opposed Manoel. Therefore, the issue arose of who speaks for Aldeia Maronal. A meeting was held to discuss the issue. Alfredo was not present but was represented by his son Txanõpa and his brother Miguel. The meeting once again resulted in support for Manoel. Later, José Barbosa explained to me that certain sectors of the village, closely linked to the former FUNAI worker, opposed the transition to an indigenous *chefe de posto*. He said that these people had managed to convey their opinion through FUNAI

channels to the administrator, who got the impression that “Maronal” did not want Manoel. José then told me that “Maronal is Alfredo’s”, not the opposition’s. The implication was that because Maronal ‘belonged’ to Alfredo (*é dele*) he could speak for the village, whereas the opposition could state its opinion but in no wise could speak for the village.

The incidents of April 22nd and May 30th 1998 clearly indicate that ultimate decision-making authority rested with Alfredo on this matter. Although he sought the broadest possible consensus, there remained opposition, but Alfredo imposed his own point of view. On April 22nd, Manoel’s message was essentially that if Alfredo opposed his appointment, then the appointment would not go through—an indication of Alfredo’s power over this outcome. Alfredo gave his authorization and the paperwork for Manoel’s appointment continued to be processed. The incident of May 30th was even more telling: because ‘Maronal is Alfredo’s’, Alfredo could speak for the village; no one else could speak for the village unless they were stating Alfredo’s opinion. The village is considered Alfredo’s because he founded it and everybody else moved there. Alfredo is in the role I identified as founder/attractor in my typology of Marubo leaders. The fact that he is founder/attractor makes him the legitimate spokesman for the entire village, a position other Marubo leaders do not have. This, I believe, is the source of Alfredo’s power—his ability to repeatedly win conflicts of will in the field of relationships to non-indigenous people. His power is an inherent aspect of his role not as headman, but as founder of a village to which others have moved. The relationship between attractor and attracted determines the fact that the founder is the ‘owner’ and, therefore, can speak for the village. This, in turn, gives him the ultimate decision-making ability in key situations.

As a result of having founded a village and successfully attracted and retained a large number of coresidents, Alfredo has the power to determine village policy regarding relationships to non-indigenous people.

Generalizing from my conclusion that Alfredo's power is based on his status as founder/attractor, I predict that any other Marubo leader who constructs a village in similar fashion will have a similar level of power. However, the fact is that at the time of my fieldwork there was no other such leader: Alfredo was unique. On the Ituí, for example, multiple villages had been established by a series of independent decisions to move. No one had Alfredo's key resource: status as founder of a village to which others had moved. The only person with a structural position similar to Alfredo's was the missionary John Jansma, who in fact did work to influence the Marubo by calling meetings and suggesting courses of action. The result of the Ituí settlement pattern was that there was no single person to determine outcomes. For example, at Aldeia Maronal Alfredo was able to determine village policy towards the mission. On the Ituí River, there was no process for creating a unified policy towards the mission: instead, each *shovo* determined its own relationship, independently of what anybody else wanted. Abundant evidence was presented in Chapter Six to bolster the assertion that on the Ituí decision-making processes often result in mutual neutralization by competing leaders, rather than in a single decision as at Aldeia Maronal. I argue that this is a result of the different processes of village formation that operated on the Ituí River as opposed to those at Aldeia Maronal. These processes resulted in different types of leaders with different levels of power; only the leader with legitimacy as founder of a multiple-*shovo*

village had real power. Alfredo's power is thus not a universal feature of Marubo politics.

I should emphasize that Alfredo's power is limited. It seems to operate only in cases of direct conflict where both opinions cannot prevail at the same time. In these cases, the Maronal political process can yield a single opinion: always Alfredo's. This is due to essential features of his role as founder/attractor and the legitimacy derived therefrom. On the Ituí there is no way to produce a single opinion because there is no one in Alfredo's position. Thus, at Maronal, there is autonomy except in cases of direct conflict between individuals with differing levels of power. On the Ituí there is autonomy even in such cases. I conclude that power exists in Marubo society, but that such power is not an essential structural feature of the role of headman or *kakáya*, but rather is determined by particular leaders' role in village formation processes and the legitimacy, derived from those roles, as speakers for the village they have founded.

Chapter Seven: Analysis of fields of choice.

In addition to residential movements and relationships to non-indigenous people, I analyzed four other fields of choice: healing rituals, feasting, organization of labor, and political meetings. I call these fields of choice following Mair (1969) because in these areas procedure is not strictly determined by custom but rather leaves room for maneuver. In that room for maneuver are discernible the goals of the social actors involved, the conflicts that arise over goals and strategies, and the resolution of these conflicts.

Analysis of these four fields of choice revealed considerable information of a political nature.

Healing rituals can be seen as a form of political organization because they act to reinforce the cohesiveness and unity of groups larger than the *shovo*. The main purpose of healing rituals is healing, but they serve also the secondary purpose of allowing elders to highlight relative differences in skill and relative status distinctions, and permit transmission of knowledge from elders to young men and from elders to elders. Since the healers are also the key members in the agnatic social structure of Aldeia Maronal, healing rituals bring together the prominent men in one place. Healing rituals thus often serve as informal councils. Knowledge of healing songs (*shōki*) thus becomes a criterion for inclusion and exclusion from decision-making processes.

Feasting has strong correlations to status and political strategy. Adult men are expected to be economically productive and to display their productivity by inviting people to eat. Men who construct *shovo* and thereby enter *shovo ivo* status are expected to build an *ako* (signal drum) and hold the village-wide *akoya* feast, which requires feeding up to 200 people. The highest political status in Marubo society, *kakaya*, has explicitly encoded in its structural role, according to Alfredo, the holding of large multi-village feasts called *tanamea* which, when I observed them, required feeding over 300 people. Age, sex, and personal ability are thus insufficient to enter *kakaya* status. A large social network is required to handle the food-processing. To enter the highest status a Marubo man must accumulate a large social network. But the number of people in Marubo society is limited; therefore, competition for personnel is a zero-sum game where one person's gain is another's loss. There is thus a limitation on accessing this status: not

all with the ability will be able to do so. Marubo society therefore has a “means of fixing or limiting” who can access high status. Hence, it is definitionally not egalitarian.

Organization of labor, like feasting, is an aspect of the role of *kakaya*. Alfredo had a large labor force because his father had had a large family and had kept it together, so that Alfredo was able to draw on a large social network from the start, without having to start from scratch. Alfredo often loaned labor to coresidents. He loaned labor more frequently than he borrowed it. Since people valued the ability to borrow Alfredo’s labor force, they generally helped him on those rare occasions when he asked for others’ help. He generally borrowed others’ labor only for major projects which increased the visible material wealth of the village. He thus used his organization of labor to expand inter-village inequalities, both in wealth and in status. Since Alfredo had superior abilities in organization of labor which he used to reinforce his status on both village-wide and multi-village levels, and since his special abilities were partly due to his inheritance of social resources from his father, and since the inheritance of social wealth is a characteristic beyond age, sex, and personal ability, I conclude that not all have an equal chance to succeed to high status even given equality of age, sex, and personal characteristics. Once again, Marubo society is not definitionally egalitarian.

Political meetings showed significant deviations from the model of egalitarianism. In the egalitarian model, the headman has no authority. The public controls him, the assembly of adult men checks his power (Lowie 1948; Clastres 1977[1974], Boehm 1999). My observations of Marubo political meetings, particularly at Aldeia Maronal, suggest that a few set the agenda and make decisions, then use political meetings to get the rest to approve. The majority have no effect on decisions. Mere silent presence at a

meeting is considered approval of the decisions made. Few people speak at meetings; most simply silently approve. At Aldeia Maronal all political meetings eventually resulted in Alfredo's opinion being approved; his authority was never checked by the assembly. Political meetings thus serve more to reinforce the authority of a few influential people rather than to check the authority of this political elite. Empirically, these are not consensus decisions at all; they only seem to be consensus decisions superficially.

Chapter Eight: reciprocity in the Marubo kinship system.

In this chapter I tested the applicability of Lévi-Strauss' theory of kinship to the analysis of Marubo politics. This was important because there is a direct link between Lévi-Strauss' kinship theory and the belief in pan-Amazonian egalitarianism. Lévi-Strauss argued that elementary structures of kinship were reflections of the principle of reciprocity and that, therefore, societies with this type of kinship had reciprocity embedded in their social structure. The concept of reciprocity was then applied to the interpretation of political systems such that all authority was seen as an exchange whereby the group grants authority to the leader while the leader gives his abilities in leadership to the group (Clastres 1974[1977]). True power was thus denied to Amazonian leaders on structural grounds. This theory must now be reconsidered. I found that, whereas it is true that Lévi-Strauss' theory of reciprocity applies to kin groups, it does not apply to the political units of Marubo society. Kin groups do not increase in size relative to one another, but political units do. Marubo leaders are playing

a zero-sum game with one another for scarce human resources, a game wherein the objective is unequal success relative to one another.

I began with the premise that Lévi-Strauss' interpretations of elementary structures of kinship contain testable predictions. Lévi-Strauss argued that inter-clan marital preferences in these types of systems are aimed at maintaining a matrimonial equilibrium. Changes in inter-clan marital preferences are made to suit the demands of that equilibrium. This is an aspect of what Lévi-Strauss calls the 'system of the scarce product', whereby society controls the distribution of products that are essential to group survival, including marriage partners. In order to ensure group survival, society places restrictions on the excessive accumulation of key resources by any subsector of society. To establish this restriction, rules are developed whereby one must give away one's own in order to receive others': the principle of reciprocity. In the realm of kinship, this rule establishes exchange among exogamous units. Since the purpose of these rules is to prevent unequal accumulation by any one group, changes in the form of the exchange system may occur in order to maintain the matrimonial equilibrium. However, Lévi-Strauss argued that historically-specific changes in the form of an exchange system do not change the fact of that system's being a structure of reciprocity.

My second premise was that the Marubo system is such that Lévi-Strauss' predictions should apply to it if his premises are accurate. I argued this by showing that the Marubo system has the features of an elementary structure of kinship, precisely the kind of structure Lévi-Strauss was analyzing. In addition, the Marubo system has been through historical vicissitudes precisely analogous to those Lévi-Strauss argued a system should be able to endure without having its structural reciprocity impaired. Available

data suggest that before the rubber boom, there existed Kariera-type structures of reciprocity in Marubo society and, after the rubber boom, such structures still existed, although the extinction of entire exogamous lineages forced a reorganization of the form of the exchange system. Despite this reorganization of form, if Lévi-Strauss is right, the system should still work to prevent the unequal accumulation of personnel by any one group and, hence, to produce matrimonial equilibrium.

In order to operationalize these hypotheses, I argued that if reciprocity is present in marriage exchanges, such that the system operates to maintain equilibrium by preventing unequal accumulations, then the relative demographic proportions among exogamous lineages should remain the same over time. This hypothesis was tested, and mathematically confirmed. Relative proportions among exogamous kin groups **do** remain the same over time. Kin groups cannot, therefore, be used as vehicles by leaders to achieve political dominance by achieving demographic predominance. But the same test applied to the Marubo residential group, the *shovo*, reveals that demographic inequalities among coresident groups do develop. This is important because the structural leadership positions in Marubo society are linked to residential groups, not to kin groups.

Marubo kin groups do not have structurally encoded leadership roles, nor even informal/interstitial ones: they do not operate in any detectable corporate form. Leadership positions, particularly those of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya*, are linked to residential units. Leaders lead residential units, not exogamous marriage classes. This is an important fact as regards the applicability of Lévi-Strauss' theory to the realm of politics. Since the relative proportions of population represented by each residential group do not

remain the same over time, but rather reveal the development of inequalities, I conclude that the fact that the Marubo kinship system is a mathematically confirmed structure of reciprocity does not prevent leaders from working to create intergroup demographic inequalities. The production of such inequalities was examined in the following chapter, Chapter Nine.

In conclusion, Lévi-Strauss argued that elementary structures of kinship operate to maintain inter-group matrimonial equilibrium, and the Marubo kinship system fits Lévi-Strauss' predictions. However, this does not mean that in such a society political inequality is impossible. Lévi-Strauss' theory operates *only* in the realm of kinship. Lévi-Strauss made the concept of reciprocal exchange the heart of how such a society should work. Clastres applied this principle to the interpretation of political relations. But Clastres' interpretation does not work for the Marubo. Inequality in the distribution of personnel is the norm among the Marubo and is, in fact, a key goal of leaders, as I showed in Chapter Nine. The processes whereby leaders endeavor to construct demographic inequality are called a political economy of people, wherein unequal access to human resources is the key goal.

