CHAPTER 17

Love and the City: *Eros* and *Philia* in Plato's *Laws*

Frisbee C.C. Sheffield

Abstract

This paper argues that the educational and social practices of Plato's *Laws* are deeply concerned with the citizens' affective relationship both to the ideals of the city and to other persons. Two kinds of love – *eros* (roughly, passionate love or desire) and *philia* (roughly, friendship) are central to this enterprise. We are familiar with the idea that virtue is not just a matter of doing the right thing, but doing it with the appropriate feelings and desires; so, too, for virtuous citizenship: what is required is both passionate devotion towards the ideals of the city (*eros*) and an orientation towards other persons (*philia*), in which citizens are recognized as equals and acknowledged as persons of worth and value, such that one is moved to treat them as deserving of goods and opportunity. Citizens learn this not, or not solely, through grasping principles of 'equality' and 'justice', but by communal experiences in which they take pleasure and which cultivate a certain kind of love.

Keywords

Plato's *Laws* – *eros* – *philia* – affective citizenship – Platonic love – political friendship

In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, we learn of the sufferings of a man deprived of friends and a community: "Without friends or comrades, or city, a dead man among the living" (1018), the chorus wonder how such a human being can survive: "For my part", sing the chorus, "I pity him, how unhappy, how utterly alone, always he suffers the savagery of his illness with no one to care for him, with no friendly face near him. Bewildered and distraught at each need as it comes, god pity him, how has he kept a grip on life?" (169–77).[1] The young Neoptolemus, chosen to approach this diseased, estranged, individual to use him for the interests of the Greeks at Troy, and "ensnare [his] soul with words", learns to see rather more than this; he learns to appreciate a human being, one who should not be

1 Translations from Grene and Lattimore (1960), vol. 3.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004432277_019

reduced to being of purely instrumental value to the protagonists, but as someone who requires their care. He has learnt this, in part, by "a kind of compassion, a terrible compassion" that comes upon him for the man (965–67). This encourages Neoptolemus to balance the needs of self-interest, with those of another, and with the larger community (in this case, the Greeks who need the bow of Philoctetes to sack Troy). This learning through affective responsiveness is fostered in the audience through the communal experience of shared emotional engagement.[2]

Though no friend to such democratic fora as fifth-century Athenian theatre, the value of shared emotional experience to the civic community was not lost on Plato. The role of affective components is central to the political programs of the *Republic* and the *Laws*; indeed, they are both, in different ways, affective communities. In the *Laws*, he explores a variety of ways in which pleasures, pains and desires can be cultivated in educational practices, symposia, and choral dance.[3] An ideal city is one in which "what is by nature private (τὰ φύσει ἴδια) somehow or other comes to be common (κοινά)", where everybody is at one in "what they approve and find fault with, getting enjoyment and pain from the same things" (*Leg.* v.739c8-d3; compare *Resp.* 463e-464a on pleasures and pains in common). This remains the model in the *Laws*, so much so that it is claimed that the inquiry into the laws (νόμων δὲ πέρι διασκοπουμένων ἀνθρώπων) is like an inquiry into the pleasures and pains of cities and individuals (ὀλίγου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις περί τε τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας ἔν τε πόλεσιν καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις ἤθεσιν, I.636d4-7). For these (pleasures, pains and desires) are "the strings from which every mortal creature dangles" (732e; cf. 788b) and legislation aims at a life "consistent with our nature" (733a).

The focus of this paper is not the cultivation of affect as such, but those desires and loves that concern the citizens' relationship both to the ideals of the

2 On which, see Nussbaum (2013), 258, who cites *Philoctetes* amongst other examples and writes that: "Tragic spectatorship cultivates emotional awareness of shared human possibilities, rooted in bodily vulnerability".

3 The *Laws* is itself presented as the "most beautiful" and the "truest tragedy" (817b3-5), which seems to refer not just to its representation of "the most beautiful and virtuous life", but also to participation of all citizens in the choral practices that cultivate shared emotional experience. This has been richly explored by Prauscello (2014); see esp. p. 75 on the "performative action" of Magnesian citizenship. On choral education as the medium to impart a correct physiology of pleasure and pain, i.e. virtue, see 656c5-6 καὶ τοὺς τῶν εὐνόμων παῖδας καὶ νέους ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς. As Prauscello argues (2014), 83: the vehicle through which the community is brought to express its shared identity in "songs, myths and discourses" (664a5-6 ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φθέγγοιτ' ἀεὶ διὰ βίου παντὸς ἔν τε ᾠδαῖς καὶ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις) is the persuasion enacted by continuous choral performances (II.663e-664d).

city and to other persons. The educational and social practices of the *Laws* are deeply concerned with fostering bonds of connectedness and two kinds of love – *eros* (roughly, passionate love or desire) and *philia* (roughly, friendship) are central to this enterprise. Or so I shall argue in this paper. We are familiar with the idea that virtue is not just a matter of doing the right thing, but doing it with the appropriate feelings and desires; so, too, for virtuous citizenship: what is required is both passionate devotion towards the ideals of the city (*eros*) and an orientation towards other persons (*philia*), in which citizens are recognized as equals and acknowledged as persons of worth and value, such that one is moved to treat them as deserving of goods and opportunity. Citizens learn this not, or not solely, through grasping principles of 'equality' and 'justice', but by communal experiences in which they take pleasure and which cultivate a certain kind of love.[4] The civic deployment of *eros* and *philia* is possible, in part, because of how they are conceived; not primarily as emotions upon which one cannot exercise control and agency, but as phenomena that involve "affective appraisal" and as such are implicated in the perception of value.[5]

Section 1 rehabilitates *eros* for Plato's political agenda in the *Laws* and explains its value for the legislative program. Section 2 turns to *philia* and argues that, though Plato gave no separate, explicit, account of "political friendship", he does hold an account of "character-friendship" in the *Laws*, which provides new possibilities for the interpreter of civic friendship, beyond those given in the *Lysis* (employed by Vlastos), or those in the *Symposium* (employed by Price). Section 3 argues that some of the hallmarks of this friendship are operative in the civic community at large. Sections 4 explores the relationship between friendship and other legislative goals, such as freedom, equality, wisdom and community, and sharpens a sense of friendship as a political value. Section 5 argues that the account of *philia* that emerges from the *Laws* resists utilitarian and homogenizing readings of friendship (such as those supposedly grounded in the *Lysis* or the *Symposium*), which bolster objectionable views of Plato's politics.

4 Compare Gaita (1998), xxi, who argues that love makes the humanity of others "fully visible" and moral imperatives attend this visibility.

5 The phrase is taken from Jennifer Robinson (2005) and is designed, in part, to leave open the extent to which emotions have simple, or complex, cognitive content. A non-cognitive view of the emotions is a relatively modern idea that fails to do justice to ancient thinking on the emotions. See Nussbaum (2001) and Price (2009) for the view that emotions have evaluative and cognitive content.

1 *Eros* and Affective Commitment

Pericles set a defining tone for fifth century Athenian politics when he urged citizens to set their gaze on the power of Athens and become her lovers (ἐρασταί).

> ἀλλὰ (sc. χρὴ) μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς (Thuc. 2.43.1.6–8: "But you should do so rather by gazing day by day at the power of the city, becoming her lovers").[6]

According to some scholars, in Plato's great political work, the *Laws*, *eros* plays a "circumscribed" role. This is taken as evidence by Munn (2013), for example, that "Plato has almost turned his back on the fifth century".[7] A "vision of greatness borne of restraint, a vision articulated in Isocrates' *On the Peace*, began to supplant the vision of greatness borne of unrestrained ambition, a vision articulated in the funeral oration of Pericles and pursued most singularly in the life of Alcibiades. A shift in the rhetorical and artistic prominence of *eros* is the most potent sign of this transition".[8] This is taken to be a sign of an apparent shift in perspective from Plato's middle period dialogues, where *eros* is a recurrent feature.[9] Apart from Prauscello's (2014) study on the *Laws*, there has been little to correct this view.[10] And yet, not only does the symposium play a central role in Books I and II, an institution in which *eros* was central, but we are told on more than one occasion that the lawgiver should turn his attention to *eros.* "The key to education", the Athenian maintains, "is correct upbringing, which

6 For earlier political contexts in which *eros* plays a role, see also Aristophanes *Ach.* 141–44, *Eq.* 732–33, with Ludwig (2002) and Wohl (1999).

7 See Miller (2013), 11–31 and Munn (2013), 31–48. Compare Morgan (2013), 275–77 who claims that Magnesia "is emotionally disengaged … a city where passion has been disengaged".

8 Munn (2013), 40.

9 Compare Miller (2013), 11, who argues that in the *Laws* "Plato does not invoke almost any of the motifs and projects that in earlier dialogues we have been led to think of as defining the depths of philosophy"; *eros* is picked out as a candidate for such neglect.

10 Prauscello (2014), 13 argues that: "To the best of my knowledge, this specific aspect of the *Laws* (the use of erotic terminology to foster civic virtue) has passed unnoticed among scholars." She argues, p. 14, that Plato is reconnecting his politics to Periclean ideals by appropriating a democratic rhetoric of civic *eros*. Plato's strategy, she argues, is "to rehabilitate the *rhetoric* of the language of desire as the main springboard to civic excellence available to the 'ordinary' citizen of Magnesia" (55). Compare also Moore (2007) who sees some positive role for *eros* in the *Laws*.

will, more than anything else, lead the soul of the child at play to a passionate desire (ἔρως) for what will be needed to make him perfect in the practice of the activity at its best when he becomes a man" (I.643c8-d3; trans. Griffith: τοῦ παίζοντος τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔρωτα μάλιστα ἄξει τούτου ὃ δεήσει γενόμενον ἄνδρ' αὐτὸν τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς). Education is directed, from childhood, towards human goodness, "producing a desire and a passion to become a complete citizen" (I.643e; ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον). "Is it not clear", asks the Athenian, "that we should wish that the sort of *eros* which is *eros* of virtue and desires the young to be as good as possible should exist within our city?" (δῆλον ὅτι τὸν (sc. ἔρωτα) μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄντα καὶ τὸν νέον ἐπιθυμοῦντα ὡς ἄριστον γίγνεσθαι βουλοίμεθ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεῖναι; VIII.837d5-8). Such passages indicate that becoming a "complete citizen" requires a certain kind of *eros,* which is deliberately and actively cultivated by the lawgiver; it is the orientation one should have towards the ideals of Magnesia, in much the same way that *eros* is the orientation towards the objects of knowledge in the *Phaedo, Republic, Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.[11]

Appreciating why that is requires clarifying the object towards which it is directed here, how it is cultivated, and a sense of its distinctive features. It is focused on the idea of becoming a perfect citizen (τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, I.643e4-5) or virtue itself (643d8-e3), and cultivated, as it is for the philosophers in the *Republic,* by an education in poetry, music and dance whose standard is beauty (668b9-669b4 with 815b); for the fundamental experience of *eros* is of beauty.[12] The relationship between *eros* and the *kalon* was axiomatic for the Greeks, and a repeated feature of Plato's accounts of *eros* (for the claim that what is most beautiful is most lovable, see *Resp.* 402d6: κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον, and *Ti.* 87d7-8: κάλλιστον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον; cf. *Phdr.* 250e1 and *Symp.* 204b2-3). *Eros* involves an appraisal of its object as *kalon* or *agathon* in some respect, and the object in question is desired under that description (*Symp.* 201a8–10, b6–7, c4–5, 202d1–3, 203d4). This is important when appreciating how *eros* can be a resource capable of being employed by the legislator, and cultivated in the education of children. The beauty of the ideals of citizenship are manifest in vocal and dance performances, which are "representations of character" (II.655d), and are beautiful to the extent that they represent *kalon* characters and actions (659c).[13] Songs (ᾠδαί) and "enchantments (ἐπῳδαί) for

11 Compare the "divine *eros*" for wise and just practices (71id6). For the pursuit of knowledge in terms of *eros,* see *Phd.* 66e2-4, 67e5-68a2, 68a7-b6; *Symp.* 204b-c; *Resp.* 485b, 490b, 501d2; *Phdr.* 252c-253b.

