**Critics of Enlightenment Rationalism: Volume II**

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**Carl Schmitt’s Exceptional Critique of Rationalism**

**I – Introduction**

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) is one of the major legal and political theorists of the twentieth century. He is well known both for having introduced a set of theoretical concepts and categories like friend and enemy distinction, norm and exception, and the political that are still widely used today to make sense of modern politics and for his involvement with National Socialism. These sources of his reputation are not entirely unrelated, since his legal and political thought, especially his scathing critique of liberalism as the politics of rational but soulless modernity, renders the path he chose in the 1930s an alluring possibility, though, obviously, one he need not take.

Schmitt’s early developed concern with and reflections on the political realities of his time offers a partial explanatory context for the eventual convergence between his political ideas and political practice. Germany’s defeat at the end of the First World War, the so-called November Criminals’ acceptance of contentious terms of the Versailles Treaty, the dissolution of the German Empire, and formation of the constitutionally democratic Weimar Republic, which failed to control the extremist groups within the country were among the major formative events on Schmitt’s political thought. Conservatives like him considered the Weimar constitution that attempted to establish liberal democracy on conservative foundations as fundamentally non-German and, therefore, antithetical to German state tradition as well as “the existential nature of the German people.”[[1]](#endnote-1) Moreover, they held the 1848 Revolution, “the moment of [Germany’s] infection with the disease of liberalism,” responsible for the eventual demise of the Imperial State of Germany in 1918.[[2]](#endnote-2) Even before the disaster of the Great War, therefore, reactionary sentiments against modern civilization, its capitalist economic organization and liberal political structure were prevalent among conservative intellectuals. The views of these thinkers, which Georg Lukács dubbed “Romantic anti-capitalism,” exerted considerable influence on Schmitt.[[3]](#endnote-3)

In late-nineteenth-century Germany, romantic anti-capitalism took the form of anxiety over the compatibility of the alien values and practices of “Western *Zivilisation*,” particularly those of England and France, with the “German *Kultur*.”[[4]](#endnote-4) German romantics expressed these worries by rejecting, through criticism, what they considered to be life-negating incarnations of Enlightenment rationality in modern science, capitalism, liberalism, and Marxism and by yearning for their older, simpler, yet more meaningful forms of existence.[[5]](#endnote-5) They stated their preference for *Gemeinschaft,* the organic community of the past, instead of *Gesselschaft*, the modern mechanical grouping of otherwise isolated individuals.[[6]](#endnote-6) These matters, which were also framed in terms of an opposition between ‘foreign’ technology and ‘organic’ culture, peaked during the Weimar era when it came to be referred to as “*die Streit um die Technik*, the debate about technology.”[[7]](#endnote-7)

The First World War and the Weimar Republic constitute a turning point for this debate since both events shattered the romantics’ nostalgic hope of restoring the lost community of the past.[[8]](#endnote-8) It is in this context that what Herf identifies as ‘reactionary modernism’ that Schmitt was part of, along with “Hans Freyer, Ernest Jünger…Werner Sombart and Oswald Spengler” took shape.[[9]](#endnote-9) Reactionary modernists inherited the concerns of German romanticism and the vocabulary in which these were framed but reinterpreted them to overcome what they thought were its grave deficiencies, namely its backward-looking, sentimental, passive, and unmanly nature.[[10]](#endnote-10)

The problems of the Weimar Republic, according to reactionary modernists, called for active intervention. They were, thus, critical both of rationalists of liberal and Marxist credo and conservative romantics. Neither, according to them, could offer a satisfactory solution to the German crisis of authority since both, in their peculiar ways, encouraged political passivity. Paralysis, however, could not be a recipe for securing internal order or countering the looming Bolshevik threat. Consequently, they held, contra romantics, that total rejection of achievements of modernity, especially in the realm of technology, was a formula for weakness and sought ways of reconciling it with native aspects of German culture and tradition. They believed that such reconciliation would imbue soulless modernity with existential meaning.

It is against this political and intellectual backdrop and with the existing problems of Weimar in mind that Schmitt wrote most of his works. His intellectual, theoretical endeavor was to expose and overcome the limits of intellectual foundations of existing social and political (dis)order such as the dichotomous understanding of modernity, pluralism, liberalism, parliamentarism, constitutionalism and so on. Part of his motivation in so doing was possibly his resolute belief in the intellectuals' responsibility for social and political order. Besides other motivations and contingencies, this conviction would, in the 1930s, make him an ally of National Socialism.

