# Online Appendix for: The preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates: Evidence from Japan

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# A Experimental Designs

Experiment 1 Japanese wording (underlined texts are bolded in the survey):

- (Preference task) 次の2人の人物のうち、どちらがより小選挙区選出の衆議院議員 として望ましいと思いますか。もし、どちらが望ましいかはっきりとは言えない 場合でも、どちらか一方、あえていえばより望ましいと思われる方を選んでくだ さい。Choice: 人物1; 人物2
- (Expectation task) 次の2人の人物のうち、どちらがより衆議院議員選挙の小選挙 区で勝利しそうと思いますか。もし、どちらが勝利しそうかはっきりとは言えない場合でも、どちらか一方、あえていえばより勝利しそうと思われる方を選んでください。Choice: 人物1;人物2

Table A1: Experiment 1 attributes and levels

Attribute	Levels
Gender (性別)	Male (男性); Female (女性)
Party (所属政党)	Liberal Democratic Party/LDP (自民党); Komeito (公明党);
	Constitutional Democratic Party/CDP (立憲民主党);
	Democratic Party for the People/DPFP (国民民主党);
	Japanese Communist Party/JCP (共産党);
	Japan Ishin Party (日本維新の会); Independent (無所属)
Age (年齢)	35 (35歳); 45 (45歳); 55 (55歳); 65 (65歳)
Political Experience (政治経験)	No Experience (経験なし);
	Local parliament member (地方議員);
	One term as a Diet Member (国会議員 1 期);
	Two terms or more as a Diet Member (国会議員 2 期以上)
Education (最終学歴)	High School (高校卒); College (大学卒);
	Graduate School (大学院卒)
Marital status (結婚歴)	Unmarried (未婚); Married (既婚); Divorced (離別)
Children Status (子の年齢 (一番下))	No Children (子なし); Children of 6- (6歳未満);
	Children of $6+(6-17歳)$ ; Children of $18+(18歳以上)$
Residential Status (居住状況)	Live together with parent (親と共に居住);
	Live close to parent (親の近くに居住);
	Live far from parent (親から遠くに居住)

Experiment 2 Japanese wording (underlined texts are bolded in the survey):

- (Preference task, national) 次の2人の人物のうち、どちらが小選挙区選出の衆議院 議員としてより望ましいと思いますか。もし、どちらが望ましいかはっきりとは 言えない場合でも、どちらか一方、あえていえばより望ましいと思われる方を選 んでください。Choice: 人物1; 人物2
- (Expectation task, national) 次の2人の人物のうち、どちらが衆議院議員選挙の 小選挙区でより当選しそうと思いますか。もし、どちらが当選しそうかはっきり とは言えない場合でも、どちらか一方、あえていえばより当選しそうと思われる 方を選んでください。Choice: 人物1; 人物2
- (Preference, local) 小選挙区選出の衆議院議員 replaced with 市区町村議会議員.
- (Expectation, local) 衆議院議員選挙の小選挙区 replaced with 市区町村議会議員選挙.

Table A2: Experiment 2 attributes and levels

Attribute	Levels
Party affiliation (所属政党)	Ruling party in the Diet (国会における与党);
,	Opposition party in the Diet (国会における野党);
	No affiliation/minor party (無所属・諸派)
Gender (性別)	Male (男性); Female (女性)
Age (年齢)	35; 45; 55; 65
Educational attainment (最終学歴)	High school (高校卒); University (大学卒);
	Graduate school (大学院卒)
Political experience (政治経験)	No experience (経験なし);
	Incumbent (1 term) (現職(1期));
	Incumbent $(2 \text{ terms})$ (現職 $(2 \text{ 期})$ );
	Incumbent (5 terms) (現職(5期));
	Former (1 term) (元職(1期))
Family structure (家族構成)	Single & have children (独身で子がいる);
	Single & no children (独身で子はいない);
	Married & have children (結婚して子がいる);
	Married & no children (結婚して子はいない)
Living condition (居住状況)	Live with parents (親と共に居住);
	Live close to parents (親の近くに居住);
- a (T. Land, both 1) High	Live far from parents (親から遠くに居住)
Policy focus (重点政策分野)	Defense/foreign policy (防衛·外交);
	Safety/social order (治安·社会秩序);
	Economy (経済); Welfare (福祉);
	Environment (環境); Education (教育);
	Women's status and social advancement (女性の地位・社会進出);
	Local governance (地方自治)
Native Place (出身地)	Local municipality (地元の市区町村);
	Local prefecture (地元の都道府県);
	Non-local prefecture (地元ではない都道府県)

