


# SWE2001: System Program

## Lecture 0x0F: Final

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Systems Security Lab @ SKKU

# Nested Array Element Access Code




```
int get_nested_digit
(int index, int dig)
{
    return nested[index][dig];
}
```

```
leaq    (%rdi,%rdi,4), %rax    # 5*index
addl    %rax, %rsi             # 5*index+dig
movl    nested(,%rsi,4), %eax  # M[nested + 4*(5*index+dig)]
```

## ▶ Array Elements


- **nested[index][dig]** is **int**
- Address: **nested + 20\*index + 4\*dig**
  - = **nested + 4\*(5\*index + dig)**

### Problem 7 Paging Terminologies (5pts, no partial pts)




Consider the figure above. A page that correspond to a *virtual address* may or may not exist in the page tables. If it exists, we call it a (a) \_\_\_\_\_ when it doesn' t it is a (b) \_\_\_\_\_ the page indeeed *does not* exist, we have to copy the page content from the disk, which is called (c)\_\_\_\_\_.

# Software Security and ROP




- ▶ If you did Lab3, you will be fine
- ▶ It might take a little bit of creativity though

### Problem 7 Paging Terminologies (5pts, no partial pts)



Consider the figure above. A page that correspond to a *virtual address* may or may not exist in the page tables. If it exists, we call it a (a) \_\_\_\_\_ when it doesn' t it is a (b) \_\_\_\_\_ the page indeed *does not* exist, we have to copy the page content from the disk, which is called (c)\_\_\_\_\_.



```

1  foreach section s {
2      foreach relocation entry r {
3          refptr = s + r.offset; /* ptr to reference to be relocated */
4
5          /* Relocate a PC-relative reference */
6          if (r.type == R_X86_64_PC32) {
7              refaddr = ADDR(s) + r.offset; /* ref's run-time address */
8              *refptr = (unsigned) (ADDR(r.symbol) + r.addend - refaddr);
9          }
10
11         /* Relocate an absolute reference */
12         if (r.type == R_X86_64_32)
13             *refptr = (unsigned) (ADDR(r.symbol) + r.addend);
14     }
15 }

```

# Linker

## Relocating PC-Relative References

In line 6 in Figure 7.11, function `main` calls the `sum` function, which is defined in module `sum.o`. The `call` instruction begins at section offset `0xe` and consists of the 1-byte opcode `0xe8`, followed by a placeholder for the 32-bit PC-relative reference to the target `sum`.

The corresponding relocation entry `r` consists of four fields:

```
r.offset = 0xf
r.symbol = sum
r.type   = R_X86_64_PC32
r.addend = -4
```

These fields tell the linker to modify the 32-bit PC-relative reference starting at offset `0xf` so that it will point to the `sum` routine at run time. Now, suppose that the linker has determined that

## Relocating Absolute References

Relocating absolute references is straightforward. For example, in line 4 in Figure 7.11, the `mov` instruction copies the address of `array` (a 32-bit immediate value) into register `%edi`. The `mov` instruction begins at section offset `0x9` and consists of the 1-byte opcode `0xbf`, followed by a placeholder for the 32-bit absolute reference to `array`.


The corresponding relocation entry `r` consists of four fields:

```
r.offset = 0xa
r.symbol = array
r.type   = R_X86_64_32
r.addend = 0
```

These fields tell the linker to modify the absolute reference starting at offset `0xa` so that it will point to the first byte of `array` at run time. Now, suppose that the linker has determined that



# Getting Low



# Understanding Programs at Binary-level

```
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {

    int number1, number2, sum;

    printf("Enter two integers: ");
    scanf("%d %d", &number1, &number2);

    // calculating sum
    sum = number1 + number2;

    printf("%d + %d = %d", number1, number2, sum);
    return 0;
}
```



```
0x0000000000401136 <+0>:  sub    rsp,0x18
0x000000000040113a <+4>:  lea     rdi,[rip+0xec3]      # 0x402004
0x0000000000401141 <+11>:  mov     eax,0x0
0x0000000000401146 <+16>:  call    0x401030 <printf@plt>
0x000000000040114b <+21>:  lea     rdx,[rsp+0x8]
0x0000000000401150 <+26>:  lea     rsi,[rsp+0xc]
0x0000000000401155 <+31>:  lea     rdi,[rip+0xebd]      # 0x402019
0x000000000040115c <+38>:  mov     eax,0x0
0x0000000000401161 <+43>:  call    0x401040 <__isoc99_scanf@plt>
0x0000000000401166 <+48>:  mov     esi,DWORD PTR [rsp+0xc]
0x000000000040116a <+52>:  mov     edx,DWORD PTR [rsp+0x8]
0x000000000040116e <+56>:  lea     ecx,[rsi+rdx*1]
0x0000000000401171 <+59>:  lea     rdi,[rip+0xea7]      # 0x40201f
0x0000000000401178 <+66>:  mov     eax,0x0
0x000000000040117d <+71>:  call    0x401030 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000401182 <+76>:  mov     eax,0x0
0x0000000000401187 <+81>:  add     rsp,0x18
0x000000000040118b <+85>:  ret
```

