Why Pay The Chief?

Land Rents and Political Selection in Indonesia

JOB MARKET PAPER

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Abstract

Much of modern development efforts are channeled through traditional local governance. Yet, despite their importance as politician-bureaucrats, traditional chiefs are rarely paid a living wage. This paper studies the effect of awarding chiefs in rural Indonesia control over rice land during their term of office. Using a novel data set tracing the electoral history of 931 chiefs in 193 villages, I show that higher land rents lead to positive political selection. Candidates are more educated and more likely to be ex-civil servants. Higher land rents also increase barriers to political entry: Campaign costs are higher and fewer candidates run for office. Positive selection translates into performance. Chiefs in villages with higher land rents raise more funds and construct more public goods, translating into a positive effect on historical and contemporary development outcomes. These findings suggest that paying chiefs from a stable source of local revenue can be an efficient tool when top-down monitoring by the state is limited.

1 Introduction

"(Kami) tidak ada bengkok tapi kerja sampe bengkok. We (in this village) don't have *bengkok*
land but we've worked (all our lives) until our backs are bent."

- Pak Acep (Rice farmer, Sumberjaya village)

Traditional local leaders are important for rural development. They perform state-like func-
tions and are responsible for development in regions where modern state bureaucracies do not exist.
Yet, positions of traditional local leadership are rarely paid and local leaders are typically appointed
to *de facto* or *de jure* hereditary positions. The absence of these features of modern governance poses
a central challenge to development economists: despite the association between local leaders and
underdevelopment (**???**), there are few settings in which we can study how implementing these
features might improve local governance outcomes. This challenge is further compounded by the
lack of systematic data on traditional leaders and elections.

My paper answers the following question: In the context of local elections, how do differences
in political land rents affect the selection and performance of local leaders? Ex ante, the effect of
awarding higher rents to local leaders is ambiguous. On one hand, much of the literature has
documented the widespread capture of public goods or civil society by traditional local leaders
(**???**). In these settings of weak state capacity, where leaders are typically not elected, higher rents
might simply lead to greater capture and worse outcomes. On the other, evidence from modern
governance suggest that higher rents can be effective in attracting good leaders who perform better
in office (**???**). My paper studies the effects of land rents in rural Indonesia and shows that higher
rents attracts higher quality leaders who bring about better development for their villages.

Crucially, I build an original dataset of village election history from oral and written histories
of 931 chiefs in 193 villages collected through in-depth qualitative interviews. This is an important
contribution because research on traditional local governance is often stymied by limited data.[1]
My dataset comprises detailed biographical information on all candidates who ever ran for village
office including education, occupation, land ownership, chief ancestry, vote shares, campaigning

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[1]An exception is **?** that collected detailed oral histories on the families of all paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone.

costs and term completion. In particular, at the candidate level, data on education and occupational characteristics comprises the entire candidate pool of 2,297 candidates in 193 villages across three decades.

Using this dataset, I study the effects of a historical natural experiment that took place during Dutch colonial rule of Java, Indonesia: the award of cultivation rights over village rice land, or *tanah bengkok*, to traditional village chiefs. Plausibly exogenous variation in *tanah bengkok* rights arose during a critical juncture in Indonesian colonial history: the Dutch Cultivation System where chiefs were awarded *bengkok* rights in return for enforcing export crop cultivation.[2] Crucially, the Dutch did not award *bengkok* rights all across Indonesia. They did so based on Dutch knowledge of pre-existing local institutions and colonial belief in the efficacy of rewarding chiefs through local institutions recognized by natives. Hence, in 1830, *tanah bengkok* was introduced in villages on one side of a historical colonial border but not on other other. These differences in *bengkok* and land rents still exist today and leaves us with both a treatment and control group.

Remarkably, the Dutch also enforced a system of local elections throughout Java. In 1819, the Dutch recognized the rights of villagers to democratically elect chiefs to positions of life with the caveat that the resulting candidate had to be approved by the Dutch Resident. This was implemented together with the designation of chiefs as tax collectors. The tradition of electing chiefs for life remained until 1979 when chief election terms were shortened to 6-8 years. I study the effect of higher rents against this backdrop of chief elections.

Leveraging differences in *bengkok* across the historical colonial border – I identify the causal effect of higher *bengkok* land rents using a fuzzy spatial regression regression discontinuity design (RDD). Given that the Dutch had little information on the interior of Java, much of this border followed salient geographical features of mountains and rivers while dividing a frontier region with no pre-existing village administration. To address this potential confounding factor from differences in geography, I focus exclusively on the southern portion of the historical boundary that transects mountain ranges. In addition, I show that results are robust to potential differences in colonial administrative policy in the Online Appendix.

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[2]It is well-documented that the largest and worst incidences of famine in colonial Java occurred during this time period as farmers were forced to give up land and labor for the cultivation of lucrative cash crops for Dutch export. See, amongst others, **?** and **?** for an overview of the impact of the Cultivation system on Java. Notably, **?** documents positive modern-day development outcomes arising from persistence in Dutch infrastructure constructed during the Cultivation System.

The practice of granting usage rights over land in return for services to the state is not unique to Indonesia. Nearly all modern nation-states practiced some form of this during monarchical reign where rights to collect taxes or usufruct land rights were granted to nobles or military personnel to compensate them for administering these areas (**??**). More broadly, lessons from traditional governance in Indonesia have broad external validity given that many aspects of traditional governance in Africa are a direct result of colonial experience in Asia (**?**). What is unique here is that the inherited institution of *bengkok* has survived until today – this allows us to investigate how the use of land rents as bureaucratic compensation has affected modern-day governance and development outcomes.

Using my survey data, I investigate the effects of higher land rents on contemporary selection in terms of education and previous occupation of candidates (1979-2014). I find that higher *bengkok* land rents increases the quality of the entire candidate pool with candidates being slightly more educated and more likely to be drawn from civil service occupations. Specifically, an increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* leads to the entire candidate pool having 0.3 years more education relative to a mean of 11 years. The largest effects, however, are on a different margin: *bengkok* candidates are 3.6% more likely to have previous occupations as civil servants or career bureaucrats relative to a mean of 21%.

Do positively selected chiefs perform better? I examine chief performance in terms of contemporary fund raising and public goods provision. I find that higher *bengkok* rents is positively associated with higher funds from both upper levels of government and local villagers, suggesting that chiefs are better at both lobbying and raising funds from local villagers. I then investigate if higher funds translate into higher public goods provision. Indeed, I find that an increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* leads to a 0.22 standard deviation increase in village infrastructure public goods such as access to roads, safe water and safe garbage disposal. This is consistent with results on positive selection on the share of civil servants – ex-civil servants familiar with workings of external village bureaucracy might be better at lobbying for funds and public goods.

Finally, I investigate if higher public goods provision translates into downstream effects on historical and contemporary development as measured by nighttime light intensity, child mortality and villager years of education. I find that higher land rents are associated with positive development. Villages exhibit stronger nighttime light intensity and villagers have both lower child mor-

tality and higher years of education. Furthermore, I find that higher education of bengkok villagers can be traced back to as early as cohorts born in 1920. This was a time when school construction was almost entirely driven by local efforts (Aritonang 1994, Djajadiningrat 1942) and hence, is strongly suggestive of historically positive selection of chiefs that were better able to lead school construction.

Taken together, these findings suggest that stable source of revenue from within-village *bengkok* land might also have successfully oriented chiefs towards local villager interests and away from the interests of external elites. To test this, I look at village-level vote rankings for political parties in the first democratic legislative elections of 1999. In particular, I use whether a village voted for Golkar, a party syonymous with Soeharto's authoritarian rule, as a measure of chief allegiance towards external elites. I find that *bengkok* chiefs are less dependent on external elite interests – higher *bengkok* land rents leads to a *lower* probability of voting for Golkar in 1999.

The positive association between *bengkok* rents and economic development contrasts with the well-established hypothesis that areas governed through traditional local governance (*indirect colonial rule*) perform more poorly, on average, compared to regions directly governed through colonial administrators (*direct colonial rule*) (**?**). Why did *indirect colonial rule* through *bengkok* chiefs not lead to worse outcomes? The reason is that across Java the Dutch ruled entirely through local leaders. Hence, the counterfactual to *bengkok* chiefs was not direct governance by colonial administrators. Instead, in places without *bengkok*, qualitative literature suggests that there was greater extraction by chiefs through taxes, fees and the embezzlement of development funds (**?**). In contrast, higher *bengkok* rents were beneficial for long-run development through positive effects on selection and the *stable, within-village* nature of *bengkok* rents could have made chiefs *less dependent* on both supra-village government and village elite interests. In turn, this strengthened the chief position and freed chiefs to act in the best interests of the village. Hence, consistent with **?** theory of "stationary bandits", the tying of incentives of chiefs to local village land could have motivated chiefs to invest in productive village assets and build bottom-up accountability.