An extremely important conclusion that is tangential to this argument has to do with how the Marubo emerged from the rubber boom as the dominant indigenous society in the Javari basin. Since the kinship system spreads growth evenly among all exogamous groups, all groups rebounded equally from the rubber boom's demographic lows. Thus, what emerged from the rubber boom was not a fragmented society with its kinship system shattered, but rather a thriving society with multiple exogamous lineages

exchanging and growing equally. The Marubo kinship system must be considered a key element in interpreting Marubo social and cultural survival.

Chapter Nine: the political economy of people.

In Chapter Nine, I elucidated the processes involved in construction of the inter-group demographic inequalities which I had discerned in Chapter Eight. The conceptual framework for interpreting these phenomena was adopted from Rivière (1984) and Mentore (1987): the concept of a political economy of people. The basis of this concept is that people are valued as a scarce resource in Amazonian societies. I argued that in order to show that a political economy of people exists, it must be shown not only that people are valued as a scarce resource but also that the active pursuit of that value is an observable social process. I first demonstrated the applicability of these premises to leaders. I showed that headmen actively solicit personnel to move to or remain in their area. The primary indicator of this was the occurrence of invitations to move, a phenomenon found in Marubo oral histories dating to before the rubber boom, and observable also in the ethnographic present of this fieldwork (1997-98). In addition, I showed that there are conflicts among headmen involving the allocation and re-allocation of personnel. The occurrence of invitations to move and conflicts over allocation of personnel showed that leaders value human resources and the pursuit of that value is an observable social process.

Demonstrating the applicability of the premises to non-leaders was a somewhat more complex task than for leaders. I originally gathered data on the

theoretical/methodological premise that if I could show that there are more and less valued social forms and that non-leaders make efforts to move to more valued networks from less valued networks, then the premises that people are valued as a scarce resource and actively pursued in an observable fashion would be demonstrated. Regrettably, this argument could not be pursued. I could not explain the direction of human movements in terms of the statement that some social configurations are more desirable than others and that human movements are in the direction of greater desirability. Aside from the sheer tautology of the argument, it was invalidated by the fact that there is so much variety in what individuals think of as a “more desirable” social configuration, that it was difficult to isolate any clear ideals. In fact, different individuals often held diametrically opposed ideals, as when men bemoan the independence of women while women cultivate that same independence. I therefore abandoned my initial premise and, instead, worked to show how the goals pursued through residential movements create dynamic interactions between individuals and groups that have varying levels of conflict and cohesion regarding those goals. I looked for the efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcomes of residential movements suit their goals and to minimize the extent to which such outcomes conflict with their goals. These efforts can be seen to demonstrate that people are valued as a scarce resource and actively pursued as such in an observable fashion.

Before proceeding to demonstrate the applicability of the political economy of people framework as regards Marubo non-leaders, I had to invalidate a hypothesis which, if true, would disprove the political economy of people. I had to show that structural norms do not compel most Marubo residential movements. Instead, individuals exercise

choice over the direction of their residential movements. I showed this by reference to the data presented in Chapter Four. There, I showed that avuncular *shovo* are the ideal pattern but are also very rare. Uxorilocal and agnatic patterns are not ideal but they are more common. Some cases of ideal avuncular patterns shown in Chapter Four were *shovo* that broke up for economic reasons, demonstrating that economic advantage can be a more powerful motivator than adherence to norms. This shows that Marubo residential arrangements are flexible and the norms do not strictly compel most residential movements. There is room for individual choice.

To demonstrate the existence of the political economy of people among non-leaders, I drew on the database of residential movements I gathered while in the field. This included 142 marriages, most of them involving a change of residence by one or the other partner, and 45 group movements involving 445 persons changing residence. I first analyzed postmarital residence. I showed that the determination of postmarital residence can be a political issue. A main goal of leaders is to expand their group. Thus, there are cases where settlement leaders compete for control of postmarital residence. There are cases where leaders try to combine uxorilocality of women with virilocality of men, which is the way to build the largest group but which obviously would lead to conflict if multiple leaders were trying to achieve this same goal. Despite finding these tensions in the field of interpersonal relations surrounding the determination of postmarital residence, I could find no direct correlations between the power I found in Chapter Six and the ability to control postmarital residence: Alfredo, in fact, sent his women away to a smaller group and received women from a variety of places, but did not try to combine female uxorilocality with male virilocality. He participated in an exchange system,

which, as I showed in Chapter Eight, precludes unequal accumulations. This shows that group size and power differentials do not necessarily allow the bigger and more powerful to determine personnel allocation.

The analysis of postmarital residence mirrors the analysis in Chapter Eight in revealing two distinct modes of social action. Firstly, there is a structure of reciprocity operating in many cases. These are situations where no effort is made to accumulate personnel unequally relative to others by controlling postmarital residence to a greater degree. These situations, such as that of Alfredo or of several exchange networks on the Ituí, result in exchange systems. One exchange system linking the Ituí and Curuçá Rivers was found to result in the smaller group getting relatively larger while the larger group gets relatively smaller. This is the effect predicted by Lévi-Strauss' theory of reciprocity in kinship systems, namely that of a levelling of differences between groups.

Side by side with exchange systems were non-exchange configurations. These were situations in which groups were built up by series of individual postmarital-residence events that were not part of any long-term exchange system. In this field of relations I noted a definite interpersonal control mechanism, one already noted by Turner (1979) as common in Amazonia: controlling a man's residence and labor by controlling a woman he wants. The best examples of this were found on the Ituí River where individuals of relatively small and broken social networks entered into uxorilocal polygyny. In these cases, men with daughters over whose residence they have control can control the residence of men who in their own background have no way of obtaining women. In looser terminology, if you are not part of a family that itself is part of an exchange system through which you can get a woman, you might have to jump through

another man's hoops to get married. In many cases this is a more balanced process than it looks because uxorilocal marriage often leads to the uxorilocal in-marrier's inheritance of group leadership. Thus, the in-marrier can eventually obtain high status and even group leadership. The original leader gains followers, but the in-marrier eventually gets higher status than he could ever hope for if he stayed in his original network. In other cases, however, this seems as unbalanced as it sounds. For example, Wanõpa managed to control Ronipa's residence and labor by holding out the possibility of a future wife for the latter. This shows that there are cases of the socially wealthy controlling the socially poor. Thus, the efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of postmarital residence events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which these outcomes conflict with their goals create situations where postmarital residence is not determined by norms or by pre-established exchange systems but rather by the resolution of tensions among persons and groups with conflicting goals. The resolution of these tensions results in groups' accumulation of personnel by repeated control of individual postmarital residence events. These non-exchange configurations result in the exacerbation of demographic inequalities among groups. The socially wealthy can control the residence of the socially poor in many cases, revealing inequalities in power resulting from inequalities in social wealth. What we cannot do is make any predictions based on this observation because there are contrary cases in which, by means of established exchange systems, the socially poor gain at the expense of the socially wealthy. Not every large network gets bigger by controlling the postmarital residence of smaller groups whose members need marriage partners.

The data on postmarital residence clearly show that a political economy of people is operational among the Marubo. People are a means of acquiring things in Marubo society. The social network provides the means of acquiring things: a labor force, the ability to attract others by controlling women, status, autonomy, freedom of action, and economic productivity. To have these desirable things, a man must begin with marriage. To marry, someone must move to where their marriage partner lives. Some such moves are pre-established by exchange systems; others are results of efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of postmarital residence events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which these outcomes conflict with their goals. In these cases, the mover is seeking to maximize the value gained through the move. Thus, these processes show that individuals value other people and networks of people and through their actions endeavor to maximize the social value at their disposal. This shows the valuation of people by people and the active, observable pursuit of that value, demonstrating the premises for the existence of a political economy of people. Leaders' efforts to control postmarital residence and non-leaders' efforts to maximize the value they derive from a postmarital residence event constitute a politico-economic system based on people moving towards people in an effort to maximize social value. This is a political economy of people.

To finish the proof that a Marubo political economy of people exists, I examined the data on group movements. In Chapter Five I had already listed the main goals sought through group movements. I noted that desire for independence was a significant goal, but attraction to superior health, communications, and education facilities were also significant. Alfredo assembled these facilities explicitly as a means of attracting others to

his village. Both José and Wanōpa found these qualities more attractive than mere independence and moved away from networks that were their own to networks that were not their own but included superior health care and education. On the other hand, some find that the best quality for a network to have is for it to be *theirs*. Hence, the moves of José and Wanōpa resulted in splits, with part of each group staying behind while the rest moved. These were younger people, who chose independence over the superior health care and education available at Alfredo's village. These data clearly show that people are working to create and be in the best possible social network according to their own conceptions of what a good network is, conceptions which often conflict with one another but which are frequently observed to guide actions in situations where groups are moving from place to place. The reader is referred back to Chapter Nine for more detailed proof. Here, it suffices to say that there is a set of social interactions surrounding the efforts of individuals to maximize the extent to which the outcome of postmarital residence events suits their goals and to minimize the extent to which these outcomes conflict with their goals, and this set of social interactions constitutes a political economy of people involving leaders and non-leaders in efforts to get the best possible social network by maximizing the value derived through residential movements.

The significance of these data becomes clear if we consider them against the backdrop of the hypothesis the testing of which informed the gathering of the data. The purpose of the research was to examine the validity of the underpinnings of the hypothesis of pan-Amazonian indigenous egalitarianism. Most significantly, Clastres argued that “economy in a primitive society is not a political economy” (Clastres 1977[1974]:168), that there is an “intrinsic impossibility of competition” (Clastres

1977[1974]:168) and a “prohibition of inequality” (Clastres 1977[1974]:168). I have shown that Marubo society has an active political economy related to the production and distribution of human resources. I have shown that, far from being intrinsically impossible, competition is an inherent aspect of this political economy as leaders play a zero-sum game for limited human resources and non-leaders likewise attempt to maximize the value derived from changes of residence. And I have shown that far from being prohibited, inequality in demographic success is an emically recognized goal actively pursued by Marubo leaders. The research into the political economy of people was thus extremely productive. By using these methods to go deeper than the surface structure of society and investigating instead possible loci of extra-structural, interstitial power through the observation of actual human interactions over one year of fieldwork, this research has revealed a system of competition for unequal success that had not been previously discerned in political analyses of indigenous Amazonian societies.

Having identified the existence of a Marubo political economy it became necessary to consider the means of production in this political economy. Rivière defined political economy as “the ways in which, within a given society, the production and distribution of wealth are ordered” (Rivière 1984:87-88). Marubo political economy is concerned with social wealth. Therefore, I looked at the means of production of social wealth. I wanted to determine if the observed fluctuations in relative size of Marubo groups could be explained in terms of unequal access to the means whereby social networks are produced. Can inequalities in the distribution of the means of production of the social network explain the development of demographic inequalities among groups? To this end, I identified four means of production of the social network which seemed to

have the potential for explaining observed demographic inequalities: marriage, polygyny, control of postmarital residence, and access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people.

I found that access of men to women was near-universal in Marubo society. Very few men were denied marriage. The only cases I found were a few openly homosexual men who did not wish to marry, and one man who was a repeated violator of key social norms. The latter was an important case because it shows that there does exist the possibility that a man will be denied marriage if he runs afoul of cherished group values. This is a powerful sanction which produces a strong impulse to conformity with established norms. Nevertheless, the exercise of this sanction was extremely rare. I also analyzed the effects of polygyny and single motherhood on availability of women to men. Theoretically, the practice of polygyny and the occurrence of unwanted pregnancies leading to the existence of single mothers should, in combination, produce a shortage of available women such that inequalities in access to women should exist. However, my calculations suggest that by having a lower age of marriage for women than for men, along with a broad-based age pyramid, enough extra women become available so as to compensate for the effects of polygyny and single motherhood. There is no real shortage of marriage partners in Marubo society. Therefore, inequalities in access to marriage—the basic means of production of the social network—do not explain the observed inequalities in demographic success among Marubo groups.

Having established that unequal access to marriage is not a factor in explaining the unequal demographic success of different Marubo groups, I investigated the possibility that polygyny could explain these inequalities. I noted that polygyny was restricted to

15.7 % of married men in Marubo society. However, I found that the groups which grew the most unequally over the period from 1974 to 1998 are not those in which the most polygyny occurred. Polygyny does not correlate well with unequal demographic success. Therefore, it does not explain the development of intergroup demographic inequalities. It is highly desirable and sought after but it does not necessarily lead to having superior demographic growth relative to other groups.

