

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis

ISSN: 0020-7578 (Print) 1745-8315 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ripa20

# Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

Joel Whitebook

**To cite this article:** Joel Whitebook (2004) Hans Loewald: A radical conservative, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 85:1, 97-115, DOI: 10.1516/8YFC-382H-2XKQ-XHQ3

**To link to this article:** https://doi.org/10.1516/8YFC-382H-2XKQ-XHQ3

Published online: 31 Dec 2017.

*Int J Psychoanal* 2004; **85**:97–116

# Hans Loewald: A radical conservative

JOEL WHITEBOOK
1225 Park Avenue #1A, New York, New York 10128, USA — whitebookj@aol.com
(Final version accepted 10 June 2003)

*Hans Loewald's work was relatively marginalized in its day and it is little known outside the United States. It is, however, assuming increasing importance in American psychoanalysis. Loewald's attractiveness as a theoretician is due, in no small part, to his rigor and synthetic reach. He is able to accomplish the difficult feat of remaining non-sectarian and systematic at the same time. Indeed, Loewald's work contains an integrative vision that is unusual in today's fragmented psychoanalytic world. This author tries to show how Loewald attempts to reconcile many of the rigid oppositions that often become reified in analytic controversies: structural theory versus relational psychoanalysis, traditionalism versus revisionism, oedipal versus pre-oedipal, modernist versus postmodernist and hermeneutical versus scientific. The article examines how Eros, understood in terms of the psyche's synthetic strivings, plays a major role in Loewald's theory. The author also situates Loewald's position within contemporary psychoanalytic discussions of epistemology. These discussions tend to criticize the objectivism of modern science—and analysis in so far as it models itself on science—and stress countertransference and the subjectivity of the analyst. Loewald's argument, however, runs in the opposite direction. Because of his concern with the autonomy and individuality of the patient, he is concerned with the clinical dangers rising from an overemphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst.*

**Keywords:** Loewald, pluralism, synthetic function, Eros, parricide, oedipal and pre-oedipal, modernism and postmodernism, guilt, sublimation, separation-individuation, primary narcissism, psychical apparatus, epistemology, objectivism, psychoanalysis and philosophy, the psychotic core, the new object

There seems to be a Loewald revival going on in American psychoanalysis (see Chodorow, 2001).[1] In a period that has grown suspicious of the sectarianism of the past, Loewald's attractiveness to analysts holding varied and even opposed theoretical positions is not difficult to understand. He was an eminently non-tendentious thinker, who pre-dated the rise of pluralism by 20 years. For example, his effort to do justice to the truth content of every position he took up is apparent in his remarkably even-handed review of the Freud/Jung letters (1977). But Loewald's non-dogmatic sensibility—his 'prophetic ecumenism', as Friedman (1991, p. 93) put it—shouldn't be taken to mean that he suffered from theoretical timidity, often the downside of pluralism. His review of Arlow and Brenner (1966) and his criticisms of Hartmann's theory of neutralization (1988, pp. 20–1), for example, make it clear that he didn't shy away from taking strong positions. Though ecumenical, he was no eclectic.

Loewald's work is characterized by a degree of systematic rigor and a synthetic thrust generally absent from contemporary psychoanalysis. Indeed, not only is the concept of synthesis central to Loewald's theory, the activity of synthesis is also manifested in his

[1] I only received Chodorow's (2003) article 'The psychoanalytic vision of Hans Loewald' after I had completed this paper and was therefore not able to take it into consideration. Chodorow also seeks to demonstrate the originality and scope of Loewald's thinking.

work. He methodically attempts to transcend the binary oppositions—the theoretical splitting—into which psychoanalytic controversies regularly get frozen. For example, both the relational analysts and the structural theorists try to claim him as their own. But Loewald's analysis should have done much to obviate the opposition between the two positions (see Friedman, 1991, p. 93; Fogel, 1996, p. 883). The relational analysts rightfully maintain that Loewald was one of the first Freudians to criticize the model of the psychic apparatus as 'a closed system', stress the role that 'interaction with [the] environment' plays in development and analysis (Loewald, 1960, pp. 223, 221) and reject the blank-screen model of analytic neutrality. At the same time the structural theorists correctly stress that he never stopped insisting that the goal of development and treatment is 'sublimation and true ego expansion' (Loewald, 1977, p. 416). In fact, he argued that this goal is achieved through the structuralizing internalization of the object of interaction: 'The development of an ego function is dependent on interaction' (1960, p. 228). In other words, he believed that interaction and structure formation are two sides of the some process. If there is a tilt in Loewald's position, it is towards autonomy and individuation, rather than relatedness and mutuality, as developmental goals. But even here we will see that he doesn't treat these norms uncritically.

A number of commentators (Friedman 1991; Schafer, 1991; Teicholz, 1999; Fogel, 1996; Greenberg, 1996; Lear, 1998; Mitchell, 2000) try to assess the extent of Loewald's radicalism versus his conservatism. But again, his thinking defies an either/or opposition. His understanding of the relation between tradition and innovation is based on his understanding of the Oedipus complex (1965, pp. 97–100, 1979, pp. 387–97). Along with seeing it as a stage of psychosexual development, he understands it in broad anthropological terms concerning the individual's assumption of his/her maturity and individuality through the conflictual entry into a tradition. Loewald insists that human beings are originally 'thrown' (1978b, p. 19)—the term is Heidegger's—into a world of language, laws and customs not of their own making. In so far as they 'strive for their own individuality and maturity', a 'parricidal' confrontation with their elders—at least 'on the plane of psychic action'—is, therefore, 'a developmental necessity' (1978a, p. 390). The processes can only be completed, however, if they also come to identify with and internalize those same elders, for those internalizations create the structures that are necessary for an autonomous psychic existence. Significant innovation in any field does not only consist in the 'break with tradition', that is, a parricidal challenge to one's forebears, as romantic modernists often believe. It also requires a deep internalization of the tradition that formed the innovators. This can been seen in the great iconoclastic innovators of modernity—Picasso, Schoenberg and Joyce. As Goethe says in one of Freud's favorite quotes: 'Take what was your father's and make it your own' (quoted in Freud, 1913, p. 207).

Psychoanalysis is itself an instituted tradition with its own particular modes of initiation, socialization and transmission of authority. (Indeed, we might say that it is its own tribe—or federation of tribes. How primitive is it? That's a different question.) And Loewald's own relation to the psychoanalytic tradition exemplifies his general theory of tradition and innovation. For Loewald—as opposed to many revisionists—a deep and prolonged engagement with the history of psychoanalysis remains an essential formative experience. His immersion in 'the language of psychoanalysis'—indeed, its *Ursprache* (see Mitchell, 2000, p. 12)—is his way of identifying with and appropriating that tradition.

Before turning to psychoanalysis, Loewald studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger, and he theorizes in a way that is more typical of a philosopher than a psychoanalyst (see 1980, pp. viii–ix). Heidegger believed that the riches of the philosophical tradition are sedimented in its vocabulary. He therefore constructed his own iconoclastic position through an idiosyncratic exegesis of basic terms from Greek philosophy and German Idealism (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 12–3). Similarly, Loewald believes that the basic terms of psychoanalysis are 'essentially contested concepts' (Gallie, 1956). That is, they have so much meaning condensed in them and are so centrally located in our conceptual schemes, that they constitute a virtually open-ended source for creative argumentation and theorizing: 'Many Freudian concepts and terms are overdetermined and full of connotations and implications that have not been spelled out by him or that are neglected' (Loewald, 1978a, p. 192). Contrary to Schafer (1976, 1991), Loewald argues that psychoanalysis doesn't need a 'new language'. Instead, it needs 'a less inhibited, less pedantic and narrow understanding and interpretation of its current language' (1978a, p. 193).

