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Thomas Aquinas on Work

Introduction

Although Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is still often seen as the main representative of medieval philosophy and theology, this view needs qualification. Although he was a doubtless important figure of thirteenth-century scholasticism, his later dominance was partly established by his followers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and especially by the papal encyclical *Aetarni Patris* in 1879, which declared his exposition of Catholic doctrine a definitive one. There were, however, many other philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages who discussed similar issues – in this case, the issue of work – so Aquinas should be treated as one of those and not as the spokesperson of any “medieval consensus.” Even if one does not agree with the opinion of some modern scholars such as John Marenbon that the study of Aquinas should be banned in departments of medieval studies for twenty or thirty years (to give way to other, lesser-known scholastics),[[1]](#endnote-1) it should be kept in mind that his arguments were part of a many-sided debate.

Moreover, it would be a gross exaggeration to say that the topic of work was a central concern for Aquinas. He first discussed it as part of the defense of those religious orders that no longer sustained themselves by manual labor, while his most frequently cited text was a *Quodlibet*, a question posed to him at a public dispute and not chosen by him for its inherent importance. Even though the argument of these early works were further developed in his later theological summaries, their point of departure always remained the same question (“whether it was obligatory for the members of a religious order to do manual work”). A more overarching “Thomistic theory of work” is thus something to be reconstructed from these scattered references and not a doctrine he laid out in a fully-fledged form.[[2]](#endnote-2)

The reason why it is nevertheless worth dealing with Aquinas is that many modern authors do the same, mostly in the field of economics. Some of them suggest that he was a forerunner of Adam Smith on the division of labor, or even of Marx on the labor theory of value; while others maintain that he promoted a more “humane” economy than ours, making him an *avant la lettre* critic of capitalism.[[3]](#endnote-3) While all these accounts testify to the enduring influence of Aquinas, they are also to some extent mistaken, for his main concern was theological, or rather soteriological (connected to the salvation of the human being), and not strictly speaking social or economic. To understand his point, it will thus be necessary to have recourse to the original texts, preceded by a brief overview of their terminology and historical context. The conclusion will then return to the significance of Aquinas for present-day discussions, while also trying to avoid anachronistic interpretations and hasty generalizations.

Terminology

Before discussing Thomas Aquinas’s reflections, it should be remembered that in medieval Latin we find several words that can be translated as “work”. The main instances are *opus* and *labor*, but it would be a mistake to suggest a clear analytical distinction between the two. Although Aquinas more frequently speaks of manual work as *labor manualis* or *labor manuum*, and of spiritual or theoretical work as *opus spirituale*, he sometimes inverts the wording, using phrases such as *opus manuale* and *labor in verbo* or *in doctrina* (especially where his biblical or ecclesiastical sources do the same). All this, therefore, is more of an issue of contemporary linguistic usage than of any strict categorization.

Regarding the antecedents of this usage, the distinction of *opus* and *labor* was also less clear in classical Latin than it is sometimes supposed. Romans translated the Greek word *ergon* as *opus*,although the latter most often meant not “work” as an activity but its result. The Greek *ponos*, in turn, was translated as *labor*, although it was much more rarely used than *opus*; when the two were explicitly distinguished, as in Virgil’s *Aeneid*, it was to emphasize the difference between the expected result and the effort to achieve it (*hoc opus, hic labor est*). So, again, it was not a distinction of intellectual and physical work.[[4]](#endnote-4) Even *ars*,which meant a specific form of work requiring a higher-than-average level of ability, could mean an either intellectual or manual activity (or both).

All this, of course, does not mean that classical and medieval authors did not care about such distinctions. Theoretical or spiritual work was always contrasted to physical activities, but this is not something that can be grasped by a purely formal, terminological analysis.

