

Global Social Policy

<http://gsp.sagepub.com/>

The diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the Americas

Natasha Borges Sugiyama

Global Social Policy 2011 11: 250

DOI: 10.1177/1468018111421295

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://gsp.sagepub.com/content/11/2-3/250>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

Additional services and information for *Global Social Policy* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://gsp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://gsp.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations: <http://gsp.sagepub.com/content/11/2-3/250.refs.html>

>> [Version of Record](#) - Dec 25, 2011

[What is This?](#)



The diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the Americas

Natasha Borges Sugiyama

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA

Abstract

In the mid-1990s, Brazil and Mexico created innovative social policies known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). Since then, CCTs have spread to countries throughout Latin America and beyond. While these programs reflect a new development norm, their spread is surprising given that some emulating countries lack the basic education and health infrastructure to support increased demand from beneficiaries. This article draws on a policy diffusion framework to explain the spread of CCTs. The author contrasts domestic preconditions (political ideology, state capacity and human development levels) with international pressure (neighborhood effects, professional norm-creation and financial inducements by international financial institutions) to explain the diffusion of CCTs. In order to elucidate the mechanisms that drive diffusion processes, the article draws on mixed methods to uncover learning and emulation among actors.

Keywords

Conditional Cash Transfer programs (CCTs), emulation, norms, policy diffusion, social sector reforms

Introduction

In the last 10 years, developing countries around the world have embraced new strategies for poverty alleviation. Following second-stage neoliberal economic reforms, which included the creation of safety net programs for sectors experiencing the negative effects of market reform, policy-makers have sought to replace piecemeal programs with integrated poverty assistance approaches. The shift represents a new paradigm in the ways social policy is designed and implemented throughout much of the developing world. A diverse set of countries has adopted Conditional Cash Transfer (CCTs) programs. As their name suggests, CCTs provide cash grants to poor families on the condition they

Corresponding author:

Natasha Borges Sugiyama, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA

Email: sugiyamn@uwm.edu

meet behavioral requirements thought to address the intergenerational transmission of poverty and improve human development. Since 1997, nearly all Latin American countries have adopted a CCT program. This article explores the rapid diffusion of the CCT model and seeks to uncover the factors that explain its widespread adoption within the hemisphere.

Diffusion research typically contrasts two elements of decision-making – internal prerequisites and external pressures – to explain adoption decisions (Collier and Messick, 1975; Walker, 1969). For instance, countries may adopt innovative programs because they share similar domestic conditions, such as problems, policy needs and political constraints. While the domestic features of a jurisdiction can illuminate why some countries adopt policies, numerous external pressures can drive the wavelike phenomenon of policy replication across space and time. Scholars of diffusion processes have evoked competition among neighbors, coercion from international actors and learning through networks or ‘epistemic communities’ to explain waves of policy diffusion (see, for example, Dobbin et al., 2007; Evans, 2004; Hulme, 2006; Stone, 2001; Weyland, 2004). In the transnational arena, diffusion research has explored such diverse phenomena as the spread of democracy (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006), economic liberalization (Dobbin et al., 2007; Simmons and Elkins, 2004), market reform (Henisz et al., 2005), pension privatization and reform (Madrid, 2003; Orenstein, 2003), women’s bureaucracies (True and Mintrom, 2001) and science ministries (Finnemore, 1993, 1996). The growth in diffusion studies is spurred not only by the apparent increase in the spread of ideas and policies across jurisdictions, but also growing interest in accounting for the behavioral motivations, including ideational, rational, sociological and cognitive processes, that drive replication decisions (see, for example, Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and Volden, 2009; Sugiyama, 2008a, 2008b; Weyland, 2005, 2007).

The case of conditional cash transfer diffusion provides an opportunity to extend our understanding of diffusion processes in a transnational context. That most Latin American countries would embrace CCTs today is surprising. The region is home to countries large and small with diverse sets of internal needs and capacities to address them. Moreover, Latin American governments are led by a diverse set of politicians who reflect a broad ideological spectrum. If domestic preconditions do not appear to sway emulation decisions, can external pressure, such as neighborhood effects, shared norms and inducements from international financial institutions account for the relative speed of country adoptions? The emulation of CCTs has taken place remarkably quickly; in less than 10 years, the vast majority of Latin American countries have adopted CCTs. In 1998, only two countries had a CCT in place. By 2008, nearly every Latin American country had adopted one. Policy diffusion often exhibits wavelike patterns where takeoff can be slow at first and then the speed of emulation can rapidly increase, only to trail off as most countries have undertaken the reform (Rogers, 2003). This general trend holds true for Latin American countries (see Figure 1). What explains this diffusion and why were some countries quick to adopt the program while others slow or resistant to the model?

The first section of this article provides a brief introduction to social policies since the 1980s, situating the emergence of model CCT programs against the backdrop of safety net programs that preceded them. The second section documents the spread of CCTs and outlines this study’s research design. Next, the analysis explores the internal and external




Figure 1. Cumulative adoption of CCTs in Latin America

determinants of CCT emulation across the Americas. To preview the argument, the analysis suggests that adoption decisions are likely influenced by foreign pressures through complementary processes of learning through neighbors, professional norming through the international development community and incentives through international financial institutions.

From safety nets to conditional cash transfers

Following the debt crisis in 1982, much of the developing world underwent substantial economic reforms. Countries sought to follow the economic prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, including the adoption of structural adjustment programs, and saw their capacities for social sector spending diminish. As neoliberal economic reforms took hold, both domestic and international actors recognized that those reforms would adversely affect the poor as well as workers in particular sectors of the economy. States would need to assist their citizens but within the confines of a smaller state. In other words, governments would need to accomplish more while they spent less on social programs. Rather than offer costly universal subsidies, for example, development agencies such as the World Bank recommended the development of safety net programs for poverty reduction. The purpose of safety net programs was to ‘protect a person or household against two adverse outcomes: chronic incapacity to work and earn (chronic poverty) and a decline in this capacity from a marginal situation that provides minimal means for survival with a few reserves (transient poverty)’ (Subbarao et al., 1997: 2). As Graham notes, safety net programs in developing countries rarely provided direct transfer payments because they lacked functional administrative systems. More commonly, safety nets provided services (employment and basic infrastructure) or targeted subsidies (food coupons) (1994: 5).

A variety of safety net programs were implemented worldwide, including in the Latin American, African and East European regions. Among the best-known examples in the Americas are Chile's Minimum Emergency Employment Program (PEM) implemented under the military regime, and Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund. In theory, these programs provided much-needed basic assistance during tumultuous economic times. Ultimately, safety nets were designed to provide short-term and temporary relief as governments adjusted to new economic conditions. Once developing countries achieved economic stability, the question became what governments should do to address persistent and extreme poverty. If the benefits of economic stabilization and growth could not, and in fact did not, result in widespread increases in standards of living, what should the state do to address the needs of indigent groups? In practice, the question of what should follow safety net policies also carried significant political weight. In some countries, safety net programs were widely criticized as vehicles for patronage politics and ruling party vote buying (Bruhn, 1996; Fox, 1994; Schady, 2000). Thus, the need to create more effective, efficient and politically insulated programs became policy goals for social sector reform. As the following section outlines, two Latin American countries would experiment with new strategies and eventually develop 'models' for social sector spending.

Origins of Mexico's innovative approach to social sector reform

In the early 1990s, Mexico's social spending on poverty alleviation under President Salinas's administration would fall to the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (Pronasol, National Solidarity Program). Pronasol was an umbrella program initiated by Salinas to establish various social projects in education, health, nutrition, housing, employment, infrastructure and other projects designed to benefit the population living in extreme poverty. Despite its wide mandate and sizable budget, Pronasol came under fire. Observers charged that Pronasol funds followed political considerations and served as vehicles for the PRI's (Institutional Revolutionary Party) traditional patronage practices and electoral vote buying (Bruhn, 1996; Dion, 2010; Fox, 1994; Menocal, 2001). In response to criticisms of Pronasol, President Zedillo (1994–2000), also of the PRI, would reform the sector early in his administration.

