

OS Installation Redesign: One Year Later

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One year ago, Athens: GanetiCon 2013

Design sessions

- Many productive design sessions
- · An agreement reached on how to proceed on all topics
- · except: How to redesign the instance OS installation

Why a redesign?

Previous state

- OS definition: set of scripts
 - · One for each operation
 - · create, import, export, ...
- · Executed as **root** on the host node
 - · When one of those operations is invoked

Issues of the old design

- Fine in a 100% trusted environment, but:
- scripts MUST be trusted
- everything they access MUST be trusted
- · No (automatic) support for personalization
- No (automatic) support for disk images
- No user-defined VM images
 - · A crafted disk image might compromise the host kernel

Last year's design session

Why was there no agreement?

- · Scripts with root powers are too powerful and flexible
- They had been around for a long time
- Everybody had developed its own workflow
 - · And hoped to change it as little as possible
 - · But they were really different from each other
- · A one hour design session was not enough to unravel the issue



A longer design journey

The following months

- Lots of communications with the interested internal and open source community parties
- · Over different channels
 - · ganeti-devel mailing list
 - · Private emails
 - Videochats
 - Meetings at conferences somewhere in the world
 - Homing pidgeons

trying to define the new design and the roadmap for its implementation



User requests (I)

- Secret parameters
 - · Pass parameters to the OS installation scripts that are not stored in the configuration file or in the logs.
 - Useful for:
 - Private keys
 - Username/passwords

User requests (II)

- Image-based install
 - No need for OS scripts
 - · Take an image and dump it AS IS on the 1st disk
 - User provided images are a security issue
 - even a non-root mount might lead to a compromised system

User requests (III)

- Personalization of image-based install
- · Image-based install is quick and convenient
- · Frequently instances should differ a bit
 - Users
 - · IPs
 - Configuration
- Scripts have OS parameters
- What about images?
- · Adding/modifying files should be possible

User requests (IV)

- · Root scripts in a safe environment
 - · Root scripts are insecure... but (sometimes) powerful and useful!
 - Untrusted scripts are currently not possible
 - Plenty of power and flexibility
 - · What about keeping them, but in a more secure way?
 - · Run inside a VM
 - · If compromised, the node is still safe
 - · Which VM?
 - · Resources might be scarce...

User requests (V)

- Communication with the instance
 - · An OS definition might need:
 - A trusted part (accessing sensitive information)
 - An untrusted part (dealing with user data)
 - · One can run in the host, one in the VM performing the install
 - They need to communicate
 - · In general: need for a bidirectional communication channel
 - Other uses are possible too

User requests (VI)

- Temporary installation state
 - During the installation, different parameters needed
 - · Installation media, different boot order, extra NICs
 - Have a special set of parameters
 - Stored with the config
 - · Used only for (re)install

User requests (VII)

- · Installation metadata
 - · An image-based install:
 - · receive metadata in a standard location during its first start-up
 - · self-configure the instance based on it



Design decisions and implementation status

OS Parameters

- Divided in 3 categories
 - Public: traditional behaviour. Logged and stored freely.
 - Private: parameter saved in the config, not shown in logs
 - Secret: parameter not saved. Reinstall impossible unless it is manually specified again. Not shown in logs, not serialized to disk.
- Implementation status
 - Implemented
 - Parameters are still serialized to disk
 - Coming soon: blocked on MasterD/LuxiD refactoring
 - Beware: if log level is set to DEBUG, some parameters might occasionally still appear. They are completely hidden only at lower levels.

