AGNES HELLER

The Theory of Need in Marx



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

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III

The Concept of "Social Need"

In Marx's view, the concept of "social need" is not a category which is in itself alienated, but one which has a rational meaning in every society, even after the positive overcoming of alienation. However, it is one of his least precise concepts, and he uses it in several different ways. It is used to describe various social facts including, often, the capitalist alienation of needs: but if we study the main tendency of Marx's thought we shall find that this interpretation is only one amongst many, and that it is only relevant for capitalist society. It is therefore completely foreign to his overall conception to identify the category of "the general interest" with that of "social need". This point must be strongly emphasised, because in marxist writing the two categories are commonly treated as synonymous. I am referring not only to the fetishistic interpretation of the concept of "social need", but also to the assumption of positive value which lies behind this fetishised interpretation. It is formulated in such a way that "social need" becomes a "need of society": not the whole or the average of the personal needs of individuals, nor the evolving tendency of such needs, nor "socialised" personal need, but a *general* system of needs which, so to speak, is "suspended above" individual people and is at a higher level than the personal needs of the individuals who constitute society. This conception has led to various conclusions (and consequences) both in theory and in practice. The two most important of these should be mentioned.

(a) Since the so-called "social need" is more general and at a higher level than "personal" need, then in cases of conflict the individual should subordinate to the "social need" his own demands for satisfaction of his personal needs. In practice, this kind of "social need" turns out to be the need of the privileged or dominant layers of the working class (or of society), disguised by their halo of "general validity".

(b) "Social needs" are the real, "genuine" needs of individual people; those people who have *de facto* needs which cannot be represented as "social need" simply have "not yet recognised" their "genuine" needs. From this conception there follows a distinction between "recognised" and "unrecognised" needs. But who is to decide which of people's needs are genuine? Once again, it can only be the representatives of the so-called "social need". In other words, the actual needs of the privileged and of the leaders of the movement are incarnations of "universality" and "socialisation", and it is they who decide which of the needs of the class (that is, of the overwhelming majority of the population) are "correct" and which "incorrect": thus the actual, existing needs of the majority are classified as "false". The "representatives" of the "social needs" then take it upon themselves to decide the needs of the majority, and to pursue the alleged "unrecognised needs" instead of people's real and actual needs.

I shall leave aside the practical consequences of this fetishisation of the concept of social needs, and simply add that the fetishised concept of need has been "fabricated" in a similar way to that of interest. We have already seen, on the basis of Marx's own analysis, that the subordination of self to the "general" interest is in fact correlated with the pursuit of personal interest. (Both the "bourgeois" and the "citizen" are necessary to the functioning of bourgeois society.) Moreover, we can sensibly distinguish between "recognised" and "unrecognised" interests. Interest is in fact constituted by opposition of interests (the identity of interests is really the identity of their opposition). Interest is the reduction and at the same time the homogenisation of needs, in the same way that we give to Self (whether "Self" signifies a person, an association or a class) the value of our own "reciprocal determination" *against* others: it is therefore realistic to assert that the person (the nation, the class etc.) who fails to assert himself over others is failing to act in accordance with his own interests. Furthermore, if a person (an association, a class) does not clearly see the optimal means of asserting his claims, then he has "not recognised" his "own interests". If the optimal means of asserting claims in the intercourse of the various objectivations are different or directly opposed, one may then reasonably speak of "conflicts of interest".

Let us return to Marx's position. As we have seen, he speaks

on various occasions of "real" and "imaginary" needs, but never and nowhere does he speak of "unconscious" or "unrecognised" needs (both the "real" and the "imaginary" are conscious). Moreover, it is precisely in order to circumvent the category of "unrecognised" needs that Marx requires the concept of "radical needs" (he ascribes the latter to the working class more than once, though he does not consider them as being present *de facto* in the class). Where there are "unrecognised needs" there are also "educators", whose job it is to make people "conscious" of their needs. But it is well known that Marx rejected this conception of "unrecognised needs" as early as the *Theses on Feuerbach* (where he treats it as what it really is: a category from the Enlightenment).

only needs of the people

Marx recognises no needs other than those of individual people. One may calculate or budget for an average of individual needs (as we have seen in the case of "necessary needs"), but these are still the needs of individual people. Only in his description of fetishism does Marx use the category of need with its fetishistic meaning (in order to contrast it with needs which are not fetishistic and which are therefore those of individuals). Let us take, for example, the passages from *Capital* quoted on page (24), where he defines capitalist alienation by the fact that it is not the worker's needs of development that are decisive but "the need to valorise capital". This latter expression is consciously used here in a fetishistic sense. For although the need to valorise capital is always the need of an individual capitalist, the capitalist too is an alienated power, a representative of capital. In capitalist society, relationships between human beings (like needs) appear as reified relationships — but in fact they are still relationships between human beings.

1. "socially produced"

As I have already said, Marx uses the concept of "social needs" in various senses. The most important meaning (and the most frequently used) is that of "socially produced" need. The relevant passages have already been quoted in the first chapter, and I will not repeat them here. "Socially produced" needs are the needs of *individual human beings*. In some places this classification includes, as a whole, needs "that are not natural needs", and in other places it includes all needs indiscriminately. In this latter interpretation, "socially produced" need is synonymous with human need, where "human" is *not* a value category.

2. positive value category (need for communism)

In another sense that appears less often, but nevertheless with a certain frequency, "social need" is a positive value category: it is the need of man for communism, the need of the so-called "socialised man". In the third volume of *Capital*, capitalist society is once again contrasted with the society of associated producers, precisely from the standpoint of needs:

> "The expansion or contraction of production are determined by . . . profit and the proportion of this profit to the employed capital, thus by a definite rate of profit, *rather than the relation of production to social needs, i.e. to the needs of socially developed human beings.*"[57]

Here, therefore, "social need" means the needs of "socially developed humanity". It is unnecessary to emphasise that here too "social need" means the need of the individual human being.