In 1997, Mexico introduced the Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación (PROGRESA) to support poor households with small children in the rural areas. In 2000, the program expanded to reach semi-urban beneficiaries as well as a few urban families. President Fox maintained PROGRESA during his first year in office and generally supported efforts to provide assistance to poor in marginalized regions (Dion, 2010: 205). In 2001, President Fox transformed PROGRESA into Oportunidades (Opportunities) and officially accelerated expansion of the program to include urban areas throughout the country. Oportunidades includes a cash transfer with three components: a household nutrition component, a school subsidy for each school-age child rising by grade (at the secondary school level there is a higher subsidy for girls) and an annual transfer to cover school costs (Barrientos and DeJong, 2006: 547). The conditionality component for the program is extensive and includes a school attendance record of at least 85 percent, parenting sessions, as well as health monitoring for mothers and infants. PROGRESA's initial geographic focus on rural communities reflected the country's geographic income

distributions where extreme poverty is concentrated in Mexico's small rural communities. Since its expansion, distribution of Oportunidades resources has continued to favor rural communities (71 percent), but now includes semi-urban (11.4 percent) and urban (17.6 percent) residents (World Bank, 2004). Figures from 2004 indicated that approximately 5 million households (25 million individuals) participate in Oportunidades; the participation rate is remarkable given that these figures account for about a quarter of the total population.

The PROGRESA/Oportunidades program received considerable attention among international development circles, despite the fact that President Zedillo initially avoided World Bank funding for the program to ensure the program was perceived as domestic initiative rather than a 'directive' of the international financial institution (Dion, 2010: 204). Much of the early acclaim for the program came from studies that documented its positive effects. At the outset, President Zedillo committed to implementing the program to facilitate an experimental design and allow for controls to evaluate the effects of PROGRESA (Zedillo, 2009). To further the credibility of these policy evaluations, the Mexican government contracted with independent researchers and think tanks, such as the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), to produce program evaluations (Potter, 2009; Skoufias and McClafferty, 2000). The widespread distribution of published reports on PROGRESA's outcomes furthered the notion that Mexico had developed a model social program.

Origins of Brazil's innovative approach to poverty and education

While Mexico's PROGRESA emerged from a national initiative, Brazil's first CCT models originated among its local governments. One of the unique features of the Brazilian state since democratization is that sub-national governments have served as the locus for innovation in social sector reforms. The constitution (1988) established a federal system with three tiers of governmental responsibility – national, state and municipal – that allowed for meaningful fiscal and administrative decentralization. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, local governments have experimented with a broad range of public policies related to health, education and participatory governance. It is in this context that two local governments established CCT programs in 1995. The city of Campinas, in the state of São Paulo, established the Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima Familiar (Minimum Family Income Program). The Renda Mínima program targeted families in extreme poverty, with children from 0 to 14 years of age, for conditional cash grants. Beneficiaries worked closely with the city's social service agency and conditionality was tied to education and health-care.¹ At the same time, the federal district of Brasília established a CCT known as Bolsa Escola. Like the Campinas program, Bolsa Escola targeted the poorest families with school-aged children. An important difference was its primary policy objective to address low educational attainment – attendance and repetition – through conditionality.²

Both the Brasília and Campinas programs received considerable attention, yet Bolsa Escola emerged as the leading model for Brazilian policy-makers due to its location in the nation's capital. International organizations with offices in Brasília took interest in the program and chose to fund program evaluations. In addition, Brasília's then governor, Cristovam Buarque, became a successful advocate of Bolsa Escola within Brazil and

abroad. In 2001, the Brazilian federal government under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration adopted a national version, Bolsa Escola Federal, which mirrored many facets of the municipal version. It, too, focused on educational conditionality and direct cash assistance to mothers. To avoid political interference by local and state politicians, funds were made directly available to beneficiaries. Later, under President Lula, Bolsa Escola evolved into Bolsa Família, with a broader set of aims with corresponding conditionality for beneficiaries, including health and nutritional monitoring. Today, Bolsa Família represents the single largest income support program for poor families, reaching over 11 million families (44 million individuals), the equivalent of 20 percent of the total population.

While programmatic nuances between the Mexican and Brazilian programs are relevant for evaluative purposes, most proponents of these strategies in the international development community have treated them as largely comparable. Bypassing the politically sensitive question of which country should receive credit for the origin of the innovation, international development institutions have chosen to focus on the similarities between these programs and outcomes related to poverty alleviation and human capital development. For instance, publications by the World Bank downplay the timing of Brazil's federal Bolsa Escola program and credit both countries with developing innovative programs (see Fiszbein et al., 2009: overview). Other institutions such as UNESCO, FAO, ILO and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have published reports touting the effects of these programs.

Conditional cash transfers catch on

Governments around the developing world have adopted CCTs (see Fiszbein et al., 2009). However, much of the tidal wave of adoption reflects a particularly Latin American phenomenon. The earliest innovators were within the region and CCTs have spread there at an astonishing pace. Since 1997, nearly all Latin American countries have adopted a CCT; some governments have been quick to emulate the model while others have lagged behind (see Table 1).

Research design

To explain the emulation of CCTs within Latin America from 1997 to 2007,³ this study adopts a broad definition of the region, including countries that share a historical and cultural experience grounded in Iberian colonization as well as two large Anglo-Caribbean countries.⁴ This article only examines replication of cash transfer programs by national (federal) governments.⁵ This distinction is important because both local and state governments in certain countries have adopted CCTs. The emphasis on national-level decision-making allows for comparable analysis of the political opportunities and constraints for decision-makers. Moreover, federalism and decentralized policy-making is not a shared feature across the region and local-level experiences would obscure timing of the dependent variable.

To explain emulation decisions, the analysis draws on quantitative and qualitative methods. An event history model can capture the likelihood that a country will adopt a

Table 1. CCT adoption

Year	Latin American countries adopting CCTs
1997	Mexico (PROGRESA/Oportunidades) ⁶
1998	Honduras (Programa de Asignación Familiar) ⁷
1999	
2000	Colombia (Familias en Acción) ⁸ Costa Rica (Supermonos) ⁹ Nicaragua (Red de Protección/Social Atención a Crisis) ¹⁰
2001	Brazil (Bolsa Escola Federal/Bolsa Família) ¹¹ Jamaica (Program of Advancement through Health and Education) ¹² Chile (Chile Solidario) ¹³
2002	Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) ¹⁴
2003	Argentina (Programa Familias) ¹⁵
2004	Dominican Republic (Solidaridad) ¹⁶
2005	El Salvador (Red Solidaria) ¹⁷ Paraguay (Red de Promoción y Protección Social) ¹⁸ Peru (Juntos) ¹⁹ Uruguay (Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social) ²⁰
2006	Bolivia (Bono Escolar – Juancito Pinto) ²¹ Panama (Red Oportunidades) ²² Trinidad and Tobago (Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Program) ²³
2007	–
2008	Guatemala (Mi Familia PROGRESA) ²⁴

CCT at a given time while controlling for internal and external characteristics of the jurisdiction (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). As many of the hypotheses developed in this article can be examined quantitatively, the event history model provides a test for hypotheses that predict adoption. The qualitative analysis, which includes interviews and archival analysis, develops an analysis for those hypotheses that cannot readily be incorporated into a statistical model but that may nevertheless offer suggestive evidence for alternate explanations for emulation decisions.

Explaining the diffusion of conditional cash transfers

Domestic preconditions

Does domestic politics explain emulation of CCTs across the region? Do Latin American countries face similar problems and share similar policy needs? If so, it would be reasonable for countries throughout the region to embrace similar strategies. While most of Latin America has embraced neoliberal economic reforms and many countries adopted safety net programs as mechanisms for poverty alleviation, it is not obvious that all countries in the region should embrace CCTs. After all, there are a diverse set of challenges within the region related to social inclusion, income inequality, poverty and educational and health barriers.²⁵

Do emulating countries display similar domestic conditions as early innovators? That is, are countries with similar poverty rates, educational repetition rates and maternal health more inclined to embrace a program with conditionality than others? The Human Development Index (HDI) compiled by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) offers a comparable scale for assessing human development in the region. The HDI measure takes into account a variety of factors that matter for individuals' opportunities in life, including health (infant mortality, maternal mortality), education (literacy) and poverty (income per capita). Interestingly, Mexico and Brazil shared similar human development indices at the time of their adoption. Nevertheless, adoption takes place among countries with better conditions (e.g. Costa Rica and Uruguay) and those with higher needs (e.g. Nicaragua and Bolivia). Moreover, countries with higher human development do not adopt CCTs more rapidly than others (see Table 2). Further regression analysis will test whether human development matters, when controlling for other factors.

Another possibility is that countries may be more or less capable of implementing new social sector reform. CCTs require bureaucratic systems to determine the scope and size of the program, select eligible families, track conditionality components and distribute cash grants. Depending on the design of the CCTs, the program can require considerable coordination across government agencies and necessitates oversight mechanisms to ensure that payments are not diverted for political purposes. Given these administrative challenges, countries with high state capacity might be more likely to adopt CCTs and do so fairly quickly. In other words, state capacity could explain rapid vs slow emulation. The Government Effectiveness Measure developed by the World Bank can be used to examine patterns of capacity and adoption. As Tables 2 and 3 show, there is no apparent connection between government effectiveness and CCT adoption. Yet, an event history model might reveal important findings by controlling for other possible factors.

