

A Online Supporting Materials

This is the Online Appendix of “Can University Education Cultivate Immigrant Integration?
The Case of Local Enfranchisement of Foreign Residents in Japan.”

A.1 Detailed regression tables for main results

Table A.1: Education and the Support for Foreigner’s Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	−0.990 (0.108)***	−1.258 (0.141)***
University Education	0.338 (0.077)***	0.061 (0.114)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.079 (0.085)	0.215 (0.104)*
Elder (>=60s)	−0.049 (0.110)	0.364 (0.095)***
University*Middle Aged	−0.241 (0.101)*	0.017 (0.130)
University*Elder	0.142 (0.101)	0.007 (0.118)
Knowledge	−0.191 (0.061)**	−0.157 (0.089) [†]
Political Interest	0.227 (0.107)*	0.172 (0.071)*
Employed	0.093 (0.045)*	0.066 (0.057)
Economic Evaluation	0.370 (0.107)***	0.175 (0.077)*
Income	−0.007 (0.071)	0.151 (0.069)*
Length of Residence	0.003 (0.068)	−0.195 (0.071)**
AIC	12437.805	19485.290
BIC	12668.327	19731.706
Log Likelihood	−6186.902	−9710.645
Deviance	12373.805	19421.290
Num. obs.	9935	16326

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident’s local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.2: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, UTAS)

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.228 (0.204)	−0.007 (0.172)
University Education	0.520 (0.173)**	0.081 (0.183)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	−0.151 (0.195)	0.282 (0.188)
Elder (≥ 60 s)	−0.427 (0.198)*	0.004 (0.170)
University*Middle Aged	−0.236 (0.382)	0.033 (0.214)
University*Elder	−0.495 (0.278) [†]	−0.031 (0.209)
Knowledge	−0.076 (0.221)	−0.198 (0.211)
Employed	−0.027 (0.110)	0.127 (0.109)
Economic Evaluation	−0.434 (0.241) [†]	−0.633 (0.207)**
AIC	2365.709	2888.057
BIC	2425.888	2950.292
Log Likelihood	−1171.854	−1433.028
Deviance	2343.709	2866.057
Num. obs.	1756	2117

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

A.2 Detailed regression tables for main results utilizing full set of responses

A.3 Using OLS

All wave/year fixed effects are omitted from the table.

Table A.3: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (OLS Regression, SIFCCT)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	0.513 (0.017)***	0.453 (0.020)***
University Education	0.028 (0.011)**	−0.002 (0.016)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.017 (0.013)	0.036 (0.013)**
Elder (>=60s)	−0.004 (0.016)	0.066 (0.012)***
University*Middle Aged	−0.026 (0.016) [†]	0.015 (0.014)
University*Elder	0.045 (0.016)**	0.015 (0.016)
Knowledge	−0.129 (0.010)***	−0.123 (0.012)***
Political Interest	−0.063 (0.016)***	−0.074 (0.014)***
Employed	0.016 (0.008)*	0.016 (0.010)
Economic Evaluation	0.071 (0.019)***	0.040 (0.013)**
Income	0.001 (0.011)	0.023 (0.012) [†]
Length of Residence	−0.018 (0.012)	−0.045 (0.011)***
R ²	0.031	0.021
Adj. R ²	0.028	0.019
Num. obs.	9935	16326
RMSE	0.312	0.344

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by OLS regression, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.4: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (OLS Regression, UTAS)

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.679 (0.025)***	0.634 (0.029)***
University Education	0.046 (0.024) [†]	0.015 (0.027)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.009 (0.029)	0.056 (0.029) [†]
Elder (≥ 60 s)	-0.032 (0.028)	0.022 (0.031)
University*Middle Aged	-0.060 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.033)
University*Elder	-0.087 (0.043)*	-0.032 (0.035)
Knowledge	-0.067 (0.034) [†]	-0.103 (0.035)**
Employed	-0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.021)
Economic Evaluation	-0.084 (0.036)*	-0.091 (0.029)**
R ²	0.029	0.033
Adj. R ²	0.024	0.029
Num. obs.	1756	2117
RMSE	0.269	0.310

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by OLS regression, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

A.3.1 Using Ordered Logit

All wave/year fixed effects are omitted from the table.