Once I had discounted unequal distribution of marriage and polygyny as potential explanations for the observed development of intergroup demographic inequalities, I examined the possibility that variations in control over postmarital residence could explain these developments. It does little good in the long term to the producer of a social network to have children if those children leave to marry elsewhere. Does differential control over the postmarital residence of one's children affect the development of intersettlement demographic inequalities? To answer this question, I tabulated data on postmarital residence on the upper Ituí River (the Curuçá will be considered below). There are seven coresident networks on the upper Ituí that could be followed from 1974 to 1998. Only two of these had increased their share of the total Marubo population over the period in question. I found that these two groups did share certain qualities in terms of control over postmarital residence. Firstly, they controlled postmarital residence of their children to a greater extent than did other groups. The two groups that had gained population share were those in which the difference between the number of people gained and the number of people lost through postmarital residence was greater than two (individuals). Secondly, these two groups had maximized the potential for growth inherent to their 1974-75 composition. I followed all the 1974-75

members of these groups through to 1998 in the census data, and calculated how many children, children's spouses, and children's children had accrued to these people. I then calculated how many of these were part of the original group. I then calculated the ratio of people retained to total people produced. These ratios represent the proportion of the total potential for demographic growth actually realized by each group over the period from 1974 to 1998. I call this ratio 'retention of potential', or RP. Again, I found that the two groups whose share of the total population had increased shared a common quality: a RP ratio of over 90%. Lauro's group had RP=90.3%, and Raimundo Dionisio's group had RP=96%. The next highest after these two was 66.7%, and the lowest RP was 28.4%. I concluded that the groups that had prospered the most from a demographic standpoint on the Ituí River were those that had maximized the reproductive potential they had in 1974 by maximizing the flow of marriage partners to their group and minimizing the loss of personnel inherent to having people leave to marry elsewhere. They had gained more than they lost through postmarital residence and they had maximized their original growth potential. Therefore, variations in control over postmarital residence do explain some of the intergroup demographic inequalities that have developed in Marubo society over the period from 1974 to 1998.

The remaining cases of unequal demographic success were explained by reference to variations in access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people. It was quite clear from observations and interviews that relationships to non-indigenous people served as means of production of the social network. At Aldeia Maronal, Alfredo cut an airstrip, then invited a mission. The mission supplied health care and education. Alfredo used these features to attract the groups of his sister's husband Wanõpa and his brother José to

form part of his own group. Alfredo's efforts to build a valued set of relationships to non-indigenous people were explicitly part of an effort to render his village more attractive to potential coresidents. Aldeia São Sebastião and Aldeia Rio Novo were villages in which the FUNAI post was the initial focus of attraction. These villages originated as FUNAI posts to which multiple groups relocated for improved access to education, health care, and non-indigenous goods. The villages stayed together even after the subsequent removal of the FUNAI posts. At Aldeia Vida Nova the focal attraction was a mission, to which multiple groups had been attracted much as FUNAI attracted groups to its posts. In all four of these cases, relationships to non-indigenous people served as means of production of the social network. There was one significant difference, however. At Aldeia Maronal the village was founded by an indigenous person who invited the non-indigenous people to his settlement. In the other three cases the non-indigenous people established themselves first, and subsequently the indigenous people moved there. As explained in Chapter Five, these facts are significant in determining the level of power exercised by the leaders of each village. Regardless, the evident conclusion was that control over valuable relationships to non-indigenous people gives the controller superior ability to attract coresidents and, therefore, confers differential access to the means of production of the social network.

By these means I was able to explain the variations in demographic growth among Marubo groups in terms of two factors. Variations on the upper Ituí could be explained by variations in control over postmarital residence. Variations elsewhere could be explained by variations in access to valued relationships to non-indigenous people.

Having established that there was a political economy of people within which the desire for a good social network was a major goal motivating people's actions, that the distribution of the valued product—the social network—is unequal, and that the means of production are unequally distributed, I sought to determine whether these inequalities were linked to political power.

In Chapter Six, it was noted that only two individuals exhibited the quality of repeatedly winning conflicts of will during the fieldwork period—Alfredo and Clóvis. The influence of these two was discernible in the analysis of relationships to non-indigenous people. In Chapter Nine, it was found that both these individuals have used relationships to non-indigenous people as a means of production of the social network. How are these features linked in these two key individuals? Clóvis started out as a low-status exile from his homeland. His main asset was a superior ability to relate to the non-indigenous world. Thanks to this, he became valuable to the headman of Aldeia São Salvador and married the latter's daughter. By age 29 he was polygynous. He used one means of production of the social network (relationships to non-indigenous people) to access another (polygyny). Thus, he had superior access to the means of production of the social network compared to most other Marubo. He also had *de facto* power due to his access to the machinery of the Brazilian state. Both his power and his ability to produce a social network came to him from his adept management of relationships to non-indigenous people.

In Alfredo's case, the ultimate causal basis of his power seems to be his ability in organization of labor. In a sense, this is a personal quality: he inherited the headmanship partly because he organized labor better than his older brother. But it is also a social

quality, because he inherited from his father a potential labor pool that was much larger than what most Marubo start out with. He used this labor to create the conditions that would permit a missionary presence—an airstrip. He thus established a unique set of relationships to non-indigenous people. Elsewhere, the non-indigenous people established locales to which the indigenous people moved, whereas here an indigenous man established the locale to which the non-indigenous people moved. Thus, the relations of authority favored Alfredo more so than anywhere else where Marubo and non-indigenous people coresided. After the missionary health care program was established, Alfredo and his father issued invitations to move. Aldeia Maronal grew. As explained in Chapters Five and Six, since Alfredo was the village founder, he was able to control public policy towards relationships to non-indigenous people. By using labor expenditures to attract non-indigenous people, then using the non-indigenous presence to attract indigenous people (i.e., as a means of production of the social network), Alfredo created a situation in which he was able to exercise power in certain key spheres of social decision-making.

Correlations between power on the one hand, and the use of relationships to non-indigenous people as means of production of the social network on the other hand, seem evident when the cases of Alfredo and Clóvis are considered. Other means of production of the social network seem to confer less power, however. For example, I showed that on the Ituí River there are variations in the level of control of postmarital residence exercised by different leaders, and these variations explain the development of intergroup demographic inequalities. But there is no link between these variations and variations in power. The villages of the upper Ituí have not established any system of ranking or

systematic variations in influence. Instead of one village winning conflicts of will they often neutralize one another. Therefore, the correlation between power and means of production of the social network is limited.

It is *possible* for unequal accumulators of means of production of the social network to have power, but rare. There are two cases of this occurring—Alfredo and Clóvis. There are other links—for example, uxorilocal polygyny is often a case of the socially wealthy controlling the labor and residence of the socially poor. But it is just as common for the socially wealthy to give up their daughters as part of a reciprocal exchange system. And at any rate, by allowing power to be exercised over him, the uxorilocal polygynist puts himself in a position to eventually enter the ranks of those who exercise power over others, highlighting the social mobility that is possible in Marubo society. Likewise, Ituí River postmarital residence patterns demonstrate that inequalities exist in the ability to produce social networks, but these inequalities do not confer power. Furthermore, analysis revealed that the groups that started out smaller are those that have had the greatest success on the Ituí, and the largest groups in 1974 have done the worst. Again, we note social mobility. Control over the means of production of the social network, then, does not in and of itself confer power on the controller. Rather, specific ways of using means of production of the social network can potentially result in power, as it has in a few individual cases.

Marubo invest considerable energy in seeking and building social networks. There are differences in the ability to produce social networks explained by differential access to the means of production of the social network, specifically variations in control over postmarital residence and in access to valued relationships to non-indigenous

people. Thus, there is a form of wealth. It is unequally distributed, and the means of producing it are unequally distributed as well. These inequalities can, though not necessarily, result in power for the unequal accumulator. Two Marubo were found to have power and adept manipulation of key means of production of the social network was a characteristic of both. For Alfredo, especially, his power was premised on his construction of a social network. But control over means of production of the social network alone does not give power to the controller. That control has to be carefully applied in very particular ways for power to result, and only two Marubo have been able to bring about such a result.

Chapter Ten: the role of the Marubo leader.

I completed the body of this dissertation by analyzing certain qualities of the role of Marubo leader, maintaining continuity with prior theoretical frameworks. I focused the analysis on Alfredo, since I had by far the most data on him relative to other Marubo leaders. I analyzed use of force, conflict resolution, oratory, generosity, and the connection between the roles of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya*.

Concerning the use of force, it is important to note that the current configuration of use of force in Marubo society is historically specific. Oral histories indicate that use of force was common during the rubber boom. These histories indicate that use of force was a way of life for some of the Marubo's ancestors. However, the end of the rubber boom saw a demographic and cultural bottleneck in which the effect of the main leader, João Tuxáua, resulted in a change in the frequency of occurrence of the cultural beliefs

endorsing use of force. João Tuxáua developed a social ethic endorsing feasting and explicitly linking internecine violence to hunger and unhappiness. What emerged was a Marubo society in which force is not used to resolve conflicts of will. There were cases of violence related to male-female relationships: women beaten by their husbands when adultery is discovered, or women forced into sexual compliance. There was also use of force against non-Marubo: a clash with the Mayoruna after Marubo women were kidnapped; the killing of a FUNAI worker who had taken a Marubo man's wife; the taking over of FUNAI headquarters in Atalaia; and threats to seize my possessions if I came to the Ituí River. But I did not see force used as part of competitions to determine public policies. I never saw Alfredo use force. Instead, he used his legitimacy as village founder, his rhetorical skills, and his dominance in labor organization. He controlled fractious youth by influencing their elders. He had a wide variety of techniques for the exercise of power, rendering the use of force unnecessary and probably counterproductive.

I examined Alfredo's role in conflict resolution. Alfredo does resolve tensions among conflicting factions regularly. However, his conflict-resolution is not disinterested. The events I observed involved his own interests directly. He acted to resolve conflicts that threatened his means of production of the social network, or that threatened the integrity of his village. I did not observe him to be called upon by villagers to resolve disputes that did not involve him personally. In this sense, his most frequent involvement in conflict resolution was when he was called upon by outsiders—FUNAI and missionaries—to defend their interests against indigenous critics. For example, when open criticism of the mission arose, the mission asked Alfredo to

intervene and he did. It should be recalled that the mission was a key factor in attracting coresidents to Alfredo's village, so his resolution of this conflict was not disinterested. Several other cases of outsiders asking Alfredo to resolve their conflicts occurred. Thus, Alfredo intervened directly in conflicts only when his own interests were at stake; his villagers did not call on him to resolve their conflicts, but outsiders did. I conclude that the image of Alfredo as a person who should intervene to resolve conflicts that did not concern him was held more by outsiders than by his villagers. Therefore, his role in conflict resolution cannot be distinguished from his efforts to win political contests.

Hence, conflict resolution *per se* is not a significant aspect of his indigenous role.

The closest match between Alfredo's role and received images of Amazonian headmanship is in the area of speech. Alfredo has superior verbal skills and uses rhetoric to influence people. He applies the moral content of traditional discourse genres to the interpretation of current events and situations, and thus influences how people believe an indigenous person *should* act in a variety of situations. In general, Aldeia Maronal leaders were masters of multiple discourse genres. Every elder had certain specialties, and their discourse-genre skills distinguished them from non-leaders. There is a direct correlation between membership in Maronal's political cupola and mastery of multiple discourse genres. Those who were political leaders, *shovo*-owners or brothers thereof, and active participants in all decision-making processes also had mastery of discourse genres which others did not have. Within this clique of master-talkers, however, Alfredo stood out for the specific areas he was skilled in. His speaking role was most evident in the realm of relationships to non-indigenous people. He used prominent speech acts to influence elders on the proper way to relate to the mission, on whom to support for

FUNAI jobs, and on the proper ways to earn and use money, and he lectured a FUNAI employee on how FUNAI workers should behave. These examples show that Alfredo had a predominant role in interpreting current events, and his main speaking role consisted of applying indigenous values to the field of relationships to non-indigenous people. In this sense, his speaking role was unique: many other elders had specific areas of discourse in which they were considered top masters, but Alfredo alone exercised such a significant role in explaining how indigenous people should approach political issues related to non-indigenous people. These speeches were often very significant because they were produced in situations where many people including key elders were in attendance, and they had a demonstrable influence over his listeners' subsequent behavior. Although Alfredo's most obvious speaking role has just been defined, he had a number of other verbal skills as well, including singing *shōki* (healing songs), teaching about ethnomedical diagnosis, singing *saiti* (myth-songs), teaching plant-lore, invitations to move, and organizing labor.