This study contributes to the political economy of development literature in four ways. First, it contributes to the literature on (pre-)colonial political institutions and long-run economic development. Appointed by hereditary rule or empowered to collect taxes without accountability mechanisms, local leaders in many parts of the developing world today continue to capture local

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public goods and civil society, leading to worse development outcomes (**???**). In contrast, I show that colonial political organization *can* have positive effects on long-run development. Despite initial motives for increasing extraction, persistently higher land rents for village chiefs outlived the Dutch. These rents created a robust mechanism for the positive selection of local leaders that continues to have effects on development today.

Second, papers in the institutional literature typically trace the effects of defunct institutions through deep historical knowledge of institutional placement in relation to historical borders. Plausibly exogenous assignment of institutions across borders motivates a spatial RD framework which allows for cross-border comparison of outcomes between regions which had the historical institution and regions which did not (**???**). Differences in modern-day outcomes can then be attributed to the effects of cross-border historical institutions that could have lived on in other ways. In contrast, differences in the incidence and size of *tanah bengkok* continue to exist today. This allows me to pin down land rents as a salient mechanism responsible for differences in observed outcomes.

Third, this study contributes to the literature on the selection and performance of politician-bureaucrats. Much of this literature focuses on the effects of short-run changes in compensation of municipal or state politicians (**??**). Another growing strand of literature studies the effects of career incentives on bureaucrat performance in india (**?**). In contrast, the persistent survival of *bengkok* over two centuries allows me to examine how a colonial-era institution, in conjunction with historical and modern-policy changes, continues to have wide-ranging impacts on rural political economy and development outcomes today. Furthermore, my results suggest that bureaucratic compensation of *village chiefs* situated at the lowest rung of the state administrative ladder, can be as, if not more, important for determining long-run development outcomes.

Last, this study contributes to a growing literature that studies the role of village chiefs in local development (**?????**). In a closely related study, **?** evaluates three Randomized Control Trials designed to increase own-village development capacity by encouraging younger, more educated villagers to participate in village development. The authors find that more educated villagers are indeed better at winning development projects but are typically sidelined by older, less educated traditional chiefs. My paper suggests that chiefs, like any other economic actor, respond to incentives. If one reason for poor development is the inability of traditional ruling institutions to bring in younger, more educated leaders, it is worth considering broader governance policies to increase

the remuneration of chiefs.

In the next section, I describe the role of village chiefs in Indonesia, with an emphasis on their role as key intermediaries between the villager and the state. Section 3 provides a brief account of Dutch expansion of *tanah bengkok* and presents the empirical strategy. In Section 4, I introduce my survey data and auxilliary data sources. Section 5 presents results on selection of candidates. Section 6 presents results on downstream chief performance and development outcomes. Section 7 concludes.

2   Background: Village Chiefs and *Tanah Bengkok* in Indonesia

Village elections are a two-century old institution in Java. Introduced by Raffles, Governor General during the British interregnum in the early 19th century, the institutionalization of local chief elections are distinct from nearly any other colonial experience where there were typically no local elections or, even if there were, elections were not enforced. Why did the British do this on colonial Java? Historical evidence suggests that village elections were introduced to strengthen the legitimacy of local chiefs as local tax collectors (**???**) and the choice of local chiefs as tax collectors over regional Javanese lords was strategic: colonizers were reluctant to grant more power to regional Javanese lords lest they threaten colonial hegemony.[3] Hence, the introduction of local elections gave chiefs a basis of power as democratically elected representatives who could be relied upon for tax collection.

Introduction of elections and taxation duties were not accompanied by a commensurate increase in remuneration. Chiefs were never formally incorporated into the bureaucratic state but were instead paid in terms of *bengkok* land or a wide variety of levies in money, produce or labor (**?**) depending on pre-existing institutions and practices. The integration of local governance into the colonial state peaked during the Dutch Cultivation System when chiefs were made responsible for the organization of local land and labor for the forced cultivation of export crops. Given heavy financial costs of paying the salaries of thousands of chiefs, the conversion of rice fields into *tanah bengkok* were sanctioned by the Dutch (**?**) and the geographical incidence of *tanah bengkok* and differences in land rents continue to follow these historical patterns. In Section 3, I outline my empirical

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[3]This was made even more difficult by the fact that the British could not find a clear equivalent to landlords as in the *Zamindari* system instituted in much of British India. See **?** for an economic analysis of the legacy of the Zamindari system.

strategy and how I exploit these historical differences.

2.1 Chief Elections: Term Length and Campaign Costs

The practice of electing village chiefs in Indonesia is a direct result of Dutch colonial rule arising from low managerial capacity (Breman 2015: 11-26) and contrasts sharply with many other colonial settings where chiefs derived their legitimacy solely from colonial authorities (Abraham 2003 on Medeland and Goody 1979).[4] The key difference between chief elections pre and post-Indonesian independence lies in term length. Under colonial rule, chiefs were elected for life. In 1979, the 1979 Village Law amended this, stipulating that chiefs were to be elected to fixed terms of 6-8 years for a maximum of two terms each.[5]

Ethnographical evidence suggests that the robustness of local elections were highly varied (**?**). A number of sources have documented State interference in the screening of candidates before elections are permitted to take place during the New Order period (1965-1998) (Antlov, 1995). In contrast, villagers today have greater freedom to vote for the candidate of their choice without district interference (LLI3 Study, 2012: 68 – 82). Regardless, **?** refers to village elections as a festival of democracy: the entire election process takes less than thirty hours during which selection of candidates are announced, speeches held, campaigning starts and ballots are cast and counted in the village hall.

Running for chief is one of the most expensive ventures in village society with preparations beginning months before election day. From fieldwork, respondents report current-day estimates of campaign costs as high as 400 million rupiah. Similarly, **?** documents costs ranging from 15 - 90 million rupiah ($8,000 - $50,000). Campaign costs are highly varied but consist primarily of making meals and serving coffee, tea, snacks and cigarettes for an endless stream of visitors. It also requires pocket money for each voter in the village and the sponsoring of local events and festivals before and after actual elections. In my study region, respondents often report having to sponsor post-election fishing festivals: one candidate reported purchasing up to 100kg of *ikan gurame*, a popular local fish.

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[4]Note that my analysis throughout this study refers to *desa*'s or rural villages where village heads are elected by popular vote and not *kelurahan*'s or urban villages in which village heads are appointed. In contrast, for example, **?** studies the effects of differences in political leanings between *desa* and *kelurahan* chiefs.

[5]This changed in 2017. Today, chiefs are technically allowed to run for a third time given that they step-down a year before the third election is scheduled to take place.

Running for chief also carries great risk and hence is a highly calculated bet. **?** documents cases where election losses led to financial disasters and the fire-sale of both land and property. Similarly, we have encountered a number of occasions where questions on campaign costs led to hushed whispers about candidates that lost everything in previous elections.

2.2   Chief responsibilities and remuneration

Village chiefs bear a heavy responsibility as both agents of the state and elected representatives of a social community, maintaining responsibilities and allegiances with his fellow villagers (**?**). As agents of the state, chiefs are expected to supervise development projects, maintain regular contacts with higher authorities and handle issues of security and politics at the village level. As elected representatives, chiefs are expected to collect informal taxes and settle disputes and grievances amongst villagers.

Yet, despite these responsibilities, chiefs have never been paid a living wage and the majority of chief remuneration contiues to come from traditional *bengkok* land rights. Based on survey data, on average, across three decades, the annual remuneration of *bengkok* chiefs stand at 34.4 million RP, about 3 times more than non-*bengkok* chiefs who earn 12.2 million RP per year. The bulk of this comes from *bengkok* land with a negligible fraction from intra-village (rice) taxes levied on the population. These differentials are roughly equal to that of the average wage of a day laborer at 18 million RP (BPS 2019).

