

Gelato SmartWallet Audit Report

Jun 13, 2025





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Disclaimer

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Summary

This report has been prepared for Gelato smart contract, to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.



Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	Gelato
Codebase	https://github.com/gelatodigital/smartwallet-contracts
Commit	2e4018e9880ccfae7f49b26cba176aec32878158
Language	Solidity

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Jun 13, 2025
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Total Issues	11

[WP-M1] Permissive signature verification implementation (not best security practice): Allows malleable (non-unique) signatures, prone to misuse

Medium

Issue Description

<https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/bc623b870f0d49bf9a58fec39708782c788c30e4/EIPS/eip-2.md?plain=1#L28>

1. All transaction signatures whose s-value is greater than `secp256k1n/2` are now considered invalid. *The ECDSA recover precompiled contract **remains unchanged** and will keep accepting high s-values; this is useful e.g. if a contract recovers old Bitcoin signatures.*

<https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/bc623b870f0d49bf9a58fec39708782c788c30e4/EIPS/eip-2.md?plain=1#L48>

Allowing transactions with any s value with $0 < s < \text{secp256k1n}$, as is currently the case, opens a transaction malleability concern, as *one can **take any transaction, flip the s value from s to $\text{secp256k1n} - s$, flip the v value (27 -> 28 , 28 -> 27), and the resulting signature would still be valid.***

For example:

In OpenZeppelin's common ERC-1271 implementation

`SignatureChecker.isValidSignatureNow(address signer, bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature) :`

- When `signer.code.length == 0` (traditional EOA): Uses OpenZeppelin's `ECDSA.tryRecover(hash, signature)`, returns `false` when encountering `RecoverError.InvalidSignatureS`, avoiding signature malleability issues
- When `signer.code.length != 0` (e.g., using `Delegation.sol` as the EIP-7702 Delegated Address for `signer` EOA): Uses `signer.isValidSignature(hash, signature)` result
 - Current implementation of `Delegation.isValidSignature(bytes32 digest, bytes`



`calldata signature)` allows upper range `s` (greater than `0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0`), allows signature malleability, and considers flipped signatures as valid

This creates inconsistent behavior in `SignatureChecker.isValidSignatureNow()`, making it easier for users to mistakenly ignore malleability issues when they actually exist.

If an `isValidSignature()` user treats signatures as identifiers, similar to Gelato contract `ExecWithSigsFacet`'s `wasSignatureUsedAlready[keccak256(_signature)]`, and directly uses `isValidSignature()` results without handling malleability, attackers can bypass restrictions by flipping signatures.

For reference, both ERC-1271 reference implementation and ERC-4337 reference implementation enforce unique signatures by not allowing `s` values greater than `0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF5D576E7357A4501DDFE92F46681B20A0`.

Besides the malleability issue caused by upper range `s` values, supporting both 65 bytes and 64 bytes long `signature` also leads to malleability problems, see:

- <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-4h98-2769-gh6h>
- <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3610>

Both ERC-1271 reference implementation and ERC-4337 reference implementation do not allow signatures with length of 64.

```
71     function isValidSignature(bytes32 digest, bytes calldata signature)
72         external
73         view
74         returns (bytes4)
75     {
76         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271
77         return _verifySignature(digest, signature) ? bytes4(0x1626ba7e) :
78             bytes4(0xffffffff);
79     }
80     function validateUserOp(PackedUserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32
    userOpHash, uint256)
```

```

81     external
82     view
83     returns (uint256)
84     {
85         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337
86         return _verifySignature(userOpHash, userOp.signature) ? 0 : 1;
87     }

```

```

208     function _verifySignature(bytes32 digest, bytes calldata signature)
209         internal
210         view
211         returns (bool)
212     {
213         return ECDSA.recoverCalldata(digest, signature) == address(this);
214     }

```

```

79     /// @dev Recovers the signer's address from a message digest `hash`, and the
    /// `signature`.
80     function recoverCalldata(bytes32 hash, bytes calldata signature)
81         internal
82         view
83         returns (address result)
84     {
85         /// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
86         assembly {
87             for { let m := mload(0x40) } 1 {
88                 mstore(0x00, 0x8baa579f) // `InvalidSignature()`.
89                 revert(0x1c, 0x04)
90             } {
91                 switch signature.length
92                 case 64 {
93                     let vs := calldataload(add(signature.offset, 0x20))
94                     mstore(0x20, add(shr(255, vs), 27)) // `v`.
95                     mstore(0x40, calldataload(signature.offset)) // `r`.
96                     mstore(0x60, shr(1, shl(1, vs))) // `s`.
97                 }
98                 case 65 {
99                     mstore(0x20, byte(0, calldataload(add(signature.offset,
0x40)))) // `v`.

```



```

100             calldatacopy(0x40, signature.offset, 0x40) // Copy `r` and
            `s`.
101         }
102         default { continue }
103         mstore(0x00, hash)
104         result := mload(staticcall(gas(), 1, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x20))
105         mstore(0x60, 0) // Restore the zero slot.
106         mstore(0x40, m) // Restore the free memory pointer.
107         // `returndatasize()` will be `0x20` upon success, and `0x00`
otherwise.
108         if returndatasize() { break }
109     }
110 }
111 }

```

```

@@ 1,4 @@
5
6 import {ECDSA} from "./ECDSA.sol";
7 import {IERC1271} from "../interfaces/IERC1271.sol";
8
9 /**
10  * @dev Signature verification helper that can be used instead of `ECDSA.recover`
to seamlessly support both ECDSA
11  * signatures from externally owned accounts (EOAs) as well as ERC-1271 signatures
from smart contract wallets like
12  * Argent and Safe Wallet (previously Gnosis Safe).
13  */
14 library SignatureChecker {
@@ 15,21 @@
22     function isValidSignatureNow(address signer, bytes32 hash, bytes memory
signature) internal view returns (bool) {
23         if (signer.code.length == 0) {
24             (address recovered, ECDSA.RecoverError err, ) = ECDSA.tryRecover(hash,
signature);
25             return err == ECDSA.RecoverError.NoError && recovered == signer;
26         } else {
27             return isValidERC1271SignatureNow(signer, hash, signature);
28         }
29     }
30