# B Full Results of Conjoint Experiments




Figure A1: Full results from Experiment 1

	Preference	Expectation	Expectation - Preference	
Male	0.000	0.001	0.000	
Female	0.000	0.001	0.000	Gender
Independent	0.000	0.000	0.000	
LDP	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Komeito	0.000	0.026	0.000	
CDP	1.000	0.937	0.955	Party Affliation
DPP	0.000	0.633	0.003	
Ishin	0.000	0.000	0.943	
JCP -	0.000	0.000	0.003	
35 Years Old	0.000	0.016	0.000	
45 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.378	
55 Years Old	0.380	0.683	0.747	Age
65 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.000	
None	0.000	0.000	0.001	
Local MP	0.177	0.092	0.032	D. I'd' 1E '
National MP 1 Term	0.096	0.000	0.179	Political Experience
National MP 2+ Terms	0.000	0.000	0.000	
High School	0.000	0.000	0.011	
College	0.019	0.000	0.226	Educational Attainment
Graduate School	0.003	0.000	0.247	
Married	0.000	0.000	0.467	
Never Married	0.109	0.003	0.343	Marital Status
Divorced	0.004	0.026	0.669	
No Child	0.000	0.000	0.867	
Younger than 6	0.807	0.856	0.961	Youngest Child
6 to 17	0.000	0.011	0.231	Toungest Clind
18 or Older	0.253	0.002	0.141	
Live Far from Parents	0.002	0.116	0.259	
Live Close to Parents	0.035	0.315	0.414	Residence
Live with Parents	0.312	0.565	0.765	

p-values from significance test

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference—expecation gap.

Figure A2: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 1




Figure A3: Full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives)

	Preference	Expectation	Expectation - Preference	
Male	0.001	0.000	0.000	
Female	0.001	0.000	0.000	Gender
Ruling party	0.001	0.000	0.001	
Opposition party	0.645	0.002	0.065	<ul> <li>Party Affliation</li> </ul>
Independent	0.003	0.000	0.118	
35 Years Old	0.000	0.020	0.069	
45 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.006	Age
55 Years Old	0.401	0.871	0.627	Age
65 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.000	
None	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Incumbent (1 term)	0.052	0.358	0.488	
Incumbent (2 terms)	0.122	0.000	0.006	<ul> <li>Political Experience</li> </ul>
Incumbent (5 terms)	0.054	0.000	0.012	
Former (1 term)	0.615	0.193	0.584	
High School	0.000	0.000	0.143	
College	0.000	0.001	0.512	- Educational Attainment
Graduate School	0.021	0.000	0.044	
Single (without child)	0.000	0.000	0.884	
Single (with child)	0.083	0.157	0.836	Eil
Married (without child)	0.122	0.127	0.995	Family
Married (with child)	0.000	0.000	0.838	
Live Far from Parents	0.983	0.202	0.379	
Live Close to Parents	0.804	0.265	0.336	Residence
Live with Parents	0.785	0.866	0.945	
Local municipality	0.009	0.121	0.424	
Local prefecture	0.002	0.001	0.853	Native Place
Outside of local prefecture	0.000	0.000	0.420	
Defense/foreign policy	0.086	0.358	0.559	
Public safety/social order	0.951	0.266	0.442	
Economy	0.449	0.699	0.808	
Welfare	0.232	0.783	0.518	
Environment	0.069	0.363	0.539	Policy Focus
Education	0.038	0.603	0.069	
Women's status/social advancement	0.288	0.496	0.797	
Local governance	0.605	0.228	0.604	
5		-values from significan		

p-values from significance test

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference–expecation gap.

Figure A4: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives)




Figure A5: Full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council)

	Preference	Expectation	Expectation - Preference	
Male	0.000	0.018	0.000	
Female	0.000	0.018	0.000	Gender
Ruling party	0.364	0.000	0.003	
Opposition party	0.099	0.145	0.919	<ul> <li>Party Affliation</li> </ul>
Independent	0.469	0.000	0.002	
35 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.049	
45 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.034	Age
55 Years Old	0.810	0.141	0.387	Age
65 Years Old	0.000	0.000	0.001	
None	0.000	0.000	0.022	
Incumbent (1 term)	0.010	0.384	0.217	
Incumbent (2 terms)	0.000	0.000	0.729	<ul> <li>Political Experience</li> </ul>
Incumbent (5 terms)	0.019	0.000	0.029	
Former (1 term)	0.054	0.678	0.289	
High School	0.000	0.000	0.029	
College	0.036	0.001	0.372	- Educational Attainment
Graduate School	0.000	0.000	0.168	
Single (without child)	0.000	0.000	0.948	
Single (with child)	0.660	0.217	0.239	Eil
Married (without child)	0.004	0.776	0.022	Family
Married (with child)	0.000	0.000	0.455	
Live Far from Parents	0.035	0.031	0.950	
Live Close to Parents	0.023	0.118	0.645	Residence
Live with Parents	0.845	0.586	0.604	
Local municipality	0.000	0.000	0.261	
Local prefecture	0.068	0.005	0.442	Native Place
Outside of local prefecture	0.000	0.000	0.109	
Defense/foreign policy	0.000	0.000	0.982	
Public safety/social order	0.401	0.464	0.266	
Economy	0.262	0.249	0.108	
Welfare	0.020	0.305	0.391	
Environment	0.262	0.195	0.885	Policy Focus
Education	0.669	0.312	0.683	
Women's status/social advancement	0.709	0.209	0.526	
Local governance	0.154	0.027	0.518	
5		-values from significan		

p-values from significance test

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference–expecation gap.