Loewald likes 'the old words' (Mitchell, 2000, p. 12), and develops his own position through the painstaking interpretation of basic—and generally unfashionable—Freudian concepts. In addition to 'Eros', examples include 'hypercathexis' and 'narcissistic libido'. This seemingly scholastic approach can obscure the iconoclastic dimension of Loewald's thinking and create the impression that he is a dyed-in-the-wool traditionalist. But such a conclusion misses the point, for it doesn't recognize that more often than not he interprets those fundamental concepts in such a radical way that he transforms their meanings. The Freud that emerges from Loewald's interpretations isn't 'the Freud of the Freudian authorities of [his] day'—indeed, it isn't even 'Freud as Freud understood himself' (Mitchell, 2000, p. 32). Loewald's 'coherent deformations' (Castoriadis, 1984, p. 132) of Freud's basic terms in fact comprise the parricidal-iconoclastic dimension of his work.

The center of Loewald's project consists in the attempt to assess the meaning of the pre-oedipal turn—and its concomitant, the widening scope of psychoanalysis—for classical theory (see also A. Freud, 1976; Green, 1986). By the 1960s—and especially by the 1970s—as a result of the work of Klein, Winnicott, Spitz, Mahler and others, a heated controversy emerged concerning the relative weight that ought to be attributed to pre-oedipal versus oedipal factors in development and clinical practice. To put it in a somewhat oversimplified way, the revisionists emphasized the pre-oedipal and the classicists the oedipal. (Today, the whole debate has been rendered largely obsolete by the notion of the hierarchical structuring of the psyche.) Loewald argues that work with post-classical patients can reach a 'genetic depth and antiquity' that is, for the most part, unusual with their classical counterparts. Because these patients are 'transfixed' by issues concerning 'the development of subject–object differentiation from primary narcissism', they can teach us something about 'the origins of human life and thereby … its essence or core' (1979, p. 400). The exploration of the more archaic layers of the psyche, Loewald argues, uncovered 'a psychotic core' where the psyche strives to undo separation and reinstitute nondifferentiation. 'The more we understand about primitive mentality', he writes, 'the harder it becomes to escape the idea that its implicit sense of and quest for irrational nondifferentiation of subject and object contains a truth of its

own' (1979, p. 403; see also Green, 1986, p. 37). (Loewald's appreciation of this quest most likely contributes to his deep appreciation of the religious impulse in psychic life, something which is absent in Freud and most contemporary analysts.)

Against the reigning psychoanalytic orthodoxy of his day, Loewald consistently challenges its touchstone, namely that the Oedipus complex is the singular 'nuclear complex' of all psychopathology (see 1973, 1984).

After the publication of 'The waning of the Oedipus complex', Loewald was often seen as an 'anti-oedipal' thinker. But a close reading of that text, as well as others that followed (see e.g. 1985), reveals that Loewald once again refuses to accept a binary opposition. Instead, he tries to integrate the pre-oedipal and the oedipal into a hierarchical developmental structure, which gives 'new luster to the Oedipus complex in the present psychoanalytic climate' (1979, p. 399). Though the drive toward separation and individuation may have its origins in inborn *Anlagen* and requires a facilitating environment to properly unfold, it must also pass through the crucible of the Oedipus complex—a 'watershed of individuation' (Loewald, 1985, p. 438)—in order to achieve maximum realization. Only something with the intensity of intrapsychic murder has the psychic heft, as it were, to effect the separation of children from their internal incestuous objects.

Loewald doesn't soften the tragic severity of the classical Oedipus complex—something he is accused of—in favor of a more benign vision of 'good enough mothering'. Nor does he believe the guilt associated with the incestuous and murderous wishes represents 'a troublesome affect that we might hope to eliminate in some fashion'. Like Freud, he sees it as 'one of the driving forces in the organization of the self' (1979, p. 194). Instead of pursuing various ways of evading it—including self-punishment, which, for Loewald, is a form of acting out—individuals must have the capacity to tolerate the painful experience of this guilt in order to 'avow', that is, acknowledge and take responsibility for their unconscious-instinctual lives. Moreover, the working through of this guilt allows for the completion of the individuation process in so far as it promotes the internalization and transmutation of the 'ghosts' of those 'murdered' into 'ancestors' (1979, pp. 248–9).

With his affirmative attitude toward the function of guilt, as well as his assumption that the internalization of parental authority and the formation of the superego is the 'normal' (Gray, 1994, p. 127) and most desirable way of managing intrapsychic conflict, Loewald joins a long line of psychoanalytic conservatives stretching back to Freud himself. For Freud, religious sentiment itself, which is the basis for culture and morality, develops out of the remorse that results from the murder of the primal father. Indeed, guilt provides the 'sacred cement' (1913, p. 136) that holds society together. Neither Freud nor Loewald consider the more radical possibility that superego morality, with its sense of guilt, represents a rather primitive instinctualized form of 'premorality' (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 449) that can, in fact, be surpassed. That is, they never entertain a proposition to the effect that 'where superego was, there shall ego be'.[2]

[2]Gray's (1994) questioning of Freud's uncritical acceptance of the superego as the highest form of moral agency and his pursuit of more self-conscious means of managing instinctual life represents a laudable attempt to expand the conception of autonomy in psychoanalysis.

## The pre-oedipal and the postmodern[3]

Through a complex feedback mechanism, psychoanalysis is simultaneously both a product of its times and a promoter of 'far-reaching changes in the sensibility of our age'. It 'does not only change our knowledge of the human mind, it changes the human mind by that new knowledge' (Loewald, 1979, p. 401). At the turn of the century, although it arose out of the conditions of Victorian society, 'the new psychology of psychoanalysis' in turn did much to undermine and fundamentally transform the prevailing attitudes toward the family, sexuality and morality. While 'classical' psychoanalysis focused on the supposedly well-structured neurotic pathologies that were produced by a relatively intact bourgeois household and its form of socializing its young (see Horkheimer, 1975), it did not directly address the genesis and structure of the self (and the nature of rationality)—at least in principle (see Winnicott, 1954, p. 284). Indeed, a sufficiently well-structured self, which makes intrapsychic conflict possible, was generally taken as the *sine qua non* of neurotic pathology. Furthermore, Freud rather unquestioningly took autonomy—the central ethical norm of the Enlightenment—as his own. His dictum 'where id was there shall ego be' (1933, p. 80) can be seen as a psychological concretization of the Enlightenment's moral program (see Castoriadis, 1984, pp. 32–4; Cavell, 1987, p. 119).

After the Second World War, psychoanalysis reflected new interrelated developments in family life, childrearing and character formation, which resulted in the loosening of social and psychic structures. Indeed, these changes were so thoroughgoing, that Loewald asked whether it was still possible to speak of 'an average acceptable environment' (1975, p. 174). The encounter with the post-classical patients and exploration of the more archaic strata of the psyche called into question the very 'objectivity of the object and the subjectivity of the subject' (p. 399). 'Objectivity, rationality, and reality themselves are not what we thought them to be' (Loewald, 1979, p. 402). 'Wittingly or unwittingly', Loewald notes, 'these deeper unconscious currents' have re-entered the 'modern sensibility' and are influencing 'the organization of mind, experience, and action … Modern life, partly moved by and partly moving psychoanalysis, is redrawing the outlines of normality, of what is archaic in mental life and what is advanced, mature mentality' (pp. 401, 403).

