The Abolition of the Division of Labor in the Work of Karl Marx

Jonathan Askonas

The Colombian aphorist and self-proclaimed reactionary Nicolás Gómez Dávila once wrote, “There are two equally erroneous attitudes toward Marxism: disdaining what it teaches, believing what it promises.”[[1]](#endnote-1) Both Marx’s critics and his disciples have often run afoul of Dávila’s warning, rushing to argue over Marx’s utopian vision of the future and ignoring his insights into what has already come to pass.

Such is the case with Marx’s work on technology. Karl Marx was arguably the first modern philosopher of technology, who found in the foundries and forges of industrial-era Britain a Machine moving world-history towards its culmination and completion.[[2]](#endnote-2) Technology’s central role, for Marx, can be seen in his theory of the division of labor, its history, and its future.

Political theory, from its earliest works onward, has been concerned with the division of labor. While political philosophers have mostly understood the problem of the few and the many as one of rulership, politics, and legitimacy, it is also an *economic* problem, and the order of the *polis* cannot help but arise in part from the order of the *oikos* (the household, the primary site of pre-industrial production). Aristotle, for instance, traces the *polis* back to the coming together of many households, and understands the nature of any regime to encompass, among other features, how a constitution operates *in light of its economic realities* (for instance, that an oligarchy which limited the franchise to those men who own land owes its character in part to the actual fraction of the city that meets the bar).[[3]](#endnote-3)

In a sense, Marx seeks to build upon and fully flesh out the implications of the Aristotelian idea that the structure of the household serves as the foundation for the structure of the city. Except, whereas Aristotle took a certain mode of production for granted, Marx seeks to understand the implications of its evolution over time, with a philosophy of man formed by the Enlightenment tradition of Hegel and a methodological perspective drawn from the British political economists.

At the heart of Marxian analysis lies the relationship between the mode of production (the material practices by which a society furnishes its continuing existence) and everything else about a society, to include its culture and symbols. While the idea of a material “base” and a cultural-ideological “superstructure” is something of an oversimplification, it is broadly true that, for Marx, any society will generate narratives, ideas, justifications, and even religious beliefs that make sense of and apotheosize the mode of production that makes its life possible.

In *The Communist Manifesto* and other writings, Marx foresees a day in which a classless society is able to meet all of its needs with leisure, where the essential questions of rulership (indeed, of politics) have been basically solved, because the basic problems of economics (including, most importantly, the problem of scarcity) have been solved. But by Marx’s methods, a classless society cannot be achieved *by fiat* or even *by violence*, because a class structure would simply be reconstituted by the mode of production. Marx’s ideal of a classless society must equally have been brought to pass *within the mode of production already in existence.*

In other words, the classless society presumes that the division of labor has already come to an end. In this chapter, we will explore the basis of Marx’s understanding of the division of labor; what (for Marx) brings about the abolition of the division of labor; misconceptions about the relationship between the plurality of *tasks* (the division of the production process) that remain in society and the more complex question of the division of labor as the basis of class structure (the social division of labor); and the unexpected contradictions which the abolition of the division of labor and the end of class struggle poses for Marx’s overall project.

## Against the Division of Labor

For Marx, the tragedy and promise of history begins with the division of labor. Before the division of labor, prehistoric man appropriated for his life and purposes all of the products of his labor, but they remained necessarily meagre, a primitive existence scratched out of toil. Marx does not pine for Rousseau’s noble savage, because his freedom and potential is a pure abstraction — his actual existence is brutal. It was improvement to mankind’s productive power that motivated the emergence of specialized production and ever more sophisticated kinds of cooperation within the village or the household.[[4]](#endnote-4) And yet, as soon as the tasks of production are split up, growing alongside cooperation and sociality are coercion and alienation. Every step of improvement in the complexity and specialization of tasks simultaneously increases mankind’s productive power and ensnares mankind’s freedom in a matrix of commodification and alienation, “that development in a man of one single faculty at the expense of all other faculties.”[[5]](#endnote-5) By the time of Marx’s writing, not only individuals and villages displayed this narrow specialization, but whole regions and domains of the globe.