The historical context

To understand the significance of work for Aquinas’s age, it is necessary to briefly outline three important developments that brought the issue in the forefront of theoretical reflection. First, medieval Europe experienced rapid socio-economic progress between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. This was, as Karl Redl suggested, partly due to the “anti-animistic stance of Christian theology that condemned the worship of nature and its religious veneration, declaring that rule over nature, the rational utilization of its gifts was a divine command.”[[5]](#endnote-5) It also meant that the problems of economics gained greater importance, to which the rediscovery of Aristotelian philosophy contributed as well; all this before the background of the emerging medieval city-republics (and let us not forget that Aquinas himself was of Italian descent, where such tendencies were prominent). In Christian theology, such developments were reflected by the works of Dominicus Gundissalinus (*De divisione philosophiae*, which acknowledged the importance of “mechanical arts” as ways to transform natural things)[[6]](#endnote-6) or Hugh of Saint-Victor and Richard of Saint-Victor, who embraced natural sciences not only because of their theoretical excellence but also because of their capability to “work” on nature.[[7]](#endnote-7) The specific problems of trade and usury were also not totally novel, but had been given a new impetus with the economic changes of the era.

The second new development was the appearance of new religious orders such as the Cistercians or the Franciscans, for whom the issue of productive, manual work appeared as a concrete ethical challenge. Here again, the *ora et labora* (“pray and work”) principle had been present since the beginnings of the monastic movement – the most notable example being the Rule of Saint Benedict (c. 530) – but it was now that the more complex issues of the relationship between manual work, contemplation, teaching and preaching, begging, wages, or property ownership appeared in a new light. While “monks practicing the ministry of the word had previously been very rare”, the ascendant mendicant orders “controversially eschewed the more traditional insistence on self-sustenance through labor and accepted alms from supportive communities.”[[8]](#endnote-8) Conflicts between traditional and “modern” religious orders – that were explicitly devoted to apostolic mission in this world – were thus often articulated within the theological and ethical context of work, the relationship between physical and intellectual activities, or the relation between active and contemplative life. A characteristic compromise was offered by Saint Francis of Assisi, whose first and second rule for his brothersconfirmed that although manual work was obligatory, an evangelical command, it could not impede spiritual life and could not be done for money.[[9]](#endnote-9)

A more radical view was presented by the Dominicans whose very name (*Ordo Predicatorum*) implied that their main task was that of preaching. Since, however, preaching was impossible without learning and teaching, Aquinas – who himself was a Dominican *magister* at the university of Paris – found himself in the midst of a third controversy, one that concerned the intellectual “work” of academics. The need to harmonize contemplation (spiritual immergence in the divine) and activity (even if it was an intellectual activity such as scholarship and education) added a new dimension to the previous problem of “manual” and “spiritual” work. The motto of the Dominicans, *Contemplare et contemplata aliis tradere* (“Contemplate and transmit the contemplated things to others”), was in fact a paraphrase of what Thomas Aquinas wrote in his *Summa*, reflecting on the complex relationship between “contemplative” and “active” forms of life:

In a simple sense, contemplative life is better than active life which is concerned with bodily acts; yet an active life by which the fruits of contemplation are handed down to others by preaching and teaching is more perfect than a solely contemplative one, because such a life presupposes an abundance of contemplation.[[10]](#endnote-10)

The categorization of work thus became even more difficult: doing manual work was no longer opposed to not working at all, but to a new concept of work that included intellectual work as well, while the latter – as a special form of activity – also remained distinguished from mere contemplation. At a personal level, therefore, Aquinas’s main concern was how to reject the claim that only manual work counted as “real,” and – at the same time – how to avoid the other extreme, according to which only contemplation, prayer, or asceticism should be treated as religious duties. In the former case, it could have been objected against academics such as him and his companions that they ignored the biblical command of Saint Paul: “if anyone was unwilling to work, neither should that one eat”;[[11]](#endnote-11) while in the latter, they could have been criticized for not being religious enough.