```



```

@@ 31,37 @@
38     function isValidERC1271SignatureNow(
39         address signer,
40         bytes32 hash,
41         bytes memory signature
42     ) internal view returns (bool) {
43         (bool success, bytes memory result) = signer.staticcall(
44             abi.encodeCall(IERC1271.isValidSignature, (hash, signature))
45         );
46         return (success &&
47             result.length >= 32 &&
48             abi.decode(result, (bytes32)) ==
49             bytes32(IERC1271.isValidSignature.selector));
50     }

```

Recommendation

Consider using OpenZeppelin's `ECDSA` library like the ERC-4337 reference implementation.

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-M2] The current implementation cannot receive ERC721, ERC1155, and other tokens due to the lack of required hooks.

Medium

Issue Description

For EOA addresses with a 7702 Delegated Address (`7702DelegatedAddress`), `eoawith7702DelegatedAddress.code.length` is 23 (the size of `0xef0100 || address`).

<https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/8008342ee834baf5d9a93b22aeb1fcae43694c7e/EIPS/eip-7702.md?plain=1#L154-L155> :

For code reading, only `CODESIZE` and `CODECOPY` instructions are affected reading. They operate directly on the executing code instead of the delegation. For example, when executing a delegated account `EXTCODESIZE` returns 23 (the size of `0xef0100 || address`) whereas `CODESIZE` returns the size of the code residing at `address` .

Note, this means during delegated execution `CODESIZE` and `CODECOPY` produce a different result compared to calling `EXTCODESIZE` and `EXTCODECOPY` on the authority.

Typical ERC721 and ERC1155 implementations check for hooks like `onERC721Received()` , `onERC1155Received()` , and `onERC1155BatchReceived()` .

To enable EOA addresses to receive ERC721, ERC1155, and other tokens, these hook functions need to be implemented.

For reference:

- The ERC-4337 reference implementation repo's Simple7702Account.sol#L16 has implemented these hooks.
- The MetaMask Delegator smart contract has implemented these hooks with an onlyProxy modifier to prevent accidental token transfers to the Delegated Address. This allows EOA addresses to receive tokens while preventing the implementation address from receiving tokens.

```
17     /**
18     * @dev Performs an acceptance check for the provided `operator` by calling
    {IERC721Receiver-onERC721Received}
```

```

19     * on the `to` address. The `operator` is generally the address that initiated
    the token transfer (i.e. `msg.sender`).
20     *
21     * The acceptance call is not executed and treated as a no-op if the target
    address doesn't contain code (i.e. an EOA).
22     * Otherwise, the recipient must implement {IERC721Receiver-onERC721Received}
    and return the acceptance magic value to accept
23     * the transfer.
24     */
25     function checkOnERC721Received(
26         address operator,
27         address from,
28         address to,
29         uint256 tokenId,
30         bytes memory data
31     ) internal {
32         if (to.code.length > 0) {
33             try IERC721Receiver(to).onERC721Received(operator, from, tokenId,
    data) returns (bytes4 retval) {
34                 if (retval != IERC721Receiver.onERC721Received.selector) {
35                     // Token rejected
36                     revert IERC721Errors.ERC721InvalidReceiver(to);
37                 }
38             } catch (bytes memory reason) {
39                 if (reason.length == 0) {
40                     // non-IERC721Receiver implementer
41                     revert IERC721Errors.ERC721InvalidReceiver(to);
42                 } else {
43                     assembly ("memory-safe") {
44                         revert(add(32, reason), mload(reason))
45                     }
46                 }
47             }
48         }
49     }

```

```

184     /**
185     * @dev Version of {_update} that performs the token acceptance check by
    calling
186     * {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155Received} or
    {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155BatchReceived} on the receiver address if it

```

```

187     * contains code (eg. is a smart contract at the moment of execution).
188     *
189     * IMPORTANT: Overriding this function is discouraged because it poses a
190     * reentrancy risk from the receiver. So any
191     * update to the contract state after this function would break the
192     * check-effect-interaction pattern. Consider
193     * overriding {_update} instead.
194     */
195     function _updateWithAcceptanceCheck(
196         address from,
197         address to,
198         uint256[] memory ids,
199         uint256[] memory values,
200         bytes memory data
201     ) internal virtual {
202         _update(from, to, ids, values);
203         if (to != address(0)) {
204             address operator = _msgSender();
205             if (ids.length == 1) {
206                 uint256 id = ids.unsafeMemoryAccess(0);
207                 uint256 value = values.unsafeMemoryAccess(0);
208                 ERC1155Utils.checkOnERC1155Received(operator, from, to, id, value,
209 data);
210             } else {
211                 ERC1155Utils.checkOnERC1155BatchReceived(operator, from, to, ids,
212 values, data);
213             }
214         }
215     }

```

```

17     /**
18     * @dev Performs an acceptance check for the provided `operator` by calling
19     * {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155Received}
20     * on the `to` address. The `operator` is generally the address that initiated
21     * the token transfer (i.e. `msg.sender`).
22     *
23     * The acceptance call is not executed and treated as a no-op if the target
24     * address doesn't contain code (i.e. an EOA).
25     *
26     * Otherwise, the recipient must implement
27     * {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155Received} and return the acceptance magic value to
28     * accept