Table A.5: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Ordered Logit, SIFCCT)

	Female	Male
University Education	0.179 (0.063)**	-0.011 (0.087)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.100 (0.069)	0.207 (0.066)**
Elder (≥ 60 s)	-0.020 (0.088)	0.379 (0.063)***
University*Middle Aged	-0.163 (0.090) [†]	0.075 (0.077)
University*Elder	0.246 (0.091)**	0.079 (0.084)
Knowledge	-0.687 (0.060)***	-0.636 (0.060)***
Political Interest	-0.302 (0.097)**	-0.432 (0.079)***
Employed	0.088 (0.045) [†]	0.092 (0.055) [†]
Economic Evaluation	0.420 (0.107)***	0.232 (0.071)**
Income	0.010 (0.061)	0.124 (0.063)*
Length of Residence	-0.093 (0.069)	-0.237 (0.058)***
AIC	29599.813	48205.913
BIC	29851.947	48475.431
Log Likelihood	-14764.907	-24067.956
Deviance	29529.813	48135.913
Num. obs.	9935	16326

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by ordered logit through `polr` function in `MASS`.

Table A.6: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Ordered Logit, UTAS)

	Female	Male
University Education	0.386 (0.161)*	0.090 (0.162)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.003 (0.189)	0.311 (0.169) [†]
Elder (>=60s)	-0.270 (0.186)	0.114 (0.175)
University*Middle Aged	-0.388 (0.369)	-0.121 (0.186)
University*Elder	-0.636 (0.293)*	-0.165 (0.203)
Knowledge	-0.361 (0.240)	-0.569 (0.213)**
Employed	-0.069 (0.100)	0.104 (0.114)
Economic Evaluation	-0.561 (0.225)*	-0.555 (0.167)***
AIC	4994.050	6470.418
BIC	5070.641	6549.627
Log Likelihood	-2483.025	-3221.209
Deviance	4966.050	6442.418
Num. obs.	1756	2117

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by ordered logit through `polr` function in `MASS`.

Table A.7: Brant Test for Ordered Logit Models

	Female (SIFCCT)	Male (SIFCCT)	Female (UTAS)	Male (UTAS)
Omnibus	703.707***	830.004***	72.553***	63.106***
University*Age Category	105.148***	84.974***	43.096***	23.608 [†]
Knowledge	175.761***	191.000***	18.708***	16.901***
Political Interest	169.687***	300.556***		
Employed	0.946	1.496	3.213	2.039
Economic Evaluation	7.787 [†]	29.761***	2.169	4.020
Income	4.311	5.076		
Length of Residence	8.715*	4.938		
SIFCCT Waves	62.697	56.329		
UTAS Years			3.492	14.141*

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Null Hypothesis is H0: parallel regression assumption holds.

A.3.2 Using Proportional Odds Models

Brant test result in ordered logit suggests that proportional odds assumption may not hold for most of the variables. We thus partially relax the proportional odds assumption for variables except for employment status and wave/year fixed effects (which turn out not to severely violate the parallel regression assumptions according to the brant test). All wave/year fixed effects are omitted from the table.

Table A.8: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Female, SIFCCT):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Relaxed.

	1—2	2—3	3—4	4—5
(Intercept)	2.109*** (0.138)	1.433*** (0.128)	−1.085*** (0.127)	−2.707*** (0.181)
University Education	0.138 (0.094)	−0.036 (0.085)	0.331*** (0.085)	0.216 (0.139)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.286** (0.104)	0.109 (0.093)	0.074 (0.093)	−0.305† (0.161)
Elder (>=60s)	0.230* (0.104)	−0.081 (0.094)	−0.056 (0.097)	−0.497** (0.171)
University*Middle Aged	−0.200 (0.122)	−0.079 (0.110)	−0.236* (0.110)	−0.017 (0.189)
University*Elder	0.277* (0.137)	0.417*** (0.123)	0.153 (0.124)	0.186 (0.217)
Knowledge	−1.188*** (0.085)	−1.035*** (0.076)	−0.211** (0.077)	0.023 (0.131)
Political Interest	−1.069*** (0.101)	−0.720*** (0.089)	0.229** (0.088)	0.571*** (0.153)
Economic Evaluation	0.523*** (0.100)	0.439*** (0.090)	0.388*** (0.091)	0.030 (0.153)
Length of Residence	−0.226** (0.076)	−0.114† (0.069)	0.002 (0.069)	−0.038 (0.117)
AIC	29058.936			
BIC	29505.573			
Log Likelihood	−14467.468			
Num. obs.	9935			

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in `VGAM` package of R.

Table A.9: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Female, SIFCCT):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Retained.

	Proportional Odds Coefficients
Employed	0.094 (0.038)*
Income	0.013 (0.068)
AIC	29058.936
BIC	29505.573
Log Likelihood	-14467.468
Num. obs.	9935

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in `VGAM` package of R.