"Social need" is given a third meaning when it is used to describe average needs for material goods in a society or a class. When Marx uses the concept in this sense, he often puts the expression "social need" in inverted commas, and he does so deliberately. "Social need" in inverted commas is the expression of needs in the form of effective demand; without the inverted commas it means those needs (relating to material goods) which do not find expression in effective demand. The distinction is only relevant for Marx in relation to the working class, since he admits that for the ruling classes material need and effective demand at least overlap; and, generally speaking, effective demand is greater than the real need (the "necessary need") of the ruling classes. For the working class, the discrepancy lies between "social need", which appears in the form of effective demand, and so-called "true" social need, the latter not only quantitatively outstripping the former but also containing qualitatively concrete needs of a different kind. In *Capital*, Marx says:

> " 'Social need', i.e. the factor which regulates the principle of demand, is essentially subject to the mutual relationship of the different classes and their respective economic position."[58]

A few pages later, arguing the matter more deeply, he says:

> "It would seem, then, that there is on the side of demand a certain magnitude of definite social needs which require for their satisfaction a definite quantity of a commodity on the market. But the quantitative determination of this need is very elastic and changing. Its fixedness is only apparent. If the

means of subsistence were cheaper, or money wages higher, the labourers would buy more of them, and a greater 'social need' would arise for them. . . . The limits within which the need for commodities represented on the market (i.e. demand) is quantitatively different from *real social need* naturally vary considerably from one commodity to another."[59]

"Social need" here refers to demand and is therefore mere *appearance* which does not express the "real" social needs of the working class, and so disguises them as their opposite.

But what are these real social needs? For Marx, the content of this category corresponds essentially to the empirical and sociological content of *necessary* needs. It needs to be emphasised, however, that this is an average; more precisely, it is the average of individual needs (historically developed, handed down by custom and containing moral aspects). We are dealing here with an objective category: a given human being, belonging to a given class, at a given period of time, is born into a system and hierarchy of needs which, although it is determined by the objects of his needs and by the customs and morality of preceding generations, is nevertheless constantly changing; he will internalise this, even though in an individual manner (to a greater or lesser extent in different societies).

This is in no way, however, an autonomous structure, "suspended above" the members of a class or of a society. The need of the individual is what he knows and feels to be his need — he has no other needs. Thus in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* Marx laments "the absence of needs" amongst the workers. He is not saying that workers are conscious of the needs which appear in the form of effective demand but unconscious of their "true" needs that do not appear in this form; "in the latter case, social needs would not be 'flexible' ". What he is saying is rather that true social needs represent actual, thoroughly conscious needs, whilst the "social needs" that are presented on the market indicate the possibilities of satisfying true social needs in a given society. It is not a question of a contrast between conscious and unconscious, but, as Marx says in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, of a contrast between being and not being, between realising and not realising, between what is satisfiable and what is not satisfiable.

Let us add that Marx applies this interpretation of social needs

only to material needs, and to those non-material needs that are purchasable by means of exchange value. As regards other non-material needs, the category of "social need" in the above sense is altogether irrelevant. It is, of course, true that there is an objective character not only to material needs, that is to "social needs" as interpreted above, but also to needs generically: to the need for artistic activity, or the need for fellowship or love. (The system of needs already realised, i.e. the hierarchy of needs, "guides" the needs of man born in a specific society, because needs can only develop in interaction with objects and realisations as objects, and because these "objects" demarcate the limits of the needs.) But Marx *never* considers the need for artistic activity or love as "social needs" in the sense specified here. The satisfaction of such needs through exchange value is for him, as we have already seen, the most characteristic form of the phenomenon of alienation: the quantification of the unquantifiable.

Let us look finally at the fourth meaning of social needs: the social (or sometimes: "communal") satisfaction of needs. This is a non-economic interpretation, serving to define or express the fact that men have needs which are not only socially produced, but which, also, are satisfiable only by the creation of corresponding social institutions. In modern society, for example, the satisfaction of the need to learn is possible only by means of adequate institutions for public instruction. The same thing applies to the need for health care and to innumerable kinds of cultural need, even to the need for community. (In this last case the creation of appropriate institutions is not absolutely necessary. However, it is a need which, by its very nature, is satisfiable only in togetherness with others.)

Although the category is not economic, we can however find an economic aspect in it. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx writes that it is necessary to deduct from the gross income of labour "that which is destined for the communal satisfaction of needs such as schools, health services, etc."[60] It is interesting to observe how Marx attributes to purely material "social needs" a character of relative quantitative stability (their quantity should increase almost exclusively in parallel with growth of the population). The part of these social values that serves the "communal satisfaction of needs" will

increase rapidly in the future (an ever greater percentage of the gross income of labour will be necessary for the satisfaction of such needs): "From the outset this part is considerably increased in comparison with present day society and it increases in proportion as the new society develops."[61] Needless to say, Marx most certainly does not consider this shift as the "true", "conscious" needs of men becoming related to personal consumption, with "unrecognised" needs becoming represented by the "communal satisfaction of needs". For the future, Marx envisages men for whom, *ab ovo*, these needs (which are only satisfiable socially) appear as *conscious* and *personal* needs, the satisfaction of which will be so important that they themselves will set the limit on other needs. We know that, according to Marx, in the society of associated producers it is only other needs which set limits on human needs. When the domination of things over human beings ceases, when relations between human beings no longer appear as relations between things, then *every* need governs "the need for the development of the individual", the need for the self-realisation of the human personality.

IV

"Radical Needs"

Marx always attributes positive values to communism and constantly contrasts them with the alienated character of past values, those of "pre-history" and particularly those of capitalism. This attribution of value by Marx is characterised, subjectively, by "Ought" [*das Sollen*]: communism *should* be realised. But from the very beginning Marx is also forced to surmount this Ought (the subjectivity of Ought) theoretically. He finds two ways of doing this; they are not always differentiated, but they can be. The first is the transformation of the *subject* into the *collectivity*. The Ought itself is *collective*, because at the maximum point of capitalist alienation it stimulates certain needs among the masses (and particularly among the proletariat); these are the radical needs which embody this Ought and which, by their very nature, tend to transcend capitalism — and precisely in the direction of communism. The second way is the transformation of Ought into *causal necessity*. "Communism should be realised" is, in this case, a principle synonymous with the idea that it will necessarily be realised by the inherent laws of the economy. It might be said that sometimes it is a fichtian conception which prevails in Marx, and sometimes a hegelian one (both, of course, are "inverted").