12 For the claim that *eros* for beauty is the *telos* of musical education in the *Republic,* see 403c5-6: δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

13 On the mimetic beauty of music and songs in the *Laws*, see Schofield (2010a).

the soul" (659e), insofar as they are beautiful, attract and draw children towards a love of what they are to embody as adults. Everybody, grouped into choruses, "must be involved in singing enchantments to children's souls, telling them the fine/beautiful things we have just described" (664b).[14] Eulogies of the "perfect citizen" (VII.822e4-823a6) and "beautiful and laudable phrases to persuade" are also used by the legislator (II.660a5-6). The educational program is designed to make citizens see the *beauty* of ideal citizenship, not just its goodness, or its centrality to the good life; this is how it cultivates an orientation in the citizens that is, properly speaking, *erotikos;* for it is the attachment to beauty that clings fast to *eros* (e.g. *Symp.* 206e).[15]

The legislative program might have restricted itself to arguments for the claim that virtue is the highest good and bypassed beauty and *eros* altogether. The fact that it does not requires attention to the characteristic features of this desire. *Eros* is explored here as a distinct species of *philia*: ὅταν δὲ … γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν (VIII.837a8-9). Though both *eros* and *philia* have a proper object in the *Laws*, the ideals of citizenship in the former case, and the good character of others in the latter case, as we shall see, this is not what marks the difference between the two in the first instance; rather, it is the characteristic intensity of *eros*-derived feelings over *philia*-inspired emotional attachments. This is a familiar thought from those dialogues that make it clear that *eros* directs attention to what is most significant to us.[16] In the *Symposium*, for a state of ἐπιθυμία to count as *eros* it must be a desire for good things and for happiness (205d2: πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν). This explains its characteristic intensity and enthusiasm. Someone with *eros* towards something does not just *desire* that thing; they hold the object in question to be something that, *above all else*, makes life worth living. This explains the respective objects of *eros* and *philia* in the *Laws*. For once it is understood that *eros* is a specific form of desire which involves not just an appraisal of its object as *kalon*, but a sense of the *supreme* value of its object, then the task for the legislator is to find a *kalon* object appropriate for that love. For these reasons, *eros* is

14 See also 671a and 812c-d on the use of "enchantments".

15 See also *Charm.* 167e where ἐπιθυμία has pleasure as its proper object, whilst *eros* is directed towards the *kalon*. Konstan (2014), 62 has argued that "the classical Greek notion of beauty is closely related to *eros*, that is, passionate desire. Indeed, I would say that the fundamental response that was excited by beauty in ancient Greece was understood to be precisely desire".

16 Ludwig (2002), 13: "Eros occurs in cases in which the desire, whether sexual or not, becomes obsessional and the subject of desire becomes willing to devote nearly all his or her life, time, or resources to achieving the goal. Eros tends to engage the whole self or to throw every other concern into the shade".

marginalized on the interpersonal level in favour of a more stable and settled state of *philia*, and its characteristic intensity and strength of focus is employed civically.[17] Directing – specifically – *eros* towards the ideals of the city supports the teachings of the lawgiver, who instructs all citizens about what is fine, good, and just, and the relationship between these values and happiness (IX.858d-859a with X.907c-d).[18] Indeed, in light of these teachings, it will not be enough to have just *any* desire for those ideals; that would not indicate that one values them in the proper way, as what is most beautiful and most lovable, which, above all else, make life worth living.

This distinctive mode of valuing involved in *eros* explains its accompanying dispositional features, as well as the ethical upshot of its cultivation. The intensity and enthusiasm of *eros*: ὅταν δὲ … γίγνηται σφοδρόν, ἔρωτα ἐπονομάζομεν (VIII.837a8-9) provides a strength of focus that marginalizes other desires and concerns, a familiar thought from the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*. Those who wish to transform a youth into a tyrant implant an *eros* in his soul, to act "as a leader" of his desires (*Resp.* 572b-576c). The single overriding aim (519c), what Scott (2007), 140 has termed "tunnel vision", emerges in the soul with *eros*, that specific form of desire which has devoted itself to an object as part of its perception that the objection in question is of supreme significance to its wellbeing.[19] As such, *eros* subordinates other desires under its rule; it manifests a degree of commitment to, and identification with, a set of desires and concerns and, as such, functions as a "leader" in the soul.[20] Indeed, as both the *Symposium* and the *Republic* make clear, once set upon psychic goods, such as wisdom, *eros* ensures that one will disdain the body and its pursuits (*Symp.* 210b5), thus promoting moderation and courage; for these are virtues that concern the agent's relationship to pleasure and pain – the body – which is of little

17 Any interpersonal *eros* is regulated in accordance with civic aims (VIII.837d5-8) such that there will be no conflict between private *eros* and civic *eros*. The Athenian is concerned to regulate all *eros*, and the proposals have one question in mind: "which of our proposals make some contribution to moral goodness" (836d). Moore (2007), 133.

18 See also the preface to the legal code at V.726a-734e. The laws claim that virtue is unconditionally good for its possessor, and that it is necessary and sufficient for happiness (660e-661e and 847d with Bobonich (1991), 383, n.70).

19 Cf. *Phaedrus*, where the lover: "forgets completely about mother, brothers and companions, and isn't concerned in the slightest if it loses its property through neglect. As for social norms, and seemly behavior, in which it used to take pride, now it despises them all" (*Phdr.* 252a).

20 The notion that *eros* involves identification with the object is gleaned from the *Symposium*, where the characteristic action of *eros* (reproduction in beauty) is a desire to capture the value of the beautiful object for the agent herself and thereby to achieve *eudaimonia*. See Sheffield (2017).

interest to someone who pursues wisdom as something that, *above all else*, makes life worth living. Such a person will have no investment in bodily pursuits that interfere with virtue, but engage in them, if at all, in a way that is consonant with the demands of their central goal.[21]

The importance of the fact that *eros* "tends to engage the whole self", in Ludwig's phrase (2002, n.18), can explain the appearance of *eros* in the historical reflections of Book III, concerned with the foundations of a well-balanced constitution. When designing laws, the legislator needs to focus not on goodness of one kind but on virtue *as a whole*:

> μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης (III.688b1-4)
>
> but especially and in the first place to what constitutes the guide to virtue in its entirety, that is, wisdom, intelligence and opinion, together with *eros* and desire that accompany them.

An education for virtue as a whole involves not only intelligence and opinion, but also *eros*, which is not just regulated but actively employed in the development of virtue, as the earlier passages from Book I indicated (643c8-d3; 643e4-5).[22] Its civic upshot is seen in the consequences for those cities that did not

21 See Scott (2000), 31 on the *Symposium*. Compare *Resp.* 485d6-8: "When someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others… When someone's desires flow towards learning and everything of that sort, he'd be concerned, I suppose, with the pleasures of the soul itself by itself, and he'd abandon those pleasures that come through the body, if, that is, he's a true *philosophos*", with Lane (2007), 50 who argues that this gives rise to "natural virtue". Cf. *Phd.* 83e where the genuine love of learning is moderate and brave. The *Charmides* is a good example: Socrates' desire for Charmides, though physically manifested in the first instance perhaps, falls under the command of reason in the sense that its expression towards the body is weakened in favour of an investigation of Charmides' soul.

22 Alternatively, Brisson (2012), 284 translates ἕπομαι as 'obey' so that the import is that the lawgiver must bear in mind "especially and pre-eminently the virtue that heads the list, judgment (*doxa*), and intelligence (*nous*), and wisdom (*phronesis*), such that sexual passion (*eros*) and appetite (*epithumia*) *are kept under control"* (italics mine). This is preferable for Brisson because he argues for the presence of tri-partition in the *Laws* and thinks that *eros* and appetite both belong in the appetitive part. Even leaving aside the difficulties of squaring the psychology of the *Laws* with that of the *Republic*, though, the role of *eros* in the *Laws* suggests a positive characterization in many passages; it is not reducible to appetite. As Prauscello (2014), 79ff. has argued, it is not clear that ἕπομαι means obey in this context, rather than something more positive like 'accompany'. Much here depends on the kind of *eros* one thinks is operative here. If (with Brisson) one is thinking of an

aviour" (688d). They experienced the greatest form of ignorance that can befall a state or a single individual, which is the disharmony (διαφωνία) between the perception of pain and pleasure and the opinion following reason (III.689a7-8 πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν), by which one does not love what is believed to be good but hates it and vice versa (689a5-8). That is why, the Athenian urges, we should not wish for everything to follow one's desires (687e6-7 ἕπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει) "unless at the same time one prays that his desires should be in accordance with his own wisdom" (τὴν βούλησιν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει). It is at this stage that the Athenian states that not only intelligence and opinion but also desire and *eros* must be enlisted into the service of civic virtue by the legislator. This recalls the Athenian's remarks about education in Book II, where we were told that: "if pleasure, friendship, pain and hatred arise in the proper way in the souls of those who cannot as yet grasp the reason for them, and if, when they do grasp the reason, their feelings are consonant with that reason because they have been correctly trained by the appropriate habits, then this consonance is in general called human goodness" (653 b-c; trans. Griffith). The educational program, above all, in musical and choral dance (654a), encourages children to "hate what they should hate, and love what they should love" (653b-c), such that their feelings are consonant with right reason, when they are able to grasp it (653b). And there is no better engine to power this enterprise than that *eros* which "engage[s] the whole self", *if* it is turned, as the Athenian urges, towards becoming "a complete citizen" (643e). This ensures that any potentially disruptive inclinations will be eclipsed by the intensity and enthusiasm that accompanies, specifically, *eros*.

The civic deployment of *eros* foregrounds a number of features of the legislative program. First, it is evidently not seen to be sufficient to ground political rule in reason and thus provide it with a universal (and in Book X, a theological) basis; citizens are to be bound to the ideals of the city by coming to love them, in a way that ensures their continued identification, sustained commitment, and psychic 'consonance' (συμφωνία), which supports the legislative aim of virtue as a whole (πᾶσαν sc. ἀρετήν, 688b1). The legislator engenders *eros* for the ideals of the city by encouraging citizens to see their *beauty* in stories, songs and dance taught to the young. This is one way in which the ideological agenda of Plato's political program is deployed, which has been richly

appetitive *eros* then one will opt for a stronger sense of ἕπομαι as obey, but if one considers the regular connection between *eros* and desire for beauty, there is no need to construe the passage this way.

documented by Schofield.[23] Second, the use of *eros* speaks to that concern to explore a legislative agenda which, though formative, is not coercive. This concern is central to the *Laws* (687c1-7).[24] Educating *eros* is part of developing the *motivation* to do willingly what is required by law. It moves the citizens to embody those ideals of which they are to be persuaded, ensuring that they are eager to achieve its aims. As Prauscello (2014), 14 has argued, Plato here echoes Pericles, who use of such language has been explored by Ludwig (2002), 332: "*eros* makes people willingly enter bonds that would otherwise look like slavery. In seeking to motivate a free, democratic citizen toward civic sacrifice and duty, Pericles here discovers a passion that is at once perfectly free and perfectly committed". Cultivating *eros* supports the aim of willing acceptance of the law.[25] Third, the political use to which *eros* is put fosters widespread commitment to Magnesian ideals, from emigrants who have come from various Greek cities (702b4-c9) and show some affinity to their practices (as reflected in the choice of interlocutors in this dialogue).[26] Due to the inclusive nature of both its grounds and object, *eros* can bind all in equal measure to ideals above individuals, family ties, or attachment to those other communities from which many have emigrated. In Magnesia, *eros* is not left to private individuals to manage, where such an intense emotion might pose a threat to social cohesion and political unity given that there would be other objects, above the ideals of

23 See Schofield (2006), Chap. 7, esp. 283, where he argues that the moral and religious rhetoric of the *Laws* fosters ideology which sustains devotion to the community. I am arguing that *eros* is the specific way in which that devotion is manifested.

24 There is "one desire commonly shared by all human beings" (πάντων ἀνθρώπων … κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι): that events may happen according to the dictates of one's soul (κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν, 687c1-7). Compare the discussion of seven titles (ἀξιώματα) to authority: "the most important claim [being the] (…) spontaneous and willing acceptance of the rule of law" (III.690b-c). Compare the criticisms of democracy, oligarchy and tyranny in Book VIII which is not, as Magnesia aims to be, government "of the willing, by the willing" (832c). Cohen (1993) and Bobonich (2002) emphasize how submission to law is voluntary. Compare Laks (2001), 111: "to strip the law of its intrinsic violence … is the most important aspect of the whole project [of the *Laws*]" and Brisson (2005), 118: who notes a concern "to mould the citizen's behaviour and morals in advance so that he conforms to the law automatically, as it were".

25 Prauscello (2014), 4, 96 argues that "the language of *eros* allows Plato to emphasize in the *Laws* the notion (and feeling) of citizenship as a mode of belonging by choice".

26 "The emigrants, you see, haven't the unity of a swarm of bees: they are not a single people from a single territory settling down to form a colony with mutual goodwill between themselves and those they have left behind" (IV.708b).