Figure A6: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council)

# C Main Results using Average Marginal Component Effect




Figure A7: Individuals prefer female political candidates more than male ones, but they expect females to have lower chances to win elections than males (results using Average Marginal Component Effects)




Figure A8: p-values for the main results using Average Marginal Component Effects

## D Moderation by Gender Role Attitudes

## D.1 The Set of Questions Used to Measure Gender Role Attitudes

Q: 社会における男性と女性のあり方について、次のような意見があります。それぞれ についてのあなたのお気持ちをお答えください。


A: 反対 (1); どちらかといえば反対 (2); どちらかといえば賛成 (3); 賛成 (4)

- 1. 結婚しても、相手に満足できないときは、いつでも離婚すればよい
- 2. 夫に充分な収入がある場合には、妻は仕事をもたない方がよい
- 3. なんといっても女性の幸福は結婚にある
- 4. 男性も身の回りのことや炊事をすべきだ
- 5. 夫は外で働き、妻は家庭を守るべきだ
- 6. なんといっても男性の幸福は結婚にある
- 7. 母親が仕事をもつと、小学校へあがる前の子どもによくない影響を与える
- 8. 結婚しても、必ずしも子どもをもつ必要はない
- 9. 妻にとっては、自分の仕事をもつよりも、夫の仕事の手助けをする方が大切である

We use the following procedure to generate a binary variable of gender role attitudes:

- 1. Impute missing values by the intermediate score (=2.5).
- 2. Pool respondents in Experiments 1 and 2 and perform a factor analysis with a single factor principal factor solution.
- 3. Calculate the factor score using the Bartlett method.
- 4. Identify the median of the factor score (pooling respondents in Experiments 1 and 2) and split each group of respondents by this median value.

## D.2 Results using Average Marginal Component Effect



Views on Gender Roles ← Liberal ← Traditional

Figure A9: Preference-expectation gap is larger for those who have a liberal gender role view, because they prefer women more strongly but expect women to be no more advantaged compared to those who have a traditional gender role view




Figure A10: p-values from the results on the moderating effect of gender role attitudes using Average Marginal Component Effect

## D.3 Full Results of Conjoint Experiments





Figure A11: Full results from Experiment 1, moderated by gender role attitudes



Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference-expecation gap.

Figure A12: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 1, moderated by gender role attitudes




Figure A13: Full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by gender role attitudes

	Preference	Exp	Expectation		Preference	
Male - Female -	0.000 0.000 1.00		0.002	0.000	0.028	Gender
Ruling party – Opposition party – Independent –	0.004 0.815 0.005	0.102	0.000 0.005 0.001	0.062 0.329 0.428	0.003 0.103 0.163	Party Affliation
35 Years Old 45 Years Old 55 Years Old 65 Years Old	0.000 0.000 0.677 0.000 0.00	0.000	0.152 0.086 0.898 0.004	0.010 0.514 0.954 0.001	0.969 0.001 0.532 0.000	Age
None Incumbent (1 term) Incumbent (2 terms) Incumbent (5 terms) Former (1 term)	0.005       0.059       0.515       0.021       0.078	0.246 0.000 0.000	0.000 0.888 0.000 0.001 0.334	0.027 0.602 0.018 0.131 0.490	0.006 0.628 0.120 0.037 0.898	Political Experience
High School – College – Graduate School –	0.000 0.009 0.108	0.009	0.000 0.037 0.002	0.037 0.934 0.051	0.998 0.308 0.361	Educational Attainment
Single (without child) Single (with child) Married (without child) Married (with child)	0.000         0.000         0.22         0.25         0.002	0.770	0.000 0.089 0.354 0.000	0.139 0.014 0.938 0.406	0.090 0.036 0.945 0.567	Family
Live Far from Parents – Live Close to Parents – Live with Parents –	0.535 0.813 0.412 0.65	0.227	0.112 0.715 0.241	0.789 0.305 0.204	0.130 0.735 0.243	Residence
Local municipality – Local prefecture – Outside of local prefecture –	0.010 0.211 0.000 0.000	0.129	0.588 0.001 0.000	0.511 0.796 0.531	0.641 0.998 0.607	Native Place
Defense/foreign policy Public safety/social order Economy Welfare Environment Education Women's status/social advancement Local governance	0.090 0.749 0.790 0.095 0.551 0.134 0.934 0.587	0.485 0.574 0.292 14 0.314 0.592 0.632	0.558 0.381 0.285 0.520 0.769 0.833 0.145 0.229 a significance	0.491 0.465 0.821 0.664 0.763 0.147 0.779 0.455	0.877 0.710 0.864 0.626 0.237 0.261 0.955 0.999	Policy Focus
	Views	on Gender Roles	a Liberal	a Traditional		

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference-expecation gap.