Another indicator of internal political environment is the ideological perspective of executives. Political decision-making regarding resource allocations can follow deep-seated values and beliefs that are tied to ideological commitments (Mullins, 1972). As such, CCTs might appeal to different ideological commitments. Some leftists might resist CCTs in favor of broader universal social welfare models, taking the view that targeted programs are not generous enough, as they did in Mexico (Dion, 2010). At the same time, leftist politicians might be expected to embrace the aims of CCTs, including poverty alleviation and educational and healthcare access, as was the case among sub-national politicians in Brazil (Sugiyama, 2008a, 2008b). Another possibility is that conservative presidents might find CCTs appealing. Although Latin American politicians on the right traditionally support business interests and neoliberal economic reforms (Mainwaring et al., 2000), it is possible CCTs would appeal to the market-oriented affinity for conditionality that requires behavioral modifications. Given the complex appeals of CCTs to politicians, it is unclear whether presidents' ideological commitments constrain the adoption decision.

As Table 2 shows, Latin American presidents who adopted CCTs represent a wide spectrum of political ideologies (right, center-right, center, center-left and left). Rather than a leftist-dominated trend, most of the presidents who adopted CCTs were centrists (center-right, center and center-left). Three countries have yet to adopt these strategies; Table 3 shows their characteristics. It is likely that Venezuela would refrain from doing so

Table 2. Features of domestic conditions at the time of CCT adoption

Country	President adopting CCT	President's ideological leaning	HDI	Government effectiveness score
Mexico	Ernesto Zedillo (Institutional Revolutionary Party)	Center-right	0.79	62
Honduras	Carlos Roberto Flores Facusse (Liberal Party of Honduras)	Center	0.65	24
Colombia	Andres Pastrana (Colombian Conservative Party)	Center-right	0.77	45
Costa Rica	Miguel Angel Rodriguez Echeverria (Social Christian Unity Party)	Center-right	0.82	69
Nicaragua	Arnolodo Aleman (Constitutionalist Liberal Party)	Right	0.64	30
Brazil	Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)	Center	0.78	58
Jamaica	Percival James Patterson (People's National Party)	Left	0.76	59
Chile	Ricardo Lagos (Socialist Party and Party for Democracy)	Center-left	0.84	87
Ecuador	Lucio Edwin Gutierrez Borbua (Patriotic Society Party)	Center-left	0.76	23
Argentina	Nestor Carlos Kirchner (Justicialista Party)	Center-left	0.86	51
Dominican Republic	Leonel Fernandez Reyna (Dominican Liberation Party)	Center	0.78	38
El Salvador	Antonio Saca (Nationalist Republican Alliance)	Right	0.74	48
Paraguay	Nicanor Duarte Frutos (Colorado Party)	Right	0.76	24
Peru	Alejandro Toledo (Peru Posible)	Center-right	0.77	32
Uruguay	Tabare Vazquez (Frente Amplio)	Center	0.85	70
Bolivia	Evo Morales (Movement for Socialism)	Left	0.69	27
Panama	Martin Torrijos (Democratic Revolutionary Party)	Center-left	0.81	59
Trinidad and Tobago	Patrick Manning (People's Nationalist Movement)	Center-left	0.81	65
Guatemala	Oscar Berger Perdomo (Guatemala GANA)	Right	0.69	54

because alternative social policies are in place, and President Hugo Chávez might resist some of the market-oriented features of CCTs. A first-order analysis suggests that Latin American presidents do not need to share ideological convictions to embrace CCTs, but we do not know how ideology might interact with some other variables of interest.

Table 3. Domestic features of non-adopting countries (2007)

Country	President	President's ideological leaning	HDI	Government effectiveness score
Guyana	Bharrat Jagdeo	Left	0.75	32
Haiti	Rene Preval	Center-left	0.53	8
Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	Left	0.79	17

Foreign pressures

If domestic conditions cannot fully explain the tidal wave of CCT adoption, is CCT emulation driven by foreign pressures? From the onset, diffusion researchers have speculated that political jurisdictions may be influenced by the decisions undertaken by their neighbors (see, for example, Walker, 1969). The reasons for neighborhood emulation can include such factors as greater connectivity and exchanges across borders and shared policy networks. Competition among jurisdictions can also spur emulation. As a greater number of neighboring countries adopt CCTs, policy-makers will more rapidly emulate them. If neighborhood matters, we might see the tidal wave of adoption exhibit a geographic pattern. As scholars who have examined Chile's innovative pension reform and the subsequent diffusion of pension privatization have noted, some countries also become known for their policy expertise and neighbors will follow the lead of well-regarded countries (Madrid, 2003; Weyland, 2005, 2007). A basic examination of the list of countries that have adopted CCTs suggests that neighborhood emulation may take place; that three of the first four countries to emulate Mexico's CCT were in Central America is suggestive that geographic proximity matters.

Other sources of foreign pressure, such as learning through technocratic exchanges and shared norms (Finnemore, 1993; Weyland, 2007) and coercion through international financial institutions (Dobbin et al., 2007; Henisz et al., 2005) are thought to spur policy diffusion in other policy domains. While it is possible to include measures of international financial institutions' (IFI) lending to analyze domestic policy decision-making (e.g. Brooks, 2005; Hunter and Brown, 2000), such statistical analysis may not adequately capture the effects of program lending in a diffusion model. As Dion notes, blunt measures of lending through loan conditionality rarely capture the more nuanced process of IFI influence (2008: 26). Further, as most IFI loans agree that support CCTs will occur after, not before, a program is in place – serving as an anticipated 'carrot' rather than a 'stick' – incorporation of IFI financing will likely fail to capture its influence on the timing of emulation decisions. Given these challenges, this article analyzes the effects of transnational learning, norms and IFI influence through qualitative analysis.

Measurement and model specification

To assess the potential effects of domestic conditions and neighborhood effects for CCT adoption, I employ an event history analysis. Event history models allow for an analysis

of change over time, which is inherent to diffusion phenomena. In this statistical approach the dependent variable measures the time that it takes for change to occur (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 1). In this case, the number of years it takes for a Latin American country to adopt a CCT, given the existence of the variables of theoretical interest.

The dependent variable for the model is thus ‘CCT adoption’, measured dichotomously for every country between 1997 and 2007. The variable is coded ‘0’ for non-adoption and ‘1’ for adoption. Once a country has adopted the program, the country is dropped from the dataset.

To capture the potential effect of a president’s ideological leaning, I created an ideological index for each president. The index classifies presidents as right, right-of-center, center, left-of-center or left, on a spectrum ranging from 1 (right) to –1 (left). The classification for each president is based on the president’s partisan affiliation as well his/her ideological position when s/he deviated from his/her governing coalition, drawing on numerous sources for classification (Alcántara, 2004; Coggins and Lewis, 1992; Coppedge, 1997; Madrid, 2003; Mars, 1998). Values for presidents’ ideological dispositions are repeated for every year they are in office.

As noted above, the HDI incorporates three dimensions – health, education and living standards – to present an overall picture of each country’s needs. For most countries, annual HDI figures are available. If the United Nations did not have data for a country in a given year, I repeated the figure from the previous year.

Data from the ‘Government Effectiveness Score’ from the World Bank are available for 1996–2007 with gaps for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. Missing values are imputed (averages) for each country from the preceding and following year.

The ‘neighborhood effect score’ indicator is based on each country’s geographic neighbors and calculates the percentage of neighbors who have adopted a CCT for a given year. In other words, as a country encounters more neighbors with CCTs, the greater the likelihood that country will follow suit. Given that it takes time for countries to learn about their neighbor’s policy endeavors, this variable is lagged for a year.

Lastly, the model includes population as a control variable. Given the wide variation in the dataset – from 734,397 in Guyana to 176 million in Brazil – it is important to control for the scope of challenges for governmental policy-makers posed by different populations. Since this variable is non-linear, the model uses the natural log of population. Summary statistics of this and all other variables are shown in Table 4.

Model results and interpretation

This study employs the Cox proportional hazards model to understand the effects that the covariates of interest bear on the ‘risks’ that a country will adopt a CCT program. As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) argue, the Cox model is well suited in these cases as the particular distributional form of the duration time is left unspecified, although estimates of baseline hazards can be retrieved (47). The hazard rate for the i th country is:

$$H_i(t) = h_0(t)\exp(\beta'x),$$

Table 4. Summary statistics

Variable name	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
CCT	0.1090	0.3127	0	1
Neighborhood effect (lagged)	0.2529	0.2913	0	1
President's ideology	0.0848	0.6976	-1	1
HDI	0.7335	0.0893	0.43	0.863
Government effectiveness	44.0878	20.3814	1	88
Population (Ln)	15.8636	1.2064	13.5068	18.9899

N = 165.

