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# Analogous Unity in the Writings of John Duns Scotus

DOMENIC D'ETTORE\*

**ABSTRACT** Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor.

**KEYWORDS** analogous unity, analogy, univocity of being, John Duns Scotus, Aristotle, Scotism, Thomism

## INTRODUCTION

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS AND HIS followers stand out among the great medieval philosophers for his affirmation that being and other perfections are univocal to God and creatures. Some contemporary scholars contend that Scotus arrives at his doctrine of univocity through overlooking analogous unity (also called “proportional unity” and “proportionality”). This paper explores the merits of the criticism by investigating Scotus's passages addressing analogous unity. It argues that Scotus does not completely overlook analogous unity, but instead develops, albeit implicitly, an alternative account of unity to Aristotle's own division of unity into numerical, specific, generic, and analogous.

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Analogy of proportionality is what Aristotle calls *analogia*. Thomas Aquinas singles out analogy of proportionality (albeit only at *DV*, q. 2, a. 11) as the kind of analogy that is uniquely suited for understanding the commonality between the existence and attributes of God and the existence and attributes of creatures. Derivative from mathematical proportions such as  $3:6::4:8$ , analogy of proportionality is the unity or commonality that holds between some pairs (or sets of pairs) of proportional relationships, such as the relationship of a spring to a river and the relationship of a point to a line; or the relationship of a rock to its great density and the relationship of a test to its great difficulty; or the relationship of a stock to its loss in value and the relationship of a ball to its motion toward the ground. Each of these proportional pairs of relationships grounds common names, which names are in turn said of members of these pairs by analogy of proportionality: the spring and the point are both “principles” or “beginnings” by analogy, the former of rivers and the latter of lines; the rock’s density and the test’s difficulty are analogously “hard”; the stock and the ball “fall” by analogy.

Aristotle himself treats analogy of proportionality—which he simply calls *analogia* (analogy)—as one of four modes of unity, along with numerical unity, specific unity, and generic unity at *Met.* V.6, 1016b31–35/Barnes, 2:1605.<sup>1</sup> Each of these four unities has a foundation in things and their natures. Aristotelians also speak of the merely equivocal unity that holds between subjects that share a common name but nothing even proportionally identical in their natures.

A word about some key terms is in order. Scotus and his scholastic Aristotelian counterparts share a broad agreement (with some notable differences) that spoken or written words signify concepts in the mind, and that concepts in the mind signify things (which are themselves either things outside the mind or other mental concepts).<sup>2</sup> The terms ‘univocal’ and ‘equivocal’ arise to account for the fact that different concepts can be signified using the same kind of spoken or written sounds. The vocal or written sound ‘strike’ conveys a different signification when said about actions in baseball, in bowling, in a fight, or in a labor dispute. Whereas all instances of knocking down all the pins on the first try in bowling are called a strike univocally to each other, the strikes in bowling are called strikes equivocally to the strikes in baseball, in fights, and in labor disputes.<sup>3</sup> In practice,

<sup>1</sup>All translations of works of Aristotle are taken from the Revised Oxford Translation edited by Barnes, citations to which are given by volume and page number. Translations from Latin texts in this paper are my own. For a contemporary treatment of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* V.6, see Halper, *One and Many*, chap. 2, 83–152. On the fourfold division in particular, see esp. 135–45. Halper discusses the fourfold division as a “qualitative series” falling under what Aristotle labels the “indivisible in form” at 1016b23–24 (136), and Halper highlights the importance of this “qualitative series” of the one for Aristotle’s biological and physical works.

<sup>2</sup>This theory of signification derives from Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* 1, 16a3–9. On thirteenth-century theories of signification, see Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing”; and Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signification.”

<sup>3</sup>Aristotle’s *Cat.* 1, 1a1–12, is the primary point of reference for the distinction between the univocal/synonymous and the equivocal/homonymous. For a recent and concise treatment of this passage, see Ward, “Aristotelian Homonymy.” See also Halper, *One and Many*, 57–66. For the purposes of this paper, I quote Halper’s summary point about univocal and equivocal naming: “In general, then, two *things* will be named univocally or equivocally depending on whether they are called by one name in respect of the same formula or different formulae; and insofar as they are univocally named, they belong to the same genus or class” (63–64, emphasis in the original). Halper

the words 'univocal' and 'equivocal' are sometimes applied to words, sometimes to concepts, and sometimes to things. For example, the word 'strike' is called "univocal" as it is said about the different bowling strikes, and the word 'strike' is called "equivocal" as it is said about bowling strikes and about baseball strikes. The concept of a bowling strike is called "univocal" by reference to the univocal use of the word 'strike,' and both the concept of a bowling strike and the concept of a baseball strike are called "equivocal" to one another by reference to equivocal uses of the word 'strike.' Bowling strikes are called "univocal" insofar as they are subjects of univocal uses of the word 'strike,' and bowling strikes and baseball strikes are called "equivocal" insofar as they are subjects of equivocal uses of the word 'strike.' Demonstrative arguments proceed on the basis of univocity, and demonstration is hindered by equivocation. No valid conclusions can be demonstrated about labor dispute strikes in a syllogism in which the word 'strike' refers variously to a labor dispute strike and to a baseball strike. Another key term is *ratio*. This word is used both (a) as a synonym for the concept in a mind through which the mind signifies things and their natures insofar as they are understood, and (b) for the things or natures of things insofar as they are signified through a concept in a mind. Scotus and his critics agree that a single *ratio* in the sense of a single specific or generic nature of things that are being signified by a concept in the mind is a sufficient condition for univocity and for demonstration, but not on whether it is a necessary condition. Scotus and his critics also agree that a single *ratio* in the sense of a concept in the mind is a necessary condition for univocity, but not on whether it is a sufficient condition.

Discussions and disputes over the unity of being as being (or indeed of beings as beings) arise within the Aristotelian tradition from Aristotle's assertion that being is not a genus (*Met.* III.3, 998b22–27) and from his choice to address the unity of the science of being as being in *Met.* IV by appealing to diverse secondary-to-primary relations called *pros hen* relations of the different senses of being to substantial being rather than by appealing to the less than generic unity of analogy (*Met.* IV.2, 1003a33–b18).<sup>4</sup> Among Latin authors in the Middle Ages, both the analogous unity of *Met.* V and the *pros hen* unity of *Met.* IV are treated using the words *proportio* ("proportion") and *analogia* ("analogy"), thereby verbally blurring the distinction between what are for Aristotle two different sorts of less than generic

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and Ward both refer to Irwin, "Homonymy in Aristotle." Irwin emphasizes the point that for Aristotle synonymy/univocity and homonymy/equivocity are not concerned with different senses of words but with the relationship between words and things: "Homonymy is indicated by different definitions; but do they mark different senses of the word replaced? Aristotle's definitions signify the essence of the thing defined, the same essence that is signified by the word replaced [by the definition] (*Top.* 101b37–102a1). Now an essence is not a meaning; it is a real property, a real feature of the word, an Aristotelian universal. A homonymous name can be replaced by many definitions because it signifies many real properties, not because it has different meanings" (535), and "[Aristotle's] interest in homonymy is an interest in words and reality, not in words and concepts" (543).

<sup>4</sup>*Pros hen* translates literally as 'toward one,' and *pros hen* relations involve secondary and dependent instances or kinds and the primary instance or kind. Aristotle gives medical examples, such as the relationships of the healthiness of medicine and the healthiness of exercise to the primary kind of health, which is the healthiness of an animal.

unity.<sup>5</sup> The history of this ambiguation and disambiguation in the Middle Ages has been the subject of much study, with special attention given in the scholarly literature to the writings of Thomas Aquinas.<sup>6</sup>

Unlike Aquinas and other scholastic Aristotelians, Scotus contends that the solution to the problem of the unity of being as being is not analogy but univocity. The doctrine of the univocity of being is not without friends today. With specifically theist concerns in mind, William Lane Craig states his approval for the univocity of being and explicitly claims agreement with Scotus, saying,

I agree wholeheartedly with Scotus that there is a univocal concept of being which applies to both God and creatures. One of the aspects of Thomas Aquinas' thought that I find most disturbing is his claim that we can speak of God only in analogical terms. Without univocity of meaning, we are left with agnosticism about the nature of God, able to say only what God is not, not what He is. Scotus rightly saw that when we say that God is or exists, we are using the term in the same sense in which we say that a man is or exists.<sup>7</sup>

Other notable contemporary philosophers, including Thomas Williams and Peter van Inwagen (who provides a Quinean perspective), also follow Scotus's lead and affirm the univocity of being.<sup>8</sup> In opposition to van Inwagen and other contemporary proponents of the univocity of being, Kris McDaniel has recently published a full monograph supporting the notion that there are "ways of being," and he cites the ancient and medieval doctrine of the analogy of being as one doctrine among others that affirms "ways of being."<sup>9</sup> The contemporary debate over the univocity of being versus analogy of being (or "ways of being" more broadly) invites investigation into the work of Scotus and the reasoning that led him to depart from the common opinion of his contemporaries. Joshua Hochschild and

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<sup>5</sup>Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy," offers a brief summary of how Boethius's fourfold division of analogy led Latin authors to treat the *pros hen* as analogy. Halper, *One and Many*, describes the medieval practice of including the *pros hen* under analogy as "perhaps not surprising" inasmuch as both Aristotle's unity of analogy and Aristotle's *pros hen* unity "function as classes beyond the highest genera" (144). Halper also puts nicely the distinction between *pros hen* unity and analogous unity, saying, "In an analogy, the terms differ, but their relation is the same; in a *pros hen*, one term remains the same, but the relations differ" (144).

<sup>6</sup>Hochschild, "Aquinas's Two Concepts of Analogy," 159–68, has recently highlighted how questions about the unity of being across the categories raise further semantic questions about how being is signified about the different categories: univocally, (purely) equivocally, or analogously. Hochschild distinguishes between analogy as "associated meaning" and analogy as "proportional likeness," and he explicitly identifies analogy as "associated meaning" with Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation and analogy as "proportional likeness" with Aristotle's *analogia* (162). Ashworth surveys the twelfth- to sixteenth-century history of the distinction between univocal, equivocal, and analogous signification in a series of publications, notably "Signification and Modes of Signification"; "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic"; "Metaphor and the Logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan"; and *Les théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle*. See also Ashworth's treatment of Scotus on analogy in "Analogy and Metaphor," esp. 231–38.

<sup>7</sup>Craig, "Is God a Being in the Same Sense That We Are?" Craig directly addresses Scotus on the univocity of being in *Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz*, 205–6.