The Texts of Aquinas

The first text which explicitly deals with our topic is the *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem* (1256). As the title suggests (“Against those who attack God’s cult and religion”, where “religion” means the life of religious orders and not religion in the modern, more general sense), it was written as a reply to those, who – like William of St. Amour – insisted that monks had always had an obligation to work with their own hands.[[12]](#endnote-12) The peculiarity of Aquinas’s argument is that after an angry outburst against the “malice” of such “enemies of the Holy City”, “heretics”, or “bad Catholics”[[13]](#endnote-13), he nevertheless lists dozens of passages from the Bible, Saint Augustine and other Church Fathers, or the Decretals[[14]](#endnote-14) that seem to support their view.

The main passage is, of course, Saint Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians (see above), to which Aquinas quite fairly adds that the apostle commanded physical work – agriculture or handicraft – which cannot be explained away by spiritualizing his message. Those who do not understand this “blind both themselves and others to the true meaning of this charitable admonition” when they refuse to obey it.[[15]](#endnote-15) There is, however, another extreme that Aquinas tries to avoid, and this is the idea that manual labor is an absolute command. It should not be forgotten what Jesus said: “Do not worry about your life, what you will eat, or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more than food and the body more than clothing?”[[16]](#endnote-16)

In other words – and this is where Aquinas seems to transcend the original question of what the members of a religious order should or should not do –, the precept of manual work is not an unconditional one. Saint Paul, as he concludes, gave the command to labor only in particular cases. The main aim of manual labor has always been to avoid sin: for thieves, it is better to live by work than by stealing; for the covetous, it is better to base their livelihood on work than on desiring what belongs to others; and for those, who follow morally questionable ways of making a living, it is better to turn to manual work instead. Sins, however, can be avoided by other means, and there are works which are even more advantageous than hand labor: “Hence they who minister to the spiritual necessities of the state, either by preaching or expounding the Scriptures or assisting in the public prayers of the Church, have a far better right to be supported by the contributions of the faithful. They are, therefore, not bound to manual labor.” Aquinas nevertheless calls all these “*labor*”, citing Saint Paul’s wording in the First Letter to Timothy (“labor in the word and doctrine”).[[17]](#endnote-17)

One last aspect to be mentioned is that the rules of work or labor form a part of natural law. Natural law, however (that part of God’s eternal law that can be grasped by natural human reason),[[18]](#endnote-18) makes two sorts of demands. There are some that only profit the individual and these must be obeyed by everyone (for instance, although it sounds somewhat strange, such is the obligation to eat). Those, on the other hand, which are advantageous to the whole human race, are not obligatory for everyone: “One individual would not suffice for the different works of reproduction, of invention, of architecture, of agriculture, or for the other functions which must be exercised for the continuance of the human race. To supply the needs common to all mankind one individual must assist another, just as in the body one limb is subserved by another.”[[19]](#endnote-19)

At this point, therefore, we get truly close to an idea of the “division of labor”, with the proviso that the rationale for such a division is not economic necessity or utility, but the plurality of human capabilities and vocations rooted in the natural law: partly in divine providence and partly in the operation of secondary causes in the world created by God.

The next, and perhaps most frequently cited text in which Aquinas tackles the topic of work is the seventh question of his seventh series of *Quodlibetal Questions*. Such questions – which were literally about “whatever you like” – formed an integral part of university life but did not belong to the formal curriculum of students. They were raised in “common disputations” or “general disputations”, where anyone in the audience could pose questions about a topic of their choice, and it was the task of the master to answer these, before closing the debate with a definite answer.