Furthermore, Indonesian chiefs sit on the bottom rung of a long bureaucratic ladder consisting of four main tiers of government: provinces, districts, subdistricts, and villages.[6] Despite the largely top-down characterization of development in Indonesia, village chiefs can and so play an important role in affecting the levels and quality of development of their villages through two channels: Top-down lobbying and bottom-up management of development projects.

First, the competence of village chiefs and their connections with upper levels of government play an important role in securing additional public goods (Evers, 2000). This was especially true during the last decades of the New Order period when discretionary project funding began to re-place structured development grants. This meant that the village head became a central figure in attracting project funding from the central and provincial government (von Benda-Beckmann

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[6]Part of the discussion in this section is largely based on Evers (2000) and Martinez-Bravo (2016). See Martinez-Bravo (2016) for a detailed discussion of the mechanisms behind public good provision at the village level.

2007). Informal and formal lobbying of private and upper-level government agencies was the main channel through which this occurred.[7] In recent years, the importance of lobbying has increased. Post-1999 decentralization, districts have not become more proactive in the disbursement and monitoring of funds to villages. Rather, "access to district resources *depends* on village capacity, rather than supporting it (LLI3 Study, 2012)." In short, lobbying and connections of village officials remains as, if not more, important than ever in accessing supra-village funds.

Second, the ability of chiefs to raise local revenue is an important determinant of final project quality (Martinez-Bravo 2016). Both in the absence of and in conjunction with supra-village government support, additional informal taxes or community cash contributions (*Swadaya*, *Gotong Royong*) are a well-documented source of funds and labor for village projects (Antlov 1995, Evers 2000, Olken & Singhal 2011, Raffles 1819). Higher own-village investment from chief efforts can lead to both higher levels and quality of public goods (Evers 2000).

3   Empirical Strategy

3.1   Pre-Colonial Roots and Determinants of Adopting *Bengkok*

The practice of *tanah bengkok* is rooted in the agrarian Indo-Javanese kingdom of Mataram – the last native kingdom to rule Java before the expansion of Dutch colonial rule in the early 19th century. Literally translated as "crooked land", *tanah bengkok* refers to cultivation rights over village rice land that was granted to local notables for political loyalty and services. Pre-colonial rule, these rights were typically expanded with the extension of Mataram rule over Java (**??**), and the correlation between *bengkok* rights and Mataram rule is still visible in contemporary village census data. Figure 1 plots the size of village-level *bengkok* land in 2000 and the largest *bengkok* land continues to be concentrated in Central and East Java – the historical centre of the Mataram kingdom. This poses a challenge for identification of the causal effect of *bengkok* land rents today: stronger pre-colonial kingdom rule may have an impact on traditional local leadership in these areas that I cannot control for.

A second potential source of bias is pre-existing rice fertility and geography. *Bengkok* takes

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[7]Evers (2000) writes:"One village head explained it as follows. "It's a matter of dropping in frequently on heads of the important government agencies. If you're lucky, you may show up just when decisions are being made about new projects. In this manner I've managed to obtain a number of projects for my village without ever paying a bribe or having to promise a kickback."

the form of village rice land, hence villages with more fertile rice land typically award chiefs with larger swathes of *bengkok* land (**?**). Given that rice is a staple food crop in Indonesia, higher rice fertility could lead to better outcomes for reasons that have nothing to do with *bengkok* land. *Bengkok* practices are also inversely related with elevation: higher altitudes are associated with lower rice fertility and hence, smaller *bengkok* land.

3.2 Exogenous Assignment from Dutch Expansion in West Java

I circumvent these concerns by focusing on a region in West Java of present-day Indonesia that was homogenous until the beginning of the ninteenth century when it was split into two Dutch administrative units assigned with different systems of chief remuneration. This region was placed under Dutch sovereignty in 1700 and, under a strict policy of non-interference, had a shared political, religious and administrative history in terms of a unified legal and taxation system (**?**). In fact, at this time, the Dutch had not yet extended their control down to the villages and there was, as a result, little pre-existing village administration and no history of *bengkok* throughout this region (**??**).

It was only in the early ninteenth century that colonial attempts to enforce and streamline village administration began. In 1808, with little knowledge about the interior of Java, the Dutch divided the region into two parts – Priangan in the East and Cirebon in the West – following salient geographical features of mountains and rivers. Shortly after, the end of the Belgian War in 1831 led to an urgent need for a new source of revenue (**?**). This led to the imposition of the Dutch Cultivation System (1832-1870) over the Java where local villagers were forced to grow export crops under the supervision of local village chiefs. A lack of colonial manpower, however, meant that Dutch authorities had to work within pre-existing local institutions and constraints (**?**). A key institution that the Dutch were aware of were traditional *bengkok* rights for chiefs in central Cirebon but not elsewhere in Cirebon nor Priangan (Figure 3). Hence, in order to facilitate extraction, the Dutch imposed *tanah bengkok* practices everywhere across Cirebon but not in Priangan. Dutch missives and regulations suggest that the differential introduction of *bengkok* land was enforced due to the self-proclaimed importance of respecting existing local customs of *bengkok* that existed in Cirebon but not in Priangan (**??**). Notably, this was despite the border between the two regions (henceforth refered to as the Priangan-Cirebon border) being extremely mountainous and unsuitable for cultivation of wetland rice and the practice of *tanah bengkok*.

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To see that the historical expansion of tanah bengkok did indeed conform to the Priangan-Cirebon border, Figure 4 illustrates the border in black and green and the extent of tanah bengkok land at the sub-district level using 1867 Dutch archival data.[8] The expansion of *bengkok* appears to align almost exactly with the extent of the border and, despite imprecision of colonial statistics at that time, there is a marked discontinuity in *bengkok* across the border.

A related concern is that there could have been historical differences in Dutch rule across the Priangan-Cirebon borders. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that crop cultivation systems were different across most of the Priangan-Cirebon border: the Dutch grew coffee in Priangan and sugar throughout Cirebon. To circumvent this, I focus on the southern segment of the Priangan-Cirebon border where historical records suggest that coffee, and not sugar, was grown along the Cirebon borders. Indeed, Figure A.1. in the Online Appendix clearly shows that no sugar was grown in the south of Cirebon. Why then was *bengkok* introduced here in south Cirebon despite the cultivation of coffee? Archival work suggests that this was due to Dutch obsession in preserving contiguous borders. Despite being designated for coffee cultivation, southern Cirebon fell on the north side of the Citanduy river and hence was placed under the administration of Cirebon. This arbitrary division led to *bengkok* expansion in south Cirebon just because it happened to lie on the other side of the river.

Given that most of the Priangan-Cirebon border closely followed rivers and mountain ranges, I further limit my sample to two segments of the south Priangan-Cirebon border where villages are balanced on elevation. Figure 2 plots the two segments of my study border and the contemporary size of *bengkok* across the Priangan-Cirebon borders. Moving across the borders, there is a marked discontinuity in *bengkok* size. There have, however, been marked increases in *bengkok* in Priangan compared to 1867 (Figure 4). This can been seen in the northwestern corner of Figure 2 where villages in Priangan have substantial amounts of *bengkok* land today. Fieldwork suggests, however, that these increases in *bengkok* came about after Dutch colonial rule. Typically, this adoption of *bengkok* land occurred when a rich villager passed on and pledged his rice land towards payment

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[8]The 1867 Eindresume is a historical land cadastre of 808 villages in Indonesian Java conducted by the Dutch colonial government in 1867 and contains the earliest records of *bengkok* land. The purpose of the survey was to determine the direction of colonial policy due to liberal Dutch opposition against the continued exploitation of natives through the Cultivation system (Eindresume Vol I, 1867 pp 3-6). All land under private estates were excluded. This refers to land sold by the Colonial Government to the European and Chinese. Most of this land was centered on the North Coast of West Java (present-day Cirebon) and Surabaya in East Java (Kano, 1904). Surveyors were advised to select at least 2 villages in each district (roughly equivalent to present-day subdistricts) with a preference for those that were as distinct from each other as possible.

of village government officials. It could also take place if village elders or officials came together to purchase rice land for the same purpose. In other cases, villages received funds from supra-village government officials to purchase *bengkok* land. Regardless, these increases in *bengkok* were relatively less uniform then under Dutch rule. Given positive amounts of *bengkok* land across both sides of the border, this motivates a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity design.

3.3 Spatial Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design

Following **?**, I estimate a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) across the Priangan-Cirebon border. The fuzzy RD design exploits the fact that the incidence of *bengkok* does not jump from zero to one at the border. Instead, the causal effect of *bengkok* is identified by instrumenting the *size* of *bengkok* with the indicator for whether a village belonged to the historical Cirebon region and hence, was assigned *bengkok* in 1830.