<sup>8</sup>See Williams, "Doctrine of Univocity." Williams is explicitly defending the doctrine of Duns Scotus. See also van Inwagen, "Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment," esp. 482–92. Van Inwagen places himself in the tradition of Quine in response to Heidegger. For a recent criticism of both Williams's and Craig's positions, see Stacey, "Perfect Being Theology and Analogy," 24–36.

<sup>9</sup>McDaniel, *Fragmentation of Being*, esp. chap. 2, "Return to the Analogy of Being," and chap. 7, "Degrees of Being."

others contend that Scotus's unique contribution to the debate over how being is signified across the categories and about God and creatures—that is, Scotus's affirmation that being is said through a univocal concept<sup>10</sup>—is the product of and depends upon Scotus's overlooking, if not explicitly rejecting, the analogous unity of Aristotle's *Met.* V as a foundation for anything more than pure equivocation.<sup>11</sup> Such criticisms of Scotus's position appear as early as the fourteenth century, and they were a common enough feature of debate between the schools that prominent proponents of Scotus's doctrine address them in their works defending and developing philosophy consistent with the thought of the Subtle Doctor.<sup>12</sup>

Scotus's critics contend that Scotus is forced into the position that being is said through a univocal concept across the categories (as well as across the division of being into finite and infinite) because (a) a demonstrative science of being requires a concept of being that is sufficiently unified for syllogistic reasoning and for founding contradictions and (b) Scotus recognizes no mode of unity that such a concept could have that is less than univocal.<sup>13</sup> Following the fifteenth- to sixteenth-century proponent of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Hochschild proposes that diverse concepts that are analogously/proportionally one do in fact have sufficient unity for syllogistic reasoning and for founding contradictions, and, furthermore, that if being is said across the categories through concepts that have proportional/analogous unity, then being is said analogously rather than univocally or purely equivocally.<sup>14</sup> The merits of Hochschild and Cajetan's proposal is the subject matter for another day.<sup>15</sup> Here I am interested in whether Scotus himself overlooks proportional unity in the

<sup>10</sup>For a very helpful and concise overview of the history in medieval philosophy that led up to Scotus's proposing the univocity of being as the solution to the problem of how to reconcile the demands of Aristotelian science for a generic subject matter with the Aristotelian position that being is not a genus, see Dumont, "Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity." For a fuller treatment of Scotus's doctrine, see Honnefelder, *Ens Inquantum Ens*. For a recent and book-length account and defense of Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being, see LaZella, *Singular Voice of Being*.

<sup>11</sup>See esp. Hochschild, "Cajetan on Scotus on Univocity," 40; and *Semantics of Analogy*, 161–64. See also D'Ettore, "Dominic of Flanders' Critique," 185–90.

<sup>12</sup>Thomas Sutton, O.P. (c. 1250–1315) is notable as an early figure who appeals to proportional unity to defend Aquinas's doctrine of analogy against Scotist criticisms. On Sutton, see esp. D'Ettore, "Thomas Sutton's Doctrine of Analogy." For a Scotist response to Thomist appeals to proportional unity, see the work of Bartolomaeus Mastri (1602–73), esp. in distinction 1, q. 1 of his *Disputationes ad Mentem Scoti*.

<sup>13</sup>For Scotus's statement of what he calls univocity, see Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, n. 26, VC 3:18: "Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri." ('I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 26' stands for Book 1, distinction 3, part 1, questions 1–2, paragraph number 26. 'VC 3:18' stands for the Vatican City edition of Scotus's *Opera Omnia*, volume 3, page 18. Subsequent citations of Scotus's *Ordinatio* follow the same citation scheme.) There is disagreement over whether Scotus is offering a definition of univocity in the passage cited. Dumont takes the position that it is a "functional definition" and that it gives sufficient conditions for univocity. By contrast, Cross takes the position that Scotus's remarks merely state the necessary conditions for univocity. See Dumont, "Transcendental Being: Scotus and the Scotists," 137; and Cross, *Duns Scotus*, 37 and 169n28.

<sup>14</sup>See the references in notes 6 and 11 above.

<sup>15</sup>For a discussion of Cajetan's argument against Scotus and the response to Scotus by the prominent Scotist Bartolomaeus Mastrius, see D'Ettore, "Does Analogy Work in Demonstration?"

way that his critics contend and in the influence that Scotus's understanding or lack of understanding of proportional unity has on his position concerning how being is signified. There are many thorough treatments of Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being, covering both his early and mature works, as well as significant treatments of his position on analogy of being.<sup>16</sup> I am unaware, however, of any direct treatment of Scotus on the topic of proportional/analogous unity for its own sake.

It is the intention of this paper to provide an account of the mind of the Subtle Doctor on the subject of proportional or analogous unity by presenting and offering an analysis of the passages where he addresses *proportio* or *analogia*. Scotus uses these terms sometimes to refer to Aristotle's *analogia* (proportional unity) and sometimes to refer to Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation. I address both sorts of passages in Scotus's writings in this paper since it helps show how Scotus distinguishes different kinds of unity in the mind from the foundations for their unity in things. While I am interested in how Scotus applies his understanding of proportional unity within the polemical context of his mature doctrine of the univocity of being, the intention of this paper is to explore how Scotus expresses his understanding of analogous unity outside of these arguments. Accordingly, the primary focus of this paper will be on passages where Scotus speaks of analogy in his commentaries and questions on the works of Aristotle. The latter portion of the paper takes up the relationship between Scotus's treatment of analogy in his philosophical commentaries and his passages defending the univocity of being in his *Ordinatio* in order to show the continuity and development of Scotus's understanding of analogous unity.<sup>17</sup> I conclude that Scotus consistently rejects the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. I argue further that Scotus's remarks on a kind of proportional or analogous unity that is mind-independent provide an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists in the Renaissance and Baroque period over whether a single concept can signify analogously.

## I. SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Malcolm Wilson observes, "Aristotle nowhere provides a clear and extended treatment of analogy, and we are forced to piece his theoretical remarks together

<sup>16</sup>See esp. Pini, "Univocity in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*." The author's revised version of the paper is available on the author's academia.edu page. See also the very lucid treatment of Scotus's position on univocity in relation to his overall understanding of the concept of being and the transcendentals in Wolter, *Transcendentals and Their Function*.

<sup>17</sup>For a recent treatment of Scotus on analogy of being, see Smith, "Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition," 638–51. The focus of Smith's article is on how Scotus includes a doctrine of analogy of being (and other pure perfections) within his mature understanding of univocity, as reflected in Scotus's *Ordinatio* and *Reportatio*, both late works of theology in Scotus's corpus. Speaking of the passage in Scotus's *Reportatio*, Smith cautions that "the usefulness of this text is limited" on the grounds that, although "in this passage Scotus does clearly endorse the analogy of being," Scotus "does not explain how it is compatible with his views on univocity" (650–51). The passage in question is Scotus's *Reportatio* II, d. 12, q. 2. I follow Smith's caution and leave the passage out of consideration in this article.



with his actual practice in order to produce a coherent account.”<sup>18</sup> A locus classicus for Aristotle’s account of analogous unity is found in his *Met.* V.6, 1016b31–1017a3:

Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy: in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose formula is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are, e.g. things that are one in number are one in species, while things that are one in species are not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus. (*Met.* V.6, 1016b31–1017a3/Barnes, 2:1605)

Later in the same book, Aristotle draws on the same list of number, species, genus, and analogy to explain “the same,” “the other,” and “the different” (*Met.* V.9, 1017b26–1019a14/Barnes, 2:1607). Analogous unity is the only addition from Aristotle’s comparable list of the three modes of sameness in *Top.* I.7:

Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly speaking, into three divisions . . . numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing, e.g. doublet and cloak; specifically, where there is more than one thing, but they present no differences in respect of their species, as one man and another, or one horse and another. . . . Similarly, too, those things are called generically the same which fall under the same genus, such as a horse and a man. (*Top.* I.7, 103a6–14/Barnes, 1:171)

Aristotle’s examples of sameness in number, species, and genus easily fit within his definitions of unity or being-one in number, species, and genus. The matter of the object that is both called a doublet and called a cloak is one and the same matter, and accordingly, the object is numerically one. The formula or definition whereby two or more men, such as Socrates and Plato, are called “man” or “human” is one and the same formula or definition, making them specifically one. Likewise, the formula or definition whereby a horse and a human are called an “animal” is one and the same, making them generically one.

Unfortunately, Aristotle does not provide examples of analogous unity or sameness within his direct treatments of unity or sameness. That said, he provides examples in many other places. For example, in *Met.* XII.4, Aristotle observes that “analogically there are three elements, and four causes and principles” (1070b25–26/Barnes, 2:1691); in *NE* I.6, he says, “Things are said to be good in as many ways as they are said to be” (1096a23–24/Barnes, 2:1732), and he provides “as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul” as an example of something “one by analogy” (1096b28–29/Barnes, 2:1733); and in *PA* I.4, he informs the reader that “Bird and Fish only agree in having analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather, in the fish is scale” (644a21–23/Barnes, 1:1003), adding that there is “resemblance . . . of analogy . . . between the bone of man and the spine of fish” (*PA* I.4, 644b12–13/Barnes, 1:1003).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Wilson, *Aristotle’s Theory*, 59.

<sup>19</sup>See also Aristotle, *HA* I.1, 486b17–21/Barnes, 2:775. For an extended treatment of Aristotle’s use of analogy in his biological works, see Wilson, *Aristotle’s Theory*, 53–88. Wilson considers three rival lines of interpretation of analogy in Aristotle’s biological works, which he calls the functionalist, the relativist, and the embryologist/genus-as-matter interpretations, and he offers his own interpretation.