Table 5. Policy diffusion of CCT in the Americas (1997–2007)

Variable	Hazard ratio (SE)
Neighborhood effect (lagged)	0.0603442(0.0831853)**
President's ideology	1.828439 (0.800385)
HDI	30.2267 (166.1592)
Government effectiveness	1.025854 (0.0198071)
Control	
Population (Ln)	1.791727 (0.3859914)**
Log likelihood	-57.611969

N = 165. **p* < .10; ***p* < .05.

Where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function and the $(\beta'x)$ are the covariates and the regression parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 48).

One of the most surprising findings of the event history model (see Table 5) is that domestic political constraints bear no statistically significant effect on the adoption of CCTs in the Americas. That presidents, regardless of ideological persuasion, adopt these programs at uniform rates is remarkable. This finding suggests that CCTs may be devoid of some of the ideological features that have constrained social policy reform in previous decades. Moreover, the model confirms the first-cut analysis that human development and government capacity to initiate reform (as measured by the government effectiveness measure) are also not statistically significant. The only domestic condition to bear a statistically significant effect is the control variable population (natural log). These domestic findings are a stark contrast with the only foreign pressure included in the model, neighborhood effects. The finding confirms the intuition that as more neighboring countries adopt a CCT, the greater the likelihood that country will also adopt the policy.

The results of the event history model are useful for analytic purposes. The model reveals that most domestic conditions – president's ideologies, state capacity and domestic needs – cannot fully explain the forces at work in the spread of CCT adoption in Latin America.²⁶ Neighborhood effects do matter, but the mechanisms at work need greater elaboration. For this reason, it is necessary to turn to other explanations that do not readily lend themselves to statistical modeling.

Toward an alternative explanation for CCT diffusion in the Americas

Research on transnational diffusion suggests that several mechanisms may be at work in the spread of ideas and politics. In addition to neighborhood effects, some scholars have demonstrated that learning through technocratic exchanges and shared norms (Finnemore, 1993; Weyland, 2007) and coercion through international financial institutions (Dobbin et al., 2007; Henisz et al., 2005) can spur policy replication. Each of these three possibilities is examined in turn.

Cross-national learning likely influenced Latin American emulation decisions. Both PROGRESA/Oportunidades and Bolsa Escola received widespread attention within the international poverty alleviation community. Domestic policy think tanks and international organizations were among the first to document the merits of these programs. PROGRESA received early attention from international organizations such as the World Bank and international non-governmental organizations such as the IFPRI (see, for example, Skoufias, 2002; Skoufias and Parker, 2001; Teruel and Davis, 2000). From the program's inception, the Mexican government collected data to evaluate the impact of PROGRESA and made it available to the public. As a result, researchers have published hundreds of papers and made thousands of references to the program (Fiszbein et al., 2009: 6). Municipal Bolsa Escola programs also generated studies and program evaluations produced by staff at IPEA, UNESCO, the World Bank and the domestic think tank Pólis. These studies raised the visibility of the education grant program and gave the program greater credibility (Abramovay et al., 1998; Lavinás and Barbosa, 2000; World Bank, 2001). Municipal Bolsa Escola programs also received awards from UNICEF and domestic policy organizations such as ABRINQ, as well as winning the Fundação Getúlio Vargas Foundation's prestigious Public Management and Citizenship award. The positive reviews of both programs were particularly important in raising the legitimacy of these strategies and broadening their exposure to a worldwide audience. The effect of knowledge production may seem diffuse, but it can result in direct policy learning. For instance, Lana and Evans (2004) argue the non-governmental organization *Missão Criança* was an influential 'knowledge institution' that contributed to the policy transfer of Bolsa Escola to Ecuador's *Beca Escolar* program.

The early analysis that credited PROGRESA and Bolsa Escola as worthwhile programs has only snowballed in recent years. As more and more countries have established pilot programs and created their own national CCTs, researchers have documented the variation in scope, design and effectiveness of other programs. The growth in output in academic research and policy-driven research is remarkable given the relatively nascent set of experiences in other countries (see, for example, Cohen and Franco, 2006; Lana and Evans, 2004; Lomeli, 2008; Villatoro, 2004, 2005; and special issues of *Development Policy Review* 2006, 24(5) and *Global Social Policy* 2009, 9(2), which address conditional cash transfers worldwide). The research productivity surrounding CCT programs sends an important signal to technocrats that these poverty alleviation strategies are largely effective and represent the most up-to-date policies. It would not be an exaggeration to say that any Latin American technocrat working on poverty alleviation could easily find information (in Spanish, Portuguese and English) on these trends and identify them as the new professional norm within the development community.

Research was only one of the mechanisms that Latin American policy-makers had to learn about CCTs. International organizations played a significant role in organizing meetings and conferences that connected policy-makers from various countries. For example, the World Bank has hosted several international CCT conferences. The first was in Mexico (May 2002), the second in Brazil (April 2004), followed by Turkey (June 2006). Other meetings, including the 'Latin American Meeting on Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes (CCTs) from a Human Rights-Based Approach', held in Costa Rica in November 2007, drew support from multiple organizations, including the ILO, UNICEF, the UNDP and the Costa Rican government. In addition to these policy-specific conferences, international meetings on the Millennium Development Goals, child labor, education and health served as opportunities for officials to learn about model programs such as PROGRESA and Bolsa Família.

International development practitioners were not alone in their interest in CCTs. Major worldwide news outlets published articles on Mexican and Brazilian social policy experiments. News pieces appeared in high visibility outlets such as *The Economist*, *The New York Times*, *Business Week* and *Wall Street Journal* (see Appendix A for a list of exemplary articles). Most of the articles on CCTs in Mexico and Brazil present them in a favorable light, highlighting the country's new social policy commitments and citing them as effective programs.²⁷ Some of the earliest reporting on CCT programs dates back to the period of 1997–9, when these programs were still relatively new.

All these sources of attention were reinforced by high-level opinion-makers. Major international figures, such as United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, former President Bill Clinton and former World Bank President Paul Wolfensohn, gave speeches that praised either Brazil's or Mexico's programs. During the 'Dakar World Education for All' forum in April 2000, Kofi Annan suggested that Bolsa Escola should be considered around the world (Missão Criança, 2001: 7). By 2005, Paul Wolfensohn said 'Bolsa Família has already become a highly praised model of effective social policy. Countries around the world are drawing lessons from Brazil's experience and are trying to produce the same results for their own people' (World Bank, 2005). These leading actors in the international community helped place CCTs on the international agenda.

A final potential feature of external pressure for diffusion is coercion exercised by international financial institutions. Program officers generally argue they do not unduly pressure countries to adopt public policies, but rather respond to country requests and make their expertise available (GM La Forgia, Program Staff, Health Division, World Bank-Brazil, personal communication, Brasília, 4 May 2004). Similarly, country officials rarely, if ever, state that their decisions are based on directives from IFIs. For obvious reasons, domestic policy-makers claim agency and autonomy in decision-making. Yet funding for projects, either in the form of grants or loans, can provide powerful incentives for countries with few resources to reconfigure their social spending programs. The establishment of Nicaragua's Red de Protección Social, where government officials worked with IADB staff in 1999 to develop a CCT serves as an example of the importance of funding. The program was funded in 2000 as part of the larger 'Nicaragua's Strengthened Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy' (Moore, 2009: 3). In Honduras, PRAF-I funding, from the IADB and the World Bank represented almost one-fifth of the country's anti-poverty spending from 1992 through 1997 (Cohen et al., 2006, cited in

Moore, 2008). Thus, financial support for CCTs at least reinforced domestic decision-making processes, and provided the necessary resources to carry them out.

The IADB and the World Bank have been active supporters of CCTs through their loan agreements (see Table 1A in Appendix B). Their support has included technical assistance for program evaluation, funding to promote the exchange of experiences, as well as outright financial resources to sustain CCTs (Teichman, 2007). For example, the IADB supported a Bahamian project that drew on Mexico's Oportunidades. In Brazil, international funders have been instrumental to the program's expansion. In June 2004, the World Bank approved a US\$572 million loan to support the Bolsa Família. The same year, the IADB approved a loan of US\$1 billion for the program (Hall, 2008: 806).

Technical assistance and funding for CCT programs certainly make the adoption of these programs more feasible than they would be otherwise. This is particularly the case when governments choose to transform or expand existing social service programs, as the transition can be technically challenging. In practice, funding and norm-creation work in tandem. Domestic policy-makers must learn about innovative programs and be convinced that they are worthwhile. Officials at international financial institutions are among the many technocrats who participate in international networks. Other individuals include policy entrepreneurs from Mexico and Brazil, technocrats involved in these programs,²⁸ actors with non-governmental organizations such as *Missão Criança*, as well as others associated with international non-governmental organizations such as UNESCO and UNICEF.

