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# BLACKDAN: A BLACK-BOX MULTI-OBJECTIVE APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE AND CONTEXTUAL JAILBREAKING OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

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## ABSTRACT

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across various tasks, they encounter potential security risks such as jailbreak attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities to bypass security measures and generate harmful outputs. Existing jailbreak strategies mainly focus on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), frequently neglecting other critical factors, including the relevance of the jailbreak response to the query and the level of stealthiness. This narrow focus on single objectives can result in ineffective attacks that either lack contextual relevance or are easily recognizable. In this work, we introduce BlackDAN, an innovative black-box attack framework with multi-objective optimization, aiming to generate high-quality prompts that effectively facilitate jailbreaking while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. BlackDAN leverages Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs), specifically the NSGA-II algorithm, to optimize jailbreaks across multiple objectives including ASR, stealthiness, and semantic relevance. By integrating mechanisms like mutation, crossover, and Pareto-dominance, BlackDAN provides a transparent and interpretable process for generating jailbreaks. Furthermore, the framework allows customization based on user preferences, enabling the selection of prompts that balance harmfulness, relevance, and other factors. Experimental results demonstrate that BlackDAN outperforms traditional single-objective methods, yielding higher success rates and improved robustness across various LLMs and multimodal LLMs, while ensuring jailbreak responses are both relevant and less detectable. Our code is available at <https://github.com/MantaAI/BlackDAN>.

**Keywords** Jailbreak · Multi-Objective · Black-Box · LLM

## 1 Introduction

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into various applications, the security of these models has become crucial [1, 2, 3]. Jailbreaking, the process of manipulating these models to bypass safety constraints and generate undesirable or harmful outputs, poses a significant challenge to maintaining their integrity and ethical use. Current jailbreaking methods depend excessively on affirmative cues from the model’s prefix [4, 5], leading to the possibility of generating responses that are irrelevant or off-topic, leaving users helpless without outright rejecting prompts. This over-reliance underscores the urgent necessity for a more nuanced approach to prompt selection and optimization, especially through multi-objective strategies that focus on both effectiveness and usefulness.

Furthermore, existing jailbreaking approaches struggle to explain why certain special directed vectors [6] result in model rejections, highlighting a significant challenge in comprehending the underlying distributions that dictate model behavior. The absence of clear explanations regarding the acceptance or rejection of prompts makes it challenging

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to establish a reliable safety boundary. Incorporating ranking mechanisms and conducting a thorough analysis of the distribution of responses can help provide interpretability and enable the identification of a more concrete safety boundary for prompts. These considerations are essential to ensure that jailbreaking attempts not only achieve success but also do so within explainable and safe constraints.

Another major limitation in current black-box jailbreak optimization strategies is the lack of transparency and interpretability. Most techniques rely on end-to-end optimization without adequately explaining the processes involved. The lack of interpretability makes it difficult to understand how jailbreak methods evolve or how specific adjustments impact the success rate of jailbreak attempts. Addressing this gap through a more structured explanation of the optimization processes will lead to more reliable and controllable jailbreak techniques.

To address these issues, we propose **BlackDAN**, a black-box, multi-objective, human-readable, controllable, and extensible jailbreak optimization framework. BlackDAN introduces a novel approach by optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously, including attack success rate (ASR), context relevance, and other factors. In contrast to traditional methods that focus solely on achieving a high ASR, BlackDAN adopts a more balanced approach by simultaneously addressing the trade-offs between effectiveness, interpretability, and safety. We hypothesize, verify, and analyze the concept of a safe boundary for prompts within this framework, using multi-objective optimization to refine the selection of useful and effective prompts while maintaining unsafety constraints.

To realize BlackDAN, we leverage the advances of Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs) [7], specifically the NSGA-II algorithm [8], which shows effectiveness in solving complex multi-objective problems. By incorporating pareto-dominance, mutation and crossover mechanisms, BlackDAN is capable of exploring a wider solution space while providing clear explanations of the optimization process. This allows for a more transparent and interpretable methodology for conducting jailbreak attacks, addressing the shortcomings of traditional end-to-end optimization techniques.



Figure 1: This image illustrates the limitations of single-objective optimization, where an AI system may produce a response that excels in one aspect but fails in another. For example, it can generate highly harmful responses that are less semantically consistent or vice versa.