At this point, the themes of post-Freudian pre-oedipal psychoanalysis intersect with the concerns of postmodern discourse. Loewald formulates the dilemmas confronting psychoanalysis directly. Psychoanalysis, he writes, 'seems to stand and fall with the proposition that the emergence of a relatively autonomous individual is the culmination of human development' (1979, pp. 401–2).[4] At the same time, however, he also maintains that the striving 'for unity, symbiosis, fusion, merging, or identification' has a 'force and validity' that cannot be denied. The problem is that the acceptance of the validity of these strivings 'fits badly' with our commitment to autonomy as a value (1979, pp. 401–2; see

[3]Teicholz claims that Loewald—along with Kohut—represents a 'way station' (1999, p. 18) on the road to a fully realized postmodernism. It is implausible to maintain that his failure to make the postmodern move *avant la lettre* simply resulted from the fact that he arrived on the scene too early. His philosophical training would have made him fully aware of the Heideggerian and Nietzschean themes that later congealed to form the postmodern paradigm. Loewald's resistance to this was surely a matter of theoretical choice not bad timing.

[4]In so far as he explicitly rejects individuation and autonomy as norms for psychoanalysis, Kohut represents a postmodernist element in psychoanalysis. See his criticism of Mahler (1980, pp. 451–3).

also Lear, 1990, pp. 22–8). Loewald's solution to the dilemma is to pursue an expanded conception of autonomy.

Autonomy, in the Kantian and Freudian conception, is achieved through repression—through the exclusion of unconscious-instinctual material from the domain of the rational ego. Indeed, as we will see, Loewald believed that the ego-psychologists of his day had unintentionally 'taken over much of the obsessive neurotic's experience and conception of reality' (1951, p. 30) and elevated a rigidly and narrowly integrated conception of the self into a normative position. Loewald proposes an alternative conception, in which autonomy is achieved through the integration of that material into the ego, thereby contributing to the expansion of a more differentiated whole.

## Loewald's revision of classical theory

As we have seen, 'Eros' is one of the old words that Loewald likes the most (see Schafer, 1991, p. 86; Lear, 1998, pp. 123–4). Indeed, it is central to his entire theory. To correct Freud's theoretical excesses, Loewald tries to bring the concept of Eros down from its speculative heights and give it concrete empirical and clinical content. He does this primarily by interpreting it in terms of the synthetic or integrative process within the psyche.

At the beginning of Freud's psychoanalytic career, Loewald maintains, he recognized the clinical importance of integration. In his early treatment of hysterics, Freud argued that ideas became pathological to the extent they were split off from 'the great complex of associations' (1893, p. 11). But Freud didn't completely incorporate these insights into his theoretical formulations. He didn't see the function of the psychic apparatus as integrating unconscious-instinctual material into larger and more differentiated psychic structures—a process that would create increased tension in the psyche. On the contrary, he saw its job as discharging, 'getting rid of' (Loewald, 1971, p. 119) stimuli as efficiently as possible. (There is only one place where the early Freud recognized a synthetic tendency in the psyche: in his instinct theory, he argued that the *telos* of psychosexual development is the unification of the component instincts under genital supremacy.) It wasn't until years later, when he postulated the structural theory, that Freud fully appreciated the 'irresistible advance towards unity in mental life' (1921, p. 105).

Freud tended to associate the synthetic function with ego functioning. Loewald, in line with his general project, locates its origins in the earliest stages of pre-oedipal development. And this reconceptualization of the synthetic function is closely connected with Loewald's rejection of Freud's conception of the earliest stage of development—'the primal psychical situation' (see Freud, 1915, p. 134)—where he likened the condition of the newborn to that of a chick in its egg (1911, p. 220 n. 4). Unlike the chick, Loewald argues, the neonate's existence doesn't consist in a self-enclosed and relatively self-sufficient homeostatic system, regulated by the pleasure principle, which is set off from and surrounded by an alien and intrinsically hostile reality. Rather, it is made up of an 'undifferentiated psychic field'—similar to Mahler's 'dual unity' (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 55; see also Loewald, 1984, 1985)—in which inside and outside, self and object, ego and drives, pleasure principle and reality principle, primary and secondary processes and

so on have yet to be distinguished. The experience of this 'primordial density' (1978a, p. 186), out of which the contents and structures of psychic life are generated, continues to exert its pull over all later stages of development.

If, as Loewald believes, differentiation and integration are the general task of every developmental phase, this is especially true of this earliest stage—where differentiation must be achieved for the first time. Indeed, we might say that the task of this period is the introduction of difference as such. Projection and introjection do not act as defenses but serve the all-important function of creating boundaries. 'Primary' externalizations and internalizations are the constitutive activities through which boundaries are created, thus bringing the realms of externality and internality into being (see 1962, p. 266).

Once a nascent distinction between inside and outside has been demarcated and a 'pre-self' and a 'pre-object' have been established, the 'interaction' of the infant and its mother becomes the general medium for further development. Indeed, no sooner has the infant differentiated a 'pre-self' and 'pre-object' from the psychical field that contained both of them than a new task presents itself: to integrate the newly differentiated object. From here on, the task of the pre-subject—and, later, the ego proper—will be constantly to maintain and re-establish something of that original unity 'on more and more complex levels of differentiation and objectivation of reality' (1951, p. 11). The memory traces of that original unity in the undifferentiated matrix exercise a 'magnetic attraction' (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 302) toward reintegration. Somewhat paradoxically, both the archaic psyche's demand for 'irrational nondifferentiaiton' and the synthetic function of the ego—the seat of rationality—have their source in the undifferentiated matrix.

In so far as Freud considered the mother's early interaction with the child, he approached it almost exclusively in terms of what Loewald calls 'fulfillment'. For Freud, her job is more or less completed when her infants are relieved of their tensions and a state of internal equilibrium is restored. When the mother's ministrations fail, hallucinatory wish fulfillment breaks down and the child is somehow—this is the big mystery—led to register the independence of the object. Pain, in short, is the agent of differentiation and the constitution of the object. Loewald, following Winnicott's lead, adds a second aspect to the mother's caregiving activities, what he calls 'recognition.' Through the empathic awareness and understanding of her child's needs, the mother not only 'fulfills' those needs, in the sense discussed by Freud, but also gathers the infant's 'as yet undifferentiated urges' together and gives them shape and organization. Thus the mother's mirroring activity does not simply reflect back to the infant what was already in the child's experience. It adds something new. As a result, when infants internalize the experiential material that has been partially integrated and structured by the mother, they also take in a new formal element, the schemes of integration and structuralization that inform it. Once set up in the mind, by demanding further organization and integration of the material that will enter the psyche, these schema become a major source of the synthetic function.

Loewald's account of early development leads to a substantial reinterpretation of two other fundamental Freudian concepts: reality and the psychic apparatus. Reality is, for the most part, seen as a hostile 'force' thrust on the psyche from the 'outside' (1951, p. 8). The father is the main 'representative of the demands of reality', who severs the libidinous tie with the mother, thus ejecting the child into the hostile world of triadic

reality. And the submission to the castration threat is understood as the 'decisive step in the establishment of the ego as based on the reality principle' (p. 7).