Some cases serve as examples of the effect of transnational technocratic learning. In Nicaragua, for instance, IADB staff and domestic policy-makers drew extensively from Mexico's PROGRESA (Moore, 2009: 3). Since the establishment of Bolsa Família in Brazil, the Ministry of Social Development has hosted many international visitors wanting to learn about the operations of their program; some of whom came to them with introductions from IFIs (V Sousa, interview, 2011, see note 9). Thus, international financial institutions appear to display multiple and overlapping effects on diffusion; they help shape international norms and then reinforce them through funding agreements.

Discussion and conclusion

Why are Latin American politicians and technocrats so open to adopting CCTs? From the technocratic perspective, the international development community has clearly defined CCTs as the new norm. On the whole, these programs are thought to be more effective at addressing the sources of intergenerational poverty (Handa and Davis, 2006). As Weyland (2005, 2007) has argued for other social policy domains, Latin American technocrats demonstrate features of bounded rationality – given short time frames for analysis and decision-making, policy-makers will employ heuristic shortcuts to make decisions about program designs. The similar features of CCT policy designs among the Latin American programs suggest cognitive heuristics may be at work. For example, most programs target similar families, are geographically defined, employ proxy means-testing, utilize similar methods for disbursing benefits and require similar conditionality components (see Fiszbein et al., 2009: Appendix summary tables). Only Chile and Bolivia have designed programs that target beneficiary populations differently and debates over the specific features of these programs, including whether conditionality requirements are necessary, reflect recent developments (see Hanlon et al., 2010).

That most Latin American CCTs have converged along a single design is suggestive that cognitive shortcuts are at work, if only because each country has distinctive poverty profiles and differing capacities to provide the state services (e.g. healthcare and education) that they require their beneficiaries to use. The extent to which policy-makers are able to process and evaluate existing models before implementing their own program is crucially important for policy effectiveness. Given the speed at which many countries are emulating CCTs, it is likely that policy-makers are adopting models wholesale and then only later, making adjustments to reflect local realities. Future research should untangle the implications between policy-makers' decision-making process and the policy's long-term effectiveness.

The literature in comparative politics has demonstrated how difficult it is to undertake reform of the social welfare system because of the high political costs of doing so (Corrales, 1999; Grindle, 2000, 2004; Kaufman and Nelson, 2004). In order for technocrats to adopt CCTs, politicians must agree to restructure existing programs where entrenched interests are in place. Existing policies, however inefficient, may serve particular interest groups that will resist efforts to curtail their benefits. Further, there is evidence that in many settings, politicians draw from social programs for clientelistic purposes. If national policy-makers choose to add CCTs to their mix of social policies without major reforms, they face an altogether different challenge of finding additional resources to sustain them. Further, if true conditionality is required of the poor, governments will need to ensure adequate resources are in place for essential basic services, such as education and healthcare. With a long-term view, the adoption of CCTs represents only the first step for government's commitments to the poor and the more equitable distribution of resources.

Given these political challenges and the fact that presidents draw on differing social bases for their electoral support, it is surprising that there is almost universal support for CCTs. Why is this? It is possible that the program is devoid of ideological constraints and the technical merits of these programs simply neutralize ideological debate. However, it is more likely that politicians have found that CCTs offer them potential electoral benefits. Research on elections in Argentina suggests that political parties draw on social programs for electioneering purposes (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Hunter and Power (2007) also suggest that Lula gained tremendous electoral gains from poor regions that benefited from Bolsa Família, during his bid for re-election. Future research on the politics of CCTs should examine why politicians have found it politically expedient to embrace these programs and whether traditional patronage practices remain in place despite reforms.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of David Doyle, Wendy Hunter, Juliana Martinez, Alexandre Borges Sugiyama, Yuriko Takahashi and the anonymous reviewers at *Global Social Policy*. Thanks also go to Leah Persky for her valuable research assistance. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, 2–5 April 2009; the meeting 'The Origins, Implementation, and Spread of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America', 17 April 2009, at the University of Texas at Austin; and the Latin American Studies Association XXVIII International Congress, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 11–14 June 2009.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. In Campinas, head of households signed agreements with the social service agency, which required children's consistent school attendance, regularized attention to healthcare and stipulated that children could not reside on the streets. In addition, families needed to participate in monthly meetings in order to receive the cash benefits.
2. Brasília's policy-makers viewed the cash grant as a mechanism to address the opportunity costs associated with sending children to school. Eligible families included those whose incomes were under half a minimum salary per capita and the monthly benefit was fixed at one minimum salary of R\$130, regardless of the number of children. The program raised roughly 10,000 families above the poverty line (Lavinás and Barbosa, 2000: 449).
3. The analysis ends at 2007 due to data availability for numerous indicators; information on Guatemala's recent adoption of a CCT in 2008 is included for informational purposes but is not included in the statistical model.
4. The list of countries includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guyana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. This study omits Cuba as its non-democratic governance obscures analysis of domestic decision-making processes.
5. As such, I date Brazil's adoption decision at 2001 rather than 1995 when a few local governments embraced the program.
6. Cohen et al. (2006a).
7. Cohen et al. (2006b).
8. Núñez and Cuesta (2006).
9. Policy documents and reports date Costa Rica's program differently. Both Bouillon and Tejerina (2006) and World Bank (2002) date Supermonos start in 2000.
10. Lacayo (2006).
11. Draibe (2006).
12. Ayala (2006).
13. Cohen and Villatoro (2006).
14. Barrientos and Holmes (2007).
15. Barrientos and Holmes (2007).
16. World Bank (2006b).
17. Soares and Britto (2007).
18. Riviola (2006).
19. Francke and Mendoza (2006).
20. Barrientos and Holmes (2007).
21. Fiszbein et al. (2009: 236).
22. Barrientos and Holmes (2007).
23. Hailiu and Pemberton (n.d.).
24. Fiszbein et al. (2009: 262).
25. See *World Development Report* (2006) and the *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, published by the World Bank and UNDP respectively.
26. Note that Hunter and Brown (2000) have a similar finding in their study on the limited effects of World Bank lending and human capital investment.
27. A notable number of articles also address the PRI's historic practices of vote-buying with social programs.
28. Both Mexican and Brazilian ministries have hosted visitors from other countries who wish to learn about their program (see, for example, Levy, 2006; SEDESOL, 2005; V Sousa, former Chief of International Technical Cooperation, Ministry of Social Development, Brazil, interview, Brasília, Brazil, 4 July 2011).