One of the defining images of Amazonian headmanship is the generous headman. An image disseminated by Lowie (1967[1948]) based on Lévi-Strauss (1944) and later written about by Clastres (1977[1974]), it holds that the headman is always giving away his material possessions to others because the power granted to him by the group puts him in its debt, a debt he repays by constant giveaways. In this view, the headman is the most materially impoverished person in the village. An analysis of the flow of goods surrounding Alfredo shows that he does not fit the image. Alfredo does not give away his material possessions. In fact, Marubo reciprocity does not seem to apply to goods purchased with money, a situation already noted by prior researchers (Melatti and

Montagner 1986). Anything outsiders donated to “the village” or “the community” generally ended up under Alfredo’s control: an aluminum boat, a 25-horsepower outboard, a 200-liter drum of diesel fuel, although there were some things he retained formal wardship over even as he delegated their keeping to others, as the CIVAJA radio and an MSF-donated 5.5-horsepower outboard. For a time, Alfredo had a drum of gasoline and re-sold portions of it to people who needed it to access distant hunting grounds. The electric generator was “the village’s” but some people told me they wanted their own because they felt it was actually Alfredo’s. Thus, far from being the most impoverished, Alfredo had a number of highly visible material possessions that few others had. In addition, his attitudes towards material goods differed from what we might expect from the received image. For example, he advised other elders to purchase material goods that could be stored in a box and used to get people to work or passed on to offspring as inheritance, and he advised his son not to loan out his shotgun. Thus, Alfredo’s position did not depend on generosity. He buys, he sells, he keeps goods, and he advises others to keep goods. Furthermore, contributions of labor from other *shovo* helped get a generator and an airstrip under his control. So, in the realm of material possessions Alfredo makes out quite well, though he is not monetarily wealthy, even by indigenous standards. On the other hand, in the realm of labor I noted that he gives more than he receives, and the products of his leadership—health care and medical access, education, communications, television—were all made available to all villagers and potential coresidents. Hence, Alfredo gives freely in some ways—but not in the realm of material objects.

Finally, I analyzed the roles of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya* and the relation between them. The role of *kakaya* was previously examined by Melatti (1983). Statements of the ideal role of the *kakaya* included the following characteristics: (1) organizing feasts and inviting others to eat; (2) organization of labor, including telling each individual where they should go and what they should do; (3) transmission of indigenous values by frequent production of *tsai iki* discourses; and (4) getting women for unmarried men and advising the men on proper behavior by means of *tsai iki*. The *shovo ivo* is the leader of a *shovo*, generally the one who directed the building of the structure. Expected characteristics of the *shovo ivo* include: (1) watching over the behavior of coresidents; (2) preventing coresidents from harming others; (3) refraining from harming others; (4) oratorical skill and ethical wisdom (*vanaya* and *eseya*); (5) making sure coresidents don't die when they are sick; (6) telling coresidents what work needs to be done and seeing that they do it; and (7) inviting people to eat and bringing good food. Comparing these roles to the classic model of egalitarian society reveals a significant difference: Lee (1979) noted that, among the !Kung, the giving of meat is explicitly divorced from creation of status, whereas among the Marubo it is explicitly linked. This is a fundamental difference in potential pathways to status.

The role of *kakaya* in multiple-*shovo* leadership was difficult to pinpoint. Aldeia Maronal was different in this regard from other villages in having a *kakaya* who exercised effective leadership over multiple *shovo ivorasi*. On the Ituí River no such role was discernible and, indeed, missionaries were known to argue that there was no such thing as multiple-*shovo* leadership among the Marubo. Alfredo disagreed with this. He pointed to the airstrip and generator as results of his ability to mobilize labor on a

multiple-*shovo* scale. He explicitly stated that his leadership over multiple *shovo*, proven by his organization of labor, was a distinctive feature of his village. Other informants told me they recognized his leadership in this sense (i.e., as multiple-*shovo* leadership).

Although it made his village different from others, Alfredo drew on stories of the roles of past leaders to explain how his leadership is an exemplification of traditional behavior. He drew on oral histories of leaders, including his father, who created large villages by issuing successful invitations to move and then organized labor on a multiple-*shovo* scale. He also drew on ideas of the proper role of the *kakaya* and *shovo ivo*, which explicitly involve skill in organization of labor.

Alfredo had real authority over multiple *shovo*. He had the authority to make decisions regarding relationships to non-indigenous people: who should occupy FUNAI positions, how the village should relate to missionaries, whether an anthropologist should be let in or not. He could also organize labor for large-scale projects. However, I do not think the role of a *kakaya* is necessarily like that I observed for Alfredo at Aldeia Maronal. I have argued that Alfredo's power derives from his founder/attractor role: he founded a village to which many others moved, and this gives him the key resource in influencing policy—legitimacy. His power is also predicated on his skills in the organization of labor, which in turn are predicated on having inherited a large kin network from his father. It is quite possible that a man could claim the title of *kakaya*, and even be widely recognized as such, without having the particularities of inheritance and the role in village formation that would produce actual power. Power is not simply acquired by a man in virtue of acquiring a particular structural position; it must be constructed. It is possible that there could be multiple *kakaya* in Marubo society with

very varying levels of power and multiple-*shovo* leadership. However, in 1997-98 there was only one *kakaya* recognized by all, Alfredo, and he did have very real, if limited, power.

B. Significance of findings

Applicability of the concept of egalitarianism to Marubo society.

The data presented indicate that Marubo society cannot be considered egalitarian because there are sufficient observable deviations from major definitions of egalitarianism that the use of that label would give an inaccurate understanding of Marubo politics. We cannot use a label that will give us misleading expectations or we defeat the purpose of scientific classification. I proceed on the assumption that members of a natural class of phenomena are classified together in virtue of sharing certain definitional characteristics. Since this is the case, by knowing what natural class a phenomenon is classified in, we can make certain accurate predictions about it. In the case of Marubo politics, there are enough contradictions relative to the definitional criteria for egalitarianism that an inaccurate view of Marubo politics would be derived by affixing that label.

A major problem with the category ‘egalitarianism’ is the large number of approaches that have been taken to defining it. Each approach carries with it, more than a narrow definitional criterion, a host of associations and multiple interrelated variables. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which are the essential characteristics of egalitarianism, and which are merely common associations. Here I will focus on the central criteria used to define societies as egalitarian. The main definition is by Morton Fried (1967). However, of equal importance with respect to Amazonian societies is the

work of Pierre Clastres (1977[1974]), which in many ways builds on the prior work of Lévi-Strauss (1944, 1969[1949]). Finally, a major synthesis of the concept of egalitarianism has been performed recently by Christopher Boehm (1999) and is closely related to the ideas of Richard Lee (1979, 1982). Here, I will address key elements of all three approaches.

Marubo politics contains features which render Fried's definition inapplicable. According to Fried,

An egalitarian society is one in which there are as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them... An egalitarian society is characterized by the adjustment of the number of valued statuses to the number of persons with the abilities to fill them... An egalitarian society does not have any means of fixing or limiting the number of persons capable of exerting power. (Fried 1967:33)

The essential characteristic, then, is that anybody with the appropriate age, sex, and ability/capability can enter the most valued status. Beyond this, there are no limits on access to statuses. Evidence that this is not the case among the Marubo comes from the analysis of the links between Marubo status and feasting and the requirements for feasting. According to informants for both Melatti (1983) and myself, the role of *kakaya* involves the organization of large feasts at which as many guests as possible are invited to eat. I observed two such feasts, the *tanamea* feasts of September and December 1998, and found them to involve the host in feeding crowds that ranged from 30 to over 300 people over sixteen days. Hosting crowds this size, in turn, requires a social network sufficiently large to produce and process enough food. The *tanamea* consumes not only the host's own coresident labor pool but also members of the host's non-coresident extended kin network in food production and cooking. Thus, there is a clear limitation on access to status beyond mere age, sex, and personal ability. To access the status of

kakaya requires a certain personal ability in organization of labor, it is true, but mere ability is insufficient: the host must have a social network of sufficient size and economic prosperity to throw a sufficiently large feast. In Chapter Nine I showed that the construction of social networks is a competitive field. There is a limited number of people in Marubo society. Social network production is in many ways a zero-sum game where one person's gain is another's loss. The number of people who can construct a social network sufficiently large to lay claim to *kakaya* status is definitely limited and it is the idea that a *kakaya* must organize feasts, generating the requirement of the social network, that ultimately creates this limitation. Further evidence is provided by the case of a man who, despite having recognized abilities in organization of feasts, could not do so because he had been prevented from constructing a social network (see 'feasting', Chapter Seven). I conclude that there are significant limitations on access to valued status beyond age, sex, and personal ability in Marubo society. These limitations are related to the significance of feasting and the political economy of people in status competition. An accurate description of Marubo politics must consider these limitations.

Perhaps the most influential proponent of the hypothesis pan-Amazonian egalitarianism was Pierre Clastres, particularly through his essay "Exchange and Power" (Clastres 1977[1974]). Clastres, in turn, incorporated the previous interpretations of Lévi-Strauss (1944) into a sort of grand synthesis of lowland South American politics. Together, Lévi-Strauss and Clastres generated a potent image of powerlessness covering Amazonian societies. This, in turn, reinforced the perception of an ontological dualism in indigenous South America: power structures in the highlands contrasted with rejection of power in the lowlands. Amazonian societies could thus be taken as evidence that

humanity originated in a Rousseauian condition, Andean societies as evidence that humanity ‘fell’ from its original condition by developing oppressive power structures. In my research, I sought to analyze the underpinnings of this view and determine what the Marubo case could tell us about it.

The main basis of Lévi-Strauss’ interpretation of Amazonian politics is his notion that the principle of reciprocity is the ultimate basis of human social organization and still the main organizing principle of many societies, including Amazonian societies. In the spheres of kinship and economics, this principle results in rules preventing the unequal accumulation of essential resources. Lévi-Strauss extended the application of the principle of reciprocity as an interpretive framework to the sphere of politics:

Consent is the psychological basis of leadership, but in daily life it expresses itself in, and is measured by, a game of give-and-take playede by the chief and his followers, and which brings forth, as a basic attribute of leadership, the notion of reciprocity. The chief has power, but he must be generous. He has duties, but he is entitled to several wives. Between him and the group, there is a perpetual balance of prestations, privileges, services, and obligations...The chief-commoners' relationship, as every relationship in primitive society, is based on reciprocity.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:59)

By applying the concept of reciprocity to the political dimension of social life, Lévi-Strauss created a perception of political relations in Amazonian society as being a system of exchange between the leader and “the group” (the latter a category the validity of which I will shortly question) in which the group consents to the leader’s exercise of power and polygyny in return for the leader’s material generosity and his consistent performance of key duties that benefit the whole group, such as directing food production and residential movements.

The main objection that can now be raised to this framework is that the principle of reciprocity does not apply to the political dimension of social life. I have shown that, while reciprocity does operate in the sphere of kinship, in politics unequal accumulations are an accepted goal. Therefore, aspects of leaders' behavior cannot simply be assumed to form part of a web of reciprocal exchange covering the whole society; we must examine each alleged case of exchange carefully to see if it fits the available data.

Clastres' work further developed Lévi-Strauss' to argue that a radical rejection of power is a basic principle of lowland South American indigenous cultures (Clastres 1977[1974]). Clastres interpreted polygyny as a gift from the group to the leader. He interpreted generosity and words (oratory) as gifts from the leader to the group. Given the disparity in value between the women on the one hand and words and goods on the other, the leader was indebted to the group and this perpetual state of debt allowed the group to keep the leader from ever exercising a semblance of coercive power. In a sense, the grant of the right of polygyny is a political strategy by the group, whereby it places the leader in debt and thus subjects him to perpetual service. Thus, the societies of lowland South America consciously kept the specter of political power, and ultimately of mutual oppression, at bay. The leader was a servant, a prisoner of the group.