Despite the dominant tendency in Freud's thinking to view the relation between psyche and environment as 'basically antagonistic', Loewald finds elements of an unofficial 'maternal' position on the relation of the psyche to reality in Freud and tries to construct an alternative account out of it. Classical theory, he observes, begins with the 'coexistence of two separate entities', subject and object, and then tries to explain how they 'come into contact with each other'. The unofficial theory, in contrast, begins with 'a unitary whole' and seeks to account for how psyche and world become differentiated from it. To put it more concretely, 'mother and baby do not get together and develop a relationship, but the baby is born, becomes detached from the mother, and thus a relatedness between two parts that originally were one becomes possible' (1951, p. 11). From the maternal perspective, then, reality is not initially and intrinsically hostile to the ego. On the contrary, it is 'intimately connected with and originally not even distinguished from it' (p. 8). The existence of the 'oceanic feeling' (see Freud, 1930, ch. 1)—which caused Freud so much consternation—testifies to the existence of this original state and perhaps points to the possibility of another post-phallocentric and post-scientistic way of relating to reality.

Loewald argues that the two relations to reality, the paternal and the maternal, which have their own advantages and dangers, are, in fact, perfect complements. If the paternal position is associated with hostility, castration and excessive distance from the object, it also promotes individuation and autonomy and protects the individual from the danger of 'maternal engulfment' (1951, p. 14). And just as the maternal position involves reconciliation, relatedness and union, it also contains the threat of de-differentiation and ego loss—which is simultaneously loss of the object. Instead of 'swinging from a paternal concept of reality to a maternal one' (p. 12)—replacing the 'Father of the horde with the Mother Goddess' (Green, 1980, p. 253)—or idealizing either stance at the expense of the other, the ego must, Loewald argues, continually pursue 'its course of integrating reality' (1951, p. 17)—the paternal and maternal—into 'new synthetic structures' (1988, p. 13).

Corresponding to these two conceptions of reality, Loewald identifies two concepts of the psychic apparatus and defense in Freud's thinking. According to the official version, based on the reflex arc, the sole function of the psychic apparatus is the reduction of tension. This governed Freud's theorizing from the 'Project for a scientific psychology' (1895/1950) until his reluctant acknowledgment of 'pleasurable tensions and the unpleasurable relaxation of tensions' (see 1924, p. 160) in 'The economic problem of masochism'. After that, Freud could no longer maintain the constancy hypothesis—with its correlate the pleasure principle—as the monolithic law governing psychic life. With the recognition of pleasurable tensions, Freud was also reluctantly forced to introduce an anabolic or integrative force in psychic life. I am referring, of course, to Eros, a second instinct whose aim 'is to establish ever-greater unities and to preserve them thus' (1940, p. 149; see also Lear, 1998). This instinct does its job of creating larger unities through the binding of energy, which is to say, the building up of tension.

It is generally assumed that the death instinct was the radically original element that Freud introduced in *Beyond the pleasure principle*, which constituted a decisive

break in his thinking. Loewald is one of the few commentators to recognize that the groundbreaking addition to the theory was not Thanatos but Eros:

> I cannot emphasize enough that it was the introduction of the idea of the life instinct … that was a true and unsettling innovation in psychoanalytic theory—an innovation that Freud could no longer circumvent but with which he felt much less at home than he did with the death instinct (1988, p. 30; see also Whitebook, 1995, pp. 256–7; Lear, 1998, pp. 123–48).

Thanatos, as an entropic force, had been present *in nuce* in Freud's thinking from the start. It represents the culmination of a series of transformations of the idea of tension reduction that begins with the constancy hypothesis, moves through the pleasure principle and the Nirvana principle and ends with the death instinct. After all, stasis—that is, death—represents the ultimate aim of tension reduction.

Just as he did with the 'unofficial' conception of reality, Loewald also locates an alternative to the tension-reduction model of psychic apparatus in the first chapter of *Civilization and its discontents*—one of Freud's richest texts, which Loewald mines for all it's worth. If the reflex arc was meant to explain how things 'are gotten rid of' (1980, p. 119), that is, discharged from the psyche, the 'psycho-archaeological' (Schorske, 1998, pp. 191–218) approach, symbolized by the city of Rome, is meant to account for exactly the opposite, how things are preserved 'in the realm of the mind' (Freud, 1930, p. 69). The feature of the 'Eternal City' that makes this preservation possible is its stratification, which allows for the simultaneous coexistence of material from different historical epochs.

With the psyche, the possibility of simultaneity is even more complete, for it is possible for two mental objects to occupy the same psychic place at the same time. With the psycho-archaeological model, the main job of the ego is not only to regulate tension, but to integrate and reintegrate all of the heterogeneous and often conflicting strata into a differentiated whole, a process that requires the constant introduction of 'fresh tensions' (Freud, 1923, p. 46). According to the tension-reduction model, the ego seeks to deal with 'inner or outer demands or influences' (Loewald, 1978a, p. 176) made on it through exclusion. It becomes strong to the extent that it excludes 'instinctual-unconscious life' from its boundaries. But the presumed strength of the 'strong' ego, Loewald suggests, is actually a form of weakness (1960, p. 241); it is achieved by narrowing the ego's domain, impoverishing its content and rigidifying its relation to inner and outer reality. Instead of exemplifying strength, the exclusionary ego resembles a familiar pathological mode of ego formation, namely that of the obsessional.

For Loewald, ideal development consists in the ego's 'assimilation or inclusion' into its own organization of the material that impinges on it from inner and outer reality. The ego is enriched materially, owing to its incorporation of that content, and its range is enlarged in so far as it acquires the possibility of 'free intercourse' (Freud, 1926, p. 98) with the domain of unconscious-instinctual life, and the ability to influence and be influenced by it at the same time. Unlike in the tension-reduction model, it no longer has to vigilantly ward off what it had experienced as its dangerous other; the ego's flexibility, suppleness and spontaneity are increased. Finally, the ego becomes the beneficiary of the energy that is now attached to it. This means that, rather than 'getting closer to a state of rest', with 'higher ego organization … there is more life' (Loewald, 1972, p. 74).

## Epistemology and technique

Three decades ago Jürgen Habermas complained about the lack of methodological 'self-reflection' in psychoanalysis (1971, ch. 11). Today things have come full circle (at least in the United States), and epistemological questions—especially the critique of positivism, scientism and objectivism—have moved to the center of many psychoanalytic controversies. Indeed, the field may be suffering from a surfeit of epistemology—motivated at times as much by political as by theoretical concerns. For example, Lewis Aron evinces no discomfort in divulging his intention of exploiting the postmodern critique of 'foundationalism' for the purpose of building a psychoanalytic 'movement'. Because there are no ultimate criteria for choosing between conceptual schemes, he argues, we need not concern ourselves with the question of which scheme 'is true or valid'. After the debunking of foundationalism, we are free to choose between theoretical models on the basis of their 'practical', which is to say, political 'consequences' (1996, p. 41).