Magnesia, to which individuals would be devoted. Nor is civic *eros* based on the household (οἶκος), kinship, or *genos*, which would attach citizens to different objects, independent of the *polis*. Its civic focus ensures that there is nothing divisive about its cultivation and allows *eros* to play an inclusive role in fostering a political identity, at least as far as the citizen body is concerned.[27] The unity of the city is not grounded in a racial, or ethnic, identity, but a shared love of its ideals. As such, *eros* can help to neutralise the threat that dominates so much of Plato's political thinking: *stasis*.[28]

In this way the egalitarianism of civic *eros* bypasses recent concerns with putting affect on the political agenda. Critics of liberalism, such as Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Roger Scruton have bemoaned the absence of strong passions of belonging, loyalty, and allegiance, without which, it is argued, the state cannot inspire civic engagement.[29] A standard liberal concern is that such passions can be divisive, since they are often grounded in pre-political attachments, to family, kin, or tribes, which might give rise to ethnic nationalism and antagonistic tribal identities.[30] Platonic *eros* floats free of those concerns, given the distinctive nature of both its object and its grounds, widely accessible to all.[31] One might object that civic *eros* can be inclusive of all citizens, only because unsuitable participants have already been excluded from membership in the city. Ancient Greek citizen bodies were of the same ethnic stock, sharing the same language and the same religion, in which case, Plato's proposals will have no traction with concerns that arise from within a modern, liberal, pluralistic society. The sheer scale of the modern nation state bears no comparison to the Magnesian *polis*. This is home to a civic religion

27 There is a large population of slaves, which frees up the citizens to cultivate virtue; for discussion, see Leg. VI.777a-b.

28 On which see Schofield (2006), 282.

29 See Sandel (1982), 323; Taylor (1995); Scruton (1990), 65 who argues that "the public sphere cannot stand so serenely above the loyalties that feed it". Compare Geuss (2005), 11: "Liberalism has for a long time seemed to lack much inspirational potential". See also Nussbaum (2013), 4, 24.

30 On such issues, see Markell (2000), 38. For the Platonic philosopher's disdain for land and family connections, see *Tht.* 174d1-b6: "When he hears ten thousand plethora or still more than that being spoken of as an astonishing amount of land to own, it seems to him quite a tiny amount to speak of, used as he is, to gazing upon the whole earth. When people hymn family connections, counting someone as noble if he has seven generations of wealthy ancestors to boast of, it seems to the type we're describing to be what only thoroughly dim and short-sighted people would praise; he puts it down to a lack of education and an inability on their part to keep their gaze fixed always on the whole…". Compare *Symp.* 216e3-5.

31 Compare Prauscello (2014), 233 on the inclusive nature of *eros*.

and civic activities, through which collective experiences of great affective power take place, and which are shared between many people, many of whom will know each other personally. Such features have no analogue in the modern nation state.[32] Even if the cultivation of civic *eros* could, in principle, wield its unifying power in a society more pluralistic than Plato envisages here, the conditions under which it is fostered no longer seem to be a realistic possibility. No matter how patriotic one is, it is difficult to imagine an *erotikos* attachment to an entity on the scale of the modern nation state.[33]

2 *Philia*: In Search of a Model

Though all citizens in Magnesia are urged to cultivate *eros*, this is for the ideals of the state and not, primarily at least, for one another. Any interpersonal *eros* is regulated in accordance with those ideals (VIII.837d5-8). But Plato is also concerned with the interpersonal dimension of citizenship, shown by the importance of *philia* to the legislative program of the *Laws*. It is specified as one of three goals that should guide legislation (I.639b-e), and claimed that "the hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) that underlies our laws aims at making the citizens as happy and as friendly to one another as possible" (ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι, V.743c5-6). As Schofield argues: "In none of Plato's contributions to political philosophy is the need for a lawgiver to devise the constitution with regard to friendship stressed more emphatically, or by more explicit insistence on the value of *philia*, than in the *Laws*".[34] This feature of Plato's political communities is sometimes neglected, however; the sense of *philia* is eclipsed by translations (such as Jowett's) that speak of being "harmonious" or "at unity with itself" in place of friendship, where *philia* appears in a civic context.[35] A deflationary construal of the term is suggested by dialogues in which *philia* appears

32 As Bobonich (2002), 432 argues: "The political structure of Magnesia makes possible an essentially political form of shared activity, that is sharing in the business of running the city, supporting its constitutions and furthering its political goals".

33 Thanks to Stephen Hailey for help in clarifying this paragraph.

34 Schofield (2013), 284. See also Prauscello (2014), 23 who highlights the "sustained ideological promotion of mutual concord (*homonoia*) and love/friendship (*philia*) between all its members". And El Murr (2014).

35 This problem is noted in Vlastos [1981](1999), n28. In his classic paper, "The Individual as an Object of Love" [1981](1999) Vlastos bemoaned the fact that more attention is not paid to political *philia* in Plato. See especially p. 144, n.28.

to be treated as roughly equivalent to *homonoia*, for example, in the *Clitophon* and the *Alcibiades*.[36] A further problem is that scholars do not agree about what sense *can* be given to political *philia* since Plato offers no distinct account of political *philia* and (it is often argued) failed to develop a positive account of *philia* of *any* kind to clarify the significance of this term in political contexts.[37] Compare the discussion of political *philia* in Aristotle, which seems grounded in the threefold classification of *philia* in Books VIII and IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[38]

There are significant ramifications to this impasse. Vlastos [1981](1999), 145 opts to use what he argues (now controversially after the appearance of Penner and Rowe's (2005) study) is the dominant sense of *philia* in Plato as emerges from the aporetic *Lysis* to explore political friendship – though in the *Republic*: "Since we are given no formal definition of *philia* and *philos* in the *Republic*", he writes, "let us try out what we heard from Socrates in the *Lysis*: 'You will be loved'. Socrates told Lysis there, 'if and only if you are useful'. Does this fit the *Republic*? It fits perfectly". Whatever claim we have to affection from others, Vlastos argues, is dependent upon our utility, in particular in this political context, our ability to produce some good for the state. An individual's own good is subsumed under that of the state, to which the individual is of some "use"; his own good is not a genuine end for the legislator.[39] *Philia* is "morally disquieting" insofar as it supports larger constraints on personal freedom. Plato, he argues, "could not have reached this result if he had thought of love as wishing another person's good for just that person's sake, looking upon the loved one's individual being as something precious in and of itself".[40]

36 *Homonoia* is a defining characteristic of *philia* in the *Clitophon* (409c3-8) and *Alcibiades* 1 where *philia* is identified with *homonoia* (*Alc. 1* 126b8-c5, cf. *Pol.* 311b-c, *Resp.* 351d).

37 Vlastos [1981] (1999) is the classic statement of this problem; cf. Kahn (1996), 261. Though for a more positive, rather than merely aporetic, account of *philia* in the *Lysis*, see Penner and Rowe (2005).

38 See *Eth. Nic.* VIII.9.1-6 and compare *Eth. Eud.* 1242b22-23, where it is said that political friendship is according to advantage: ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ (sc. *philia*) ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Cooper (1990), 230, however, argues that political friendship is a variant of "virtue-friendship", since it is "a general concern on the part of those living under the constitution of a city and participating in its civic life for the moral characters of all similarly engaged". See also Price (1989), 197, (1999), 542.

39 Though Vlastos [1981] (1999), 146 sees a tension with the supreme aim of the state being the moral improvement of its citizens, which comes to the fore in the *Laws*, his reconciliation of these ideas is that the good of each is promoted *insofar as it supports the larger good of the state*.

40 Vlastos [1981] (1999), 150.

Another approach to political friendship is taken by Price (1999) 527, again with reference to the *Republic*: where "the *Republic* is inexplicit….we find a supplementation of the kind we need within the *Symposium*". *Eros* involves "passing on one's life, mental or physical", in a way that elides the distinction between self and other, so that "each citizen takes a vicarious interest in the well-being of the others" (*id.* 531). *Eros* provides a model for civic relations in which "maximal mutual identification" is fostered, with citizens applying the term "mine" together (e.g. 463e3-5).[41] This, he argues, gives rise to a unity that invites fascism; "Plato's mistake is to model civic upon personal relations" (*id.* 534). Aristotle, by contrast, appreciates that unity must not be overplayed and here we find a personalized politics, which is communitarian without being totalitarian. As he rightly notes: "It can make all the difference how we conceive of friendship and its varieties". For Price, it is not until we have Aristotle's threefold classification of different kinds of *philia* that we can enter the political fray with more sophisticated tools to hand.

We need not wait for Aristotle, however; nor is the *Republic* the only text in which to explore this notion. In *Laws* VIII, Plato provides an account of *philia*, strikingly similar to that in the *Phaedrus,* in which, in the best case, the nature of the other is seen as "something precious in and of itself", in Vlastos' phrase, as something to be "revered and worshipped" in the language of the *Laws* (VIII.837a). This conception is promoted by the legislator (837d).[42] The most plausible strategy, then, is to explore this notion and determine whether any of its hallmarks can be seen in relations between citizens and, if so, whether this contributes to an understanding of political friendship (in the *Laws*, at least). To that I shall now turn.

Within a discussion of the regulation of desires (ἐπιθυμίαι), the Athenian states the following (VIII.836e5-837d8, trans. Griffith):

> ATHENIAN: A close look at the nature of friendship (φιλίας), desire (ἐπιθυμίας) and what we call passionate desire (ἐρώτων) is essential if we want to distinguish accurately between them. There are two separate species, plus a third category formed from those two – but one single

41 Aristotle also suggests this reading of the unity of the city at *Politics* 1262a40-b22, citing Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium*.

42 For friendship in the *Phaedrus*, see Sheffield (2011), 258, n.12 where the similarity with the threefold classification of friendship in *Laws* VIII is noted, thanks to Zena Hitz. On the significance of the *Laws* VIII passage, see Bobonich (2002), 427–36, esp. 427, Moore (2007), 114–17, Prauscello (2014), 47, with detailed discussion by El Murr (2014), 13–16 who explores parallels between *Laws* VIII and the *Phaedrus*.

name embracing all of them, which creates a lot of confusion and obscurity.

CLEINIAS: In what way?

ATHENIAN – Well, we use the term 'friend' (φίλον), I take it, to indicate a relationship, of a virtuous kind, between like and like, or of an equal with an equal. But we also say that what is in need is the friend of what is wealthy, despite being quite different in kind. In either case, when the feeling becomes very strong, we call it 'love' (ἔρωτα).

CLEINIAS: Rightly so.

ATHENIAN: Very well. Now the friendship (φιλία) between opposites, in our societies, is dangerous, violent, and rarely returned; whereas the friendship of those who are alike is gentle and *is* returned, all their life through. As for the friendship which is a mixture of the two – well, for a start, it is hard to know what exactly the person feeling this third kind of love (ἔρωτα) wants for himself; on top of which, he is torn between two conflicting impulses, and doesn't know what to do. One tells him the fruit is ripe, and he should pick it; the other tells him he shouldn't. The lover of the body (ὁ ἐρῶν) is hungry; as he eyes the ripe peach in front of him, he tells himself to eat his fill, without a thought for the moral character of the one he desires (τοῦ ἐρωμένου); whereas the one who regards love (ἐπιθυμίαν) of the body as incidental, more admiring than desiring, whose desire is spiritual, and its object spiritual – for him, when body gets its fill of body, this is excess. What he reveres, yes and worships, is what has self-control, what is brave and great-hearted, what is wise, and his aim would be to live, forever chaste, with the chaste object of his passion. The love (ἔρως) which is a mixture of the two is the one we have just described as a third type. With so many kinds of love, does the law need to say no to all of them, banning their existence among us? Isn't it obvious that the one which is love of goodness, which desires the young person to become as good as possible, is the one we would want in our city, and that we would ban the other two, if it were possible? (trans. Griffith, with modifications)

Three kinds of friendship can be identified here. The first is "a virtuous kind", between "like and like", those who are similar in respect of virtue (837a). It attends to the good character of the other (c2), treats this with reverence (c5) and tries to promote that good character (d4). It is characterized by equality (a4), reciprocity (b3), and stability (b3). The second is between those who want to be "filled up" by the other, enjoyed by "lovers of the body", who use the other as an instrument of their own pleasure, without showing consideration for the

other's character (c2). This is "violent and unrestrained" and "rarely reciprocated" (τὸ κοινόν, 837b2-3). The third is a combination of these two, though it is difficult to clarify what this type wants; the agent is conflicted, which suggests at least two opposing desires are in play. On the one hand, this character privileges "the desire of soul for soul" and respects self-control and intelligence; on the other, he is subject to occasional pulls of appetite, which urge him to enjoy the other's body as if it were a ripe fruit (c1). Love of soul for soul, where consideration for, and benefit of, the other's character is central, is the feature whose presence or absence seems responsible for the ranking of these kinds. The best kind of friendship, what I will call "character- friendship" ("friendship is the name we give to the love of those who are like each other in respect of virtue", 837a6-7) is explicitly contrasted with a concern for the other "for the purposes of filling up", that is, using another for one's own ends.

