*Nec Spe Nec Metu: Philosophic Catharsis in Karl Löwith’s Meaning in History*

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*To ask earnestly the question of the ultimate meaning of history takes one’s breath away; it transports us into a vacuum which only hope and faith can fill. The ancients were more moderate in their speculations. They did not presume to make sense of the world or to discover its ultimate meaning.*

-Karl Löwith[[1]](#endnote-2)

Best known in the English-speaking world for expounding one of the classic articulations of the “secularization thesis” in his most influential work, *Meaning in History* (1949), the German-Jewish philosopher Karl Löwith (1897-1973) presents the Enlightenment the philosophy of history as a secularization of Christian theological history. Arguing that the modern emphasis on secular history as the scene of humanity’s destiny, that history has a meaning or purpose, is fundamentally dependent on an eschatological history of salvation. For Löwith, not only do modern thinkers ranging from Voltaire to Marx fail to demonstrate a meaningful plan of history by means of reason – instead “living by hope and expectation” – by secularizing the theological conception of history and seeking to realize the Kingdom of God on earth the philosophy of history proves to have perverse political consequences.[[2]](#endnote-3)

Yet despite the radical nature of this critique, Löwith has not exerted a major influence on political theorists concerned with the crisis of modernity. Often thought of as a less ambitious, more apolitical thinker than fellow twentieth century *émigré* critics of modern rationalism such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, or Eric Voegelin.[[3]](#endnote-4) Indeed, in the view of Voegelin, although Löwith successfully dismantles the philosophy of history he does not possess a positive philosophy of his own.[[4]](#endnote-5) This reputation arises, as Jeffrey Barash and Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz remind us, that in spite of the charged implications of his writings, Löwith remains circumspect regarding both the political consequences of his interpretations and his philosophical intentions.[[5]](#endnote-6) Instead of advocating for the revival of classical political philosophy, the reality of transcendence, or the *vita activa*, Löwith’s writings appear to lack a philosophical program, modestly appearing as a chronicler of the historical consciousness and the breakdown of modern rationalism into nihilism.

On the other hand, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas have made the case for recognizing the ambition of Löwith’s philosophical undertaking. Gadamer writes that Löwith adopts a form of Stoicism in the face of the “desperate disorder of human affairs,” rejecting the anthropocentrism of the Enlightenment in favor of looking to “the eternal cycle of nature, in order to learn from it the equanimity that alone is appropriate to the minuteness of human life in the universe.”[[6]](#endnote-7) Habermas meanwhile argues that Löwith desires to generate “the powerful mechanisms with which he hopes to set in motion a portentous change of scene from modernity to antiquity” in order to restore “a repristinized Stoic worldview.”[[7]](#endnote-8) Yet, an important question arises. How does Löwith presuppose to initiate the desired change of scene with a meditative critique of the philosophy of history in place of a robust normative vision?

Löwith provides an answer to this question by noting that while we find ourselves “at the end of the modern rope,” a recovery of the classical sources of the Western tradition cannot be achieved by a desperate “imaginary jump” into classical paganism as attempted by Nietzsche (nor for that matter, to early Christianity à la Kierkegaard).[[8]](#endnote-9) Though impressed with Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence as an antipode to progressive schemes of history, for Löwith Nietzsche remains too *theologically* burdened, lacking the equanimity to effect an authentic return to the perspective of the ancient Greeks. *Meaning in History* therefore is oriented by the desire to avoid the errors of Nietzsche. As Löwith writes in a 1935 letter to Leo Strauss, “there are better and more moderate ways to wean oneself of the belief in progress and the belief in creation and providence.”[[9]](#endnote-10) The aim of this chapter is to explore how Löwith aims to bring about the change of scene from modernity to antiquity by “moderate” means in the form of a philosophic catharsis. By beginning *Meaning in History* with Jacob Burkhardt’s renunciation of both the philosophy and theology of history in favor of “continuity,” Löwith introduces the reader to the closest representative of ancient moderation before working backward from the culmination of the philosophy of history in the revolutionary expectations of Marx to the Christian *procursus* toward the Kingdom of God. By examining the philosophy and theology of history’s professed claim to know the meaning of history from the perspective of Burkhardt’s sober wisdom, Löwith seeks to show the impossibility of demonstrating these claims on rational grounds and their dependency on hope and faith. Thus, instead of the anti-Christian pathos of Nietzsche, the philosophical reader can be brought to embrace the Stoic maxim: *nec spe nec metu*. Cultivating the serenity necessary for the reapprehension of the classical perspective. To demonstrate this, I will first sketch Löwith’s interpretation of the secularization of historical thought developed in the text before considering how Löwith employs Burkhardt in his didactic approach to avoid the polemical extremism of Nietzsche.