In what follows, we present Schmitt’s critique of Enlightenment rationality. First, we focus on his general treatment of the rationalist-romantic conundrum central to his understanding of the modern predicament. Second, we concentrate on his particular critique of rationalism in politics as it manifests itself in liberalism and liberal principles and institutions. Finally, in the concluding section, we offer some reasons for the significance of Schmitt’s critique of rationalism for our times.

**II - Schmitt’s Understanding of Modernity: Between Technical Rationality and Romantic Aestheticization**

Schmitt holds that although “radical dualism” governs “every sphere of the contemporary epoch,” the modern age is typically understood and portrayed, like Max Weber does, in terms of increasing rationalization, which permeates all areas of life, including religion, economics, and politics.[[11]](#endnote-11) He, like Weber, characterizes modernity in terms of growing domination of what he calls economic-technical rationality in the world.[[12]](#endnote-12) In one of his earliest writings, a monograph on Theodor Däubler’s epic poem, *Nordlicht* (Northern Lights) published in 1916, he depicts modernity that is dominated by economic-technological rationality as “the capitalistic, mechanistic, relativistic age, as the age of transport, of technology, of organization.”[[13]](#endnote-13) Schmitt does not intend to convey, with this portrayal, simply a picture of an age conquered by automobiles, airplanes, factories, assembly lines, and bureaucratic establishments. For him, technology is, just as it was for earlier German romantics, the prime emblem of the spirit of the age. Hence, it connotes a particular way of thinking about the world, which has become so prevalent that everything else like ethics, aesthetics, and politics acquires its form and meaning in relation to its paradigm.[[14]](#endnote-14)

"The spirit of technicity," as Schmitt sometimes calls this mindset of the age, to distinguish it from material technology, manifests itself in “this-worldly activism” propelled by “the belief in a limitless power and domination of man over nature, even over human nature.”[[15]](#endnote-15) A world governed by this spirit, by economic-technological rationality is machinelike: it is productive, efficient, rule-governed, and, to that extent, predictable. It is also a world in which quantity instead of quality becomes the measure of everything resulting in “quantification of life.”[[16]](#endnote-16) As the sole standard of achievement, quantification encourages continual activity, yet it undermines the moral substance of human action. Instrumental, utilitarian, manipulative motivations replace all the higher values. In this age, Schmitt writes, “[r]ight had become might; loyalty, calculability; truth, generally acknowledged correctness; beauty, good taste; […] A sublimely differentiated usefulness and harmfulness took the place of the distinction between good and evil.”[[17]](#endnote-17) Hence, economic-technological rationality is also the rationality of the world that Weber dubbed disenchanted, where “the prison of the soul has become a cosy summer residence.”[[18]](#endnote-18) It is perhaps a world of great material comforts but home to mechanical, soulless, spiritless, meaningless existence bereft of moral guidance of higher purposes.

German romantics, Schmitt attests, understood this situation well and reacted to what they considered to be sources of disenchantment in modernity. They levelled powerful critiques against economic-technological rationality that undergirds modern capitalism, science and technology. However, they could not go beyond lamentation and criticism, since to redeem the present they turned their gaze to a lost past. This turn towards the past as a source of value and meaning for the present signifies, for Schmitt, its aestheticization, whereby a past object, event or place becomes an aesthetic object of individual contemplation to be privately consumed as one pleases. Romantic activity, therefore, is essentially passive.[[19]](#endnote-19) Romantics, Schmitt remarks, transform the world “not by means of activity, but by mood and imagination.”[[20]](#endnote-20) Romanticism so-conceived cannot constitute a challenge to economic-technological rationality, since it privatizes, and, therefore neutralizes the supposed source of value and meaning. In so doing, it remains within the rationalist paradigm it sets out to transcend and becomes flipside of rationalism.

Modernity, according to Schmitt, is Janus-faced: it contains within itself an “assortment of antitheses.”[[21]](#endnote-21) The antithesis between rationalism and romanticism is only one among many of its manifestations: form vs. content, rationality vs. irrationality, universal vs. particular, abstract vs. concrete, objective vs. subjective, norm vs. exception, machine vs. soul are some of the others. Schmitt believes that if we were to attempt to understand this Janus-faced modernity solely from the perspective of economic-technological rationality, we would fail to comprehend it in its entirety. Romanticism pungently enunciated this: that there are, and will always be, aspects of life, which simply elude rationality. Ultimately, however, it became trapped within the rationalistic paradigm itself.