The division of labor arises from the improvement to efficiency gained from the organization of the various tasks into which productive efforts may be broken down. A task (say production of a loaf of bread) may be broken down (into growing the grain, milling the flour, and baking the loaf), and these tasks may be further broken down (growing the grain entails tilling, planting, harvesting, etc.). For societies to grow more complex and capable of supporting ever more sophisticated and efficient production, ever more elaborate and narrow distinctions within society become necessary.

In a number of places, Marx makes a distinction between the division of the production process and the social division of labor.[[6]](#endnote-6) In any given production process, there are stages and tasks of production that may be split up between individuals. This may entail “simple cooperation” in which there is division but no specialization (imagine a porcelain factory where two workers each paint a different feature on a vase), or the tasks may be specialized in some way at distinct stages of the production process (one worker stencils a simple design, while another more skilled worker finishes fine detailing. A third worker glazes the final product). We will return to this “division of the production process” later, but what distinguishes it is the workers are cooperating in the division of tasks to produce a single commodity (e.g. a piece of fine china).

It is complex specialization in the production of particular commodities that gives rise to the social division of labor, in which particular social groups, families, networks, and (eventually) classes specialize in the production of different commodities and exchange them with each other for those which they lack. The fisherman, the farmer, the candlestick maker, the blacksmith - they each contribute a distinct kind of commodity. While “the division of labor” as a world-historical fact is of great interest to Marx, he mostly writes of specific “divisions of labor” that characterize particular epochs.[[7]](#endnote-7) The social division of labor, and the particular nexuses of value that emerge from a particular mode of production, are what give a society its particular hierarchical organization. In pre-capitalist societies, the pattern of increased specialization is of the division of production spilling over into the further elaboration of the social division of labor. A blacksmith may originally act as a kind of jack-of-all-metal-trades, but a more sophisticated society will have goldsmiths and jewelers, makers of swords or weapons, iron-mongers, and so on. And you will have an increase in intermediary commodities and makers of specialized equipment.

As Marx and Engels wrote in *The Communist Manifesto,* “In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.”[[8]](#endnote-8) The social division of labor, defined by control over elements of the means of production, sets in place power relations between groups, which seek to maintain their autonomy and privileged positions, demanding deference, recognition, resources, and more from other groups.

What becomes definitive for Marx, the glimmer of hope by which alienation can be overcome, is capitalism’s acidic effect on the social division of labor as part of the reorganization of the division of labor within the productive process. “Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.”[[9]](#endnote-9)

The Bourgeoisie, emerging out of the urban trading classes but taking on the role of capitalists investing in factories and manufactures, seek to reorganize production in order to maximize money profits, paying no heed to the non-monetary relations that had characterized the social division of labor. From the *Manifesto* again:

“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.”[[10]](#endnote-10)

In *Capital,* Marx seeks to explain in detail how this process works. At its center is a world-historical change in the relation of the division of the production process to the social division of labor. “In spite of the numerous analogies and links connecting them, division of labour in the interior of a society, and that in the interior of a workshop, differ not only in degree, but also in kind.”[[11]](#endnote-11) The capitalist seeks total freedom within the factory to re-order production however he sees fit, respecting no guild-privileges, social niceties, traditional crafts, or other impediments to profit.

The pin factory which Adam Smith writes of or the great porcelain factories of Josiah Wedgwood are *pre-industrial* in an important sense. Their efficiencies are of the *organization of the production process* within the manufactory, such that the most skilled artisans (who can demand a wage premium) are performing only those specific tasks which only they can do. Each sub-task is assigned to a worker paid the bare minimum for the skill required, and production is made efficient by continuous assembly-line process in which tools, skills, and workers never sit idle.

By winning a political victory over “every conscious attempt to socially control and regulate the process of production,” the bourgeois factory owner wins the right to totally dictate the conditions and structure of his workshop and order it towards profit alone: “anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism in that of the workshop are mutual conditions the one of the other.”[[12]](#endnote-12)

## The End of the Social Division of Labor

We have not, however, arrived at the true end of the social division of labor. For even though the capitalist has gained ascendency and the right to re-order the division of production within the manufactory to maximize his profits (at the expense of the growing alienation of labor), he cannot help but smuggle the social division of labor back in.