This fluctuating attitude is expressed, *inter alia*, when Marx oscillates between a conception of economic laws as "laws of nature" and the contrary conception. In the well known preface of 1867 to the first volume of *Capital*, he writes of his standpoint as one from which "the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history."[62] It only needs to be added that in the postscript to the second edition (1873) he draws our attention to his conscious use of the hegelian method. Not so well known are the observations that contradict this position. In the third volume of *Theories of Surplus Value* Marx writes that when capitalism comes to be analysed historically, "the illusion of regarding (the economic

laws of a social formation) as natural laws of production vanishes".[63] And even in the first volume of *Capital* he speaks of a "law of capitalist accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into a pretended law of nature".[64] It might be objected that "the process of natural history" and "law of nature" are not synonymous. But the objection is not valid, because in the preface that has been quoted one can already read, in so many words, the expression "law of nature", in a context which is for us particularly important, the context of the historical perspective:

> "And even when a society has got on to the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement . . . it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth pangs."[65]

We shall see that there is an analagous interpretation for the "negation of the negation".

In his letter to the editors of *Otecestvennye Zapiski* Marx again raises doubts about the naturalistic interpretation. And in his rough notes for a letter replying to Vera Zasulic, he writes about the possibility of reaching communism by a circuitous route, "jumping over" capitalism. (Thus there also exists the possibility of "jumping" some "stages of development".) Primitive accumulation is not therefore a "general law", and the proletarianisation of the peasantry is not a "necessity". Indeed, Marx writes with a tone of resignation: "If Russia continues to tread the path on which it has travelled since 1861, it will *lose the finest opportunity* that history has ever offered a people, and will experience all the inevitably circuitous journeyings through the régime of capitalism."[66] As so often when he is examining concrete historical problems, Marx substitutes the concept of "alternatives" for that of "necessity".

In the other conception, however, the category of "Possibility" occupies as small a position as it does in the hegelian conception of "economic law". In order to understand this and the central problem of "radical needs", we must briefly consider Marx's conception of "the social totality".

Every social formation is a total Whole, a unity of structures coherently linked to each other and constructed interdependently. There is no causal relationship between these structures (no one

of them is the "cause" or the "consequence" of another); they are only able to function as parts of an interdependent arrangement. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx formulates this as follows:

> "The production relations of every society form a whole. M. Proudhon considers economic relations as so many social phases, engendering one another, resulting one from the other like the antithesis from the thesis, and realising in their logical sequence the impersonal reason of humanity. . . . How, indeed, could the single logical formula of movement, of sequence, of time, explain the structure of society, in which *all relations coexist simultaneously and support one another?*"[67]

In the *Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy*, explaining the problems of production, exchange and consumption, Marx concludes: "The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity."[68] And in the *Grundrisse* he says, "Forces of production and social relations (are) two different sides of the development of the social individual."[69] Also, in the well known passage in which he deals in detail with the relation between the economic base and ideological forms, Marx concerns himself with the reciprocal composition of these structures. The life processes of society manifest themselves in the superstructure, since the moments of the latter "bring out" [*austragen*] the conflicts of the base.

Now from our point of view, why is the conception of the social totality (the "formation") important? It is because this conception makes it possible to locate the foundations of the collective Ought in Being. For the present, let us briefly say that one of the essential interdependent structures of capitalism as "formation" is the structure of need. To be able to function in the form characteristic of Marx's epoch, to be able to subsist as "social formation", capitalism had to have, within its structure of need, certain needs that were not satisfiable internally. According to Marx, radical needs are *inherent* aspects of the capitalist structure of need: without them, as we have said, capitalism cannot function, so it creates them afresh every day. "Radical needs" cannot be "eliminated" from capitalism because they are necessary to its functioning. They are not the "embryos"

of a future formation, but "members" of the capitalist formation: it is not the *Being* of radical needs that transcends capitalism but their *satisfaction*. Those individuals for whom the "radical needs" already arise in capitalism are the bearers of the "collective Ought".

In order to deepen the discussion of this problem it is, however, also necessary to analyse the antinomies of capitalism.

Naturally the two kinds of "transformation" of Ought, which we have traced back to Fichte and Hegel respectively, also find expression in the theory of the antinomies of capitalism: "naturally", because the problem of what are the opposites to be surmounted and the problem of how to surmount them are organically connected.

We begin with the "hegelian" conception of antinomy, which is better known and also easier. Let us refer to two unambiguous passages, one from the *Preface to the "Critique of Political Economy"*, the other from the first volume of *Capital*. (Analagous formulations are to be found in the *Communist Manifesto* and in passages of *Anti-Dühring* in which Engels explains Marx's conception.)

In the *Preface* he writes:

> "At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters."[70]

Marx explains a general law here, which is valid for *every* social formation (though elsewhere he is opposed to the formulation of social laws of universal validity).

In every social formation, relations of production are first established which correspond to the level of development of the productive forces, and which for a certain period contribute to the development of the productive forces. But subsequently oppositions develop that lead to contradiction, whereby the relations of production become fetters on the productive forces. Here the point is to invert the hegelian conception of contradiction and thus to change it. The course of development (of the forces and relations of production) in every social formation

would accordingly be correspondence — opposition — contradiction.

In the first book of *Capital*, in the chapter on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", Marx shows how capitalism developed the productive forces and how, in parallel, the oppositions within this society have unfolded. He concludes as follows:

> "The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.
>
> The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e. on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production produced by labour itself."[71]

This passage describes the phases of capitalist development as follows. For a certain period capitalism develops the productive forces to an extraordinary degree, through the socialisation of production. Then the socialised productive forces and the relations of production enter into contradiction. This contradiction sharpens, becomes irreconcilable and finally reaches the "point" at which the centralisation of the means of production breaks the "shell" of capitalism. The capitalist mode of production brings about its own negation with the necessity of a natural process. Of course capitalism does not collapse of its own accord: it is overturned by the proletariat. But this overturning is necessary because of capitalism's economic dysfunction. Quite rightly Marx denies having simply adapted the hegelian model to his own way of thinking, and asserts that he is using it only to express his own conceptions. We have seen that this assertion is valid. In fact

Marx's theory of contradiction can be traced back to Hegel simply in the sense that the hegelian formula is an *adequate* mode of expression for it.