Fig 1 contrasts multiple scenarios demonstrating how multi-objective optimization can yield outputs that are both semantically relevant(thumbsup) and harmful (Little devil). It shows the limitations of single-objective optimization in AI, where focusing on just one goal (like semantic consistency or safety) can lead to imbalanced results. In the top-left, responses are safe and contextually relevant, while the bottom-left is safe but less helpful. The top-right shows dangerous, harmful responses that are highly relevant, and the bottom-right is both harmful and irrelevant. The image highlights the need for multi-objective optimization to balance safety and relevance in AI outputs.

Additionally, BlackDAN builds upon previous work, such as AutoDAN [9], by extending the framework beyond single-objective optimization to a multi-objective perspective. AutoDAN focuses on balancing fluency and evading perplexity detection in prompt text generation, but BlackDAN improves upon this by simultaneously optimizing multiple objectives, such as harmfulness, context relevance and other factors, thereby increasing the overall effectiveness and reliability of jailbreak attempts.

In summary, our contributions are as follows:

- **Beyond ASR - Focus on Semantic Consistency:** BlackDAN not only optimizes for attack success rate (ASR) but also emphasizes semantic consistency, ensuring that jailbreak responses remain contextually relevant and aligned with harmful prompts, making the attacks more practical and less detectable.
- **Extensibility to Arbitrary Objectives:** The BlackDAN framework is theoretically extensible to any number of optimization objectives. Users can customize and prioritize different factors in jailbreak attempts, such as harmfulness, stealthiness, or relevance, based on their specific needs.
- **Rank Boundary Hypothesis and Improved Differentiation:** We introduce the Rank Boundary Hypothesis, positing that each rank has distinct boundaries in the embedding space. This allows better differentiation between toxic and non-toxic prompts, enhancing the framework’s ability to target specific harmful content distributions.
- **Comprehensive Single and Multi-Objective Experiments:** Extensive experiments conducted on both LLMs and multimodal LLMs demonstrate that BlackDAN significantly outperforms single-objective and other black-box approaches. The results show higher effectiveness across multiple dimensions, establishing BlackDAN as a robust and versatile tool for jailbreak optimization.

## 2 Related Work

LLMs’ susceptibility to adversarial attacks has been explored through various approaches, mainly categorized into white-box and black-box attacks. White-box attacks require access to the model’s parameters, as demonstrated by [4], who utilized gradient search to optimize adversarial prompts by accessing the model’s logits. Other methods, such as Shadow alignment [10] and Weak-to-Strong Jailbreak [11], involve modifying the model’s weights or decoding processes to bypass safeguards, making these approaches unsuitable for black-box LLMs. On the other hand, black-box attacks operate solely through prompt manipulation, modifying input queries to induce harmful outputs. Examples include methods like AutoDAN [12], PAIR [13], and PAP [14], where LLMs are used to generate harmful queries. Rule-based techniques have also been proposed, as illustrated by [15], who encrypted harmful queries and requested LLMs to respond in the ciphered format. Other rule-based methods include EasyJailbreak [16].

Black-box attacks are inherently more challenging than white-box attacks. Many existing techniques rely heavily on the transferability of adversarial examples; adversarial examples designed for one model often succeed in attacking other victim models. It is generally assumed that attackers can query the victim model to annotate training samples or access a pre-trained source model designed for the same task as the victim model. To enhance adversarial transferability, several methods have been proposed to adjust the backpropagation computation. Techniques include the skip gradient method (SGM) [17], linear backpropagation (LinBP) [18], intermediate-level attack (ILA) [19], and ILA++ [20, 21]. Increasing input diversity has also been widely adopted, as evidenced by works like [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32].

## 3 Methodology

In this setting, we aim to generate prompts that maximize the likelihood of generating unsafe responses from a target language model  $\mathcal{T}$  while ensuring semantic consistency between the generated responses and harmful questions. This process is framed as a multi-objective optimization problem, and we utilize NSGA-II (Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II) [8] to perform the optimization.

### 3.1 Fitness Functions

We define two continuous fitness functions to guide the optimization process:

**Unsafe Token Probability (Using llama\_guard\_2):** The first fitness function,  $f_1$ , evaluates the probability that a response  $R$  generated by  $\mathcal{T}$  contains unsafe content. This is computed by the proxy model `llama_guard_2`, which outputs the log-probability of specific "unsafe tokens."