Literally anyone could attend, masters and scholars from other schools, all kinds of ecclesiastics and prelates, and even civil authorities, all the “intellectuals” of the time who were always attracted to skirmishes of this kind, and all of whom had a right to ask questions and oppose arguments.[[20]](#endnote-20)

It was thus not Aquinas’ own intention to deal with the issue of work in a more general sense than the duties of the religious. He nevertheless gave a thorough discussion, the elements of which would later appear in the *Summa theologiae* as well. (The Seventh Quodlibet dates from the first time he was a Master of Theology at the University of Paris, most probably from 1256).[[21]](#endnote-21)

As in all other disputes (the *Quaestiones disputata* or the *Summa* itself), the basic form is to pose a yes-or-no question: “Is working with your hands a commandment?” To which there are no less than seven, “seemingly” positive answers (*videtur*)from the Old Testament, Saint Paul, and Saint Augustine. Then, however, comes the “on the contrary” (*sed contra*) section, in which Matthew 6:25 is quoted again, which Aquinas interprets by saying that “the labor of the hands is opposed to this, because those who work with their hands are concerned about the necessities of the body. Therefore, the work of the hands is not in the commandment.”[[22]](#endnote-22)

After adding four more arguments (the Ten Commandments do not contain anything about manual labor; rich people who do not have to do manual work cannot for this single reason be called sinners; Saint Augustine’s advice to monks to work with their hands cannot be applied to everyone; and liberal arts, which are otherwise of a higher status than mechanical arts, are not commanded to everyone either, so mechanical arts are even less so), he concludes that “Each thing should be judged by reference to the end at which it is aimed.”[[23]](#endnote-23)

This is an important remark, for it reveals the ultimate context of Aquinas’s argument, that of teleology. Work – including manual work – is not good or bad in itself; its evaluation depends on its aim or *telos*. As he mentioned in the *Contra impugnantes*, it is good when it helps avoid idleness (*otium*) and other sins. Here, he adds that it helps to control the body (*ad corpus domandum*) and, more obviously, to seek livelihood (*ad quaerendum victum*). Since the first two may be achieved by other means (idleness by any permissible activity and control over one’s body by ascetic practices such as vigils and fasts) – the sole justification of manual work is that it sustains livelihood. In this sense, it remains a command, but one that does not oblige everyone, because natural law itself concerns what human beings are naturally directed toward, and the very design of human bodies shows they are directed toward different sorts of work.[[24]](#endnote-24)

Compared to the somewhat condescending attitude to manual work, Aquinas’s *Summa contra gentiles* (written around 1259-65) sounds more positive when it states that it is not the labor of the hands that was condemned by the Gospel, only “solicitude” or the “anxiety of mind about the necessaries of life.”[[25]](#endnote-25) It is nevertheless the human beings’ unique gift that they can win their livelihood by their own work, so even if there are exceptions to the rule, “an order cannot be rejected because of a defect which occurs in a few.”[[26]](#endnote-26) After repeating his earlier arguments in the *Contra impugnantes* and the *Quodlibet*, he once again asserts that it is only the necessity of self-sustenance that compels one to manual work, but in this sense it remains a precept, as Saint Paul said in his epistle to the Thessalonians.

Finally, in the *Summa theologiae* (which Aquinas began writing in 1265 and remained unfinished by his death in 1273), the issue of manual work is relegated to the same context in which it first arose, the duties of the members of religious orders. Since, however, this part of the *Summa* (the second part of the second part) is a complex treatise on the specifics of moral theology, the discussion of religious life appears in the more overarching context of different “states of life.” There is also a delicate change of perspective, for now the first and principal purpose of manual work is to seek livelihood (in support of which Aquinas quotes Genesis 3:19, “By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food”)[[27]](#endnote-27) to which the removal of idleness, the curbing of concupiscence, and almsgiving join as three further motives. While it is maintained that the latter can be avoided by other means, an interesting remark adds that “by manual work we mean all human duties by which people can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether these are done with hands, feet, or tongue (…) since the hand is the organ of organs, by the work of the hands is meant every effort by which someone may lawfully gain a livelihood.”[[28]](#endnote-28) In the final analysis, therefore, the boundary between physical and intellectual work turns out to be more porous than it was originally suggested, and only strictly speaking contemplative life remains separated from the active one.