But what is the role of "radical needs" in this conception? In the context which I have already quoted Marx writes, with reference to these needs:

> "Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital . . . grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with it too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself."[72]

However one reads this passage, the theory of absolute impoverishment is clearly formulated (poverty *grows* with the development of capitalism). At the same time the theme of "radical needs" also emerges. We are thus confronted with the most paradoxical possible articulation of the paradox to which we have referred. If the negation of the negation were a natural law, no kind of radical need whatever would be necessary for the downfall of capitalism.

These passages from *Capital* clearly demonstrate that Marx, in the hegelian sense, "objectivised" Ought in social necessity, or rather in economic necessity, thus removing precisely its character as "Ought". The generalisation of the hegelian theory of contradiction into a global social law is, of course, only a consequence of this. The fact that the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production (where the latter are smashed by the development of the former) appears in *every* society is the historical demonstration of the necessity for capitalism to collapse. It should be added that Marx here is ruthlessly consistent — more so than Engels — about there always being another possibility, i.e. the ruin of the productive forces (since the *Manifesto* is a jointly written work we cannot refer to it in this connection):

> "The capitalist mode of production more and more completely transforms the great majority of the population into proletarians, it creates the power which, under penalty of its own destruction, is forced to accomplish this revolution."[73]

The fact that Engels poses the alternative here is without a doubt a merit on his part, but there is still a certain one-sided-

ness in his conception. Of Marx's two theories of contradiction Engels in fact accepts only one exclusively (the hegelian version); hence this is the only one in which he can "find room" for practice. But Marx had an additional, fundamentally different theory of contradiction which is of no less significance.

This second conception of contradiction cannot be generalised with reference to past history: Marx himself several times underlines the point that it cannot be generalised (for example in the first volume of *Capital*, in the chapter on commodity fetishism). According to this conception, the antinomies that are expressed in capitalism are the contradictions of advanced commodity production. And the structure of the first part of the first volume of *Capital* (commodities - money - capital) is founded upon the unfolding of precisely these antinomies. The commodity is use value and exchange value; from the very beginning (from the moment at which products are turned into commodities), these develop oppositions of a contradictory character. The commodity is not the unity of opposites but the form in which the opposites move. The commodity form is the embryo of the antinomies of capitalism, and these contradictions are already contained in the embryo itself.

In the production of commodities, human relations assume the form of relations between things; social existence becomes fetishised in "the thing" [*zu Dinglichem fetischisiert*]. Social relations fetishised in "the thing" confront individual human beings in the form of economic laws — laws of nature, as it were. The functioning of social power is mystified into a law of nature:

> "All the different kinds of private labour, which are carried on independently of each other, and yet as spontaneously developed branches of the social division of labour, are continually being reduced to the quantitative proportions in which society requires them. And why? Because in the midst of all the accidental and ever fluctuating exchange-relations between the products, the labour-time socially necessary for their production forcibly asserts itself like an over-riding law of Nature."[74]

However, this mystified expression of economic laws in the form of natural laws is precisely and exclusively the consequence of commodity production, its inner essence:

> "The value-form of the product of labour is not only the *most abstract*, but is also the *most universal* form, taken by the

> product in the bourgeois mode of production . . . If then we treat this mode of production as one eternally fixed by Nature for every state of society, we necessarily overlook the specificity of the value form, and consequently of the commodity-form, and of its further developments, money-form, capital-form, etc."[75]

These are the forms which "bear it stamped upon them in unmistakeable letters that they belong to a state of society, in which *the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him.*"[76]

Before starting to analyse the antinomies of commodity production I want to emphasise the fact that this conception logically contradicts any statement that the realisation of the society of associated producers is a law of nature. The functioning of the economy in the guise of natural law belongs in fact to commodity production and only to it, as an expression of commodity fetishism. The positive overcoming of private property cannot therefore in any way proceed in the form of a "natural necessity"; the essence of this process is the overcoming of fetishism and the revolutionary liquidation of the appearance which social existence has of being a quasi-law of nature. Although it has economic aspects, the transition *cannot* be a purely economic process, but must be a total social revolution and is only conceivable as such.

For Marx the specific antinomies of capitalism, which derive from commodity production, are those between *freedom and necessity, necessity and chance, teleology and causality;* from these follows the special antinomy of social wealth and social impoverishment. These are the antinomies of the "pure" society in which economic development assumes the status of natural law and in which — to recall *Capital* once again — man is subordinated to the process of production and not the process of production to man.

First let us consider the antinomy of freedom and necessity. In commodity production the producer is a free man, a man who has cut "the umbilical cord of the natural community": commodity exchange itself is an act of freedom and equality. Every producer of commodities freely pursues his own private interest (we refer once again to the passage in Marx) if, when he exchanges his commodity, he exchanges "like for like". Marx says the same thing about wage labour. The wage labourer is free;

without free labour power, capitalist accumulation could never have started (one of the functions of primitive accumulation was that of bringing free labour power on to the market). However, the free commodity producer and the free labourer are equally subordinated to the quasi-natural necessity of the economy, which asserts itself behind the backs of the "free" actions of individual human beings.

This antagonism is part of the essence of commodity production, i.e. of capitalism, from the first moment of its appearance.

Let us look briefly at the antinomy of necessity and chance. Marx associates the law of value (according to which value is defined by the socially necessary labour time) not exclusively with capitalism but with every society in which the sphere of production is rational; the law of value therefore will assume its most pure form in the society of "associated producers". In the third volume of *Capital*, Marx writes:

> "This reduction of the total quantity of labour going into a commodity seems, accordingly, to be the essential criterion of increased productivity of labour, no matter under what social conditions production is carried on. Productivity of labour, indeed, would always be measured by this standard in a society in which producers regulate their production according to a preconceived plan."[77]

This economic law, which characterises rational production, is manifested in capitalism as a natural law, that is, as a law of chance (recall the quotation from the first volume of *Capital* quoted earlier), since the value of the commodity in exchange functions as exchange value. Profit, average profit and the market price, as apparently different forms, hide and mystify the same law of value. In this context, it is important to note that production and need meet on the market in the form of supply and demand, and that this meeting comes about in an altogether chance way. It is equally possible that they do not meet; in this event, the law of value is again confirmed as a natural law, but it takes the form of crisis.