Recall that the foundation of the division of labor is the diversity of tasks to be accomplished in the process of production. In the *Wealth of Nations*, for instance, Smith describes the division of labor within the pin factory: drawing the wire, cutting it, sharpening the point, making the head, polishing the pin, and so on. And the pin factory (which was many orders of magnitude more efficient than artisanal pin production) is sort of an extreme case of a narrow range of tasks within the manufacture system of the time. Many kinds of factories (such as those for making china or furniture) continued to employ a gradation of artisans and craftsmen of different levels of skill, such that a “hierarchy of labour-powers” develops even within the factory.[[13]](#endnote-13)

In Volume 1, Chapter 15 of *Capital* (“Machinery and Modern Industry”), Marx turns from mercantile capitalism to the specifically industrial mode of production. It is there that he finds the principle to finally expel the social division of labor from the workshop once and for all.

As long as the factory remained ordered to the specific sub-tasks required to produce a commodity, conceptualized according to the social division of labor, it remained bound up within it. Tasks like “painting”, “pouring”, “sanding”, “etching”, etc. were still embedded within the social structures that provided those skills and training to the workers which occupied them, and while the “detail laborer” did not develop the full capacities over the whole production process which characterized the guild apprentice of a bygone era, the process of production as a whole remained legible in human way.

For Marx’s theory, there is a sense in which world-historical development towards utopia hinges on what finally frees the process of production from the social division of labor (and, with it, from the incipient causes of class division). Marx seeks to understand the meaning of the intensification of capital in the factories of his day with the rising importance of machine tools in factory production and the application of physical science to manufacture. He considers and dismisses one common delineation between the tools that characterize any production process and the modern technologies of the factory: that the latter are powered by captive energy sources like steam-power. He provides a number of examples of old tools powered by such energy, and of new machine tools not powered by them. There’s something else going on.

He makes a subtle but important distinction. When the factory owner first seeks new machines for his factory, he buys machine-tools in order to render human labor that much more productive (and, under Marx’s theory, to expropriate a greater portion of the value). The tools themselves are still ordered to the social division of labor. One tell is that their names retain the verbal structure of the social division of labor: a harvester to harvest, a circular saw to saw, a power drill to drill, a pneumatic hammer to hammer, etc. That each of these is a power tool with capabilities beyond any human-powered tool does not change their *function.[[14]](#endnote-14)*

But the power of the capitalist is to reorder production to efficiency however he sees fit. And the machine soon opens a whole new world of possibility. Marx sees the importance of controlled energy in the factory not through the lens of the power available to machine tools but of the *coordination amongst machines* it makes possible through governing mechanisms that coordinate the machines through the steady transmission of power. “A system of machinery, whether it reposes on the mere co-operation of similar machines, as in weaving, or on a combination of different machines, as in spinning, constitutes in itself a huge automaton, whenever it is driven by a self-acting prime mover.”[[15]](#endnote-15)

With the automatic factory, the subjective logic of the social division of labor (a production process oriented towards human legibility and the division of the productive process into discrete tasks humans could accomplish) is replaced by the objective logic of the entire productive process considered as a whole, oriented to the needs of the machines “without regard to the question of its execution by human hands”.[[16]](#endnote-16) The aim is to ensure as smooth and continuous as possible a transition from machine to machine: human labor becomes an input into a machine process, whereas before machine tools served to enhance the productivity of a human process.

So formless and alien is this method of production that it is difficult to explain to those who have not seen it up close. But imagine, for example, the modern assembly-line production of automobiles. What is paramount is the continuous movement of the vehicles through the line: human workers might step in, for example, to install a wiring harness in the bowels of the automobile, because the next machine step will render it inaccessible. Bit by bit, the automobile will be built, but each step makes sense in the context of the end result and the machine steps required to get there, not according to a set of human-legible tasks like “install the electrical system”, “emplace the engine”, etc.