Figure A14: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by gender role attitudes




Figure A15: Full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by gender role attitudes

	Preference	Exp	Expectation E		- Preference				
Male Female	0.000 0.000 0.50		0.675	0.000	0.437	Gender			
Ruling party Opposition party Independent	0.200 0.103 0.760 0.49	0.782	0.000 0.019 0.064	0.191 0.178 0.013	0.004 0.219 0.067	Party Affliation			
35 Years Old 45 Years Old 55 Years Old 65 Years Old	0.000 0.000 0.815 0.000	0.001 0.449	0.008 0.012 0.186 0.000	0.085 0.194 0.494 0.013	0.295 0.091 0.573 0.030	Age			
None Incumbent (1 term) Incumbent (2 terms) Incumbent (5 terms) Former (1 term)	0.000       0.112       0.002       0.568       0.326	2 9 0.040 7	0.000 0.770 0.000 0.001 0.665	0.068 0.620 0.553 0.009 0.569	0.157 0.210 0.295 0.599 0.355	Political Experience			
High School College Graduate School	0.000 0.129 0.002 0.03	0.014	0.000 0.018 0.000	0.090 0.526 0.343	0.158 0.529 0.326	Educational Attainment			
Single (without child) Single (with child) Married (without child) Married (with child)	0.000 0.532 0.046 0.000 0.000	0.209 0.564	0.004 0.619 0.869 0.001	0.616 0.672 0.066 0.602	0.668 0.217 0.162 0.608	Family			
Live Far from Parents Live Close to Parents Live with Parents	0.075 0.032 0.631 0.82	0.204	0.060 0.351 0.358	0.669 0.536 0.803	0.603 0.995 0.619	Residence			
Local municipality  Local prefecture  Outside of local prefecture	0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000	0.073	0.000 0.028 0.000	0.434 0.669 0.364	0.409 0.502 0.172	Native Place			
Defense/foreign policy Public safety/social order Economy Welfare Environment Education Women's status/social advancement Local governance	0.000     0.17       0.712     0.40       0.039     0.52       0.485     0.00       0.714     0.966       0.487     0.85       0.726     0.09	0.192 0.372 0.289 0.327 0.931 0.152 0.119	0.087 0.743 0.461 0.694 0.396 0.180 0.724 0.115 a significance	0.742 0.242 0.034 0.784 0.335 0.927 0.593 0.369	0.793 0.716 0.941 0.139 0.441 0.644 0.706 0.986	Policy Focus			
	Views on Gender Roles a Liberal a Traditional								


Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference–expecation gap.

Figure A16: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by gender role attitudes

## E Moderation by Respondent's Gender

Respondents with self-identified nonbinary gender (neither male nor female) are excluded from all the analyses below.


## E.1 Figure that is parallel to Figure 2



Respondent's Gender  $\longrightarrow$  Female  $\longrightarrow$  Male

Figure A17: Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates is larger for female voters, because they prefer women more strongly but expect women to be no more advantaged or even disadvantaged compared to male voters

## E.2 Results using Average Marginal Component Effect



Respondent's Gender - Female - Male

Figure A18: Results on the moderating effect of respondent's gender using Average Marginal Component Effect




Figure A19: p-values from the results on the moderating effect of respondent's gender using Average Marginal Component Effect

## E.3 Full Results of Conjoint Experiments





Figure A20: Full results from Experiment 1, moderated by respondent's gender



Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference-expecation gap.

Figure A21: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 1, moderated by respondent's gender




Figure A22: Full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by respondent's gender