Conclusion

The most important lesson from Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of work is that it is part of a teleologically conceived system of natural law. It is always the aim of any kind of work that determines its value, and the ultimate aim (“the aim of aims”) is salvation in God. Utility and practicalities are also parts of this teleological scheme, which includes the human being both as an individual and as the member of the community. That is also why there is a sort of “division of labor”, mainly between physical and intellectual work. As Jacques Le Goff said:

With Saint Thomas, the necessity of specialization for the intellectual worker was asserted in a plain and straightforward manner. The academic had his trade. The job of working with one’s hand was to be left to others – it, too, had spiritual value – but the intellectual worker was not to waste time in what was not his affair. In this way, the division of labor was legitimated on the theoretical plane and became the basis of academic specificity.[[29]](#endnote-29)

It is true that in the teleological order, intellectual work was “closer” to the human being’s real end than manual work, but, as Goff also remarks, Aquinas never went as far as some of his contemporaries (Siger of Brabant or Boethius de Dacia) who – reviving the ancient aristocratic virtue of magnanimity – declared the status of the philosopher an exceptional one, compared to which all others – with their corresponding virtues such as humility – were essentially worthless.[[30]](#endnote-30)

On the other hand, it should also be noted that Aquinas – while asserting the value of intellectual work as well as contemplation – did not exemplify a return to those early monastic views that rejected active life altogether. He unambiguously confirmed that work was a divine precept and not just a counsel; he only added that it was a precept for humanity in general, and not for every single human being. Yet, while there remained contemplatives who did not have their share in any form of activity, the category of work itself was significantly extended.[[31]](#endnote-31) It is well known that Aquinas confirmed the lawfulness of such disputed professions as that of merchants; moreover, the condemnation of usury explicitly lied on the distinction that merchants sold something that was real and useful for society while moneylenders sold “what did not exist,”[[32]](#endnote-32) meaning that they only sold the “use” of their money, claiming back the money itself (and thus, accidentally, also making money without work). The merchant, on the other hand, was seen as someone who worked for his living, and whose primary aim was not to make money but to satisfy the needs of his fellow human beings.[[33]](#endnote-33)

Which was not a naïve presupposition, however, but a criterion: a way of distinguishing “good” and “necessary” works from unjust human activities. Since this criterion was once again a teleological one that sprang from the God-given natural law that governed societies, we can indeed say that Aquinas’s various discussions of work show a remarkable consistency. This consistency at the same time relies on the mentioned teleological context and cannot be properly understood without reference to the aim of the human being or that of humanity in general.