```

```

23     * the transfer.
24     */
25     function checkOnERC1155Received(
26         address operator,
27         address from,
28         address to,
29         uint256 id,
30         uint256 value,
31         bytes memory data
32     ) internal {
33         if (to.code.length > 0) {
34             try IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id, value,
35 data) returns (bytes4 response) {
36                 if (response != IERC1155Receiver.onERC1155Received.selector) {
37                     // Tokens rejected
38                     revert IERC1155Errors.ERC1155InvalidReceiver(to);
39                 }
40             } catch (bytes memory reason) {
41                 if (reason.length == 0) {
42                     // non-IERC1155Receiver implementer
43                     revert IERC1155Errors.ERC1155InvalidReceiver(to);
44                 } else {
45                     assembly ("memory-safe") {
46                         revert(add(32, reason), mload(reason))
47                     }
48                 }
49             }
50         }
51     }
52     /**
53     * @dev Performs a batch acceptance check for the provided `operator` by
54     calling {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155BatchReceived}
55     * on the `to` address. The `operator` is generally the address that initiated
56     the token transfer (i.e. `msg.sender`).
57     *
58     * The acceptance call is not executed and treated as a no-op if the target
59     address doesn't contain code (i.e. an EOA).
60     *
61     * Otherwise, the recipient must implement
62     {IERC1155Receiver-onERC1155Received} and return the acceptance magic value to
63     accept
64     * the transfer.
65     */

```

```

60     function checkOnERC1155BatchReceived(
61         address operator,
62         address from,
63         address to,
64         uint256[] memory ids,
65         uint256[] memory values,
66         bytes memory data
67     ) internal {
68         if (to.code.length > 0) {
69             try IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155BatchReceived(operator, from, ids,
70 values, data) returns (
71         bytes4 response
72         ) {
73             if (response != IERC1155Receiver.onERC1155BatchReceived.selector)
74 {
75                 // Tokens rejected
76                 revert IERC1155Errors.ERC1155InvalidReceiver(to);
77             }
78         } catch (bytes memory reason) {
79             if (reason.length == 0) {
80                 // non-IERC1155Receiver implementer
81                 revert IERC1155Errors.ERC1155InvalidReceiver(to);
82             } else {
83                 assembly ("memory-safe") {
84                     revert(add(32, reason), mload(reason))
85                 }
86             }
87         }
88     }

```

Simple7702Account.sol

```

1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2  pragma solidity ^0.8.28;
3
4  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/introspection/IERC165.sol";
5  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC1271.sol";
6  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/utils/ERC1155Holder.sol";
7  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/utils/ERC721Holder.sol";
8  import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";

```

```

9  import "../core/Helpers.sol";
10 import "../core/BaseAccount.sol";
11
12 /**
13  * Simple7702Account.sol
14  * A minimal account to be used with EIP-7702 (for batching) and ERC-4337 (for gas
   sponsoring)
15  */
16 contract Simple7702Account is BaseAccount, IERC165, IERC1271, ERC1155Holder,
   ERC721Holder {
17     @@ 17,65 @@
66 }

```

EIP7702StatelessDeleGator/src/EIP7702/EIP7702DeleGatorCore.sol

```

102  /**
103   * @dev Prevents direct calls to the implementation.
104   * @dev Check that the execution is being performed through a delegatecall
   call.
105   */
106   modifier onlyProxy() {
107       if (address(this) == __self) revert UnauthorizedCallContext();
108       _;
109   }

```

EIP7702StatelessDeleGator/src/EIP7702/EIP7702DeleGatorCore.sol

```

323  /// @inheritdoc IERC721Receiver
324  function onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes memory) external
   view override onlyProxy returns (bytes4) {
325      return this.onERC721Received.selector;
326  }
327
328  /// @inheritdoc IERC1155Receiver
329  function onERC1155Received(
330      address,
331      address,
332      uint256,
333      uint256,

```



```

334     bytes memory
335 )
336     external
337     view
338     override
339     onlyProxy
340     returns (bytes4)
341 {
342     return this.onERC1155Received.selector;
343 }
344
345 /// @inheritdoc IERC1155Receiver
346 function onERC1155BatchReceived(
347     address,
348     address,
349     uint256[] memory,
350     uint256[] memory,
351     bytes memory
352 )
353     external
354     view
355     override
356     onlyProxy
357     returns (bytes4)
358 {
359     return this.onERC1155BatchReceived.selector;
360 }

```

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-M3] `execute()` SHOULD REVERT when `modeSelector != EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT` && `modeSelector != EXEC_MODE_OP_DATA`

Medium

Issue Description

According to `supportsExecutionMode()` L67 - L69, Delegation only supports two `modeSelector` values: `EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT` (0x00000000) and `EXEC_MODE_OP_DATA` (0x78210001).

However, in the `execute()` function, when `modeSelector != EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT`, there is no additional check on the `modeSelector`. It processes any non- `EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT` (0x00000000) `modeSelector` using the same logic as `EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT` (0x00000000).

Notes:

- According to <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#overview>, different `mode` values require different encoding formats for `executionData`.
- The Reference Implementation at <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#reference-implementation> shows that `execute()` should `revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();` when encountering an invalid mode.

```

19  contract Delegation is IERC7821, IERC1271, IERC4337, EIP712 {
    @@ 20,52 @@
53
54    receive() external payable {}
55
56    function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
    {
57        _execute(mode, executionData, false);
58    }
59
60    function supportsExecutionMode(bytes32 mode) external pure returns (bool) {
61        (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
        _decodeExecutionMode(mode);
62
63        if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
64            return false;

