



Red Hat API Management

API Security with OpenID Connect

Presenter

Title

Date

CUSTOMER MOVING TO CONTAINERS?

Customer Benefits

- Breaking down the monolith means faster turnaround.
- Greater flexibility.
- Fully automated testing driving better QA.
- Free from single technology limits
- Makes customer agile, cloud native, reactive compliant, with bounded security and fully aggregate enabled!

REMEMBER SECURITY

Everything Has To Be Super Secure

- Independent services that are no longer bound to one monolith i.e. just one security context on one cluster or multiple ones ?
- So in microservices - does each service have to store identity?
- Ownership of identity data is a risk if not done properly.



CSO IS ON THE SPOTLIGHT

Recent News On Data Breaches Is Not A Good Start



77,000,000 PSN RECORDS STOLEN

Sony



143,000,000 ACCOUNTS

Equifax



117,000,000 RECORDS STOLEN

LinkedIn

DEVELOPERS HEADACHE


Homemade Security Is Always A Recipe For Disaster

- The bar for appdev security has been raised substantially.
- Most devs don't really 'do' security.
 - E.g. Storing user information - should be as salted hash.
- The hand rolled solutions of the past are not viable going forwards.
- Are you still sure you want to store 'identity' in your App?



PROBLEM WAS SOLVED WHILE AGO

Banks




- Most people do not keep their savings under their mattress for the same security reasons.
- They store them in a trusted environment - i.e. the bank.
- Then use a separate means to authorise / authenticate payments.

API SECURITY WORKS IN THE SAME WAY

Trusted Identity Authority

- Identity is abstracted away to a single 'fortress'.
- Tokens are issued as a means of allowing access to services and resources.
- So now your application services no longer have to store sensitive data!



API SECURITY

Evolution of API Security

Naked API

Simple API Keys

Federated Control

The Authentication Granddaddy - Basic Auth

API SECURITY

Top Schemes

Most API Management platforms supports the following security schemes:

- **API Key** single token string
- **APP ID/APP Key (Basic Auth)** two token strings i.e. username, password
- **OpenID Connect (OIDC)** simple identity layer on top of OAuth framework

OAUTH

OAUTH 2.0


From 20,000 FT



OAuth (Open Authorization) is an open standard for access delegation:

- One service can request access to resources on another service on the behalf of the user.


Published October 2012



OAUTH 2.0

Delegation

OAuth enables users to grant third-party access to their web resources without sharing their passwords.



OAUTH 2.0

Terminology

- **Resource Owner:** generally yourself.
- **Resource Server:** server hosting protected data (for example Google hosting your profile).
- **Client:** application requesting access to a resource server (i.e. a mobile application).
- **Authorization Server:** server issuing token to the client. This token will be used for the client to request the resource server.

OAUTH 2.0

Grant / Flow Types

Authorization Code Flow

The most secure and used where a user logs into Identity server and grants access to Application to retrieve their data

Client Credentials Flow

Only Application data is passed in a single request for an Access Token

Implicit Flow

User logs in but secret is not passed

Resource Owner Password Flow


Application, username and password data is passed in a single request for an Access Token

OPENID CONNECT

OPENID CONNECT


Overview

- Built on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol
- Allows clients to verify the identity of an end user
- Obtains basic profile information about the end user
- RESTful HTTP API, using JSON as a data format
- Like SAML - but not just webpage centric, easier to implement.



OPENID CONNECT

Layered Security Standards



OPENID CONNECT

Vs OAuth 2.0


OpenID is an open standard for authentication. A user must obtain an OpenID account through an OpenID identity provider (for example, Google). The user will then use that account to sign into any website (the relying party) that accepts OpenID authentication.

OAuth2 is an open standard for authorization. Confusingly, OAuth2 is also the basis for OpenID Connect. OAuth2 provides secure delegated access, meaning that an application, called a client, can take actions or access resources on a resource server on the behalf of a user, without the user sharing their credentials with the application.

OPENID CONNECT

ID Token

- Provides identity information to the application from the Authority Server
- Base64 encoded - easy to work with.



Name: John Doe

Type: Employee

Expired by: Company


Expiration:

02-06-2019

JWT (“JOT”)

To The Rescue


- Signed by algo and verified by only correct key
- Contains user identity in form of claims (Private, public, reserved)
- For OIDC purpose, SSO is widely adopted in consumer/enterprise apps
- Eliminates the need to look up against a central access control list



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW COMPLETE EXCHANGE


AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

An Orientation




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#0 - 3scale API Gateway Gets RH SSO Public Key On Configuration Load




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#1 - User Starts Using The Web App




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#2 - The Application Introduces RH SSO




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#3 - RH SSO Forwards To Login Form




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#4 - The User Logs Into RH SSO




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#5 - RH SSO Forwards To Consent Page




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#6 - The User Consents



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW


#7 - RH SSO Redirects To Application And Sends An Auth Code



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW


#7.1 - The Temp Auth Code

- Is used to acquire an access code.
- Think of this as being a cloakroom ticket - this can be used once only to acquire a bearer token.




