Over the course of several decades, John Gray has been a consistent critic of the later Rawls, and in particular, a critic of the idea that an overlapping consensus solves the problem of pluralism. On Gray’s view, the Rawlsian solution only deals with a kind of superficial pluralism. In arguing that subjects will rationally converge (for a multitude of different reasons) upon liberal principles, Gray argues, Rawls still assumes that acceptability requires rational convergence upon a single way of life. True, the reasons for accepting this way of life may vary, but for Gray, this just lands us back in the seat of the problem of pluralism: why, in the face of serious political controversy, should we assume that the only acceptable political regime is the one arrived at through a Rawlsian overlapping consensus? Gray’s own response to the problem, developed over a series of papers, is, to ditch the requirement that acceptability rides on rational convergence on a single political arrangement. Instead, he argues, the problem of pluralism shows us that there isn’t a single way of life or political arrangement that is, for all subjects and times, singularity acceptable. Rather, he argues, if we are to save liberalism from the problem of pluralism, we must instead see it not as the only acceptable regime, but rather, as a *modus vivendi*.

In this paper, I provide a detailed exposition of Gray’s critique of Rawl’s solution to the problem of pluralism. I then defend Gray from a recent criticism. Sleat (2019) argues that Gray’s *modus vivendi* doesn’t constitute a viable solution to the problem of pluralism, and this because he smuggles in universalist premises of the type he criticizes in Rawls. I argue that Sleat’s argument fails, because we are open to interpret Gray’s pluralism in a direction which does not commit him to such universalist premises.