PasswordStore Initial Audit Report

Version 0.1

GenesisGlitch

July 14, 2024

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- [GenesisGlitch]

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Table of contents

See table

About GenesisGlitch

IT Securty guy who is intrested in Web3 and started to play with it.

Disclaimer

!! THIS IS JUST A GENERATION TEST - MOST OF REPORT IS JUST COPY PASTED. ONE OF THE POCs IS MINE.

The GenesisGlitch team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566
```

Scope

```
src/
--- PasswordStore.sol
```

Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user's passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

Roles

- Owner: Is the only one who should be able to set and access the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	1
Info	1
Gas Optimizations	0
Total	0

Findings

High

[H-1] Passwords stored on-chain are visable to anyone, not matter solidity variable visibility

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable, and only accessed through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

However, anyone can direclty read this using any number of off chain methodologies

Impact: The password is not private.

Proof of Concept: The below test case shows how anyone could read the password directly from the blockchain. We use foundry's cast tool to read directly from the storage of the contract, without being the owner.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool

We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

`0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014`

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string 0
    x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of:

```
myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` is callable by anyone

Description: The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however the documentation of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
    function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
      // @audit - There are no access controls here
        s_password = newPassword;
        emit SetNetPassword();
    }
```

Impact: Attacker can change the password stored in vault.

Proof of Concept:

Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test suite.

```
        attacker = randomAddress;
```

```
        vm.assume(attacker != owner);

        vm.startPrank(owner);
        string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
        console.log("V: ", actualPassword);
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.startPrank(attacker);
        string memory attackedPassword = "attackedPassword";
        console.log("A: ", attackedPassword);
        passwordStore.setPassword(attackedPassword);
        vm.stopPrank();

        vm.prank(owner);
        assertNotEq(actualPassword, passwordStore.getPassword());
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add access control modifier to the `setPassword` function.

```
if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

Low Risk Findings

L-01. Initialization Timeframe Vulnerability

Submitted by dianivanov.

Relevant GitHub Links

https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-10-PasswordStore/blob/main/src/PasswordStore.sol

Summary

The PasswordStore contract exhibits an initialization timeframe vulnerability. This means that there is a period between contract deployment and the explicit call to setPassword during which the password remains in its default state. It's essential to note that even after addressing this issue, the password's public visibility on the blockchain cannot be entirely mitigated, as blockchain data is inherently public as already stated in the "Storing password in blockchain" vulnerability.

Vulnerability Details

The contract does not set the password during its construction (in the constructor). As a result, when the contract is initially deployed, the password remains uninitialized, taking on the default value for a string, which is an empty string.

During this initialization timeframe, the contract's password is effectively empty and can be considered a security gap.

Impact

The impact of this vulnerability is that during the initialization timeframe, the contract's password is left empty, potentially exposing the contract to unauthorized access or unintended behavior.

Tools Used

No tools used. It was discovered through manual inspection of the contract.

Recommendations

To mitigate the initialization timeframe vulnerability, consider setting a password value during the contract's deployment (in the constructor). This initial value can be passed in the constructor parameters.

[I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect

Description:

```
1     /*
2      * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3      * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4      */
5     function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
```

The protocol documentation for the function `PasswordStore::getPassword` indicates it should have a parameter with the signature `getPassword(string)`. However, the actual function signature is `getPassword()`.

Impact: The documenation is incorrect.

Recommended Mitigation: Correct documentation.

```
-     * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```