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#8 - The Web App Calls The Token Endpoint



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9 - RH SSO Sends A Valid Bearer Token



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9.1 - The Bearer Token



"A security token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can"

AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9.2 - The Bearer Token

Authorization: Bearer

```
QXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbjogQmVhcmVyIA0Kew0KICJqdGkiOiAiYmNiMTFmNDktZTZhZS00NGNhLWIwNzctMzc5MjU5NGYwZDk4IiwNCiAiZXhwIjogMTQ5NTI3Mjc3OSwNCiAibmJmIjogMCwNCiAiaWF0IjogMTQ5NDMyMjMzOSwNCiAiaXNzIjogImh0dHA6Ly8wOTY2ZWExZi5uZ3Jvay5pby9hdXRoL3JlYWxtcy9mb3VybwFya3MiLA0KICJhdwQiOiAiNGQ2NTI0MDYiLA0KICJzdWIiOiAiZDIwZGM0MTUtNzUyZi00YTc5LWEzYTgtNTJlOTVlYTZkZW2MiIiwNCiAidHlwIjogIkJ1YXJlciIsDQogImF6cCI6ICI0ZDY1MjQwNiIsDQogInNlc3Npb25fc3RhZGU0iAiINTVhODQzMjktY2Y2ZC00YjliLWJhOGYtYWJhMDM3NjRjMjFjIiwNCiAiY2xpZW50X3Nlc3Npb24iOiAiYmYxYTA3MzktYTM5Yy00NTE1LTljMDAtNzh1MTgyNmI4ZDM2IiwNCiAiYXsb3dlZC1vcmlnaW5zIjogw0KICAiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ2V0cG9zdG1hbi5jb20iDQogXSwnCiAicmVhbG1fYWNjZXNzIjogew0KICAicm9sZXMiOiBbDQogICAiYWNjZXNzX215X3Jlc291cmNlIjog0KICBdDQogfSwNCiAicmVzb3VyY2VfYWNjZXNzIjogew0KICAiYWNjb3VudCI6IHsNCiAgICJyb2xlcYI6IFsNCiAgICAibWFuYWdlLWFjY291bnQiLA0KICAgICJ2aWV3LXB2Z2pGU0I0QogICBdDQogIH0NCiB9LA0KICJuYW1lIjogInRlc3QgdXNlc3QgInByZWZlcnJlZD91c2VybWFTZSI6ICJ0ZXN0dXNlc3QgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiOiAidGVzdCI6DQogImZhbm9uY291IjogInVzZXIiLA0KICJlbWVpbCI6ICJ0ZXN0QGJsYWguY29tIjogKfQ0K
```

Accept: */*

Postman-Token: 86b86d4a-8369-40af-8612-9f0d3589fdfb

Cf-Ray: 35c3a94bb1ac35ae-LHR

X-3Scale-Proxy-Secret-Token: Shared_secret_sent_from_proxy_to_API_backend_169ad455fe40801e

What does a bearer token look like?

AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9.3 - The Bearer Token

if you base64 decrypt you get:

notice the role information


the token is a JWT.

```
Authorization: Bearer
{
  "jti": "bcb11f49-e6ae-44ca-b077-3792594f0d98",
  "exp": 1495272739,
  "nbf": 0,
  "iat": 1494322339,
  "iss": "http://0966ealf.ngrok.io/auth/realms/fourmarks",
  "aud": "4d652406",
  "sub": "d20dc415-752f-4a79-a3a8-52e95ea6dec6",
  "typ": "Bearer",
  "azp": "4d652406",
  "session_state": "55a84329-cf6d-4b9b-ba8f-aba03764c21c",
  "client_session": "bf1a0739-a39c-4515-9c00-78e1826b8d36",
  "allowed-origins": [
    "https://www.getpostman.com"
  ],
  "realm_access": {
    "roles": [
      "access_my_resource"
    ]
  },
  "resource_access": {
    "account": {
      "roles": [
        "manage-account",
        "view-profile"
      ]
    }
  },
  "name": "test user",
  "preferred_username": "testuser",
  "given_name": "test",
  "family_name": "user",
  "email": "test@blah.com"
}
```

AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW


#9.4 - The Bearer Token

- Digitally signed by the Auth Server.
- A Standardised Identity token.
- Contains the username and roles, but
can also add custom claims.




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9.5 - Web App Submits The Access Token To Get User Info (Optional)




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#9.6 - Web App Receives UserInfo




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#10 - Web App Submits The Bearer Token




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#10.1 - Gateway Verifies Token




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#10.2 - Gateway Requests Auth To API Manager




AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#10.3 - API Manager Response “Authorized”



AUTHORIZATION CODE FLOW

#10.3 - Gateway Calls Backend API



RED HAT 3SCALE API MANAGEMENT

RED HAT 3SCALE API MANAGEMENT

System Architecture

The 3scale API Management architecture consists of :

- The **API Manager** which manages the API, Developers and Applications
- The **Traffic Manager** (API Gateways) that enforce the policies from the API Manager and delegate authorization to 3rd party IDPs
- The **Identity Provider** (IDP) identity hub that supports many authentication using various protocols
- The **API Backend** the API. i.e. the API Provider


RED HAT API MANAGEMENT

Gateway Operations

- Checks the timestamp for 'expired' token.
- Checks the client_id is still valid
- Performs a check on the signature of the JWT using RH SSO public key

RED HAT API MANAGEMENT


System Architecture



RED HAT API MANAGEMENT




2.1: Openshift On-Premises + OpenID Connect




DEMO


INITIAL SCENARIO




INSECURE SCENARIO



ISOLATE BACKEND API




SECURING THE SERVICE




SECURING THE SERVICE

Malicious app now has no token or invalid token, API gateway controls rate limits and mapping rules



FINAL DEPLOYMENT





THANK YOU



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