1. J. Marenbon, “Why we shouldn’t study Aquinas” [The annual ‘Aquinas Lecture’ given at Maynooth University in March 2017]. <https://www.academia.edu/32902867/Why_we_shouldnt_study_Aquinas?sm=b> (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. The classic work of Sylvester Killeen nevertheless upholds that Aquinas’s views on the role of labor in monastic life remained remarkably consistent across his writings. S. M. Killeen, *The Philosophy of Labor According to Thomas Aquinas: A Study in Social Philosophy* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. R. W. McGee, ‘Thomas Aquinas: A Pioneer in the Field of Law and Economics.’ *Western State University Law Review* 18, No. 1 (1990), 471-483; M. L. Hirschfeld, *Aquinas and the Market: Towards a Humane Economy* (Harvard University Press, 2018); J. Hughes, *The End of Work: Theological Critiques of Capitalism* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. BLT19, *The Story of Work 3: Work and the Romans*. https://www.blt19.co.uk/the-history-of-work-3-work-and-the-romans/blt19/ (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. K. Redl, “A munka értékelése a virágzó középkorban” [The evaluation of work in the High Middle Ages], *Filozófiai Szemle* 28, No. 3-4 (1984), 284-297: 284. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid., 285. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid., 287. See also J. Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, translated by A. Goldhammer(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 117. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. J. Hanson, “Thomas Aquinas and the Qualification of Monastic Labor”, *Religions* 15 (2024) 366. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/rel15030366 [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. J. M. Sweeney, *The Complete Francis of Assisi: His Life, the Complete Writings, and the Little Flowers* (Paraclete Press, 2018). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. “Vita contemplativa simpliciter est melior quam activa quae occupatur circa corporales actus, sed vita activa secundum quam aliquis praedicando et docendo contemplata aliis tradit, est perfectior quam vita quae solum contemplatur, quia talis vita praesupponit abundantiam contemplationis.” *Summa Theologiae*, IIIª q. 40 a. 1 ad 2. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth4040.html> (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. 2 Thessalonians 3:10. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. J. Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, translated by A. Goldhammer(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 129. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Mostly from the *Glossa ordinaria*, whichwas a widely used medieval collection of biblical commentaries by the Church Fathers. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. The Decretals were papal letters that formulated decisions in Catholic canon law. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. “Dicunt quidam de operibus spiritualibus hoc praecepisse non de opere corporali, in quo vel agricolae vel opifices laborant; et infra: sed superfluo conantur et sibi et ceteris caliginem obducere, ut quod utiliter caritas monet, non solum facere nolint, sed nec etiam intelligere; et infra: vult servos Dei corporaliter operari unde vivant.” *Contra impugnantes*, pars 2, cap. 4, arg. 2. https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oci2.html#69616 (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Matthew 6:25. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. 1 Timothy 5:17. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. “Natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (“lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura”), *Summa theologiae*, IaIIae, a. 2, co. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2090.html#37471> (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. “Non enim posset unus homo generationi intendere, et contemplationi et aedificationi et agriculturae et omnibus aliis exercitiis, quibus indiget vita humana: verum in his unus ab alio iuvatur, sicut in corpore unum membrum ab alio.” *Contra impugnantes*, pars 2, cap. 4 ad 1. https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oci2.html#69616 (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. B. Lawn, *The Rise and Decline of the Scholastic “Quaestio Disputata”* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 16. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. T. Nevitt and B. Davies, *Thomas Aquinas’s Quodlibetal Questions* (Oxford University Press, 2020). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. “Huic autem contrariatur labor manuum, quia qui laborant manibus, solliciti sunt de necessariis corpori. Ergo labor manuum non est in praecepto.” *Quodlibet* VII, q. 7 a. 1 s. c. 1. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth4040.html> (Accessed: 4 August 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. “Iudicium de unaquaque re sumendum est secundum finem ad quem ordinatur.” Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. “Secundum autem quod ordinatur ad victum quaerendum, sic videtur esse in praecepto.” Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. “Considerandum autem quod dominus in Evangelio non laborem prohibuit, sed sollicitudinem mentis pro necessariis vitae. Non enim dixit, nolite laborare: sed, *nolite solliciti esse*.” *Summa contra gentiles*, liber3, cap. 135, n. 10. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg3111.html#26899> (Accessed: 4 Aug 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. “Non est autem, propter defectum qui in paucioribus accidit, aliqua ordinatio repudianda: hoc enim et in naturalibus et in voluntariis ordinationibus accidit.” Ibid., n. 11. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg3111.html#26899> (Accessed: 4 Aug 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. “Labor manualis ad quatuor ordinatur. Primo quidem, et principaliter, ad victum quaerendum.” *Summa Theologiae*, 2a 2ae, q. 187 a. 3 co. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3183.html#46526> (Accessed 4 Aug 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. “Sciendum tamen quod sub opere manuali intelliguntur omnia humana officia ex quibus homines licite victum lucrantur, sive manibus, sive pedibus, sive lingua fiant (...) Quia enim manus est organum organorum, per opus manuum omnis operatio intelligitur de qua aliquis potest licite victum lucrari.” Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. J. Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, translated by A. Goldhammer(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 129. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Ibid., 130-131. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. On lawyers’ and physicians’ work, see ibid. 312-313, n 13. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. “Venditur id quod non est.” *Summa theologiae*, 2a 2ae q. 78 a. 1 co. <https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3061.html#42261> (Accessed 4 Aug 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. J. Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, translated by A. Goldhammer(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 65. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)