Many details recall the *Phaedrus*, where Plato also operates with a threefold account of friendship, with each type distinguished by a love that informs the friendship. The desire for pleasure, the desire for some kind of advantage, or honor, and the love of the goods of the soul, especially wisdom and virtue, create different conditions under which the goodwill characteristic of friendship is expressed, or inhibited.[43] Those who seek pleasure use others to serve their own ends ("for the purpose of filling up", *Phdr.* 241d1; *Leg.* 837c2) and the goodwill (*eunoia*) characteristic of friendship is stunted by desire for the subject's own gain (*Phdr.* 232c5-e2). Goodwill is shown insofar as the other provides pleasure; the other's good is not promoted if it is inconsistent with that (241c6-d1). Once sated, this person is "compelled to default", so the association is fleeting (232e6). And since this is a relationship of inequality, where one needs something from the other, this is a non-reciprocal relationship (cf. *Leg.* 837b-c). A second kind holds between those who love honor and whose relationship is based on an exchange of pledges (*Phdr.* 256c-d), which suggests some mutual advantage for both.[44] Such types are conflicted and their *philia* is not as great as it could be (256a6-d3).[45] Plato makes it plain here, too, that love based on

43 Whereas the *Laws* operates with a distinction between body and soul, the *Phaedrus'* analysis is in terms of three distinct desires which inform the friendship. These are compatible distinctions because the *Phaedrus* makes it plain that those who desire pleasure desire the body; those who desire honor are drawn to both body and soul; only the philosopher is interested in soul alone.

44 In the *Symposium*, the advantage for the beloved is education, whilst the lover receives honor from his edifying speeches (209b7-8 with 208c3).

45 Compare *Leg.* 837c: the third type of friendship is mixed because the agent is interested in soul (and self-control and intelligence) but also desires "to be filled" (c1). Neither honor,

pleasure, or advantage, is not the only kind of love; a third kind holds between those who are alike and both of a good, wisdom-loving character (*Phdr.* 252e3, 255b; cf. *Leg.* 837c2). In this case, the other is loved not for some pleasure, or advantage, for the one loving, but for something independent of him – a good nature (*Phdr.* 252e-253b; cf. *Leg.* 837a4-b3, c2), which is revered and worshipped (*Phdr.* 255a; *Leg.* 837c). This suggests a non-instrumental mode of valuing: the other is an end of care and concern.[46]

Taken together these passages from the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* provide evidence that Plato does, in fact, provide a positive account of *philia*. Friendship is, at best, a relationship of equality, based on the mutual recognition of good character, characterized by reciprocal goodwill towards the other, actively trying to promote the good of the other, and an absence of φθόνος.[47] In both texts, such love is contrasted with those who use another to serve their own ends ("for the purpose of filling up", 241d1 with *Leg.* 837c6), so we have good reason to think that Vlastos' "utility love" is *denigrated* in favour of friendship between those of good character, who treat the other with *reverence*, and not, in the first instance at least, for some benefit or use for the one loving. This should be sufficient to reject the claim that Plato did not have a positive account of *philia*, and the claim that the account of "utility love" Vlastos extracts from the *Lysis* is the only general model of friendship Plato has, or that it is *the* relevant model

nor advantage is explicitly mentioned, but there is clearly something the other wants from the other which eclipses the all-important consideration – for the other's character (837c2).

46 I say 'suggests' because an objection to any stronger formulation at this point is that in the *Laws* passage above what the lover is said to revere and worship is τὸ σώφρον etc. where all these qualities appear in the neuter, when they could have been masculine. If they had been masculine, then it would have been clear that the lover loves the temperate, brave and wise *person*, but as it is, the object of his reverence is presented as impersonal, a list of abstract qualities. If all the passage states is that the object of the best kind of love is virtue, wherever it is found, then it would not follow from this that the person who is virtuous is an end of care and concern. That would remain to be shown, as I hope to do below. I thank Stephen Hailey for this objection.

47 Though all features are present in both texts (equality, reciprocity, consideration for character, no φθόνος; on the importance of this last feature, see *Leg.* v.730e), εὔνοια is more strongly present in the *Phaedrus*. The word occurs five times in the *Laws*, where it is used to characterize the friendly dialogue between the interlocutors (635b1, 642b5, c5, e5), the army's sentiments towards its leaders when freedom and friendship ruled (695d5) and it is linked to an attitude of worship towards ancestors (931a), which bears comparison to the reverential attitude of the character-friend (837c). See below for why this feature is not more prominent in the *Laws*.

for exploring *philia* in Plato's political works.[48] I want now to continue the task begun by Schofield (2013) and El Murr (2014) and explore the application of this friendship to the relationship between citizens in the *Laws* itself.[49]

Here we face an objection. Even if a positive account of *philia* can be identified in the *Phaedrus* and Book VIII of the *Laws*, it is a further question what relationship, if any, character-friendship has to *civic philia*. The *Laws* VIII passage is concerned to regulate desire in general terms, and sexual desire in particular, to which the Athenian returns (838bff). This might be taken to suggest that this account of *philia* is not the one that should guide the legislator in establishing relationships between citizens *in general*, but rather, a framework within which we should see and regulate erotic passions in particular. In this context the state will encourage "the love that aims to make a young man perfect", but there may be all sorts of other contexts (e.g. civic ones) in which *philia* arises that have nothing to do with *philia* in this sense. Here it is important to notice that the account of desire and love in the *Laws* is contextualized within an account of *philia*: *philia* is the overarching category within which different kinds of relationship can develop, a particularly intense species of which is *eros*.[50] If so, the account may have broad application to *philia* – relationships of various kinds. Though a relationship with a "young person" will be one example of character-friendship, it need not be the only kind. This helps with a second objection. In both the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, the relationship holds with a young person whom one desires to become as good as possible (837d). Though the ideal relationship in both texts is characterized by an absence of asymmetry – they are treated as equals (837a), we are looking for a model for bonds between citizens of *all* ages; *philia* is spread throughout the civic community in the *Laws*. We will need a specification of the equality involved in friendship which can accommodate its range (on which, more below). But, given the absence of asymmetry in relations between lovers who are, in fact, not age-mates, there is, in fact, no reason why this model could not be

48 Price's use of *eros* in the *Symposium* to provide a model of maximal mutual identification is not, however, derailed by any observations made so far. For if a good nature is had in common with similar others, this might *support* Price's reading. See further below.

49 See Bobonich (2002), 428 who uses the Book VIII passage to some extent in his account of friendship in the *Laws,* with Prauscello (2014), 57. Schofield (2013) is more centrally concerned with friendship as a legislative ideal and how it structures the appropriate relations between the different *classes* of the city; El Murr (2014) has his focus on citizen relations in the *Republic*.

50 As Moore (2007), 115 and El Murr (2014) note. This need not be a difference from the *Phaedrus*. *Philia* might also be the overarching category there, especially since the focus is on what kind of friend the lover will be (e.g. after sexual passions have cooled).

extended to citizens of all ages for precisely that reason. At any rate, all we need to find is evidence of a concern with *philia*-relationships beyond the *Lysis* to expand the options available in the interpretation of civic friendship, for Plato. The usefulness of this enterprise can only be determined by clarifying whether any of the hallmarks of character-friendship can be identified in the political community of the *Laws*. To that I shall now turn.

3 Friendship between Citizens

Is there evidence that relations between citizens satisfy the condition of being "between like and like, or of equal with equal" (VIII.837a)? First, many material conditions support the equality of citizens: land is distributed into lots of equal productive capacity (737c, 745c), with each plot divided into two portions so at least one of these portions is roughly equidistant from the centre of the city.[51] There is a cap on wealth and poverty (744d, 745a, 744e), which eliminates extremes of wealth and poverty, as well as the contribution of all to the common meals, which as Bobonich argues, is "one important way in which economic inequality is muted in Magnesia".[52] Most significant, given the focus in the Book VIII passage on equality between those who are alike *with regard to virtue* (837a), their equality obtains with respect to the worth and value of each.[53] All citizens are subjected to the same formative educational program; both "in their education and in other things", men and women are in "equal partnership" (805d-e). Citizens are "as alike one another as possible" (816d; cf. 965a), where this means, not just that they enjoy the same pleasures, pains and desires (732e; 788b), which results in that shared *erotikos* orientation towards the ideals of the city and a measure of virtue as fostered in their education (643e3-5); it also means that in virtue of whatever measure of excellence such members of a virtuous community have, they each have something to contribute and so can engage in reciprocated, co-operative activities together. This likeness and equality does not eradicate differences between citizens in respect of

51 Samaras (2010), 174.

52 Bobonich (2002), 376. Compare the spatial arrangement of the city which fosters equality, and which has been explored by Betegh (forthcoming). Comparing the *Laws* with the *Republic* in this respect, Betegh argues that: "As soon as Plato gives up on the idea of strictly separated classes in the *Laws*, and stresses rather the overarching force of *philia*, he also moves to a spatial arrangement which fosters *philia*, rather than separation. This is why, as we shall see shortly, he puts the emphasis on the equal distribution of real estate".

53 On the importance of this characterisation of their likeness, see El Murr (2014).

virtue. In Books V and VI, the privileged notion of equality (ἰσότης) is proportional equality, which is distinguished from strict arithmetical equality (V.744c, VI.757a). This "truest and best" equality is achieved by "allocating more to what is greater and less to what is less, and by giving each of them a measure related to its nature" (VI.757c-d). Friendship exemplifies that proportional equality where citizens are recognized as equal partners in the sense that each has *something* of value to contribute and they co-operate together on that basis. This allows us to integrate models of friendship based on some superiority and hierarchy, such as those between parties, one of whom is superior in virtue (VIII.837d) and, as we shall see later, even that between ruler and ruled (III.697c).[54] So, this preserves a symmetry in the relationship, and the equality characteristic of *philia*.

For such relationships to flourish citizens must know about each other's characters. If citizens do not know each other, they cannot acknowledge each other's value, or manifest this proportionate equality; people will not be awarded the respect they deserve, the most deserving will not be appointed to office, and just shares will not be distributed correctly (V. 738e2-5).[55] There are many ways in which this familiarity is achieved. First, the whole population is relatively small, five thousand and forty households, which are sub-divided into twelves tribes, each of four hundred and twenty households (738a). Second, numerous festivals and meetings in the central area of the city encourage intimacy and familiarity. Citizens will recognize and greet each other at sacrifices in mutual friendship; they "may use the sacrifices as a way of strengthening their ties of friendship, kinship, and familiarity"; for "there is no greater good for a city than for them to be on terms of familiarity with one another" and to know each other's characters (V.738d6-e1 φιλοφρονῶνταί τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι).[56] Festivals are important occasions for cultivating familiarity and friendship; the organization of ἑορταί aims both to please the gods

54 For the notion of proportional equality in the *Republic* compare the equality characteristic of democratic distribution (VIII.558C) with the proportionate principles of distribution which operate in the ideal city (IV.433e-434b), as noted by Sedley (2007), 271 n.24. For friendship as an instantiation of proportional equality see *Ti.* 32b with El Murr (2014).

55 This will result in social unrest if those more deserving experience resentment, and bad administration if worse people are elected to office. Compare Aristotle: "if the citizens of the good life are to judge and distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters" *Pol.* 1326b15-16.

56 Compare 650b6-9, where the Athenian states that "this, that is, to know the nature and dispositions of soul, would rank as one of the most useful aids for that art *which is concerned to take care of these*. And we say that this is the art of statesmanship".

(θεῶν μὲν δὴ πρῶτον χάριτος ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν περὶ θεούς) and to foster familiarity and companionship (δεύτερον δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἰκειότητός τε πέρι καὶ γνωρίσεως ἀλλήλων, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, καὶ ὁμιλίας ἕνεκα πάσης, VI.771d5-e1).[57] The symposium is described as "a gathering of friends who in time of peace share goodwill and friendship towards each other" (ὁμιλία … φίλων δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης, 640b7-8), a description which mirrors the language used to describe relationships in the city: the greatest good is peace and goodwill among men (τό γε μὴν ἄριστον … εἰρήνη δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἅμα καὶ φιλοφροσύνη, 628c10-11).[58] The legislator is urged to protect and "promote an increase in friendship" in these gatherings (I.640d). Such arrangements enable us to appreciate *how* friendship which acknowledges the equal value of others can be the model for civic friendship. Citizens may not know each other with the same degree of intimacy as the character-friends of Book VIII, but insofar as these gatherings are designed not only to increase familiarity, but to enable recognition of each other specifically *as members of a virtuous community*, whose good characters are expressed in shared practices, they will generate the desired awareness of each. Such proposals mitigate the concern raised by Aristotle that friendship in the proper sense requires an intimacy (συνήθεια) which cannot be cultivated so widely (*Eth. Nic.* VIII.1156b24-9).