People in capitalist society are "accidental individuals", not born into any "natural division of labour"; their destiny is not predetermined from birth. However, given the structure of capitalist society, they are subordinated to a kind of social division of labour that, as we have already said, "allocates" their

needs, needs which are no longer determined by their personality but by their position in the social division of labour. At the same time their capacities, "senses" etc. are also "divided" by the social division of labour.

Now let us consider the antinomy of causality and teleology. Engels, following in the footsteps of Hegel, describes the dialectic between human activity and its consequences, by which everyone sets out to realise his own individual ends but the result is something completely different from what the individual originally wanted to achieve. He presents, in a fundamental manner, the contradictory character of commodity-producing society. The fact that he does not recognise it as such but considers it to be "the general dialectical character" of the historical process, spotlights the hegelian foundations of his position. What does the individual capitalist want, what is his goal? He wants the realisation of exchange values, more precisely, to make a profit. And what does the worker want? He wants to survive. These aims are what set the laws of capitalism in motion, "behind the backs of" human beings and the aims which they set for themselves. Even the raising of production is not the aim of an individual. The formula "production for production's sake" which Marx deals with so extensively, is not only a highly scientific formula, it is also a *value judgement* taken from Ricardo. (On the basis of this formula Ricardo justifies capitalism, because it effectively develops the productive forces.) All the same, for the purpose of regulating the mechanism of capitalism it is not the principle "production for production's sake" that counts but the principle "production for the sake of valorising capital". Marx's finest concrete analysis concerning the antinomy of causality and teleology is to be found in the law of the falling average rate of profit. No individual capitalist aims at lowering the average rate of profit. But in order to further his actual aim (to make a profit and to survive under conditions of competition), he must keep increasing his fixed capital and thus constantly submit to the process that causally leads to the continuous lowering of the average rate of profit. In capitalist society, *the individual teleology* can never become *the social teleology*.

Finally, as regards the special antinomy of wealth and poverty (which characterises capitalism in particular) let Marx speak for himself:

"Ricardo, rightly for his time, regards the capitalist mode of production as the most advantageous for production in general, as the most advantageous for the creation of wealth. He wants production for the sake of production and this with good reason. To assert . . . that production as such is not the object, is to forget that production for its own sake means nothing but the development of human productive forces, in other words the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself. . . . They reveal a failure to understand the fact that, although at first the development of the capacities of the human species take place at the cost of the majority of the human individuals and even classes, in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual; the higher development of individuality is thus only achieved by a historical process during which individuals are sacrificed."[78]

The discussion here clearly does not turn upon alienation in general, but on capitalist alienation in particular, the alienation of the "pure society" in which commodity relations have become universal and capitalism has "liberated" the productive forces. (See Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 157-8, 470 and 528.) For the moment what interests us in particular is the resolution of the antinomy, of the problem of "transition" to the society of the future. What does Marx say? It will be "the development of the capacities of the human species" that breaks through this antagonism. But is this concept synonymous with the "centralisation of the means of production" and the "socialisation of labour" which appear in the passage quoted from the first volume of *Capital*? The answer is, without a doubt, no. The "development of the human species" is a much broader concept than the others; and it is not, of course, a mere consequence of the centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour. Moreover there is no question here (nor in any other passages where this conception of the antinomy is under discussion) of any "natural law" that leads society into the future. The necessity of the "transition" is not in fact "guaranteed" by any *natural* law but by the *radical needs*.

If Marx said that with his first theory of contradiction he "inverted" the dialectic of Hegel, we can justifiably say that with the second he inverted the antinomies of Fichte. The antinomies

of freedom and necessity, chance and necessity, causality and teleology, subject and object, are not antinomies in thought but in Being. Nor are they simply antinomies in social Being but rather in commodity-producing society, and in capitalism in particular. According to this interpretation, the dialectic is merely the *expression* of the antinomies in capitalist society. (Following Marx, Lukács interpreted the dialectic in this way in both *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel*.)

These, then, are capitalism's "antinomies in Being"; the capitalist "social body" finds expression in them. In *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx ironically rejects Proudhon's proposal to get rid of the "bad aspects" of capitalism and keep the "good". The structures of the capitalist "formation" are interdependent: it is impossible to reject some and keep others. The specific freedom which stands in a contradictory relation to necessity is not the same as the specific freedom which does not stand in a contradictory relation to necessity. The same applies to necessity in relation to chance, and to teleology in relation to causality. Finally, the specific subject which develops a contradictory relation to its object is not the same as that which "reabsorbs" its object into itself, and which brings about the subject-object identity. (We know in fact that not until "the human species" breaks through capitalist alienation and the antagonistic development of subject and object does the development of the species coincide with that of the individual.)

It is interesting to note the arguments in *The Poverty of Philosophy* from this point of view, where Marx examines every aspect of Proudhon's writing — even down to observing the latter's order of exposition. After the concept of "formation" there follows an important mode of formulation of the radical needs as "the need for universality", which Marx regards as particularly important. The reasoning concludes as follows: "Meanwhile the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution."[79] That is to say, where there are no "good sides" to preserve in opposition to the "bad sides", where the oppositions are reciprocally arranged and interdependent, total revolution is the only way of transcending this opposing pair.

All this proves what we have been saying up to now. The idea

that the transition from capitalism to communism is an objective law of nature is incompatible with Marx's second theory of contradiction. According to this theory, only the revolutionary struggle of the collective subject (the working class), having become such by virtue of its radical needs and revolutionary practice, can guarantee the transition to and creation of the future society.

I have used the word "guarantee" deliberately: it is a "guarantee" in the factual sense of the word. Communism follows from Marx's second theory of contradiction no less necessarily than from his first. In this second theory too, Marx has given Ought an objective existence: as we have already said, not as "natural law" but as the collective Ought. Only the struggle of the collective subject is capable of bringing about the new society: its revolution is radical, "from the root", and total. But the collective Ought arises necessarily, for the "social body" of capitalism itself necessarily generates the radical needs and their bearers. The fact that in Marx's time these radical needs had not yet become actual — at least not on a mass scale — and that Marx therefore had to "invent" them, so to speak, does not disprove the theory. Consider how today we can see with our own eyes the emergence of such "radical needs". It does not detract from Marx's greatness that the bearers of these radical needs today are not, or rather not exclusively, the working class. Marx could only construct radical needs where he saw some possibilities for their development. Another problem is presented by the fact that for us today, the simple "assigning" of Ought to the sphere of objectivity — i.e. the idea of the necessity of revolutionary action — cannot be accepted, for we would at least have to add Engels's qualification: "on pain of death".