In each of Aristotle's examples, we can see that Aristotle describes things as "one by analogy" because they stand in similar relations to other things. Aristotle's analogates can be represented with the formula " $a : b :: c : d$ ."<sup>20</sup> Later Aristotelians take proportional or analogous unity to cover not only the kinds of  $a : b :: c : d$  cases explicitly mentioned by Aristotle but also cases in which two (or more) things stand in different relations to the same thing (think medicine and urine to health, or quantity and quality to substance).<sup>21</sup> In doing so, these later Aristotelians create a doctrine of analogy that blends together the *pros hen* equivocation of Aristotle's *Met.* IV with the *analogia* of Aristotle's *Met.* V and other passages such as those cited above.<sup>22</sup>

With Aristotle's discussion of the one by analogy or proportion in mind, let us now turn to Scotus's exposition of analogy, beginning with his direct treatment of Aristotle's division of the one into the numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, 5.<sup>23</sup>

## 2. ANALOGOUS UNITY IN SCOTUS'S ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTARIES

### 2.1. *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, 5, q. 4

Scotus dedicates question 4 of his *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*, Liber 5 to "the division of the one, which is divided into one numerically and in species, and one in genus and into the one in proportion or analogy: whether the division is fitting and about its parts" (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, OP 3:437).<sup>24</sup> This passage is not the only one

<sup>20</sup>Aristotle himself is, of course, extending the Greek term *analogia* from its original meaning as pertaining to quantities. Scholastic interpreters of Aristotle were aware of the original mathematical sense of the term 'proportion,' as illustrated by Thomas Aquinas's casual reference to its strict and the extended senses in *DV*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6 (Turin, 139): "Ad sextum dicendum, quod proportio, proprie loquendo, nihil est aliud quam habitudo quantitates ad quantitatem, sicut quod aequalis sit una alteri, vel tripla; et exinde translatus est nomen proportionis, ut habitudo cuiuslibet ad rem alteram proportio nominetur."

<sup>21</sup>For example, see Aquinas, *In Met.*, L. 5, l. 8 (Turin, 236): "Proportione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modis, vel in eo quod aliqua duo habent diversas habitudines ad unum; sicut sanativum de urina dictum habitudinem significat signi sanitatis; de medicina vero, quia significat habitudinem causae respectu eiusdem. Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa, sicut tranquillitatis ad mare et serenitatis ad aerem. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris." For a brief overview of the history of the understanding of analogy in the Middle Ages and a bibliography, see Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy."

<sup>22</sup>The passage cited above from Aquinas's commentary represents well what Donati has called the transformation of Aristotle's doctrine of *pros hen* unity into the medieval theory of analogy. See Donati, "La discussione sull'unità del concetto di ente," 65; see also 66–68. Ward makes a similar observation about the medieval and renaissance reception of Aristotle, saying, "The medieval classification of analogy overlaps with Aristotle's own taxonomy in the following way: analogy by attribution coincides with Aristotle's concept of related homonymy, and analogy by proportion, with what Aristotle calls 'geometrical' analogy, a relation of proportions expressed as  $A : B :: C : D$ " ("Aristotelian Homonymy," 575).

<sup>23</sup>Scotus's *QMet* is a notably difficult text from which to draw Scotus's own position, partially due to the late additions that Scotus himself made to the drafts that have come down to us and were never published during Scotus's lifetime. On this subject, see esp. the editors' introduction to the critical edition in *Opera Philosophica*, 3:xxviii–xxxvii. The citation scheme for works taken from Scotus's OP will be Book, question number, paragraph number, OP volume number:page number.

<sup>24</sup>"De uno etc., quaeritur de divisione unius, quod dividitur in unum numero et specie, et unum genere et in unum proportionem sive analogiam: utrum divisio sit conveniens, et de partibus." The editors of the volume indicate that question 4 is absent from Codex E, but they regard the question as authentic (3:437n1).

in which Aristotle's fourfold division of unity appears within Scotus's works, but it is the only one I have found that is directly concerned with the fourfold division itself ("whether the division is fitting and about its parts"), rather than about some other related issue. Scotus explains the fittingness (*conveniens*) of the division before defending its sufficiency. With respect to its fittingness, Scotus observes, "It is said that the division is fitting because it is according to logical intentions" (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 7, OP 3:438).<sup>25</sup> Scotus explains this point by contrast with a separate fivefold division of the "one" into continuity, species, genus, definition, and simplicity. Whereas the fivefold division of the one is "according to real foundations," the fourfold division spoken of here is "according to intentions that are founded upon things" (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 7, OP 3:438).<sup>26</sup> That is, the fourfold division concerns the way in which the mind considers things, and, although the mind's intentions or concepts are in some way founded upon things in reality, the unity of objects in the mind (the objects studied by logic) need not be perfectly identical to the unity of things in reality outside the mind (the things studied by physics and metaphysics). Before considering further the relationship between the members of the fourfold division and the things they are founded upon, Scotus immediately turns to the sufficiency of the division, saying,

And then the sufficiency [of the division] is offered on the grounds that the intellect, while it is understanding something under the concept of one, either understands it under the concept of incommunicable, and this is numerical unity; or under the concept of predicable of many, and then in two ways: either differing in number, then unity of species, or about many differing in species, then unity of genus. Beyond this unity there is not to be found one predicable concept. Nevertheless, by taking one most common concept in comparison to another most common [concept], a unity of proportion is found in similarly relating to others, namely their inferiors in being predicated about them *in quid*. So, the division is sufficient. (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 8, OP 3:439)<sup>27</sup>

The fourfold division itself concerns the modes whereby logical intentions or concepts in the mind can have foundations in things. Scotus reports that the division is defended (by whom, he does not say) on the principle that any logical intention of unity concerns either (a) what is predicable of only one (incommunicable) or (b) what is predicable of many (communicable) (see table 1). Numerical unity fully covers what is predicable of only one. Specific and generic unity subdivide the predicable of many through a single concept, and proportional unity covers the unity that is predicable of many but not through "one predicable concept." Inasmuch as Scotus reports this fourfold division, defends its sufficiency, and later

<sup>25</sup>"Dicitur quod divisio conveniens est, quia ista est secundum intentiones logicas; et prima divisio est secundum fundamenta realia, ista secundum intentiones fundatas in rebus."

<sup>26</sup>For the objection that the fourfold division is unfitting because it includes members of the distinct fivefold division, see n. 1 (OP 3:437).

<sup>27</sup>"Et tunc assignatur sufficientia, quia intellectus intelligens aliquid sub ratione unius, aut intelligit sub ratione incommunicabilis, et haec est unitas numeralis; aut sub ratione praedicabilis de pluribus, tunc dupliciter: aut differentibus numero, tunc unitas speciei; aut de pluribus differentibus specie, tunc unitas generis. Ultra hanc unitatem non est invenire unum conceptum praedicabilem; tamen unum conceptum accipiendi communissimum comparando alii communissimo, invenitur unitas proportionis in similiter se habendo ad alia, scilicet sua inferiora in praedicando in quid de eis. Sic divisio sufficiens est."




Table 1: Division of the logically one reported by Scotus.<sup>29</sup>

The above fourfold division of the one is clearly not intended to be a simple repetition or even an exposition of Aristotle’s own account of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous or proportional unity. This can be seen immediately in Scotus’s treatment of numerical unity, which he defines in terms of incommunicability rather than in terms of the material cause.<sup>30</sup> For the interests of this paper, what stand out are three points pertaining to proportional unity. (1) Just as in *Met.* V Aristotle defines proportional unity as what holds between “those which are related as a third thing is to fourth,” Scotus characterizes proportional unity as a similarity “in relating to others” (*QMet.* 5, q. 4, n. 8, OP 3:439). (2) Scotus’s example of proportional unity is the unity between two different “most common” concepts insofar as they are predicated of their inferiors. By ‘most common,’ he is, of course, referring to the ten categories of being. But notice that Scotus does not say here that the diverse categories of being have an analogous or proportional unity insofar as they are being. As most common, by definition, they can have no numerical, specific, or generic unity between them, yet the “most common” are one insofar as each is predicated *in quid* (that is, as addressing what its subject is

<sup>28</sup>I thank a reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper for pointing out that Scotus is not reporting his own original division and sufficiency argument in these passages and for the reference to a parallel passage in Scotus’s *Notabilia super Metaphysicam*, Liber 5, n. 105–6 (Turnhout, 59), in which Scotus is even more explicit in attributing to others this fourfold logical division of the one. I omit further discussion of the passage in *Notabilia super Metaphysicam* here due to both its brevity—it is just a few lines—and its repetition of *QMet.*

<sup>29</sup>See also the chart representing the same division of the logically one in D’Ettore, “Dominic of Flanders’ Critique,” 189. I see the difference between these two charts as one of emphasis. The chart in this article emphasizes the sufficiency of the division (Scotus’s main point in the passage), and the chart in the aforementioned article emphasizes the distinctiveness of proportional unity from the other modes of unity insofar as proportional unity alone requires diverse concepts.

<sup>30</sup>Scotus directly addresses the relation between material causality and the numerically one at Scotus, *QMet.* 5, q. 4, nn. 19–28, OP 3:442–44. See the treatment of the passage in Aertsen, “Being and One,” 47–64. On the topic of the one as a transcendental in the thought of Scotus, see Goris’s study *Transzendente Einheit*, esp. chap. 9.

generically or specifically) of its inferiors.<sup>31</sup> (3) Proportional unity holds between diverse concepts, but no one concept is predicable of many with proportional unity. If one concept is predicable of many, that concept has either specific or generic unity. Aristotle's text makes no specific reference to concepts, and the references to a common formula or definition in specific and generic unity are ambiguous, as is the relationship between a thing's formula and its concept, inasmuch as the formula could be taken to be a thing's intrinsic formal cause or to be the product of an intellect's abstraction of a thing's formal cause (that is, a concept).

Scotus himself recognizes that his discussion of the modes of logical unity raises questions about the foundations for these modes of unity in things, especially where proportional unity is concerned. Accordingly, in the paragraph that follows the quotation above, Scotus considers the following objection to placing proportional unity among the modes of logical unity: "The fourth [mode of unity is incorrect] because there may be some proportion that in no way exists in the intellect. But now, 8 relates to 4 and 6 to 3 similarly. Therefore, there is some proportion that is not caused by the intellect" (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 9, OP 3:439).<sup>32</sup> The objector's point is that Scotus's discussion of proportional unity turns proportional unity into something that depends entirely upon acts of the mind, and yet there are counterexamples of mind-independent proportional unities, such as mathematical proportions.

Scotus responds to the objection by granting that proportion can be found in two ways, and that the relevant kind of proportion is the one that depends upon the mind: "To that argument concerning proportion, I say that proportion can be according to real foundations, as in numbers, or intentions, as in to be predicated and to be subjected. The first can be without an intellect, not the second; and the latter is the one about which we speak, because the predicates have this proportion in predicating *in quid* about the thing contained under them" (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 12, OP 3:440).<sup>33</sup> Scotus admits that there are instances of proportional unity besides

<sup>31</sup>On *in quid* predication (as distinct from *in quale* predication) in Scotus, see Wolter, *Transcendentals and Their Function*, 79–80, esp. 79: "To predicate *in quid* means to predicate either the entire essence (species) or at least the determinable part of the essence (genus). . . . Such predication represents an answer to the question: What is it? (*Quid est?*). . . . Most commons predicate the determinable part of the essence (genus). See also LaZella, *Singular Voice of Being*, 49: "*In quid* predication captures the *quiddity* of its subject whether generically or specifically. . . . *In quale*, on the other hand, grasps some qualification of the subject."