**The End of the Dream of Eschatological History**

The central tenet of Löwith’s secularization thesis asserts that modern historical consciousness remains fundamentally oriented by the eschatological pattern of Hebrew-Christian faith.[[10]](#endnote-11) For Löwith, we cannot fail to grasp the dependence of the philosophy of history on the theological conception of history nor its eschatological motivation once we recognize the profound gulf between the Biblical and Greek approaches to history. In Löwith’s telling, owing to their apprehension of nature as a cosmos, the Greek understanding of history took its bearings from the eternal cycle of generation and corruption, grow and decay. Limited by the cosmic law of eternal recurrences, this view of history has no place for the possibility of discovering anything radically new, or of a unique historical event. Greek philosophers therefore depreciated history against poetry, concerning themselves with the *logos* of the cosmos rather the meaning of history. Meanwhile, historians such as Polybius reflecting on the fate of all cities and empires, like human beings, to eventually meet their end, sought to educate his readers through the study of history in political moderation and magnanimity.[[11]](#endnote-12)

Opposing this “natural” experience of history is the Christian eschatological understanding. For Christians, history is a story of redemption, directed toward an end and goal, the eschaton of the Last Judgment and Second Coming. The Biblical conception of history therefore opens up the future and is linear and progressive. “The Hebrew and Christian view of history the past is a promise to the future; consequently, the interpretation of the past becomes a prophecy in reverse, demonstrating the past as meaningful ‘preparation’ for the future.”[[12]](#endnote-13) Thus, because the Greek historians were convinced that the future would be of the same character as the past and present, they wrote “pragmatic” history centred on a political event to provide guidance for statesmen, the Church Fathers developed a theology of history “focused on the supra-historical events of creation, incarnation, and consummation.”[[13]](#endnote-14) The modern philosophy of history reveals its kinship with the Christian eschatological understanding in interpreting history as progressing or development toward a goal. Voltaire’s open-ended progress, Hegel’s unfolding of Spirit in history, Comte’s positive philosophy, and Marx’s dialectical materialism could have only arisen within a horizon of reflection established by Biblical understanding. For in a cyclical model there is no room for progress. The irreligion of progress derives from the Christian faith in the future.

However, though continuing the teleological Christian orientation, Löwith argues that crucially the philosophy of history modifies the Christian intention by *secularizing* the original religious inspiration. This secularization of eschatological history proves to have profound philosophical and political consequences as modernity unfolds. Despite conceiving of history as oriented toward salvation, the original Biblical and Augustinian understanding did not endow political-historical events with transcendental meaning. As Löwith observes, New Testament is focused on the story of Jesus Christ and the ambiguity of the Kingdom of God that is already at hand yet at the same time an eschaton still to come. It is unconcerned with the political history of the world. Viewing it as a “story of action and suffering,” the “continuous repetition of painful miscarriages and costly achievements which end in ordinary failures” without any meaning or purpose.[[14]](#endnote-15) Similarly, Augustine does not attach meaning to the rise and fall of empires but with the “sacred history of salvation.”[[15]](#endnote-16)

