

edhiphy.org

A new digital tool to study philosophy and its history

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
Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie Münster, 24.9.2024

Joint Work

- Database design: Eugenio Petrovich, University of Turin
- Part of ERC & NWO project 'Exiled Empiricists': Sander Verhaegh (PI), Claudia Cristalli, Fons Dewulf (now HKUST), Ties van Germert, Nina IJdens, Tilburg University
- Digital Research support: Wessel Dankers (Tilburg)

Outline

- 1. From Citations to Mentions
- 2. Constructing the edhiphy database
- 3. Application: the history of Logical Empiricism
- 4. edhiphy.org



TILBURG SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND DIGITAL SCIENCES

Digital methods for (the history of) philosophy have a promise in at least two respects:

- 1. Close reading of historical sources has to be selective how do we select?
- 2. How do we check the coarsegrained claims of historical narratives?

From Citations to Mentions

- Citation analysis is a key method in quantitative studies of science
- (in)famous citation metrics are e.g. the Impact Factor, h-index, etc. But citations have also been used to construct (co-)citation networks
- Formalized citations became common in the early 20th century
 - but reference lists remain rare in philosophy until the 1980s

It appears to me that Prof. Weldon's argument, referred to in NATURE of July 16 (p. 245), is accurately represented in the following illustration. It might be an established fact, although it is not in reality, that there was a con-

Cunningham, T. J. 1896 «The Utility of Specific Characters», *Nature* 54 (1396): 295 https://doi.org/10.1038/054295a0

From Citations to Mentions

But philosophers' practice of referring to other scholars' work is much older

R. M. BLAKE.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE PARADOX OF TEMPORAL PROCESS

T is commonly assumed that the difficulties first raised by Zeno I with regard to the possibility of motion have been pretty definitely disposed of in modern times by means of the mathematical analysis of continuity and infinity, in the way made familiar among us, for example, by Mr. Russell. William James, however, among others, remained to the end unconvinced of the validity of these modern solutions of the ancient problem, and in our own day Professor Whitehead also asserts the existence of an outstanding and unresolved difficulty. The residual problem is essentially the same for both James and Whitehead, and both of them propose to deal with it in much the same way. I wish here to enquire (1) What is the nature of the problem which men like James and Whitehead feel to be still outstanding? (2) Is the type of solution which they propose adequate to deal with the problem? and (3) Is the problem not really soluble in terms not involving the novel conceptions which they employ for this purpose?

James distinguishes between two types of infinite, called by him respectively the "standing" infinite and the "growing" infinite. To the first class belong infinites conceived as already completed, such as the infinite of space, of past time, of events now finished, of motions already accomplished, and the like. To the second belong infinites in process of completion, such as the infinites of motion, change, activity, conceived as actually occurring. In James' view the difficulties of the first sort of infinite are on the whole sufficiently disposed of by the modern mathematical treatment; but those of the second sort still remain unsolved. As he explains the matter, "Zeno's and Kant's dialectic holds good wherever, before an end can be reached, a succession of terms, endless by definition, must needs have been successively counted out. This is the case with every

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Zeno



William James



▼Immanuel Kant



Bertrand Russell



A. N. Whitehead

From Citations to Mentions

But philosophers' practice of referring to other scholars' work is much older

We define a 'mention' as a generalized form of reference to a philosopher: a **link between a document and a scholar.** In an explicit mention, this link is realized by the occurrence of a **proper name**

- With the concept of a 'mention' we can construct a database to describe the structure of philosophy (similar to what the 'Web of Science' did with citations)
- The Ingredients:
 - A corpus: 22,977 articles from 12 English-speaking journals* between 1890 and 1980
 - Metadata for 44,376 philosophers, including partial PhD and affiliation data

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all contradictions are there removed, harmonised and united in

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IV .- TIME AND THE SUCCESSION OF EVENTS

By J. L. McIntyri

TIME, it may be taken for granted, is no longer regarded by any whool of philosophy as an ultimate reality substating for any choice of philosophy as an ultimate reality substating the property of the question is rather as to the validity of the time relations in their application to the ultimately real,—whether negations in their application to the ultimately real,—whether relations in their application to the ultimately real,—whether the property of the pr



Of course it is not that simple:

- Non-trivial cleaning (e.g. journal headers)
- But the main obstacle is the *disambiguation* of homonymous author names



Bertrand Russell



Walter C. Russell



Leonard J. Russell



Francis C. Russell




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
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
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Bertrand Russell | P:664

+450.000 mentions in EDHIPHY are homonymous!

• Multiple Disambiguation Strategies are used successively:



• We currently estimate the accuracy of the extracted mentions to be **82%-91%**

• More in:

Scientometrics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-024-05116-x

Bibliometrics beyond citations: introducing mention


Eugenio Petrovich^{1,2} • Sander Verhaegh² • Gregor Bös² • Claudia Cristalli² • Fons Dewulf² • Ties van Gemert² • Nina IJdens²


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extraction and analysis

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-024-05116-x


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




Mention statistics of eleven logical empiricists in philosophy journals by decade.

See Verhaegh, S., Petrovich, E. and Bös, G.E. (forthcoming) 'The American Reception of Logical Empiricism: A Mention-Based Bibliometric Analysis', in F. Stadler and G. Schiemer (eds) *The Vienna Circle - History and Legacy*. Springer (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook). Preprint available on https://edhiphy.org/publications





edhiphy.org

- The edhiphy database is now available as a a web-application. This allows you to:
 - Inspect individual philosophers
 - Study aggregate mentions over periods
 - Inspect the co-mention links between philosophers
 - Search the extracted mentions
 - Create custom network plots
 - Submit custom SQLite queries

https://edhiphy.org