Eagle et al. have provided an excellent assessment of these recent developments in psychoanalysis. In no uncertain terms, they give credit to the 'new view theorists'—for example, Mitchell, Renik and Donnell Stern—for their major contribution to the field. The new theorists' criticisms of the authoritarianism and rigidity of classical psychoanalysis, rejection of the blank screen model of neutrality and stress on interaction, they argue, have done much to open the discipline and provoke fundamental debates. Eagle et al. maintain, however, that the new theorists should stop at this point, that is, with their important *psychoanalytic* critique. But they often feel compelled to take a further step and try to defend their *clinical* claims with fashionable but untenable *philosophical* arguments. Not only is this second step unnecessary, it also often creates 'at least as many difficulties' as it is meant to resolve, and 'undermines assumptions essential to psychoanalysis' (2001, p. 461). Ironically, the new theorists' failure systematically to distinguish between clinical and philosophical issues itself amounts to a piece of philosophical naïveté.

The widespread practice of writing Freud off as a positivist is too simplistic. Granted, he signed the 'Positivist Manifesto' and maintained that psychoanalysis belongs to the scientific *Weltanschauung*. And although his own approach deviated from the quantitative and experimental standards of his day, he clearly believed that modern natural science represented the culmination of humanity's theoretical development (see Loewald, 1960, p. 228). The problem is, however, that it isn't exactly easy to determine what he meant by 'science'. I would contend that for Freud *Wissenschaft*—whatever its precise content—was the marker for 'the sole discipline of knowledge' and 'the single rule of intellectual honesty' (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 73). For Freud, it stood for the methodical struggle against falsehood, that is, the human tendency toward self-deception and illusion. As a Hellenizing Jew, he traced the history of science thus conceived to Akhenaten's and Moses's attack on idolatry and the Greeks' critique of mythos by logos. There is some similarity between this view of science and recent attempts by philosophers to rebut the postmodern critique of scientific objectivity. For example, Bernard Williams argues that the commitment to truthfulness, accuracy and the methodical attempt 'to get things right' distinguishes science from other forms of discourse and practice. And, like Freud, he believes that this pursuit requires the constant struggle against the misleading temptations created by 'fantasy and wish' (2002, p. 45).

Following Feuerbach, Freud maintained that illusions are the result of the projection of human ideas—primarily wishes—onto the external world (see Harvey, 1995, ch. 1). He was convinced that modern natural science had systematically eliminated anthropocentric projection from its constitution and operated in strict accordance with the reality principle. Furthermore, because it had purified itself of anthropocentric projections, he argued that science not only provides the methodology for the exploration of the natural world, but could also serve as a weapon in the struggle against 'idolatry', that is, illusion.

What Freud failed adequately to acknowledge, however, is that there is a sense in which modern science is deeply anthropocentric and therefore subjectivist. Indeed, such eminent thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger and Adorno have argued that, rather than creating the correct method for objectively apprehending 'the nature of nature', modern mathematical science 'constitutes'—or 'enframes' (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 19–21)—the natural world from a particular perspective, namely, the subjective standpoint of the human mind conceived in a particular way.

Beginning with Descartes, the universal structures of the knowing mind—as opposed to the nature of the object to be known—became the point of departure for modern philosophical investigation. It is in this sense that modern science can be seen as subjectivist—or projective. The investigation of the invariant structures of the knowing mind, moreover, was supposed to produce a universal scientific method, a *mathesis universalis* (see Vassalli, 2001), that could be legitimately applied to all realms of nature—inanimate, living and human alike. The structures of the mind, so it was claimed, which permit the attainment of valid knowledge, are those having to do with quantity—time, space and number. And correlatively, the founders of modern philosophy and science sought to demonstrate that objective nature is itself a mathematical manifold—*res extensa*, as Descartes called it (see Heidegger, 1977, p. 115ff.). And it follows that only those phenomena that are capable of quantification can 'enter at all into' (p. 119) the structure of objective, that is to say, mathematical science, and be treated by its methods. From the standpoint of objective science, everything that can't be quantified—for example, love, meaning or dreams—is written off as 'dross' (Adorno, 1973, p. 46). Those who criticize modern science for its objectivism don't realize that ultimately objectivism and subjectivism coincide (see Kant, 1964, p. 20; Heidegger, 1977, p. 129). What can count as objective knowledge, in its most general sense, is subjectively predefined by the structure of the knowing subject.

There are, in fact, two different meanings of 'objective' that have to be distinguished. As the term itself suggests, the first 'primordial meaning' (Lear, 2003, p. 42) has to do with apprehending the object in its own right, independently of the subjective structures of our mind. It therefore requires a certain respect for the self-standing object. This is the way premodern philosophers, who were oriented more toward ontology than epistemology, tended to understand the term. The second meaning of the term is generally favored by epistemologically oriented modern philosophers and pertains to the idea of validity. If an idea or theory is correctly formulated, by a knowing subject or intersubjective group of investigators, then it is, by definition, objective in the sense of being valid. This position, however, is confronted with a daunting problem, namely, how to gain sufficient contact with the object so our thinking does not dissolve into an unacceptable form of subjective idealism. After the reflective turn in modern philosophy, we cannot simply return to the

first meaning of 'objective'. It is necessary, however, to moderate the epistemological obsessions of modern philosophy and pay due attention to the demand that the primordial meaning of objectivity makes on our thinking. For analysts, this is especially important when it comes to issues of technique.

With his philosophical sophistication, there is no doubt that Loewald was thoroughly familiar with the problem of objectivism. But an important clinical—as opposed to epistemological—consideration leads him to take his critique of scientism in the opposite direction from the new psychoanalytic epistemologists who emphasize the subjectivity of the analyst. His *entrée* into the problem is an observation of Freud's: even though 'paranoiacs' project their own 'endopsychic' material 'outwards' on to the object, they do not 'project it into the blue'. Rather, 'they let themselves be guided by their knowledge of the unconscious, and displace onto the unconscious minds of others the attention which they have withdrawn from their own' (Freud, 1922, p. 226). That is, even in the extreme case of paranoia—where the projection of subjective material on the object is at its maximum—apprehension of the nature of the object still plays a crucial role. Projection doesn't only consist in imposition of our internal representations on the object, but is also based on an 'obscure knowledge' (Loewald, 1987, p. 53) of it.

It is striking that Hoffman—a major advocate of constructivism—provides an illuminating counterexample to radical subjectivism. As we know, the Rorschach test presents subjects with highly unstructured ink-blots and asks them to construct a percept out of the material. In an important statement, Hoffman observes that 'just as there are infinite possible percepts that conform to the features' of the ink-blot, 'so too are there infinite percepts that don't'. Indeed, responses to the Rorschach are even scored in quasi-objective terms of 'good and poor form responses' (1998, p. 24). Thus, even in the case of the famous ink-blots—which have come to represent the quintessence of subjective projection in everyday speech—a notion of objectivity, of the right fit, enters in. Some percepts fit the pattern of the ink-blot better than others. Similarly, popularized versions of Kuhn's or Foucault's theories notwithstanding, not every paradigm can be imposed on the world at will. For nature rejects some of the grids we seek to place on it (see Castoriadis, 1984, p. 169ff.), and thereby provides objective constraints on our powers of construction. Although the correspondence theory of truth—where the representation is supposed to mirror the object exactly—may have been discredited, some descriptions of the object remain more 'apposite' (Vassalli, 2001, p. 11) than others.