Figure 2: Overview of Multi-objective Genetic Method - BlackDAN

Given a prompt  $P$  and a harmful question  $Q$ , let  $R = \mathcal{T}(P, Q)$  denote the response generated by the target model  $\mathcal{T}$ . The unsafe token probability is computed as:

$$f_1(P, Q) = \log P(\text{unsafe token} | R),$$

where  $P(\text{unsafe token} | R)$  is the probability of the most relevant unsafe token appearing in response  $R$  as calculated by `llama_guard_2`.

**Semantic Consistency (Using all-MiniLM-L6-v2):** In the black-box attack setting, we do not have direct access to the target model's internals or its embeddings. Instead, we utilize a pre-trained proxy model, such as the `all-MiniLM-L6-v2`, to generate sentence embeddings for both the harmful prompt and the candidate responses. These embeddings allow us to measure the semantic similarity between the prompt and the responses.

The second fitness function,  $f_2$ , measures the semantic consistency between the generated response  $R$  and the harmful question  $Q$ . We use a pre-trained sentence embedding proxy model  $\mathcal{M}_p$  (`all-MiniLM-L6-v2`) to compute the embeddings of both  $Q$  and  $R$  and then calculate their cosine similarity.

Let  $e_Q = \text{Encode}_{\mathcal{M}_p}(Q)$  and  $e_R = \text{Encode}_{\mathcal{M}_p}(R)$  represent the embeddings of  $Q$  and  $R$ , respectively. The cosine similarity between these two embeddings is computed as:

$$f_2(P, Q) = \text{Sim}(e_Q, e_R) = \frac{\mathbf{e}_Q \cdot \mathbf{e}_R}{\|\mathbf{e}_Q\| \|\mathbf{e}_R\|},$$

where  $\cdot$  represents the dot product, and  $\|\mathbf{e}\|$  is the Euclidean norm of the embedding vector.

We select the responses with the higher similarity scores as the jailbreaking outputs. This ensures that the selected response is semantically aligned with the harmful prompt, even though we rely on a proxy model for the embedding computations.

### 3.2 NSGA-II for Multi-Objective Jailbreaking Prompts Optimization

To find an optimal set of jailbreak prompts, we apply the NSGA-II algorithm. This algorithm performs multi-objective optimization based on two key criteria:

**Dominance:** A solution  $P_1$  dominates another solution  $P_2$  if it is better in at least one objective (e.g., higher unsafe token probability or better semantic consistency) and no worse in all other objectives. For a problem with  $m$  objectives, we define dominance as:

$$P_1 \prec P_2 \quad \begin{aligned} &\text{if } \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}, \quad f_i(P_1, Q) \geq f_i(P_2, Q) \\ &\text{and } \exists j \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}, \quad f_j(P_1, Q) > f_j(P_2, Q), \end{aligned}$$

where  $f_i(P, Q)$  represents the fitness value for the  $i$ -th objective function given the prompt  $P$  and the harmful question  $Q$ .

**Crowding Distance:** Once the population is sorted into non-dominated fronts, a crowding distance is assigned to each solution in order to maintain diversity. The crowding distance  $d(P)$  for an individual solution  $P$  in a given front is calculated across all  $m$  objective functions. For each objective  $f_i$ , the crowding distance is computed as:

$$d(P) = \sum_{i=1}^m \left( \frac{f_i^{\text{next}} - f_i^{\text{prev}}}{f_i^{\max} - f_i^{\min}} \right),$$

where  $f_i^{\text{next}}$  and  $f_i^{\text{prev}}$  are the fitness values of the neighboring solutions with respect to the  $i$ -th objective, and  $f_i^{\max}$  and  $f_i^{\min}$  are the maximum and minimum fitness values in the front for the  $i$ -th objective.

This ensures that the solutions selected from each non-dominated front are both optimal in terms of the multiple objectives and diverse with respect to each objective.

### 3.3 Genetic Operations: Crossover and Mutation

NSGA-II evolves the population using genetic operations:

**Crossover:** The crossover operation creates two new offspring by recombining sentences from two parent prompts. Let  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  be the parent prompts. The offspring  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are generated by randomly swapping sentences between the two parent prompts:

$$C_1, C_2 = \text{Crossover}(P_1, P_2).$$

**Mutation:** The mutation operation modifies a randomly selected word in a prompt with a synonym. Let  $W$  represent a randomly chosen word from prompt  $P$ , and let  $\text{Syn}(W)$  denote the set [33] of synonyms for  $W$ . A mutated prompt is generated as:

$$P' = \text{Mutation}(P) \quad \text{where} \quad W' \in \text{Syn}(W).$$

The complete algorithm is provided in Appendix Algorithm 1 and 2 due to space constraints.