Within the automatic factory, human labor is reduced to its barest constituent parts. Not humans skilled in particular activities, but human labor with particular qualities is required. The capitalist seeks to pay not only for the minimum skills required to accomplish a task, but for the minimum physical and mental characteristics. Nimble fingers, strong arms, alert eyes, patient attention, quick learning - these become commodified characteristics of the labor which factory workers sell.[[17]](#endnote-17) Before it is deployed in the socialist society, the mantra “from each according to his ability” describes the individualized assessment of physical and mental capacities driving the employment of human capital in the production process of the automatic factory.

And the qualities of human capital required in the automatic factory system refer to the skills or capacities needed to operate and interact with the machines of the factory, replacing skill in the use of tools (even machine tools) to perform some discrete task. To the extent a factory is automated, the social division of labor is expelled from the production process in favor of a division of production designed around the optimal use of machines.

Marx being Marx, there are endless other considerations and aspects of the automatic factory of theoretical interest to the Marxian theory of labor value, the alienation of labor, the contradictions of capital, etc. But for our purposes, we have completed the essential elements of the sketch. The automatic factory displaces the human-legible social division of labor and with it the basis of class division.

## Jobs are not Classes

Now the astute reader will note that a diversity of *jobs* remains in this picture. The automatic factory requires human labor at various points, both for tasks unsuitable for automation and for the employment of human judgment in trouble-shooting and quality assurance. Outside an industrial setting, service jobs of different kinds will still require the human touch. And, more importantly, the vital task of setting up and managing the automatic factory will remain. In what sense, then, has the division of labor really been eliminated?

Here, it is helpful to push beyond Marx *per se* to what is entailed and suggested by his theory. Marx’s treatment of class as such remains incomplete, literally: it is at the beginning of his section on class that the manuscript to *Capital, Vol. III* breaks off mid-thought.

To understand why the technical demands of building and maintaining automatic factories do not generate a new class, it is helpful to engage Schumpeter’s characterological gloss on Marx. The identification of a *class* with a *job* is a uniquely modern, one might say uniquely American pathology. Going back to the classical period, the fundamental unit of production has always been not the individual but the *household,* the *oikos* of *oikonomia*.

What characterizes economic classes is the induction of their members from birth into a vocation or profession, to include the handing down of habits, sensibilities, language, skills, networks, etc. This was true not only of the feudal aristocracy, medieval guilds, or traditional peasants, but also of the bourgeoisie. It was this class — raised from birth to steward capital, take calculated risks of principal, manage costs, etc. — that so ferociously attacked the social and economic basis of all of the other classes, per Marx. The simplification of class division into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is, for Marx, the ultimate outworking of the destruction of the social division of labor by the capitalist mode of production. But what is the fate of these two classes in the age of the automatic factory?

The fate of the proletariat is treated explicitly in *Capital.* They are, in a sense, not a true class but an anti-class, a class defined by its reduction to the sale of its labor. This is not to suggest that every member of the proletariat is the same or has the same job. But the diversity of roles within the division of production owes not to any kind of division of labor within the proletariat but rather to the needs of different kinds of factory systems, and the wages which a proletarian can demand are not the product of a particular vocational skill (of the kind that might be handed down from father to son) but arise from the demand for particular physical or cognitive capabilities.

What about the bourgeoisie? His materialism does not allow Marx to merely wish them into non-existence. If they are to fade into history, it must be rooted in a change in the mode of production.

Marx suggests that just as the bourgeoisie have liquified every other laboring class into the proletarian by virtue of the abolition of the social division of labor, so too have they eliminated their own role in the productive process by their discovery of technology as the basis of man’s productive power. Before, each social class had sought to preserve its status in part by obscuring from outsiders its operations. “A characteristic feature [of classes] is, that, even down into the eighteenth century, the different trades were called “mysteries” (mystères); into their secrets none but those duly initiated could penetrate.”[[18]](#endnote-18) The “mystery” of the bourgeoisie, such as it was, was the deployment of capital.

But the automatic factory rendered man’s power over the material world transparent: “Modern industry rent the veil that concealed from men their own social process of production, and that turned the various, spontaneously divided branches of production into so many riddles, not only to outsiders, but even to the initiated. The principle which it pursued, of resolving each process into its constituent movements, without any regard to their possible execution by the hand of man, created the new modern science of technology.”[[19]](#endnote-19) In an evocative footnote, Marx explains further. “Technology discloses man’s mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them.”[[20]](#endnote-20) Having midwifed a science of making (technology), the bourgeoisie has rendered itself obsolete.