Like most contemporary analysts, Loewald (1986) believed that the rejection of the blank screen model of neutrality and the acknowledgment of the ubiquity of countertransference represented inestimable advances in psychoanalysis. His discussion of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis (1960) suggests, however, that a heightened emphasis on the subjectivity of the analyst may be exactly the wrong response to these developments. To speak of the 'irreducible' (Renik, 1998) subjectivity of the analyst doesn't name a solution; it only points to a problem. It is, in other words, a *terminus ad quem* not a *terminus a quo*. Though catchy, the term 'irreducible' is, in fact, misleading. Although the analyst's subjectivity cannot ultimately be eliminated, it can be reduced, that is, 'contained, stayed and channeled', that is, 'sublimated' (Loewald, 1986, p. 281)—and this is the analyst's constant task. The problem is how to handle it in the patient's

best interest. From Loewald's perspective, what is called for is not the celebration of subjectivity but the reconceptualization of objectivity. As he puts it, 'the justified and necessary requirement of objectivity and neutrality' must be disentangled 'from a model of neutrality' (Loewald, 1960, p. 227) drawn from the natural sciences.

Most patients have been forced, in one way or another, to subordinate their developmental potentialities to the 'subjectivity'—most especially, the pathology—of their parents. The ever-present danger is that this compliance will be repeated in the analysis, that—subtly or not so subtly—patients will be coerced into submitting to the analyst's (often unconscious) agenda. Loewald argues, however, that 'through all the transference distortions', the patient can reveal 'rudiments at least of the core of himself' (1960, p. 229). This core is 'mainly lost' on analysands due to the continual repetition of their pathological experiences of self- and object relations. The good-enough analyst, however, must recognize that core and hold it 'in safe keeping' (p. 226) until the patient can appropriate it. Loewald argues that without a sufficient apprehension of that core—'rudimentary and vague as it may be'—the analyst cannot avoid the danger of 'molding the patient in [his/her] … own concept of what the patient should become'. In a controversial statement, which may be his central thesis, he argues that the safeguarding of the core 'requires an objectivity and neutrality the essence of which is love and respect for the individual and for individual development' (p. 229).

The reference to the analyst's love of the patient has raised more than a few eyebrows. It is obviously anathema to anyone who subscribes to the idea of detached scientific observation, for it appears to be a wholesale interjection not just of analysts' subjectivity, but their passions, into the analytic process. More troubling still, it raises the specter of boundary violations. Furthermore, Loewald's claim that the patient's core can provide a piece of 'undistorted reality' (p. 225), which analysts can use as a stable signpost through all the transference and countertransference distortions, smacks of an objectivism that runs counter to his own observations about transference and the limits of objectivity. He has therefore rightfully been criticized for it (see Hoffman, 1998, p. 9).

We might begin to unravel these problems by considering a much-maligned argument from *Totem and taboo*, where Freud drew a connection between objectivity and object love. He argued that the species attained its maturity when, having overcome magical thinking and the omnipotence of thoughts, it arrived at the scientific stage of development where the world can be grasped in objective terms. Similarly, individuals attain their maturity—which is the 'exact counterpart' of scientific maturity—when they sufficiently relinquish their infantile narcissism and achieve the capacity to love the other in his/her own right, rather than as a narcissistic extension of themselves (1913, pp. 88–90). And many commentators—including Loewald (1960, p. 228)—have legitimately criticized this scheme for its Eurocentric conception of historical progress and sheer naïveté. Nevertheless, I believe there is a valid intuition behind Freud's thinking here that ought to be pursued. We know how difficult and painful it is for young children to accept the independence of the object and how, as a result, they deploy a multitude of 'manic defenses' to deny it. Whether it is called the depressive position or the resolution of the *rapprochement* crisis, an essential developmental milestone is achieved when children begin to acknowledge the fact that the mother exists outside the subjective sphere of their omnipotent control. Freud tells us he 'suspects' that 'this narcissistic organization is never wholly abandoned' and that 'a human

being remains to some extent narcissistic even after he has found external objects for his libido' (1913, p. 89). This is an understatement if ever there was one.

Reducing our omnipotent denial and accepting the independence of the object—especially with our spouses, lovers, children and friends—is a life-time task that is always relative and incomplete. Indeed, I would maintain that this task represents an essential element of the analytic project, both inside and outside the consulting room. The fact that we encourage our patients to struggle against their omnipotent denial of the object's independence raises a question for those of us who sit on the other side of the couch. Analysts have rejected the old notion of neutrality and acknowledged the ubiquity of countertransference. But we haven't taken the next step. That is, we haven't systematically placed the same arduous demand that we place on our patients on ourselves. Instead of celebrating the subjectivity of the analyst, there should be a new focus on combating our own 'manic' resistances that interfere with our acceptance of the independence—that is, 'the objectivity'—of the patient.

Conventional wisdom assumes that passion and scientific objectivity are opposed, that scientists must suppress their passion because it 'can only disturb or corrupt the real work of knowledge' (Castoriadis, 1992, p. 76). Loewald claimed just the opposite. Like Plato in *The symposium*, he maintained that 'the love of truth is no less passion because it desires truth rather than some less elevated end'. (For a discussion of how passion—Eros—becomes attached to this peculiar 'object/nonobject', truth, see Castoriadis, 1992, pp. 88–93.) Loewald isn't merely referring to the rather banal point that the will to power—for example, competition with rivals and the struggle for recognition—plays a crucial motivating role in the development of science. In our own field, Freud's fervent desire to vanquish Jung led him to write some of his most important works: 'Two principles of mental functioning' (1911a), *Totem and taboo* (1913), Schreber (1911b) and, perhaps most especially, 'On narcissism' (1914; see Castoriadis, 1984, pp. 64–5, 1992, p. 76). But what makes the difference in great works of creativity is not the desire for power and recognition, but the passion directed at the object. 'All great works of knowledge', Castoriadis notes, 'have been motivated by a single-minded passion and tyrannical absorption in a single object' (1992, p. 76). Indeed, Loewald claimed that 'the scientist is filled with love for his object precisely in his most creative and "dispassionate" moments', that is, when he/she has succeeded in reaching the object in its own right—what the Germans call the *Sache Selbst*. (Examples of this phenomenon are, in descending order of rigor, solving a mathematical problem, coming up with *le mot juste* or finding a musical interpretation—however idiosyncratic—that 'fits' the composer's score.)

The same can be said in our field. 'In our best moments of dispassionate and objective analyzing', Loewald writes, 'we love our object, the patient, more than at any other time' (1977, p. 297; see also Lear, 1998, p. 142). A consideration of the distinction between the states of being in love and loving might help us understand what Loewald is getting at. The 'normal psychosis' of being in love involves the overvaluation of the object—that is, the projection of our idealized image of ourselves on to it. To be sure, the beloved will always be in part a selfobject. But in loving we are, to a larger degree, drawn to the object because of what it is in itself.

Loewald doesn't try to refute the philosophical skeptic—postmodern or otherwise—by attempting to demonstrate the epistemological possibility of gaining access to the

patient's core. Instead, he offers a psychological-developmental argument. It is possible for the analyst to approach the patient's core, he maintains, because of 'the resonance between' their 'unconscious' (1988, p. 281), which derives from the origin of all psychic life in an undifferentiated matrix. This doesn't mean, however, that Loewald denies the asymmetry between analyst and analysand. He has no difficulty in claiming that analysts are more 'mature' than their patients. But, as Mitchell observes, this claim is bound to ring 'false to many contemporary ears'. He also points out, however, that, for Loewald, 'maturity' doesn't have its customary meaning of a more 'advanced position along a linear scale'. It means, rather, the capacity to navigate among and bridge different developmental and organizational levels' (Mitchell, 2000, p. 50).