```

```

65     }
66
67     if (modeSelector != EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT && modeSelector !=
EXEC_MODE_OP_DATA) {
68         return false;
69     }
70
71     return true;
72 }
73
@@ 74,121 @@
122
123     function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
124         internal
125     {
126         (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
_decodeExecutionMode(mode);
127
128         if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
129             revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
130         }
131
132         Call[] calldata calls = _decodeCalls(executionData);
133
134         if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {
135             // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821
136             // If `opData` is empty, the implementation SHOULD require that
`msg.sender` ==
137             // `address(this)`.
138             // If `msg.sender` is an authorized entry point, then `execute` MAY
accept calls from
139             // the entry point.
140             if (msg.sender != address(this) && msg.sender != ENTRY_POINT_V8 &&
!allowUnauthorized) {
141                 revert Unauthorized();
142             }
143
144             _executeCalls(calls);
145         } else {
146             bytes calldata opData = _decodeOpData(executionData);
147             bytes calldata signature = _decodeSignature(opData);

```

```

148
149         uint256 nonce = _getAndUseNonce(_decodeNonceKey(opData));
150         bytes32 digest = _computeDigest(mode, calls, nonce);
151
152         // If `opData` is not empty, the implementation SHOULD use the
signature encoded in
153         // `opData` to determine if the caller can perform the execution.
154         if (!_verifySignature(digest, signature) && !allowUnauthorized) {
155             revert Unauthorized();
156         }
157
158         _executeCalls(calls);
159     }
160 }
161
@@ 162,287 @@
288
289     function _decodeExecutionMode(bytes32 mode)
290         internal
291         pure
292         returns (bytes1 calltype, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector, bytes22
modePayload)
293     {
294         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7579
295         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821
296         assembly {
297             calltype := mode
298             execType := shl(8, mode)
299             modeSelector := shl(48, mode)
300             modePayload := shl(80, mode)
301         }
302     }
303
@@ 304,312 @@
313 }

```

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-M4] `Delegation.execute()` should handle the `calls[i].to == address(0)` properly

Medium

Issue Description

According to <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#overview> and <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#replacing-address0-with-addressthis>, setting `Call.to` to `address(0)` can represent `address(this)` for calldata compression optimization.

The Reference Implementation at <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#reference-implementation> uses `address to = c.to == address(0) ? address(this) : c.to;` in its `_execute(Call[] memory calls)` function.

```

56     function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
    {
57         _execute(mode, executionData, false);
58     }

```

```

123     function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
124         internal
125     {
126         (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
_decodeExecutionMode(mode);
127
128         if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
129             revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
130         }
131
132         Call[] calldata calls = _decodeCalls(executionData);
133
134         if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {
135             // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821
136             // If `opData` is empty, the implementation SHOULD require that
`msg.sender` ==
137             // address(this)`.
138             // If `msg.sender` is an authorized entry point, then `execute` MAY
accept calls from

```

```

139         // the entry point.
140         if (msg.sender != address(this) && msg.sender != ENTRY_POINT_V8 &&
!allowUnauthorized) {
141             revert Unauthorized();
142         }
143
144         _executeCalls(calls);
145     } else {
146         bytes calldata opData = _decodeOpData(executionData);
147         bytes calldata signature = _decodeSignature(opData);
148
149         uint256 nonce = _getAndUseNonce(_decodeNonceKey(opData));
150         bytes32 digest = _computeDigest(mode, calls, nonce);
151
152         // If `opData` is not empty, the implementation SHOULD use the
signature encoded in
153         // `opData` to determine if the caller can perform the execution.
154         if (!_verifySignature(digest, signature) && !allowUnauthorized) {
155             revert Unauthorized();
156         }
157
158         _executeCalls(calls);
159     }
160 }
161
162 function _executeCalls(Call[] calldata calls) internal {
163     for (uint256 i = 0; i < calls.length; i++) {
164         (bool success, bytes memory data) =
165             calls[i].to.call{value: calls[i].value}(calls[i].data);
166
167         if (!success) {
168             assembly {
169                 revert(add(data, 0x20), mload(data))
170             }
171         }
172     }
173 }
174
175 function _decodeCalls(bytes calldata executionData)
176     internal
177     pure
178     returns (Call[] calldata calls)
179 {

```

```
180      // If `opData` is empty, `executionData` is simply `abi.encode(calls)`.
181      // We decode this from calldata rather than abi.decode which avoids a
    memory copy
182      assembly {
183          let offset := add(executionData.offset,
    calldataload(executionData.offset))
184          calls.offset := add(offset, 0x20)
185          calls.length := calldataload(offset)
186      }
187  }
```

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-M5] The `validateUserOp()` implementation in the `Delegation` contract does not comply with the ERC-4337 specification for `IAccount.validateUserOp()`, which may lead to an unexpected revert: "AA21 didn't pay prefund."

Medium

Issue Description

<https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337#smart-contract-account-interface>

The current implementation only checks the signature, but the specification requires:

<https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/080f189cebda98c0f2aacf027f845992757fa09d/ERCs/erc-4337.md?plain=1#L135-L144>

```

119  ### Smart Contract Account Interface
120
121  The core interface required for the Smart Contract Account to have is:
122
123  ```solidity
124  interface IAccount {
125      function validateUserOp
126          (PackedUserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 userOpHash, uint256
127           missingAccountFunds)
128          external returns (uint256 validationData);
129  }
130  ```
131
132  The `userOpHash` is a hash over the `userOp` (except `signature`), `entryPoint`
133  and `chainId`.
134
135  The Smart Contract Account:
136
137  * MUST validate the caller is a trusted `EntryPoint`
138  * MUST validate that the signature is a valid signature of the `userOpHash`, and
139  SHOULD return `SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED` (`1`) without reverting on signature
140  mismatch. Any other error MUST revert.
141
142  * SHOULD not return early when returning `SIG_VALIDATION_FAILED` (`1`). Instead,
143  it SHOULD complete the normal flow to enable performing a gas estimation for the
144  validation function.

