Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” is rightly famous. In it, she argues explicitly for several theses and implicitly for several more; studying the essay, one gets the impression that these theses are related to one another by implication—but it’s not obvious precisely *how* they are related. In this chapter, I suggest—less controversially, perhaps—that at the heart of “Modern Moral Philosophy” is Anscombe’s rejection of what she calls “consequentialism.” I also suggest—more controversially, perhaps—that Anscombe is articulating a tension within consequentialism: the *form* of consequentialism presupposes the existence of a divine legislator, while the *content* of consequentialism presupposes the nonexistence of a divine legislator. In making this argument, I employ the work of David Solomon, a senior scholar of the work of Elizabeth Anscombe.