Despite the cunning of reason, our life is still struck by indeterminacy, irresoluteness, irrationality, and mystery. That it is so is not an anomaly as progressive modernists would like us to believe, but a permanent condition of our modernity, according to Schmitt. The opposition between the forces of rationality and irrationality and its various manifestations are two sides of the Janus-faced modernity. Schmitt’s intellectual ambition was to formulate a theoretical framework that captures and expresses both of these sides neither by prioritizing one over the other nor by striking a compromise, but as separate, yet interrelated “members in tension” in a “*complexio oppositorum*,” “a complex of opposites.”[[22]](#endnote-22) The ultimate meaning of the complex, he thought, would originate from the inherent tension between the distinct pairs. His definition of the political in terms of a friend and enemy distinction could be interpreted as a move in this direction. The substantive emptiness of this particular tension, however, would render his theoretical scheme critically powerless in the face of the politics of National Socialism.

In the following section, we turn to Schmitt’s criticism of rationalism in politics as it manifests itself in his critique of liberalism in general and liberal parliamentary politics in particular.

**III - Schmitt’s Critique of Rationalism in Politics**

Rationalism in politics, according to Schmitt, manifests itself in both of the dominant ideologies of the age: liberalism and socialism. In their own peculiar ways, both are embodiments of economic-technological rationality that Schmitt identifies as one of the structural elements of modernity alongside romantic aestheticization. While the abstract formalism of Enlightenment rationality plagues liberalism, Soviet socialism is partially successful, according to him, in bringing together form and content by imbuing this kind of formal rationality with substance, albeit a mythical one. Though Schmitt first searches for a non-mythical foundation that would bring the binaries of modernity together, later, he endorses myth himself, which marks his move from conservatism to Nazism.

Schmitt criticizes liberal thought characterized by economic-technical rationality for failing to provide moral meaning and guidance to human life, while he criticizes liberal political practices and institutions, such as the rule of law and constitutional, representative democracy, for their failure to provide substance to politics. He characterizes the modern age in terms of successive stages of “neutralizations and depoliticizations” and considers liberalism with its explicit endorsement of the principle of neutrality as the politics of the latest stage in this development.[[23]](#endnote-23)

He argues that since the religious wars of the 16th century, the European intellectuals, whom he calls "clerics", have been searching for a neutral sphere that would be free of conflict.[[24]](#endnote-24) Each century, he argues, has found such neutrality in different realms that soon became conflictual themselves and therefore abandoned and replaced by another. Consequently, theology, which was the organizing idea, or the "central sphere", as Schmitt calls it, of the 16th century, was superseded by metaphysics in the 17th.[[25]](#endnote-25) Metaphysics was followed by humanitarian ethics and morality in the 18th century, economics in the 19th century and technology in the 20th. The ineradicable human propensity to conflict, for Schmitt, is why “Europeans always have wandered from a conflictual to a neutral sphere, and always the newly-won neutral sphere has become immediately another arena of struggle, once again necessitating the search for a new neutral sphere.”[[26]](#endnote-26)

In the 20th century, “the absolute and neutral ground has been found in technology since apparently there is nothing more neutral.”[[27]](#endnote-27) The belief in technological progress and its associated promise of deliverance from all problems is so pervasive in this century that Schmitt characterizes it “as the age not only of technology but of a religious belief in technology.”[[28]](#endnote-28) A strong conviction about the neutrality of this central sphere accompanies this belief. Technology is considered to be neutral primarily because it has no substantive content and is, therefore, potentially free of conflict. However, Schmitt argues that contrary to the general conviction, its lack of content and seeming neutrality makes technology a perfect tool for manipulation, domination and mastery over nature, including human nature. Depending on the context, it "can be revolutionary or reactionary, can serve freedom or oppression."[[29]](#endnote-29) Which one, in the end, it does is a political question that requires a political answer. The Russians, according to Schmitt, have understood this, while Europeans have not. Schmitt laments, hence, that while Soviet Russia, where “the anti-religion of technicity has been put into practice” brings together “rationalism and its opposite” in “the union of Socialism and Slavism,” Europeans “still live in a period of exhaustion” and “in the eye of the more radical brother.”[[30]](#endnote-30) The Soviet experience proves that the age of neutralization is over and that “technology is no longer a neutral ground,” but a battleground for domination.[[31]](#endnote-31) Therefore, European liberal states like Germany can no longer afford to stay neutral but must face the fundamental political decision and distinguish between friend and enemy.[[32]](#endnote-32)