<sup>32</sup>"Quartum non, quia aliqua proportio esset, nullo existente intellectu. Nam similiter tunc se haberent 8 ad 4 et 6 ad 3; ergo unitas proportionis non causatur ab intellectu." Here again, I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the parallel passage in Scotus's *Notabilia super Metaphysicam*, 5, n. 106 (Turnhout, 59): "Contra: si nullus esset intellectus, esset unitas numeralis et unitas proportionis. Probatio, quia materia esset una, etc. Tamen forte moti sunt pro duobus modis intermediis, qui sunt modi tantum intentionales." ("Against what has been said, it can be argued that if nothing were understood there would still be numerical unity and unity of proportion. The proof is that matter would be one, etc. Nevertheless, perhaps they are moved on behalf of the two intermediary modes which are only intentional modes.") The solution in the *Notabilia* passage follows the solution in the *QMet* treated below. For unity of proportion and numerical unity, there can be both logical unity and real unity that does not depend upon the act of an intellect.

<sup>33</sup>"Ad illud de proportionem, dico quod proportio potest secundum fundamenta realia, sicut in numeris; vel intentionalia, sicut in praedicari et subici. Prima potest esse sine intellectu, secunda non; et haec est illa de qua loquitur, quia praedicata habent hanc proportionem in praedicando in quid de contentis sub ipsis."

those arising from a comparison of concepts, such as the diverse cases of one number being double or triple another number. It seems reasonable to think that Scotus would also acknowledge Aristotle's biological examples (e.g. feathers are to birds as scales are to fish) as instances of mind-independent proportional unities, inasmuch as these cases do not rely upon an act of the mind any more than the mathematical ones rely on a mind (feathers would relate to birds as scales to fish whether anyone noticed or not). Still, insofar as proportional unity is treated as one of the modes of unity belonging to logical intentions (along with numerical, specific, and generic unity), such proportional unity derives from and depends upon acts of the mind.

Notwithstanding the dependency of proportional unity on the mind, Scotus thinks that even mind-dependent proportional unity depends upon a prior unity found in things. He affirms explicitly that any unity caused by the mind originates from a unity *in re*, writing as follows:

To this note that every unity caused by an intellect has a unity *in re* from which it originates. . . . And from that unity *in re* the intellect is moved to discover the intentional unity that is founded in that real unity. And this real unity is in the members of the first [division—that is, the fivefold division of unity into continuity, species, genus, definition, and simplicity], and unity of *ratio*, which is founded in such unity, is in the second division [that is, the fourfold division of unity into numerical, specific, generic, and proportional]. (*QMet*, 5, q. 4, n. 15, OP 3:441)<sup>34</sup>

From Scotus's *QMet*, 5, q. 4, we have seen that Scotus observes two distinct but related divisions of unity in Aristotle's *Met.* V.6. The first division is a fivefold division “according to real foundations,” and the unities falling under this division are in no respect caused by an act of the mind. The second is the fourfold division that *includes* proportional unity, and the unities falling under this division are caused by an act of the mind. The principle for distinguishing the members of the second division is the most general disjunction of ways that a mind can consider something to be one, namely, *predicable of one* or *predicable of many*. The principle for arriving at proportional unity is the disjunction of *predicable of many through one concept* or *predicable of many through diverse concepts*. Scotus's example of proportional unity is the comparison between two concepts of “most common [concepts]” (that is, the concepts of the highest categories). Even this, the least among the modes of mind-generated unities, has some foundation in things that justify the intellect's joining them through its act of comparison.

In the selections that follow below from other passages taken from Scotus's *Opera Philosophica*, we will pay particular attention to how logical unity, especially proportional unity, is caused by the mind and how it is founded in things.

## 2.2. *Quaestiones Super Librum Elenchorum*, 15–16

The reader finds Scotus addressing the relationship between *analogia*, the mind, and things in his *Quaestiones Super Librum Elenchorum*, questions 15 and 16.

<sup>34</sup>“Ad hoc nota quod omnis unitas causata ab intellectu habet unitatem in re a qua originatur, sicut tangitur in I libro, quaestione 1, et manifestius in VII libro, quaestione 1. . . . Et ex illa unitate in re movetur intellectus ad inveniendum unitatem intentionalem quae in illa unitate reali fundatur. Et haec unitas realis est in primis membris; et unitas rationis, quae fundatur in tali unitate, est in secunda divisione.”

Question 15 asks “whether it is possible that a name signifies one thing primarily and the rest secondarily” (*In SE*, q. 15, OP 2:331).<sup>35</sup> An affirmative answer to the question would be the admission that *analogia* is a medium between univocal and equivocal signification of a name. The motivation for the question is concern over the signification of the name ‘being’ said about substance and the accidents.

Before delving into the questions, I note that whereas *QMet* considered *proportione sive analogia* (“proportion or analogy”) in opposition to the one numerically, specifically, and generically, the *In SE* passage treated below considers *analogia* in opposition to the univocal and the equivocal. Accordingly, in moving from the *QMet* into the *In SE*, we move from Scotus’s consideration of *analogia* as referring to the proportional unity of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 5 into Scotus’s consideration of *analogia* as referring to Aristotle’s *pros hen* equivocation. Although Scotus himself is silent on whether the treatment that he applies to *analogia* in this passage would apply to proportional unity, later Scotists, notably Mastrius, are not silent, and I follow their example here by looking to Scotus’s treatment of *analogia* as *pros hen* equivocation for insight into what he would consistently hold about proportional unity.

At *In SE*, question 15, Scotus argues against the opinion that a name such as ‘being’ is said primarily about substance and secondarily about the other categories through one common *ratio* and an analogous name (*In SE*, q. 15, n. 5, OP 2.332–33). Scotus writes,

No medium falls between the same and the diverse. Therefore, everything which is conceived, is conceived under the same *ratio* or a diverse [*ratio*]. But those things which are conceived under the same *ratio* are made univocal in that *ratio*, and those things which are conceived under a diverse *ratio* are made equivocal under those diverse *rationes*. Therefore, since no medium falls between the same and the diverse, every name will be either simply equivocal or univocal. (*In SE*, q. 15, n. 6, OP 2:333)<sup>36</sup>

In this passage, Scotus twice invokes the principle that there is no medium between the same and the diverse on the way to deriving the conclusion that a name is either simply univocal or simply equivocal through the mediating premise that things that are conceived under the same *ratio* are “made univocal [*literally* univocated]” in that *ratio*. In effect, there is no logical space for a name that is *simply analogous* because it is not possible to conceive a *simply analogous ratio* to the exclusion of some underlying univocity or equivocation.

In this same question, Scotus explains how signification requires distinct and determinate *rationes*.<sup>37</sup> He writes,

To the question, it must be said that as far as it is on the side of the significant linguistic expression [*vocis significantis*], it is not possible that the linguistic expression [*voce*m] signifies one thing primarily and the rest secondarily. For to signify is to represent something to the intellect. Therefore, what is signified, is first conceived by the intellect. But everything that is conceived by the intellect, is conceived under

<sup>35</sup>“Utrum possibile sit aliquod nomen significare unum per prius et reliquum per posterius.”

<sup>36</sup>“Inter idem et diversum non cadit medium; ergo omne quod concipitur, concipitur sub eadem ratione vel diversa. Sed illa quae concipiuntur sub eadem ratione, in illa ratione univocantur. Quae autem sub ratione diversa concipiuntur, sub illis rationibus diversis aequivocantur. Cum igitur inter idem et diversum non cadit medium, omne nomen vel erit simpliciter aequivocum vel univocum.”

<sup>37</sup>For a direct treatment of Scotus’s understanding of signification, particularly as compared to Aquinas and to Scotus’s contemporaries, see Pini, “Signification of Names.”



a distinct and determinate *ratio*, because the intellect is a certain act, and, therefore, what it understands is distinguished from another. Therefore, everything which is signified, is signified under a distinct and determinate *ratio*. This is clear. For prime matter, which of itself is being in potency, if it is understood, it is necessary that it is understood under a determinate *ratio*. And, if it is so about matter, this will be true all the more about everything else. (*In SE*, q. 15, n. 17, OP 2:336)<sup>38</sup>

To signify is to represent something to the intellect. What the intellect understands has to be distinct because whatever it understands, it distinguishes from another. The evidence that this principle applies across the board is that even prime matter is understood under a distinct *ratio*, and if anything could be understood without distinction, it would be what of itself is lacking in distinction, that is, prime matter.<sup>39</sup>

In the following paragraph, Scotus clarifies that the inability of our minds to signify names in a way that is between univocation and equivocation need not entail that there is no such medium in reality: “There can be analogy in reality, but no priority or posteriority falls in the significant linguistic expression” (*In SE*, q. 15, n. 18, OP 2:336).<sup>40</sup> Scotus distinguishes the perspective of the logician from the perspective of the metaphysician or natural philosopher. Metaphysics and natural philosophy consider “things themselves” (*ipsas res*), whereas logic considers “things of reason” (*res rationis*). Scotus gives the standard example of “body,” which is univocal to corruptible and incorruptible bodies from the perspective of the logician because they share the common *ratio* of “having three dimensions” even though the natural philosopher says that corruptible and incorruptible bodies differ in nature and are called “body” equivocally (*In SE*, q. 15, nn. 19–20, OP 2:337–38).<sup>41</sup> Just as univocation from the perspective of logic is consistent with analogy from the perspective of a science that studies things themselves, equivocation in logic is consistent with analogy from the perspective of a science that studies things in themselves:

The first philosopher [i.e. the metaphysician] considers things according to their quiddities, and it is the case that certain things have an ordered relation [*habitudinem*] to each other in reality. Therefore, the Philosopher says that being is said analogously about substance and accident. But because the logician considers things as they fall

<sup>38</sup>“Ad quaestionem dicendum quod quantum est ex parte vocis significantis, non est possibile vocem significare unum per prius et reliquum per posterius, nam significare est aliquid intellectui repraesentare. Quod ergo significatur, prius ab intellectu concipitur. Sed omne quod ab intellectu concipitur, sub distincta et determinate ratione concipitur, quia intellectus est quidam actus, et ideo quod intelligit ab alio distinguit. Omne ergo quod significatur, sub distincta ratione et determinata significatur. Hoc patet: nam materia prima quae de se est ens in potentia, si intelligitur, oportet quod intelligatur sub ratione distincta. Et si ita sit de materia, multo fortius hoc erit verum de omni alio.”