	Preference		Expectation E		Expectation -	- Preference			
Male Female	0.000	0.844	0.000	0.278	0.000	0.364	Gender		
Ruling party Opposition party Independent	0.033 0.864 0.049	0.011 0.364 0.077	0.000 0.283 0.005	0.000 0.001 0.000	0.155 0.537 0.504	0.001 0.088 0.056	Party Affliation		
35 Years Old 45 Years Old 55 Years Old 65 Years Old	0.004 0.000 0.038 0.000	0.000 0.000 0.533 0.000	0.458 0.001 0.572 0.000	0.006 0.001 0.792 0.000	0.118 0.313 0.270 0.001	0.477 0.003 0.798 0.000	Age		
None Incumbent (1 term) Incumbent (2 terms) Incumbent (5 terms) Former (1 term)	0.000 0.460 0.088 0.002 0.097	0.002 0.071 0.512 0.849 0.330	0.000 0.412 0.002 0.000 0.816	0.000 0.611 0.000 0.000 0.030	0.005 0.943 0.276 0.447 0.180	0.040 0.377 0.007 0.008 0.027	Political Experience		
High School College Graduate School	0.000 0.025 0.063	0.000 0.000 0.178	0.000 0.025 0.000	0.000 0.014 0.013	0.031 0.929 0.032	0.981 0.358 0.483	Educational Attainment		
Single (without child) Single (with child) Married (without child) Married (with child)	0.000 0.010 0.580 0.000	0.059 0.773 0.086 0.000	0.000 0.099 0.190 0.000	0.004 0.722 0.377 0.001	0.772 0.515 0.578 0.399	0.527 0.648 0.552 0.538	Family		
Live Far from Parents Live Close to Parents Live with Parents	0.492 0.462 0.953	0.549 0.318 0.649	0.149 0.221 0.834	0.598 0.631 0.952	0.597 0.702 0.851	0.425 0.290 0.789	Residence		
Local municipality Local prefecture Outside of local prefecture	0.000 0.380 0.000	0.590 0.000 0.000	0.155 0.000 0.000	0.353 0.246 0.044	0.170 0.055 0.839	0.827 0.101 0.148	Native Place		
Defense/foreign policy Public safety/social order Economy Welfare Environment Education Women's status/social advancement Local governance	0.090 0.728 0.964 0.069 0.487 0.217 0.581 0.927	0.521 0.655 0.277 0.857 0.034 0.108 0.359 0.404	0.645 0.684 0.607 0.153 0.598 0.279 0.693 0.222 alues from si	0.277 0.036 0.192 0.408 0.446 0.792 0.144 0.720 gnificance to	0.362 0.955 0.688 0.790 0.897 0.102 0.505 0.406	0.752 0.222 0.846 0.645 0.375 0.341 0.698 0.749	Policy Focus		
	Respondent's Gender a Female a Male								

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference–expecation gap.

Figure A23: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by respondent's gender




Figure A24: Full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by respondent's gender


	Preference	I	Expectation E		Preference			
Male - Female -		024 025 0.01		0.000	0.031	Gender		
Ruling party – Opposition party – Independent –	0.898	0.05 014 196 0.01	0.007	0.159 0.686 0.076	0.007 0.864 0.008	Party Affliation		
35 Years Old = 45 Years Old = 55 Years Old = 65 Years Old =	0.000 0.774 0.	000 000 896 000 0.01 0.00	0.003	0.294 0.115 0.115 0.359	0.108 0.186 0.761 0.000	Age		
None = Incumbent (1 term) = Incumbent (2 terms) = Incumbent (5 terms) = Former (1 term) =	0.192 0.002 0.015	000 009 010 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.76	0.582 0.000 0.002	0.428 0.672 0.746 0.160 0.828	0.030 0.139 0.510 0.099 0.185	Political Experience		
High School = College = Graduate School =	0.138	0.00 159 0.00 0.00	0.055	0.180 0.348 0.591	0.109 0.779 0.176	Educational Attainment		
Single (without child) - Single (with child) - Married (without child) - Married (with child) -	0.014 0.013	018 059 129 000 000	0.086	0.986 0.088 0.051 0.762	0.832 0.838 0.209 0.234	Family		
Live Far from Parents – Live Close to Parents – Live with Parents –	0.015	0.20 383 364 0.73	0.532	0.947 0.588 0.540	0.875 0.862 0.712	Residence		
Local municipality – Local prefecture – Outside of local prefecture –	0.021	0.00 799 000 0.02	0.051	0.264 0.972 0.497	0.785 0.216 0.143	Native Place		
Defense/foreign policy - Public safety/social order - Economy - Welfare - Environment - Education - Women's status/social advancement - Local governance -	0.133 0.371 0.009 1.000 0.174 0.928	025 967 402 386 099 452 518 022 0.05 0.13 0.96 0.18 0.25 0.25	0.281 0.100 0.862 1.000 0.090 0.642	0.491 0.273 0.572 0.443 0.134 0.326 0.306 0.284	0.476 0.462 0.084 0.476 0.235 0.086 0.888 0.998	Policy Focus		
Respondent's Gender a Female a Male								

Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference-expecation gap.

Figure A25: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by respondent's gender

# F Moderation by Candidate's Party

## F.1 Figure that is parallel to Figure 2




Candidate's Party → Ruling party → Opposition party → Independent

Note: In Experiment 1, ruling parties are LDP and Komeito; Opposition parties are CDP, DPP, Ishin, and JCP.

Figure A26: Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates is no smaller for ruling party candidates after filtering away the direct effect of party status

## F.2 Results using Average Marginal Component Effect



Note: In Experiment 1, ruling parties are LDP and Komeito; Opposition parties are CDP, DPP, Ishin, and JCP.