Somewhat ironically, a central component in analysts' maturity is their capacity to undergo the controlled regression of the analysis in a less inhibited and more fruitful way than their patients. For, despite the regressiveness of their pathology, patients tend to fear the regressive pull of the analysis and cling to current 'neurotic compromise formation[s]' (Loewald, 1960, p. 224). Again, Loewald's philosophical style may mask how unconventional his thinking actually is. He cautions us against the dangers of the 'disillusioned adult' (1975, p. 368) and argues that the aim of analysis is neither the 'dictatorship of reason' nor the adaptation to the *mores* of contemporary society. It is, rather, 'more life' (1972, p. 74), which derives from an 'optimal communication' (1971, p. 108) with 'the more infantile, archaic states and structure of the psychic apparatus' (1960, p. 254). He is ready to admit, however, that 'more life' doesn't necessarily coincide with more stability.

**Acknowledgements:** I would like to thank Drs Peter Neubauer and Fred Pine for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this article that helped me find my focus. The paper was presented at a meeting of the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine on 1 April 2003 and was discussed by Drs Aaron Esman, Lawrence Friedman and Helen Meyers. I would also like to thank them for their useful criticisms and comments. Finally, I am grateful to Kitty Ross for her uncompromising editorial assistance.

## Translations of summary

**Hans Loewald und die „psychoanalytische Moderne".** Zu seinen Lebzeiten wurde Loewalds Werk relativ wenig zur Kenntnis genommen; außerhalb der USA ist es kaum bekannt. Seither aber hat es in der amerikanischen Psychoanalyse an Bedeutung gewonnen. Loewalds Attraktivität als Theoretiker ist zu einem nicht geringen Teil auf seine Exaktheit und seinen synthetischen Ansatz zurückzuführen. Er meistert die schwierige Aufgabe, nicht-sektiererisch und systematisch zugleich zu bleiben. Loewalds Werk zeichnet sich durch eine integrative Sichtweise aus, die in der heutigen fragmentierten Welt der Psychoanalyse tatsächlich ungewöhnlich ist. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie Loewald die zahlreichen rigiden Gegensätze zu integrieren versucht, die in analytischen Kontroversen so häufig reifiziert werden: Strukturtheorie contra relationale Psychoanalyse, Traditionalismus contra Revisionismus, ödipal contra präödipal, Moderne contra Postmoderne und hermeneutisch contra wissenschaftlich. Der Autor versucht auch zu zeigen, daß *Eros*, verstanden als Streben der Psyche nach Synthese, in Loewalds Theorie eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Er verortet Loewalds Position innerhalb der zeitgenössischen psychoanalytischen Epistemologiediskussionen. Gewöhnlich üben diese Diskussionen Kritik am Objektivismus der modernen Naturwissenschaft—und an der Analyse insofern, als sie sich die Naturwissenschaften zum Vorbild nimmt—und betonen die Gegenübertragung und Subjektivität des Analytikers. Loewalds Argumentation indes folgt der entgegengesetzten Richtung. Weil er die Autonomie und Individualität des Patienten betont, erkennt er klar die klinischen Gefahren, die aus einer Übergewichtung der Subjektivität des Analytikers erwachsen.

**Hans Loewald: un conservador radical.** La obra de Hans Loewald fue relativamente marginada en sus días y es poco conocida fuera de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Sin embargo está asumiendo una creciente importancia en el psicoanálisis estadounidense. La atracción de Loewald como teórico se debe, en gran medida, a su rigor y a su capacidad sintetizadora. El logra la difícil proeza de ser no-sectario y sistemático a la vez. En efecto, la obra de Loewald comprende una visión integradora que es inusual en el fragmentado mundo actual del psicoanálisis. El autor trata de demostrar cómo Loewald intenta reconciliar muchas de las oposiciones rígidas que a menudo son reificadas en las controversias psicoanalíticas: la teoría estructural y el psicoanálisis relacional, el tradicionalismo y el revisionismo, lo edípico y lo preedípico, lo moderno y lo postmoderno, y lo hermenéutico y lo científico. El autor examina cómo *Eros*, entendido en términos de los esfuerzos sintetizadores de la psique, desempeña un importante papel en la teoría de Loewald. El autor ubica la posición de Loewald dentro de las discusiones psicoanalíticas contemporáneas en torno a la epistemología. Estas discusiones tienden a criticar la objetividad de la ciencia moderna—y el psicoanálisis en la medida en que sigue el modelo científico—y dan énfasis a la contratransferencia y a la subjetividad del analista. Sin embargo el argumento de Loewald corre en la dirección opuesta: su interés por la autonomía y la individualidad del paciente lo lleva a preocuparse por los daños clínicos que surgen de un excesivo énfasis en la subjetividad del analista.

**Hans Loewald … un conservateur « radical ».** L'œuvre de Hans Loewald était relativement marginalisée à son époque, et reste peu connue en dehors des États Unis. Toutefois, elle est en train de gagner une importance croissante dans la psychanalyse américaine. L'attrait de Loewald en tant que théoricien est dû, en grande partie, à sa démarche rigoureuse et synthétique. Il est en mesure d'accomplir la tâche difficile de rester à la fois systématique et non sectaire. En effet, l'œuvre de Loewald comporte une vision intégrative, ce qui est inhabituel dans le monde psychanalytique actuel, volontiers fragmenté. L'auteur essaie de montrer comment Loewald parvient à concilier un certain nombre d'oppositions rigides qui souvent se réifient dans les débats psychanalytiques : théorie structurale versus psychanalyse relationnelle, traditionalisme versus révisionnisme, oedipien versus pré-œdipien, moderniste versus post-moderniste, et herméneutique versus scientifique. Par ailleurs, l'auteur essaie de montrer comment l'*Éros*, en tant qu'ambition synthétique de la psyché, joue un rôle majeur dans la théorisation de Loewald. De même, l'auteur précise la position de Loewald au sein des discussions épistémologiques psychanalytiques contemporaines. Ces discussions tendent à une critique de l'objectivisme de la science moderne – et de l'analyse dans la mesure où elle prend modèle sur la science – et soulignent le contre-transfert et la subjectivité de l'analyste. L'argument de Loewald, toutefois, prend un chemin opposé. Étant donné son souci de l'autonomie et de l'individualité du patient, Loewald attire l'attention sur les dangers cliniques qui surgissent lorsque l'on surévalue la subjectivité de l'analyste.

**Hans Loewald ; un conservatore innovativo.** Ai suoi tempi il lavoro di Hans Loewald fu lasciato relativamente ai margini ed è poco noto fuori degli Stati Uniti, tuttavia sta assumendo un'importanza sempre maggiore nella psicoanalisi americana. Il fascino del Loewald teorico si deve, in non piccola parte, al rigore e alla capacità di sintesi che gli sono propri. Egli riesce nella difficile impresa di essere allo stesso tempo non settario e sistematico. In effetti, nella sua opera, riscontriamo una visione integrativa che non è comune nell'attuale mondo frammentato della psicoanalisi. L'autore di questo articolo si propone di mostrare come Loewald cerchi di riconciliare tra loro molte delle rigide opposizioni che spesso si reificano nelle controversie psicoanalitiche: teoria strutturale *versus* psicoanalisi relazionale, tradizionalismo *versus* revisionismo, edipico *versus* preedipico, moderno *versus* postmoderno ed ermeneutico *versus* scientifico. L'autore cerca anche di dimostrare come l'Eros, inteso come espressione degli sforzi sintetici della psiche, abbia un ruolo importante nella teoria di Loewald, e colloca la sua posizione nell'ambito delle discussioni epistemiologiche della psicoanalisi contemporanea. Queste discussioni tendono a criticare l'oggettivismo della scienza moderna—e l'analisi nella misura in cui si modella sulla scienza— ed enfatizzano il controtransfert e la soggettività dello psicoanalista. L'analisi di Loewald, però, va nella direzione opposta poiché, nella sua preoccupazione per l'autonomia e l'individualità del paziente, egli si preoccupa dei danni clinici derivanti dall'eccessiva importanza conferita alla soggettività dello psicoanalista.