Table A.10: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Male, SIFCCT):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Relaxed.

	1—2	2—3	3—4	4—5
(Intercept)	1.551*** (0.120)	0.855*** (0.116)	-1.329*** (0.125)	-2.859*** (0.172)
University Education	-0.013 (0.081)	-0.042 (0.078)	0.044 (0.090)	-0.113 (0.132)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.292** (0.092)	0.218* (0.089)	0.199* (0.100)	-0.243 (0.154)
Elder (>=60s)	0.504*** (0.093)	0.338*** (0.090)	0.354*** (0.101)	-0.206 (0.152)
University*Middle Aged	0.047 (0.102)	0.077 (0.098)	0.034 (0.111)	0.227 (0.169)
University*Elder	0.081 (0.103)	0.108 (0.100)	0.025 (0.112)	0.196 (0.170)
Knowledge	-1.019*** (0.067)	-0.906*** (0.063)	-0.187** (0.068)	0.032 (0.108)
Political Interest	-1.038*** (0.072)	-0.734*** (0.068)	0.194** (0.074)	0.929*** (0.121)
Economic Evaluation	0.317*** (0.067)	0.294*** (0.065)	0.215** (0.071)	-0.199 [†] (0.107)
Length of Residence	-0.279*** (0.051)	-0.220*** (0.050)	-0.208*** (0.055)	-0.313*** (0.087)
AIC	47458.983			
BIC	47936.415			
Log Likelihood	-23667.492			
Num. obs.	16326			

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vg1m` function in `VGAM` package of R.

Table A.11: Education and the Support for Foreigner’s Local Suffrage (Male, SIFCCT):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Retained.

	Proportional Odds Coefficients
Employed	0.097 (0.042)*
Income	0.127 (0.055)*
AIC	47458.983
BIC	47936.415
Log Likelihood	-23667.492
Num. obs.	16326

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident’s local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in `VGAM` package of `R`.

Table A.12: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Female, UTAS):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Relaxed.

	1—2	2—3	3—4	4—5
(Intercept)	3.393*** (0.339)	2.400*** (0.258)	0.280 (0.198)	−1.296*** (0.255)
University Education	0.026 (0.386)	−0.015 (0.291)	0.527* (0.217)	0.385 (0.280)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.379 (0.346)	0.368 (0.263)	−0.146 (0.185)	−0.042 (0.252)
Elder (≥ 60 s)	0.232 (0.313)	−0.058 (0.238)	−0.434* (0.178)	−0.211 (0.242)
University*Middle Aged	−0.406 (0.527)	−0.674 [†] (0.391)	−0.235 (0.297)	−0.388 (0.397)
University*Elder	−0.708 (0.521)	−0.513 (0.407)	−0.508 (0.342)	−0.507 (0.482)
Knowledge	−1.743*** (0.371)	−0.921*** (0.276)	−0.104 (0.220)	0.079 (0.302)
Economic Evaluation	−0.331 (0.406)	−0.692* (0.301)	−0.413 [†] (0.249)	−0.875* (0.355)
AIC	4974.558			
BIC	5166.036			
Log Likelihood	−2452.279			
Num. obs.	1756			

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vg1m` function in **VGAM** package of **R**.

Table A.13: Education and the Support for Foreigner’s Local Suffrage (Female, UTAS):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Retained.

	Model 1
Employed	−0.063 (0.098)
AIC	4974.558
BIC	5166.036
Log Likelihood	-2452.279
Num. obs.	1756

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident’s local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in `VGAM` package of `R`.

Table A.14: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Male, UTAS):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Relaxed.

	1—2	2—3	3—4	4—5
(Intercept)	2.308*** (0.251)	1.760*** (0.218)	0.079 (0.195)	−1.257*** (0.241)
University Education	0.168 (0.262)	0.032 (0.220)	0.092 (0.193)	0.145 (0.251)
Middle Aged (40-50s)	0.600* (0.256)	0.412 [†] (0.212)	0.301 [†] (0.179)	0.112 (0.234)
Elder (>=60s)	0.433 [†] (0.231)	0.217 (0.196)	0.023 (0.172)	−0.004 (0.226)
University*Middle Aged	−0.454 (0.345)	−0.352 (0.284)	0.048 (0.246)	−0.131 (0.320)
University*Elder	−0.312 (0.331)	−0.275 (0.275)	−0.034 (0.248)	−0.279 (0.335)
Knowledge	−1.210*** (0.272)	−1.048*** (0.220)	−0.260 (0.195)	−0.236 (0.265)
Economic Evaluation	−0.175 (0.288)	−0.510* (0.236)	−0.632** (0.219)	−0.681* (0.296)
AIC	6468.878			
BIC	6666.899			
Log Likelihood	−3199.439			
Num. obs.	2117			

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in **VGAM** package of **R**.