## 4 Evaluation Metrics for Jailbreaking Prompts

In our black-box jailbreaking attack evaluation, we use two main metrics: **Keyword-based Attack Success Rate (ASR)** and the **GPT-4 Metric**. These metrics assess the effectiveness of jailbreaks in bypassing restrictions and generating unsafe content.

### 4.1 Keyword-based Attack Success Rate (ASR)

The Keyword-based ASR measures whether a generated response avoids predefined rejection patterns typically used by language models. This is determined by checking if the response  $R$  contains any phrases from a list of rejection keywords  $\mathcal{K}$  (e.g., "I'm sorry," "As a language model," "I cannot"). The success indicator  $s(R)$  and ASR over  $N$  responses are defined as:

$$s(R) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \forall k \in \mathcal{K}, k \notin R, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad \text{ASR} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N s(R_i)$$

where  $R_i$  is the  $i$ -th response for harmful prompt  $Q_i$ . The top-level ASR ( $\text{ASR}_{\text{top}}$ ) is computed similarly but only for the highest-ranked responses.

### 4.2 GPT-4 Metric

The GPT-4 Metric uses an external model to evaluate whether a response  $R$  violates ethical, legal, or safety guidelines. The score  $g(Q, R)$  ranges from 1 (non-jailbroken, refusal to answer) to 10 (fully jailbroken, comprehensive violation). It is computed as:

$$g(Q, R) = \text{GPT-4Judge}(Q, R),$$

where  $\text{GPT-4Judge}(Q, R)$  returns a score between 1 and 10. The success indicator  $s_g(Q, R)$  and GPT-4-based metric are defined as:

$$s_g(Q, R) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } g(Q, R) \geq 5, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad \text{GPT4-Metric} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N s_g(Q_i, R_i)$$

This metric provides a qualitative measure of jailbreak success by assessing the ethical violations in the responses.

## 5 Experiment

### 5.1 Experimental Setups

**Text Dataset:** For evaluating jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs), we utilize the AdvBench [4]. This dataset consists of 520 requests spanning various categories, including profanity, graphic depictions, threatening behavior, misinformation, discrimination, cyber-crime, and dangerous or illegal suggestions.

**Multimodal Dataset:** To assess jailbreak attacks on multimodal large language models (MLLMs), we use the MM-SafetyBench [34]. This dataset encompasses 13 scenarios, including but not limited to illegal activity, hate speech, physical harm, and health consultations, with a total of 5,040 text-image pairs.

**Models:** We utilize state-of-the-art (SOTA) open-source large language models (LLMs), including Llama-2-7b-hf [35], Llama-2-13b-hf [35], Internlm2-chat-7b [36], Vicuna-7b [37], AquilaChat-7B [38], Baichuan-7B, Baichuan2-13B-Chat [39], GPT-2-XL [40], Minitron-8B-Base [41], Yi-1.5-9B-Chat [42], and Internlm2-chat-7b [36]. For multimodal LLMs, we employ llava-v1.6-mistral-7b-hf [43] and llava-v1.6-vicuna-7b-hf [43] to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in expanding from unimodal to multimodal capabilities.

### 5.2 Single-Objective(harmfulness) Jailbreaking Optimization

Table 1: Comparison of attack methods across different models and box types.(AdvBench 520 samples)

<b>Model</b>	<b>Attack Type</b>	<b>White-box</b>	<b>Gray-box</b>	<b>Black-box(Ours)</b>	
		GCG	AutoDAN	w/o question (LG2)	w/ question (LG2)
Llama2-7b-chat	Time Cost per Sample	$\approx 15\text{min}$	$\approx 12\text{min}$	$\approx 2\text{min}$	$\approx 2\text{min}$
	Self-Attack	45.3%	60.7%	80.4%	<b>93.1%</b>
Vicuna-7B-v1.5	Transfer	13.7%	72.9%	89.6%	<b>99.2%</b>
Vicuna-13B-v1.5	Transfer	12.9%	69.2%	84.0%	<b>86.6%</b>
Llama3-8B	Transfer	12.3%	45.0%	<b>72.1%</b>	60.1%

Table 1 compares attack methods across various models (Llama2-7b-chat, Vicuna-7B-v1.5, Vicuna-13B-v1.5, Llama3-8B) under different conditions (White-box, Gray-box, and Black-box).