In *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* the economist Joseph Schumpeter analyzes this obsolesce in greater detail. Modern systems of capitalist production and organization are, on the whole, too complex and demanding to simply hand on to one’s children (moreover, modern finance eliminates the necessity of doing so). Instead, professional managers educated within the university system take care of the management of the large corporation, while the development and design of the production systems is handled by scientists and engineers. The role of the traditional entrepreneur is rendered obsolete: “Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automatize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous.”[[21]](#endnote-21) What results is “the destruction of the institutional framework of capitalist society.”[[22]](#endnote-22)

Do these two scientific groups – of managers and of engineers – constitute a new ruling class to replace the bourgeoisie and maintain a bipartite social division of labor? The theory of a “managerial revolution” put forth by some like Schumpeter and James Burnham seems to indicate there may be something to this idea. And yet, a careful analysis suggests something more complex.

For one thing, both management and engineering, to the extent they purport to be scientific, require elite training in higher education. In most advanced societies, entry into the most elite schools and firms is either partially or totally indifferent to parentage. Managers are incapable of directly handing on their occupations to their children in a way that was not the case for bourgeois entrepreneurs or other ruling classes.

Maybe more importantly, the atomization and proletarianization of labor is creeping upwards within the firm. As firm relationships grow more complex and interwoven with global supply chains and third-party services firms, the production of corporate strategy, product and process engineering, logistics and corporate planning, and the like increasingly looks like the Marxian picture of the automatic factory: some human labor chosen for its cognitive characteristics interacting in a production process driven by and designed around a cybernetic production system of advanced machinery. Big data, machine learning, and artificial intelligence may be to these last bastions of the division of labor what the steam engine was to the early industrial proletarian.

# After Production, After Philosophy

The centrality of the division of labor, and the necessity of its substantive abolition for the realization of communism, can be seen already in *The German Ideology.* As soon as Marx and Engels raise the question of the relation between individual freedom and the need for interpersonal intercourse in production, they focus on the demands for an ever-more-sophisticated division of labor in the course of civilization. The realization of human freedom requires its abolition:

For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.[[23]](#endnote-23)

This paragraph, now-famous, remained unpublished until the 1920s. Marx never again set out such an explicit vision of the good life or a communist Utopia. Perhaps he felt it placed him too close to the revolutions in pure thought of the Young Hegelians whom he so scornfully criticized.

For those seeking to take Marx seriously, two conclusions emerge about this passage as it relates to the role of technology in Marx.[[24]](#endnote-24) The first is that, whether this bucolic vision remains the ideal for Marx or whether it is replaced by a more thoroughly industrial utopia, it remains the case that the abolition of the division of labor depends implicitly on some mixture of intensive automation and rational planning that renders it *materially unnecessary*. And the second, following from the first, is that the pastoral activities Marx mentions cannot be serious sites of production (or else necessity would re-produce the division of labor and return us to the cycle of history) but rather must be *hobbies* of some kind.

The human struggle - both of work and of political revolution - will have ended. Human sociality, long based on the material need for cooperation in the division of labor, will now take on a purely voluntary and spiritual or cultural form. [[25]](#endnote-25)This is not to say there are no *jobs* – the abolition of the social division of labor is perfectly compatible with a division of production which draws “from each according to his ability”, the concrete realization of the Platonic myth of the Guardians.

But let us set aside any holes we might poke in the assumptions underlying Marx’s model, and let us grant for a moment that the problem of political rulership could be solved. Will Marx’s proletarian class, freed by the realization within history of technological automation, the relief of man’s estate, and the abolition of the social division of labor, behave the way Marx hopes?