Citizens socialize together in a way that fosters not just recognition of each's good character, but co-operative activity to support and promote it. They provide support and assistance to one another in times of need, for example, by defending those who are wronged, 'as they would a brother, a father, or a still older progenitor' (IX.880b1-6), in other words, as *philoi* are inclined to do. They are urged to become implicated in the punishment of wrongdoers (V.730d), which can be an expression of friendship if giving someone a well-deserved reprimand stems from the benevolent wish to improve the other's character.[59] This support for each other's endeavours extends to cooperative participation in a wide range of religious festivals and athletic contests. An agonistic spirit is curtailed by the injunction not to guard virtue jealously (without φθόνος); each is urged to share out virtue, "because of friendship" (730e6 διὰ φιλίας), and to compete in goodness with *generosity* (731a).[60] The encouragement to

57 See Prauscello (2014), 131 with n.76.

58 On civic φιλοφροσύνη see also V.740e4.

59 I thank Myrthe Bartels for this point.

60 The "jealous man (φθονοῦντα)" who does not want to share his virtue with others (καὶ ἄλλοις μεταδιδόναι) is blamed (ψέγειν), while his virtuous counterpart is praised (ἔπαινον) (V.730e-731a). "We want everyone to compete in the struggle for virtue in a generous spirit, because this is the way a man will be a credit to his state – by competing on his own account but refraining from fouling the chances of others by slander. The jealous man, who

be "passionate, yet as gentle as may be" (v.731b) recalls the "gentleness" of character-friendship in Book VIII (837b). Further, participating in choral practices is a way in which citizens learn a receptivity and responsiveness towards their peers and appreciate how their own success is related to, and dependent upon, the success of others. One's own performance requires others to play their role well, and performing one's own part excellently supports the flourishing of others; one does not shine at the expense of others in a chorus. A sense of reciprocity and interdependence is nurtured in the collective experience of singing and dancing together, as Prauscello (2014), 102 has shown. To adapt a phrase from Laks (1988), 220, choral practices embody the "kinetics of *philia*".[61] This interdependence and reciprocity is also fostered in the support of each for the common meals for men and women (συσσιτία), where private wealth is employed for public benefit.[62] This promotes friendship between the participants by enabling each to see themselves as part of a larger community which supports them and which they, in turn, support.

Given this focus on common pursuits and activities, one might suppose that camaraderie, or solidarity, captures the sense of civic *philia*.[63] Though active

thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation, in so far as it depends on him" (v.731a-b). The passage, along with 829c, 831a, 834c, may seem to suggest a striving for victory (φιλονικείτω), together with θυμός, which goes hand in hand with φιλοτιμία in 744e3: ὅστις φιλότιμος ἐπ' ἀρετῃ. One might read these passages as urging a redirection of personal striving in order to make it useful for the community. My reading, however, suggests a kind of benevolence (not just an 'absence of envy') which emphasizes the verbs μεταδιδόναι and κοινωνεῖν and the insistence of διὰ φιλίας, which leads me to construe this as something like a "generosity". This suggests that generosity is an effect of *philia* (διὰ φιλίας).

61 Laks talks here of the "kinetics of virtue". See also Prauscello (2014), 137 "rhythmic bodily agreement creates affective bonds and hence a shared perception of life".

62 On which see Samaras (2010), 83 and Bobonich (2002), 376. For the role of συσσιτία in promoting civic friendship, see Ar. *Pol.* 1313a39.

63 As Konstan (1997), 9 argues: "the form *philia* does in fact cover relationships far wider than friendship, including the love between kin and the affection or solidarity between relatively distant associates such as members of the same fraternity or city". Aristotle states that soldiers and sailors address each other as *philoi*, *Eth. Nic.* VIII.1159b27-9. Such a sense might be bolstered by the negligible role played by εὔνοια, which was central to the *Phaedrus'* account of friendship (εὔνοια is opposed to φθόνος at 635b1 to characterise the desired tone of the interlocutors' conversation and occurs as a feature of civic friendship at 695d5). This may be because the *Laws* is concerned with community building, which requires focusing on aspects of *philia* that promote that *practical* end. Wishing well to each other, whilst important, falls short of those features of *philia* that are central to community building (compare Aristotle on εὔνοια as 'idle friendship', *Eth. Nic.* IX.5

engagement in the co-operative activities that help to constitute friendship doubtless shows that *philia* is not reducible to a *pathos,* i.e. something that one undergoes or suffers, this must not eclipse the bonds of affection forged through such activities, nor the affective responses which will be their continued accompaniments.[64] These help to support that legislative focus on virtue as a whole (III.688b1-4) by encouraging that συμφωνία between the perception of pain and pleasure and opinion following reason (III.689a7-8 πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν). Furthermore, this community of friends exemplifies many of the hallmarks of the best kind of friendship, which is a further indication that civic 'solidarity' does not exhaust the sense of friendship here. The familiarity nurtured in various social practices fosters: (i) the recognition of each other as equals (in a specific sense of that term, for difference, as well as likeness, in the degree of virtue attained is apparent in competitions), (ii) awareness of each other's *good* characters as these are manifested in their communal activities, (iii) which citizens actively support and promote in those common pursuits, (iv) with gentleness and generosity (without φθόνος). So, when the Athenian claims in Book V (743c) that "our people should be as happy as possible, and as far as possible friends with each other" he is urging them to adopt an orientation towards their fellows that carries many of the hallmarks of friendship of the best kind. The claim is not that civic friendship is identical to that private or intimate character-friendship described in Book VIII; rather, the presence of many features of character-friendship, as opposed those of the other two kinds discussed in this work, suggests that this is the ideal model towards which civic relations will aspire. At least within the framework given in Book VIII (which, admittedly, may not be the only one), this is the *only* model of the kinds given in this text whose values support that towards which the legislator looks in this exercise of community building: virtue (688b1-4; cf. 630c1-4, 963a1). This is presumably why there are striking parallels in language and tone between the Book VIII passage and the social practices of the civic community.

This raises a concern, however. For it would seem that friendship demands too much of the citizens. It requires not only a degree of intimacy that might be thought unsustainable in a political community (though the limited scale

1166b32-1167a12). The practical dimension of *philia* among citizens is manifested in their reciprocal relationships and their sharing in common activities and pursuits.

64 As LSJ has it: a *pathos* is 'that which happens to a person or thing' (Liddell and Scott: 1940) with Price (2009), 122, who opts for 'affection', rather than 'emotion' to capture the sense in which Greek views of emotion give a central role to cognitions in a broad sense.

of the city and the social practices of the *Laws* are designed to encourage this); it *also* requires a sense of the value of those qualities central to the good character of each. In some dialogues, this is the mark of the privileged few. This sense of value need not involve a fully rational understanding, though; such is ruled out by II.653b where friendship, along with pleasures and pains, arise "in the souls of those who cannot as yet grasp the reason for them". Citizens have acquired the values required for the desired treatment of others not, or not solely, through learning abstract principles of 'beauty', 'equality', and 'justice', but by a training in their affective responses (653b-c; 689a) – pleasures, pains and desires, through songs (ᾠδαι) and "enchantments (ἐπῳδαί) for the soul" (659e). This delivers that *erotikos* orientation towards the ideals of the state which enables them to appreciate the value of those qualities (such as self-control, courage, and wisdom: 837c) exhibited in the good characters of others, as well as providing the basis for their common activities.[65] This training supports the teachings of the legislator about what is fine, good, and just, and the relationship between these values and happiness (858d-859a Bobonich (1991), 383). As Bobonich (2002) has argued, all citizens seem capable, to some extent, and by whatever means, of appreciating genuine value in the *Laws*: "People in general (*hoi polloi*) don't fall so far short of real goodness that they can't judge (*krinein*) virtue and vice when they see it in others" (XII.950b).[66] This ability has been fostered in early education and is reinforced during the educational program.[67] Furthermore, constitutional features, such as preludes to the laws, "support this enterprise" (see, e.g. 720c3-5 with 857d-e, 858d-859a).[68] Not only do all citizens have the opportunity to develop a sense of the value of virtue, but the communal experiences in which they take pleasure encourage that sense to be acknowledged and expressed, along with other hallmarks of

65 One might be more precise here and see this as operating through θυμός and the love of victory (for example, in the passages quoted above, n.60). This is to say that the θυμός is trained affectively, which at least Aristotle supposes is the "place" where *philia* is felt (when you are betrayed), as Ar. *Pol.* VII.7, 1327b39-1328a16. ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν·αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ᾗ φιλοῦμεν

66 Compare (768a-c) on the role of the many in the courts of justice.

67 This includes arithmetic, 'everything to do with number', measurement, and astronomy (817e-820d). The population *in general* must have a grasp of the necessary elements of these subjects, though a few will study them in detail (818a).

68 See Bobonich (1991), 379, though there is some debate about precisely *how* this is achieved. On which, see Annas (2010), 84 who has argued that it is not always rational persuasion that is employed, but rhetorical devices and stories, which embody 'ideals of living' to be achieved in following the laws, so that the agent in question is rightly disposed towards those laws.

friendship, in their shared activities. The fact that *philia* demands so much of the citizens explains why its cultivation in the citizen body must be worked out in such detail in the constitutional provisions of the legislator.[69]

4 Friendship as a Political Value

Friendship is intertwined with other legislative goals, such as freedom and wisdom, which sharpens a sense of its *political* value.

> A city should be free and wise and a friend to itself and the lawgiver should give his laws with a view to these things (ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν). (*Leg.* III.693b2-5)[70]

Since the city is a "friend to itself", it might seem that we have a new model here, that of self-love. This does little to derail the importance of the salient features employed thus far, however, though we are concerned in the case of the city, with relations between its component parts. For the grounds of self-love do not differ from the grounds of *philia* between citizens. In his great prelude to the laws, the Athenian reworks the notion of self-love as follows:

> The truth of the matter is that for anyone, in any given situation, excessive love of self is the cause of all his faults… What the would-be great man should be in love with is not himself or his own possessions, but what is just, whether this in fact manifests itself in his own actions, or in somebody else's (*Leg.* V.731d6-732a3; trans. Griffith).

Love of self, like *all* kinds of love, should be grounded in an appreciation of excellence *as such*, and not because it is my excellence, or that of my friend, nor, then, because it is the excellence of that of any one component part of the city. The question becomes how the value of each component (e.g. the common people and the rulers and the laws) is recognized and acknowledged, such that the city expresses friendship. Central here is that the *aim* of each of

69 With Bobonich (2002), 432 "[Magnesia's] political organization provides the constitutive structuring of these activities", i.e. those activities characteristic of friendship.

70 Compare (701d7-9): "The lawgiver must in laying down his laws aim at three [goals], namely that the city for which he legislates be free, that it be a friend to itself, and that it possesses reason" with the reiteration of this threefold goal of legislation at 701d7-9.

the component parts of the city does not differ from the model of friendship that obtains between citizens, any more than do its *grounds*. The individual citizens aim at excellence, both individually and in their relations with each other, and this ensures that their worth and value to the community can be expressed and acknowledged as they can co-operate together in common activities. This is also the aim of each of the component parts of the city, which ensures that their worth and value can be acknowledged as they co-operate together without discord (III.689a-c).

The intertwining of friendship with freedom and wisdom in this legislative triad also recalls characteristics of friendship present elsewhere. The reverence for wisdom in the Book VIII account (837c) was a defining characteristic of the highest kind of friendship, and this is mirrored in the celebration of this value by the citizens in their civic practices. Freedom, too, though not mentioned as an ideal in the Book VIII account is explored here in Book III in terms of the recognition of each component of the city as equal in some sense, and equality is a key feature of the Book VIII account (III.694a with VIII.837a4), no less than for relations between citizens. This interplay of values is very close: it is said that the three goals (freedom, wisdom, and friendship) amount to the same thing (693c2). What this means, and how it works, on the level of the component parts of the city is explored via an account of the different political systems of monarchy and democracy (III.693d).[71] As Schofield (2013) argues, the presence, or absence, of friendship acts as a litmus test for determining whether the desired balance between the differing political systems of monarchy and democracy has been achieved, with Persia and Athens as respective examples. Friendship obtains when citizens are recognised as free (as in a democracy) and those with greater wisdom and virtue are respected (a monarchical element).