References

- Abramovay M, Andrade C and Waiselfisz JJ (eds) (1998) *Bolsa Escola: Melhoria Educacional e Redução da Pobreza*. Brasília: UNESCO/UNICEF/PÓLIS.
- Alcántara M (2004) *¿Instituciones o Máquinas Ideológicas? Origen, Programa y Organización de los partidos Latinoamericanos*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.
- Ayala F (2006) Jamaica: Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH). *Policy Brief*, 4 (February). Available at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1070.pdf>.
- Barrientos A and DeJong J (2006) Reducing child poverty with cash transfers: A sure thing? *Development Policy Review* 24(5): 537–552.
- Barrientos A and Holmes R (2007) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database. Version 3.0 (July). Brooks World Poverty Institute, The University of Manchester and the Overseas Development Institute. Available at: <http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/SocialAssistanceDatabase%20Version3%20July%202007.pdf> (accessed 2 July 2008).
- Bouillon CP and Tejerina L (2006) Do we know what works? A Systematic Review of Impact Evaluations of Social Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Working Paper, 2006 IDB Annual Meeting, Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Development Department, Poverty and Inequality, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil, April 1, 2006. Available at: <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=721045>.
- Box-Steffensmeier J and Jones BS (2004) *Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brinks D and Coppedge M (2006) Diffusion is no illusion: Neighbor emulation in the third wave of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies* 39(5): 463–489.
- Brooks S (2005) Interdependent and domestic foundations of policy change: The diffusion of privatization around the world. *International Studies Quarterly* 49(2): 273–294.
- Bruhn K (1996) Social spending and political support: The ‘lessons’ of the National Solidarity Programme in Mexico. *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151–177.
- Coggins J and Lewis DS (eds) (1992) *Political Parties of the Americas and the Caribbean: A Reference Guide*. London: Longman Current Affairs.
- Cohen E and Franco R (2006) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una Mirada Latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL.
- Cohen E, Franco R and Villatoro P (2006a) México: El Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 85–136.
- Cohen E, Franco R and Villatoro P (2006b) Honduras: El Programa de Asignación Familiar. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 281–320.
- Cohen E and Villatoro P (2006) Chile: Puente-Chile Solidario. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 179–226.
- Collier D and Messick RE (1975) Prerequisites versus diffusion: Testing alternative explanations of social security adoption. *American Political Science Review* 69(4): 1299–1315.
- Coppedge M (1997) A classification of Latin American political parties. Kellogg Institute Working Paper 244 (November), University of Notre Dame.
- Corrales J (1999) *The Politics of Education Reform Implementation: Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocs*. Education Reform and Management Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Dion M (2008) International organizations and social insurance in Mexico. *Global Social Policy* 8(1): 25–44.
- Dion M (2010) *Workers and Welfare*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Dobbin F, Simmons B and Garrett G (2007) The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? *Annual Review of Sociology* 3 (August): 449–472.
- Draibe SM (2006) Brasil: Bolsa-Escola y Bolsa Família. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 137–178.
- Evans M (ed.) (2004) *Policy Transfer in Global Perspective*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Finnemore M (1993) International organizations as teachers of norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and science policy. *International Organization* 47(4): 565–597.
- Finnemore M (1996) *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fiszbein A, Schady N, Ferreira FHG, Grosh M, Kelleher N et al. (2009) *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Fox J (1994) The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. *World Politics* 46(2): 151–184.
- Francke P and Mendoza A (2006) Perú: Programa Juntos. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 389–432.
- Graham C (1994) *Safety Nets, Politics, and the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Grindle MS (2000) *Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Grindle MS (2004) *Despite the Odds: The Contentious Politics of Education Reform*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hailiu D and Pemberton C. n.d. Note on Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme (TCCTP) in Trinidad and Tobago. Unpublished Manuscript. Available at: <http://www.ipc-undp.org/publications/cct/lac/ConditionalCashTransfersTnT.pdf> (accessed 26 June 2008).
- Hall A (2008) Brazil's Bolsa Família: A double-edged sword? *Development and Change* 39(5): 799–822.
- Handa S and Davis B (2006) The experience of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Development Policy Review* 24(5): 513–536.
- Hanlon J, Barrientos A and Hulme D (2010) *Just Give Money to the Poor*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
- Henisz WJ, Zelner BA and Guillén MF (2005) The worldwide diffusion of market-oriented infrastructure reform, 1977–1999. *American Sociological Review* 70 (December): 871–897.
- Hulme R (2006) The role of policy transfer in assessing the impact of American ideas on British social policy. *Global Social Policy* 6(2): 173–195.
- Hunter W and Brown D (2000) World Bank directives, domestic interests, and the politics of human capital investment in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(1): 113–143.
- Hunter W and Power TJ (2007) Rewarding Lula: Executive power, social policy, and the Brazilian elections of 2006. *Latin American Politics and Society* 49(1): 1–30.
- Kaufman R and Nelson JM (eds) (2004) *Crucial Needs Weak Incentives: Social Sector Reform, Democratization, and Globalization in Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lacayo C (2006) Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social. Policy Brief 3 (February). Available at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1069.pdf>.

- Lana X and Evans M (2004) Policy transfer between developing countries: The transfer of the Bolsa-Escola Programme to Ecuador. In: Evans M (ed.) *Policy Transfer in Global Perspective*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 190–210.
- Lavinas L and Barbosa ML (2000) Combating poverty and increasing school attendance: The case study of Bolsa-Escola in Recife. Paper presented at the LCSHD conference Education and Poverty: Including the Excluded.
- Levy S (2006) *Progress against Poverty: Sustaining Mexico's PROGRESA-Oportunidades Program*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Lomeli EV (2008) Conditional cash transfers as social policy in Latin America: An assessment of their contributions and limitations. *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475–499.
- Madrid RL (2003) *Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring S, Meneguello R and Power T (2000) Conservative parties, democracy, and economic reform in contemporary Brazil. In: Middlebrook K (ed.) *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 164–222.
- Mars P (1998) *Ideology and Change: The Transformation of the Caribbean Left*. Detroit, IL: Wayne State University Press.
- Menocal AR (2001) Do old habits die hard? A statistical exploration of the politicisation of PROGRESA, Mexico's latest federal poverty-alleviation programme, under the Zedillo administration. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33(3): 513–538.
- Missão Criança. (2001) *What is Bolsa Escola?* Available at: unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001364/136427eo.pdf.
- Moore C (2008) *Country Study Assessing Honduras' CCT Programme PRAF, Programa de Asignación Familiar: Expected and Unexpected Realities*. International Poverty Centre (15). Available at: www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy15.pdf.
- Moore C (2009) *Country Study Nicaragua's Red de Protección Social: An Exemplary but Short-Lived Conditional Cash Transfer Programme*. International Poverty Centre (17). Available at: www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy17.pdf.
- Mullins WA (1972) On the concept of ideology and political science. *American Political Science Review* 66(2): 498–510.
- Nichter S (2008) Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 19–31.
- Núñez J and Cuesta L (2006) Colombia: Programa Familias en Acción. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 227–280.
- Orenstein MA (2003) Mapping the diffusion of pension reform. In: Holzmann R, Orenstein M and Rutkowski M (eds) *Pension Reform in Europe: Progress and Process*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 171–194.
- Potter J (2009) Presentation: PROGRESA/Oportunidades. Conference presentation at the Origins, Implementation, and Spread of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America, University of Texas at Austin, 17 April.
- Riviola D (2006) Paraguay: La Red de Protección y Promoción Social. In: Cohen E and Franco R (eds) *Transferencias con Corresponsabilidad: Una mirada latinoamericana*. México: SEDESOL, 363–388.
- Rogers EM (2003) *Diffusion of Innovations*, 5th edn. New York: Free Press.

- Schady NR (2000) The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991–1995. *American Political Science Review* 9(2): 289–304.
- SEDESOL. (2005) *Bolletines de Prensa. Oportunidades: Coordinación Nacional del Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades Dirección General Adjunta de Comunicación y Difusión*. Mexico DF, 11 December. Available at: www.oportunidades.gob.mx/prensa/DDACD0562005.html.
- Shipan CR and Volden C (2009) The mechanisms of policy diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 840–857.
- Simmons B and Elkins Z (2004) The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the international political economy. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171–189.
- Skoufias E (2002) Rural poverty alleviation and household consumption smoothing: Evidence from PROGRESA in Mexico. Unpublished manuscript, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
- Skoufias E and McClafferty B (2000) *Is PROGRESA Working? Summary of the Results of an Evaluation by IFPRI*. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Available at: www.ifpri.org/publication/PROGRESA-working-0.
- Skoufias E and Parker SW (2001) Conditional cash transfers and their impact on child work and schooling: Evidence from the PROGRESA program in Mexico. *Economía* 2(1): 45–86.
- Smith G (2000) A powerful incentive to keep kids in school. *Business Week*, 1 May.
- Soares FV and Britto T (2007) Confronting Capacity Constraints on Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: The cases of El Salvador and Paraguay. Working Paper, International Poverty Center, (38) August. Available at: <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper38.pdf>.
- Stokes S (2005) Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315–325.
- Stone D (2001) Think tanks, global lesson-drawing and networking social policy ideas. *Global Social Policy* 1(3): 338–360.
- Subbarao K, Bonnerjee A, Baithwaite J, Carvalho S, Ezemenari K et al. (1997) *Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction: Lessons from Country Experience*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Sugiyama NB (2008a) Theories of diffusion: Social sector reform in Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(2): 193–216.
- Sugiyama NB (2008b) Ideology and networks: The politics of social policy diffusion in Brazil. *Latin American Research Review* 43(3): 82–108.
- Teichman J (2007) Multilateral lending institutions and transnational policy networks in Mexico and Chile. *Global Governance* 13(4): 557–573.
- Teruel G and Davis B (2000) *Final Report: An Evaluation of the Impact of Progresca Cash Payments on Private Inter-Household Transfers*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute
- True J and Mintrom M (2001) Transnational networks and policy diffusion. *International Studies Quarterly* 45(1): 27–57.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Program). (2008) *Human Development Report 2007/2008*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf.
- Villatoro PS (2004) *Programas de Reducción de la Pobreza en América Latina: Un Analisis de Cinco Experiencias*. Division de Desarrollo Social 87 (May). Santiago: CEPAL.
- Villatoro PS (2005) Conditional cash transfer programs: Experiences from Latin America. *CEPAL Review* 86 (August): 83–96.