Table A.15: Education and the Support for Foreigner’s Local Suffrage (Male, UTAS):
Variables with Partial Proportional Odds Assumption Retained.

	Model 1
Employed	0.105 (0.103)
AIC	6468.878
BIC	6666.899
Log Likelihood	-3199.439
Num. obs.	2117

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Year fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident’s local suffrage.

The model is estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in `VGAM` package of `R`.




Models are estimated by partial proportional odds model (logit) through `vglm` function in VGAM package of R. Each model is estimated within each gender subset of each dataset. All models include knowledge, political interest (only SIFCCT), employment, economic evaluation, income (only SIFCCT), and wave/year fixed effects as controls. Parallel regression assumption retained for employment, income and wave/year fixed effects, relaxed for all other variables. See Appendix for the detailed tables.

Figure A.1: Comparing SIFCCT and UTAS for the effect of university education on the support for granting suffrage to permanent residents using unmatched data (Partial Proportional Odds Model)


Comparing SIFCCT and UTAS in [Figure A.1](#), the only consistent result among female is that university education increases the probability of answering rather agree or higher among young cohort. Education does not have an effect to reduce disagreement.

A.4 Additional Illustrations of Geographic Distance Adjustment




Dots represent randomly sampled 200 matched respondent pairs (age 20s or 30s in SIFCCT) and lines connect two matched pairs on the map (red = female, blue = male). The left panel shows the matching outcome without geographic distance adjustment and the right panel shows the outcome of matching with geographic distance adjustment.

Figure A.2: Improved balance in geographic distance ($\lambda = 50\text{km}$)



Dots represent randomly sampled 200 matched respondent pairs (age 20s or 30s in SIFCCT) and lines connect two matched pairs on the map (red = female, blue = male). The left panel shows the matching outcome without geographic distance adjustment and the right panel shows the outcome of matching with geographic distance adjustment.

Figure A.3: Improved balance in geographic distance ($\lambda = 100\text{km}$)



Dots represent randomly sampled 200 matched respondent pairs (age 20s or 30s in SIFCCT) and lines connect two matched pairs on the map (red = female, blue = male). The left panel shows the matching outcome without geographic distance adjustment and the right panel shows the outcome of matching with geographic distance adjustment.

Figure A.4: Improved balance in geographic distance ($\lambda = 350\text{km}$)

A.5 Detailed regression tables for education causal effects from matched datasets

Table A.16: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT with Respondents 30s or Younger: Matched Without Distance Adjustment)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	−1.002 (0.270) ^{***}	−1.340 (0.304) ^{***}
University Education	0.272 (0.088) ^{**}	−0.072 (0.148)
Knowledge	0.102 (0.284)	−0.656 (0.173) ^{***}
Political Interest	0.572 (0.191) ^{**}	0.353 (0.220)
Employed	0.097 (0.123)	0.339 (0.187) [†]
Economic Evaluation	0.342 (0.220)	0.255 (0.315)
Income	−0.131 (0.250)	0.235 (0.229)
Length of Residence	−0.237 (0.174)	−0.384 (0.128) ^{**}
AIC	2232.187	1815.467
BIC	2385.812	1967.311
Log Likelihood	−1088.094	−879.734
Deviance	2176.187	1759.467
Num. obs.	1784	1674

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.17: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT with Respondents 30s or Younger: Matched With $\lambda = 50\text{km}$)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	$-1.406 (0.302)^{***}$	$-2.013 (0.346)^{***}$
University Education	$0.224 (0.114)^*$	$0.107 (0.153)$
Knowledge	$-0.385 (0.365)$	$-0.139 (0.229)$
Political Interest	$0.936 (0.218)^{***}$	$0.276 (0.246)$
Employed	$-0.011 (0.119)$	$0.366 (0.252)$
Economic Evaluation	$0.086 (0.194)$	$0.428 (0.404)$
Income	$-0.312 (0.419)$	$0.681 (0.244)^{**}$
Length of Residence	$-0.270 (0.213)$	$-0.461 (0.168)^{**}$
AIC	1445.007	1413.942
BIC	1586.628	1557.652
Log Likelihood	-694.503	-678.971
Deviance	1389.007	1357.942
Num. obs.	1162	1252

