

Analisi del Malware

```
remnux@remnux:/media/C8D5-495F/TorrentLocker$ volatility -f xsp3-before-infection.dmp --profile=WinXPSP3x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0x823c8830: System	4	0	56	256	1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
0x81f877c0: smss.exe	536	4	3	19	2014-12-19 20:24:47 UTC+0000
0x822a1020: csrss.exe	600	536	10	346	2014-12-19 20:24:48 UTC+0000
0x81f16da0: winlogon.exe	624	536	20	509	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x822f64f0: wpabaln.exe	1940	624	1	58	2014-12-19 20:26:51 UTC+0000
0x81df5020: lsass.exe	680	624	20	330	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81f0c850: services.exe	668	624	16	253	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81de5da0: svchost.exe	1024	668	66	1162	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81d98020: wscntfy.exe	260	1024	1	28	2014-12-19 20:26:06 UTC+0000
0x81dd68c0: wmiadap.exe	772	1024	5	150	2015-02-28 16:12:52 UTC+0000
0x82123148: wuauclt.exe	220	1024	8	180	2014-12-19 20:26:49 UTC+0000
0x822a3708: spoolsv.exe	1444	668	13	136	2014-12-19 20:24:51 UTC+0000
0x81efb750: svchost.exe	1072	668	6	76	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81f08380: vmacthlp.exe	836	668	1	25	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x822ef020: alg.exe	328	668	6	107	2014-12-19 20:26:04 UTC+0000
0x82279780: svchost.exe	852	668	18	195	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x82192d08: svchost.exe	932	668	11	254	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x82185360: svchost.exe	1140	668	15	201	2014-12-19 20:24:50 UTC+0000
0x82190020: vmtoolsd.exe	1020	668	7	262	2014-12-19 20:26:00 UTC+0000
0x821711a0: explorer.exe	1564	1564	13	490	2014-12-19 20:24:51 UTC+0000
0x8216b590: vmtoolsd.exe	1668	1564	7	229	2014-12-19 20:24:52 UTC+0000
0x81f544f8: VMwareTray.exe	1660	1564	1	52	2014-12-19 20:24:52 UTC+0000

Run list of process from known good machine and then compare it with infected machine

```
remnux@remnux:/media/C8D5-495F/TorrentLocker$ volatility -f xsp3-after-infection.dmp --profile=WinXPSP3x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0x823c8830: System	4	0	56	263	1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
0x81f877c0: smss.exe	536	4	3	19	2014-12-19 20:24:47 UTC+0000
0x822a1020: csrss.exe	600	536	11	338	2014-12-19 20:24:48 UTC+0000
0x81f16da0: winlogon.exe	624	536	17	502	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x822f64f0: wpabaln.exe	1940	624	1	58	2014-12-19 20:26:51 UTC+0000
0x81df5020: lsass.exe	680	624	20	344	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81f0c850: services.exe	668	624	16	255	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81de5da0: svchost.exe	1024	668	59	1159	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81d98020: wscntfy.exe	260	1024	1	28	2014-12-19 20:26:06 UTC+0000
0x822a3708: spoolsv.exe	1444	668	10	130	2014-12-19 20:24:51 UTC+0000
0x81efb750: svchost.exe	1072	668	6	83	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81f08380: vmacthlp.exe	836	668	1	25	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x822ef020: alg.exe	328	668	6	107	2014-12-19 20:26:04 UTC+0000
0x82279780: svchost.exe	852	668	15	189	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x81e8eb28: wmiaprvse.exe	868	852	5	136	2015-02-28 17:07:59 UTC+0000
0x82192d08: svchost.exe	932	668	9	257	2014-12-19 20:24:49 UTC+0000
0x82185360: svchost.exe	1140	668	14	199	2014-12-19 20:24:50 UTC+0000
0x82190020: vmtoolsd.exe	1020	668	6	259	2014-12-19 20:26:00 UTC+0000
0x8225e020: explorer.exe	1872	1380	8	328	2015-02-28 17:06:16 UTC+0000
0x822f2020: vssadmin.exe	1168	1872	0	---	2015-02-28 17:06:16 UTC+0000
0x8214a8e0: IEXPLORER.EXE	1224	1872	5	194	2015-02-28 17:14:54 UTC+0000
0x821711a0: explorer.exe	1564	1548	15	569	2014-12-19 20:24:51 UTC+0000
0x8216b590: vmtoolsd.exe	1668	1564	5	213	2014-12-19 20:24:52 UTC+0000
0x81f544f8: VMwareTray.exe	1660	1564	1	52	2014-12-19 20:24:52 UTC+0000

The parent process of explorer.exe does not exist. This is rather suspicious!

