

Homework 9

Due **Friday**, November 12

(note that November 11 is a university holiday)

Implementation Part

1. Implement the Goldwasser-Micali probabilistic encryption scheme to securely send 1 bit of data.
 - (a) Create a function `GenerateGMKey(b)` which creates a Goldwasser-Micali key from b -bit primes. In particular, it should output a *public key* $[N, a]$ where $N = pq$ is a product of (secret) b bit primes and $a \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ is a quadratic *nonresidue* modulo p and q , as well as a *private key* which should just consist of one of the secret primes. (You can use HW8 Problem 1 to compute Legendre symbols.)
 - (b) Write functions `GMEncrypt(publicKey,m)` and `GMDecrypt(privateKey,c)`. The first takes a Goldwasser-Micali public key, and a bit $m = \{0, 1\}$, and returns a ciphertext $c \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ which is a square modulo N if and only if $m = 0$. The second recovers m from c and the private key and Legendre symbols. (*Note:* When you compute the random integer in the encryption function make sure it is larger than the square root of N . For extremely large N , you should make use of the sage integer square root function `isqrt()` since floats may round up to infinity and have trouble reconverting to ints).
 - (c) Generate and print a Goldwasser-Micali key from 16 bit primes. Use it to encrypt and then decrypt both both 0 and 1. Confirm that you recover the bit correctly.
 - (d) Implement a Goldwasser-Micali key from primes $p = 151$ and $q = 233$. Recover the bit from the cipher $c = 33482$.

2. Implement the RSA Digital Signature algorithm. It will look very similar to the first project, and you are welcome to reuse code from that assignment (especially for key generation).
 - (a) Write a function `generateRSAKey(b)` which generates an RSA private signing key and public verification key from primes b bits long. The verification key will be a pair $[N, e]$ where $N = pq$ is a product of secret primes b bits long and e is an integer prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$, and the signing key will be a pair $[N, d]$ for the same N and d the inverse of e modulo $(p-1)(q-1)$ (sound familiar?).
 - (b) Write functions

`RSSign(signingKey,document)` and
`RSVerify(verificationKey,document,signedDocument)`.

The former will sign a document with the signing key (by taking an appropriate root), and the second will verify that a document is correctly signed (by exponentiating).
 - (c) Generate an RSA digital signature key from 16 bit primes. Use it to sign the document $D = 314159$. Run your verification algorithm for twice, once with the signed document and once with the unsigned document, and confirm you get the expected results.
 - (d) I generated a RSA Digital Signature key, below is my public verification key.

$N =$

10522131111414083920142713395050769617442433657695255146537311896434311144361
52105697372008556663566615508174430418471897265040190399740387723795071615822
78783519296999687194872224184723574952162166440945091505292215584920700394034
42226365661647537411508608651137113856704007797414387581567049968246853446643
9.

$e =$

21016836287029986747723759800774101835281275854873180166245543058525887395193
96307766860254990165396054303259228348297307889093719835313656626522445205557
65407005232827058670837160067093166648952976725071881739083691398929472902959
38964443139784969754551470562127704086246141892044152375206351855610254115515.

You receive two documents:

$D = 44591585690519734445193105605299933531568892342090748601970008137$

$D' =$

33737713092926002711997965938686781423985198340985423980678740668540837920165
7143087595936042616688490456529718758762313

Run `intToText` to read these documents (note: they are not encrypted). Each claims to be signed by me, and comes with a digital signature:

$D^{sig} =$

84266656881633759645931434414589646373474140299696318568846558871354683992664
91115775348447213721512083388365998130055074496366371336684453834515335491064
69940898673531353559586336758802075651425026668697230132550765551653945548321
68424776641559903698464211162982834359695243021419912674971036001530626269241

$D'^{sig} =$

90592809313509991477767898543561252818730285233946708276918316631997361944737
64728663367105923665686312882726901254765910591149065525748838442609274074694
58299675381621160449150556922441295777712973489019131240798265816551541474157
14324848399155672059930064485203220452985824881282662030076919344957027591627

Which message is truthful?