Though it is not clear what notion of freedom is in play in the *Laws*, remarks on the Persians that follow are instructive here.[72] Apparently, the Athenians embraced too much freedom, whilst the Persians embraced too much monarchy. Under Cyrus, however, there was a balance between freedom and slavery:

> The rulers gave a share of freedom to those under their rule, putting them on an equal footing. This made the soldiers well disposed towards their generals, and they showed themselves eager to face danger. And further, if there was any among them with brains enough to offer good advice, the

71 This is repeated in Book VI where, again friendship comes to the fore (756e).

72 Whether or not they bear much relation to historical facts, on which see Schofield (2013), 292. For an informative account of freedom in Plato and Aristotle, see Hansen (2010).

> king was not the one to resent this [N.B. the absence of φθόνος]. He allowed freedom of speech, and promoted those whose advice was of some value. So someone like this could regard the benefit of his wisdom as belonging to everybody, and put it forward openly (694a-b; trans. Griffith).

At this time, everything flourished because of freedom, friendship and community (694b5-6 αἰ πάντα δὴ τότε ἐπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς δι' ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν). The same held for the Athenians at the time of the Persian Wars (699c2: φιλία). The Persians degenerated after Cyrus, for "by taking away the freedom of the common people too completely, and by placing undue emphasis on the authoritarian element, they destroyed the principle of friendship and cooperation in the community. Once that has been lost, the policy of the rulers no longer has *the good of its subjects and the common people in view*. Their own rule becomes an end in itself; and they lay waste cities, lay waste friendly nations and destroy them with fire, at the merest hint, in any particular situation of some advantage to themselves" (697c8-d3; trans. Griffith).

Sharing in freedom with the rulers is a way that the *equal* (in the relevant sense) worth and value of each is acknowledged ("putting them on an equal footing", III.694a with VIII.837a). This feature allows us to appreciate the relationship between freedom and friendship. The privileged kind of equality, as Book VI explains, is proportionate equality (757c-d), which gives each a "measure related to its nature"; so each is free in the sense that the worth and value of both ruler and ruled is acknowledged, and the recognition of each as equal in this sense is an expression of friendship, that is, that relationship between "like and like, or of an equal with an equal" (VIII.837a with VI.757a). This equality fosters goodwill (εὔνοια, 695d5), and active support and assistance ("eager to face danger"). Moreover, allowing others to share in freedom involves not begrudging those with "sound advice" (694b3; an absence of φθόνος is a mark of friendship, V.730e6), by encouraging freedom of speech (694b4). In other words, it involves the recognition that others might have something of value to contribute and the celebration of any such wisdom by promotion. In these conditions reason can flourish ("sharing in νοῦς", 694a-b). This is a way in which relationships between component parts of the city promote wisdom, a feature that can be tracked in the legislative agenda more broadly.[73] And insofar as this

73 Note the Athenian's remarks about current legislation (857c2-e5), which now proceeds as if "for slaves being doctored by slaves" is opposed to a free doctor who proceeds by "dialogue" using arguments that "come close to philosophizing" and which "educate". Earlier this was contrasted with those who do not listen to anyone, and offer no explanation "with all the arrogance of a tyrant" (720c). On the importance of the preludes to the laws, see Bobonich (1991); Laks (2001), 272, 289: "Under ideal circumstances [the preambles] – take the form of quasi-philosophical discussions carried out by means of rational argu-

feature enables each citizen toeel that their advice will be heeded, such freedom also respects that single desire common to all humanity: "that what happens should happen in obedience to the dictates of one's own will" (687c; trans. Griffith). Finally, notice that defining characteristic of the privileged kind of friendship in Book VIII surfacing here in the attention given to having the good of others as an end in view and not using them for some advantage to oneself (III.697d1-3 with VIII.837c). Once the principle of friendship and cooperation has been lost (by which is meant "the freedom of the common people"), "the policy of the rulers no longer has *the good of its subjects and the common people in view*. Their own rule becomes an end in itself" (697d1-3). Non-instrumental interest in the good of others (not one's own advantage) is a mark of the friendship of the good ruler, no less than of the ideal friend.[74] Friendship is a non-coercive association which exemplifies that proportional equality (VI.757c-d) where each of the components in the city is given the recognition it deserves and willingly co-operates on that basis. Under these conditions, then, there will be that co-operation and concord between various elements that "constitutes a form of friendship".[75]

Though an element of freedom is clearly central to fostering this concord, it is a freedom moderated by wisdom (the monarchical element), whose role is not just to be an element in the desired balance, but to help to constitute it, like the idealised ruler under Cyrus. This concord generating feature of wisdom's deployment is suggested by the analogy between city and soul. The common people and population at large (δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς) stand to the city as the part which experiences pleasures and pains stand to the soul (III.689b). Wisdom in the soul (by analogy, the dictates of law, or the ruler in the city) is not reducible to knowing what is fine and good, but is closely aligned with

ment"; though see Brisson (2005) for criticism of this view. Bobonich (2002), 448 argues that "the value of political activity consists in its being an expression of one's capacity to be a self-governing agent". If so, then the notion of freedom in the *Laws* might come closer to the view that "actions performed issue from reasoned choice" (Moravcsik (1983), 7), showing the interplay of freedom and wisdom more closely. This might seem anachronistic since the most basic sense of freedom for the Greeks seems to be in contrast to the position of the slave. But an extended sense occurs by considering the passages discussed below where freedom seems to shade into 'liberality', just as slavery for Plato can sometimes shade into 'slavishness' or 'servility'; see, for example, the description of 'slavish music' in VII.802d.

74 As Bobonich (2002), 427–34, 454–59 has argued. See also Price (1989), 192–93; Morrow (1960), 562.
Bobonich (2002), 454–59, 427–34.

75 As Schofield (2013), 297, argues, "a just society that is equal in the right sense will deliver more reliably the rational harmony between its different elements that constitutes a form of friendship that Plato particularly values (e.g. *Gorg.* 508a, *Resp.* 443c-d)".

concord (συμφωνία), the finest and greatest of which is "properly *called* the greatest wisdom" (689d). Wisdom in the soul is manifested when the whole soul is moved to act in accord with the values reason affirms. By contrast, "when someone does not love what he has decided is fine and good" (689a), and the soul opposes "knowledge, opinion and rational argument – the things which should direct it – this I call folly" (689b), which is a kind of 'discord' (διαφωνία). This is not the "folly of the uneducated" (689c2), but the folly of those whose pleasures and pains (by analogy, the citizens) oppose rational opinion (the rulers and the laws). By analogy, then, the successful manifestation of wisdom in the community ensures that the population at large is moved to act willingly in accordance with the law, or ruler.[76] And this is precisely because of its interplay with the values explored thus far: allocating a share of *freedom* which acknowledges the equal value of other citizens, who are deserving of goods and opportunity (694b; 697d), such that they eagerly co-operate for common purpose (695d5). If this is what the operation of wisdom amounts to, then just as its operation is called a kind of συμφωνία (689d) on the level of the soul, so will its operation exemplify a kind of *friendship* between component parts of the city, where different elements act in consonance. This is how the desired unity of the city is expressed.[77]

The interplay of freedom, wisdom and friendship is also exemplified on the level of the dialogue's form, as well as its content. The interlocutors are from diverse Greek states, bringing together a number of different elements in this discursive exchange, under the auspices of friendship (φιλία, 642e). They are acknowledged as equal participants in the discussion, each with something of value "to contribute to the common stock" and each of whom enjoys the

76 By contrast, folly, a kind of discord, is manifested when the population does not act in accord with the knowledge enshrined in law, or embodied in the ruler. Compare the discussion of the 'discord' between the kings of the Dorian states, where they would not follow what the enacted laws prescribed, or agree with one another *about the thing they had consented to*. It was "discord between them, looking like wisdom, perhaps, but actually stupidity of the highest order" that led to their ruin (691a).

77 This allows us to appreciate the *kind* of unity involved in Magnesia : a συμφωνία of different components, with a shared aim in view. Compare *Resp.* 590c-d: "so that we may all be alike and *philoi* as far as possible, *all governed by the same principle*". See the distinction Proclus draws in his rejection of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's *Republic* (Festugiere, J., (trans.) *Proclus: Commentaire sur la* Republique (1976), 317–23). Unity, he argues, can be understood either as numerical unity, or as a unifying principle (what he terms "final unity", τελικόν). In the latter case, there is a bond of feeling among all its parts, since "one life and one form holds all together" (p. 364: 27–29), by which he means that it "directs the city as a whole and everyone in it towards one good" and as such turns the city into a community. This latter is "most one" (τὸ μάλιστα ἕν) and compared to the Good itself, which is the cause of all unification (ἕνωσις). On this view, unity is understood in terms of wholeness and perfection (τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τελείου). I am indebted to Alessio Santoro for discussion of Proclus.

freedom to say as much as they like (642d). This generates an almost uncharacteristic degree of goodwill in this work (εὔνοια: 635b1, 642b5, c5, e5) and much agreement and community between the participants. As so often in Plato, λόγος and ἔργον come together beautifully as he exemplifies the significance of friendship as a pervasive theme of the *Laws*.

In this use of *philia* as part of the language of the legislator Plato both draws on and departs from his contemporaries.[78] More prominent in political discourse of this period was a call for citizens to get along in a spirit of concord (ὁμόνοια), as Christ (2012), 8 and Konstan (2010), 242 have argued.[79] It is a surprising feature of the *Laws* that ὁμόνοια, which Plato elsewhere associates with friendship (*Clitophon* 409c3-8; *Alc.* I 126b8-c5, cf. *Pol.* 311b-c, *Resp.* 351d), makes *no* explicit appearance at all.[80] This sense of surprise is bolstered by comparison with Aristotle, who not only had a distinct account of "political *philia*", but aligns this closely to ὁμόνοια: "to promote ὁμόνοια, which seems similar to *philia*" is the chief aim of the lawgiver (*Eth. Nic.* 1155a22-6; compare 1167a22-9); "ὁμόνοια appears to mean political *philia*, which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life" (1167b2-4). Ὁμόνοια clearly does not capture quite what Plato has in mind here.

Indeed, as Schofield (2013), 292 has argued, the triad of freedom, wisdom and friendship can be seen as a revaluation of the Spartan values encoded in Lycurgus' oracle on freedom, where courage and ὁμόνοια were central: "But in the Athenian's version, friendship and wisdom take the place of concord and, more importantly, courage or manliness. In other words, we get precisely the substitution of what the Athenian Stranger calls the leading virtue – wisdom – for

78 There is evidence that politicians drew on the language of *philia* as part of a rhetorical strategy claiming to benefit the people as a whole, rather than a limited kinship group (Connor (1971), 43). "These developments of language mark the emergence of a new hierarchy of values in the Greek city, one that emphasizes civic virtues and devotion to the well-being of the whole city. They form the natural culmination of a progression towards popular rule and the essential preconditions for a successfully functioning democratic system" (Connor (1971), 106). Plutarch's *Moralia* (806f.) offers a good example in citing how Cleon publicly gathered together his *philoi* and renounced his *philia* for them, claiming instead to be a *philos* of the *demos* as a whole.

79 For civic friendship as ὁμόνοια, see Thuc. 8.93; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.16; Lys. *On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias*, 17–18; *Defense Against the Charge of Subverting Democracy*, 20–22, 27; Dem. *De Cor.* 164–67, 246; Iso. *Paneg.* 103–04, *Panath.* 42, 258, *Nicocles* 41, *Phillipus* 16, 40, 141; Plat. *Clitophon* 409c; *Alc.* I, 126c-127d; Ar. *Eth. Nic.* IX.6 1167a22-b3; *Eth. Eud.* VII.1241a1-35. I thank Tony Leyh for these references.