The Christian separation between profane human history and sacred history collapses with the advent of secular philosophies of history. Where the Christian theological understanding was “two dimensional,” the philosophy of history of the Enlightenment narrows this down by “secularizing divine providence into human prevision and progress.”[[16]](#endnote-17) To borrow a phrase from Voegelin, the philosophy of history “immanentizes the eschaton.” Further, once Voltaire and Vico emancipate secular history from sacred history, the quest for meaning in history heightens. For, following Vico, who argues (contra Descartes), the only real knowledge we have is historical knowledge because the historical-political world is created by human beings, it becomes possible to believe that meaning can be produced by human reason and will.[[17]](#endnote-18) Thus, as the Enlightenment’s confidence in the mastering the destiny of man grows, modern thinkers grow ever more assured in their power of devising systems of interpretation and hopeful of bringing history to its culmination. Condorcet therefore is more enthusiastic in his expectations for human progress than Voltaire, by incorporating Christian theology into his speculative system Hegel goes beyond earlier Enlightenment philosophies of progress, Comte surpasses Hegel in attempting to establish predictable laws of historical social development, and Marx seeks to prepare for history’s final consummation with the proletariat revolution. The growing hope and expectation in the philosophy of history meanwhile is mirrored in the political movements of modernity. Löwith writes that there would be “no American, no French, and no Russian revolutions and constitutions” without the belief in progress.[[18]](#endnote-19) Like the progression from Voltaire to Marx, modern revolutionary politics too becomes ever more hopeful and extreme in advancing history to its end through political action. In short, the secularization of Christian eschatological history sows the seeds not only of modern liberal democracy but the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century.

Yet the Enlightenment philosophy of history only continues in a modified form what was already present in the Biblical understanding. While Christianity did not intend for its own secularization, as Barash argues, for Löwith the Christian tradition too is “marked by the ever more resolute projection of eschatological hope into the advent of salvation onto human secular history.”[[19]](#endnote-20) In particular, it is in the “theological historicism” of Joachim of Flores that the Christian eschatological perspective reveals its kinship with secular philosophical and political movements.[[20]](#endnote-21) Löwith accords a special place for Joachim because with his thought Christianity becomes historicized. While with “Augustine and Thomas, the Christian truth rests, once and for all, on certain historical facts; with Joachim the truth itself has an open horizon and a history that is essential to it.”[[21]](#endnote-22) In Joachim’s eschatological scheme salvific history is divided into three epochs: the Age of the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit. Because it will be in the Kingdom of Spirit that the last revelation of God’s plan will be revealed, the secular world will undergo a transformation. Though Joachim himself did not criticize the contemporary church, he did expect the appearance of a messianic leader. His followers went even further, combing the teachings of Joachim with Francis of Assisi into a messianic Christianity with radical political aims regarding the Church and other secular institutions.[[22]](#endnote-23) Though the eschatological-historical expectations of the Joachites were refuted by real historical events, in Löwith’s interpretation, its heritage lived on. Proving to be not only an inspiration for fourteenth century political actors such as Cola di Rienzo, but a fateful source of fascination for the moderns. Writing in the most politically explicit passage of *Meaning in History*:

The revolution which has been proclaimed within the framework of an eschatological faith and with reference to a perfect monastic life was taken over five centuries later, by a philosophical priesthood, which interpreted the process of secularization in terms of a “spiritual” realization of the Kingdom of God on earth. As an attempt at realization, the spiritual pattern of Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel could be transposed into the positivistic and materialistic schemes of Comte and Marx. The third dispensation of the Joachites reappeared as a third International and a third Reich, inaugurated by a dux or a Führer who was acclaimed as a savior and greeted by millions with Heil! The source of all these formidable attempts to fulfil history by and within itself is the passionate, but fearful and humble, expectation of the Franciscan Spirituals that a last conflict will bring history to its climax and end.[[23]](#endnote-24)

Yet despite the tragedies and suffering engendered by political-historical eschatology, all attempts to find a solution to problem of history have been one of steady failure. “The world is still as it was in the time of Alaric; only our means of oppression and destruction (as well as of reconstruction) are considerably improved and adorned with hypocrisy.”[[24]](#endnote-25) The effort of articulating either a progressive secular history on the basis of faith or elaborating the plan of history by means of reason culminates in the conclusion that instead of reason and providence, history is governed by chance and fate. Ironically, the philosophy of history ends up contributing to the dissolution of the Enlightenment belief in reason and progress.[[25]](#endnote-26) The dissolution of the quest for meaning in history though offers us an opportunity to break free of the Christian horizon. For after weaning us off the last residues of the belief in progress, Löwith concludes *Meaning in History* by calling for the reconsideration of the ancient cycle of eternal recurrence.[[26]](#endnote-27)