Candidate's Party ← Ruling party ← Opposition party ← Independent

Figure A27: Results on the moderating effect of candidate's party using Average Marginal Component Effect




Figure A28: p-values from the results on the moderating effect of candidate's party using Average Marginal Component Effect

## F.3 Full Results of Conjoint Experiments





Figure A29: Full results from Experiment 1, moderated by candidate's party



Note: H0=0.5 for preference and expectation tasks. H0=0 for preference-expecation gap.

Figure A30: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 1, moderated by candidate's party




Figure A31: Full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), mod

Figure A31: Full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by candidate's party




Figure A32: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (House of Representatives), moderated by candidate's party




Figure A33: Full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by candidate's party




Figure A34: p-values from significance tests in full results from Experiment 2 (Municipal Council), moderated by candidate's party

# G Pre-analysis plan for the first experiment: Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates in Japanese parliamentary elections

## Registration Metadata

#### Title

Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates in Japanese parliamentary elections

## Description

This study examines the extent to which personal preference for female candidates in Japanese parliamentary elections correlates with personal evaluations of female candidates' likelihood of winning.

#### Contributors

Anonymous contributor(s)

#### License

MIT License, 2022, Anonymous contributor(s)

## Subjects

Social and Behavioral Sciences, Political Science, Comparative Politics

## **Study Information**

## Hypotheses

H1: Individuals are personally not less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates.

H2: Individuals believe other individuals are less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates. i.e. Individuals believe female political candidates are less electable (i.e. likely to win) than male political candidates.

# Design Plan

## Study type

Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

## Blinding

For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

## Is there any additional blinding in this study?

N/A

#### Study design

A conjoint survey experiment whereby respondents review profiles of two hypothetical candidates randomly generated from a set of attributes (see attached document) and then choose between the candidates. All subjects review 6 pairs of profiles. For 3 profiles, subjects choose the candidate they personally prefer/view as desirable. For 3 profiles, they choose the candidate they think a majority of other subjects prefer/view as desirable (i.e. is more likely to win).

We also collect personal information from subjects, including their gender, age, education, marital status, residential environment, annual household income, and partisanship.

Attached are the survey instrument in Japanese, as well as a draft of the English translation.

```
experiment_fempoljp_spring22_v2.1.docx
experiment_fempoljp_spring21_v2.1_en.txt
```

#### Randomization

To avoid learning effects, we randomize the order in which subjects are asked to make two types of decisions: select the candidate they personally prefer/view as desirable and select the candidate they think a majority of other subjects prefer/view as desirable.

We also randomize attribute levels across conjoint tasks. See section on "Variables" for constraints on how attribute levels are randomized.

In any conjoint task, we maintain the same order of the attributes, as listed in the manipulated variable section. The order is typical of the realistic candidate profile to ensure external validity.

# Sampling Plan

#### Existing Data

Registration prior to creation of data

#### Explanation of existing data

N/A

## Data collection procedures

Participants will be recruited from the monitor pool of the online survey company, Rakuten Insight, with the criteria that they are 18 or older. The entire experiment will be conducted in Japanese.

#### Sample size

n = 1800

#### Sample size rationale

Since the unit of analysis is rated candidate profile, 1800 subjects who each rate 6 candidate profiles provide us with sufficient power.

## Stopping rule

N/A

## Variables

## Manipulated Variables

#### **Conditions:**

A binary measure of whether respondents evaluate candidate profiles in the context of national (House of Representatives) or local election (municipal council).

#### Conjoint attributes and levels:

- 1. Gender (性別): Male (男性); Female (女性)
- 2. Party (所属政党): Liberal Democratic Party/LDP (自民党); Komeito (公明党); Constitutional Democratic Party/CDP (立憲民主党); Democratic Party for the People/DPFP (国民民主党); Japanese Communist Party/JCP (共産党); Japan Ishin Party (日本維新の会); Independent (無所属)
- 3. Age (年齢): 35 (35歳); 45 (45歳); 55 (55歳); 65 (65歳)
- 4. Political Experience (政治経験): No Experience (経験なし); Local parliament member (地方議員); One term as a Diet Member (国会議員 1 期); Two terms or more as a Diet Member (国会議員 2 期以上)
- 5. Education (最終学歴): High School (高校卒); College (大学卒); Graduate School (大学院卒)
- 6. Marital status (結婚歷): Unmarried (未婚); Married (既婚); Divorced (離別)
- 7. Children Status (子の年齢 (一番下)): No Children (子なし); Children of 6- (6歳未満); Children of 6+ (6-17歳); Children of 18+ (18歳以上)

8. Residential Status (居住状況): Live together with parent (親と共に居住); Live close to parent (親の近くに居住); Live far from parent (親から遠くに居住)

#### Constraints:

Parties are constrained so that a candidate from ruling party (LDP or Komeito) is always matched with one from opposition (All else).