Explorer.exe launched Volume Shadow Copies util?

Analisi del Malware

- Statica
- Dinamica
- Analisi della memoria
- Estrazione di codice malevolo da file
- Un esempio: FinFisher

Analisi Statica

- Header PE
- Import Address Table (IAT)

Resource entries

Name	RVA	Size	Lang	Sublang
BIN	0x19100	0x4a63	LANG_CHINESE	SUBLANG_CHINESE_SIMPL
BINSYS	0x1db68	0x727	LANG_CHINESE	SUBLANG_CHINESE_SIMPL
RT_VERSION	0x1e290	0x3ec	LANG_CHINESE	SUBLANG_CHINESE_SIMPL

Suspicious IAT alerts

OpenProcess
VirtualAllocEx
WriteProcessMemory
CreateRemoteThread
CreateProcessA
StartServiceA
OpenProcessToken
InternetReadFile

Analisi statica

- Disassembler
- Debugger

```
OllyDbg - PEB.exe - [CPU - main thread, module PEB]
File View Debug Plugins Options Window Help
L E M T W H C / K B R ... S
00401231 55 PUSH EBP
00401232 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP
00401234 83C4 F8 ADD ESP,-8
00401237 60 PUSHAD
00401238 8B75 08 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0040123B 803D 70334000 LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[403370]
00401241 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
00401243 8A06 MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00401245 8907 MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI],AL
00401247 47 INC EDI
00401248 83C6 02 ADD ESI,2
0040124B 803E 00 CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],0
0040124E 75 F3 JNZ SHORT PEB.00401243
00401250 66:C707 0D0A MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI],0A0D
00401255 83C7 02 ADD EDI,2
00401258 66:C707 0D0A MOV WORD PTR DS:[EDI],0A0D
0040125D 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
0040125F 803D 70334000 LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[403370]
00401265 B9 FFFFFFFF MOV ECX,-1
0040126A F2:AE REPNE SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
0040126C F7D1 NOT ECX
0040126E 49 DEC ECX
0040126F 894D FC MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],ECX
00401272 6A 02 PUSH 2
00401274 6A 00 PUSH 0
00401276 6A 00 PUSH 0
00401278 FF35 6D324000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[40326D]
0040127E E8 4B000000 CALL <JMP.&kernel32.SetFilePointer>
00401283 6A 00 PUSH 0
00401285 8045 F8 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00401288 50 PUSH EAX
00401289 FF75 FC PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
0040128C 68 70334000 PUSH PEB.00403370
00401291 FF35 6D324000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[40326D]
00401297 E8 38000000 CALL <JMP.&kernel32.WriteFile>
0040129C 68 FF000000 PUSH 0FF
004012A1 68 70334000 PUSH PEB.00403370
004012A6 E8 1D000000 CALL <JMP.&kernel32.RtlZeroMemory>
004012AB 59 POPAD
004012AC C9 LEAVE
004012AD C2 0400 RETN 4
004012B0 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.CloseHandle>]
004012B6 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.CreateFileA>]
004012BC JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.ExitProcess>]
004012C2 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.GetCommandLineA>]
004012C8 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.RtlZeroMemory>]
004012CE JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.SetFilePointer>]
004012D4 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.WriteFile>]
004012DA JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.lstrcpyA>]
004012E0 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&kernel32.lstrcpyA>]
004012E6 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&user32.wsprintfA>]
004012EC JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&user32.MessageBoxA>]
004012F2 JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&shell32.ShellExecuteA>]
004012F8 DB 00
004012F9 DB 00

Origin = FILE_END
pOffsetHi = NULL
OffsetLo = 0
hFile = 00000080 (window)
SetFilePointer
pOverlapped = NULL
pBytesWritten
nBytesToWrite
Buffer = PEB.00403370
hFile = 00000080 (window)
WriteFile
Length = FF (255.)
Destination = PEB.00403370
RtlZeroMemory
kernel32.CloseHandle
kernel32.CreateFileA
kernel32.ExitProcess
kernel32.GetCommandLineA
ntdll.RtlZeroMemory
kernel32.SetFilePointer
kernel32.WriteFile
kernel32.lstrcpyA
kernel32.lstrcpyA
user32.wsprintfA
user32.MessageBoxA
shell32.ShellExecuteA
```

Analisi statica

- Ricerca di stringhe e url

```
remnux@remnux:~$ xorsearch -s hubert.dll http:
```

```
Found XOR 05 position 2E18: http://%s/readdatagateway.php?type=stats
```

```
remnux@remnux:~$ strings hubert.dll.XOR.05 > out.txt
```

```
remnux@remnux:~$ xorstrings Windows\ Live\ Messenger.exe
```