**Time Efficiency:** The black-box methods, both "w/o question" (which do not use the harmful question and response as input to the moderation model) and "w/ question" (which include the harmful question and response), are significantly faster, taking approximately 2 minutes per sample. In contrast, the white-box method takes around 15 minutes, and the gray-box method takes about 12 minutes per sample, when applied to Llama2-7b-chat.

**Self-Attack:** The success rate(Llama2-7b-chat) significantly increases from White-box (45.3%) to Black-box, reaching 93.1% with harmful questions ("w/ question").

**Transfer Attack:** Vicuna-7B-v1.5 shows the highest success rate, increasing from 13.7% in the White-box scenario to 99.2% in the Black-box scenario ("w/ question"). All models, such as Vicuna-7B-v1.5, are derived from Llama2-7b-chat through transfer learning. Other models follow similar trends, though Llama3-8B shows a slight decline when harmful questions are included.




Figure 3: Single-Obejective Self-attack &amp; Transfer vs Multi-Objective Self-attack

### 5.3 Multi-Objective Optimization

Fig 3 compares the success rates of single-objective black-box jailbreak attacks across various models (left) and transferability of these attacks (bottom). Diagonal values represent self-attacks, showing high vulnerability in most models (e.g., AquilaChat-7B at 99.8%). The final row shows multi-objective self-attack optimization results, which consistently outperform or match the self-attacks, indicating stronger, more generalizable attacks.

**Transfer Success:** Transfer success varies across models, with some, like GPT-2-XL and Baichuan2-13B-Chat, being more vulnerable, while models such as Llama-2-7b-hf and Llama-2-13b-hf demonstrate better resistance to attacks based on column averages, excluding self-attacks.




Figure 4: Single-Objective and Multi-Objective methods Jailbreak Multimodal Models

**Jailbreak Multimodal Models across Different Scenarios:** Fig 4 shows that multi-objective (MO) optimization significantly outperforms single-objective (SO) across all harmful categories and scenarios (SD, SD + Typo, Typo).

MO consistently achieves higher attack success rates (ASR), with models like llava-v1.6-mistral-7b-hf MO reaching 100% in many cases. Overall, multi-objective optimization proves much more effective than single-objective methods across all models and conditions.




Figure 5: Best Pareto Rank vs Worst Pareto Rank Embedding

**Embedding Comparison for Best and Worst Pareto Ranks:** Fig 5 provides a comparison of embeddings for samples with the best and worst Pareto ranks using three visualization techniques: PCA 2D, PCA 3D [44], and UMAP [45]. These embeddings are derived from the model bge-large-en-v1.5 to ensure fairness, as all-MiniLM-L6-v2 was used for fitness calculation, potentially biasing the evaluation if used. In the PCA plots, an SVM decision boundary effectively separates the two groups, demonstrating that the different ranks occupy distinct regions within the embedding space. This is further corroborated by the UMAP visualization, which shows clear and tight clustering of the best and worst ranks. These results strongly suggest that Pareto ranking not only differentiates the quality of jailbreak prompts but also has a significant discriminative effect on how prompts are represented in the embedding space.

**Pareto Ranking and Embedding Space:** Figure 6 visualizes the relationships between different Pareto rank categories across all samples by projecting the embeddings onto a 2D spherical surface. Each subplot represents a specific model, where data points are color-coded based on their Pareto rank, and larger points denote the Fréchet means for each rank. The Fréchet means are connected by green geodesic lines, demonstrating the smooth progression of the means as the Pareto rank decreases, which indicates better-performing data points. At each Fréchet mean, Tangent PCA is applied to analyze the local variability in the data, capturing the principal directions of variation around each mean point. This visualization highlights both the global geometric structure of the embeddings and the local variations, providing insights into how Pareto rank-ordered embeddings transition across models and revealing underlying patterns in the data. The visualization showcases the interpretability and advantages of multi-objective optimization by illustrating how solutions progress across Pareto ranks on a 2D spherical surface. Fréchet means and geodesic paths reveal the convergence of solutions, while Tangent PCA offers a novel perspective on the distribution of embeddings. This




Figure 6: Visualization [46] of the Fréchet means [47] for different Pareto ranks across multiple datasets projected onto a 2D spherical surface. For each dataset, data points are color-coded by Pareto rank, and the Fréchet means for each rank are connected by green geodesic lines on the spherical surface. The Tangent PCA is applied at each Fréchet mean to analyze local variations in the data, illustrating the progression of the means as the Pareto rank decreases, indicating better data points.

approach provides new insights into how multi-objective optimization balances competing goals and enhances the structure of textual embeddings.