```



```

139 * MUST pay the `EntryPoint` (caller) at least the `missingAccountFunds` (which
140 * The `sender` MAY pay more than this minimum to cover future transactions. It can
141 * also call `withdrawTo` to retrieve it later at any time.
142 * The return value MUST be packed of `aggregator`/`authorizer`, `validUntil` and
143 * `validAfter` timestamps.
144 * `aggregator`/`authorizer` - 0 for valid signature, 1 to mark signature
145 * failure. Otherwise, an address of an `aggregator`/`authorizer` contract, as
146 * defined in [ERC-7766](./eip-7766.md).
147 * `validUntil` is 6-byte timestamp value, or zero for "infinite". The
148 * `UserOperation` is valid only up to this time.
149 * `validAfter` is 6-byte timestamp. The `UserOperation` is valid only after this
150 * time.
151
152 The Smart Contract Account MAY implement the interface `IAccountExecute`
153
154 ```solidity
155 interface IAccountExecute {
156     function executeUserOp(PackedUserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 userOpHash)
157     external;
158 }
159 ```
160
161 This method will be called by the `EntryPoint` with the current UserOperation,
162 instead of executing the `callData` itself directly on the `sender`.

```

For example, if `validateUserOp(PackedUserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32 userOpHash, uint256 missingAccountFunds)` doesn't pay for the `missingAccountFunds`, it would prevent the UserOperation from being executed. see `EntryPoint.sol` L555-557

Reference Implementation:

<https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337#reference-implementation> <https://github.com/eth-infinitism/account-abstraction/blob/v0.8.0/contracts/core/BaseAccount.sol#L80-L89>

```

13 /**
14  * Basic account implementation.
15  * This contract provides the basic logic for implementing the IAccount interface
16  * - validateUserOp
17  * Specific account implementation should inherit it and provide the
18  * account-specific logic.

```

```

17  */
18  abstract contract BaseAccount is IAccount {
19  @@ 19,77 @@
78
79  /// @inheritdoc IAccount
80  function validateUserOp(
81      PackedUserOperation calldata userOp,
82      bytes32 userOpHash,
83      uint256 missingAccountFunds
84  ) external virtual override returns (uint256 validationData) {
85      _requireFromEntryPoint();
86      validationData = _validateSignature(userOp, userOpHash);
87      _validateNonce(userOp.nonce);
88      _payPrefund(missingAccountFunds);
89  }
90
91  /**
92   * Ensure the request comes from the known entrypoint.
93   */
94  function _requireFromEntryPoint() internal view virtual {
95      require(
96          msg.sender == address(entryPoint()),
97          "account: not from EntryPoint"
98      );
99  }
100
101  @@ 101,141 @@
142
143  /**
144   * Sends to the entrypoint (msg.sender) the missing funds for this
145   * transaction.
146   * SubClass MAY override this method for better funds management
147   * (e.g. send to the entryPoint more than the minimum required, so that in
148   * future transactions
149   * it will not be required to send again).
150   * @param missingAccountFunds - The minimum value this method should send the
151   * entrypoint.
152   * This value MAY be zero, in case there is
153   * enough deposit,
154   * or the userOp has a paymaster.
155   */
156  function _payPrefund(uint256 missingAccountFunds) internal virtual {

```

```

153         if (missingAccountFunds != 0) {
154             (bool success,) = payable(msg.sender).call{
155                 value: missingAccountFunds
156             }("");
157             (success);
158             // Ignore failure (its EntryPoint's job to verify, not account.)
159         }
160     }
161 }

```

```

1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2  pragma solidity ^0.8.29;
3
4  // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337
5  interface IERC4337 {
6      struct PackedUserOperation {
7          address sender;
8          uint256 nonce;
9          bytes initCode;
10         bytes callData;
11         bytes32 accountGasLimits;
12         uint256 preVerificationGas;
13         bytes32 gasFees;
14         bytes paymasterAndData;
15         bytes signature;
16     }
17
18     function validateUserOp(
19         PackedUserOperation calldata userOp,
20         bytes32 userOpHash,
21         uint256 missingAccountFunds
22     ) external returns (uint256);
23 }

```

```

@@ 1,5 @@
6  import {IERC4337} from "./interfaces/IERC4337.sol";
@@ 7,17 @@

```

```

18
19 contract Delegation is IERC7821, IERC1271, IERC4337, EIP712 {
20 @@ 20,81 @@
82
83     function validateUserOp(PackedUserOperation calldata userOp, bytes32
84     userOpHash, uint256)
85         external
86         view
87         returns (uint256)
88     {
89         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337
90         return _verifySignature(userOpHash, userOp.signature) ? 0 : 1;
91     }
92 @@ 92,218 @@
219
220     function _verifySignature(bytes32 digest, bytes calldata signature)
221         internal
222         view
223         returns (bool)
224     {
225         // If `signature` length is 64 or 65, treat it as secp256k1 signature
226         if (signature.length == 64 || signature.length == 65) {
227             return ECDSA.recoverCalldata(digest, signature) == address(this);
228         }
229
230         // `data` is `abi.encode(keyHash, signature)`.
231         bytes32 keyHash;
232         assembly {
233             keyHash := calldataload(signature.offset)
234
235             let offset := add(signature.offset, calldataload(add(signature.offset,
236             0x20)))
237             signature.offset := add(offset, 0x20)
238             signature.length := calldataload(offset)
239         }
240
241         bytes storage pubkey = _getStorage().pubkey[keyHash];
242
243         (bytes32 x, bytes32 y) = P256.tryDecodePoint(pubkey);
244
245         return WebAuthn.verify(

```

```

245         abi.encode(digest), false,
WebAuthn.tryDecodeAuthCompactCalldata(signature), x, y
246     );
247 }
248
@@ 249,312 @@
313 }