The main flaw in Clastres' framework is in his interpretation of polygyny. Polygyny among the Marubo was not restricted to leaders; leaders were not automatically entitled to polygyny; polygyny was not a gift from the group to the leader; and polygyny does not even represent such a serious offense to the principle of reciprocity as Lévi-Strauss and Clastres seem to believe. Clastres argued that polygyny must be restricted because of the imbalances it creates in the availability of women to men: "If one takes

into account the fact that the natural sex ratio, or numerical relationship of the sexes, could never be such as to permit every man to marry more than one woman, it is obvious that generalized polygyny is a biological impossibility" (Clastres 1977[1974]:24). However, by making the age of marriage higher for men than for women, the sex ratio among marriageable adults can be adjusted to account for numerous cases of polygyny. Furthermore, the solution which Clastres suggested that most Amazonian societies utilize to resolve the imbalance created by polygyny is not applicable in the Marubo case: "Almost all of them recognize it as the usually exclusive privilege of the chief" (Clastres 1977[1974]:23). Marubo polygyny *is* restricted to 15.7% of married men, but it is not restricted to any particular class of individuals or to any named social status. There is no rule that says that a certain type of people can be polygynous and certain other types cannot. Rather, anyone who can find a way to become polygynous and wishes to may do so. Thus, there are members of fairly low-status families, orphans and marginal figures who find ways to enter into polygynous arrangements, as well as village leaders and high-status men of prominent families. For low-status men, polygyny is often part of an overall strategy to eventually have a position of leadership. Thus, polygyny is one strategy used by non-leaders to become leaders. It is not a perquisite of office enjoyed by men *after* becoming leaders. Clastres and Lévi-Strauss give the impression that polygyny is accessed by first becoming group leader. The leader performs certain duties for the group, whereupon he is 'entitled' to a 'gift' of women from the group. This is clearly not the case among the Marubo, because many people who are not leaders become polygynous, and many leaders become polygynous before they become leaders.

As problematic as the notion of leaders being entitled to polygyny is that of the group giving women to the leader. Available data on Marubo polygyny show that a number of polygynous leaders receive their wives from groups other than their own. Since this is the case, polygyny cannot possibly be a reward for services rendered nor a means of reducing the polygynous man's power over the group by placing him in debt. In other cases, such as those of uxorilocal polygyny on the Ituí River, the individual who receives wives comes from elsewhere and is not the group leader at all, at least not until his father-in-law ages sufficiently so that a succession takes place. Furthermore, in the cases for which I have sufficient data, it is clear that giving multiple wives to a man is not a group decision at all. It is an alliance between families, and usually it is the girls' father, or at least senior male kin, who makes the decision. The notion of a 'group' giving a man women simply finds no support in the available data on Marubo polygyny. The 'group' as presented in Clastres, i.e., the polygynous man's entire coresident network, does not play a role in the determination of marriage. It is an analytic construct based on a misunderstanding of indigenous social organization, similar to when an outsider gives a knife to a group leader in the belief that by doing so, he has given a knife to 'the community', later to find that he has actually given the knife to an individual and each other individual desires his or her own. 'The group' does not exist unless it can be shown to act as a corporate unit in the way Clastres suggests it does. Among the Marubo, it does not.

Clastres' interpretation of indigenous polygyny is a key facet of his assertion that these societies consciously reject power. By showing that this interpretation does not apply to the Marubo I show that his conclusions do not apply, either. According to

Clastres, lowland societies use polygyny as a weapon to prevent leaders from having power by placing him in debt to the group. This is manifestly not the case among the Marubo because polygyny is not a relation between the leader and his group, it is a relation between two families which are often not a part of the same group at all. Therefore, if there are societies in which polygyny is part of an ontological rejection of power, Marubo society is not one of them. There may be such societies in existence, and the Guayakí may be one of them, but surely the assertion that polygyny is a gift of the group must be examined on a case-by-case basis and the Marubo example shows that it cannot be generalized to all lowland indigenous societies.

The finding that Marubo polygyny is not the group's weapon against the leader, contrary to what Clastres argues for the Guayakí, is important because it opens the way to an analysis of Marubo politics in which inequality and power are not only possible but actually present. Clastres argued that the leader gave significantly to the group, both in material generosity and in oratory. These prestations would normally place the group in his debt, but the group's gift of polygyny more than wipes out the debt, it tips the scales to the group's side. The Marubo case is one in which the group has no such device to tip the scales. At Aldeia Maronal, I have shown how Alfredo had a pre-eminent speaking role similar to what Clastres predicted. I showed also that he was not generous in the sense of giving away all his possessions until he was destitute. However, he was generous in other ways. For example, he loaned parts of his substantial labor force out frequently, helping others in his village to complete major agricultural and architectural tasks in a third of the time it would have taken without Alfredo. He also made available to all the villagers the health care, education, transportation, and communication facilities

that had resulted from his long-term strategy of relating to non-indigenous people. So, in this case, the village was getting a lot from Alfredo. Yet his wives were not a gift of the group, and he was not, therefore, a prisoner of the group. In fact, to maintain access to all the benefits of Alfredo's leadership, the villagers had to accept the fact that they were in Alfredo's village and that Alfredo had the last word on certain key decisions. The analysis of decisions regarding relationships to non-indigenous people demonstrated that, in this area at least, Alfredo had the last word by virtue of his recognized legitimacy as founder of a village to which everyone else had moved. The option of leaving the village was always available to those who were dissatisfied, and the possibility of schism was in fact discussed by a number of people when at various times they were dissatisfied with Alfredo's decision-making. But, if they wished to maintain coresidence with Alfredo and thus retain access to the benefits of his leadership, they had to accept his legitimacy and leadership. This, in turn, gave Alfredo real, observable power to determine policy in a key area of Marubo social life.

The underpinnings of Clastres' argument concerning rejection of power in lowland societies do not apply to Marubo society. On the contrary, by applying Clastres' interpretive framework we find an imbalance not on the group's side, but on the leader's side, and this correlates with actual observations of the exercise of power by the leader. This case should be sufficient to demonstrate that Clastres' assertions are not universally valid across all lowland South America. There may be situations where they are valid, but the radical rejection of power postulated by Clastres is not an essential feature of all these societies. Some societies, such as the Marubo, make power a very real possibility.

The third main conception of egalitarianism the applicability of which must be examined is the recent synthesis of concepts by Christopher Boehm (1999). This was published after the fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted, so it did not directly inform the gathering of data. However, the data now available on Marubo politics are sufficiently relevant to this theory that it is productive to examine how those data affect the theory. Boehm is highly influenced by Richard Lee's work on the !Kung (Lee 1979) but also quotes Clastres (1977[1974]) and Lowie's work on indigenous South Americans to support his perspective. To Boehm, egalitarianism is a reverse dominance hierarchy in which individuals occupying positions of authority or potential authority are strictly controlled by those beneath them in the status hierarchy. The main defining feature of this type of system is, according to Boehm, the existence of levelling mechanisms whereby all efforts at development of power differentials are systematically put down by organized group actions ranging from simple expressions of public opinion, through criticism, ridicule, ostracism, disobedience, deposition, and desertion, to the ultimate penalty of assassination (Boehm 1999:112-122). It should be noted that Fried already noted this phenomenon in his own seminal work: "Most egalitarian societies have powerful levelling mechanisms that prevent the appearance of overly wide gaps in ability among members" (Fried 1967:34). However, it is more fully developed and given a more central place in the theory by Boehm. More specific to Boehm's theory is the notion that the actions taken to enact the reverse dominance hierarchy are related to the existence of an 'egalitarian ethos':

"A constellation of values that define what is important to a given people... Egalitarian societies... use social control to keep their societies equalized rather than hierarchical, and they do so quite effectively... It is the values inherent in the

egalitarian ethos that focus people efficiently in this respect: certain attitudes and behaviors are praised, while others are condemned and punished”

(Boehm 1999:66-67).

In Boehm’s synthesis, egalitarianism is thus defined firstly by a set of values—an “ideology” (Boehm 1999:123) which identifies and condemns actions that could lead to power inequalities and, secondly, by a set of social mechanisms brought to bear on people whose actions violate the ethos. Again, I emphasize that I did not specifically design the methodology to test Boehm’s theory—unlike those of Fried and Clastres—but the available data allow me to state that Marubo society deviates significantly from Boehm’s model of what an egalitarian society should look like.

Boehm provides an excellent summary of what he considers the essence of egalitarian ethos:

The egalitarian ethos amounts to an unusual political “game” that is based on social agreement among the main political actors. The implicit contract reads something like this:

“There are individually variable tendencies to outstrip or control one’s fellows, which can lead to domination by the strong. We determine to solve the problem as follows. Rather than countenance modes of competition that will permit one of us to dominate the others, we all agree to give up our statistically small chance of becoming ascendant—in order to avoid the very high probability that we will be subordinated. We agree to settle merely for individual autonomy for all, rather than seeking ascendancy or domination, and we implement this program by defining our ‘firsts’ as mere ‘equals’.”

(Boehm 1999:123-124)

Boehm thus argues that egalitarian societies do not “countenance modes of competition” that result in political inequality. However, in Chapter Nine I went to great lengths to demonstrate the existence of precisely such a system of competition among the Marubo: the political economy of people. I also went to considerable lengths to

demonstrate an emic basis for this system, showing that individuals were well aware of the value derived from personnel and social networks and employed a great number and variety of strategies to achieve those ends, often in conflict with competitors. Finally, I showed that the system yields empirically verifiable inequalities of results. The political economy of people contains both the variables mentioned in Boehm—a set of values and a set of social mechanisms reflective of those values, each variable carefully described in Chapter Nine—but they are exactly opposite of what Boehm calls egalitarian in that they result in the systematic construction of social inequality.

Further contradictions between the Marubo case and the egalitarian model arise in considering the values related to processes of obtaining status and to the exercise of high-status roles. Firstly, are the correlations between Marubo feasting and status. This phenomenon was already noted in Chapter Seven. Among the Marubo, the statuses of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya* are both linked explicitly to the practice of inviting people to eat, such that successful food production displayed in feasts is a recognized means of symbolizing high status. This value is contrary to what might be expected of an egalitarian ethos, where, as among the !Kung (Lee 1979), this path to status is neutralized by cultural emphasis on ridiculing superior food production. By refusing to express admiration for food gifts, the !Kung negate a pathway to status that is very much open and emphasized among the Marubo.

Secondly, there is the notable inclusion of organization of labor in Marubo statements of the ideal roles of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya*. In both cases, the status-holder is expected to know how to organize labor, to inform people of what they should be doing, where and when, and in such a way that people are well-fed and healthy. The reality was

that this was not a strictly enforced practice, as individuals had wide latitude to determine their daily work autonomously, but there were situations where it came into evidence, particularly during periods of lack and in the organization of feasts. What is interesting here is the social use which certain people make of this attribute. It is true that Lévi-Strauss and Clastres have suggested that the function of Amazonian headmen in organization of labor for food production is a service to the group, and have interpreted in terms of what Boehm would call a reverse dominance hierarchy where individuals of superior ability are allowed to determine food production routines but are carefully prevented from exercising actual power. But I have already shown that the mechanism suggested by Clastres for controlling the leader does not exist among the Marubo, and the operation of reciprocity in the political sphere, suggested by Lévi-Strauss, does not occur in the Marubo case either. Therefore there exists the possibility of combining organization of labor with power and that is what has happened. Alfredo has taken the idea of organizing labor for group prosperity and applied it far beyond the realm of food production and also beyond the confines of his immediate coresident group. He organized labor of multiple *shovo* to cut an airstrip which he successfully used to invite missionaries, who established health care and some educational facilities. This resource was then used to issue a number of successful invitations to move which eventually led to Aldeia Maronal being the largest Marubo village. Furthermore, Alfredo's position as founder-attractor, as I have extensively argued elsewhere, gave him decision-making power in certain key fields of social action. Alfredo thus exemplifies the link between organization of labor and power.

Thirdly, there is the pride taken in the presence of a powerful headman. Alfredo regularly produced discourses on the value of having a *cacique*. He pointed to all the things Aldeia Maronal had that other villages did not, that were there thanks to the successful organization of multiple-*shovo* labor groups by an indigenous leader. It was thus a distinguishing feature of his village. Statements from other informants suggest that Alfredo's ideas were widely accepted, as I heard a number of people disparage other villages and simultaneously point to Alfredo's achievements as evidence. And I heard statements from aspiring leaders in other villages suggesting that they admired Alfredo's ability and would like to emulate his accomplishments, if possible. This suggests that Alfredo's achievement in socially constructing a position of power was not met by widespread revulsion, as we would expect if an egalitarian ethos were present. Instead, many people felt it would be good to have more people like Alfredo.