80 Nor do any of its obvious synonyms, such as ὁμολογία, which occurs four times, each of which concerns a particular case, such as agreements between husband and wife (840e), reaching agreement in the courts (768a8), contracts and agreements between workman (921c2) and the breaking of agreed contracts which will be brought before the courts (920d2, d5). In none of these cases is it mentioned alongside friendship.

the courage the Spartans and Cretans mistakenly suppose to be what virtue consists in". Just as we get wisdom in place of Spartan courage, so we get *philia* in place of ὁμόνοια. What explains this substitution? There is more built into *philia*, as we have seen. Friendship exemplifies proportional equality (VI.757c-d) where each of the components in the city is given the recognition it deserves (a share of freedom) and co-operates together *on that basis*. The basis seems important; for friendship speaks to the *willing* co-operation of all these parts, which is important to the legislative enterprise as it is conceived in the *Laws* (687c1-7; 690b-c). Its analogue in the soul is that συμφωνία (689d), where affective components – pleasures, pains and desires – willingly accord with what they have consented to. This is part of that legislative focus on virtue as a whole (III.688b1-4). Just as virtue "as a whole" requires certain motivations to be developed in the individual, so the virtuous community as a whole will need to foster orientations towards each other, through shared and reciprocated affective responses, which generate *goodwill* and *eagerness* to act together (694d5). No doubt *homonoia* will be implicated in this process insofar as the goals for the sake of which they act are held in common, but the conditions that give rise to their co-operative behaviour, and which ensure that all are *moved* to do what is agreed by law, require orientations and motivations both towards one another, and between rulers and ruled, to engage in that mutually benefitting co-operative activity. This is perhaps better served with the more affective *philia*, than the affectively neutral ὁμόνοια.[81]

The prominence of friendship may also explain the curious absence of justice, eclipsed from view in the triad of legislative values.[82] For as Aristotle explains: "of the forms of justice the most important is thought to be that bound up with friendship" (*Eth. Nic.* 1155a28).[83] If friendship expresses that proportional equality between citizens, ensuring that each is acknowledged as a free and equal partner and given their due, it is not clear what consideration of justice would add in this particular context. For the truest and best equality – geometrical equality (757b) – is the source of justice itself (757c6).[84] Back in

81 See Tony Leyh, "A Symphony of Citizens: A New Strategy of Civic Friendship in the Laws" (unpublished) who argues that: "The Laws account of civic friendship pays due respect to how emotional consonance serves as a pillar upon which friendships can both originate and be sustained."

82 As Bartels (2017), 33–36 argues, who notes that it appears 11 times compared to 140 in the *Republic*.

83 Compare *Eth. Eud.* VII.10, 1242a20-1: "All just behaviour is relative to a friend"; VII.1 1234b25-6: "We all say that justice and injustice are found especially in relations between friends". See also *Clitophon* (409e) where the production of friendship is the ἴδιον ἔργον of justice.

84 Compare Socrates in the *Gorgias* (507e-508a): "The wise say that what holds together heaven and earth and gods and men is κοινωνία (community), friendship, orderliness,

Book I, the priority of friendship to other legislative aims was marked: the ideal scenario is one in which justice arises organically, so to speak, and not through the legislative impositions of the legislator wielding principles of justice: for, "you might just as well suppose that the sick body which has been purged by the doctor was therefore in the pink of condition, and disregard the body that never had any such need" (628d-e).[85] Friendship is the organic root of justice, hence the greatest good for the legislator is "peace and goodwill among men" (628c), whose presence ensures no "doctoring" will be required. The context here is important, though; the claim is not that justice is explanatorily redundant once armed with an account of friendship. Comparison with Aristotle's rich, though complex, discussion of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, alongside his extended account of friendship, shows how much can be gained from such consideration. The issue is one of emphasis. The thought is that it is not clear what it would add *to the Laws*. The principal concern in the *Laws* is to create a virtuous state from the bottom up (and not to "doctor" one already in existence), hence the importance of the moral psychology of Books I and II and the emphasis on those interpersonal relationships wherein those affective components can find proper expression and reinforcement. One may object that the *Republic* is also concerned with the virtuous state from the bottom up, so to speak, and justice, as well as friendship, is central. The thought is that the distinct perspective of much of the discussion in the *Laws* (with the exception of Book X) works better, perhaps, with a project that conceives of justice in familiar terms – in terms of relations between each other in which we are all, to some extent, already implicated – and not in terms of a value more abstractly conceived.[86] For we are not framing laws for heroes and sons of gods, but "we are human beings, legislating in the world today for the children of human beings" (IX. 853c-d). Such, perhaps, helps to make the *Laws* persuasive "to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite".[87]

---

moderation and justice", where the extent to which these latter notions are distinct is not clear, especially given that it is Callicles' neglect of geometry which is responsible for his failure to appreciate all five values. Geometry would have given him that sense of proportional equality central to all five. For friendship and proportional equality, see *Ti.* 32b with El Murr (2014).

85 Compare IX.853b on penal legislation where it is said that: "in a way it is something of a disgrace to be making laws at all for any of the things we are now about to make laws for – in a city like ours which will be well run, we maintain, and which will realise all the right conditions for the practice of human goodness".

86 Here it is relevant that the family arrangements of the *Laws* are less restrictive than those of the *Republic*.

87 See Schofield (2010b), 23: "The *Laws* envisages itself as trying to cope with human beings as they actually are". Bobonich (2002), 110; cf. 385, 451: "The *Laws* is highly sensitive to the fact that human nature sets limits on the attainment of what would be ideally best". See,

5 Friendship and Plato's Politics

> "There is a scene in War and Peace I sometimes think about," said Sammler. "The French General Davout, who was very cruel, who was said, I think, to have torn out a man's whisker's by the roots, was sending people to the firing squad in Moscow, but when Pierre Bezhukov came up to him, they looked into each other's eyes. A human look was exchanged and Pierre was spared. Tolstoy says that you don't kill another human being with whom you have exchanged such a look."[88]

The social practices of the *Laws* foster a kind of face-to-face interaction from which ethical and legislative imperatives also seem to follow. The cultivation of *philia* makes the humanity of others "fully visible", as Gaita puts it (1998) xxi, such that we see them as worthy of care and concern, deserving of goods and opportunity, and promote their interests, with generosity, gentleness, and justice. This brings citizens relationships close to the characteristic features of character-friendship in Book VIII, and suggests that this is the normative model for citizenship. It will no doubt be to the mutual advantage of citizens that all are so valued and their interests promoted, but Plato does not explicitly discuss a distinct kind of "political *philia*", nor then is it placed under the auspices of mutual advantage (*Eth. Nic.* IX.6, 1167b3-4), as it seems to be for Aristotle.[89] Plato's conception is more closely aligned to the moral ends of the city.

Much here may be a matter of emphasis, which depends on their respective starting points. As Schofield (1998), 44, has argued with reference to Aristotle: "The idea that political friendship is a form of advantage friendship is supported (*Eth. Eud.* vii.10, 1242a6-9) by appeal to the mutual advantage the very existence of the *polis* is designed to secure".[90] Plato is less concerned in the

---

also Bartels' general view of the *Laws* in Bartels (2017). Schofield (2003), 13, argues as follows: "Plato wanted two things above all of the discourse he was to develop in the *Laws*: first, that it should reflect and embody a sense of a transcendent moral framework for political and social existence; second, that it should be capable of being persuasive – because *inter alia* generally intelligible – to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite". Bartels (2017), by contrast, argues that *Laws* drops the transcendent moral framework.

88 Saul Bellow, *Mr Sammler's Planet*, (1970/2007 Penguin Modern Classics) p. 155.

89 Though there is debate about whether advantage friendship or character friendship best captures Aristotle's notion of political friendship; on which, see Schofield (1998), 40–43 and Cooper (1977), (1990), 235.

90 Plato's *Republic* seems to offer an account of political friendship as advantage friendship precisely in the context of the origins of the city in *Republic* II. A city is created because "partners and helpers" are collected, creating a network of giving and receiving, on the

Laws with "the very existence of the *polis*" and begins with existing states – Athens, Crete and Sparta, whose practices he attempts to revise.[91] Indeed, the prominence of virtue "as a whole" as a legislative ideal arises dialectically through critical examination of Sparta (Books I and II).[92] The opening lines speak to this focus on the origin of *law*, not, principally, the origin of the *polis*, where the advantages of living together and exchanging services might be more prominent.[93] The focus on law leads to that pervasive concern with *paideia*, now broadly conceived, concerned to foster virtue as a whole. With the emphasis on virtue from the start, any 'advantage' to be had from friendship will be explored as promoting that value.

This also suggests that strict utility friendship, where the value of others is reduced to their 'use' to the city, fails to capture its central features. This model can be resisted, along with the objectionable politics it suggests (Vlastos [1981] 1999, 150), where the interests of the individual are eclipsed and subordinated to those of the state. Doubtless, friendship supports the larger community and it is to the mutual advantage of all, and to the advantage of the city, that each is valued and supported.[94] This need not reduce the citizens' experience of

---

grounds that *each supposes this to be better for himself* (μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὑτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι, *Resp.* II.369c6-7).

91 I do not mean to deny that Plato is also concerned with aspects of founding such as Magnesia's natural resources (IV.704a-705c), climate (V.747d-e), population size (V.737e; V.740b-741a), and land distribution (V.737c-d; V.739e-740a), but such is not the principal focus of the *Laws*. Book III begins with an inquiry into the origins of constitutions (πολιτείαι, 676a2) rather than the origin of the city itself.

92 Plato's choice of an Athenian Stranger to be the interlocutor with the two Dorians', Morrow (1960), 74 notes, "indicates clearly his intention to confront the Dorian way with the traditions of his native city".

93 "Tell me, gentlemen, to whom do you give the credit for establishing your codes of law? It is a god, or a man (Θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως;)?" (I.624a). Compare Book III where the history of constitutions is in view (676a7-b8), which is concerned with the origin (*arche*) of constitutions and their transformations.

94 For passages which speak to larger community interests, see the remarks on marriage: "we should seek to contract the alliance that will benefit the city, not the one that we personally find most alluring" (VI.773b). Compare: "If public interest is well served, rather than private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited (καὶ ὅτι συμφέρει τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν, ἢν τὸ κοινὸν τιθῆται καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἴδιον)" (IX.875a7-b1). And in Book X we view the aims of the community from the perspective of the cosmos as a whole. Each component of a whole strives for what is best in common, because what is best for each part is also best for the whole (πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συντεῖνον βέλτιστον μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, 903c6-d1). To foster virtue in its every form is "sharing in god's plan for the universe as a whole" (Bobonich (2002), 433). It is possible that one might want happiness for others without wishing this for *their* own sake,

philia to merely instrumental considerations, from which the privileged kind is explicitly distanced on more than one occasion (III.697d1-3; VIII.837a-c). Acknowledging each person's worth and value and seeing it as contributing to some larger whole (the choral community, or city) of which one is a part, are not mutually exclusive alternatives.

Nor is the model one of maximal mutual identification, as Price (1999) argues with reference to the *Republic*. Citizens value others as equal to themselves, which does *not* mean that differences in type are stamped out, so that they form some homogenous totality.[95] The fact that the salient notion of equality is proportionate equality, not numerical equality, is designed to capture that point. The very first book of the *Laws* ends with the idea that one of the most useful tools for the science of politics is the ability to know the nature and disposition of people's souls in order to care for them (θεραπεύειν, 650b). These dispositions are seen in the types of lives discussed in Book V (733d-e), in which four distinct virtues are more or less prominent in different characters, as well as four corresponding vices. Other qualities are also mentioned such as good looks, uprightness, and good reputation (734d-e), against which people can be distinguished. Appropriate tests need to be applied to particular cases to determine who should hold high office (735a). In Book VIII we are told of ceremonial battles where there is a "need to award prizes for victory and outstanding performance, and make one another speeches of praise and criticism for the kind of individual each turns out to be, both in these competitions, and for that matter in the whole of life".[96] Competitions in virtue would make little sense if all citizens were alike and the same. The differences may be one of degree, not kind, but they speak to a civic celebration of such distinctness.

This may diffuse a persistent concern with Plato's accounts of love, which rears its head here, too. This is that the kind of valuing of others that the legislator encourages is not particularly individual, given the virtuous character in view. The issue is not that the account fails to accommodate love for who each

---

that is out of any concern for *them*. The perspective of the universe need not involve any wishing of happiness for the individual's own sake (on which, see Sidgwick (1967), 382), but that is *not* the perspective relevant to the cultivation of *philia* amongst citizens.

95 Compare Aristotle, who accused Plato of creating a *polis* of ὅμοιοι which looks more like an alliance than a proper city, and "the *polis* consists not merely of a plurality of persons, but of persons who differ in type; for a *polis* does not come from people who are alike" (*Pol.* 1261a22-7).