In a fuzzy RD estimation framework, I estimate the following specification using ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV):

$$c_{ivbt} = \alpha + \gamma \, \text{bengkok}_v + f(\text{geographic location}_v) + \phi_b + \text{Soeharto}_t + X_v \, \beta + \epsilon_{ivbt}, \tag{1}$$

where c_{ivtbt} is the outcome variable of interest for candidate i in village v at time t located along segment b of the Priangan-Cirebon administrative boundary. In the OLS specification, bengkok$_v$ is the size of *bengkok* land in village v and in the IV, this is instrumented by Cirebon$_v$ an indicator equal to 1 if village v is located in Cirebon Residency and equal to 0 otherwise. $f(\text{geographic location}_{vd})$ is an RD polynomial which controls for smooth functions of geographic location. ϕ_b is a set of boundary segment fixed effects that denote each of the north and south segments of the study boundary and Soeharto$_t$ is an indicator that equals one if the village election took place during the Soeharto dictatorship. X_v is a vector of time-invariant covariates for village v. In my baseline specification, I control for predetermined geographical characteristics of elevation and slope shown to be important determinants of *bengkok* and results are robust to excluding these controls.

The main coefficient of interest is γ: the effect of higher land rents from an increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* land. Under the assumption that Dutch Cirebon rule only affects outcomes via its effect on *bengkok*, the IV estimate of γ identifies the causal effect of *bengkok* land on downstream outcomes. Notably, under a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) framework the IV estimates also isolate the

effects of marginal *bengkok* land endowed under the Dutch. Given low population density at that time, it is plausible that this land would have been more productive than the marginal *bengkok* land endowed in later periods. This is important for understanding differences between OLS and IV results presented later.

For outcomes on chief performance and development, I estimate village and individual-level outcomes analogous to equation (1) with two differences. For village-level outcomes, I include (survey-)year indicators and for individual-level outcomes, covariates for 5-year cohort fixed effects and, where applicable, controls for gender. Since village-level unobservables are likely to be spatially correlated, I report standard errors corrected for arbitrary spatial correlation and allow for spatial dependence of an unknown form (**?**).[9] In robustness checks in the Online Appendix, I further show that these results are largely robust to alternative cut-off windows and the clustering of standard errors at the village-level.

In terms of bandwidth selection, I limit my analysis to observations within 30 km, 20 km and 10km of the Priangan-Cirebon border. This leaves me with 193 sample villages within a 30km bandwidth. I calculated the optimal Imbens-Kalyanaram bandwidth for my main outcomes with distance to the border as the running variable. The optimal bandwidth was generally between 5 and 10 km depending on the outcome.

For villages in Cirebon to be an appropriate counterfactual for those in Priangan, all relevant factors besides treatment have to vary smoothly at the Cirebon-Priangan Residency boundary before the introduction of Dutch *tanah bengkok* in Cirebon, i.e. before 1830. I first test for differences in pre-treatment economic prosperity. This is important given that, if the Dutch simply introduced *bengkok* in areas that had higher pre-existing prosperity, any differences in post-treatment outcomes could simply be a reflection of this and not differences in *bengkok*. To test this, I use 1819 Dutch population records that I collect from Dutch colonial archives in Indonesia. Unfortunately, these population records are aggregated and reported only for the largest village located within each sub-district, a larger administrative unit. Hence, to construct measures consistent with present-day administrative boundaries, I match 1819 village names to contemporary village locations. I then divide population by the size of sub-districts and, in this way calculate measures of population density for 24 contemporary sub-districts. Table 1 shows that in 1819 the entire Priangan-Cirebon

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[9]I use a cut-off window of 30kms and results are largely robust to the use of different cut-offs.

border region was sparsely populated with an average population density of 0.24 persons per ha and that, if anything, the Cirebon region was less sparsely populated before Dutch intervention.

In Table 2, Panel A, I further test for jumps in important geographic characteristics of elevation, slope and ruggedness. The first three columns shows that elevation is statistically identical across the Cirebon-Priangan residency boundary except within the 10km bandwidth where Cirebon villages are of slightly higher elevation. This is consistent with historical evidence discussed above: the introduction of *bengkok* was done in a haphzard manner uncorrelated with pre-existing geographical characteristics. Regardless, I control for elevation in all my regressions and results are robust to its exclusion. I next look at differences in slope and terrain ruggedness and all differences remain small and statistically insignificant except for ruggedness for villages within 30km where Priangan villages are marginally more rugged.

In Panel B, I further test for differences in crop suitability in terms of percentage soil with poor drainage and proxies for rice and coffee fertility using FAO-GAEZ potential yield data. Rice is a staple food crop and rice fertility is often a strong determinant of *bengkok* incidence and size. I test for differences in coffee fertility as a proxy for Dutch extraction given that coffee was the main cash crop grown in my study region. Again, across variables and specifications, there are no large differences except on potential yield for wet rice that is, on average, 3 kilograms lower in *Cirebon* villages. Relative to a mean of 2154 kg, however, this is not a meaningful difference. In sum, I find balance on important predetermined geographical characteristics and crop suitability, suggesting that villages on either side of my study border are comparable.

4 Data

To examine the effects of higher land rents on political selection and economic development, I collect original survey data and combine this with various rounds of the Indonesian Village and Population Census data. Here, I provide details on core regressors and outcomes. I introduce other outcomes of interest as they arise in Section 5.

4.1 Original Survey Data

Between January - May 2019, I conduct an original survey of village chiefs to record the oral and written history of village establishment, chief characteristics, and chief and village income for all post-1979 elections in 193 villages within 30km of the southern Priangan-Cirebon border. As discussed above, 1979 marked the implementation of the 1979 Village Law which introduced regular chief elections. The final dataset comprises detailed biographical information on all chief candidates who ever ran for village office including education, occupation, land ownership, chief ancestry, vote shares, campaigning costs, term length, and completion. In particular, data on education and occupational characteristics comprises 931 chiefs and the entire candidate pool of 2,297 candidates from 1979 - 2014. I also collect qualitative data on how *tanah bengkok* functions in each village: the size of *bengkok* awarded to chiefs, mode of cultivation, the reason behind the choice of system, the number of leasors or sharecroppers and actual harvest income. Finally, I collect quantitative data on (in-)formal tax collection, development projects and qualitative information on how chiefs obtain funds for projects.

My dataset substantially improves upon existing data with detailed information on characteristics of each election-term period and information on the entire candidate pool. Existing data on chief elections is limited to education and age of chiefs starting from the 1986 Indonesian village census and number of years a chief has been in office in the 1992, 2000 and 2003 census rounds.

Prior to implementation, I conduct in-depth qualitative fieldwork and pre-testing of questionnaires, entirely in the Indonesian language, jointly with AKATIGA foundation, an Indonesian NGO with extensive experience in rural poverty studies. This was done to determine how best to elicit responses to sensitive questions including corruption charges, electoral campaign costs, land ownership of chiefs before they ran for office and (in-)formal sources of income from the chief position. I hire and work with qualified locals as enumerators (fluent in local dialect and skilled in social issues) who reside in each survey village and, in interviews, all enumerators tried to simulate a "conversation about village oral history". We target 5 respondents per village and, to the best of our ability, interview all past and present village chiefs, currently alive, with quantitative, historical recall questionnaires embeded in qualitative interviews. If a chief was no longer alive or not able to communicate, we instead interviewed village elders or officials who were alive during that chief's rule and familiar with his rule.

There are two main survey issues – recall bias and whether an individual's response to questions varies systematically with local socio-political conditions. While it is impossible to rule out both effects, I do my best to control for them during survey implementation. First, we collect village administrative and archival records from village offices and village elders. We then cross-check survey responses with these records and the village census for all variables common across datasets. Second, survey responses were consistent across all 5 respondents. Third, almost all respondents seemed very willing to talk about corruption and electoral costs. Any hesitation seemed idiosyncratic and unrelated to local socio-political conditions. This is possibly because of the historical framing of our data collection exercise and our conduct of conversational interviews within private residences.

4.2 Measuring Village Development and Chief Performance

To examine the *bengkok* system's impact on contemporary development outcomes and chief performance, I use various rounds of the Indonesian Village Census and the 100% count 2010 Indonesian Population Census and georeference outcomes to the village-level. Crucially, the 100% count population census provides information on education and health outcomes in all my sample villages. This is important because the geographical concentration of my sample limits usage of other survey modules with more detailed measures of education and health.