Opr	Key	Count	Avg	Max
XOR	0xf7	1	6.0	6
XOR	0xfb	1	12.0	12
XOR	0xe3	2	7.5	9
XOR	0xe6	2	8.0	9
XOR	0xf9	2	5.0	5
XOR	0x1a	4	8.5	16
XOR	0xc9	4	7.0	9
XOR	0xe5	4	9.2	15
XOR	0xe7	4	9.8	21
XOR	0xef	4	10.5	12
XOR	0xf5	4	6.0	6
XOR	0xfa	4	5.5	6
XOR	0xfe	4	13.5	39
XOR	0x1d	5	7.0	9
XOR	0xec	5	7.2	8
XOR	0x1b	6	6.5	7
XOR	0xcd	6	7.2	11
XOR	0xce	6	56.2	293

Analisi statica


- Packer

```
remnux@remnux:~$ pescanner lamarr.dll
#####
Record 0
#####

Meta-data
=====
File:      lamarr.dll
Size:      120355 bytes
Type:      PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386
MD5:       9a7a3ed7e9fa238c3314e579a4dc192b
SHA1:      6b7e2a6d72fd938485701897f4a3b2c6b5a93bde
ssdeep:    3072:Nf32Cz0ZEZrFu2ZPNBReAiAP0Ck8Ig3gqoFC256:92S0Zg0WN
Date:      0x4B9F339D [Tue Mar 16 07:30:37 2010 UTC]
EP:        0x100119ba .text 0/5
CRC:       Claimed: 0x0, Actual: 0x2a415 [SUSPICIOUS]
Packers:   Armadillo v1.xx - v2.xx
```

Analisi statica


- Analisi entropia



Le contromisure del malware

- Codice antiVM, antisandbox e antidebugging

Branch: **master** ▼ [soldier-win](#) / [Soldier](#) / **antivm.cpp**

 **Ivan** new VMWare check, Facebook photo and location scheduling moved into s...

[0 contributors](#)

165 lines (127 sloc) | 4.05 KB

```
1  #include <windows.h>
2  #include "utils.h"
3  #include "crypt.h"
4  #include "antivm.h"
5  #include "utils.h"
6
7  BOOL AntiVM()
8  {
9      AntiCuckoo();
10     BOOL bVMWare = AntiVMWare();
11     BOOL bVBox = AntiVBox();
12
13     if (bVMWare || bVBox)
14         return TRUE;
15
16     return FALSE;
17 }
```


Le contromisure del malware

- Sfruttare vulnerabilità dei software di analisi

CVE-ID

CVE-2014-8485

[Learn more at National Vulnerability Database \(NVD\)](#)


• CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software
Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description

The `setup_group` function in `bfd/elf.c` in `libbfd` in GNU binutils 2.24 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted section group headers in an ELF file.


Analisi dinamica

- Esecuzione del malware in ambiente isolato e analisi degli artefatti



Analisi dinamica

- Confronto dello stato del sistema prima e dopo l'esecuzione del malware (files, chiavi di registro...)




The screenshot displays the Process Monitor application window, titled "Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com". The interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, Event, Filter, Tools, Options, Help) and a toolbar with various icons. The main area is a table of system events. The table has columns for Time of Day, Process Name, PID, Operation, Path, Result, Detail, and Image Path. The events are filtered to show only those from the process "OUTLOOK.EXE". The status bar at the bottom indicates "Showing 284,492 of 396,148 events (71%)" and "Backed by page file".

