GEDEON J. LIM

270 Bay State Rd, Room 314

Boston University, Department of Economics

Boston MA 02215 USA Cell: (617) 949-1882 Email: gedeonl@bu.edu

Website: https://sites.google.com/a/bu.edu/gedeonlim

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Student, Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2020 (expected)

Dissertation Title: Essays on Development Economics

Main Advisor: Samuel Bazzi

Dissertation Committee: Samuel Bazzi, Dilip Mookherjee and Robert A. Margo

B.Soc.Sci. Economics, First Class Honors, National University of Singapore, Singapore 2014

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Development Economics, Political Economy, Economic History

WORKING PAPERS

"Why Pay the Chief? Land Rents and Political Selection in Indonesia (Job Market Paper)"

WORK IN PROGRESS

"The Effects of Long-Run Ethnic Segregation in Southeast Asia"

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

Northeast Universities Development Conference. Evanston, IL	2019
Economic History Association Meeting, Poster Session. Atlanta, GA	2019
Southeast Asia Research Group N.A. Meeting. Vancouver, Canada	2019
17th Nordic Conference on Development Economics. Helsinki, Finland	2018
Summer School in Development Economics. Prato, Italy	2017

GRANTS

Manuel Abdala Gift Grant	Spring 2019
Boston University Initiative on Cities, Seed Funding	Fall 2018
Graduate Research Abroad Fellowship (Short-Term)	Fall 2018
Economics Department Summer Research Grant	Summer 2018
Global Development Policy Center, Summer in the Field	Summer 2018

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for S. Bazzi, Boston University,	2015-Present
Visiting Researcher, AKATIGA, Indonesia,	2018
Visiting Junior Researcher, SMERU Research Institute, Indonesia	Summer 2015, 2016
Research Assistant for R. Arunachalam & A. Shenoy, University of Michigan, MI	Summer 2013
Communications & Research Intern, Centre for Microfinance, India	Summer 2012
Non-Commissioned Officer, Singapore Armed Forces, Singapore	2009-2011

Languages:

English (native), Mandarin Chinese (native), Bahasa Indonesia (intermediate)

COMPUTER SKILLS: ArcGIS, Stata

CITIZENSHIP: Singapore/F1

REFERENCES

Professor Samuel Bazzi

(Chair)

Department of Economics Boston University

Phone: (617) 353-6150 Email: sbazzi@bu.edu ${\bf Professor\ Dilip\ Mookherjee}$

Department of Economics Boston University

Phone: (617) 353-4392 Email: dilipm@bu.edu Professor Robert A. Margo

Department of Economics Boston University

Phone: (617) 353-6819 Email: margora@bu.edu

GEDEON J. LIM

Why Pay the Chief? Land Rents & Political Selection in Indonesia (Job Market Paper)

Much of modern development efforts are channeled through traditional local governance. Yet, despite their importance as politician-bureaucrats, local leaders are rarely paid a living wage. This paper studies the effect of awarding chiefs cultivation rights over village rice land, a stable revenue generating asset, during their term of office. I use a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design to exploit a historical natural experiment in Java where in the nineteenth century a homogeneous region was split, and in one part chiefs were awarded cultivation rights but not in the other. To measure political outcomes, I collect original data from the field tracing the modern electoral history of 931 chiefs in 193 villages. Higher land rents cause positive chief performance and economic development. Chiefs raise more funds and construct more public goods such that areas under their control are richer and more developed even today. I find evidence consistent with historically positive political selection as a key mechanism. Higher rents attracted better quality chiefs in the past. These chiefs were so effective at educational provision that the entire village today remains more educated. As a result, despite higher land rents attracting a higher quality pool of candidates today, neither candidates nor chiefs today are more selected compared to the average villager. Instead, positive development outcomes today are shaped by the selection of chiefs whose interests are aligned away from supra-village elite interests. Overall, my findings provide evidence that paying local leaders from a stable source of local revenue can be good for economic development.