It is true that attempts were regularly made to undercut Alfredo's position and that some from other villages were heard to say that Alfredo was accumulating too much influence, but these efforts were made to undercut Alfredo's occupancy of the position, not the existence of the position itself. Those who endeavored to undermine Alfredo's position were not saying that no one should act like Alfredo does; they were saying that they should be equal to Alfredo. Thus the concept of Alfredo-like behavior was maintained as a commonly held goal to which several people aspired. Rather than advocating that Alfredo retreat from his position to theirs, his critics wished to advance to his position themselves. It was rebellion, not revolution; they wished to remove a person from a position of pre-eminence, but maintain the possibility that they themselves might occupy the same position. What Alfredo had done was too attractive to other indigenous

politicians to be negated; it was kept open as a general possibility. This was reflected in occasional talk of a *cacique de todos os Marubo*, a ‘chief of all Marubo.’ I only heard this title mentioned by two people. Alfredo’s son often signed his father’s radiograms ‘*Alfredo Barbosa, cacique de todos os Marubo*’, but an aspiring young man on the Ituí River described his deceased father, Reissamon, as having also been *cacique de todos os Marubo*. Regrettably, I did not carry out systematic research on what people thought of this, so I do not know if the idea of a paramount leader was more widely accepted or rejected. But the impression I received is that although people might grumble about any specific occupant or would-be occupant of the position, many felt that the idea of someone occupying it was a good one. This is precisely because the presence of a strong leader was thought to lead to tangible material benefits and, eventually, in virtue of having attracted people to partake in the benefits of strong leadership, to power when those who have moved to the village accept that the village founder has ultimate authority to make certain key decisions.

These three examples are presented to illustrate the considerable variance that exists between Marubo political values and the egalitarian ethos. Marubo society is one which leaves open the possibility of power though it makes it difficult to obtain and accepts a set of values which create that possibility.

In terms of the second aspect of egalitarian politics according to Boehm—leveling mechanisms—I also noted significant Marubo deviations from the egalitarian model. Most significant in this regard was the analysis of Marubo political meetings. An important aspect of Boehm’s synthesis of leveling mechanisms is the power of public opinion to enact the group’s power over its leader at public decision-making events. The

ability of “public opinion” to override the leader’s opinion is a major component of Boehm’s concept of a reverse hierarchy. He explicitly refers to Clastres and Lowie in citing as support for his theory evidence from South America indicating that “the assembly of adult men” (Boehm 1999:113) is a significant check on the power of headmen. In this view,

The typical tribal unit in the Americas and elsewhere is a local group that meets to make decisions, with everyone (in theory) having an equal say... Most tribes have a chosen leader, generally a male, who formally presides over a meeting. He keeps a low profile at first and begins to speak up only when a consensus is emerging.”
 (Boehm 1999:113)

Thus, according to Boehm, egalitarian societies render decisions at councils in which everybody has a voice and which serve to inform the leader of the group consensus. The group makes the decision by consensus; the leader accepts the decision and carries it out. My analysis of Marubo political meetings suggests that they do not fit Boehm’s model. Political meetings at Aldeia Maronal appear on the surface to be classic examples of “tribal” consensus decision-making but careful observation over a long period of time indicates that Alfredo’s opinion was never contradicted. Boehm suggests that leaders wait until the group consensus has sorted itself out before they talk. This was not the case among the Marubo, where leaders would often speak first and speak at length, establishing baseline opinions which others would have to agree or disagree with. The group did not make decisions for the leader. The group accepted the leader’s decisions and gave its support to them, not vice-versa. In this way, political meetings served to establish a hierarchy of varying influence, from individuals who actively participated in the decisions—a tiny minority—to the majority who silently approved, or

even failed to participate at all. Furthermore, many important decisions were made at restricted informal councils, where only a small selection of elders with specialized healing knowledge were present, and this was the accepted ‘traditional’ locale for decision-making, the full-village political meeting being a relatively recent innovation according to informants. I did not have the opportunity to observe decision-making in detail at other villages, where Boehm’s model may be more applicable, but at Aldeia Maronal political meetings did not work as part of a reverse dominance hierarchy or as a leveling mechanism; on the contrary, they served to reinforce an emerging power structure.

Finally, I should note the absence at Aldeia Maronal of many of the sanctioning mechanisms which Boehm suggests that egalitarian societies use to level political upstarts. These are criticism, ridicule, ostracism, disobedience, deposition, desertion, and assassination. Alfredo was the subject of criticism, but he was the subject of equal praise and admiration. It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which criticism kept his power limited, but it probably did have an impact in making him aware that he had to temper his power to keep his village intact. Ridicule, however, was never practiced against Alfredo; he was regarded even by his opponents with great respect, and even fear, and never treated as a joke. The idea of him being ostracized, deposed, or assassinated is simply impossible. Aldeia Maronal was his village; he could not be ostracized or deposed, and no one would assassinate him. Disobedience was possible though rare: on the occasions when he corrected someone’s deviant line of behavior, the violators tended to heed Alfredo’s corrections out of fear that they themselves would be ostracized or shunned by Alfredo and his family. The sanction that was most available was desertion, which was

often discussed by subgroups within the village. However, the easy availability of health care at Aldeia Maronal—in an environment where deadly *falciparum* malaria is endemic—made it difficult for people to leave, and no one did while I was there (on the contrary, a number of new *shovo* were built). In other villages, some of the sanctions listed by Boehm were practiced more often, as I heard reports of members of an Ituí village threatening their own leader, and another village regularly refused to obey its leader's advice. These other villages seem to be more egalitarian than Aldeia Maronal. Aldeia Maronal did not really work to level Alfredo. Instead, the group accepted Alfredo's power, which was regarded in some senses as a fact that just had to be dealt with in order to enjoy the numerous benefits of Alfredo's leadership; but in other ways it was seen as a beneficial phenomenon that made the whole group wealthier and better off. Thus, there was no concerted group effort to sanction or level Alfredo's clearly superior power.

In summary, according to all major definitions and perspectives on egalitarianism, Marubo politics are not egalitarian. Certain villages do operate on more egalitarian principles than do others, but the society as a whole includes a system of competition for unequal power and leaves open the possibility of people entering positions of power. It does not contain the features of reverse dominance and leveling suggested by Fried, Clastres, and Boehm. Since there are so many significant deviations from the model of egalitarianism, to classify Marubo politics as egalitarian would stretch the label to the point of meaninglessness and raise inaccurate expectations of how Marubo political dynamics play out.

This is not to say that there are no egalitarian features in Marubo politics. There are many recognizably egalitarian features and certain villages closely fit the egalitarian model. Most significantly, there is no automatically ascribed power linked to any status, even that of *kakaya*. No one will obey another just because that other has been recognized as occupying a certain status, as might be the case in a true chiefdom where mere entry into a status entitles one to be obeyed. Among the Marubo, power must be individually constructed. But although power is not made into a *necessity* by the social structure, that structure leaves open numerous *possibilities* of power in the definitions of political roles and the pathways of access to them. Most perspectives on egalitarianism argue that society radically rejects power by various means; Marubo society does not.

Variability in multiple contexts of Marubo politics.

Having resolved the main issue of this dissertation by establishing that the Marubo political system is not egalitarian, there remains the task of explaining what it is. It is a system containing political ideals that are not egalitarian, but where actual political dynamics may be egalitarian or not, depending on particular contexts. An evident problem in explaining what the Marubo system is, is that relative to our modes of description (i.e., to the criteria of distribution of power and influence) the Marubo system is highly variable depending on specific contexts. I noted very different distributions of influence and modes of decision-making in different villages and also noted a strong influence of historical context. Here I will describe these variations and suggest explanations for them. I will then interpret the place of Marubo politics in the spectrum of world systems.

First I will address the impact of historical context on Marubo politics. The key fact in this regard is that the Marubo are in a state of rebound from a recent demographic low. The demographic low can be placed by educated guess around the end of the rubber boom, between 1910 and 1920. That low was followed by a period of near-total isolation from 1920 to 1960. The period of isolation was followed by a period of increasing contact with non-indigenous people, 1960 to present. However, since the end of the rubber boom relations between the Marubo and non-indigenous people have been peaceful. Except for a clash with Mayoruna neighbors which resulted in the deaths of two Marubo, the Marubo have had eighty years of peaceful relations with neighbors. During those years they have also had enough land that they have not suffered from hunger. In the years for which we have historical records (i.e., since the penetration of missionaries in the 17th century), eighty years of peaceful isolation and demographic growth are a rarity for *any* indigenous group in the area. The instance of maximal development of powerful leadership—Aldeia Maronal—is the result of these eighty years of development. The number of people that have gathered there—at least 220 in 1997—is greater than the likely total Marubo population at the end of the rubber boom. The increasing population and stability of settlements have permitted the development of forms of political organization that would not be possible either at lower population levels or in conditions of constant warfare that impede settlement permanence. Therefore even if some pre-boom or boom-era Marubo wanted to create situations like that at Aldeia Maronal—i.e., if culturally pervasive ideals of political behavior were such that individuals could conceive of creating Aldeia Maronal-like phenomena in the past—they could not do so due to low population and rapidly shifting settlements. Furthermore, if I

had gone into the field thirty years ago I would have in all likelihood come to very different conclusions about Marubo politics. Therefore, the moment in time in which the Marubo were observed had a very important impact on the conclusions arrived at.

The key variables in understanding the effect of historical context on Marubo politics are the social structure and the political ethos. I have shown that the political roles encoded in the social structure, and the ideals concerning political leadership, are such as to permit power to develop. However, these parameters are such that although they *permit* power to develop, they do not automatically produce it. Power must still be individually constructed and the only pathway I discerned towards that end was a particular village formation process resulting in a role I labelled ‘founder-attractor’. To carry out such a formation process requires certain preconditions: the founder has to have time to establish a village and render it attractive to potential coresidents; potential coresidents must exist in sufficient numbers, so that there must be a number of other villages available to draw on to add to the founder’s village, and each of these villages must have had its own time-consuming process of development; and the village formed when the founder attracts other coresident networks to his own must have time to fuse its formerly multiple decision-making processes into a single one. All this takes time, settlement stability, and a certain minimum population level. Hence my argument that even if members of this society wanted to develop power structures, until very recently they could not do so due to warfare and low population.

Equally important in rounding out this line of thought is the idea that a society that is capable of producing power structures does not necessarily do so. The Marubo have egalitarian and non-egalitarian villages. I have argued that this has to do with the

way each village is formed and the role of the leader in village formation (see Chapter Five). There are villages where the leader is appointed by consensus and kept powerless by a reverse dominance hierarchy (Aldeia São Sebastião, Aldeia Liberdade); there are even villages where the position of leader is kept unoccupied by the competition of aggressively equal political peers (Aldeia Alegria, Aldeia Vida Nova). But there is a village where a leader exercises real power—Aldeia Maronal. None of these leadership types is ‘the Marubo ideal’. Marubo social structure correlates to a limited set of residence patterns, and patterns of village composition and village formation repeat themselves. The options are limited but multiple: there are a number of options available for village formation and village composition that are all fully compatible with socio-structural norms (this argument is more fully developed in Chapters Four and Nine). Each resulting leadership pattern is considered normal, too. Hence the Marubo political value system accepts each of the political outputs of settlement patterns as normal. It is therefore a system capable of producing both egalitarian and non-egalitarian forms in different contexts. Concerning historical context, this is important because Marubo society could, at any given moment that it is observed, have only egalitarian villages. This would happen if settlement stability and population levels did not permit the development of founder-attractor roles for long time periods.

The importance of political ethos now becomes clear. The Marubo are a society that may be fully egalitarian in practice at any moment, but contains within it the seeds of political inequality which may sprout into social activity when conditions are right. Theories of egalitarianism suggest that egalitarian societies have systematic ways of consciously eliminating power as a threat to individual autonomy. The Marubo, on the

other hand, maintain a consistent set of beliefs regarding the advantages of having powerful leaders. This raises the prospect of a significant categorical division: on the one hand, there are societies that are egalitarian in practice and in ethos; on the other hand we must recognize the possibility that there are societies that are egalitarian in practice but whose ethos permits and even values power. In the former, egalitarianism is a permanent way of life; in the latter it is a result of particular historical conditions, and as soon as those conditions change power begins to develop. Of course, since ethos is an important aspect of the definition of egalitarianism, a society that is egalitarian in practice but not ethos is not in fact egalitarian. Yet it is not ranked either. I believe this requires a new category. In ranked societies, power is made *necessary* by the social structure and is always present; in the Marubo type it is only *possible*, and must be constructed by individual effort, hence it is not always present.

This argument raises the need to consider a reinterpretation of the theory of pan-Amazonian egalitarianism in terms of its historical context. The early political ethnologies of indigenous South Americans drew on observations made at the moment in time of greatest demographic precariousness for lowland South Americans. Nearly every lowland group had been reduced in population to dangerously low levels by recurring waves of disease, warfare, forced resettlement, slavery and forced labor, and genocidal practices linked to resource extraction booms. If it is true that for some societies, the development of power inequalities is considered desirable but requires conditions of long-term settlement stability and demographic growth, then we must recognize that conditions at the time of initial anthropological observation were extremely detrimental to such developments. We may find that if Amazonian societies establish successful land

claims and create long sought-after conditions of peaceful growth, they will be able to develop the political potentialities held in check by the grim historical circumstances of the past few centuries. My conclusions thus lead inevitably to a testable hypothesis. If there are other societies that are experiencing a demographic rebound from very low levels, and have established long-term settlement stability after a period in which this was not possible, and if they have an ethos that is non-egalitarian, then we should observe the initial development of political inequality as the ethos finds conditions favorable to its manifestation in social praxis.