Time of Day	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail	Image Path
11:31:03.6066...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegSetValue	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAs...	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY, Length: 72, Data: 17 00 00 00 ...	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6066...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegSetValue	HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAs...	SUCCESS	Type: REG_BINARY, Length: 1,612, Data: 17 00 00 00 ...	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6080...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\MSILink	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6080...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\AllFilesystemObjects	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6080...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\Ink	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6080...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\Inkfile	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6081...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\Inkfile	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6081...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegCloseKey	HKCR\AllFilesystemObjects	SUCCESS		C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6085...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegOpenKey	HKCU\AppEvents\Schemes\Apps\Explorer\MenuCommand\current	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6085...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	Load Image	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x2f360000, Image Size: 0xf2a000	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6103...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x77840000, Image Size: 0x13c000	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6111...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:\Windows\Prefetch\OUTLOOK.EXE-C6B7F77A.pf	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read, Disposition: Open, O...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6111...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryStandardI...	C:\Windows\Prefetch\OUTLOOK.EXE-C6B7F77A.pf	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 106,496, EndOfFile: 102,764, Number...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6112...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	ReadFile	C:\Windows\Prefetch\OUTLOOK.EXE-C6B7F77A.pf	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 102,764, Priority: Normal	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6116...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CloseFile	C:\Windows\Prefetch\OUTLOOK.EXE-C6B7F77A.pf	SUCCESS		C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6116...	Explorer.EXE	2328	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\KnownClasses	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read	C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
11:31:03.6117...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Write Attributes, Sy...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6118...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryInformatio...	C:	SUCCESS	VolumeCreationTime: 5/22/2010 3:43:45 AM, Volum...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6119...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	FileSystemControl	C:	SUCCESS	Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6130...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:\Program Files	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchroni...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6131...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	SetBasicInforma...	C:\Program Files	SUCCESS	CreationTime: -1, LastAccessTime: -1, LastWriteTime...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6131...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryFileInterna...	C:\Program Files	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x100000000edc0	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6131...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	FileSystemControl	C:\Program Files	END OF FILE	Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6131...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CloseFile	C:\Program Files	SUCCESS		C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6133...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Common Files	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchroni...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6134...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	SetBasicInforma...	C:\Program Files\Common Files	SUCCESS	CreationTime: -1, LastAccessTime: -1, LastWriteTime...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6134...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryFileInterna...	C:\Program Files\Common Files	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x100000000edc1	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6134...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	FileSystemControl	C:\Program Files\Common Files	END OF FILE	Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6135...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\Common Files	SUCCESS		C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6137...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchroni...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6137...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	SetBasicInforma...	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared	SUCCESS	CreationTime: -1, LastAccessTime: -1, LastWriteTime...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6137...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryFileInterna...	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x100000000edc2	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6137...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	FileSystemControl	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared	END OF FILE	Control: FSCTL_FILE_PREFETCH	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6138...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CloseFile	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared	SUCCESS		C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6140...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	CreateFile	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\OFFICE14	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchroni...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6140...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	SetBasicInforma...	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\OFFICE14	SUCCESS	CreationTime: -1, LastAccessTime: -1, LastWriteTime...	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE
11:31:03.6140...	OUTLOOK.EXE	5808	QueryFileInterna...	C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\OFFICE14	SUCCESS	IndexNumber: 0x1000000028dde	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\OUTLOOK.EXE

Analisi dinamica

- Analisi del traffico di rete



The image shows a screenshot of the Wireshark network traffic analysis tool. The main window displays a list of captured packets with columns for No., Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, and Info. The selected packet (No. 5454) is highlighted in red. Below the packet list, the details pane shows the structure of the selected packet, including Ethernet II, Internet Protocol, and the raw packet data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
5452	610.72074	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.1	TCP	2459 > http [ACK] Seq=20 Ack=...
5453	610.72121	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.1	TCP	2459 > http [FIN, ACK] Seq=20 Ack=...
5454	610.72195	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.102	TCP	http > 2459 [RST, ACK] Seq=5 Ack=...
5455	610.76519	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.4	DNS	Standard query A www.mikroti...
5456	610.76856	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.102	DNS	Standard query response A 66...
5457	611.09368	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.3	NBNS	Name query NBSTAT *<00><00><...
5458	611.09386	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.102	NBNS	Name query response NBSTAT...
5459	611.46980	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.4	NBNS	Name query NBSTAT *<00><00><...
5460	611.47022	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.102	NBNS	Name query response NBSTAT...
5461	612.88506	Cisco-Li_a9:b5:eb	Broadcast	ARP	who has 192.168.1.200? Tell...
5462	613.02826	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.245	SNMP	get-next-request
5463	613.03054	192.168.1.245	192.168.1.102	SNMP	get-response
5464	613.73557	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.102	synerg	24800 > 1168 [PSH, ACK] Seq=...
5465	613.73678	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.4	synerg	1168 > 24800 [PSH, ACK] Seq=...
5466	613.73752	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.102	synerg	24800 > 1168 [PSH, ACK] Seq=...
5467	613.73793	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.4	synerg	1168 > 24800 [PSH, ACK] Seq=...


Frame 1 (46 bytes on wire, 46 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: AsustekC_24:50:9e (00:0e:a6:24:50:9e), Dst: LinksysG_d8:68:b5 (00:0c:4d:00:00:00)
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.102 (192.168.1.102), Dst: 192.168.1.245 (192.168.1.245)

0000 00 0c 41 d8 68 b5 00 0e a6 24 50 9e 08 00 45 00 ..A.h... .\$.P...E.
0010 00 20 6d 9c 00 00 40 01 88 95 c0 a8 01 66 c0 a8 . m...@.f..
0020 01 f5 08 00 cf bf 28 0e 4e 39 b8 e6 f9 11(. N9....