- Walker JL (1969) The diffusion of innovations among the American states. *American Political Science Review* 63(3): 880–899.
- Weyland K (2004) *Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Weyland K (2005) Theories of policy diffusion: Lessons from Latin American pension reform. *World Politics* 57(2): 262–295.
- Weyland K (2007) *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- World Bank. (2001) *Brazil: An Assessment of Bolsa Escola Programs*. Report No. 20208-BR. Available at: siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/4044168-1186326902607/06BolsaEscola.pdf.
- World Bank. (2002). First International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, April 29–May 1, 2002. Puebla, Mexico. Program. Available at: <http://go.worldbank.org/T5K687TP41>.
- World Bank. (2004) *Second World Bank Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers. Proceedings and Country Report*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. (2005) Brazil's Bolsa Família program celebrates progress in lifting families out of poverty. *World Bank News and Broadcasts*, 19 December. Available at: go.worldbank.org/5NAMSEOR60.
- World Bank. (2006a) *World Development Report*. Washington, DC. Available at go.worldbank.org/XP2234QDV0.
- World Bank. (2006b) Dominican Republic. Third International Conference on Conditional Cash Transfers, World Bank. Istanbul, Turkey June 26–30, 2006. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/Resources/281945-1131738167860/1898367-1150829758165/DominicanRepublic_Solidaridad.pdf (accessed 24 June 2008).
- Zedillo E (2009) Keynote address: A look at PROGRESA's genesis. Conference presentation at The Origins, Implementation, and Spread of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Latin America. University of Texas at Austin, 17 April.

Appendix A: Dissemination of CCT models via major international news publications: A selective list (1997–2008)

1997

- DePalma, Anthony. Mexico's recovery just bypasses the poor. *The New York Times*, 12 August 1997, Tuesday, Late edition – Final, Section A; p. 3.
- The Economist*. Brazil. Schooling the multitudes. 18 October 1997, US edition, World Politics and Current Affairs; The Americas; p. 38.

1998

- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Finance Secretariat forecasts 1999 public spending. 10 November 1998, Tuesday, Part 5 Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; Mexico; AL/W0563/WL.
- LaFranchi, Howard. Paying parents \$65 a month to keep kids in school. *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), 15 April 1998; p. 11.

1999

- The Economist*. Mexico. Let them eat hamburgers. 9 January 1999, US edition, World Politics and Current Affairs; The Americas; p. 32.
- Chacon, Richard. Mexico turns to welfare to aid poorest. *The Boston Globe*, 11 January 1999, Monday, National/Foreign; p. A1.
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. President Zedillo visits Chiapas, speaks about proposed legislation. 22 March 1999, Monday, Part 5 Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; Mexico; AL/D3489/L.
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Anti-poverty programme launched. 18 May 1999, Tuesday, Part 5 Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; Venezuela; AL/W0589/WL.
- Friedland, Jonathan. Mexico tries to take politics out of welfare and focus on neediest. *Wall Street Journal*, 15 October 1999, Friday, Section A; p. 1, column 1.
- Becker, Gary S. 'Bribe' third world parents to keep their kids in school. *Business Week*, 22 November 1999, Economic Viewpoint; No. 3656; p. 15.
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Finance official says changes to be introduced to 'improve' spending, 27 November 1999, Saturday, Part 5 Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; Venezuela; AL/W0617/W.

2000

- Chacon, Richard. In Mexico's tight race, voter intimidation feared. *The Boston Globe*, 15 June 2000.
- Diebel, Linda. Mexico's Indians target of sterilization sweep. *The Toronto Star*, 26 March 2000, Sunday, edition 1.
- Diebel, Linda. Vote-buying could play havoc in Mexico elections, observers fear. *The Toronto Star*, 17 June 2000, Saturday, edition 1.
- Diebel, Linda. Losing its grip. *The Toronto Star*, 25 June 2000, Sunday, edition 1.
- Deutsche Presse-Agentur. ADB says only poverty reduction can eliminate child labour. 26 April 2000, Wednesday, Financial Pages.
- Dillon, Sam. In Mexican campaign, money still buys votes. *The New York Times*, 19 June 2000, Monday, Late edition – Final, Section A; p. 1, column 2.
- The Economist*. Mexico's hidden election issue. 10 June 2000, US edition.
- The Economist*. The beginning of the end of the longest-ruling party. 24 June 2000, US edition.
- The Economist*. Rich is rich and poor is poor. 28 October 2000, US edition.
- The Economist*. The Fox experiment begins. 2 December 2000, US edition.
- Smith, Geri. A powerful incentive to keep kids in school. *Business Week*, 1 May 2000, Social Issues, Mexico; No. 3679; p. 76.
- Smith, Geri. A powerful incentive to keep kids in school. *Business Week*, 1 May 2000, Business Week International Editions; Latin American Cover Story: Mexico; No. 3679; p. 50.

2001

- Downie, Andrew. Brazil creates race quotas to aid blacks; Seen as only way to offset inequality. *The Washington Times*, 28 August 2001, Tuesday, Final edition, Part A; World; Briefing/The Americas; p. A10.

Downie, Andrew. Brazil latest to try racial preferences. *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), 7 August 2001, Tuesday, World; p. 1.

2002

Business Week, Global Poverty. 14 October 2002, Business Week International Editions. Int'l Cover Story; No. 3803; p. 54; By Pete Engardio in New York, with Declan Walsh in Kampala, Uganda, and Manjeet Kripalani in Dhamri, Bangladesh.

Krueger, Alan B. Economic scene; A model for evaluating the use of development dollars, south of the border. *The New York Times*, 2 May 2002, Thursday, Section C; column 1; Business/Financial Desk; p. 2.

The Economist. Can Lula finish the job? – Brazil's election, 5 October 2002, US edition, Special Report (1).

O'Boyle, Michael. President consolidates poverty programs after billion-dollar loan. *The News*. 27 February 2002, Wednesday.

Wheatley, Jonathan. Where Lula may look for bright ideas. *Business Week*, 16 December 2002, Business Week International Editions; Latin America: Brazil; No. 3812; p. 32.

Wheatley, Jonathan. Seeing eye to eye with business. *Business Week*, 4 November 2002, Business Week International Editions; Latin America: Brazil; No. 3806; p. 34.

2003

The Economist. Targeting the poor. 16 August 2003; US edition; The Americas.

Jeter, Jon. Brazil pays its poor to send kids to school; Officials say program cuts truancy, hunger. *The Washington Post*, 1 July 2003 Tuesday, A Section; p. A07.

2004

(None)

2005

Chauvin, Lucien. Peru gives its poor more money, but there's a catch. *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), 14 October 2005, Friday, World; p. 01.

The Economist. New thinking about an old problem; Poverty in Latin America. 17 September 2005, The Americas.

The Economist. A mixed record; Mexico's president. 10 September 2005, The Americas.

Stevens, Dana. Children trapped in labor, with few reasons for hope. *The New York Times*, 20 May 2005, Friday, Section E; p. T1; column 1.

2006

BBC. Brazilian presidential candidate Alckmin promises judicial reform to fight crime. BBC Monitoring Latin America - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 July 2006, Thursday.

- Downie, Andrew. Brazil's Lula poised to earn four more years at the helm. *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 2006, Tuesday, World; p. 4.
- Rivera, Ray. In Mexican town, maybe a way to reduce poverty in New York. *The New York Times*, 25 April 2007, Wednesday, Section B; column 2; Metropolitan Desk; p. 1.

2007

- Bone, James. The rewards of parenthood. *The Times* (London), 17 September 2007, Monday, Overseas News; p. 33.
- Cardwell, Diane. City to reward poor for doing right thing. *The New York Times*, 30 March 2007, Friday, Section B; column 5; Metropolitan Desk; p. 1. Elisabeth Malkin contributed reporting from Mexico City.
- The Economist*. Mexico's mezzogiorno. 18 November 2006, Survey.
- Margolis, Mac. How Brazil reversed the curse; Latin America used to suffer the deepest gap between rich and poor. Now it is the only region narrowing the divide. *Newsweek*, 12 November 2007, Special Report: Issues Asia. With Monica Campbell in Mexico City.

2008

- The Economist*. When bribery pays; Welfare economics. 15 March 2008, Finance & Economics.
- The Economist*. Happy families; Brazil. 9 February 2008, The Americas.
- Rosenberg, Tina. A payoff out of poverty? *The New York Times*, 21 December 2008, Sunday, Section MM; column 0; Magazine Desk; p. 46.
- The New York Times*. Paying for better parenting. *The New York Times*, 17 October 2006, Tuesday, Section A; column 1; Editorial Desk; p. 20.