```

```

520 /**
521  * Call account.validateUserOp.
522  * Revert (with FailedOp) in case validateUserOp reverts, or account didn't
send required prefund.
523  * Decrement account's deposit if needed.
524  * @param opIndex - The operation index.
525  * @param op - The user operation.
526  * @param opInfo - The operation info.
527  * @param requiredPrefund - The required prefund amount.
528  * @return validationData - The account's validationData.
529  */
530 function _validateAccountPrepayment(
531     uint256 opIndex,
532     PackedUserOperation calldata op,
533     UserOpInfo memory opInfo,
534     uint256 requiredPrefund
535 )
536 internal virtual
537 returns (
538     uint256 validationData
539 )
540 {
541     unchecked {
542         MemoryUserOp memory mUserOp = opInfo.mUserOp;
543         address sender = mUserOp.sender;
544         _createSenderIfNeeded(opIndex, opInfo, op.initCode);
545         address paymaster = mUserOp.paymaster;
546         uint256 missingAccountFunds = 0;
547         if (paymaster == address(0)) {
548             uint256 bal = balanceOf(sender);
549             missingAccountFunds = bal > requiredPrefund
550             ? 0

```

```
551         : requiredPrefund - bal;
552     }
553     validationData = _callValidateUserOp(opIndex, op, opInfo,
missingAccountFunds);
554     if (paymaster == address(0)) {
555         if (!_tryDecrementDeposit(sender, requiredPrefund)) {
556             revert FailedOp(opIndex, "AA21 didn't pay prefund");
557         }
558     }
559 }
560 }
```

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-L6] Consider adding a no-op `fallback()` external payable to make EOA addresses set as 7702 Delegated Address behave more like regular EOA addresses

Low

Issue Description

Regular EOA addresses do not revert on any calldata.

The current implementation reverts on inbound transactions with calldata (e.g., sending messages).

For reference, Simple7702Account.solL60-62 in the ERC-4337 reference implementation repo has such a `fallback()` external payable .

```

11  @@ 1,10 @@
12  /**
13   * Simple7702Account.sol
14   * A minimal account to be used with EIP-7702 (for batching) and ERC-4337 (for gas
   sponsoring)
15   */
16  contract Simple7702Account is BaseAccount, IERC165, IERC1271, ERC1155Holder,
   ERC721Holder {
17  @@ 17,58 @@
59
60     // accept incoming calls (with or without value), to mimic an EOA.
61     fallback() external payable {
62     }
63
64     receive() external payable {
65     }
66 }
```



Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-L7] When `mode` is `0x010000000000078210001...`, `opData` is optional, but `_execute()` does not handle the case when `opData` is missing.

Low

Issue Description

According to <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#overview> and <https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821#optional-encoding-of-opdata-in-executiondata>, `0x010000000000078210001...` Single batch mode supports *optional* `opData`.

```
/// Authorization checks:
/// - If `opData` is empty, the implementation SHOULD require that
///   `msg.sender == address(this)`.
```

The Reference Implementation at L77-L83 first checks if `opData` exists, then at L86-L90 only decodes `executionData` as `(Call[], bytes)` when `opData` is present.

Delegation.sol

```
56     function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
    {
57         _execute(mode, executionData, false);
58     }
```

Delegation.sol

```
123     function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
124         internal
125     {
126         (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
_decodeExecutionMode(mode);
127
128         if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
```

```

129         revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
130     }
131
132     Call[] calldata calls = _decodeCalls(executionData);
133
134     if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {
135         // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821
136         // If `opData` is empty, the implementation SHOULD require that
137         // `msg.sender` ==
138         // address(this).
139         // If `msg.sender` is an authorized entry point, then `execute` MAY
140         // accept calls from
141         // the entry point.
142         if (msg.sender != address(this) && msg.sender != ENTRY_POINT_V8 &&
143             !allowUnauthorized) {
144             revert Unauthorized();
145         }
146         _executeCalls(calls);
147     } else {
148         bytes calldata opData = _decodeOpData(executionData);
149         bytes calldata signature = _decodeSignature(opData);
150
151         uint256 nonce = _getAndUseNonce(_decodeNonceKey(opData));
152         bytes32 digest = _computeDigest(mode, calls, nonce);
153
154         // If `opData` is not empty, the implementation SHOULD use the
155         // signature encoded in
156         // `opData` to determine if the caller can perform the execution.
157         if (!_verifySignature(digest, signature) && !allowUnauthorized) {
158             revert Unauthorized();
159         }
160         _executeCalls(calls);
161     }
162 }

```

```

189 function _decodeOpData(bytes calldata executionData)
190     internal
191     pure
192     returns (bytes calldata opData)

```

```

193     {
194         // If `opData` is not empty, `executionData` is `abi.encode(calls,
195         // We decode this from calldata rather than abi.decode which avoids a
196         // memory copy
197         assembly {
198             let offset := add(executionData.offset,
199             calldataload(add(executionData.offset, 0x20)))
200             opData.offset := add(offset, 0x20)
201             opData.length := calldataload(offset)
202         }
203     }

```

```

1  // SPDX-License-Identifier: CC0-1.0
2  pragma solidity ^0.8.4;
3
4  /// @notice Minimal batch executor mixin.
5  abstract contract ERC7821 {
6
7      @@ 6,26 @@
8
9
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50
51
52
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59
60
61
62     function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes memory executionData)
63         public
64         payable
65         virtual
66     {
67         uint256 id = _executionModeId(mode);
68         if (id == 3) {
69
70             @@ 69,73 @@
71
72
73
74             return;
75         }
76         if (id == uint256(0)) revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
77         bool tryWithOpData;
78         /// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
79         assembly {
80             let t := gt(mload(add(executionData, 0x20)), 0x3f)
81             let executionDataLength := mload(executionData)
82             tryWithOpData := and(eq(id, 2), and(gt(executionDataLength, 0x3f), t))
83         }