File: "C:\DOCUME~1\VAIO\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXXIPAAJT" 1183 KB ... | P: 6802 D: 6802 M: 0 Drops: 0

Analisi dinamica

- Interagire con il malware per scoprire nuove caratteristiche
- Usare honeypot per DNS, SMTP, HTTP e qualunque altro servizio il malware cerchi di raggiungere



Connected At	Rcpt To	Bytes	File Name	Remote IP	Subject	Attachment
6/27/2007 1:13:42 PM	<proagent2.1@gmail.com>	6493	1736031209.txt	192.168.1.26	RISHIMXPP is Online	
6/27/2007 3:29:03 PM	<proagent2.1@gmail.com>	6318	437640621.txt	192.168.1.24	VM-2KPRO is Online	
6/27/2007 3:48:09 PM	<hostmaster@airn.net>	3565	241873872.txt	192.168.1.71	Secure Mail from MSN.com user.	msg.zip
6/27/2007 3:48:11 PM	<robert2004@yahoo.com>	3608	736420135.txt	192.168.1.71	Encrypted Message from MSN.com user.	mail.zip
6/27/2007 6:13:17 PM	<bill2002@msn.com>	3635	1622644734.txt	192.168.1.77	Secure Message from Yahoo.com user.	message.zip
6/27/2007 6:18:46 PM	<pamela2001@hotmail.com>	5193	1191991604.txt	192.168.1.77	Secure E-mail from Gmail.com user.	data.zip
6/27/2007 6:27:58 PM	<austria@msdirectservices.com>	5160	1951468189.txt	192.168.1.77	Secure Message	mail.zip
6/27/2007 6:27:59 PM	<mts@lebanon-online.com.lb>	5145	1072017617.txt	192.168.1.77	Protected Message	message.zip
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<eo5ha@funb.com>	2626	1144140450.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<envy730@funb.com>	2603	1550201278.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<bullard@jnl.com>	5471	245871049.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<brysonnn@jnl.com>	5421	1909203634.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<calvelonn@jtax.com>	5438	199303371.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<caldwell@jtax.com>	5447	1986980167.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<engupta@cspic.com>	8322	831852132.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<enrique.bernaldez@cspic.com>	5538	3187635.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<devoll.dougdd@con-way.com>	5396	1145617454.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	
6/27/2007 6:49:02 PM	<dewittd@con-way.com>	5490	1737950965.txt	192.168.1.71	You've received a postcard from a family	

Log Dir = C:\mailpot\ Listen Port = 25 Server Banner Mailennium ESMTP/MULTIBOX Listen

Analisi della memoria

- Estrazione di artefatti dalla RAM
- Tecnica completamente indipendente dal sistema sotto indagine
- Volatility Framework

```
C:\Users\Haider\Downloads\volatility>volatility.exe -f H-HP-20121209-120703.raw --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1
Offset(U)      Name                PID    PPID    Thds     Hnds     Sess     Mou64    Start                Exit
-----
0xffffffffa8003606740 System              4       0      170     3039     ----- 0 2012-12-07 11:42:15
0xffffffffa8006939b30 smss.exe           440      4       2       32     ----- 0 2012-12-07 11:42:15
0xffffffffa8007581b30 csrss.exe          564     544      11      929       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:21
0xffffffffa8007816b30 wininit.exe       760     544       3       78       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa800781ab30 csrss.exe          780     760      13      849       1 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa8007839b30 services.exe      824     760       9      311       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa8008162b30 lsass.exe          840     760       8      825       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa80081891e0 lsm.exe            848     760      10      204       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa800816ab30 winlogon.exe      900     760       3      117       1 0 2012-12-07 11:42:24
0xffffffffa800820e060 svchost.exe        984     824      11      415       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:25
0xffffffffa8008249060 svchost.exe        484     824       9      425       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:25
0xffffffffa800824cb30 atiesrxx.exe       648     824       6      118       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:25
0xffffffffa8008358750 svchost.exe        784     824      21      643       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:25
0xffffffffa8008369350 svchost.exe       1000     824      18      542       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:26
0xffffffffa80083ff8a0 svchost.exe       1040     824      43     1605       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:26
0xffffffffa800839b580 stacsv64.exe      1124     824      10      325       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:27
0xffffffffa800849cb30 svchost.exe       1328     824      10      597       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:29
0xffffffffa8008508060 hpservice.exe     1432     824       4       76       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:29
0xffffffffa8008537b30 svchost.exe       1480     824      13      449       0 0 2012-12-07 11:42:30
```