My main measure of chief performance is public goods provision. To measure this, I merge eleven different waves of the triennial Indonesian Village Census (*Potensi Desa*) collected between the years 1983 and 2014.[10] Conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia, the village census covers the entire country and comprises a large number of measures of public goods provided in the village, such as infrastructure, health and educational facilities.[11]. Across waves, the village census has a different focus (agriculture, economy, or population) and several variables are not reported consistently across years. I focus on public good outcomes that are reported consistently across different waves of the survey.

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[10]In particular, these waves correspond to the years 1983, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011 and 2014.

[11]As discussed in Martinez-Bravo (2016), survey enumerators collect answers from members of the village administration and are expected to check these answers against village administrative records and through physical, on the ground, surveys. Since measures of public goods such as the number of schools and health facilities are easily verifiable, this survey provides an accurate representation of public goods in all villages.

5 Results

5.1 First Stage

Table 3 and Figure x presents first stage results of the average size of *bengkok* land under chief control between 1979-2014. I report estimates as follows: Across columns, I demonstrate robustness of results to bandwidth choice by presenting results for observations within three bandwidths of 30km, 20km and 10km. Following **?**, I use a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude of each village as my baseline specification (Panel A) and report robustness of main results to the use of a cubic polynomial in distance to the border and cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude in Panel B and C. Given the small N nature of my study, however, a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude results in substantially noiser results but reassuringly, coefficient magnitudes remain largely the same.

Figure x shows a clear discontinuity in size of *bengkok* land at the border. Across columns in Table 3, Panel A, Cirebon villages have 1.36 to 1.48 more hectares of *bengkok* land than Priangan villages and the use of a cubic polynomial in distance and latitude, longitude leads to slightly larger estimates in Panels B and C. As expected, a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude leads to noisier estimates of the jump in *bengkok* at the border but reassuringly, magnitudes remain stable across all three polynomial specifications. The noisier results in panel C raises concerns about weak instruments, however, and motivates the use of a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude as my baseline specification in all my main outcomes. Taken together, these results testify to the strong persistence of differences in *bengkok* practices since their introduction almost 200 years ago in 1830 and suggests that IV estimates based on a linear polynomial in latitude and longitude do not suffer from a weak instruments problem.

5.2 Main Outcomes

I report positive effects of *bengkok* land rents on contemporary political selection and entry. Next, I show that *bengkok* chiefs today are better at raising both supra and intra-village funds which translates into higher public goods provision. I then investigate downstream effects on historical and contemporary development outcomes and show that *bengkok* villages today continue to be better developed in terms of economic activity, education, and health outcomes. Finally, I explore effects

on the orientation of chiefs towards external village interests.

For all outcomes, across columns, I continue to present results for observations within three bandwidths of 30km, 20km and 10km but present results only for my baseline specification of a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude of each village. In the Online Appendix, I show robustness of main results to the use of a a cubic polynomial in distance to the border and cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude.

5.3 Political Selection

This section examines the impact of higher land rents from *bengkok* on the quality of village chief candidates at the village-election term level for all elections between 1979 to 2014. Following the literature on political selection (**??**), I examine two proxies for candidate quality: years of education and occupation. For education, I investigate contemporary effects on selection of candidates and elected chiefs from 1979 to 2014. I then ask if chiefs in Cirebon were more educated, on average, than chiefs in

Given that I cannot observe historical selection, I instead focus on differences between candidate education and average education of villagers in the candidate's village. Long-run differences in *bengkok* land rents could have had a persistent effect on both historical and contemporary selection. Hence, positive historical selection of chiefs could be reflected by higher observed average education of villagers given the historical autonomy of chiefs in public goods provision.

Candidate and Chief Quality: Education Table 4 estimates the effect of *bengkok* land rents on the education of village chief candidates. I present OLS results in panel A and IV results in panel B for ease of comparison. Across columns (1) - (3), a 1 hectare increase in *bengkok* land increases the average years of education of the candidate pool by 0.15 to 0.35 years relative to a mean of 11 years. Given the duration of high school education in Indonesia is 12 years, this suggests that *bengkok* land rents attracts a larger number of high school graduates. These results are consistent with a model where chief candidates have better outside options such that candidates have to be compensated adequately to convince them to run for office (**?**).

IV estimates presented in panel B are larger than OLS estimates in column (1). An F-test of equality of coefficients, however, rejects that the coefficients are statistically different from each

other. Nevertheless, OLS estimates could be smaller than IV if marginal bengkok land plots awarded post-Dutch rule, as dicussed in section 3.3., are less productive. This implies that holding size constant, the marginal post-Dutch *bengkok* land might provide less rents and have a smaller effect on selection.

In Table 5, I report effects of *bengkok* land rents on education of village chiefs. I.e. Only election winners. OLS estimates in Panel A are largely similar to that of chief candidates in 4. IV estimates, however, fall short of statistical significance across columns except for column (1) panel B. These ambiguous effects of higher land rents on the quality of elected politicians is consistent with **?** and suggests that elected chiefs might be selected based on other traits. This motivates estimating the effect of land rents on another important proxy for quality: the previous occupation of chiefs.

Historical vs Contemporary Selection Table 6 reports differences in education between candidates and average villager education. Average villager education is constructed from the 100% count 2010 Indonesian population census. correct this. Chief candidates have 4 additional years of education compared to the average villager. This is similar to **??** who find that members of parliament in Sweden and legislators in America are highly selected compared to constituents. Focusing on the IV results in panel B, however, there are no effects of land rents on differences in education between candidates and the average villager. Across columns (1) to (3), coefficient estimates on differences in education are small and unstable, implying that estimated differences in contemporary education of candidates are driven by historically higher average education of *bengkok* villages and not contemporary selection. Historically higher education of *bengkok* villages are, in turn, suggestive of positive historical selection of chiefs. I do not have historical characteristics of chiefs. In sectionxx, however, I further explore this mechanism by investigating effects on historical school construction and education of villagers.

Candidate Quality: Occupation Table 7 examines effects on occupational selection of candidates. I construct the previous occupation of chief candidates from the survey question, "What was the previous occupation of each chief (candidate)?" and classify occupations into three main categories: candidates who, prior to running for elections, held a high wage occupation, was a civil servant, or held a low wage occupation. These three occupational categories are not mutually exclusive owing

to the difficulty of classifying occupations. For example, a large portion of my sample consists of traders (*pedagang*) who might plausibly be classified as medium or low wage. I do not classify these occupations and they remain outside of my analysis.

Before we move to results in Table 7, it is also useful to understand how formal compensation from the village chief position compares with compensation from various outside options. The average annual remuneration of a *bengkok* chief in my sample with 2.8ha of *bengkok* land rights is 34.4 million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), roughly three times more than a non-*bengkok* chief who earns 12.2 million IDR. A civil servant, on average, earns 18.72 - 70.8 million IDR annually depending on their pay grade. Remuneration from the lowest pay grade of 18.72 million IDR exceeds that of a non-*bengkok* chief but the salary of a middle-ranking civil servant is roughly equivalent to that of a *bengkok* chief.

Results in Table 7 are presented as follows: columns (1) - (3) presents estimates on an indicator for whether the candidate held a high skilled occupation pre-election, columns (4) - (6), presents estimates on an indicator for whether a candidate was an ex-civil servant, and columns (7)-(9), presentes estimates on an indicator for whether a candidate had a low skilled occupation pre-election. Results across columns imply that there are positive effects on selection of ex civil servants. An increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* land leads to a 1.9pp to 3.6pp increase in the share of chief candidates from a civil service background. There are no differences in the share of chief candidates from neither high nor low wage occupations. Taken together, these results suggest that candidates are being selected exactly from the middle-end of the skill-wage distribution. This is exactly what we would expect given prevailing wage differentials outlined above.

linking paragraph on summary of this section, what it means and why it occurred? pol. (barriers to) entry but not political competition

5.4   Effect of land rents on political entry

The results thus far suggest that land rents from *bengkok* shifted villages into a positive political equilibra, attracting higher quality candidates as proxied by education and occupation. This section sheds deeper light on how these political equilibria arose and reveals that effects are a result of endogenous increases in campaign costs driven by higher land rents. This, in turn, leads to

marginally fewer candidates (6%) running for office. In this respect, the negative effects of campaign costs on number of candidates here are analagous to the effects of higher campaign spending limits and consistent with empirical findings that higher spending limits are associated with fewer candidates and lower political competition (**??**). Here, however, the negative effects of campaign costs on number of candidates is smaller: higher net benefits from *bengkok* land rents induce more candidates to run in spite of higher campaign costs.