To understand the implications of this argument for broader issues of political evolution it is necessary to establish a position regarding power and human nature. This issue has been at the center of debates on political evolution since Hobbes and Rousseau. Arguments about the significance of egalitarianism note that foragers are egalitarian and foraging is temporally antecedent to all other modes of subsistence, therefore egalitarianism is precedent to all other forms of political organization. Hence, this argument continues, original human nature is egalitarian while power structures have developed subsequently, and are thus not natural. Perhaps a more nuanced view, incorporating recent developments in primate studies, is provided by Boehm (1999) when he argues that humans retain some of the same instincts as our primate relatives. Chimpanzees are moved to establish dominance hierarchies, but as much as a chimpanzee is moved to become dominant over others, he is moved to resist others' establishment of dominance over himself. The urge to dominate and the urge to resist dominance are equally powerful. In human societies these coexisting motivations are reflected in the notions of domination and resistance, or of hierarchy and reverse

hierarchy. In every society there are some elements of each. That is why egalitarian societies have to maintain an egalitarian ethos—to restrict the will to power—and why other societies maintain a hierarchical ethos. In some cases aspects of both coexist, or exist in a state of tension which can produce hierarchical and egalitarian forms simultaneously and/or successively as is the case among the Marubo or in modern states where communes and collectives exist side-by-side with prisons and army bases. There is no society devoid of urges to power, and likewise none that is so submissive to power as to lack forms of resistance. It is merely a matter of emphasis. The evidence suggests therefore that domination and resistance are equally inherent to human nature. The importance of this is in eliminating the notion that power was absent from human society before the advent of archaeologically recognized complex polities.

In this context, the idea that societies with egalitarian practices can have a non-egalitarian ethos prevented from social manifestation by particular conditions gains significance relative to some of the main problems in political ethnology and evolution. A central issue of debate in this sense is: how did societies with power emerge from those without it? The implication of this argument is that they didn't. Even foragers with egalitarian practices can theoretically have sets of ideas that could permit the development of power structures given correct conditions. Otherwise, how can we explain phenomena such as the ranked foragers of the Northwest Coast area of North America, or the Calusa of what is today Florida's Gulf coast (Widmer 1988)? The Marubo case demonstrates that there are societies that do not have fixed power structures but that nevertheless have social structures and cultural value systems that are conducive to the development of power structures given conditions of long-term sedentism and

sufficient population levels. These cultures produce egalitarian systems under most conditions but can produce power under certain conditions. I believe this to be the most significant implication of this research as regards theoretical issues of political evolution.

It is easy to envision scenarios in which cultures shift ethical emphasis. There is the example of Marubo use of force, mentioned in Chapter Seven. The recent Marubo demographic bottleneck resulted in a change in the frequency of certain cultural variants related to the use of force. The frequency of use of force and the number of contexts for its use decreased, largely because of the peculiar nature of the main surviving leader's beliefs and his importance in enculturating the next generation. Thus, if any event decreases the number of people who can pass on egalitarian ethics to others, and the same event leaves a number of people who tend more to believe in the benefits of power, then what is left behind is a group of people who appreciate power and will seek to develop it if possible. Under conditions in which groups with small populations are common, such shifts in frequencies of cultural variants could occur often and for any number of reasons. Therefore, egalitarianism is not an essential feature of any group of people, nor is mutual oppression. Rather, these should be seen as cultural emphases that are subject to variation through time and space within cultural inheritance systems.

Returning to the specific case of Amazonia, a clear direction for future research is indicated. It would be beneficial to examine the political aspect of social life in other indigenous groups that are rebounding from demographic lows and experiencing unprecedented settlement stability. Such groups should be examined both in terms of observable political practices and in terms of political ethos, using fieldwork observations and oral history to establish a synchronic perspective in a diachronic context. If I am

right, there should exist other groups where non-egalitarian forms coexist with egalitarian ones, but where the development of power inequalities reflects a political ethos that in some ways values power rather than emphatically rejecting it. Such societies may have culturally transmitted political concepts that in the past could not be fully realized in social practice. The current historical moment affords the opportunity to see power structures developing in egalitarian frameworks. The direction taken politically by indigenous Amazonians over the next century should be a fascinating area of research. If my ideas are correct, such research will reveal a wide variation in forms of internal political organization among indigenous Amazonians, ranging from groups with true egalitarian ethos who institutionalize group control over weak consensus leaders, to groups that value powerful leadership and move towards institutionalized political inequality. If, on the other hand, Clastres was right and all Amazonian societies are radical rejectors of power, then no institutionalized political inequality will develop even as indigenous Amazonians continue (we hope) to grow in population over the next century.

Possible directions for future research.

A number of issues remain to be clarified by future research. Some of the conclusions made in this dissertation must be considered preliminary. Because only one year of fieldwork was conducted, some conclusions may be based on observations of processes that were over-emphasized by chance during that year, or on failure to observe processes that were not present at all during that year. Therefore the conclusions made here should be taken as statements which, while the current available evidence suggests they are true, could also be hypotheses which are rejected or revised when future research

adds new data. Additionally, ethnological research is necessary to determine the relationship of the Marubo political system to other Amazonian systems.

Ethnographically, I hope that future research can extend my examination of the residential patterns and the relationship between these patterns and leaders' behavior. I have argued that there is a correlation between village formation process and type of leader, and this correlation plays a significant role in my arguments. Future research on the Marubo should extend forward in time my research on the development of Marubo settlements (Chapter Five) and examine whether my suggested correlations with leadership type hold true for future cases. In particular, the fate of Aldeia Maronal should be examined. This village was subject to schismatic pressures, and if any of these schisms take place, they may affect the validity of some of my conclusions. This would be the case if Alfredo is forced to revise his style of leadership in response to schismatic pressures or to prevent future recurrence of schism. Of equal interest is the possibility of another founder-attractor emerging in Marubo society. Aldeia Maronal was unique at the time of research in its village formation process and associated leadership style. To confirm or deny my claims regarding that association, observations of another village with a similar formation process will be required. The development of leadership styles beyond Aldeia Maronal should also be examined to determine the prevailing political ethos, variations within that ethos, and what changes are occurring in attitudes towards political action.

Further research on the Marubo should also deepen our understanding of their moral and ethical beliefs through a profounder investigation into oral history and myth. A method specifically designed to investigate issues of political ethos would also be

useful in confirming or denying my assertions concerning Marubo political values.

Finally, it would be interesting if a census could be conducted around 2020 or 2025 to confirm or deny my claims concerning the presence of long-term relative-proportion stability in the Marubo exogamous lineage system.

Ethnologically, research on two levels would be useful. One is the level of the regional interaction sphere of the Marubo: the Javari basin specifically, and more broadly the Juruá-Javari-Ucayali continuum. The second level is that of the entirety of lowland South America. Within the Javari basin the Marubo have become the politically predominant indigenous society. Political ethnographies of their neighbors could determine if the Marubo strong leadership style is indeed unique in the area. Such research could be extended to other Panoan societies in the Juruá and Ucayali areas to create a broader yet still Panoan-specific perspective. Though some such research exists for the Kaxinawa (Kensinger 1995), more than two cases are necessary for a good comparative perspective to be possible. Finally, additional research using methods specifically geared to perception of political phenomena is necessary more generally in lowland South America. This will enable confirmation or rejection of my claim that the Marubo system represents a type of system more generally extant, but not easily perceived. The current moment in lowland South America allows us to observe a multiplicity of peoples with widely varying cultural systems shifting from conditions of demographic threat and shifting settlements to conditions of demographic growth and permanent settlement. The opportunity to observe political change during this time should not be wasted. In particular, I urge other researchers to distinguish societies with egalitarian practices *and* ethos, from societies with egalitarian practices but *not* ethos, and

to observe what happens in the latter as populations and settlement lifetimes increase.

The opportunity may exist to observe the development of power structures out of egalitarian systems. I can think of nothing more fascinating for the student of political change and evolution, and ethnoarchaeologists interested in issues of social evolution should also take note. This research also has important applications in understanding indigenous goals and reasoning, as it emphasizes perception of indigenous motives. Political research among indigenous Amazonians over the next century could help us understand how indigenous people view the world at the same time as it contributes to a host of theoretical issues concerning change in political systems.

Effect of method on results in political ethnography.

This research shows the importance of methods of investigation in determining how indigenous political systems are perceived. Marubo society is one in which power is not necessary, only possible. It is rare but not forbidden. Above all, it is individually constructed rather than socio-structurally ascribed. Because of this, its presence can only be ascertained by observation, not by deduction from socio-structural norms. The social structure does not determine the existence of powerful people, it merely leaves open that possibility. Analysis at the level of linguistically encoded statuses and associated ideal roles might not ascribe power to high political status, thus erroneously lumping the Marubo with societies having a true egalitarian ethos which actively suppress power. This would depend, in the last resort, on any given researcher's interpretation of the fact that 'telling people what to do' is an aspect of the ideal roles of *shovo ivo* and *kakaya*, but since the organization of labor for food production by Amazonian leaders has long been

interpreted in Lévi-Straussian terms as an obligation rather than a privilege it is doubtful that this would be seen as implying power. What I take to be indicative of power is the fact of repeated victory in conflicts of will, repeated ability to impose one's own policy at public decision-making events. This power was not discovered through interviews, only through observation. The methods used were taken from Manchester School ethnography (Turner 1957) and action theory (Vincent 1978)—essentially the extended-case method (Gluckman 1961). Methods such as these were created precisely at a time when the synchronic perspective of structural-functionalism seemed to require supplementation by a more empirical and diachronic perspective that paid attention to actual individual behavior. Despite its popularity in New Guinea and Africa, I know of only one other example of this type of political anthropology in the Amazon: Arvelo-Jimenez (1971). Even that monograph mainly consists of formal descriptions of “the Ye’cuana” *supplemented* by illustrative cases, whereas I aspire to present mainly specific cases, supplemented by some statistical data to determine if the cases are generalizable. At any rate, the type of political system extant among the Marubo—where power is not explicit or obvious and its presence in political values makes it a potentiality rather than a necessity—cannot be discerned by more superficial modes of observation and analysis. Fieldwork must specifically include methods geared towards the perception of this type of power or it will be missed. The extended-case method is like an observing device, a microscope or telescope, without which the phenomenon in question is not perceptible. It may be necessary to question conclusions about indigenous Amazonian political systems that are based on more superficial impressions, or that are derived from fieldwork programs whose methods could not have picked up subtle modes of extra-structural

interpersonal power, nor repeated patterns thereof. This should underline the genuine significance of Descartes' warning: "As well might a man burning with an unintelligent desire to find treasure, continuously roam the streets, seeking to find something that a passerby might have dropped... It were far better never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so without a method" (Descartes 1969[1628]:44). I predict that systems with characteristics similar to the Marubo one will be found elsewhere in Amazonia if appropriate methods are applied to their discovery.

Political motives in relationships with non-indigenous people.

This research has made it clear that the Marubo have a well developed political system and political economy. The Marubo political economy of people is a system of competition in which unequal accumulation of resources is the goal. One method used to accumulate unequal demographic resources is the intelligent manipulation of relationships with non-indigenous people. This shows that motives derived from an individual's position in the indigenous political system affect their decision-making as regards relationships to the non-indigenous world. In the Marubo case, the need to maintain the intactness of one's social network is a strong influence on decisions regarding relationships with non-indigenous people.

Clastres argued that Amazonian societies have no political economy, no competition for inequality and, given their social structuring around concepts of reciprocity, no unequal accumulations of resources. This view has led to a number of mistaken expectations concerning Amazonian groups. For example, non-indigenous expectations that infusions of monetary wealth to indigenous leaders would automatically result in equal redistribution were disappointed by cases of indigenous leaders

accumulating wealth. The very fact that we could be disappointed by this suggests there is indeed a widespread belief that everything is shared in indigenous societies, that unequal accumulations are anathema. However, although there may be societies that resemble Clastres' model, the Marubo are not one of them. This is not to deny the existence of reciprocity, which operates very evidently in many areas such as eating and feasting, kinship and marriage exchange, and mutual assistance in labor, just to name a few. But Marubo society has a very active political dimension that involves leaders in competition for limited resources and influence and, therefore, they should be understood as humans with political goals as complex as anyone else's. Simplistic assumptions that the drive to profit and power is absent would result in serious misunderstandings. To understand Marubo relationships to non-indigenous people it is necessary to keep in mind the complexity of internal Marubo political dynamics and the goals people derive from their place in this system.