Analisi della memoria

- Estrarre file PE dalla memoria per eseguire analisi statica dopo l'esecuzione del packer
- Trovare zone di memoria che contengono codice malevolo
- Trovare processi nascosti o infettati

```
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1_alpha
Name                Pid    Start      End        Tag        Hits   Protect
svchost.exe         856    0x00b70000 0xb95fff00 VadS        0      PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Dumped to: /home/evild3ad/Volatility/dump-files/svchost.exe.115b8d8.00b70000-00b95fff.dmp
0x00b70000  4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  MZ.....
0x00b70010  b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....@.....
0x00b70020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0x00b70030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 00 00 00
0x00b70040  0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68  .....!...L.!Th
0x00b70050  69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f  is program canno
0x00b70060  74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20  t be run in DOS
0x00b70070  6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  mode....$......
```

Estrarre codice malevolo da file

- xxxswf: Estrarre sfw da altri formati
- swfdump: Disassembly Adobe Flash
- pdfid e pdfextract: Estrarre contenuti da pdf (JS, media...)

```
PDFiD 0.0.11 conrad.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.4
obj 15
endobj 15
stream 2
endstream 2
xref 1
trailer 1
startxref 1 ⓘ
/Page 1
/Encrypt 0
/ObjStm 0
/JS 2
/JavaScript 3
/AA 0
/OpenAction 1
/AcroForm 1
```


FinFisher

- Una suite di malware “legale” destinato a forze dell’ordine
- Venduto a regimi non democratici in tutto il mondo

Security

FinFisher spyware used to snoop on Bahraini activists, police told

Gamma International on the end of UK criminal complaint

FinFisher spyware seen targeting victims in Vietnam, Ethiopia

New research finds the surveillance spyware is spreading but may be used to spy on activists

FinFisher: funzionalità

FinSpy

- Features:
 - Custom Executables
 - Bypasses Anti-Virus/ Anti-Spyware Software
 - Location Tracing
 - Scheduled Operations
 - Key Logging
 - Password Gathering
 - Webcam/ Microphone Access
 - Communication Sniffing:
 - Skype
 - Instant Messengers (ICQ, Yahoo, ...)
 - Other



FinFisher: il caso del Bahrain

- Attacchi mirati ad attivisti e oppositori politici
- Social engineering tramite mail e social network

----- Forwarded Message -----

From: Melissa Chan <melissa.aljazeera@gmail.com>

To:

Sent: Tuesday, 8 May 2012, 8:52

Subject: Torture reports on Nabeel Rajab

Acting president Zainab Al Khawaja for Human Rights Bahrain reports of torture on Mr. Nabeel Rajab after his recent arrest.

Please check the attached detailed report along with torture images.



Shehab Hashem
@hashem911



#**Bahrain**: Those guys dont give up! They keep sending me those emails with viruses from many different email addresses.
pic.twitter.com/FDLtNriI

← Reply ↻ Retweet ★ Favorite



From: Melissa Chan > Hide

Breaking News from Bahrain – 5 Suspects Arrested

17 May 2012 17:03 Mark

Breaking News from Bahrain – 5 suspects have been arrested from wanted list announced yesterday evening of the suspects involved in the bomb attacks in Bahrain


Attached are the pictures with names of those arrested.




powered by Photobucket Flag this media

Finfisher: vettore di infezione

- File rar contenenti eseguibili mascherati da jpg o doc
- Uso del carattere RLO per non destare sospetti