**The Serene Return to Ancient Serenity**

In advocating for the renewal of the cosmological perspective of the ancient Greeks, Löwith echoes Nietzsche’s similar project to revive the eternal recurrence as the way out “two thousand years of falsehood” culminating in the “modern illusion of the last man.” As several commentators observe, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence acts as an important lodestar for Löwith’s own attempt at the rejuvenation of Stoic naturalism.[[27]](#endnote-28) Indeed, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence had been the focus of Löwith’s 1935 study of Nietzsche philosophy, and the German philosopher’s doctrine is given pride of place in the last appendix of *Meaning in History*. Yet, despite his admiration, Löwith ultimately concludes that Nietzsche cannot serve as the model for the re-conception of classical paganism because he is unable to free himself from the Hebrew-Christian horizon. How can Löwith insist that the last disciple of Dionysus remains within the eschatological frame of reference? While the Greeks were unconcerned with the future, feeling ‘awe and reverence for fate,” Nietzsche’s philosophy is a self-described prelude to the future and Zarathustra seeks to bring about its *redemption*.[[28]](#endnote-29) Notwithstanding his struggle to base his vision on the nature of modern physics, the eternal recurrence is founded on the will, which confirms to a linear conception of time of eschatological history. “Nothing is more conspicuous in Nietzsche’s godless philosophy than the emphasis on being creative and willing, creative by willing, like the God of the Old Testament.”[[29]](#endnote-30) Unlike the ancients, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence is an “subjective ethical imperative” that must be created and consummated rather than accepted.

Because Nietzsche’s doctrine must be demonstrated by means of its ethical consequences, Nietzsche’s teaching also takes on polemical character. He teaches the eternal recurrence with a “hammer” instead of with “virile assent.” His *contra christianos* simply reverses the *contra gentiles* of the Church Fathers. Though repeating many of the arguments of the pagan philosophers, that the Christian religion is an absurdity and Christians themselves are people “bad breeding and taste,” he does so with the pathos of an “Antichrist” instead of a philosopher. *Zarathustra* is a counter-gospel rather than a philosophical reflection.[[30]](#endnote-31) Because he remains *theologically* burdened, Nietzsche lacks the composure of a classical pagan and his project of “repeating antiquity at the peak of modernity” is frustrated. Rather than reviving the political moderation of Polybius, Tacitus, and Thucydides, Nietzsche’s hope of redemption in the superman culminates, like secularization, in political extremism.

Seeking to purge eschatological hope from the philosophic reader while avoiding the dangers of Nietzsche’s “imaginary jump,” Löwith instead turns to Nietzsche’s Basel colleague, Jacob Burkhardt, in whom Löwith finds the best representation of ancient moderation at the end of the nineteenth century. Where even Nietzsche continues to cohere to the future-oriented perspective, Burkhardt provides a full-throated renunciation of progressive history. Detecting only “continuity” without beginning, progression, or end. Because for Burkhardt “man’s mind and soul were complete long ago”, the historical process cannot being leading up to our redemption or fall.[[31]](#endnote-32) While “all those philosophies of history – from Hegel to Augustine – which definitely knew, or professed to know, the *true* desirability of historical events,” Burkhardt’s skeptical wisdom sees only the “sober insight into our real situation: struggle and suffering, short glories and long miseries, wars and intermittent periods of peace. All are equally significant, and none reveals an ultimate meaning in a final purpose.”[[32]](#endnote-33) Because of this sober insight, neither does Burkhardt feel the distress of Nietzsche’s self-perceived historical destiny. Instead of aiming to become “dynamite,” Burkhardt only at best tries to delay the dissolution of the European tradition.