The Marubo resemble other Amazonian societies in that evidence suggests that political economies of people exist elsewhere in Amazonia (Overing 1975, Rivière 1984, Mentore 1987), but since those other societies have not been studied utilizing the same methods as the Marubo have been studied with, finding a political economy among the Marubo raises the strong suspicion that this type of system is common in Amazonia but has not been discerned by past and current research techniques. It is probable that many other Amazonian societies have systems of political competition that strongly impact individuals' senses of self-interest and make it logical for them to manipulate relationships with non-indigenous people to advance their political position. This is important if we consider how perceptions of political systems affect non-indigenous

approaches to indigenous economic development. If inequality and struggles for power are absent from a society, then in the provision of outside assistance it becomes unnecessary to worry about how the aid is distributed once it is in indigenous hands: the principle of reciprocity will determine that wealth is distributed equally since unequal accumulations of resources are morally anathema. The fact that this is not the case among the Marubo and potentially not the case in much of Amazonia signifies that expectations derived from Lévi-Strauss' and Clastres' claims about reciprocity can be at great variance with Amazonian social reality in ways that have a practical impact on indigenous/non-indigenous relations. If a poor understanding of indigenous political life can create misleading expectations that negatively affect the application of aid by non-indigenous entities, then an accurate understanding of indigenous political life is necessary to correct those problems. While a detailed discussion of how understanding a political system can facilitate the realistic applications of economic assistance plans is not relevant to this dissertation, it should be clear that this understanding is important to any such applications. To approach indigenous people as political naïfs is to expose oneself to grave problems when such expectations turn out to be wrong. Conversely, an accurate understanding of the lines of factionalization and competition in society should permit such problems to be avoided.

Concluding thoughts: Rousseau or Hobbes?

This dissertation recasts the old debate between Rousseau and Hobbes in modern terms. The concept of egalitarian society is a direct genealogical descendant of Rousseau's idea that the original state of humanity is one in which mutual oppression is

absent, while critiques of the concept of egalitarianism (e.g., Flanagan 1989) can be seen as recursions of Hobbes' view that the original state of humanity is one in which mutual oppression is unchecked. The Marubo case does not entirely fit in to the old debate because we cannot regard it as representing a state of nature or any past state of humanity. What it *is* is one possible state of humanity, and in this sense, since the Rousseau-Hobbes debate concerns human political nature, it is possible to make some tentative remarks on the issue of how this research might affect the validity of the philosophical positions advocated by Rousseau and Hobbes.

Rousseau argued that “the state of nature, being the state where man’s care for his own self-preservation is least prejudicial to that of others, is the one most conducive to peace” (Rousseau 1984[1755]:98). In a state of nature human behavior would be driven by natural law rather than reason. Rousseau argued that behavior would respond to ‘two principles antecedent to reason’ (Rousseau 1984[1755]:70), the first being an interest in self-preservation, the second being a ‘natural’ aversion to seeing other sentient beings suffer or perish. It is natural not to harm others except in self-defense; therefore, in a state of nature people would behave socially in the absence of reason. Compassion, “an innate repugnance against seeing a fellow creature suffer” (Rousseau 1984[1755]:99-100), keeps ‘natural man’ from pointless aggression against others. The natural state of humanity was exemplified in the lifeways of his ‘savage’ contemporaries (Rousseau 1984[1755]:82-83). Rousseau explicitly linked the ‘natural’ condition of ‘savages’ with the condition of humans in the Garden of Eden (Rousseau 1984[1755]:79).

Rousseau argued that inequality among humans was not “authorized by natural law” (Rousseau 1984[1755]:77). In the state of nature there is only ‘natural or physical

inequality’—such inequalities as are established by nature, as for example differences in health, strength of body, and qualities of mind and soul (Rousseau 1984[1755]:77). In contrast to this, rational humans who live in civilization have ‘moral or political inequality’ (Rousseau 1984[1755]:77). This consists of privileges, derived from convention, enjoyed by some at the expense of the rest—some are richer, have more honor, more power, or get themselves obeyed when others do not. There was a “moment in the progress of things” (Rousseau 1984[1755]:77) when a change occurred from natural man with only natural inequality to civilized man with political inequality. The original human condition, represented by contemporary ‘savages’, was one without moral or political inequality.

In contrast, Hobbes argued that humans were naturally aggressive towards one another (Hobbes 1947[1651]). In the absence of rules, there would be nothing to keep these aggressions in check. Therefore, a state is necessary in order to ensure that people do not harm one another. This view implies that humans have always tried and will always try to dominate one another by force unless restrained by greater force. It further implies that oppressive power structures are not, therefore, recent and unnatural veneers placed over a fundamentally ‘egalitarian’ human nature, rather they are manifestations of the basic human will to power.

The Marubo, obviously, are not primitive, nor are they representative of any past state of humanity. However, their current system of political organization is largely rooted in a period of development wherein the state was completely absent. After the rubber boom, the Marubo lived in isolation for at least forty years. The main leader, João Tuxáua, had a very important impact in determining the kind of political ideology that

would be adopted by the current generation of Marubo leaders. Therefore, the political framework within which today's Marubo leaders operate was largely formed during a period of autonomous development beyond the state's reach. This makes it a very interesting case for considering how humans organize themselves politically where there is no state. Furthermore, the Marubo are a small society that is clearly bounded, with a coherent but acephalous political organization operating mainly according to indigenous political values. They are not savages nor are they in a state of nature, but this is the type of people that the Rousseau-Hobbes fracas is all about. Without falling prey to the temporal, proto-evolutionary frameworks of those thinkers, it may be profitable to consider the Marubo simply as one point in the great range of possibilities for political organization among small, stateless groups, and see what this case tells us concerning the great debates over power and human nature.

The Marubo case indicates that both Rousseau and Hobbes were wrong. Therefore, subsequent reifications of the Rousseau-Hobbes debate fail to capture the reality of the phenomena they claim to describe. Let us consider first Rousseau's argument. A number of arguments can be made against that perspective.

Lévi-Strauss argued that his research among the Nambiquara supplied evidence to support Rousseau:

If I had the time, and if it were not so far removed from my topic, I would have liked to show what considerable support modern anthropological observations bring... to the analysis of the eighteenth century social philosophers. I am well aware of the fact that Rousseau's 'social contract,' which is the step by which individuals resign their autonomy in favor of the General Will, is entirely different from the nearly contractual relations existing between the chief and his followers. It remains true, however, that Rousseau and his contemporaries displayed a keen sociological feeling when they understood that cultural attitudes and elements such as 'contract' and 'consent' are not the result of secondary processes, as claimed by their

opponents; they are culture's raw materials, and it is impossible to conceive a political or social organization in which they would not already be present.

(Lévi-Strauss 1967[1944]:59)

Ultimately, Lévi-Strauss' ideas about consent in indigenous leadership are derived from application of the concept of reciprocity to the political field of social action. To Lévi-Strauss, culture is a set of rules the basic purpose of which is to ensure group survival. Culture establishes reciprocity to avoid group-threatening unequal accumulations of resources. In this sense, the basic rule is the incest taboo. The incest taboo is thus not only the origin of culture but of society as well, since it establishes intergroup exchanges by means of which groups larger than the family emerge. Therefore, the origin of human culture and society is the establishment of reciprocity. The implication is that all 'original' human societies were structured around reciprocal exchange, which rendered unequal power by leaders impossible. The Marubo case demonstrates, however, that reciprocity in kinship does not have to be accompanied by reciprocity in politics. Reciprocity in kinship can coexist quite well with competition and inequality in politics. Therefore, this argument for an original human condition of universal equality is not valid.

The findings concerning the significance of political ethos also suggest that the idea that all human societies were once egalitarian is not valid. I have argued that the Marubo case indicates that some societies have no established power structures, but have an ethos that directs that society's members to establish such a structure when the opportunity arises. Other societies may in fact have the opposite ethos and thus resist power structures even when they are easily adoptable. But it is clear that in no case is the issue of ethos black and white. It is a matter of frequency of cultural variants,

specifically of individual interpretations of political values. Changes in frequencies of cultural variants due to random demographic-impact events can change a society's political emphasis, as occurred with the change in frequency of Marubo use of force after the rubber boom. We cannot assume that the apparent absence of power *structures* prior to the Neolithic reflects a total absence of belief in power. Ranked foragers have existed under certain circumstances in the historical past (as, for example, on the Northwest Coast of North America, or the Gulf Coast of modern Florida) and therefore could have existed, archaeologically invisible, in the prehistorical past. Following the geological rule of thumb that the same processes we observe today shaped past changes, we can assume that the period of time prior to the emergence of archaeologically visible states included the same range of variation in terms of political ideology that is observed today, meaning that there were societies whose political beliefs clustered on the egalitarian ethos, while others clustered on the opposite end. The Neolithic simply gave these differences greater latitude to manifest themselves in spectacularly obvious ways. These very obvious manifestations (ancient heavy transport, propaganda machines, control of historical interpretation) then become the only ones we are (ethnocentrically) capable of discerning. The idea that all societies before the state were essentially egalitarian is invalidated. It is logical to deduce that while some such societies were in fact egalitarian, others contained within them the ideological seeds of power structures.

If Rousseau's ideas about non-state politics find no support in the Marubo case, neither do Hobbes'. The current Marubo political system, I have argued, developed under conditions of autonomy from the state—near-total isolation for forty years. Despite this recent isolation from the state, politics, inequality, and power are all

significant features of Marubo social life. But the game of political competition for unequal power is played without coercive force (except insofar as it is used against forces external to the Marubo system). Instead, it is played through processes of resource accumulation and the construction of legitimacy, as well as consensus-building and persuasion. The ideology that pushed aside force as a major political strategy was developed and culturally transmitted precisely during the time of maximum isolation from the state. Therefore, absence of the state does not lead to uncontrolled brutality in political competition; in fact, in this case the absence of the state correlates with a move away from such brutality. The Marubo system is one where moral concepts channel political competitiveness into nonviolent paths of social action. Since this system was developed precisely under the conditions Hobbes theorized about—where there is no state to impose behavioral restrictions—Hobbes' main argument is thereby invalidated.

If Rousseau and Hobbes were both wrong, where does that leave us? The current situation in anthropology is still one in which some argue that egalitarianism is the basic human condition (Lee 1990) while others argue that hierarchy is the basic human condition (Flanagan 1989). Among my research goals was that of moving towards a resolution of this issue by acquiring better information than had previously been at our disposal on a lowland South American society, and I did not find an egalitarian society. I found evidence that the methods used to look at indigenous political systems affected how they were seen. If the Marubo were looked at by old methods, or even if they had been looked at forty years ago by newer methods, the forms of power and inequality that I saw would have passed by unperceived. I concluded that we must question the automatic assignment of Amazonian societies to the category of egalitarianism. On the

other hand, I found certain Marubo villages that closely conformed to the model of egalitarianism, which leads me to conclude that just because Marubo society as a whole is not egalitarian, that does not mean that no egalitarian systems exist anywhere. There may well be societies wherein every village is organized along egalitarian lines and that organization is encoded in an egalitarian ethos. Nevertheless, the Marubo case indicates that the category of ‘egalitarianism’ contains within it societies that were perceived to be egalitarian but are not so. It also indicates that in the complete absence of the state and in a kinship and economic system based on reciprocity there may still be overt competition for power and unequal access to resources. This signifies that it is unrealistic to posit an ‘age of egalitarianism’ in which all human societies were organized around egalitarian principles. But it *is* realistic to envision systems wherein the drive to unequal power is prevented from resulting in forceful mutual oppression, and where the chief legitimate use of force is to protect against outside aggression. Politics outside the state are not as bad as Hobbes believed, but contain a greater range of more nuanced inequalities than Rousseau envisioned.

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BIOGRAPHY

Javier Ruedas

The author was born in Madrid, Spain in 1970. He graduated from high school at the International School in Geneva, Switzerland, 1987. He attended the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1988. He attended the University of Texas-Austin from 1988 to 1990. He received a Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology in 1990. He entered Tulane University Graduate School in 1991. He received a Master of Arts in Anthropology in 1993. He was admitted to Ph.D. candidacy in 1995. He carried out fieldwork in Brazil, in 1997 and 1998. He received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Tulane University in 2001.