I have said that in the society of associated producers which Marx foresaw the above-mentioned antinomies cease to exist, and that the way to overcome them is total revolution. How, in Marx's view, is communist society shaped from the point of view of overcoming these particular antinomies? I shall deal with it only in a few words here, because the analysis of the system of needs in the society of associated producers will come later. When the opposition between subject and object ceases, as we have already seen, the wealth of the species and the wealth of the individual "coincide" (*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of*

1844), i.e. the wealth of the species is represented by every separate individual. The realm of production (the organic interchange between society and nature) remains the realm of necessity, but necessity is subordinated to freedom. Social relations between human beings then become free relations; mankind, socialised in freedom, dominates the realm of necessity and regulates it, controls it. The law of value does not assert itself on the market: hence the aspect of chance is eliminated from the economy. Human beings no longer have a chance relationship with society. As socialised individuals, they represent the human species for itself. Teleology has dominance over causality. The "associated intelligence" of the associated producers embodies social teleology. No quasi-natural force makes itself felt "behind the backs of people": from the dispositions of the collective teleology, what people *really want* "emerges". The subordination to which we refer will be possible only because the freedom, necessity, teleology and social wealth of the future society are not the same freedom, necessity, teleology and wealth as in capitalist society. The future society, in every aspect of its structure, is fundamentally different from capitalist society, and hence it can only come about in total revolution. However, it is obviously the capitalist development of the productive forces that generates the possibility of this revolution.

This latter feature is common to both of Marx's conceptions of contradiction. One observation seems necessary here. In my own view it has been sufficiently proved that in Marx there are two kinds of theory of contradiction which are mutually exclusive in principle; but this does not mean that there are no passages in Marx's work where the two conceptions appear together, where in dealing with one theory of contradiction considerations deriving from the other are also used. There are actually several such examples. I have already drawn attention to it: we saw that in "the negation of the negation" there is an echo of the "radical needs" motif, though in this particular context the motif was not essential.

The fact that Marx held two differing theories of contradiction is not a defect in his thought: on the contrary, it is a striking proof of his genius. Like every other thinker of importance, he too refused to sacrifice the *search* for truth in various directions and along various paths on the altar of coherence. He pinpointed

various possibilities of finding a solution and considered every one of them with the consistency that is characteristic of genius. To refurbish Marx into a thinker who worked out a coherent system means to deprive him of precisely the main source of his greatness: his feverish and many-sided search for truth. It is characteristic of a great thinker that he not only creates important impulses, but that these impulses point in many directions. The immortality, the living content of Marx's thought which transcends historical epochs, is based precisely upon this brilliant lack of coherence. For this reason it is always possible to rediscover him; for this reason many different movements, which however are all of world historical importance, can consider Marx as their precursor, as "their own". His work is a clear, inexhausible fountain.

The conception of radical needs appears for the first time in a detailed form in the Introduction to (the proposed revision of) *A Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Law"*. If we look at this conception in the course of its birth, we can "catch it red-handed": we can see how far Marx gives Ought an objective existence, when he says that pure theoretical critique is realised in activity, in tasks "for whose solution there is one means only: practice". The reference goes further:

> "The weapon of criticism obviously cannot replace the criticism of weapons. Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses when it demonstrates *ad hominem*, and it demonstrates *ad hominem* when it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root, but for man the root is man himself."[80]

Marx measures the radicalism of theory in terms of the way it attributes value (i.e. its value-premise): theory is radical to the extent that man (human wealth) represents the highest value. (I do not consider this value-premise to be characteristic only of the younger Marx, as I have already pointed out several times. We need only look at the third volume of *Theories of Surplus Value*, where Marx quotes the expression used by Galiani, "true wealth . . . is man", and praises with enthusiasm rare for him the sublime "idealism" of the proletarian ideology expressed there.)

The problem is, however, as follows: how can radical theory become practice? How can it grip the masses? How can the values of radical criticism become the values of the masses, that is, how can Ought become the collective Ought? The reply is: "Theory is actualised in a people only in so far as it actualises *their needs. . . . A deep-going revolution can only be a revolution in basic needs.*" The "bearers" of radical needs are therefore those who can actualise radical deep-going theory. Marx then looks for the bearers of these radical needs and in the end he finds them in the working class. He bases his conclusion on the fact that it is "a class with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not of civil society . . . a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it; a sphere that can invoke no traditional title but only a human title."[81] The working class therefore embodies radical needs, because it has no *particular* goals of its own, nor can it have any, since its goals, by the very fact of being the working class's goals, can only be general. Later on Marx speaks again of this idea — for example, in *The Communist Manifesto* — saying that the working class cannot free itself without freeing humanity as a whole. (*The Communist Manifesto* is, on the other hand, also the work in which the concept of class interest is introduced. Since it was written jointly by Marx and Engels, I have not taken it into consideration in my analysis of interest.)

If indeed it is right to say — and in my opinion it is — that the working class can free itself only by freeing humanity too, it does not follow from this however that in terms of historical reality the working class actually wishes to free itself and that its needs are in fact radical needs. Nor does it even follow that it has no particular goals (particular needs) which it can realise or satisfy within capitalist society. As we have seen, Marx himself speaks later on of these particular interests in relation to the struggle for wages: he contrasts the particular struggle for wage increases with the "general" struggle to abolish the wages system and to satisfy radical needs. Remember also that, in Marx's view, what characterises the working class is both its reduction to paltry particular needs and interests, and at the same time the rise of radical needs.

In his subsequent writings, Marx no longer seeks the origin of "radical needs" either in "radical chains" or in the absence of particular goals. But the essence of his viewpoint remains unchanged. It is based on the fact that capitalist society itself gives rise to radical needs, thus producing its own gravediggers, and that these needs are an organic constituent part of the "social body" of capitalism, thus being unsatisfiable within that society; for precisely this reason, they are the motives of the practice which transcends the given society.

In *The German Ideology* radical needs are founded on what for the proletariat has *accidentally* become labour, "over which the individual proletarians have no control and over which no *social* organisation can give any control; and the contradiction between the personality of the individual proletarian and the condition of life that is imposed upon him, labour, is clear to the proletarian himself."[82] (It emerges clearly from this quotation that the idea of radical needs proceeds from Marx's *second* theory of contradiction.)

