

Attested TLS

10000-foot view

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Attestation (WiP)


- The process of providing a **digital signature** for a **set of measurements** securely stored in hardware, and then having the requester **validate** the signature and the set of measurements.

(Bartock et al., Trusted Geolocation in the Cloud: Proof of Concept Implementation, [NISTIR 7904](#), 2015)


Note: wrongly attributed to NIST SP 1800-19B in [NIST glossary](#)


- Not necessarily *only*:
 - digital signature
 - set of measurements

Use Cases of Attestation




Computing Paradigms using Attestation






Collaboration Model



Attestation in IETF



RATS WG



OAuth, TLS, EST, ACME, ...

What is Attested TLS ?

- The Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake protocol allows authentication of one or both peers using static, long-term credentials
- In some cases, it is also required to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in secure state
- Attested TLS introduces a series of protocol extensions to the TLS 1.3 Handshake that enables binding of TLS authentication key to a remote attestation session


Need for Attested TLS ?

- PKI Certificates used in TLS handshake are good at conveying a (network) identity of a service
- Remote Attestation is good at conveying the security state of a service, i.e. whether the execution environment is trustworthy ?
- We can combine them efficiently to get the security benefits of both


Proposed Design

- Proposed Design uses Remote Attestation information as a first-class credentials in a TLS Handshake
- Attestation information (Evidence or Results), from any scheme, carried as extensions alongside X.509 certificate or using a new certificate type
- This approach has following benefits
 - Better security
 - Better performance – No need to run channel establishment and remote attestation sequentially


Augmented TLS v1.3 Handshake



Initial Use Cases




IoT/Edge Device Onboarding



Confidential Computing

PROTOTYPE



- Open-source End to End System Prototype operated under CCC – Attestation SIG
- Consists of Interconnected Docker Containers to simulate entire System
- Attester is TPM 2.0
- Fully symmetrical (both Client AND/OR Server can be the Attester)
- <https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc>

Open standards and Open-Source Links

Description	Link
IETF TLS Extension Draft	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-tls-attestation/
IETF EAT based Key Attestation Token	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bft-rats-kat/
Conceptual Message Wrapper(CMW) draft	https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ftbs-rats-msg-wrap/
CCC Project Repository	https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tlspoc
Parsec	https://parsec.community/
Project Veraison	https://github.com/veraison
MbedTLS	https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls/

Current Community Contributors

- Linaro
- TU Dresden
- Arm
- Siemens
- Intuit
- Barkhausen Institute
- Huawei

Join us:

- **Via Slack –**
ietf.slack.com # attested-tls
- **Participate via Biweekly Community meeting@ 4 PM CET (Monday and Thursday)**


Zoom Meeting Details:

[Meeting link](#)

Meeting ID: 926 3098 5214

Passcode: 794083

Join us!



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