Image-based install

- gnt-instance add --os-parameters os-image=install_disk.img
 inst1
- The image is dumped on the first disk of the instance
- · Not only local files: URLs too!
- · OS scripts can be executed too, afterwards, for further personalization

Personalization package

- · Image-based install don't need to be identical
- · Configs, users, private keys can be injected
- Personalization package
 - Compressed archive
 - · Contains same structure of the filesystem
 - Extracted on / of the first disk
 - From a safe environment (no risks while mounting the image)

Communication mechanism (I)

- Based on a link-local network interface (last interface, added after the userdefined ones)
- Host-instance only communication. No cross-instance communication.
- Mainly meant for install. Can be used also during normal runtime if needed.
- TAP interfaces created by ganeti: gnt.com.%d (%d is a host-unique number)
- The host listens on 169.254.169.254/32
- Static point-to-point, interface-based route set on the host
- No iptables magic
 - · Common, so unconfigured instances always know where to look for it.

Communication mechanism (II)

- · Interface name (NOT IP!!) distinguishes the connection.
- Guest side
 - Host-unique MAC address
 - · Host-unique IP address, provided by DHCPon the host
 - DHCP dynamically configured by Ganeti
 - · dnsmasq is preconfigured. Scripts can be adapted for any other server
 - Only listens to network interfaces/MAC addresses configured by Ganeti
 - Virtually no conflict with other DHCP servers

Communication mechanism (III)

Why using network interfaces?

- Network support
 - Ubiquitous
 - · OS independent
 - Hypervisor independent
 - · Unconfigured network interfaces are common, no side effects
- · VirtlO, XenBus
 - hypervisor dependent
 - might require (para)virtualization drivers
- Virtual floppy, virtual USB device
 - Detected and configured automatically by the guest OS
 - Frequently in prominent positions of the UI
 - Might lead to unexpected behaviour for the user if communication is active outside install-time

Communications mechanism (IV)

- Implementation status
 - Done
 - · Allows host-instance network connections on any port
 - Firewalling is up to the user if required
 - Activated by
 - Enabling the communication network: gnt-cluster modify -instance-communication-network=net1
 - Enabling communication for a specific instance: gnt-instance add/modify --communication=yes|no

Metadata service (I)

- · A new daemon provides metadata about the instance
 - Static IP address
 - A ganeti specific pipe-like communication channel that the scripts can use to communicate
 - OS scripts parameters
- The instance can use it to self-configure itself
- · Implementation status
 - Partial
 - Daemon listening on 169.254.169.254:8080: Done

Metadata service (II)

- Implementation status
 - · Daemon implemented
 - · Implemented endpoints
 - /os/os-install-package: an archive containing OS scripts and related files
 - · /os/parameters.json: the OS parameters to be accessed by the scripts
 - /os/package: personalization package
 - More to come
 - · /read, /write: endpoints of the communication pipe
 - /os/meta_data.json: arbitrary metadata to be received and used by the instance

Helper VM

- Running root scripts on the host is dangerous
- Root powers are usually required to mount images/prepare VMs
- · Solution: run them in a VM
- · Helper VM
 - User-provided
 - · Ganeti will have a default script for creating one
- Ganeti communicates with the helper VM
- · Instructs it on what to do, how to install/modify instances

Helper VM

Where does it run?

- · With its own resources?
 - · Take them into account in all tools
 - · Have them!
 - · Only one running at a time: possible long waits
 - · ...or multiple copies, huge waste of resources!
 - :-(
- · In the domain/with the resources of the instance it is working on
 - Resources already accounted for
 - Surely more than enough
 - · When the helper VM runs, the instance is down anyway
 - :-)

Helper VM

What does it do?

- Runs the untrusted OS scripts (currently, only create)
- · Will extract the personalization package on top of the installation image
 - · If both are specified, and there are no OS scripts
- Other future uses
 - · Zeroing out unused disk space before an instance move to make it quicker
 - · Other unsafe operations?

Trusted VS untrusted scripts

- New category of OS install scripts introduced **Untrusted** scripts
- Functionally equivalent to the trusted ones
- · Run inside the helper VM
- · Can use the communication mechanism to interact with the trusted ones
 - Over sockets
 - Over the metadata / read and /write (TODO)

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Thank You!

Questions?