Thus, by beginning *Meaning in History* with Burkhardt , Löwith teaches us to cast a wary eye on the pretensions of the philosophy and theology of history while inoculating the reader against Nietzsche’s polemical anti-Christianity. Equipped with Burkhardt’s skeptical moderation, Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* reveals itself to be guided by prophetism than “tangible facts” and Hegel’s realization of the Spirit and Comte’s prognostications for the future of Europe are an incompatible blending of theology with philosophy. We see that there is nothing “scientific” about Condorcet’s hopes for humanity’s future perfection, and that Turgot projects “his hopes into facts and his wishes into thoughts.”[[33]](#endnote-34) The theology of history meanwhile can be discarded because it cannot refute the thesis of the ancients because Greek *theoria* is a vision of “what is visible” while Christian faith is a “firm trust in what is invisible.”[[34]](#endnote-35) Even Augustine therefore is compelled to make his argument against the pagan doctrine a moral one, that the pagan position is hopeless and the moral implications of the Christian promise of salvation are more satisfactory.[[35]](#endnote-36) But this amelioration offered by Biblical faith cannot be accepted by reason which prefers the “dependable continuity” of history instead of an “unfulfilled, proclamation of a veritable *eschaton* with last judgement and redemption.”[[36]](#endnote-37) In re-apprehending the classical perspective we can steer clear of the dangerous hopes and expectations of political life engendered by the philosophy and theology of history, instead adopting the “supra-historical wisdom” of Scipio at Carthage.

We can hardly conceive of a modern statesman who after the victorious outcome of the last world war, would reflect, as did Scipio after the destruction of Carthage, that the same fate which has just been meted out to Berlin will one day befall Washington and Moscow. The modern historical consciousness, which is either based on Hegel, Marx, or Comte, does not know how to unite the remote future with the remote past because it does not want to admit that all things on earth come and go.[[37]](#endnote-38)

**Repeating Antiquity at the Peak of Modernity**

Thus, though Paul and Augustine assert we are saved by hope and Hegel saw world history as the tribunal of justice, for Löwith it is wiser to accept the Stoic *nec spe nec metu*. Yet, as Löwith observes, “to be theoretically consistent, however, the trust in continuity would have to come back to the classical theory of a *circular* movement; for only on the basis of a circular, endless, movement, without beginning and end is continuity really demonstrable.”[[38]](#endnote-39) Burkhardt may approximate ancient moderation, but he is not an ancient philosopher but a modern historian. With the dissolution of the geocentric universe in the aftermath of the Copernican revolution and modern natural science, can we still feel reverence for the physical universe? Can Löwith’s natural apprehension of the cosmos be revived within modern physics, or it doomed to be frustrated like Nietzsche’s?[[39]](#endnote-40) These questions aside, at the very least there is profound truth to Löwith’s critique of modern and Christian hubris. As Gadamer observes, against the overblown formulations of the philosophy of history Löwith “seeks to bring nature to bear as the constant reality, the granite that bears all.”[[40]](#endnote-41) Löwith’s robust skepticism encourages us to reconsider the moral-political lesson of Polybius: “to be moderate in times of prosperity and to become wise by the misfortune of others”[[41]](#endnote-42)

1. Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 207. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
2. Löwith’s secularization thesis has been criticized by Hans Blumenberg in the *Legitimacy of the Modern Age* who attempts to show how that the belief in progress is not a continuation of Christian eschatological history but a new answer or transformation of the theological view of history. Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). The Löwith-Blumenberg debate is too large to address here, but the reader should consult: Henrik Syse, “Karl Löwith and Eric Voegelin on Christianity and History,” *Modern Age* 42, 3 (2000), 253-262; Stephen McKnight, “The Legitimacy of the Modern Age: The Löwith-Blumenberg Debate in Light of Recent Scholarship,” *The Political Science Reviewer* 19:1 (1990), 177-195; and Robert M. Wallace, “Progress, Secularization, and Modernity: The Löwith-Blumenberg,” *New German Critique* 22 (1981), 63-79. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
3. Ronald Beiner, *Political Philosophy: What It Is and Why It Matters* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
4. Eric Voegelin, *Published Essay, 1953-1965* in *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin Volume XI*, edited by Ellis Sandoz (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 15. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
5. Jeffrey Barash, “The Sense of History: On the Political Implications of Karl Löwith’s Concept of Secularization,” *History and Theory* 37, 1 (1998), 69-82; Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz, “Existentialism as a Political Problem in Karl Löwith’s Thought,” *History of European Ideas* 42, 7 (2016), 951-964, “Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss on Modernity, Secularization, and Nihilism” in *Modernity and What Has Been Lost: Considerations on the Legacy of Leo Strauss*, Edited by Pawel Armada and Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press, 2010), 93-110. Also consider Daniel Tanguay, “Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss: A Dialogue Concerning a Possible Overcoming of Historicism,” in *Sojourns in the Western Twilight: Essays in Honor of Tom Darby*, Edited by Robert C. Sibley and Janice Freamo (Quebec: Fermentation Press, 2016), 138-40. Thus, whereas there is an abundance of scholarship on Arendt, Strauss, and Voegelin’s confrontation with modernity there is not, as Ronald Beiner observes, a “Löwithian school and no shelf devoted to his thought and legacy.” Beiner, *Political Philosophy*, 63. On the character of Löwith’s art of writing, See Leo Strauss, “Löwith, Karl. *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche*. Zürich, New York: Europa. 1941”  in *What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 268-70. Strauss describes it as “*sine ira et studio*.” [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
6. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* Revised 2nd Edition, Translated and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 550-51. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
7. Jürgen Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles*, translated by Fredrick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 79-82. It should be pointed out that Habermas is deeply critical of the political implications of Löwith’s Stoic naturalism which in his view engenders a doctrine of complacency in response to historical-political transformations This criticism is echoed by Richard *Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 98-99. Yet nothing in Löwith’s biography or his writings should lead us to believe that he is complacent in the face of political events. Löwith experienced first-hand the crisis of totalitarianism in the mid-twentieth century. One of Martin Heidegger’s earliest students, when Heidegger embraced National Socialism in 1933, Löwith fled Nazi Germany because of his Jewish heritage. Forced into exile in Italy, then Japan before arriving in the United States mere months prior to Pearl Harbor. Indeed, writing *Meaning in History* in the aftermath of the Second World War is very much a political act. For Löwith’s account of his experience of the rise of National Socialism and the beginning of his exile, see Löwith, *My Life in Germany Before and After 1933*, Translated by Elizabeth King (London: Althone Press, 1994). As Beiner argues, Löwith’s appeal to Stoicism is not an invitation to withdraw but a warning against hubris. Beiner, *Political Philosophy*, 74. Consider Löwith’s praise of the supra-historical wisdom of Scipio at Carthage in contrast to modern historical consciousness. Löwith, *Nature, History and Existentialism and Other Essays in the Philosophy of History*, ed. Arnold Levison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 137. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
8. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
9. Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss, “Correspondence Concerning Modernity,” translated by George Elliot Tucker, *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 5/6 (1988), 188. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
10. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
11. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 4, 6-9. Löwith argues that the ancient Greek experience of nature and history is reflected in the reflections of Chinese and Japanese thought as well. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
12. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 6. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
13. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
14. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 190. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
15. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 168-70. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
16. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 103. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
17. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 116-17, 194. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
18. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 212. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
19. Barash, “The Sense of History: On the Political Implications of Karl Löwith’s Concept of Secularization,” 73. On the tension on Voegelin’s presentation of Christianity, see Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* (Chicago: Henry Regnery: 1968), 109. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
20. Joachim of Flores of course plays a central role in Voegelin’s discussion of how modernity immanentizes the Christian eschaton. The difference between the interpretations is that where Voegelin views Joachim as a perversion of Christian thought, in Löwith’s presentation Joachim represents a modification but an inevitable modification of the Christian theology of history. Joachim acting as the Marx to Voltaire’s Augustine. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
21. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 156. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
22. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 149-53. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
23. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 159. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
24. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 191. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
25. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 198-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
26. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 207. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
27. Beiner, *Political Philosophy*, 71; Habermas, *Philosophical Profiles*, 79-80; Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, 172-73. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
28. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 221. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
29. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 222 [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
30. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 220. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
31. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
32. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 25-26. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
33. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 43; 58, 90-91; 96; 101. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
34. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 161. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
35. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 160-64. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
36. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 206-07. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
37. Löwith, *Nature, History, and Existentialism and Other Essays in the Philosophy of History*, ed. Arnold Levison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966),137. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
38. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 207. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
39. Ronald Beiner’s excellent study of Löwith’s philosophy is particularly helpful in clarifying these issues. Beiner, *Political Philosophy*, 77-79. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
40. Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, 174. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
41. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)