#### Measured variables

#### Outcome variables:

- 1. Perception of which candidate is more desirable/preferred
- 2. Perception of which candidate is more likely to win

Covariates include: [see attached file for measurement]:

- 1. Gender and Age [genderage]
- 2. Education [edu]
- 3. Residential environment [urban], [postcode]
- 4. Socioeconomic status: income [income], occupation [employment]
- 5. Family status: married and have kids or not [marrykids]
- 6. Political views: support for the current Kishida cabinet [pmsup], interest in politics [polint], vote in the 2021 election [voted], partisanship [psup]
- 7. Political knowledge: Self-assessed levels of political knowledge [selfknow] and aggregated score of answers to 9 factual test questions. Following Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), three questions are on political institutions, four questions are on ideological position of parties (LDP versus CDP, LDP versus JCP, Ishin versus CDP, Ishin versus JCP), and two questions are on political leaders. We will use both the continuous scale and the binary scale (median split). [know\_court, know\_cabinet; know\_hoc; ppos\_2; ppos\_3; ppos\_5; ppos\_6; know\_kishi; know\_makishima]

#### Indices

To create a continuous scale of aggregated variables, we sum up question responses and rescale to a unit interval.

To create a binary scale of aggregated variables, we sum up question responses and recode those above the midpoint as 1, those below the midpoint as 0.

## Analysis Plan

#### Statistical models

We estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each attribute on the probability that the candidate will be chosen as the preferred candidate as well as the more likely to win candidate, where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. We run the analysis separately for each dependent variable and for national/local election conditions.

## Transformations

Continuous variables will be standardized in the standard deviation units.

## Inference criteria

Alpha = .05 and 0.10; two-tailed.

#### Data exclusion

Cases who take too long or too short time (3SD above/below the mean) to complete each conjoint task are excluded.

## Missing data

If respondents do not complete all conjoint tasks, we retain the choices they did make.

#### Exploratory analysis

We expect certain candidate attributes moderate the relationship between their gender and level of support. Therefore, we will look for interaction effects between gender and political party, education, marital status, children status, and residential status.

We expect certain voter attributes moderate the relationship between candidate gender and level of support. Therefore, we will look for interaction effects between candidates' gender and voters' gender, political party, marital status, children status, education residential environment.

#### Other

#### Other

N/A

## H Pre-analysis plan for the second experiment: Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates in Japanese national and local elections

## Registration Metadata

#### Title

Preference-expectation gap in support for female candidates in Japanese national and local elections

## Description

This study examines the extent to which personal preference for female candidates in Japanese parliamentary elections correlates with personal evaluations of female candidates' likelihood of winning. Furthermore, it tests whether this correlation varies by national or local-level election.

#### Contributors

Anonymous contributor(s)

#### License

MIT License, 2022, Anonymous contributor(s)

#### Subjects

Social and Behavioral Sciences, Political Science, Comparative Politics

# **Study Information**

## Hypotheses

H1: Individuals are personally not less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates.

H2: Individuals believe other individuals are less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates. In other words, individuals believe female political candidates are less electable (i.e. less likely to win) than male political candidates.

H3: The preference-electability gap is wider in national elections than in local elections. In both national and local elections, individuals are personally not less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates. More so in national than local elections, individuals believe other individuals are less likely to prefer/view as desirable female political candidates than male political candidates.

## Design Plan

## Study type

Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

## Blinding

For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

## Is there any additional blinding in this study?

N/A

#### Study design

Respondents are randomized into two conditions: national election (House of Representatives) and local election (municipal council). Within each condition, a conjoint survey experiment whereby respondents review profiles of two hypothetical candidates randomly generated from sets of attributes and then choose between the candidates. All subjects review 8 pairs of profiles. For 4 profiles, subjects choose the candidate they personally prefer/view as desirable. For 4 profiles, they choose the candidate they think is more likely to get elected (i.e. a majority of other subjects prefer/view as desirable).

The specific attributes that are randomized are described below. Attribute order is randomized across each respondent (gender -; age and family structure -; living condition orders are preserved to make a profile look natural).

We also collect personal information from subjects, including their gender, age, education, marital status, residential environment, annual household income, and partial partial partial status.

Attached are the entire survey instrument in Japanese, as well as a draft of the English translation.

```
experiment_fempoljp_spring22_v3.1.docx
experiment_fempoljp_spring21_v3.1_en.txt
```

#### Randomization

To avoid learning effects, we randomize the order in which subjects are asked to make two types of decisions: select the candidate they personally prefer/view as desirable and select the candidate they think is more likely to be elected.

We also randomize attribute levels across conjoint tasks and also attribute orders across respondents. See section on "Variables" for constraints on how attribute levels are randomized.

In any conjoint task within the same respondent, we maintain the same order of the attributes, but the order is randomized across respondents to avoid ordering effects.