According to him, modern liberal states that partake in the general neutrality of the age of technology and legitimize their authority precisely on the basis of the principle of neutrality are ill-suited for this fundamental political task. The decision between friend and enemy, which makes political activity purposeful and meaningful, necessitates relinquishing neutrality. Liberal preference for value-neutral proceduralism over explicit moral and political commitments paralyzes liberal states and turns politics into spiritless, immaterial administration. Schmitt further contends that, in actuality, liberal states are far from being entirely neutral. Behind the facade of neutrality, they use politics instrumentally to safeguard the factional interests of various groups. This instrumentalization of politics, which is yet another symptom of infiltration of economic-technological rationality into the political realm, tends to undermine, or at least conceal, the existential significance of the political decision.

Schmitt’s general critique of liberalism is, then, that it tries to suppress and displace the political or the omnipresence of conflict. Liberalism, he argues, transforms the political concept of conflict into “competition” in the domain of economics” and into “discussion in the intellectual realm,” while the enemy becomes a “competitor” or a “debating adversary.”[[33]](#endnote-33) For Schmitt, liberal depoliticization is objectionable because a world without friend and enemy distinction or identity generating conflict is devoid of higher purpose and value, and, hence, one-dimensional, trivial and worthless.[[34]](#endnote-34) Schmitt ultimately traces the origin of this liberal impulse to the Enlightenment tradition that introduces a rift between object and subject, mind and spirit, universal and particular, abstract and concrete and so on. In liberal political thought, bifurcated modernity manifests itself in the fundamental opposition between the state and the individual, which grounds others like the public sphere vs. the private sphere and the state vs. the society. For Schmitt, the liberal state in its entirety is ruled by these dualities: “down to the last ramifications of the ostensibly abstract theories and conceptualizations” as well as “the last detail of its legislative, administrative and judicial organization.”[[35]](#endnote-35) The political practices and institutions of the liberal state, such as parliamentarism and representation, are, therefore, at the center of Schmitt’s critique of rationalism in politics.

However, it is essential to emphasize its contextual nature before proceeding with Schmitt's critique of these liberal practices and institutions. Following his conviction that "[a]ll essential concepts are not normative but existential,” and, therefore, can only be understood in relation to a concrete experience, Schmitt does not aim his criticisms at parliamentarism and representation *per se*, but on the form and meaning these practices and institutions assumed since the mid-nineteenth century.[[36]](#endnote-36) Emanating from the same conviction, part of his critique centers on the foreignness of what he deems fundamentally English practices, which spread in Prussia in the aftermath of the 1848 Revolution, to the native German state tradition. For Schmitt, the import of these alien practices and institutions was a recipe for further fragmenting the already divided social and political scene of Weimar Germany.[[37]](#endnote-37)

Schmitt, who conceptualizes the state as a concrete unity just like the Roman Catholic church, is convinced that liberal parliamentarism, which has its roots in the English political tradition, is not a solution for restoring and maintaining the veracity and the unity of the state. Neither is it key to establishing and upholding political stability, especially in conditions of “polarized pluralism.”[[38]](#endnote-38) Liberal parliamentarism can, at best, express an existing unity but cannot itself construct it. The relative stability of the English political system, for instance, according to Schmitt, is not due to the merits of its parliamentarism but rather due to the strong sense of national unity prevalent among the English people.[[39]](#endnote-39)

The core of Schmitt’s critique against liberal parliamentarism is, hence, that though the institution once successfully functioned in the mixed political regimes of the nineteenth century, it is redundant in the conditions of mass society, mass democracy and mass party politics, because under these conditions it can no longer facilitate rational collective will formation. The primary reason for this outcome is the infiltration of economic-technological rationality into political representation. While representation originally meant, Schmitt argues, giving a material presence to something that exists as an essence and thereby making it publicly visible through the very act of representation, modern political representation is more like mere reproduction of what is already physically present.[[40]](#endnote-40) Schmitt models the original idea of parliamentary representation on the Roman Catholic church, which he describes as a *complexio oppositorum*, a complex of opposites.[[41]](#endnote-41) In *Roman Catholicism*, he suggests that:

The simple meaning of the principle of representation is that the members of Parliament are representatives of the whole people and thus have an independent authority vis-à-vis the voters. Instead of deriving their authority from the individual voter, they continue to derive it from the people. “The member of parliament is not bound by instructions and commands and is answerable to his conscience alone”. This means that the personification of the people and the unity of Parliament as their representative at least implies the idea of a complexio oppositorum, that is, the unity of the plurality of interests and parties. It is conceived in representative rather than economic terms.[[42]](#endnote-42)

Modern parliamentarism based on representation by political party delegates, who are mere “administrative servants” of their increasingly rationalized and bureaucratized parties, fragments the popular will instead of unifying it.[[43]](#endnote-43) Instead of representing the substantive unity of the people as a whole, the delegates become spokespersons of party ideology, the factional interests of organized groups or quantified members of their constituencies to win electoral majorities. Schmitt, at times, attributes parliament’s ability to no longer represent the popular will to the corruption of its fundamental principle, public discussion, under conditions of pluralism and mass democracy.[[44]](#endnote-44) Under these conditions, public discussion, he argues, becomes either a hollow formality or an electoral instrument of bargaining and negotiation instead of a means for pursuing the truth.[[45]](#endnote-45) At other times, however, he launches a wholesale attack on the notion of public discussion, which he considers to be predicated on a general rational liberal assumption “[t]hat the truth can be found through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that competition will produce harmony.”[[46]](#endnote-46) Contrary to this assumption that conflict can be transformed into opinion and resolved by discussion, Schmitt holds that discussion can only generate more discussion, and result in an “unending conversation” or culminate in a partial, non-representative resolution rather than in anything like a sovereign decision expressing the general will of the people on which the legitimacy of parliamentarism ultimately depends.[[47]](#endnote-47) To the question “Christ or Barabbas?” the liberal answers “with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a committee of investigation.”[[48]](#endnote-48)

Schmitt is convinced that the political principle of the age is democracy. The essence of democracy, for him, lies in the identity of the ruler and the ruled, whereby the sovereign will conveys the will of the people as a political unity established on the basis of some chosen "substance of equality", be that “civic virtue,” “religious convictions,” class, or “national homogeneity.”[[49]](#endnote-49) Liberal parliamentarism, due to its commitment to an abstract, universal human equality, refuses to discriminate on the basis of any such substance and cannot, therefore, express the substantive homogeneity of the people.[[50]](#endnote-50) This kind of parliamentarism, Schmitt suggests, is lacking democracy; that is, it is without normative justification and is, consequently, only an expediency. It is not difficult to see how he moves from such portrayal of parliamentarism as a “simply practical-technical means” to his proposal that the democratic essence is “just as well and perhaps better realized through acclamation,” through “antiparliamentary Caesarism.”[[51]](#endnote-51) He writes that:

Compared to a democracy that is direct, not only in the technical sense but only in the vital sense parliament appears as artificial machinery, produced by liberal reasoning, while dictatorial and Caesaristic methods not only can produce the acclamation of the people but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance and power.”[[52]](#endnote-52)

It is important to emphasize that, for Schmitt, the principles and institutions of liberalism are inappropriate not only in the age of mass democracy, but also in the face of the imminent threat of Bolshevism. Soviet socialism, for him, is an example of a successful marriage of rationality and irrationality. Absolutely centralized, rationalized, bureaucratized party state’s promise of a stateless society in the future demonstrates an effective combination of technology and myth. Schmitt grows increasingly convinced that the West would benefit from a similar approach and finds it realized in the Third Reich.

**IV - Conclusion**

Schmitt is likely to outlast all of his contemporaries as the symbolic representative of the crisis of his age. This is doubtless partly a matter of style. Schmitt could not only forge an unforgettable argument: he could delineate stark antitheses. He presented us with a picture of the world torn into two, between friend and enemy, between rationality and myth, between the old church-and-state tradition and the new tradition of the political, between the liberalism which fails to understand the political and the various expedients—such as dictator, sovereign, church, movement—that Schmitt brought into play to restore a sense of the political.