<sup>39</sup>See also Ashworth’s treatment of *In SE*, q. 15 in *Les théories de l’analogie*, 66–69. She also provides an English translation of the question in an appendix to her article “Analogy and Metaphor,” 242–48.

<sup>40</sup>“Unde in re potest esse analogia, sed in voce significante nulla cadit prioritas vel posterioritas. Quia aliqua est proprietas quae magis convenit uni rei quam alteri. Sed non est aliqua proprietas quae magis conveniat substantiae vocis quam alia. Hoc patet per signum, quia Aristoteles libro *Praedicamentorum*, ubi determinat de vocibus significativis, nullam facit mentionem de his quae in re sunt analogata, sed solum ibi de univocis et aequivocis.”

<sup>41</sup>For an article-length treatment of the distinction between what is univocal in logic and what is univocal in other disciplines according to Aquinas, see Maurer, “St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus.”



under a *ratio*, it follows that [the logician] says that being is said equivocally about substance and accident. (*In SE*, q. 15, n. 21, OP 2:338)<sup>42</sup>

We have seen above that question 15 establishes that there is no such thing as a name that signifies analogously, where ‘analogy’ is understood as a kind of signification between the univocal and the equivocal that signifies one thing primarily and other things secondarily. Scotus grants in the question that there can be analogy in things, including the being of substances and the being of accidents, defining analogy as one thing standing in an ordered relation of attribution to another (that is, as in Aristotle’s *pros hen* equivocation). In question 16, Scotus explains how such analogy between things reduces to either univocation or equivocation in signifying. Here is the salient passage:

Nevertheless, it must be understood that an analogous term sometimes represents many things, sometimes only one alone, yet that one is found in diverse things according to diverse being. An example of the first is ‘expedient.’ [‘Expedient’] signifies the expedience which is in good things, and the utility which is in evil things, and those two do not relate according to the prior and the posterior in the significant linguistic expression. Similarly, ‘being’ signifies the being which is substance and the being which is accident. And although the being which is accident has attribution *in re* to substance, nevertheless, in the significant linguistic expression, [the being which is accident] has no relation [to substance]. And therefore, all such analogues have to be reduced to the first mode of equivocation. An example of the second is [‘healthy’]. For ‘healthy’ signifies a proportion of the hot and the cold, of the wet and the dry. That proportion is found in an animal as in a subject, and in urine as a sign, in diet as in what conserves. And similarly, it is about the element with respect to fire and of prime matter. And such analogues must be reduced to univocation, since they only signify the first primarily. (*In SE*, q. 16, n. 13, OP 2:344)<sup>43</sup>

We see Scotus here granting that there are two ways in which we can speak of a term as being analogous. In one respect, a term is analogous if it represents many things, and in another respect, a term is analogous if it only represents one thing that has diverse being in diverse things. Either way, an analogous term depends on a more fundamental univocal term or on a more fundamental equivocal term, and it follows that analogy is not a third kind of predication in its own right that mediates between univocity and equivocation. As an example of an analogous term that represents many, Scotus refers to the term ‘expedient,’ which can signify good

<sup>42</sup>“Primus philosophus res considerat secundum suas quiditates, et in re est ita quod quaedam res ad invicem habent habitudinem, ideo dicit Philosophus quod ens analogice dicitur de substantia et accidente. Sed quia logicus considerat res ut sub ratione cadunt, ideo dicit quod ens aequivoce dicitur de substantia et accidente.”

<sup>43</sup>“Verumtamen intelligendum quod terminus analogus quandoque plura repraesentat, quandoque tantum unum solum; sed illud unum secundum diversa esse in diversis reperitur. Exemplum primi est: ‘expedire’ significat expeditionem quae est in bonis, et utilitatem quae est in malis, et ista duo in voce significante non se habent secundum prius et posterius. Similiter, ‘ens’ significat ens quod est substantia et ens quod est accidens. Et licet ens quod est accidens in re habeat attributionem ad substantiam, in voce tamen significante nullam habet habitudinem. Et ideo omnia talia analogia habent reduci ad primum modum aequivocationis. Exemplum secundi est: nam ‘sanum’ significat proportionem calidorum et frigidorum, humidorum et siccorum: ista proportio in animali reperitur ut in subiecto, et in urina ut signo, in dieta ut in conservante. Et similiter est de elemento respectu ignis et materiae primae. Et talia analogia reducenda sunt ad univocationem, cum solum primo significant unum.”

things as well as useful evils.<sup>44</sup> As a second example, Scotus offers the term ‘being,’ which can signify substance as well as accidents. Scotus explains the analogous term that represents only one by using the example of ‘healthy’ signifying “the proportion of hot and cold, wet and dry,” which is in an animal as in a subject, urine as in a sign, and diet as in a conservative cause. Analogous terms that primarily signify one thing are reducible to univocity, whereas analogous terms that signify many are reducible to equivocation (*In SE*, q. 16, n. 13, OP 2:344).<sup>45</sup>

With Scotus’s reduction of (*pros hen*) analogy to either univocity or equivocation in mind, we can consider what position his principles would commit him to regarding names that are predicated of many through concepts that share only a unity of proportion. The options are (a) that such names reduce to univocity, (b) that such names reduce to equivocation, or (c) that such names are *simply analogous* (by unity of proportion) and have a unity that stands between simple univocity and simple equivocation. Scotus’s principles do not permit option (c). There is no medium between univocity and simple equivocation precisely because there is no medium between signifying a name of many through one and the same *ratio* and signifying a name of many through diverse *rationes*. Furthermore, Scotus’s account of proportional unity in *QMet* does not permit option (a). Proportional unity, in the order of logic, is between diverse *rationes*. Since these *rationes* must first have diverse significations that can be the subject of comparison by the intellect, a name said of many through *rationes* with proportional unity must primarily signify many, and, as primarily signifying many, it reduces to equivocation, which is option (b). However, just as for (*pros hen*) analogy, reduction of proportional unity to equivocation in the order of logic does not preclude metaphysical (or physical) proportional unity. To give an example, “external covering of an animal” (or “integument”) reduces to equivocation in the order of logic as said about the feathers of a bird and the scales of a fish, and yet, from the perspective of the Aristotelian biologist studying real birds and fish, feathers relate to birds just as scales relate to fish.

Scotus’s treatment of proportional or analogous unity in *QMet*, 5, q. 4 and his treatment of (*pros hen*) analogy in *In SE*, qq. 15–16 have in common the recognition

<sup>44</sup>A similar example is used to explain the first mode of the fallacy of equivocation in Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, 276: “Omne expediens est bonum; malum est expediens; ergo malum est bonum.” On the authorship and significance of Peter of Spain’s *Summary of Logic*, see the editors’ introduction at pages 1–16.

<sup>45</sup>In this work Scotus defends a doctrine of the logical equivocation of being and the *in re* analogy of being. Donati has shown that this position was already present among English scholastics at the time of Scotus. Hence, Scotus can be said to be holding the received position at this period of his writing. See Donati, “La discussione sull’unità del concetto di ente,” esp. 71–81. Pini stresses the distinction in Scotus’s thought between the logical and metaphysical consideration of the categories of being in *Categories and Logic*, esp. 147–50. He states these differences concisely: “The metaphysician considers the real relation between an accident and a substance, whereas the logician deals with the inherence of a predicate in a subject” (149). See also Pini’s treatment of the same point in *Scoto e l’analogia*, 84: “Il metafisico considera la realtà conosciuta in quanto essenza indipendente dall’intelletto, il logico in quanto tale realtà è conosciuta tramite un concetto o più concetti ed in quanto è significata da un termine.” Honnefelder, *Ens Inquantum Ens*, 310, affirms that Scotus consistently holds in both his logical writings and his later *Ordinatio* and *Lectura* that as real beings God and creatures are “*alterius et alterius ratio*.” More recently, LaZella, *Singular Voice of Being*, 20, affirms that, for Scotus, sameness in concept is sufficient for *logical univocity* whereas sameness in essence is required for *real univocity*.

that the order between things does not necessarily match up with the order of our intellect's conception or signification of things. A real-order proportional unity can exist in the absence of an intellect comparing two concepts that relate to other concepts in proportionally similar ways; a name can be said about many things by an order of priority and posteriority whether there is or is not a real order of attribution between the things; and a name can be said about many things without an order of priority and posteriority whether there is or is not a real order of attribution between the things. What is analogous (by *pros hen* equivocation or by proportional unity) to the metaphysician may be univocal or even equivocal to the logician.

### 2.3. *Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta*, 3, 4, and 10

Scotus's *Quaestiones Super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* considers proportional or analogous unity in questions 3, 4, and 10. Question 10 features a treatment of proportional unity that is familiar from the treatment offered in the *QMet*, 5. Addressing the question of whether the same thing can belong to diverse genera, Scotus writes,

And in *Metaphysics* 5, it is said that the same, according to itself, is said in as many ways as the one, according to itself, namely, in number, in species, in genus, and in proportion. The same in proportion and the same in number can be in diverse genera with respect to two modes, namely, the same in accident and in property. [This can be seen from the fact] that animal and colour are the same in proportion, because identity of this kind is in "relates similarly"; for just as colour [is] to whiteness, so animal [is] to human. (*In Cat.*, q. 10, n. 10, OP 1:335–36)<sup>46</sup>

Just as in his *QMet*, 5, q. 4, Scotus lists numerical, specific, generic, and proportional unity as modes of unity addressed in Aristotle's *Met.* V. Likewise, Scotus explains proportional unity in this passage by reference to a likeness between diverse proportions in which the members of one pair of proportions are categorically different (in the sense of belonging to diverse categories of being) from the members of the other pair of proportions.<sup>47</sup> Scotus does not specify in the passage whether this unity of proportion is the product of an act of the mind, nor does he specify whether this unity exists or could exist irrespective of an act of the mind.