I first examine if *bengkok* remuneration affected the level of campaigning costs. Within each village, we ask respondents the average cost of running for the chief position in millions of Indonesian rupiah and minimize reporting bias by triangulating responses across respondents. To take into account meaningful content of zeros and attenuate the effects of outliers, I apply an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation for all variables for which zeroes are meaningful.[12] Compared to typical log transformations, this transformation allows for more consistent estimates of marginal effects (**?**).

Across columns, Table 8 implies a large, positive and statistically significant effect of *bengkok* rents on the costs of running for office. Following **?**, a coefficient of 0.392 in column (1) implies that a 1pp increase in *bengkok* land at the mean is associated with a 0.77pp increase in campaign costs. Higher campaign costs deters the number of candidates who run for office. Across columns, Table 9 implies that a 1 hectare increase in *bengkok* land leads to a 0.08 to 0.157 decrease in the number of candidates running for office. Given that on average 2.46 candidates run for office, this reflects a 3 to 6% decrease.

6 Land Rents and Chief Performance

Thus far, results suggest that higher land rents from *bengkok* leads to positive selection of chief candidates as measured by occupational share of ex civil servants. Given higher campaigning costs, however, it is likely that elected *bengkok* chiefs are also wealthier on average. Hence, depending on re-election motives of the wealthy, the effects of higher land rents on the performance of wealthier, ex civil servants in office is unclear. To investigate this, I turn to two measures of chief performance

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[12]For a random variable x, taking the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation yields $\tilde{x} = arcsinh(x) = ln\left(x + \sqrt{x^2 + 1}\right)$

discussed in section xx: village funds and public goods provision. I find that higher land rents from *bengkok* leads to the collection of both higher external and internal village revenue and the construction of more infrastructure facilities.

Village transfers To construct public goods, chiefs can lobby for external revenue from external government sources or raise internal revenue through informal taxation of villagers. In Table 10, I investigate the extent to which chiefs are able to leverage both channels using all four rounds of village census data in 1996, 2003, 2008 and 2011 that report receipt of village revenue. To account for possibly meaningful content of zeroes, I again apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the dependent variable. Coefficients across columns (1) - (3) imply an increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* is associated with 0.155 to 0.191 higher external village revenue. Higher external revenue does not come at the expense of internal revenue. Columns (4) to (6) imply a similar positive effect of *bengkok* land rents on internal revenue. Taken together, these results suggest that chiefs are more effective at raising funds from both top-down and bottom-up sources. The effects on top-down external funding are especially interesting given earlier results on positive occupational selection of ex-civil servants. Existing networks and bureaucratic know-how gained through experience in the civil service might facilitate chief efforts in obtaining external funds and public goods. I next investigate effects on public goods provision.

Public goods provision Table 11 examines the effects of higher land rents on public goods provision from 1983 to 2011.[13] Following **?**, I construct standardized z-score measures of three types of public goods provision per capita – infrastructure, health and education. To isolate the effects of chief effort, I examine effects on public goods that are more susceptible to village governance **??**. Hence, I construct a z-score for infrastructure by taking standardized, per capita averages of three indicators for whether the main village road is passable by a 4-wheel vehicle, whether the village has access to safe garbage disposal, and whether the village has safe drinking water as measured by access to tap water or water pump. I construct a z-score for health public goods by taking standardized, per capita averages of the sum of health posts, supplementary health posts and trained doctors in each village. I construct a z-score for education public goods by taking standardized, per capita averages

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[13]Given that public goods measures are not consistently reported across village census years, I use measures from 1983, 1986, 1993, 2003, and 2011 which consistently reports my public good measures of interest.

of the number of kindergartens, primary schools and junior secondary schools. I omit anything above the junior secondary level as the construction and management of these schools are almost always under the control of external government offices.

Higher land rents from *bengkok* leads to positive effects on infrastructure public goods but no differences in health public goods. There is also a large negative effect on education public goods. Columns (1) to (3) examines effects on infrastructure public goods and implies that a 1 hectare increase in *bengkok* land rents leads to 0.14 to 0.22 s.d. higher infrastructure public goods. As a benchmark, **?** finds that each additional year of *district* exposure to Soeharto-era mayors is associated with a decrease of 0.047 s.d. in education public goods per capita. Next, columns (4) to (6) examine effects on health public goods and finds small and insignificant differences in health public goods. In the remaining columns of (7) to (9), higher *bengkok* land rents leads to 0.08 to 0.14 standard deviations less educational public goods provision.

Why do *bengkok* villages have less educational public goods? In Indonesia, large-scale central government school construction efforts, or INPRES, between 1937 and 1978 sought to equalize primary schooling access with the number of schools constructed inversely related to pre-existing pupil enrolment (**?**). This suggests that lower eduational public goods provision in *bengkok* villages might be a result of higher pre-existing education and schools. To investigate this, I use the 1983 village census to reconstruct the number of central government INPRES schools and non-INPRES village schools. For comparison with results in Table 11, I construct a standardized z-score average of INPRES and non-INPRES schools. Indeed, in Table 12, columns (1) - (3) reveal that less INPRES schools were constructed in *bengkok* villages and columns (4) - (6) implies that more village schools were constructed during this time. Taken with the results in Table , lower contemporary educational public goods provision is almost surely a result of greater top-down provision in non-*bengkok* villages in recent years.

Large positive results on village schools are important for two reasons. In the absence of school construction by Dutch colonial authorities, the presence of village schools are strongly suggestive of greater village school construction efforts led by village chiefs. Typically involving the pooling of contributions from land-owners or market taxes (**??**), greater school construction efforts are indicative of greater ability of village chiefs to build consensus or greater trust between chiefs and villagers. In the absence of top-down intervention, village school construction is also a pure outcome

from bottom-up village capacity and rules out differential top-down provision as an alternative explanation for my results.

Given historically larger number of village schools, I investigate effects on historical education of villagers. Using the 100% count Indonesian population census, I construct pseudo-panels of historical education levels at the individual villager level. Figure 5 plots *bengkok* coefficient estimates at 5-year cohort levels and reveals a strong positive effect of higher *bengkok* rents that decreases over time. The decrease in coefficient estimates are consistent with greater top-down government provision of schools over time. Interestingly, the largest effect size is found in the earliest cohorts: Villagers born in 1920 had 1.2 more years of education relative to a mean of 3.6. Taken together, positive effects on village schools and villager education are indicative of the *timing* of effects of higher *bengkok* land rents and suggests that positive effects on political selection were salient as far back as the early 20th century and decreased over time.

Contemporary development Do higher public goods provision translate into better development outcomes beyond historical education? Together with census educational levels, I use two additional proxies of nighttime light intensity and the proportion of deceased children. Nighttime light intensity is from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (see Henderson et al., 2012, for details) and is increasingly used to proxy for income in studies exploiting highly localized identifying variation (e.g., Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014). I use all available years of nighttime light intensity from 1992 to 2011 as my main measure of overall economic development at the village level. The percentage of deceased children is a proxy for child mortality constructed from the 2010 Population Census where, for each women ever married, I use the difference between the number of children ever born and the number of children still alive to construct the percentage of deceased children. To obtain a better measure of recent village health conditions, I restrict the sample to all women of recent child-bearing age at the time of enumeration. I.e. All women aged between 20 to 35 years. Finally, I complement this with years of education of all individuals aged 20 to 35 or born between 1975-1990 from the 2010 Indonesian population census. I include 5-year cohort fixed effects in regressions of proportion of deceased children. In regressions of education, I include both 5-year cohort fixed effects and gender controls.

I begin with estimates of *bengkok* remuneration on village-level economic development in Table

13, panel A. The estimates in Panel A implies that *bengkok* villages have higher economic activity as proxied by nighttime light intensity. This is consistent with positive effects on infrastructure in columns (1) - (3) of . Panel B shows that *bengkok* villages have 0.6 percentage points fewer deceased children relative to a mean of 2.4 percentage points in spite of no effects on health infrastructure in columns (4) to (6) of . This can be reconciled by the fact that childbirth and important medical care continues to take place outside villages. Within-village health posts are rarely staffed by adequately trained personnel and women have to be transported to hospitals in towns or cities with adequate medical equipment. In transportation of women to towns or cities, roads are likely to play a greater role and lower proportion of deceased children possibly reflects better within-village infrastructure as shown in columns (1) - (3) of .