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.18: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT with Respondents 30s or Younger: Matched With $\lambda = 100\text{km}$)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	-1.442 (0.334)***	-1.605 (0.369)***
University Education	0.195 (0.116) [†]	0.068 (0.150)
Knowledge	-0.213 (0.302)	-0.373 (0.214) [†]
Political Interest	0.717 (0.237)**	0.263 (0.211)
Employed	0.028 (0.109)	0.360 (0.297)
Economic Evaluation	0.250 (0.199)	0.254 (0.365)
Income	-0.292 (0.338)	0.672 (0.189)***
Length of Residence	-0.295 (0.186)	-0.490 (0.136)***
AIC	1792.431	1649.477
BIC	1939.864	1797.985
Log Likelihood	-868.216	-796.739
Deviance	1736.431	1593.477
Num. obs.	1430	1486

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.19: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT with Respondents 30s or Younger: Matched With $\lambda = 200\text{km}$)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	-1.266 (0.267)***	-1.670 (0.386)***
University Education	0.184 (0.111) [†]	0.012 (0.143)
Knowledge	-0.195 (0.286)	-0.533 (0.185)**
Political Interest	0.691 (0.227)**	0.321 (0.217)
Employed	0.053 (0.108)	0.398 (0.278)
Economic Evaluation	0.432 (0.196)*	0.281 (0.310)
Income	-0.108 (0.317)	0.670 (0.204)**
Length of Residence	-0.296 (0.150)*	-0.417 (0.134)**
AIC	2019.884	1754.985
BIC	2170.878	1905.771
Log Likelihood	-981.942	-849.492
Deviance	1963.884	1698.985
Num. obs.	1624	1612

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

Table A.20: Education and the Support for Foreigner's Local Suffrage (Logit, SIFCCT with Respondents 30s or Younger: Matched With $\lambda = 350\text{km}$)

	Female	Male
(Intercept)	−1.304 (0.284) ^{***}	−1.538 (0.366) ^{***}
University Education	0.227 (0.106) [*]	0.018 (0.145)
Knowledge	−0.150 (0.289)	−0.627 (0.181) ^{***}
Political Interest	0.717 (0.223) ^{**}	0.315 (0.213)
Employed	0.061 (0.115)	0.256 (0.244)
Economic Evaluation	0.337 (0.193) [†]	0.329 (0.319)
Income	0.026 (0.309)	0.705 (0.225) ^{**}
Length of Residence	−0.315 (0.157) [*]	−0.441 (0.132) ^{***}
AIC	2104.617	1794.082
BIC	2256.793	1945.453
Log Likelihood	−1024.309	−869.041
Deviance	2048.617	1738.082
Num. obs.	1694	1646

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Wave fixed effects omitted from the output.

Response ranges from 1 = disagree to 5 = agree for supporting permanent resident's local suffrage.

The model is estimated by logit, standard errors are clustered by prefectures..

B Distribution of mediators





Figure B.1: The distribution of mediator variables (SIFCCT, Young Cohort)

C Causal mediation analysis with ideology proxies




Treatment: University education or more (1), Senior High School or less (0).

Mediator: LDP Feeling Thermometer (rescaled to 0-1 with 1 being the warmest). Model is estimated by OLS.


Outcome: Rather agree or agree with granting suffrage to permanent residents (1), else (0). Model is estimated by logit.

Figure C.1: The causal mediation effect of university education on the support for granting suffrage to permanent residents through LDP Thermometer (SIFCCT, Young Cohort)



Treatment: University education or more (1), Senior High School or less (0).
 Mediator: Right Party Support (1 supporting LDP, YP, or JRP, 0 else). Model is estimated by logit.
 Outcome: Rather agree or agree with granting suffrage to permanent residents (1), else (0). Model is estimated by logit.

Figure C.2: The causal mediation effect of university education on the support for granting suffrage to permanent residents through Right Party Support (SIFCCT, Young Cohort)



Treatment: University education or more (1), Senior High School or less (0).
 Mediator: Left Party Support (1 supporting DPJ, JCP, SDP, or CGP, 0 else). Model is estimated by logit.
 Outcome: Rather agree or agree with granting suffrage to permanent residents (1), else (0). Model is estimated by logit.

Figure C.3: The causal mediation effect of university education on the support for granting suffrage to permanent residents through Left Party Support (SIFCCT, Young Cohort)