Appendix B

Table 1. IFI support for CCT programs and related activities in the Americas^a

IFI	Project name	Project number	Approval date
ARGENTINA Programa Familias, adopted 2004			
IADB	Conditional Income Transfers	AR-T1007	9 Nov. 2004
IADB	Support for Plan Families Program	AR-L1006	26 Oct. 2005
World Bank	Argentina Basic Protection Project	PI15183	9 Jun. 2009
World Bank	Basic Protection Project Additional Financing	PI20622	10 Mar. 2011
BRAZIL Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Família, adopted 2001			
IADB	Human Capital Promotion Sector Loan	BR0360	5 Dec. 2001

(Continued)

Appendix B Table 1. (Continued)

IFI	Project name	Project number	Approval date
IADB	Support to the Social Protection System	BR-LI004	15 Dec. 2004
World Bank	BR Bolsa Familia 1st APL	P087713	17 Jun. 2004
World Bank	Second Bolsa Familia	PI01504	16 Sept. 2010
CHILE Chile Solidario, adopted 2002			
—	—	—	—
COLOMBIA Familias en Acción, adopted 2000			
IADB	Multiphase Program to Support Second Stage of Familias en Acción – Phase I	CO-LI021	19 Dec. 2007
World Bank	Additional Financing for Colombia Social Safety Net Project (Ln. 7337)	PI04507	15 Mar. 2007
IADB	Expansion of the Familias en Acción Conditional Cash Transfer Program – Phase II	CO-LI059	3 Aug. 2010
World Bank	CO Social Safety Net Project	P089443	1 Nov. 2005
COSTA RICA Supermonos, adopted 2000			
—	—	—	—
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Solidaridad, adopted 2005			
World Bank	DO Social Sectors Investment Program	P090010	2 Aug. 2007
World Bank	DO Additional Financing Social Sectors	PI16369	17 Sept. 2009
World Bank	First Performance and Accountability of Social Sectors Development Policy Loan	PI16972	17 Nov. 2009
IADB	Food Price Crisis and Support to Social Protection Network	DR-TI052	9 Jun. 2010
IADB	Support for the Social Protection Program – Second Phase	DR-LI044	27 Oct. 2010
ECUADOR Bono de Desarrollo Humano, adopted 2003			
IADB	Process Evaluation Bono Desarrollo Humano	TC0306003	29 Oct. 2003
World Bank	Bono de Desarrollo Humano	P098167	1 Jun. 2006
EL SALVADOR Red Solidaria, adopted 2005			
World Bank	Social Protection Project	P088642	27 Oct. 2005

Appendix B Table 1. (Continued)

IFI	Project name	Project number	Approval date
IADB	Support for Red Solidaria Program's Research and Social Evaluation	ES-TI063	19 Mar. 2007
World Bank	Public Finance and Social Progress DPL	PI22699	2 Jun. 2011
GUATEMALA Mi Familia PROGRESA, adopted 2008			
World Bank	GT Fiscal and Institutional DPL	PI12312	21 Oct. 2008
World Bank	Second Fiscal and Institutional Development Policy	PI14373	28 Jul. 2009
IADB	Support to MiFaPro's Communications Strategy	GU-TI138	7 Oct. 2009
IADB	Improved Access and Quality of Health and Nutrition Services – Phase I	GU-LI022	8 Jun. 2010
HONDURAS Programa de Asignación Familiar, adopted 1998			
IADB	Family Assistance Program	HO0114	28 Jun. 1995
IADB	Inst. Strengthening to FHIS & PRAF	TC9502487	28 Jun. 1995
IADB	Family Assignment Program Stage II	HO0132	24 Nov. 1998
IADB	Social Protection Program	HO0222	28 Jul. 2004
IADB	Support to the Institutional Articulation of the Social Policies	HO-TI126	28 Jun. 2010
World Bank	Social Protection	PI15592	29 Jun. 2010
JAMAICA Program of Advancement through Health and Education, adopted 2001			
IADB	Social Safety Net Reform Program	JA0115	3 Oct. 2001
World Bank	Social Protection Project	PI05024	13 May 2008
MEXICO PROGRESA/Oportunidades, adopted 1997			
IADB	Opportunities Phase I	ME0244	16 Jan. 2002
IADB	Consolidation & Expansion of the Oportunidades Human Devt. Prog.	ME-LI007	16 Mar. 2005
World Bank	Support to Oportunidades Project	PI15067	9 Apr. 2009
World Bank	Additional Financing for the Support of Oportunidades	PI22349	9 Apr. 2010

(Continued)

Appendix B Table 1. (Continued)

IFI	Project name	Project number	Approval date
NICARAGUA Red de Protección, adopted 2000/Social Atención a Crisis, adopted 2005			
IADB	Social Protection	NI0075	8 Mar. 2000
IADB	Social Safety Net Stage II	NI0161	4 Sept. 2002
PANAMA Red Oportunidades, adopted 2006			
World Bank	Social Protection Project	P098328	26 Jul. 2007
World Bank	Protecting the Poor under Global Uncertainty ^b	PI15177	21 Apr. 2009
World Bank	Development Policy Loan	PI23255	3 May 2011
PARAGUAY Red de Promoción y Protección Social, adopted 2005			
PERU Juntos, adopted 2005			
IADB	Social Sector Reform Program I	PE-L1072	18 Nov. 2009
IADB	Supporting the Strengthening of the Crecer Strategy and the Juntos Program	PE-T1149	28 May 2009
World Bank	Results in Nutrition for Juntos SWAp	PI17310	8 Mar. 2011
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Program, adopted 2006			
URUGUAY Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social, adopted 2005			

Source: World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank projects database; search results for keywords including cash transfer and country program names, conducted 3–14 July 2011.

^aClassification of CCT programs in the World Bank and IADB databases varies significantly; the table is not exhaustive.

^bSome funds dedicated toward social safety nets.

Résumé

La diffusion de sursis du transferts d'argent aux Amériques

Dans le milieu des années 1990, le Brésil et le Mexique ont créé des politiques sociales innovantes connues comme transferts monétaires conditionnels (CCT). Ces programmes offrent des subventions en espèces aux mères, à la condition qu'elles surveillent l'assiduité scolaire et la santé de leurs enfants. Depuis lors, les CCT sont devenus un nouveau paradigme de l'atténuation de la pauvreté pour le monde en développement et se sont propagées aux pays de l'Amérique latine et au-delà. Bien que ces programmes reflètent une nouvelle norme de développement, leur propagation est surprenante étant donné que certains pays ayant émulé cela n'ont pas l'éducation de base et les infrastructures de santé pour appuyer une demande accrue des bénéficiaires. Cet article s'appuie sur un cadre de diffusion de politique pour expliquer la propagation de la CCT. Je

contraste les pre-conditions nationales (l'idéologie politique, la capacité de l'État, et les niveaux du développement humain) avec une pression internationale (effets de voisinage, création de normes professionnelles, et des incitations financières par les institutions financières internationales) pour expliquer la diffusion de la CCT. Afin d'élucider les mécanismes qui conduisent les processus de diffusion, ce document s'appuie sur des méthodes mixtes pour découvrir l'apprentissage et l'émulation entre les acteurs.

Mots-clés

diffusion de la politique, l'émulation, normes, programmes conditionnelle de transfert d'argent (CCT), réformes du secteur social

Resumen

La difusión de programas de transferencia en efectivo en las Américas

A mediados de los 90, Brasil y México crearon políticas sociales innovadoras conocidas como *transferencias condicionadas en efectivo* (TCE). Estos programas proporcionan becas en efectivo a madres con la condición de que monitoricen la salud y la asistencia a la escuela de sus hijos. Desde entonces, las TCE se han convertido en un paradigma de paliación de la pobreza para el mundo desarrollado y se han extendido a países de toda Latino América y más allá. Mientras estos programas reflejan una nueva norma de desarrollo, su difusión sorprendente dado que algunos países emuladores carecen de la infraestructura básica educativa y de sanidad para soportar una demanda creciente por parte de los beneficiarios. Este artículo establece un marco de difusión de la política para explicar la proliferación de las TCE. Contrasto las precondiciones domésticas (ideología política, capacidad del estado y niveles de desarrollo humano) con la presión internacional (efectos vecinos, creación de norma profesional e incentivos económicos por instituciones financieras internacionales) para explicar la difusión de las TCE. Para poder aclarar los mecanismos que conducen los procesos de difusión, este artículo traza métodos combinados para revelar el aprendizaje y la emulación entres los actores.

Palabras clave

difusión de la política, emulación, normas, programas de transferencias condicionadas de efectivo (TCE), reformas del sector social

Biographical note

Natasha Borges Sugiyama is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She specializes in the diffusion of social sector reforms, including model programs in education and health in Brazil. Her research has been published in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Latin American Research Review*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, and is forthcoming in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*. She is currently finishing a book on the diffusion of good government programs in Brazil.