```

```
84     Call[] memory calls;
85     bytes memory opData;
86     if (tryWithOpData) {
87         (calls, opData) = abi.decode(executionData, (Call[], bytes));
88     } else {
89         calls = abi.decode(executionData, (Call[]));
90     }
91     _execute(calls, opData);
92 }
93
@@ 94,162 @@
163 }
```

Status

✓ Fixed

[WP-I8] After an EOA clears all storage, the nonce is reset and signatures may be subject to replay attacks

Informational

Issue Description

Consider:

- Warn users about potential impacts of clearing storage-location
erc7201:gelato.delegation.storage
- Set the version number in domain separation during initialization. Cleaning storage and reinitialization will invalidate all previous signatures

Related Info: EIP-7702 <https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/015f08bba346696a02379f1dec40cd38db38b2c9/EIPS/eip-7702.md?plain=1#L551-L553>

```
535  ### Storage management
```

```
536
```

```
537  Changing an account's delegation is a security-critical operation that should
538  not be done lightly, especially if the newly delegated code is not purposely
539  designed and tested as an upgrade to the old one.
```

```
540
```

```
541  In particular, in order to ensure a safe migration of an account from one
542  delegate contract to another, it's important for these contracts to use storage
543  in a way that avoids accidental collisions among them. For example, using
544  [ERC-7201](./eip-7201.md) a contract may root its storage layout at a slot
545  dependent on a unique identifier. To simplify this, smart contract languages may
546  provide a way of re-rooting the entire storage layout of existing contract
547  source code.
```

```
548
```

```
549  If all contracts previously delegated to by the account used the approach
550  described above, a migration should not cause any issues. However, if there is
551  any doubt, it is recommended to first clear all account storage, an operation
552  that is not natively offered by the protocol but that a special-purpose delegate
553  contract can be designed to implement.
```

```

19  contract Delegation is IERC7821, IERC1271, IERC4337, EIP712 {
    @@ 20,24 @@
25
26      // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7201
27      /// @custom:storage-location erc7201:gelato.delegation.storage
28      struct Storage {
29          mapping(uint192 => uint64) nonceSequenceNumber;
30          mapping(bytes32 => bytes) pubkey;
31      }
32
33      // keccak256(abi.encode(uint256(keccak256("gelato.delegation.storage")) - 1))
    &
34      // ~bytes32(uint256(0xff));
35      bytes32 private constant STORAGE_LOCATION =
36          0x1581abf533ae210f1ff5d25f322511179a9a65d8d8e43c998eab264f924af900;
37
    @@ 38,54 @@
55
56      function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
57      {
58          _execute(mode, executionData, false);
59      }
60
    @@ 60,121 @@
122
123      function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
124          internal
125          {
126              (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
_decodeExecutionMode(mode);
127
128              if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
129                  revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
130              }
131
132              Call[] calldata calls = _decodeCalls(executionData);
133
134              if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {

```

```

@@ 135,144 @@
145     } else {
146         bytes calldata opData = _decodeOpData(executionData);
147         bytes calldata signature = _decodeSignature(opData);
148
149         uint256 nonce = _getAndUseNonce(_decodeNonceKey(opData));
150         bytes32 digest = _computeDigest(mode, calls, nonce);
151
152         // If `opData` is not empty, the implementation SHOULD use the
signature encoded in
153         // `opData` to determine if the caller can perform the execution.
154         if (!_verifySignature(digest, signature) && !allowUnauthorized) {
155             revert Unauthorized();
156         }
157
158         _executeCalls(calls);
159     }
160 }
161
@@ 162,247 @@
248
249 function _computeDigest(bytes32 mode, Call[] calldata calls, uint256 nonce)
250     internal
251     view
252     returns (bytes32)
253 {
254     bytes32[] memory callsHashes = new bytes32[](calls.length);
255     for (uint256 i = 0; i < calls.length; i++) {
256         callsHashes[i] = keccak256(
257             abi.encode(CALL_TYPEHASH, calls[i].to, calls[i].value,
258                 keccak256(calls[i].data))
259         );
260     }
261
262     bytes32 executeHash = keccak256(
263         abi.encode(EXECUTE_TYPEHASH, mode,
264             keccak256(abi.encodePacked(callsHashes)), nonce)
265     );
266
267     return _hashTypedData(executeHash);
268 }

```

```
268     function _getAndUseNonce(uint192 key) internal returns (uint256) {
269         uint64 seq = _getStorage().nonceSequenceNumber[key];
270         _getStorage().nonceSequenceNumber[key]++;
271         return _encodeNonce(key, seq);
272     }
273
274 @@ 274,302 @@
275
303
304     function _domainNameAndVersion()
305         internal
306         pure
307         override
308         returns (string memory name, string memory version)
309     {
310         name = "GelatoDelegation";
311         version = "0.0.1";
312     }
313 }
```

Status

 Acknowledged

[WP-D9] Consider documenting the source of ENTRY_POINT_V8 address

Issue Description

Given the high privileges of ENTRY_POINT_V8 (ability to make arbitrary calls as wallet without signature), its address correctness is critical for wallet security. Consider explicitly documenting its source for user verification.