## Sampling Plan

## Existing Data

Registration prior to creation of data

## Explanation of existing data

N/A

## Data collection procedures

Participants will be recruited from the monitor pool of the online survey company, Rakuten Insight, with the criteria that they are 18 or older. The entire experiment will be conducted in Japanese.

#### Sample size

n = 2400

## Sample size rationale

According to Orme 2019 (https://sawtoothsoftware.com/resources/technical-papers/sample-size-issues-for-conjoint-analysis-studies), the minimum required N for conjoint experiment is calculated by  $(n^*t^*a)/c \geq 500$  where n is the number of respondents, t is the number of tasks, a is number of alternatives per task (not including the none alternative), and c is equal to the largest number of levels for any one attribute (p.64). In our experiment, n is 1200 (under each election context), t is 4, a is 2, and c is 8 (see Variable section) and thus  $(n^*t^*a)/c = (1200^*4^*2)/8 = 1200 > 500$ , and satisfying this minimal sample size.

#### Stopping rule

N/A

#### Variables

#### Manipulated Variables

#### **Conditions:**

A binary measure of whether respondents evaluate candidate profiles in the context of national (House of Representatives) or local election (municipal council).

#### Conjoint attributes and levels:

- 1. party affiliation: ruling party in the Diet; opposition party in the Diet; No affiliation/minor party (所属政党: 国会における与党、国会における野党、無所属・諸派)
- 2. gender: male; female (性別:男性、女性)

- 3. age: 35; 45; 55; 65 (年齢)
- 4. educational attainment: high school, university, graduate school (最終学歷:高校卒、大学卒、大学院卒)
- 5. political experience: no experience; incumbent (1 term); incumbent (2 terms); incumbent (5 terms); former (1 term) (政治経験:経験なし、現職(1期)、現職(2期)、現職(5期)、元職(1期))
- 6. family structure: single & have children, single & no children, married & have children, married & no children (家族構成:独身で子がいる、独身で子はいない、結婚して子がいる、結婚して子はいない)
- 7. living condition: live with parents, live close to parents, live far from parents (居住状況:親と共に居住、親の近くに居住、親から遠くに居住)
- 8. policy focus: defense/foreign policy; safety/social order; economy; welfare; environment; education; women's status and social advancement; local governance (重点政策分野:防衛・外交、治安・社会秩序、経済、福祉、環境、教育、女性の地位・社会進出、地方自治)
- 9. area of origin: local municipality, local prefecture, non-local prefecture (出身地:地元の市区町村、地元の都道府県、地元ではない都道府県)

#### **Constraints:**

Attribute order sets, gender to age, and family structure to living conditions are always preserved to make the profile look natural.

#### Measured variables

#### Outcome variables:

- 1. Perception of which candidate is more desirable/preferred
- 2. Perception of which candidate is more likely to win

Covariates include: [see attached file for measurement]:

- 1. Gender and Age [genderage]
- 2. Education [edu]
- 3. Residential environment [urban], [postcode]
- 4. Socioeconomic status: income [income], occupation [employment]
- 5. Family status: married and have kids or not [marrykids]
- 6. Political views: support for the current Kishida cabinet [pmsup], interest in politics [polint], vote in the 2021 election [voted], partisanship [psup]

7. Political knowledge: Self-assessed levels of political knowledge [selfknow] and aggregated score of answers to 9 factual test questions. Following Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), three questions are on political institutions, four questions are on ideological position of parties (LDP versus CDP, LDP versus JCP, Ishin versus CDP, Ishin versus JCP), and two questions are on political leaders. We will use both the continuous scale and the binary scale (median split). [know\_court, know\_cabinet; know\_hoc; ppos\_2; ppos\_3; ppos\_5; ppos\_6; know\_kishi; know\_makishima]

#### Indices

To create a continuous scale of aggregated variables, we sum up question responses and rescale to a unit interval.

To create a binary scale of aggregated variables, we sum up question responses and recode those above the midpoint as 1, those below the midpoint as 0.

## Analysis Plan

#### Statistical models

We estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each attribute on the probability that the candidate will be chosen as the preferred candidate as well as the more likely to win candidate, where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. We run the analysis separately for each dependent variable and for national/local election conditions.

## Transformations

Continuous variables will be standardized in the standard deviation units.

#### Inference criteria

Alpha = .05 and 0.10; two-tailed.

#### Data exclusion

Cases who take too long or too short time (3SD above/below the mean) to complete each conjoint task are excluded.

#### Missing data

If respondents do not complete all conjoint tasks, we retain the choices they did make.

#### Exploratory analysis

We expect certain candidate attributes to moderate the relationship between their gender and level of support. Therefore, we will look for interaction effects between gender and age, political party, political experience, education, family structure, residential status, policy focus, and the area of origin. We expect certain voter attributes to moderate the relationship between candidate gender and level of support. Therefore, we will look for interaction effects between candidates' gender and voters' gender, age, political party, family structure, education, residential environment, political knowledge and policy focus.

## Other

Other

N/A