Finally, panel C reports estimates for *villager* years of education. Across columns, villagers have 0.17 to 0.23 more years of education relative to a mean of 6.5. These small but positive effects on education stand in contrast to negative effects on educational public goods in columns (7) - (9) of but are consistent with possibly higher quality of own village schools in 12. These marginally positive effects could also be indicative of intergenerational spillovers from higher education of earlier cohorts as shown in .

7 Discussion: The effect of *bengkok* land rents on orientation towards elite interests

Results so far suggest that the receipt of external funds is one channel through which land rents from chief control over *bengkok* land has positive effects on village development. In this section I investigate how greater receipt of external funds affects the orientation of chiefs towards supra-village government interests by looking at the probability that villages vote for Golkar, the party of Soeharto, the longest-standing dictator in Indonesia, in the 1999 elections. The 1999 elections is significant for being the first free democratic supra-village election after the fall of the Soeharto dictatorship in 1998. Hence, given well-documented evidence that chiefs were made to turn out the vote for Golkar during the Soeharto era and persistence of party machinery that helped Golkar carry the vote in 1999, votes against Golkar are a plausible indicator of chief independence of elite interests.

In the absence of individual-level vote counts, I construct an indicator that equals 1 if Golkar was reported to have came into first place in the 2000 village census. Across columns (1) - (3), Table 14 implies that an increase in 1 hectare of *bengkok* leads to a decline in 10.5 to 18.4% probability that Golkar obtained first place in a village. Together with evidence that land rents from *bengkok* led to positive development outcomes, I hypothesize that *bengkok* rents made chiefs less dependent on both supra-village government and village elite interests. This strengthened the chief position and freed chiefs to act in the best interests of the village. This is consistent with **?** theory of "stationary bandits": a stake in local village land gave chiefs a stronger incentive to invest in productive village assets and build bottom-up accountability.

8 Conclusion

In conclusion, I provide micro-level empirical evidence for the efficacy of paying chiefs higher land rents based on rights to a stable, within-village income generating asset. In contrast to the large literature that emphasizes the extractive nature of traditional local governance, I document a rare case where the strengthening of local chief authority did not lead to worse outcomes. This is striking given that the award of *bengkok* land took place during one of the most extractive colonial enterprises in history.

Using original survey data, I document that higher rents to office in the context of regular elections led to the positive selection of traditional local leaders. Positively selected leaders are better able to work the levers of both modern-day and historical public goods provision through accessing funds from both top-down sources and bottom-up processes. This translates into greater economic activity and better health outcomes of villages today. The stationary nature of *bengkok* land is likely to be important. Similar to **?**'s theory on stationary bandits, the provision of higher rents through control over a within-village income-generating asset appears to have strengthened the chief position by making chiefs less reliant on largesse from supra-village actors and gave chiefs a stronger incentive to invest in their villages and build bottom-up accountability.

Last, these findings have direct implications for development policy. In 2014, Indonesian village chiefs were added to the State payroll. This was launched under the 2014 Village Law Fund (*Undang-Undang Dana Desa 2014*) which mandated the direct transfer of US$70,000 to village bank accounts for development purposes, broadly construed. My research also highlights benefits that

might accrue if attempts to raise the salary of village chiefs in India and Africa succeed (Times of India, 2012; Daily Monitor, 2016) and provides conditions under which such measures might be effective.

Figure 1: Bengkok Land in each village, 2000 (ha)

Figure 1: This map plots the size of *tanah bengkok* land, at the village-level, across the entire island of Java, Indonesia. The Priangan-Cirebon border is highlighted in dark blue. In particular, I study villages along the southern Priangan-Cirebon border where villages have similar historical crop cultivation patterns. I zoom in on this portion of the map in Figure 2 below

Figure 2: Bengkok Land in each village, 2000 (ha)

Figure 2: This map plots the size of *tanah bengkok* land, at the village-level, across my study borders. Given the mountainous geography of this region, I restrict my study sample to villages across two segments of this border where there are no discontinuities in elevation. Hence, in grey, are villages not included in my study. In white, are mountains where no village settlement exists. Urbanized towns and cities are omitted given that settlements in these areas are organized under a different system and chiefs are not awarded *bengkok* land.

Figure 3: Bengkok Land in Priangan-Cirebon, Pre-1830

Figure 3: This map plots the geographical spread of *bengkok* before Dutch expansion in 1830. The institution was only known in central Cirebon pre-1830.

Figure 4: Average Bengkok Land in each Village, Sub-District Level 1867 (ha)

Source: Eindresume 1867. Mean village in two subdistricts in Priangan with nonzero bengkok had 2 and 2.4ha of bengkok land

Figure 4: This map plots the size of *tanah bengkok* land, at the subdistrict-level, across my study borders from 1867 Dutch archival data.

Figure 5: Cohort-Level Differences in Years of Education of Villagers Across the *Bengkok* Boundary

Source: Census 2000 data. Regressions estimated at the individual-level and pooled at 5 year cohort-levels. First cohort pooled at 10-year level (1920-1930) for power. Bars plot 95% confidence intervals.

Table 1: Balance on Pre-Treatment Population Density, 1819

sample within:	1819 Population Density		
	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
cirebon border	−0.139	−0.178*	−0.177**
	(0.132)	(0.084)	(0.067)
Observations	24	20	17
Mean Dep. Var	0.24	0.25	0.26

Note: Unit of observation is at the sub-district level measured in terms of persons per hectare. Source: 1819 Dutch archival records. Regressions include border fixed effects. In successive columns, I limit the sample to include only villages located less than 30km, 20km, and 10km from the historical Cirebon-Priangan Residency boundary. Conley standard errors for difference in means between Cirebon and Priangan villages are in brackets (assuming a cut-off window of 30km).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Pre-Determined Geographic Characteristics

	Panel A: Geographic Characteristics								
	Elevation			Slope			Ruggedness		
sample within:	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
cirebon border	−25.252	10.451	41.253***	1.511	0.567	−0.864	0.046*	0.004	−0.012
	(43.610)	(26.721)	(15.658)	(3.647)	(3.279)	(2.282)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.018)
Observations	193	164	103	193	164	103	193	164	103
Mean Dep. Var	459.38	480.41	443.03	24.76	24.94	27.15	0.18	0.16	0.14
	Panel B: Drainage & Potential Crop Yield								
	Drainage			Wet Rice Potential Yield			Coffee Potential Yield		
sample within:	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
cirebon border	0.042	0.019	−0.004	3.845	0.798	−3.131***	−0.441	0.261	−2.448
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(3.270)	(2.787)	(1.190)	(1.384)	(1.292)	(1.568)
Observations	164	137	81	193	164	103	193	164	103
Mean Dep. Var	0.73	0.84	0.94	2152.87	2155.18	2154.88	623.71	623.43	619.53

Note: Unit of observation is village-level. I include border fixed effects. Geospatial measures of elevation, slope and drainage are calculated using data at 30 arc second (1km) resolution (SRTM (2000)). Meaures of potential agricultural yield are calculated using FAO-GAEZ data. All measures calculated at 2000 village border polygons. The unit of measure for elevation is meters; slope is degrees; drainage is percentage of land covered by soils with poor or excessive drainage; wet rice and coffee potential yield in tons per hectare. In successive columns, I limit the sample to include only villages located less than 30km, 20km, and 10km from the historical Cirebon-Priangan Residency boundary. Conley standard errors for difference in means between Cirebon and Priangan villages are in brackets (assuming a cut-off window of 30km).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: First Stage: Jumps in Size of *Bengkok* Across Historical Border, Border RD

Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Panel A: Linear Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude		
cirebon	1.362***	1.437***	1.487**
	(0.478)	(0.526)	(0.596)
cirebon	1.644***	1.669***	1.669***
	(0.388)	(0.400)	(0.461)
cirebon	1.589*	1.602*	1.465
	(0.923)	(0.961)	(1.289)
Observations	191	162	101
Mean Dep. Var	1.64	1.87	2.01

Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the average size of *bengkok* land awarded to the elected chief as reported in our survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Candidate Characteristics: Education, Fuzzy RD