exe.Rajab1.jpg



exe.Rajab.jpg

Finfisher: infezione

- Cancella il file originale e si sposta in una cartella temporanea
- Crea la cartella destinata ai file da inviare al C&C

```
C:\DOCUME~1\%USER%\LOCALS~1\Temp\delete.bat  
C:\DOCUME~1\%USER%\LOCALS~1\Temp\driverw.sys
```

```
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:50:59 35875 m..b r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 22469-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Desktop/Arrested Suspects.jpg  
48 ...b d/dnwxrwxrwx 0 0 25931-144-1 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Local Settings/Temp/TMP51B7AFE  
909824 ...b r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 25932-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Local Settings/Temp/tmpD.tmp  
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:51:01 35875 .ac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 22469-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Desktop/Arrested Suspects.jpg  
807 ...b r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 25934-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Recent/Arrested Suspects.lnk  
438272 .a.. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 3011-128-3 C:/WINDOWS/system32/shimgvw.dll  
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:51:02 389120 .a.. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 2114-128-3 C:/WINDOWS/system32/cmd.exe  
807 mac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 25934-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Recent/Arrested Suspects.lnk  
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:51:03 389120 .c. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 2114-128-3 C:/WINDOWS/system32/cmd.exe  
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:51:08 48 m.c. d/dnwxrwxrwx 0 0 25931-144-1 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Local Settings/Temp/TMP51B7AFE  
909824 .ac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 25932-128-4 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Local Settings/Temp/tmpD.tmp  
Thu Jun 14 2012 11:51:09 37024 mac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 10351-128-4 C:/WINDOWS/Prefetch/CMD.EXE-087B4001.pf  
56 m.c. d/dnwxrwxrwx 0 0 10992-144-6 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Application Data/Microsoft  
312 m.cb d/dnwxrwxrwx 0 0 25933-144-1 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Application Data/Microsoft/Installer  
48 .c. d/dnwxrwxrwx 0 0 25935-144-1 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Application Data/Microsoft/Installer/{5AAB219B-1B2B-4404-2F96-57347FF27294}  
11088 .ac. r/rrwxrwxrwx 0 0 25936-128-3 C:/Documents and Settings/XPMUser/Local Settings/Temp/driverw.sys
```


FinFisher: infezione

- Infetta processi di sistema tra cui winlogon e svchost
- L'analisi delle stringhe contenute in memoria permette l'attribuzione

```
Process: winlogon.exe Pid: 424 Address: 0x1af0000  
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE  
Flags: CommitCharge: 19, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6
```

```
0x01af0000 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  MZ.....  
0x01af0010 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....@.....  
0x01af0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....  
0x01af0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 00 00 00  .....  

```

```
00003960 47 4e 55 20 4d 50 3a 20 43 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 61 |GNU MP: Cannot a|  
00003970 6c 6c 6f 63 61 74 65 20 6d 65 6d 6f 72 79 20 28 |llocate memory (|  
00003980 73 69 7a 65 3d 25 75 29 0a 00 00 00 47 4e 55 20 |size=%u)....GNU |  
00003990 4d 50 3a 20 43 61 6e 6e 6f 74 20 72 65 61 6c 6c |MP: Cannot reall|  
000039a0 6f 63 61 74 65 20 6d 65 6d 6f 72 79 20 28 6f 6c |ocate memory (ol|  
000039b0 64 5f 73 69 7a 65 3d 25 75 20 6e 65 77 5f 73 69 |d_size=%u new_si|  
000039c0 7a 65 3d 25 75 29 0a 00 79 3a 5c 6c 73 76 6e 5f |ze=%u)..y:\lsvn |  
000039d0 62 72 61 6e 63 68 65 73 5c 66 69 6e 73 70 79 76 |branches\finspyv|  
000039e0 34 2e 30 31 5c 66 69 6e 73 70 79 76 32 5c 73 72 |4.01\finspyv2\sr|  
000039f0 63 5c 6c 69 62 73 5c 6c 69 62 67 6d 70 5c 6d 70 |c\libs\libgmp\mp|  
00003a00 6e 2d 74 64 69 76 5f 71 72 2e 63 00 63 20 3d 3d |n-tdiv_qr.c.c ==|  
00003a10 20 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 03 04 04 04 04 | 0.....|
```

Persistenza

- Il malware modifica il MBR per rimanere persistente

```
y:\lsvn_branches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\src\target\bootkit_x32driver\objfre_w2k_x86  
\i386\bootkit_x32driver.pdb
```

hackedteam / **vector-edk** Watch 12 Star 35 Fork 145

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Branch: **master** **vector-edk** / **vector-uefi** / Create new file Find file History

cod replaced "chipsec" Intel with "chipsec.efi" ... Latest commit 1ad0980 on 19 Mar 2015

..		
UEFITool-master	vector-uefi tools and source code	4 years ago
fd	replaced "chipsec" Intel with "chipsec.efi"	3 years ago
insyde	vector-uefi tools and source code	4 years ago
GenFfs.exe	vector-uefi tools and source code	4 years ago
Qt5Core.dll	vector-uefi tools and source code	4 years ago
UEFIExtract.exe	vector-uefi tools and source code	4 years ago
dropper.mod	first release based on chipsec/*python*	4 years ago

Antidebugging

- Utilizzo di diverse tecniche per eludere e rallentare l'analisi
- Se individua un debugger salta ad un indirizzo casuale
- Virtualized Packer

```
.text:00401683 finit  
.text:00401686 fld ds:tbyte_40168E  
.text:0040168C jmp short locret_401698  
-----  
.text:0040168E tbyte_40168E dt 9.2233720368547758075e18  
-----  
.text:00401698 locret_401698:  
.text:00401698 retn
```