*In Cat.*, q. 3 directly addresses the issue of the causal relationship between unity in the mind and unity in reality. The topic of the question itself is whether an intentional predicate is univocal to the categories. In an objection, Scotus writes,

<sup>46</sup>"Et in V *Metaphysicae* dicitur quod idem secundum se dicitur tot modis quot modis unum secundum se, scilicet numero, specie, genere et proportionem. Idem proportionem et idem numero, quoad duos modos, scilicet idem accidente et proprio, potest esse in diversis generibus. Quia animal et color sunt idem proportionem, quia huiusmodi identitas est in 'similiter se habere'; sicut enim color ad albedinem ita animal ad hominem." Notice that the identity of proportion involves similarity of relations. Color relates to whiteness just as animal relates to human.

<sup>47</sup>The examples are different in the *QMet* and in the *In Cat.* In the former, the example is of the concepts of different categories taken in proportion to their inferiors, and in the latter, the example is the similarity between the proportion of a genus under the genus of substance to a lowest species of substance (animal to human), and the proportion of a genus under the genus of quality to a lowest species of quality (color to whiteness). I do not think that there is doctrinal significance to the differences between these examples.

The intention is caused by the thing [*a re*], therefore, the unity of the intention [is caused] by the unity of the thing. But there is not a thing that belongs univocally to [the diverse categories]; therefore, neither [is there] any intention [that belongs to them univocally]. The premise [*propositio*] is clear, for what is from the intellect, not from a thing [*a re*] is a figment, of which kind there is not any intention. (*In Cat.*, q. 3, n. 3, OP 1:267)<sup>48</sup>

Just as in *QMet*, 5, the objection affirms that logical unity depends upon unity *in re*. Accordingly, it follows that where there is no unity in reality, there is an insufficient foundation for the intellect to generate an intentional or logical unity. Since, according to the objection, the categories of being lack any univocal unity *in re*, no univocal intention can arise about them in the intellect.

Scotus responds to this objection by saying,

To the third, I say that a thing is not the total cause of an intention, but only the occasion, namely, inasmuch as it moves the intellect to actually consider, and the intellect is the principal cause [of the intention]. Therefore, a lesser unity in a thing than belongs to the intention suffices, because it suffices that the intellect be moved by something extrinsic to cause many things through consideration to which there are not things corresponding in reality. (*In Cat.*, q. 3, n. 13, OP 1:270)<sup>49</sup>

Scotus's remarks here lend clarity to his claims in *QMet*, 5 that proportional unity is caused by the intellect and that unity in the intellect has a foundation in reality. The unity in reality is merely an occasional cause of the activity of the intellect, which is the primary cause of logical unity, including unity of proportion. Accordingly, the intellect can generate an intention or concept that has greater unity than is to be found in the occasional cause in reality. For example, 'genus' (and other terms of second intention) is said with greater unity about quantity and quality than there is unity between a quantity and a quality.<sup>50</sup> Presumably, the opposite can also occur and an intellect can produce a unity that is lesser than the unity in reality. I assume that is what Scotus holds when he proposes that the concepts of

<sup>48</sup>"Item, intentio causatur a re, igitur unitas intentionis ab unitate rei; sed nulla res univoce convenit illis; ergo nec aliqua intentio. Prima propositio patet: quod enim est ab intellectu, non a re, est figmentum, cuiusmodi non est aliqua intentio."

<sup>49</sup>"Ad tertium dico quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed tantum occasio, scilicet in quantum movet intellectum ut actu consideret, et intellectus est principalis causa. Ideo minor unitas sufficit in re quam sit intentionis, quia sufficit intellectum ab aliquo extrinsece moveri ad causandum multa per considerationem, quibus non correspondent aliqua in re."

<sup>50</sup>Pini explains Scotus's understanding of the relationship between first intentions, second intentions, and real extramental things as well as why second intentions are not fictitious: "Extramental things, which cause first intentions, do not cause second intentions. The intellect, when forming second intentions, does not receive anything from outside and does not turn to properties pertaining to extramental things. Instead, it reflects on its activity and takes into account the mode in which it understands extramental things. . . . Nevertheless, the concepts the intellect forms by reflecting on its operation do have some real ground, for extramental things still play some role in forming intentions—not that of main causes but that of occasions. That is to say that an extramental thing is what is understood by the operation on which the intellect reflects when it forms second intentions. This is enough to give some real ground to second intentions and to differentiate them from fictitious concepts" (*Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus*, 112–13). Pini adds that Scotus's position on this point "adheres to Aquinas's position regarding the foundation of intentions on things" (113). See also LaZella, *Singular Voice of Being*, 18–19, on the distinction between first and second intentions as well as on things as occasional causes of intentions. LaZella emphasizes that for Scotus "the way things *are* need not be identically reflected by the way things *are conceived*" (19).

being for substance and for the accidents are equivocal. In any case, Scotus here denies the assumption of the objection considered above that unity in an intention must correspond to an equal unity in a thing.<sup>51</sup>

Question 4 develops the divergence between unity in the intellect and unity in things established in question 3. The topic of the question is “whether being is univocal to the ten categories.” Scotus argues that being is said equivocally about the categories from the perspective of logic, even though the categories are analogous (*In Cat.*, q. 4, nn. 37–38, OP 1:285).<sup>52</sup> Here is a key passage in which he contrasts analogy between things and equivocation in signification:

Nevertheless, it must be understood that the linguistic expression [*vox*] [of ‘being’], which in logic is simply equivocal, evidently because it carries many [meanings] with equal primacy, is analogous in metaphysics and the science of nature [*naturalem*], which do not consider the linguistic expression [used] in signifying but those things which are signified according to that which they are. . . . Nevertheless, inasmuch as they exist, they have order among themselves. Therefore, being is affirmed [to be] analogous to substance and accident by the metaphysician in books 4 and 7 of the *Metaphysics*, evidently because these things which are signified have order in being. But in logic, [being] is simply equivocal because, inasmuch as they are signified by the linguistic expression, they are signified with equal primacy. (*In Cat.*, q. 4, n. 38, OP 1:285)<sup>53</sup>

In this passage, analogy once again corresponds to Aristotle’s *pros hen* equivocation, and it is understood as a unity of order of priority that is considered by the natural philosopher or by the metaphysician, but not by the logician. The term or name ‘being’ that is considered by the logician is not analogous, but merely equivocal, because there is not a unity of order in its signification about substance and the accidents. The word ‘being’ signifies substance without referring to the relationship of substance to accidents, and it signifies each of the accidents without referring to the relationships that accidents have to substance or to one another. By contrast, insofar as they are beings, substance does have priority over

<sup>51</sup>Scotus gives a similar explanation in his *Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii*, q. 15, nn. 25–28, OP 1:82–83, when addressing the unity of an intention in relation to the unity in things. After considering the argument that any sort of unity, even “*unitas proportionis*,” is enough for the intellect to attribute a univocal intention to the things, he writes, “The contrary: unity of univocation is greater than unity of proportion. Therefore, the former cannot be taken from the latter. It can be said that occasionally a greater unity can be taken from a lesser, not totally. Hence, unity *in re* is only the occasion of unity in intention in so far as the intellect is moved by it. Nevertheless, the motion of the intellect is able to cause a greater unity in intention” (“*Contra: unitas univocationis maior est unitate proportionis. Igitur haec ab illa non sumitur. Dicitur potest quod occasionaliter potest accipi maior unitas a minori, non totaliter. Unde unitas in re tantum est occasio unitatis in intentione in quantum intellectus movetur ab ipsa. Potest tamen intellectus motus causare maiorem unitatem in intentione.*”) (nn. 27–28, OP 1:82–83). Here again, then, Scotus denies the principle that unity in intention must correspond to an equal unity in the thing or things known. What has only a proportional unity can have a greater and even univocal unity in intention due to the activity of the intellect.

<sup>52</sup>See esp. conclusion 2.

<sup>53</sup>“Intelligendum tamen quod vox [‘ens’], quae apud logicum simpliciter aequivoca est, quia scilicet aequae primo importat multa, apud metaphysicum vel naturalem, qui non considerant vocem in significando sed ea quae significantur secundum illud quod sunt, est analogae . . . ; tamen in quantum existunt habent ordinem inter se. Ideo, ‘ens’ a metaphysico in IV et VII *Metaphysicae* ponitur analogum ad substantiam et accidens, quia scilicet haec quae significantur, in essendo habent ordinem; sed apud logicum est simpliciter aequivocum, quia in quantum significantur per vocem, aequae primo significantur.” See also Ashworth’s translation of q. 4 in “Analogy and Metaphor,” 238–41.

accidents, and consequently there is analogy between the being of substance and the being of accidents.<sup>54</sup>

Scotus makes the priority of substance over the accidents in being the foundation for his solution to the problems about unity and demonstration in the science of metaphysics. Addressing the unity of the science of metaphysics, Scotus writes, “I say that unity of analogy in a subject suffices for the subject of a science, as is determined in book 4 of the *Metaphysics*, namely that all the things to which the subject of a science belongs have *per se* attribution to one first in being and in knowing” (*In Cat.*, q. 4, n. 48, OP 1:288).<sup>55</sup> Turning to demonstrations in the science of being as being, he writes,

When it is shown that the subject necessarily is univocal, I say that all those authorities and proofs proceed about the subject of demonstration. But when the subject is analogous, demonstrations do not happen about [the subject] according to itself, but about the first to which all the others are attributed. Because, for determining about many analogates, it suffices to determine about the first to which all the others are attributed, as is said in the beginning of Book 7 of the *Metaphysics*. Nor is it unfitting, when the subject of a science is analogous, that no property [*passionem*] can be shown *secundum se*, provided that the properties [*passiones*] are shown about the first to which the others are attributed. (*In Cat.*, q. 4, n. 49, OP 1:288–89)<sup>56</sup>

In these passages, we see Scotus attempting to reconcile the equivocity of being as signifying the different categories of being with the status of metaphysics as a science, which requires (per Aristotle’s *APo.*) that properties be demonstrated about the subject of a science.<sup>57</sup> Following his interpretation of Aristotle’s *Met.* VII, Scotus affirms that the science of metaphysics has “unity of analogy” through the relationship that the diverse categories have toward substance “in being and in knowing.” Accordingly, demonstrations in metaphysics are properly demonstrations provided that they are about substance (or presumably about being insofar as being is substance).<sup>58</sup>

<sup>54</sup>Discussing *In Cat.*, q. 4, Pini explains, “The metaphysician . . . considers analogy as an intermediate case between having essences different and independent of one another and having the same essence. The logician, however, posits nothing intermediate between equivocity and univocity because each term either signifies each of them under a different concept or signifies all of them under the same concept. . . . The logician is not interested in ascertaining the real relationship holding among the things signified” (*Categories and Logic*, 178). Ashworth emphasizes the same point in her treatment of the passage in *Les théories de l’analogie*, 66–69.