Sample Within:	*Years of Education*		
	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares		
bengkok	0.262***	0.241***	0.217***
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.054)
	Panel B: Instrumental Variables		
bengkok	0.356***	0.241***	0.155*
	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.089)
Observations	2136	1769	1103
Mean Dep. Var	10.89	10.95	11.06
First Stage F Statistic	22.70	20.30	11.05

Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the years of education received all village chief candidates that ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial auto-correlation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Chief Characteristics: Education, Fuzzy RD

	Years of Education		
Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares		
bengkok	0.246***	0.224***	0.188***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.051)
	Panel B: Instrumental Variables		
bengkok	0.318***	0.143	0.057
	(0.111)	(0.154)	(0.191)
Observations	873	735	456
Mean Dep. Var	11.07	11.14	11.21
First Stage F Statistic	22.2	22.9	13.9

Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the years of education received by each village chief that ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Candidate Characteristics: Differencing out Average Village Education, Fuzzy RD

	Differences in Years of Education		
Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares		
bengkok	0.073	−0.015	−0.061
	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.104)
Observations	2136	1769	1103
Mean Dep. Var	3.98	4.01	3.98
First Stage F Statistic	22.7	20.3	11.1

Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the years of education received for each village chief candidate that ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data substracted by average years of education in the candidate's village for individuals aged 25-70 from Census 2010 data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Candidate Characteristics: Occupation, Fuzzy RD

Sample Within:	High Wages			(Ex-)Civil Servants			Low Wages		
	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Instrumental Variables								
bengkok	0.001	0.010	0.011	0.036***	0.017**	0.019**	0.013	0.007	0.013
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Observations	2204	1821	1137	2204	1821	1137	2204	1821	1137
Mean Dep. Var	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.23
First Stage F Statistic	22.5	21.2	11.9	22.5	21.2	11.9	22.5	21.2	11.9

Note: Unit of observation is at the village chief candidate level. All outcomes are coded from previous occupations of all chief candidates that ever ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is an indicator for whether the candidate held a high wage occupation which includes occupations like businessman, rice paddy huller and equivalent. Column (4) - (6) is an indicator for whether the candidate was previously a career bureaucrat (*PNS*) Column (7) - (9) is an indicator for whether the candidate held a low wage occupation such as day-wage (farm) laborers. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator for whether election took place before or after 1999 democratization and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Barriers to Political Entry: Campaigning Costs, Fuzzy RD

	Campaigning Costs, IHS		
Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Instrumental Variables		
bengkok	0.392***	0.546***	0.443***
	(0.123)	(0.101)	(0.082)
Observations	553	484	298
Mean Dep. Var	2.84	2.84	2.80
First Stage F Statistic	19.4	21.7	11.9

Note: Unit of observation is at village level. Outcomes are from survey data. Outcome of campaign cost in columns (1) - (3) are transformed by an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the amount of funds that a village chief candidate expended when running for village office. We triangulate campaign costs across all available respondents in each village. Based on respondent interviews, campaign costs consist largely of food preparation costs, favors for voters and sponsorship of pre and post election events. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator for whether election took place before or after 1999 democratization and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Barriers to Political Entry: Number of Candidates, Fuzzy RD

Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Instrumental Variables		
bengkok	−0.157***	−0.185***	−0.080**
	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.036)
Observations	929	786	490
Mean Dep. Var	2.46	2.42	2.45
First Stage F Statistic	13.2	13.6	10.0

Note: Unit of observation is at the village election term level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the number of candidates that ran for office between 1979 - 2014 from survey data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, indicator if election took place before 1999 and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Village Revenue: Fuzzy RD

	Village Revenue					
	Supra-Village			Intra-Village		
Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Instrumental Variables					
bengkok	0.191***	0.142***	0.155***	0.341***	0.277***	0.219***
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.086)	(0.060)	(0.053)
Observations	764	648	404	764	648	404
Mean Dep. Var	11.34	11.35	11.39	11.84	11.85	11.89
First Stage F Statistic	12.7	13.6	9.1	12.7	13.6	9.1

Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. All variables are inverse hyperbolic sine-transformed. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is the amount of funds that a village reports having received from Central, Provincial and District governments. Outcome in column (4) - (6) is the amount of funds that a village reports having received from internal village sources such as village own taxes. Source: Village census 1996, 2003, 2008 and 2011. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, survey-year and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Contemporary Public Goods Provision: Fuzzy RD

| | Infrastructure Z-Score Per Capita | | | Health Z-Score Per Capita | | | Education Z-Score Per Capita | | |
| Sample Within: | 30 km | 20 km | 10 km | 30 km | 20 km | 10 km | 30 km | 20 km | 10 km |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Instrumental Variables								
bengkok	0.229***	0.188***	0.141**	0.032	0.027	−0.021	−0.083***	−0.143***	−0.113**
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.052)
Observations	945	802	499	946	803	499	946	803	499
Mean Dep. Var	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
First Stage F Statistic	12.9	13.9	9.0	12.9	13.9	9.0	12.9	13.9	9.0

Note: Source: Village Census (PODES) data. Pooled regressions at tri-annual podes level for all available village census years between 1983 to 2014. All Z-scores calculated using per-capita measures. Infrastructure z-score includes 3 indicator variables which equal 1 if the village has a road passable by 4wd vehicle, if the village has safe garbage disposal, or if the village has safe water. Health: number of health posts *posyandu*, supplementary health posts and number of doctors. Schools: Kindergartens, (non-)religious primary and junior high schools Controls: Village-level mean elevation & slope, survey-year and border segment fixed effects

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Historical Public Goods Provision, Fuzzy RD

	Z-Score Schools, 1983					
	INPRES			Non-INPRES		
Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Instrumental Variables					
bengkok	−0.167	−0.135	0.052	0.406***	0.226***	0.153**
	(0.105)	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.145)	(0.064)	(0.075)
Observations	188	160	100	188	160	100
Mean Dep. Var	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
First Stage F Statistic	11.7	12.2	7.4	11.7	12.2	7.4

Note: Source: 1983 Village Census (PODES) data. Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in columns (1) - (3) is the standardized per capita z-score of number of INPRES schools in the village. Outcome in columns (4) - (6) is the standardized per capita z-score of number of non-INPRES village schools. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Development Outcomes: Fuzzy RD

Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Nighttime Light Intensity			
bengkok	0.114*	0.165***	0.208***
	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.054)
Observations	3820	3240	2020
Mean Dep. Var	2.18	2.32	2.49
First Stage F Statistic	13.0	14.0	9.5
Panel B: % Children Died			
bengkok	−0.63***	−0.65***	−0.52***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	21709	17947	11027
Mean Dep. Var	2.4	2.3	2.3
First Stage F Statistic	14.9	13.2	9.4
Panel C: Years of Education, Villagers			
bengkok	0.208**	0.177***	0.233***
	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.065)
Observations	204189	173744	113862
Mean Dep. Var	6.50	6.55	6.67
First Stage F Statistic	12.8	11.6	7.8

Note: Panel A: Unit of observation is at village-year level. Outcome in columns (1) - (3) is nighttime light intensity, inverse hyperbolic sine transformed. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, year and border fixed effects. Panel B: Unit of observation is at individual level. Outcome is constructed from the number of dead children as a proportion of total children ever born reported by each women who was recorded as having ever given birth in the 2010 Indonesian Population Census. To better approximate current-day health conditions, I restrict the sample to all women born between 1975-1990. These are women who would have been 20-35 years of age at the time of enumeration of the 2010 census and of prime child bearing age. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope, 5-year cohort and border fixed effects. Panel C: Unit of observation is at individual level. Outcome is the number of years of education as reported in the 2010 Indonesian Population Census. For comparability with health outcomes in Table 3, I restrict the sample to all individuals born between 1975-1990. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14: Orientation towards Elite Interests: Voting for Golkar in 1999, Fuzzy RD

Sample Within:	30 km	20 km	10 km
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Instrumental Variables		
bengkok	−0.184***	−0.146**	−0.105**
	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.053)
Observations	191	162	101
Mean Dep. Var	0.32	0.29	0.30
First Stage F Statistic	12.2	13.0	8.4

Note: Unit of observation is at the village level. Outcome in column (1) - (3) is an indicator that equals 1 if Golkar received the most number of votes in 1999, the first elections after the end of Soeharto's rule in 1998. Source: 2000 village census data. Controls: Village-level mean elevation, slope and border segment fixed effects. Conley standard errors allowing for spatial autocorrelation within cutoff of 30km is used.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$