Conly raises the disturbing possibility that there is a contradiction here between Marx’s theory of human freedom and his historical materialism. While Marx, still a kind of Hegelian, leaves room for mankind’s social development at the margins, his entire theory is premised on the notion that it is the mode of production that shapes the conditions of human life, including his sociality. Mankind’s sociality, Marx says, is driven by the practical and material need to cooperate in order to meet his needs, through the social division of labor. In a world of substantial technological automation where a person is able to meet his or her needs without deep cooperation with others, what is there to motivate ongoing sociality and development? And if the social division of labor motivates specialization and the development of skill, what motivation does one have to continue to develop one’s faculties after its abolition?

Furthermore, most of these highly developed social patterns and social skills will need the motivation of thing-oriented needs, that is, physical necessity, rather than people-oriented needs. This is especially true of forms of cooperation and organization for the sake of shared productive goals. It seems very unlikely that people-oriented needs of themselves would lead very far in the development of social relationships and social organization, probably not much beyond the range of the family, and perhaps not even that far if the functions of the family itself were diminished. On the whole, if the role of physical necessity is reduced in human life in order to eliminate the division of labor, this eventually would mean a return to basic, abstract, biological needs. The consequences for human faculties and for human society would also be a return to the primitive-a more or less gradual decline of standards and accomplishments.

In a fully automated society there would still be certain basic human relationships, close friendships perhaps. And yet how deep would even the basic relationships of friendship and affection become without the operation of physical necessity? Just how strong is the actual desire to sacrifice one’s self in order to raise children, for example, particularly when there is a host of other more or less interesting and much less demanding activities? How much does the family relationship, which seems so basic, depend on sheer necessity, on the irreversible fact at a given point that one has had children who require care and attention?[[26]](#endnote-26)

Absent the social division of labor, there is no longer a mutual and necessary connection between a man’s freedom and self-development and any kind of deep obligation and responsibility towards society at large.

At the End of History, after the abolition of the social division of labor and the establishment of a classless society built on top of automation so sophisticated and productive that everyone’s material needs can be readily met, there is still one vital and irreplaceable task remaining for the ascendent proletariat. Throughout his thought, Marx defines the proletarian class in terms of their relationship to their labor (alienated under capitalism, restored under socialism). But the term “proletarian” has an older meaning and origin. In ancient Rome, the *proletarius* was one who had no property and owed no taxes or military service. His service to the state was in his production and rearing of offspring.

As the most developed countries realize the kinds of automatic production that Marx foresaw, a foreboding realization is growing that the escape from the social division of labor and from material deprivation is leading not to a flowering of human sociality and self-cultivation, but to the withdrawal into freedom and leisure (and away from obligation) that Conly identified as a critical contradiction within Marx’s thought. As fertility rates crash without abatement all over the world, we glimpse a future in which automated production leads not to the ascendency of the proletariat but to an abdication of its most essential role.[[27]](#endnote-27) To address this unthought crisis, we must heed Dávila’s warning and venture beyond Marx.

1. Nicolás Gómez Dávila, *Escolios a un Texto Implícito* (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1977), 449. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. David Harvey, *Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 107-108. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Aristotle’s *Politics* Book I, Ch. 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, edited by Frederick Engels (Moscow: Progress Publishers, USSR [1887] 1974), 50-51. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid, 245. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Cf. Ibid, Ch. 14. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Robert Ware, “Marx, The Division of Labor, and Human Nature,” *Social Theory and Practice* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 43–71. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works, Vol. One* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 98–137. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Marx, *Capital,* 246. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Ibid, 246-247. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid, 246-247. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid, *261.* [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid, 264. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid, 264. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid, 271. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid, 317. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid, 317. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid, 260fn4. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1942), 134. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid, 139. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* , Vol. 5 (London, New York and Moscow, 1976), p. 47 quoted in Terrell Carver, “Communism for Critical Critics? ‘The German Ideology’ and the Problem of Technology,” *History of Political Thought* 9, no. 1 (1988), 129. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Terrell Carver, “Communism for Critical Critics? ‘The German Ideology’ and the Problem of Technology,” *History of Political Thought* 9, no. 1 (1988): 129–36. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Craig A. Conly, “Alienation, Sociality, and the Division of Labor: Contradictions in Marx's Ideal of 'Social Man,'” *Ethics* 89, no. 1 (Oct. 1978): 82–94. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, *Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline* (New York: Crown, 2020). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)