Table 2: Comparison of ASR and GPT4-Metric scores(%) across models

<b>Methods</b>	<b>Llama2-7b</b>		<b>Vicuna-7b</b>		<b>GPT-4</b>		<b>GPT-3.5</b>	
	ASR	GPT4-Metric	ASR	GPT4-Metric	ASR	GPT4-Metric	ASR	GPT4-Metric
PAIR [13]	5.2	4.0	62.1	41.9	48.1	<b>30.0</b>	51.3	34.0
TAP [48]	30.2	23.5	31.5	25.6	36.0	11.9	48.1	5.4
DeepInception [49]	77.5	31.2	92.7	41.5	61.9	22.7	68.5	40.0
Ours(Multi-objective)	<b>95.4</b>	<b>93.8</b>	<b>97.5</b>	<b>96.0</b>	<b>71.4</b>	28.0	<b>75.9</b>	<b>44.8</b>

**Evaluation across multiple models and metrics:** Table 2 demonstrates BlackDAN (Ours - Multi-objective) consistently outperforms all other methods, achieving the highest ASR and GPT4-Metric scores across all models. Notably, it reaches an ASR of 95.4% on Llama2-7b and 97.5% on Vicuna-7b, demonstrating significant improvement over previous methods like DeepInception (77.5% on Llama2-7b and 92.7% on Vicuna-7b). GPT-4 shows the lowest ASR overall (71.4%) for BlackDAN, highlighting its relative robustness compared to other models. However, BlackDAN still significantly surpasses other methods like DeepInception and PAIR on GPT-4. GPT4-Metric, which evaluates the ethical violation degree of the generated outputs, indicates that BlackDAN produces the most harmful responses, with the highest scores of 93.8 on Llama2-7b and 96.0 on Vicuna-7b, outperforming other techniques. The results show that BlackDAN achieves a much higher attack success rate and generates more contextually harmful responses than traditional single-objective jailbreak methods, proving the efficacy of multi-objective optimization.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we introduced BlackDAN, a multi-objective, controllable jailbreak optimization framework for large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Beyond optimizing for attack success rate (ASR) and stealthiness, BlackDAN addresses the critical challenge of context consistency by ensuring that jailbreak responses remain semantically aligned with the original harmful prompts. This ensures that responses are not only evasive but also relevant, increasing their practical impact. Leveraging the NSGA-II algorithm, our method significantly improves over traditional single-objective techniques, achieving higher success rates and more coherent jailbreak responses across various models. Furthermore, BlackDAN is highly extensible, allowing the integration of any number of user-defined objectives, making it a versatile framework for a wide range of optimization tasks. The inclusion of multiple objectives—specifically ASR, stealthiness, and semantic consistency—sets a new benchmark for generating useful and interpretable jailbreak responses while maintaining safety and robustness in evaluation.

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## A Appendix




Figure 7: This image demonstrates the logarithmic convergence of fitness as the number of generations increases. With more generations, the fitness score tends to stabilize, indicating convergence to a steady state. Throughout this process, the model’s performance, as evaluated by the fitness metric, shows significant improvement, supporting the effectiveness of our approach. Moreover, around generation 50, most state-of-the-art (SOTA) large language models (LLMs) reach convergence, further highlighting the efficiency of our proposed method.

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### Algorithm 1 Multi-Objective Jailbreaking Prompts Optimization