Raccolta dati

- Nella cartella C:\Windows\Installer\[random]\ , protetti da cifratura
- Screenshot, tasti premuti, conversazioni, password...

winlogon.exe	420	CreateFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Write,
winlogon.exe	420	SetEndOfFileInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 0
winlogon.exe	420	SetAllocationInformationFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 0
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 4,096, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 8,192, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 12,288, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 16,384, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 20,480, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 24,576, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 28,672, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 32,768, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 36,864, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 40,960, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 45,056, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 49,152, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 53,248, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 57,344, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 61,440, Length: 4,096
winlogon.exe	420	WriteFile	C:\WINDOWS\Installer\{49FD463C-18F1-63C4-8F12-49F518F127}\t111o00000000.dat	SUCCESS	Offset: 65,536, Length: 4,096

I problemi della cifratura

- La chiave è composta da 8 letture consecutive dell'indirizzo 0x7ffe0014 (orologio Windows Time Service)
- La risoluzione dell'orologio non è alta: ~15.6 millisecondi
- Non è implementato padding

```
00000200  ed ff c5 7e 0e 8e 17 4b 33 80 2f 9a 74 92 b6 50 |...~...K3./..t..P|
00000210  41 ba fc 1d 7f ce ff 52 cf 68 1f d1 ea 8a 3b 5d |A.....R.h.....;||
00000220  b5 1a fe eb eb 54 e2 4a 12 d1 24 33 60 cd 2e f6 |.....T.J..$3'...|
00000230  da dc 86 6a 56 c6 df 6d b5 18 5c 96 14 a3 84 13 |...jV..m..\......|
00000240  3e 27 25 dd 33 72 56 e8 be 5c e5 54 3a dc 96 e2 |>'%.3rV..\.T:...|
00000250  4f cc 3f e9 16 76 8b 6e bf 61 73 40 2e 15 11 d7 |O.?..v.n.as@....|
00000260  73 a1 c6 12 c2 c6 7f 56 08 bb 37 50 5f 55 54 99 |s.....V..7P_UT.|
00000270  d3 21 2c 59 2a 27 48 01 54 b5 45 a7 d7 b5 32 62 |.!,Y*'H.T.E...2b|
00000280  dd 15 fc 46 00 00 00 90 03 fe 00 ea e9 e8 ff 38 |...F.....8|
00000290  01 3a 64 e2 98 58 c7 e6 b7 96 7f 68 8d 1f 4e 09 |.:d..X.....h..N.|
000002a0  b1 9f 29 7f e4 dd e2 9f b9 4b eb 3d 4b 4a 8b 42 |..).....K.=KJ.B|
000002b0  81 b5 6a 76 db d8 1c 36 ad a9 25 1f 40 b5 ef 69 |..jv...6...%.@...i|
000002c0  00 6e 00 53 00 70 00 79 00                                |.n.S.p.y.|
```

C&C

- Il sample contatta un IP del Bahrain
- Comunica sulle porte 22, 53, 80, 443, 4111

TCP Conversations - Filter: ip.addr == 77.69.140.194

Address A	Port A	Address B	Port B	Packets .	Bytes	Packets A->B	Bytes A->B	Packets A<-B	Bytes A<-B	Rel Start	Duration	bps A->B	bps A<-B
192.168.131.65	1200	77.69.140.194	53	3	186	3	186	0	0	46.533336000	8.9749	165.80	N/A
192.168.131.65	1212	77.69.140.194	53	3	186	3	186	0	0	229.148416000	8.9776	165.75	N/A
192.168.131.65	1217	77.69.140.194	53	3	186	3	186	0	0	447.436820000	8.9725	165.84	N/A
192.168.131.65	1204	77.69.140.194	80	15	1767	8	1273	7	494	101.999621000	2.0481	4972.45	1929.61
192.168.131.65	1205	77.69.140.194	80	15	1767	8	1273	7	494	134.195659000	2.0208	5039.53	1955.64
192.168.131.65	1181	77.69.140.194	22	25	5489	13	4387	12	1102	15.101931000	2.5512	13756.79	3455.66
192.168.131.65	1202	77.69.140.194	80	25	5225	13	4387	12	838	68.840833000	2.7173	12915.95	2467.19
192.168.131.65	1207	77.69.140.194	80	56	7266	27	4312	29	2954	166.481391000	32.9779	1046.04	716.60
192.168.131.65	1213	77.69.140.194	443	1710	1270075	597	59063	1113	1211012	251.429902000	193.7304	2438.98	50008.13
77.69.140.194	4111	192.168.131.65	1219	15660	4766223	8258	498554	7402	4267669	469.714476000	196.8652	20259.71	173425.05

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