<sup>55</sup>“Ad aliud argumentum de subiecto *Metaphysicae* dico quod ad subiectum scientiae sufficit unitas analogiae in subiecto, ut determinatur IV *Metaphysicae*, scilicet quod omnia quibus convenit subiectum scientiae habeant per se attributionem ad unum primum in essendo et cognoscendo.”

<sup>56</sup>“Cum ostenditur subiectum necessario esse univocum, dico quod omnes illae auctoritates et probationes procedunt de subiecto demonstrationis. Quando autem subiectum est analogum, de illo secundum se non fiunt demonstrationes, sed de primo ad quod omnia alia attribuantur. Quia ad determinandum de multis analogatis sufficit determinare de primo ad quod omnia alia attribuantur, ut dicitur in principio VII *Metaphysicae*. Nec est inconveniens de subiecto scientiae, secundum se, nullam passionem ostendi quando est analogum, si tamen passiones ostendantur de primo ad quod alia attribuantur.”

<sup>57</sup>See especially Dumont, “Scotus’s Doctrine of Univocity,” 207–12, for Scotus’s later answer to this problem through the univocity of being.

<sup>58</sup>Scotus explains the unity of metaphysics through attribution to substance and through attribution to God, in his *QMet.*, q. 1. For unity of metaphysics through attribution to substance, see especially Scotus, *QMet.*, q. 1, nn. 91–92, OP 3:47. For unity of metaphysics through attribution to God, see esp. Scotus, *QMet.*, q. 1, n. 134, OP 3:61. See also Marrone, “Notion of Univocity,” 357.



Although Scotus's position at the point represented by these passages is that, strictly speaking, 'being' is said equivocally across the categories of being (and if in any way analogously, then, by reduction to equivocation and not to univocation), his argument in defense of metaphysical reasoning is a remarkable anticipation of his later doctrine that univocity (in the signification) of being is necessary for the preservation of metaphysical reasoning. In this earlier work, Scotus saves metaphysical science through the analogous unity of the subject founded upon their diverse relations of attribution to substance. *There can be demonstrations about being as being because there can be demonstrations about substance*, and all the other modes of being stand in relation to substance. Such demonstrations about being as being do not depend on equivocal concepts of being, because the name 'being' is only said through one concept of being in these demonstrations, namely, through the concept of substantial being. No demonstrations are made about being as being through the concepts of quantitative being or qualitative being, and so on, because the other categories are not being by analogy (that is, through an ordered relationship of priority and posteriority) to the being of quantity or quality, and so on. Likewise, no demonstrations about being as being can be made through syllogistic arguments that employ diverse concepts of being in the premises or conclusion (e.g. the concept of quantitative being in the major premise and the concept of substantial being in the minor premise).<sup>59</sup>

In his later theological works, Scotus will take the position that there is a concept of being that is other than, but contained within, the concept of substantial being and the concepts proper to the accidental categories of being—but more on that below. For now, I note the consistency of Scotus's position. Throughout his transition from affirming that being is said equivocally about the diverse categories to affirming that being is said univocally about the categories, Scotus maintains that demonstrations in metaphysics only occur through a univocal concept of being. The difference (albeit a significant difference) is that in the earlier works of Scotus the univocal concept of being is the proper concept of substantial being,<sup>60</sup> and in the later works of Scotus the univocal concept of being is distinct from, but common to, the concepts of each of the categories.<sup>61</sup>

### 3. ANALOGOUS UNITY IN SCOTUS'S *ORDINATIO*

The reader can find Scotus's mature position on analogy within Scotus's defenses of the doctrine of a univocal concept of being in his *Ordinatio* I, d. 3 and d. 8.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>59</sup>For example, the following syllogism would be invalid: "All beings (as signified through the concept of quantitative being) are dependent or independent. Substances are beings (as signified through the concept of substantial being). Therefore, substances are dependent or independent."

<sup>60</sup>Note, this concept of being is said univocally of substances. It is not univocal across the categories.

<sup>61</sup>For a fuller discussion of the relationship between Scotus's early and mature positions on univocity, see esp. Marrone, "Notion of Univocity"; on a comparison of the *In Cat.* 4 and the *Ordinatio*, see esp. 376–78. Marrone nicely sums up his interpretation of the development of Scotus's thought with the sentence "The early and the later accounts come so near, and yet remain so far apart" (378).

<sup>62</sup>The account of the foundations of analogy in univocity in these texts is explained in Cross, "Duns Scotus and Analogy," 147–54. Cross's interpretation of Scotus coincides with (I am unaware if it is influenced by) the position defended by the great seventeenth-century Prince of Scotists, Bartolomaeus Mastrius. On Mastrius, see esp. Smith, "Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition," 667–71. See also



Scotus gives a clear indication in his *Ordinatio* of the kind of analogy that he means to oppose with his doctrine of the univocity of being, writing, “I say that not only in a concept that is analogous to a concept of a creature is God conceived, that is, in one that is altogether other than the one which is said about a creature, but in some concept that is univocal to Him and to the creature” (*Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 26, VC 3:18, emphasis added).<sup>63</sup> Just as in his questions on works of Aristotle, in this mature theological work, Scotus lays it down that, where concepts are concerned, there can be no analogy without diverse concepts (“a concept . . . is analogous to a concept”). That is, taken by itself, a concept cannot be analogous. Rather, concepts are analogous to each other. Scotus puts the point in this way: “at the same time or before” they are compared according to analogy, “they are conceived as distinct” (*Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 32, VC 3:20).<sup>64</sup>

Scotus reinforces the principle that unity of analogy is posterior in the intellect to diversity between the concepts joined in a unity of analogy elsewhere (when addressing the same issue as in the passage quoted above), saying, “There are not any concepts that can be conceived under any unity unless they are conceived under the distinction proper to them at the same time or prior naturally, which is presupposed for that unity” (*Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 60, VC 4:179).<sup>65</sup> Speaking directly about “unity of analogy” (*unitate analogiae*) in the same question, Scotus adds, “Those two [concepts] do not seem to the intellect to be ‘one,’ because, at the same time, they are conceived as distinct concepts” (*Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 67, VC 4:183).<sup>66</sup>

In the passages above from Scotus’s *Ordinatio* I, distinctions 3 and 8, the specific contexts for Scotus’s uses of the word ‘analogy’ are arguments against the position of Henry of Ghent, according to whom analogous unity involves the confusion of two distinct, but similar, concepts for one concept.<sup>67</sup> When not directly engaging with Henry of Ghent, Scotus often uses the phrase ‘unity of attribution’ (*unitas attributionis*) in place of ‘unity of analogy.’ Later Scotists, including Bartolomaeus Mastrius, consider ‘unity of analogy’ and ‘unity of attribution’ to be synonyms in

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Smith’s treatment of Scotus’s own texts on the relation between analogy and univocity at 643–51. For an extensive treatment of the position of Mastrius on the concept of being, see Forlivesi, “Nature of Transcendental Being.” For an extensive treatment of Mastrius’s metaphysics, see Andersen, *Metaphysik im Barockscotismus*. See Andersen’s brief summary of Mastrius’s understanding of proportional unity and why it is unsuitable for addressing the unity of the concept of being at 371–72.

<sup>63</sup>“Dico quod non tantum in conceptu analogo conceptui creaturae concipitur Deus, scilicet qui omnino sit alius ab illo qui de creatura dicitur, sed in conceptu aliquo univoco sibi et creaturae.”

<sup>64</sup>“Ut comparati secundum analogiam . . . tunc simul vel prius concipiuntur ut distincti.” At least one distinguished Thomist of the twentieth century proposed that a concept can be analogous in itself, namely, Maritain in his brief appendix on analogy in *The Degrees of Knowledge*. Although Maritain cites Cajetan in support of his position, it is not clear to me that Cajetan is saying what Maritain is saying. See Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, 418–21, esp. 419. The opposed position is represented by another distinguished twentieth-century Thomist, who was also much influenced by Cajetan’s treatment of analogy, in Simon, “On Order in Analogical Sets,” 5–13.

<sup>65</sup>“Non possunt aliqui conceptus concipi sub unitate aliqua nisi simul vel prius naturaliter concipiantur sub distinctione propria sua, quae supponitur illi unitati.”

<sup>66</sup>“Illi duo non videntur intellectui esse ‘unus,’ quia simul concipiuntur ut distincti conceptus.”

<sup>67</sup>For a useful summary of Henry of Ghent’s position on analogy as the “confusion” of two different indistinct concepts, see Dumont, “Scotus’s Doctrine of Univocity,” 204–7.

the writings of Scotus. More recently, Marrone and Smith both explicitly treat unity of attribution as a stand-in for unity of analogy.<sup>68</sup> From the examples that Scotus uses in the *Ordinatio*, which involve real-order relationships, we can safely assume that ‘unity of attribution’ refers at least to the ‘unity of analogy’ that Scotus recognized in his *In SE* and *In Cat.* (q. 4) that holds between things *in re* even if logically the signification of their common name reduces to equivocation.

Scotus compares “unity of attribution” to other forms of unity in the *Ordinatio* where he writes,

Attribution alone does not affirm unity, because unity of attribution is lesser than the unity of univocation, and the lesser does not entail the greater. Nevertheless, the lesser unity can stand with a greater unity, as some things that are one in genus are [also] one in species, even though unity of genus is lesser than unity of species. So here, I concede that unity of attribution does not affirm unity of univocation, and nevertheless the unity of univocation that belongs to the *ratio* of a genus in its species stands with it [that is, with unity of attribution]. All the more so then, it is necessary that . . . in the *ratio* of being, in which there is unity of attribution, the attributed have unity of univocation, because never are any things compared as measured to the measure, or exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in something one. (*Ordinatio* I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 83, VC 4:191)<sup>69</sup>

Unity of attribution is lesser than the univocal modes of unity (that is, generic unity and specific unity), and to affirm a unity of attribution is not to affirm one of the univocal modes of unity, just as to affirm generic unity between two or more things or concepts is not to affirm specific unity between them. Nonetheless, the lesser unity does not exclude the greater unity, and both unities can be present without excluding the other. Hence, just as generic unity in being animals does not exclude specific unity in being humans in Plato and Socrates, unity of attribution between substance and the accidents (or between infinite and finite being) does not exclude the presence of a greater and univocal unity between them. As the argument above indicates, in such cases of unity of attribution in which a comparison can be made between the subjects of a unity of attribution, a greater than univocal unity needs to be copresent to serve as the basis for the comparison.