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- 1: **Input:** Initial prototype prompt  $P_0$ , Harmful question  $Q$ , Population size  $N$ , Generations  $G$ , Mutation rate  $m$
- 2: **Output:** Non-dominated front  $\mathcal{F}$  with optimized prompts
- 3: Initialize population  $\mathcal{P}$  with  $N$  individuals using  $P_0$
- 4: **for** each generation  $g = 1, 2, \dots, G$  **do**
- 5:     Evaluate fitness of each individual in  $\mathcal{P}$  using  $f_1$  (Unsafe Token Probability) and  $f_2$  (Semantic Consistency)
- 6:     Perform non-dominated sorting on  $\mathcal{P}$  to generate fronts  $\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \dots$
- 7:     **for** each front  $\mathcal{F}_i$  **do**
- 8:         Assign crowding distance  $d(P)$  to each individual  $P \in \mathcal{F}_i$
- 9:     **end for**
- 10:     Select individuals for mating pool using non-dominated rank and crowding distance
- 11:     Initialize offspring population  $\mathcal{O}$  by applying crossover and mutation:
- 12:     **for** each pair of parents  $(P_1, P_2)$  selected from the mating pool **do**
- 13:         Apply crossover to  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  to generate two offspring  $C_1, C_2$
- 14:         Apply mutation to  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  with probability  $m$
- 15:         Add  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  to  $\mathcal{O}$
- 16:     **end for**
- 17:     Combine populations  $\mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{O}$
- 18:     Perform non-dominated sorting on the combined population
- 19:     Truncate combined population to size  $N$  by selecting the best fronts and individuals with highest crowding distance
- 20: **end for**
- 21: **Return** the non-dominated front  $\mathcal{F}_1$

---

Explanation of Symbols and Process in algorithm 1:

**Inputs:**  $P_0$ : Initial prototype prompt.  $Q$ : Harmful question to guide the optimization process.  $N$ : Population size, the number of prompts in each generation.  $G$ : Number of generations to evolve the population.  $m$ : Mutation rate that controls how often mutations happen in the population.

**Fitness Functions:**  $f_1$ : Unsafe token probability based on a model like Llama Guard 2.  $f_2$ : Semantic similarity to the harmful question, based on a sentence embedding model.

**Genetic Operations:** Crossover: Combines parts of two parent prompts to create offspring. Mutation: Randomly alters parts of a prompt to introduce diversity.

**Non-Dominated Sorting:** Solutions are sorted based on dominance criteria—those that are not dominated by any other solutions form the first front  $\mathcal{F}_1$ , and so on.

**Crowding Distance:** Used to maintain diversity in the population. Individuals with a higher crowding distance are selected preferentially when fronts overlap.

**Selection and Truncation:** After generating offspring, the combined population is sorted, and the best individuals are retained to form the next generation.

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## Algorithm 2 Non-Dominated Sorting Algorithm

---

```

1: Input: Population  $\mathcal{P}$ , fitness values  $\{f_1(P), f_2(P)\}$  for each  $P \in \mathcal{P}$ 
2: Output: Sorted fronts  $\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \dots$ 
3: Initialize fronts  $\mathcal{F} = \emptyset$ 
4: Initialize domination count  $n[P] = 0$  for each individual  $P \in \mathcal{P}$ 
5: Initialize domination set  $S[P] = \emptyset$  for each individual  $P \in \mathcal{P}$ 
6: for each individual  $P \in \mathcal{P}$  do
7:   for each individual  $Q \in \mathcal{P}, Q \neq P$  do
8:     if  $P$  dominates  $Q$  then                                 $\triangleright$  Check if  $P$  dominates  $Q$ 
9:       Add  $Q$  to the domination set  $S[P]$ 
10:    else if  $Q$  dominates  $P$  then
11:      Increment domination count  $n[P] = n[P] + 1$ 
12:    end if
13:   end for
14:   if  $n[P] = 0$  then                                 $\triangleright P$  is non-dominated
15:     Add  $P$  to the first front  $\mathcal{F}_1$ 
16:   end if
17: end for
18: Set front counter  $i = 1$ 
19: while  $\mathcal{F}_i \neq \emptyset$  do
20:   Initialize next front  $\mathcal{F}_{i+1} = \emptyset$ 
21:   for each individual  $P \in \mathcal{F}_i$  do
22:     for each individual  $Q \in S[P]$  do                       $\triangleright Q$  is dominated by  $P$ 
23:       Decrement domination count  $n[Q] = n[Q] - 1$ 
24:       if  $n[Q] = 0$  then                                 $\triangleright Q$  is non-dominated now
25:         Add  $Q$  to front  $\mathcal{F}_{i+1}$ 
26:       end if
27:     end for
28:   end for
29:   Increment front counter  $i = i + 1$ 
30: end while
31: Return sorted fronts  $\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \dots$ 

```

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


Figure 8: This image presents the results of the multi-objective optimization process. The findings indicate that the hierarchical levels defined by BlackDAN align well with the Pareto optimality principle. Additionally, different models are generally able to identify optimal hierarchies under the multi-objective scenario, resulting in similar distributions.