For example, consider referencing <https://github.com/ethereum/ERCs/blob/9f18295f250a18a33eac52c8ea60b0516eb6d4b8/ERCs/erc-4337.md?plain=1#L581-L583>, <https://github.com/eth-infinitism/account-abstraction/releases/tag/v0.8.0>, and <https://github.com/eth-infinitism/account-abstraction/blob/v0.8.0/README.md?plain=1#L76>

```

53     function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
54     {
55         _execute(mode, executionData, false);

```

```

111     function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
112     internal
113     {
114         (bytes1 callType, bytes1 execType, bytes4 modeSelector,) =
_decodeExecutionMode(mode);
115
116         if (callType != CALL_TYPE_BATCH || execType != EXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
117             revert UnsupportedExecutionMode();
118         }
119
120         Call[] calldata calls = _decodeCalls(executionData);
121
122         if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {
123             // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7821
124             // If `opData` is empty, the implementation SHOULD require that
`msg.sender` ==
125             // address(this)`.
126             // If `msg.sender` is an authorized entry point, then `execute` MAY
accept calls from

```

```

127         // the entry point.
128         if (msg.sender != address(this) && msg.sender != ENTRY_POINT_V8 &&
!allowUnauthorized) {
129             revert Unauthorized();
130         }
131
132         _executeCalls(calls);
133     } else {
@@ 134,146 @@
147     }
148 }
149
150 function _executeCalls(Call[] calldata calls) internal {
151     for (uint256 i = 0; i < calls.length; i++) {
152         (bool success, bytes memory data) =
153             calls[i].to.call{value: calls[i].value}(calls[i].data);
154
155         if (!success) {
156             assembly {
157                 revert(add(data, 0x20), mload(data))
158             }
159         }
160     }
161 }

```

```

11 // https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4337
12 address constant ENTRY_POINT_V8 = 0x4337084D9E255Ff0702461CF8895CE9E3b5Ff108;

```

Status

✓ Fixed



[WP-I10] Consider implementing ERC-7739: Readable Typed Signatures for Smart Accounts

Informational

Issue Description

When the EOA address is also the owner of other smart contracts that implement ERC-1271, the same signature will be considered valid for all these smart contracts. See also: <https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/erc-7739-readable-typed-signatures-for-smart-accounts/20513>

As a reference, Uniswap's Calibur MinimalDelegation implemented ERC-7739: <https://github.com/Uniswap/calibur/blob/main/src/MinimalDelegation.sol#L46>

Status

📄 Acknowledged

[WP-I11] In cases of invalid signature length or failed recovery, `_verifySignature()` does not return false but `revert InvalidSignature()`, thus `_execute()` does not continue to check `allowUnauthorized` nor `revert Unauthorized()`

Informational

Issue Description

`ECDSA.recoverCalldata(digest, signature)` will `revert InvalidSignature()` at L89 when the signature "length is not 64/65" or when "0x01(ecRecover) Precompiled Contract's returndatasize is 0 (an address cannot be recovered or not enough gas was given)".

The current implementation might be intentional, based on the observations:

- `allowUnauthorized` is only set to true in `Simulation.sol`
- Using different custom errors for invalid signature and signature mismatch makes it easier to identify the revert reason

If it is *indeed* necessary to check `allowUnauthorized` or `revert Unauthorized()` when signature invalid, consider using OpenZeppelin's `ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32 hash, bytes memory signature)`.

```

53     function execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData) external payable
54     {
55         _execute(mode, executionData, false);

```

```

111     function _execute(bytes32 mode, bytes calldata executionData, bool
allowUnauthorized)
112     internal
113     {
    @@ 114,120 @@
121
122     if (modeSelector == EXEC_MODE_DEFAULT) {

```

```

@@ 123,132 @@
133         } else {
134             bytes calldata opData = _decodeOpData(executionData);
135             bytes calldata signature = _decodeSignature(opData);
136
137             uint256 nonce = _getAndUseNonce(_decodeNonceKey(opData));
138             bytes32 digest = _computeDigest(mode, calls, nonce);
139
140             // If `opData` is not empty, the implementation SHOULD use the
signature encoded in
141             // `opData` to determine if the caller can perform the execution.
142             if (!_verifySignature(digest, signature) && !allowUnauthorized) {
143                 revert Unauthorized();
144             }
145
146             _executeCalls(calls);
147         }
148     }

```

```

208     function _verifySignature(bytes32 digest, bytes calldata signature)
209         internal
210         view
211         returns (bool)
212     {
213         return ECDSA.recoverCalldata(digest, signature) == address(this);
214     }

```

```

79     /// @dev Recovers the signer's address from a message digest `hash`, and the
`signature`.
80     function recoverCalldata(bytes32 hash, bytes calldata signature)
81         internal
82         view
83         returns (address result)
84     {
85         /// @solidity memory-safe-assembly
86         assembly {
87             for { let m := mload(0x40) } 1 {
88                 mstore(0x00, 0x8baa579f) // `InvalidSignature()`.
89                 revert(0x1c, 0x04)
90             } {
91                 switch signature.length

```

```

92         case 64 {
93             let vs := calldataload(add(signature.offset, 0x20))
94             mstore(0x20, add(shr(255, vs), 27)) // `v`.
95             mstore(0x40, calldataload(signature.offset)) // `r`.
96             mstore(0x60, shr(1, shl(1, vs))) // `s`.
97         }
98         case 65 {
99             mstore(0x20, byte(0, calldataload(add(signature.offset,
100 0x40)))) // `v`.
101             calldatacopy(0x40, signature.offset, 0x40) // Copy `r` and
102             `s`.
103         }
104         default { continue }
105         mstore(0x00, hash)
106         result := mload(staticcall(gas(), 1, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x20))
107         mstore(0x60, 0) // Restore the zero slot.
108         mstore(0x40, m) // Restore the free memory pointer.
109         // `returndatasize()` will be `0x20` upon success, and `0x00`
110         otherwise.
111         if returndatasize() { break }
112     }
113 }
114 }
115 }

```

Status

✓ Fixed

Appendix

Timeliness of content

The content contained in the report is current as of the date appearing on the report and is subject to change without notice, unless indicated otherwise by WatchPug; however, WatchPug does not guarantee or warrant the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any report you access using the internet or other means, and assumes no obligation to update any information following publication.



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