Though Schmitt was an antithetical thinker, he was continually looking for answers to the riddles of politics: looking for some Archimedean point that would enable us not only to understand the world but to stabilize it. Stabilization meant reversing the depoliticizations and neutralizations, also the liberalizations and rationalizations, of his time. This is what makes Schmitt a confusing thinker, because he himself struggled with his antitheses. He, too, wanted to transcend them. But he never overcame the antinomies of his own thought through dialectical synthesis, of the contradiction between Romanticism and Enlightenment.

We may disagree with Schmitt about his positive suggestions for transcending the antinomies of modernity, but there is no question that the vision of the world Schmitt engineered in the Weimar period is still a vision of our world. We are still troubled by the tension between liberalism and democracy, we are still troubled by our inability to establish foundations for legal order, we still see no way to harness together the great forces of constitutionalism and populism, and, above all, we are still out of our depth politically in a world of vast technological possibility and of abundant instances of unreason, which are, paradoxically, expressed in terms of rationality. As long as the possibility of reason becoming myth and of myth becoming reason remains, Schmitt’s status as the Janus of our civilization seems assured.

1. Joshua Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation’: Carl Schmitt’s teleological history of the Second Reich,” *History of European Ideas* 44, no. 5 (2018): 590-604; 591. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation,’” 592. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Michael Löwy, “Naphta or Settembrini? Lukács and Romantic Anticapitalism,” *New German Critique* 42 (1987), 23. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984), 1. See also, Michael Löwy, “The Romantic and the Marxist Critique of Modern Civilization,” *Theory and Society* 16, no. 6 (1987), 892. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*, 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Löwy, “The Romantic,” 892. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid., 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid., 24. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid., 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid., 30. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid., 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. For the relationship between Weber and Schmitt, see also, Kjell Englebrekt, “What Carl Schmitt Picked up in Weber’s Seminar: A Historical Controversy Revisited,” *The European Legacy* 14 (2009), 667-84; John P. McCormick, *Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31-82; G.L. Ulmen, “The Sociology of the State: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber,” *State, Culture and Society* 1 (1985), 3-57; Dana Villa, “The Legacy of Max Weber in Weimar Political and Social Theory,” in *Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy*, eds. Peter E. Gordon and John P. McCormick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 73-97. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Carl Schmitt, Theodor Däublers ‘Nordlicht’. *Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die Aktualität des Werkes* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1991), 63-65. Cited and translated in Heinrich Meier, *The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between Political Theology and Political Philosophy*, trans. Marcus Brainard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, ed. and trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985 [1922]), 35; Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, ed. and trans. Georg Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1932]), 93. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Carl Schmitt, “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” trans. Matthias Konzett and John P. McCormick, *Telos* 96 (1993 [1929]), 130-142; 140. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Löwy, “The Romantic,” 892. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Schmitt, “Theodor Däublers,” 69 cited in Meier, *The Lesson*, 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, 115-16. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid., 84. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Carl Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, ed. and trans. G. L. Ulmen (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996 [1923]), 23. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Hugo E. Herrera, *Carl Schmitt between Technological Rationality and Theology: The Position and Meaning of His Legal Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2020), 4; Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism*, 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Schmitt, “Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” 136. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid., 135. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid., 132. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid., 138. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid., 138. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid., 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Ibid., 140. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 131; 130; 130; 131. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid., 141. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Ibid., 28. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Schmitt, *Political Romanticism*, 109-62. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Carl Schmitt, *State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity*, ed. and trans. Simona Draghici (Corvallis: Plutarch Press, 2001), 24. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Schmitt, “Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Smeltzer, “‘Germany’s Salvation’,” 600. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Dominique Leydet “Pluralism and the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy” in *Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism*, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 110. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Ibid., 114-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. For Schmitt's theory of representation, see Duncan Kelly, "Carl Schmitt's Theory of Representation," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 65, no. 1 (2004): 113-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism,* 7-8; 14; 18-9. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid., 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid., 26-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. There is a clear discrepancy, for instance, between his 1926 Preface to *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* and the main body of the text published in 1923. In the latter, he comes across as unreserved antiparliamentarist, while, in the former, he is at pains to prove that he is not against parliamentarism per se, but only to its contemporary instantiation. For a more detailed discussion, see McCormick, *Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism*, 157-205. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, ed. and trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988 [1923]), 4-6; 49-50; Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Schmitt, *The Crisis*, 35. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Schmitt, *The Crisis*, 36. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Schmitt, *Political Theology,* 62. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Schmitt, *The Crisis*, 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., 11. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., 8; 16; 34. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., 16-7. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)