# Low-level Knowledge Helps You Write Better Code

- ▶ Be a *Programmer*, not a coder
- ▶ Have the intuition into how your program will interact with hardware
- ▶ You will naturally see why Code A will run faster than Code B

# Advanced Reverse Engineering

The screenshot displays the CodeBrowser interface for the target binary 'SerialKey2020314978'. The left sidebar contains the 'Program Trees' and 'Symbol Tree' panels. The main window is divided into three panes: 'Listing: SerialKey2020314978' (assembly), 'Decompile: function\_b - (SerialKey2020314978)' (C-like decompiled code), and 'Function Graph' (empty). The assembly pane shows instructions for 'function\_b' starting at address 00401253. The decompiled code pane shows the C-like representation of 'function\_b', which takes two integer parameters and returns an integer. The function graph pane is currently empty.

**Listing: SerialKey2020314978**

```
00401253 0f 44 ee CMOVZ EBP,ESI
00401256 be 38 00 MOV ESI,0x38
0040125b 0f 44 f2 CMOVZ ESI,EDX
0040125e 89 e7 MOV EDI,EBP
00401260 29 f7 SUB EDI,ESI
00401262 83 c7 01 ADD EDI,0x1
00401265 89 d8 MOV EAX,EBX
00401267 99 CDQ
00401268 f7 ff IDIV EDI
0040126a 01 d1 ADD ECX,EDX
0040126c 89 c8 MOV EAX,ECX
0040126e 29 e8 SUB EAX,EBP
00401270 85 c0 TEST EAX,EAX
00401272 8d 44 06 ff LEA EAX,[RSI + RAX*0x1 + -0x1]
00401276 0f 4e c1 CMOVL EAX,ECX
00401278 48 83 c4 08 ADD RSP,0x8
0040127d 5b POP RBX
0040127e 5d POP RBP
0040127f c3 RET

*****
* FUNCTION
*
*****
undefined function_b()
AL:1 <RETURN>
XREF[3]: Entry Point(*), 00402e4c
00402f44(*)

00401280 55 PUSH RBP
00401281 53 PUSH RBX
00401282 50 PUSH RAX
00401283 89 f3 MOV EBX,ESI
00401285 89 fd MOV EBP,EDI
00401287 e8 34 fe CALL __ctype_b_loc
0040128c 48 8b 00 MOV RAX,qword ptr [RAX]
0040128f 48 63 f5 MOVXSD RSI,EBP
00401292 0f b7 04 70 MOVZX EAX,word ptr [RAX + RSI*0x2]
00401296 31 d2 XOR EDX,EDX
00401298 a9 00 01 TEST EAX,0x100
0040129d 0f 94 c2 SETZ DL
004012a0 c1 e2 85 SHL EDX,0x5
004012a3 8d 7a 5a LEA EDI,[RDX + 0x5a]
004012a6 83 ca 41 OR EDX,0x41
004012a9 a9 00 08 TEST EAX,0x800
004012ae b9 39 00 MOV ECX,0x39
```

**Decompile: function\_b - (SerialKey2020314978)**

```
1 int function_b(int param_1,int param_2)
2
3 {
4     ushort **ppuVar1;
5     int iVar2;
6     uint uVar3;
7     uint uVar4;
8     int iVar5;
9     bool bVar6;
10
11     ppuVar1 = __ctype_b_loc();
12     uVar3 = (uint)((*ppuVar1)[param_1] & 0x100) == 0) * 0x20;
13     bVar6 = ((*ppuVar1)[param_1] & 0x800) == 0;
14     iVar2 = 0x39;
15     if (bVar6) {
16         iVar2 = uVar3 + 0x5a;
17     }
18     uVar4 = 0x30;
19     if (bVar6) {
20         uVar4 = uVar3 | 0x41;
21     }
22     param_1 = param_1 - param_2 % (int)((iVar2 - uVar4) + 1);
23     iVar5 = uVar4 - param_1;
24     iVar2 = (iVar2 - iVar5) + 1;
25     if (iVar5 < 1) {
26         iVar2 = param_1;
27     }
28     return iVar2;
29 }
30
31
```

# If you enjoyed reversing and exploiting


- ▶ See you in security courses I teach {Introduction to Information Security, Internet Security, Special Topics in Systems Security ( Graduate)}
- ▶ I own ctf.skku.edu, where we have Capture-The-Flag competitions for classes and also just for fun

# Hackers Wanted



- ▶ We are always open to undergraduate internships
- ▶ If you enjoy hacking stuff please come and join us

# Our Interesting Projects



- ▶ **Defenseive:** Just-in-Time program transformation for security
- ▶ **Offensive:** ML model stealing
- ▶ **Offensive:** Bypassing modern hardware security features in 2021
- ▶ #1 Rule in research topic @ SSLab
  - The student must enjoy it

Thank you for your hard work,  
good luck on your exam,  
and see you later