The above passage reflects the position that Scotus takes in his earlier work that analogy reduces to univocation or to equivocation. But whereas in his earlier

<sup>68</sup>Marrone, “Notion of Univocity,” 379: “Duns [in *Lectura* I, d. 3 and *Ordinatio* 1, d. 3], in defence of the univocity of the concept of being, was countering arguments drawn from the fourth book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, all holding that the unity of the object of metaphysics could be explained by the attribution of all other categories to substance as ‘ad unum.’ In scholastic terms this meant that the unity of the object of metaphysics was a unity based on analogy.” Smith, “Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition,” 645: “Thus analogy, or as Scotus calls it, ‘attribution,’ is a feature of real things in the world and consists of relations of dependence and participation among real things.” Smith also cites Mastrius on this point (671n140).

<sup>69</sup>“Attributione sola non ponit unitatem, quia unitas attributionis minor est unitate univocationis, et minor non concludit maiorem; tamen minor unitas potest stare cum maiore unitate, sicut aliqua quae sunt unum genere, sunt unum specie; licet unitas generis sit minor quam unitas specie. Ita hic, concedo quod unitas attributionis non ponit unitatem univocationis, et tamen cum hoc stat unitas univocationis rationis generis in ipsis speciebus. Ita—et multo magis—oportet esse in proposito, quod in ratione entis, in qua est unitas attributionis, attributa habeant unitatem univocationis, quia numquam aliqua comparantur ut mensurata ad mensuram, vel excessa ad excedens, nisi in aliquo uno convenient.” See also the treatment of this passage in Smith, “Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition,” 647–50.

work Scotus excludes ‘being’ said across the categories from among the cases of analogies that reduce to univocation, now Scotus makes it his principal example. This development follows from abandoning his earlier position that there are many equally primary senses of being for each of the categories (and consequently ‘being’ primarily signifies many things, not one), and, in place of his earlier position, adopting the position that there is one meaning of being that is distinct from and common to the meaning of being proper to each of the categories (as well as to finite and infinite being). Moreover, the logical community that Scotus now affirms among the categories in their one shared concept of being is a necessary condition for the intellect to recognize their metaphysical unity of attribution or analogy, in which one grade of being can be compared to another grade as superior to inferior, independent to dependent, infinite to finite.

We can also see in Scotus’s *Ordinatio* a departure from or a development of Aristotle’s division of the logically one into the numerically, specifically, generically, and proportionally or analogously one. In Scotus’s *QMet*, Scotus appears to accept this division as exhaustive, while he at once defends the claim that being is said univocally but not generically across the categories. In his *Ordinatio*, Scotus does not take up (in any place that I have found) the exhaustiveness of the fourfold division. Rather, Scotus implies a space for another univocal mode of logical unity that falls implicitly between generic unity and proportional unity. Within that space, he places the concepts of the perfections that transcend the division of finite and infinite being, which are univocal with a less than generic unity.<sup>70</sup> (It is not my present question whether Scotus places anything else besides pure perfections within the logical space between generic and proportional unity.) What specific, generic, and the *less than generic but greater than proportional* unities have in common (and presumably what makes each a kind of univocal unity) is that in each case they are the products of an intellect forming single concepts. Indeed, I take it that Scotus’s definition of univocal is more properly “said of many through one concept” than it is “sufficiently one for founding a contradiction and for serving as the middle term in a syllogism” on the grounds that the latter are properties arising from the unity of the concept and Scotus denies that the properties of sufficiency for founding a contradiction and serving as a valid middle term in a syllogism can occur in the absence of one concept (*Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 26, VC 3:18).

#### CONCLUSION

From our survey of Scotus’s remarks on analogous unity, we can derive several doctrinal points. First, analogous unity—inasmuch as it is distinguished from

<sup>70</sup>Ashworth makes a similar observation that Scotus broadens the logical scope of the univocal in *Les théories de l’analogie* when discussing Scotus’s “nouvelle définition du concept univoque” at 69–70: “Ce qui est latent dans cette citation, c’est l’absence totale de l’idée que l’univocité va de pair avec les cinq predicables. D’un seul coup, Duns Scot abolit le problème qui se présentait antérieurement quand on cherchait à concilier l’affirmation qu’un terme univoque signifie soit un genre, soit une espèce, soit une différence, soit une propriété, soit un accident, avec la reconnaissance de l’existence de termes, comme ‘ens’ et ‘unum,’ qui transcendent les catégories et par conséquent ne signifient ni les genres, ni les espèces, ni les différences, ni les propriétés, ni les accidents.”

numerical, specific, and generic unity—is a product of an act of the mind. Its distinctive feature is that it is occasioned by the intellect's comparing two or more things that do not belong within the same genus, and yet stand in similar relationships of proportion to others (as in the case of animal: human :: color: white) or another (as in the case of quantity: substance :: quality: substance).

Second, as a product of an act of the mind, analogous unity holds between diverse concepts. Accordingly, analogous unity is no medium between univocity and equivocation. That is, properly speaking, no concept signifies analogously. Rather, an “analogous concept” is by reduction a univocal concept or diverse equivocal concepts. An analogy is univocal reductively when the comparison between the diverse concepts is based on how the meaning of the name as it signifies one is to be found in the definitions of the others (as in the case of healthy medicine and urine). An analogy is equivocal reductively if the name applies with equal primacy to each of the things about which it is said (as in the example of expedient good things and expedient useful evils) and there is not one meaning of the name on which all of the other meanings depend. Rather than deny that there is an analogous/proportional/attributional unity between being and the other categories, Scotus consistently takes the position that the analogous unity between them is reducible to another form of unity, either to equivocation (in his *In Cat.*) or to univocation (in his *Ordinatio*).

Third, conceptual or intentional unity, whether analogous or otherwise, need not correspond to unity in reality. Unity in the mind does have a foundation in things. Things, however, are not the total cause, but rather the occasional cause, of unity in the mind. Hence, there can be a greater unity in the mind than is found in the things.

Fourth, relations that hold between things in reality need not carry over to the signification of names. That is, although two things may have a relation of analogy in the order of the real, with one being prior and the other being a dependent posterior, the two can receive a common name that in no respect includes the analogous relationship within its signification (as in Scotus's example of ‘being’ as predicated equally primarily across the categories despite the analogous unity between the categories through their common attribution to substance).

Fifth, analogous unity in reality but not in intentions suffices for the unity of a science. As far as intentions or concepts are concerned, demonstration requires univocity. In his *In Cat.*, the univocity condition is met in metaphysics through the condition of all its demonstrations about being as being occurring through the concept proper to the being of substance. In his *Ordinatio*, this same condition is met in metaphysics and natural theology through the condition that their demonstrations occur through the concept of being that is distinct from, and yet contained within, the concepts of substance and the other categories, as well as in the concepts of finite and infinite being.

What about the mind-independent analogous or proportional unity that Scotus acknowledges, but does not include within the sort of proportional unity that belongs within the fourfold division of the one into numerical, specific, generic, and analogous or proportional at *QMet*, 5, q. 4? Recall that Scotus grants to his objector that in such cases as “4: 8 :: 3: 6” the unity is proportional but not the

product of the intellect's activity. I proposed above that, by parity of reasoning, Scotus should also acknowledge Aristotle's biological examples of proportional unity as instances that do not depend upon an act of the mind, and consequently that Aristotle's biological examples fall outside the kind of proportional unity that Scotus includes within the fourfold division of unity.

I do not find Scotus explicitly acknowledging mind-independent analogous or proportional unity elsewhere, and it is notably absent from his discussions of the debate over the unity of being. (The same could be said about Aristotle's treatments of the unity of being, as well as about most of Thomas Aquinas's, with an arguable exception in his early *De Principiis Naturae*.) Mind-independent proportional unity could be what Scotus has in mind when he speaks of the unity of attribution between substance and the accidents and between God and creatures that allows substance and God to stand in as the subject matter for metaphysics in *QMet*, 1, q. 1 despite the absence of any concept of being that is common to substance and accidents and to God and creatures. However, the mind-independent proportional unity of *QMet*, 5, q. 4 does not involve any sort of causal relationship or relationship of dependency between the members of the proportional unity; that is, there is no dependence of 3: 6 on 4: 8 or the other way around (and similarly in feathers: birds :: scales: fish). So, it does not appear that *QMet*, 5, q. 4's mind-independent proportional unity can be identified with the unity of attribution within *QMet*, 1, q. 1. I see the same problem with identifying mind-independent proportional unity with the unity of attribution persisting outside of the *QMet*. Both in his books of questions on works of Aristotle and in his *Ordinatio*, Scotus's examples of unity of analogy or attribution involve dependency relations, and they appear to be examples of Aristotle's *pros hen* equivocation (analogy of attribution) rather than of *Metaphysics* 5's analogous unity.

Supposing that Scotus has not simply forgotten or set aside the mind-independent proportional unity of *QMet*, 5, q. 4 in his mature work, would it make any difference to his conclusions about analogy and univocity? Major figures of the Thomist tradition thought that it should. Cajetan explicitly draws on Aristotle's biological examples to show how such unity outside the mind can be the foundation for one and the same concept to signify with proportional unity (*De Conceptu Entis*, 4 [Rome, 98–99]). Major figures of the Scotist tradition, such as Mastrius, have offered counterarguments in defense of the position Scotus expresses in his *Ordinatio*.<sup>71</sup> It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a resolution to the dispute between these eminent figures. However, I have yet to find a later Scotist who directly addresses Scotus's admission of mind-independent unity in his *QMet* 5, q. 4. Scotus's admission of this mind-independent proportional unity and his reasons for doing so provide an internal Scotistic justification for the question that is at the heart of the Thomist critiques of Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being (especially and most explicitly Cajetan's). If things can have proportional

<sup>71</sup>For Mastrius on univocity, equivocity, and analogy, see esp. Bartolomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Bellutus, *Disputationes in Aristotelis Logicam*, distinction 2, questions 4–5 (Venice, 1727, 101A–111B). For his direct engagement with Thomists over proportional unity, see especially Bartolomaeus Mastrius, *Disputationes ad Mentem Scoti in duodecim Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Metaphysicorum Pars Prior*, distinction 2, question 1 (Venice, 1727, folio 32, column A).

unity independently of the act of the mind, then why would the intellect be unable to represent them in a single concept insofar as they are proportionally one, and would not such a concept be sufficiently one both for it to be a contradiction to affirm and deny it about the same thing and for it to appear in a syllogism without causing the fallacy of equivocation?<sup>72</sup>

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