## References

Aron L (1996). *A meeting of the minds: Mutuality in psychoanalysis*. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.

Adorno TW (1973). *Negative dialectics*. Translator Ashton EB. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Castoriadis C (1984). *Crossroads in the labyrinth.* Translators Soper K, Ryle MH. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Castoriadis C (1987). *The imaginary institution of society.* Translator Blamey K. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Castoriadis C (1992). Passion and knowledge. Translator Epstein T. *Diogenes* **44**:75–93.
Cavell S (1987). Freud and philosophy: A fragment. *Critical Inq* **13**:386–95.
Chodorow N (2001). Love, not science is the key: Review of *The essential Loewald*. *Times Literary Supplement*, 29 September.
Chodorow N (2003). The psychoanalytic vision of Hans Loewald. *Int J Psychoanal* **84**:897–913.
Eagle M, Wolitzky D, Wakefied J (2001). The analyst's knowledge and authority: A critique of the 'new view' in psychoanalysis. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **49**:457–90.
Fogel G (1996). Greenberg's Loewald. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **44**:895–8.
Freud A (1976). Changes in psychoanalytic practice and experience. *Int J Psychoanal* **57**:257–80.
Freud S (1893). On the psychical mechanisms of hysterical phenomena. SE **2**.
Freud S (1895/1950). Project for a scientific psychology. SE **1**.
Freud S (1911a). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. SE **12**.
Freud S (1911b). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoids). SE **12**.
Freud S (1913). *Totem and taboo*. SE **13**.
Freud S (1914). On narcissism: An introduction. SE **14**.
Freud S (1915). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE **14**.
Freud S (1921). *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. SE **18**.
Freud S(1922). Some neurotic mechanisms in jealousy, paranoia and homosexuality. SE **18**.
Freud S (1923). *The ego and the id*. SE **19**.
Freud S (1924). The economic problem of masochism. SE **19**.
Freud S (1926). Inibitions, symptoms and anxiety. SE **20**.
Freud S (1930). *Civilization and its discontents*. SE **21**.
Freud S (1933) *New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis*. SE **22**.
Freud S (1940). *An outline of psycho-analysis*. SE **23**.
Friedman L. (1991). On the therapeutic action of Loewald's theory. In: *The work of Hans Loewald: An introduction and commentary*. Editor Fogel GI. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
Gallie WB (1956). Essentially contested concepts. *Proc Aristotelian Soc* **56**:167–93.
Gray P (1994). *The ego and the analysis of defense*. Northvale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Green A (1980). Passions and their vicissitudes: On the relation between madness and psychosis. In: *On private madness*. Madison CT: Int. Univ. Press, p. 214–53.
Green A (1986). The analyst, symbolization, and absence in the analytic setting. In: *On private madness*. Madison CT: Int. Univ. Press, p. 30–59.
Greenberg J (1996). Loewald's transitional model. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **44**:886–95.
Habermas J (1971). *Knowledge and human interests*. Translator Shapiro JJ. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Harvey VA (1995). *Feuerbach and the interpretation of religion*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Heidegger M (1977). *The question concerning technology and other essays.* Translator Lovitt W. New York: Harper and Row.
Hoffman IZ (1998). *Ritual and spontaneity in the psychoanalytic process: A dialectical-constructivist view*. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Horkheimer M (1975). Authority and the family. In: *Critical theory: Selected essays.* Translators O'Connell M et al. New York: Seabury Press.
Kant I (1964). *The critique of pure reason.* Translator Kemp Smith N. New York: Macmillan.
Kohut H (1980). Two letters. In: *Advances in self psychology*. Editor Goldberg A. New York: Int. Univ. Press, p. 449–72.

Kohut H (1986). Forms and transformations of narcissism. In: *Essential papers on narcissism*, Editor Morris AB. New York: New York Univ. Press, p. 61–88.
Lear J (1990). *Love and its place in nature: A philosophical interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Lear J (1998). The introduction of Eros: Reflections on the work of Hans Loewald. In: *Open minded*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
Lear J (2003). Therapeutic action: a serious plea for irony. New York: The Other Press
Loewald H (1951). Ego and reality. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1960). On the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1962). Internalization, separation, mourning and the superego. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1965). Some considerations on repetition and the repetition compulsion. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1966). Book review: *Psychoanalytic concepts and the structural theory*, by Jacob A. Arlow and Charles Brenner. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1971). On motivation and instinct theory. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1972). On internalization. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1973). Book review: Heinz Kohut, *The analysis of the self*. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1975). Psychoanalysis as an art and the fantasy character of the psychoanalytic situation. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1977). Book review essay on the Freud/Jung correspondence. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1978a). Primary process, secondary process and language. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1978b). *Psychoanalysis and the history of the individual*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1979). The waning of the Oedipus complex. In: *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1980). *Papers on psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1984). Review of Margaret S. Mahler, *The selected papers* (2 vols). *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **32**:165–75.
Loewald H (1985). Oedipus complex and development of self. *Psychoanal Q* **54**:434–43.
Loewald H (1986). Transference and countertransference. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **34**:275–87.
Loewald H (1987). Psychoanalysis in search of nature: Thoughts on metapsychology, 'metaphysics,' projection. In: *The annual of psychoanalysis*, vol. 16. Madison, CT: Int. Univ. Press.
Loewald H (1988). *Sublimation: Inquiries in theoretical psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Mahler M, Pine F, Bergman A (1975). *The psychological birth of the human infant: Symbiosis and individuation*. New York: Basic Books.
Mitchell S (2000). *Relationality: From attachment to intersubjectivity*. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.
Renik O (1998). The analyst's subjectivity and the analyst's objectivity. *Int J Psychoanal* **79**: 487–97.
Ricoeur P (1970). *Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Schafer R (1976). *A new language for psychoanalysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Schafer R (1991). Internalizing Loewald. In: *The work of Hans Loewald: An introduction and commentary*. Editor Fogel GI. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Schorske C (1998). Freud's Egyptian dig. In: *Thinking with history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

Teicholz J (1999). *Kohut, Loewald and the postmoderns: A comparative study of self and relationship*. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.

Vassalli G (2001). The birth of psychoanalysis from the spirit of technique. *Int J Psychoanal* **82**:3–16.

Whitebook J (1995). *Perversion and Utopia: A study in psychoanalysis and critical theory*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Williams B (2002). *Truth and truthfulness*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

Winnicott DW (1954). Metapsychological and clinical aspects of regression within the psycho-analytical set-up. In: *Through paediatrics to psycho-analysis*. London: Hogarth Press.