3. Implement Elgamal digital signatures.

- Write a function `generateElgamalKey(p,g)` which takes as input a prime p and a primitive root $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, chooses a secret exponent a (at random) and returns a private signing key $[a, p, g]$ and a public verification key $[A, p, g]$.
- Write functions

`elgamalSign(signingKey,document)` and
`elgamalVerify(verificationKey,document,signedDocument)`.

The former will sign a document with the given signing key, returning the signed document as a pair $[S_1, S_2]$ where $0 \leq S_1 < p$ and $0 \leq S_2 < p-1$. The second will verify that the document was correctly signed. Both should follow the Elgamal digital signature protocol defined in the October 22 lecture and described in Table 4.2 of [HPS].

- If you sign 2 different documents with the same random element k , your Elgamal signing key becomes insecure. In problem 6 (below) you will describe an algorithm to steal that signing key. Implement that algorithm here. In particular, implement an algorithm

`stealElgamalSignature(verificationKey,D,Dsig,D',D'sig)`.

which takes as input verification key associated to an Elgamal signature (which is public information), as well as 2 distinct documents signed with that key. It will first check if those 2 documents were signed with the same random value k , and if they were it will return the signers secret exponent a . (This attack was used to steal Sony's digital signature in 2013!).

- (d) Let $p = 3700273081$, and $g = 7$. Create an Elgamal key, and use it to sign the document $D = 314159$. Then verify that the signature was valid.
- (e) Suppose Samantha has a public verification key $[A, p, g] = [185149, 348149, 113459]$. Suppose Samantha signed the following 2 documents:

$$\begin{aligned} D &= 153405 & D^{sig} &= (S_1, S_2) = (208913, 209176) \\ D' &= 127561 & D'^{sig} &= (S'_1, S'_2) = (208913, 217800). \end{aligned}$$

Use `stealElgamalSignature` to steal Samantha's signing exponent.

4. Implement DSA.

- (a) Write a function `generateDSA(p,q,g)` which takes as input primes p, q with $p \equiv 1 \pmod q$, and an element $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ of order q . It then chooses a secret exponent a (at random) and returns a private signing key $[a, p, q, g]$ and a public verification key $[A, p, q, g]$.
- (b) Write functions

`DSASign(signingKey,document)` and
`DSAVerify(verificationKey,document,signedDocument)`.

The former will sign a document with the given signing key, returning the signed document as a pair $[S_1, S_2]$ where $0 \leq S_i < q$ for $i = 1, 2$. The second will verify that the document was correctly signed. Both should follow the DSA protocol defined in the November 4 lecture and described in Table 4.3 of [HPS].

- (c) Let $p = 48731$ and $q = 443$. Assume that 7 is a primitive root for \mathbb{F}_p^* . Use this to find an element of order 443 in \mathbb{F}_p^* . Call this element g .
- (d) Generate a DSA key for p, q, g in part (c). Use it to sign the document $D = 314$ and verify that this signature is valid.

Written Part

In the written part we explore some attacks on the Elgamal Digital Signature algorithm.

- 5. First let's describe a way Eve can produce documents that appear to be signed by Sam. Let p be a prime number and $g \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ a primitive root. Let i and j be integers such that $\gcd(j, p-1) = 1$. Let A be arbitrary. Set:

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 &\equiv g^i A^j \pmod p \\ S_2 &\equiv -S_1 j^{-1} \pmod{p-1} \\ D &\equiv -S_1 i j^{-1} \pmod{p-1} \end{aligned}$$

- (a) Show that the pair (S_1, S_2) is a valid Elgamal signature for the document D . In particular, this means Eve can produce valid Elgamal signatures.

- (b) Explain why this doesn't mean that Eve can forge Sam's signature on a given document.
6. In this exercise we describe a security flaw in the Elgamal digital signature algorithm, caused by a careless signer. Suppose that Sam signed two distinct documents D and D' using the same random value k .
- (a) Explain how Eve can immediately recognize that Samantha has made this blunder.
- (b) Let the signature for D be $D^{sig} = (S_1, S_2)$ and the signature for D' be $D'^{sig} = (S'_1, S'_2)$. Explain how Eve can recover Samantha's secret signing key a .