According to Marx, therefore, the worker becomes *conscious* of the contradiction between the need to develop his personality and the "accidental" character of his subordination to the division of labour. For this very reason,

> "Proletarians, *in order to make themselves felt as persons*, must abolish their own conditions of existence as they have been up to the present, which at the same time are the conditions of existence for all society up to the present time, namely labour [read "wage labour" — *A.H.*]. So they find themselves also in direct antagonism with the form in which individuals in society have up to now found their collective expression, the state, and they *must overturn the state* to express *their own* personality."[83]

It is necessary to observe that in this passage the word "must" appears twice and on both occasions is stressed. This necessity is not, however, that of "objectively natural economic laws" but of subjective action, of collective activity, of practice.

The idea that radical needs are in some sense constituted from labour runs like a thread through Marx's work: either because surplus labour (performed for its own sake) becomes need; or because of the increase in free time, which gives rise to radical needs (and to the need for still more free time); or because of

the need for universality which, having arisen in the form of mass production, cannot be satisfied within capitalism.

The need for free time is, in Marx's view, an elemental one, because it always thrusts beyond the limits of alienation. In the first volume of *Capital* and elsewhere, the struggle for more free time (for a decrease in labour time) constantly appears within the focus of the proletarian class struggle:

> "There is here, therefore, an antinomy, law against law, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. It is *force* that decides between equal laws. Hence the fact that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of the length of the working day presents itself as the result of a struggle for its limitation: a struggle between the collective capitalist, i.e. the capitalist class, and the collective labourer, i.e. the working class."[84]

While the wage struggle, according to Marx, is conducted for the particular interests of the proletariat, the struggle for free time transcends particular interests and contains in principle "that which conforms to the needs of the species". He proudly draws attention to the fact that when workers were asked in the course of a sociological survey whether they wanted more wages or more free time, the great majority opted for the latter. Of course, he does not deny that the struggle for free time can also remain within the framework of capitalism. But it is precisely the laws regulating commodity exchange that give rise to the "equal laws" between which force decides. At the same time, he is convinced that from a certain point onwards capitalism is incapable of shortening labour time any further: the need for free time then becomes in principle a radical need, which can only be satisfied with the transcendence of capitalism. When related to the need for free time, the character of "radical needs" is brought out in a particularly striking manner: it is produced by capitalism itself, by its contradictory character, and thus belongs to the very functioning of capitalism. (The reduction of labour time compels capitalists to increase their productivity constantly, and to give priority to relative rather than absolute surplus value; this basically represents a specific peculiarity of the capitalist production of surplus value.) At the same time, need itself mobilises the working class into transcending capitalism.

The same applies to the need for universality. In *The German*

Ideology, this idea is still openly formulated with its characteristic of "Ought". The need for universality *must* come about, because only people who have become possessed of the need (and the capacity) for universality are capable of a total revolution:

> "Private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round development of individuals, because the existing character of intercourse and productive forces is an all-round one, and *only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion* can appropriate them, i.e. can turn them into free manifestations of their lives."[85]

But in *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx no longer refers to Ought. The need for universality has already come about, in capitalism; the "radical need" to transcend capitalism already "exists":

> "What characterises the division of labour in the automatic workshop is that labour has there completely lost its specialised character. But the moment every special development stops, the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual begins to be felt."[86]

Marx expresses the same idea in the first volume of *Capital*. The "machine" that dominates in capitalist society makes the development of a universality of capacities indispensable. But while in capitalist society this tendency asserts itself as a natural law, the capitalist division of labour nevertheless "serves as a barrier" to the development of universality. In order to realise this universality (no longer as a natural law asserting itself behind the backs of human beings), the working class must conquer political power and overcome the division of labour.

> "But if, on the one hand, the variation of work at present imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and *with the blindly destructive action of a natural law* that meets with resistance at all points, modern industry, on the other hand, through its catastrophies imposes the necessity of recognising, as a fundamental law of production, the variation of work, and consequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, and consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law. Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker

of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquiring powers. . . . There can be no doubt that when the working class comes into power, as *inevitably* it must, technical instruction, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the working-class schools. There is also no doubt that such revolutionary ferments, the final result of which is the abolition of the old division of labour, are *diametrically opposed* to the capitalist form of production, and to the economic status of the labourer corresponding to that form."[87]

Undoubtedly Marx here is raising only one aspect of the problem of radical needs, giving a meaning to the concept that is more limited than in the previously quoted passages. But the mature Marx does not consider radical needs only from this point of view. Moreover he deals with the same problem, in relation to the dissolution of the family, barely two pages after the passage quoted, where he says that capitalism dissolves the Germano-Christian family form as a "combination of working personnel, composed of individuals of both sexes and all ages, which *must* (under the relevant conditions) become a source of *humane* development, although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalistic form, where *the labourer exists for the process of production and not the process of production for the labourer*, it is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery."[88]

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the mature Marx relates the structure of radical needs exclusively to modern industrial production. In the *Grundrisse* the idea of radical needs has a more universal character than in any of the earlier works. He maintains there that capitalist alienation itself gives rise to radical needs, because of the very consciousness of alienation:

"The material which it works on [Marx is referring here to subjective "labour capacity", not to the workers — *A.H.*] is alien material; the instrument is likewise an alien instrument; its labour appears as a mere accessory to their substance and hence objectifies itself in things not belonging to it. Indeed, living labour itself appears as alien vis-à-vis living labour capa-

city, whose labour it is, whose own life's expression it is. . . . Labour capacity relates to its labour as to an alien, and if capital were willing to pay it without making it labour it would enter the bargain with pleasure. Thus labour capacity's own labour is as alien to it — and it really is, as regards its direction etc. — as are material and instrument. Which is why the product then appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien instrument and alien labour — as alien property, . . . the recognition of the products as its own and the judgement that its separation from the conditions of its realisation is improper — forcibly imposed — is a consciousness *which exceeds its bounds*, itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's consciousness that he cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production."[89]

Here every aspect of Marx's conception appears clearly and unequivocally.

(1) Capitalism is an antinomous society: its essence is alienation. The wealth of the species and the poverty of the individual are reciprocally based and reproduce each other. The antinomy is that of *commodity* production *becoming universal*. (At the beginning of the paragraph quoted, Marx says: "Value having become capital, and living labour confronting it as mere use value, so that living labour appears as a mere means to realise objectified, dead labour . . . , and having produced, as the end product, alien wealth on one side and, on the other, the penury which is living labour capacity's sole possession."[90])

(2) Capitalist society as a totality, as a "social body", produces not only alienation but the consciousness of alienation, in other words, radical needs.

(3) This consciousness (radical needs) is necessarily generated by capitalism.

(4) This consciousness (the complex of radical needs) already transcends capitalism by its existence, and its development makes it impossible for capitalism to remain the basis of production. The need to resolve the antinomy and the activity directed towards this end are therefore constituted in the collective

Ought, in the consciousness that "exceeds its bounds" [*enorme Bewusstsein*].

This concept of "consciousness exceeding its bounds" is beyond question the same as the "imputed consciousness" [*zugerechnete Bewusstsein*] which is a central category in Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* (and nothing shows Lukács's insight into Marx's ideas better than the fact that he did not know the *Grundrisse* when he wrote his own book). Although Marx does not say so, it is obvious that this "consciousness exceeding its bounds" is not identical with the "empirical consciousness" of the working class. It is not consciousness of misery and still less of poverty in the narrow sense: the needs which flow from it (or which constitute its base) are not directed towards "greater possession" and still less towards higher wages or a "better standard of living". It is the simple consciousness of alienation, the recognition that the social relations are alienated: from this there follows (or this constitutes the base for) the need to overcome alienation, to overturn the alienated social and productive relations in a revolutionary way, and to create general social and productive relations which are not alienated.

As yet, history has not answered the question as to whether capitalist society *in fact* produces this "consciousness exceeding its bounds", which in Marx's day did not exist, and whose existence Marx therefore had to *project*.

NOTES

1 Marx, *Capital* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), Vol. I, p.35.
2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 620-1.
3 Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p. 149-50.
4 Ibid., p. 159.
5 Ibid., p. 113.
6 Marx, *Grundrisse* (London: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 92.
7 Ibid., p. 325.
8 Ibid., p. 528.
9 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 171. Translation modified.
10 Ibid., p. 519.
11 Ibid., p. 559.
12 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 799-800.
13 Ibid., p. 800. Translation modified.
14 Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p. 68.
15 *Capital*, Vol. II, p. 403.
16 Ibid., p. 410.
17 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 143-4.
18 Ibid., p. 147.
19 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 252.
20 Marx, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), p. 87.
21 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 141.
22 *The German Ideology*, p. 39.
23 Ibid., p. 276.
24 Ibid., p. 277.
25 Ibid., p. 277.
26 Ibid., p. 459.
27 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 182. Translation modified.
28 *Grundrisse*, p. 409.
29 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 432.
30 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 137. Translation modified.
31 *Grundrisse*, p. 84.
32 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 155.
33 Ibid., p. 155.
34 Ibid., p. 147. Translation modified.
35 Ibid., p. 147.

36 Ibid., p. 168.
37 *Grundrisse*, p. 222.
38 Ibid., p. 224.
39 Ibid., p. 415-16.
40 Ibid. Marx is quoting, in Latin, from the Book of Revelation.
41 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 167.
42 Ibid., p. 169. Translation modified.
43 *Grundrisse*, p. 224.
44 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 139.
45 Ibid., p. 150.
46 Ibid., p. 151.
47 *Grundrisse*, p. 422.
48 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 139.
49 Ibid., p. 139.
50 Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1956), p. 152-3.
51 Ibid., p. 163.
52 Ibid., p. 165.
53 Ibid., p. 267.
54 *Grundrisse*, p. 244.
55 Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital", in *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 268 and 273.
56 Marx, "Value, Price and Profit", Ibid., p. 337.
57 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 253.
58 Ibid., p. 178. Translation modified.
59 Ibid., p. 185. Translation modified.
60 *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 562.
61 Ibid., p. 562.
62 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 10.
63 Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1972), Vol. III, p. 429.
64 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 620-1.
65 Ibid., p. 10.
66 Letter to the editors of *Otecestvennye Zapiski*.
67 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 123-4.
68 *Grundrisse*, p. 99.
69 Ibid., p. 706.
70 Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 153.
71 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 763. Translation modified.
72 Ibid., p. 763.
73 Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p. 388.

74 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 75.
75 Ibid., p. 81, footnote 2.
76 Ibid., p. 81.
77 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 256.
78 *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. II, p. 118.
79 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 197.
80 See *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 137.
81 Ibid., p. 138. Translation modified.
82 *The German Ideology*, p. 93.
93 Ibid., p. 94.
84 *Capital*, Vol. I. Translation modified.
85 *The German Ideology*, p. 483.
86 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 161.
87 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 487-8. Translation modified.
88 Ibid., p. 490. Translation modified.
89 *Grundrisse*, p. 463. Translation modified.
90 Ibid., p. 461.
91 *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 45.
92 *Grundrisse*, p. 712.
93 Ibid., p. 527-8.
94 Marx and Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party", in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 227.
95 *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. III, p. 267. Translation modified.
96 *Grundrisse*, p. 705.
97 *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. III, p. 257.
98 Ibid., p. 273. Translation modified.
99 Ibid., p. 276 (footnote).
100 Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme", in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 563. Translation modified.
101 *Grundrisse*, p. 173.
102 Ibid., p. 612.
103 Ibid., p. 325.
104 Ibid., p. 705-6.
105 *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. I, p. 253.
106 *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 78-9.
107 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 828.
108 Ibid., p. 184.
109 *Grundrisse*, p. 611.
110 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 799-800.
111 Ibid., p. 184.
112 Ibid., p. 830.
113 Ibid., p. 799.

114 *The Holy Family*, p. 60.
115 "Critique of the Gotha Programme", in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 564.
116 *Grundrisse*, p. 714. Marx is actually quoting Robert Owen.
117 Ibid., p. 707.
118 *The Holy Family*, p. 238-9.
119 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 800.
120 *Theories of Surplus Value*, Vol. III, p. 255.
121 *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 137.
122 Ibid., p. 137. Translation modified.
123 Ibid., p. 139-40. Translation modified.
124 Ibid., p. 137.
125 *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 431.

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