96 νικητήρια δὲ καὶ ἀριστεῖα ἑκάστοισι τούτων δεῖ διανέμειν ἐγκώμιά τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν ἀλλήλοις, ὁποῖός τις ἂν ἕκαστος γίγνηται κατά τε τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐν παντί τε αὖ τῷ βίῳ (*Leg.* VIII.829c2-4).

person is, in favour of a focus on abstractions, for the *Laws* is clear on the relationship that holds between the virtue of each and the whole person: "of the things that most belong to one, the most divine – after the gods – is the soul, the thing that is most one's own" (v.726a6-8). Since virtue is the excellence of the soul, it is the excellence of the thing that is most one's own and attending to this just is to attend to what belongs most of all to others. If there is nothing more fundamental to a person than their good character, this is not a failure on Plato's part to appreciate the value of individuals; it is a radical re-evaluation of what is salient to that appreciation.[97]

It might be objected that if Plato operates with an impersonal conception of the soul, this argumentative move has little traction, but the legislator is concerned with the *different* dispositions of soul (i.650b), and *distinctness* is celebrated in the civic competitions; soul considered from a larger theological perspective (as in Book x) is not the object of civic *philia*; rather, it is other *persons* who manifest virtue in distinct ways, given their particular dispositions, and to a greater or lesser extent.[98] Though *philia* is an emotion that contains appraisal of another's character, the evaluative content of which is tethered to a specific set of normative goals, virtue is not a straightjacket under which individual difference is objectionably constrained. The many and rich ways in which human excellence can be manifested will be the subjects of stories, songs and eulogies; these representations of good character will doubtless deliver a rich sense of the embeddedness of virtue in characters and individual lives.[99]

Competitions in virtue celebrate distinctness and provide incentives for individual striving, albeit ones constrained by the gentleness and generosity one is urged to show towards others (730e6-731a). The social activities of the *Laws* encourage the intimacy and familiarity with individuals that comes about through repeatedly eating, dancing and singing together, and acting in common. The appreciation each citizen has for others, in other words, is not

97 This strand of Plato's thinking can be seen in the *Symposium* where Socrates explains that since we are willing to cut off our own arms and legs if we are diseased it is not what is akin to ourselves that we love, but what is good (205e). See Kosman [1976] (2014) on the *Symposium* and Waterlow (1972) on the *Republic*. Compare Aristotle: 'The good man is a lover of the good (φιλάγαθος) not a lover of self (φίλαυτος); for he loves himself, if at all, because he is good' (*Mag. Mor.* ii.14 1212b18-20) with Whiting (1991).

98 This is even a feature of the eschatology of Book x (903b4-905a1) where the desires and characters of individual souls determine what they will become.

99 On the sense of "embeddedness" transmitted in stories, see Nussbaum (2013), 10: "The human mind is quirky and particularistic, more easily able to conceive a strong attachment if these high principles are connected to a particular set of perceptions, memories, and symbols, that have deep roots in the personality and in people's sense of their own history".

fostered by attendance to abstract principles (compare the Highest mysteries of the *Symposium's* ascent), but by attendance to *persons*. So though the *grounds* of *philia* may be broad, this does not deliver a depersonalised conception of friendship; the *objects* of that love are, and remain, persons, whose characters are appreciated for the good qualities they manifest.[100]

True enough, the objection might continue, any expression of difference will be one of degree, not kind; this is not a problem for the legislator, though, but an *opportunity*. For, if orientated towards the good character of others (however distinctly that is manifested), we have equal reason to love others sharing in that virtue: "…whether this in fact manifests itself in his own actions, or in somebody else's" (*Leg.* v.731d6-732a3; trans. Griffith). The friendship cultivated in the *Laws* extends partiality: by cultivating an orientation towards anybody and everybody who manifests these values, in whatever distinct way that is. This inclusive reworking of *philia* is based on the fact that a lover is partial to what he loves and so if grounded in attachments to self, or kin it will eclipse the values that are most fundamental to human flourishing (732a1-2).[101] The valuation one is urged to adopt gives one equal reason to value virtuous action wherever it occurs, which is to say that all citizens will be *equally worthy of love*. For this reason, *philia* is not something whose intimacy threatens the public sphere; its grounds enables citizens to widen and direct concern towards others in their community and to bring each citizen into a common mode of living – without recourse to ties such as family, ethnicity, or any other particularized traits. The very reasons which provide the basis for Vlastos' disappointment are the very *same* reasons why *philia can* be employed to widen one's circle of concern – to extend partiality – beyond any one individual such that one acknowledges all citizens as equally worthy. The so-called "fungible import" of Platonic love is precisely why it can be deployed towards ends that are, in a sense, egalitarian.[102] In recent political theorizing, by contrast,

100 For the importance of this distinction between the grounds and object of love in modern philosophy of love, see Delaney (1996).

101 Since excessive love of self is the cause of all ills (731e), this thesis is central to the cultivation of virtue. A variety of practices are designed to counteract "this excessive love of ourselves (τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν) [which] … makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice (ὥστε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κακῶς κρίνει)" (v.731e4-732a1); Compare Aristotle, *Pol.* vii.16, 1335b5-11

102 The fact that all citizens, to the extent that they are capable of virtue and orientated towards it, are equally worthy might seem to limit the scope of *philia* to those inside a community of this kind. For similar concerns, see Irwin (1995), 316. This may only be a contingent matter, however. The grounds of *philia* are broad enough to include all persons,

friendship is often seen as too partial and preferential to ground the kinds of universalizing claims of ethics, or provide any basis for legislation; love has been marginalized in favour of respect, or dignity.[103] This supposedly objectionable feature of Platonic love, though, is that key move which allows for its political deployment.[104] Leaving aside our obsession with the particularities of the individual, of which the reading of Plato and Aristotle is always a sobering reminder, what remains that is "morally disquieting", perhaps, is not that Plato fails to recognize the value of citizens as ends of care and concern, but that what is required to develop this orientation towards each other requires so much regulation and socialization of what we would now consider to be the "private" realm (739b-d).[105]

Acknowledgements

This paper was first aired in 2015 and has received many helpful comments. I thank the Cambridge B club for comments on this paper, especially Malcolm Schofield, and the audience of a conference in Edinburgh on Plato and the Emotions, especially Olivier Renaut and Douglas Cairns for written comments.

---

though there may be contingent reasons why we are exposed to some human beings and not others. The Athenian is concerned with the proper treatment of foreigners (729e-730a), claiming that "they deserve greater sympathy from mankind and the gods" and it is "of the greatest concern to get to the end of life without committing any misdeed against foreigners". Sympathy falls short of *philia*, though, which involves common pursuits and activities, but this is still evidence of a broad concern for other persons in this text.

103 Though see Rawls (1971), 190 on the relationship between love and other-directed concern and Dworkin (1986), 186–224, 410–13 who speaks of "fraternal concern" rather than friendship, in which we express equal concern for the well-being of others. Cf. Sandel (1982), 179–83.

104 Evidence for this partiality problem pre-Plato can be seen in the way *philia* was deployed by politicians, as noted by Connor (1971), 43, who argues that by claiming to be a *philos to the people* a politician would be claiming to benefit the people as a whole, rather than a limited kinship group.

105 Elements belonging to what we would consider the private realm – such as pleasure, pain, and desires – are regulated (732e; 788b), including private households (790b) as well as regulations that govern the way citizens spend *all* of their time (807e). According to Klosko (2006), 225: "The end result of Plato's prescriptions is an all-embracing public opinion, intruding into every aspect of people's lives". Compare Laks (2001), 286: "the whole of human life can become the object of legislative attention". Morgan (2013), 288: "If no area of life in the city remains private, each act, and speech act, is public, performed for one's own benefit and that of one's fellow citizens". For a critique of the widespread use of a robust distinction between the private and the public realms, see Geuss (2003).

I would also like to thank the participants of the conference on Plato and Community in Brasilia, especially Gabor Betegh, Gabriele Cornelli and Allesio Santoro. Thanks are also due to Lucia Prauscello for helpful discussion, to Tony Leyh for urging me to attend to *sumphonia*, to Michael Withey and Myrthe Bartels for comments on an earlier draft and to Max Leventhal for help with Greek. Above all, thanks are due to Stephen Hailey for detailed comments and encouragement.

References

Annas, J. (2010). "Virtue and Law in Plato." In *Plato's Laws: A Critical Guide*, C. Bobonich (ed.), 71–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DO1:10.1017/CBO 9780511781483.005.

Bartels, M.L. (2017). *Plato's Pragmatic Project: A Reading of Plato's* Laws. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Betegh, G. (forthcoming). "Magnesia and Brasilia."

Bobonich, C. (1991). "Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's *Laws*." *The Classical Quarterly* 41 (2): 365–88.

Bobonich, C. (2002). *Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Brisson, L. (2005). "Ethics and Politics in Plato's *Laws*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 28: 93–121.

Brisson, L. (2012). "Soul and State in Plato's *Laws*." In *Plato and the Divided Self*, R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.), 281–307. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Christ, M.R. (2012). *The Limits of Altruism in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, D. (1993). "Law, Autonomy, and Political Community in Plato's *Laws*." *Classical Philology* 88 (4): 301–17.

Connor, W.R. (1971). *The New Politicians of fifth-century Athens*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, J.M. (1977). "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship." *The Review of Metaphysics* 30 (4): 619–48.

Cooper, J.M. (1990). "Political Animals and Civic Friendship." In *Aristoteles' "Politik,"* G. Patzig (ed.), 221–41. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Delaney, N. (1996) "Romantic Love and Modern Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, No 4: 339–56.

Dworkin, R. (1986). *Law's empire*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.

El Murr, D. (2014). "Philia in Plato." In *Ancient and medieval concepts of friendship*, S. Stern-Gillet and G.M. Gurtler (eds.), 3–34. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Gaita, R. (1998). *A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice*. London: Routledge.

Geuss, R. (2003). *Public goods, private goods: with a new preface by the author*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Geuss, R. (2005). Outside Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grene, D., & Lattimore, R. (eds.). (1960). *Greek tragedies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hansen, M.H. (2010). 'Democratic Freedom and the Concept of Freedom in Plato and Aristotle'. *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 50 (1): 1–27.

Irwin, T. (1995). *Plato's Ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kahn, C.H. (1996). *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue : The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klosko, G. (2006). *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford university press.

Konstan, D. (1997). *Friendship in the Classical World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Konstan, D. (2010). *Before forgiveness: the origins of a moral idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Konstan, D. (2014). *Beauty: the fortunes of an ancient Greek idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kosman, L.A. (1976) (2014). "Platonic Love." In *Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, 27–42. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Laks, A. (1988). "Loi et Persuasion. Recherche Sur La Structure de La Pensee Politique Platonicienne." Université Paris IV. http://www.theses.fr/1987PA040443.

Laks, A. (2001). "In What Sense is the City of the *Laws* a Second Best One?" In *Plato's* Laws *and its historical significance*, F.L. Lisi (ed.), 107–14. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Lane, M. (2007). "Virtue as the Love of Knowledge in Plato's *Symposium* and *Republic*." In *Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat*, D. Scott (ed.), 44–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ludwig, P.W. (2002). *Eros and polis : desire and community in Greek political theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

Markell, P. (2000). "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On 'Constitutional Patriotism.'" *Political Theory* 28 (1): 38–63.

Meyer, S.S. (ed.) (2015). *Plato.* Laws *1 and 2*. S.S. Meyer (trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, M. (2013). "On Reading the *Laws* as a Whole: Horizon, Vision, and Structure." In *Plato's* Laws*: Force and Truth in Politics*, E. Sanday and G. Recco (eds.), 11–30. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Moore, K.R. (2007). "*Erôs*, *Hybris* and *Mania*: Love and Desire in Plato's *Laws* and Beyond." *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought* 24 (1): 112–33. DOI:10.1163/20512996-90000110.

Moravcsik, J.M.E. (1983). "Plato and Pericles on Freedom and Politics." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 13 (sup. 1): 1–17. DOI:10.1080/00455091.1983.10715860.

Morgan, K.A. (2013). "Praise and Performance in Plato's *Laws*." In *Performance and Culture in Plato's* Laws, A.-E. Peponi (ed.), 265–93. New York: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/CBO9781139061674.013.

Morrow, G.R. (1960). *Plato's Cretan city: a historical interpretation of the Laws*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Munn, M. (2013). "*Eros* and The Laws in Historical Context." In *Plato's* Laws*: Force and Truth in Politics*, E. Sanday and G. Recco (eds.), 31–47. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2001), *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2013) *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*. Harvard University Press.

Penner, T., & Rowe, C.J. (2005). *Plato's Lysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prauscello, L. (2014). *Performing Citizenship in Plato's* Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Price, A.W. (1989). *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Price, A.W. (1999). "Friendship and Politics." *Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie* 61 (3): 525–45.

Price, A.W. (2009). 'Emotions in Plato and Aristotle'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, P. Goldie (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of justice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Robinson, J. (2005). *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role In Literature, Music, and Art*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Samaras, T. (2010). 'Family and the Question of Women'. In *Plato's* Laws*: A Critical Guide*, C. Bobonich (ed.), 172–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandel, M.J. (1982). *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schofield, M. (1998). "Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity." In *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict, and Community in Classical Athens*, P.A. Cartledge and S. von von Reden (eds.), 37–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schofield, M. (2003). "Religion and Philosophy in the *Laws*." In *Plato's Laws: From Theory into Practice. Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicium*., S. Scolnicov and L. Brisson (eds.), 1–13. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Schofield, M. (2006). *Plato. Political Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schofield, M. (2010a). "Music all pow'rful". In *Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide*, McPherran, M., (ed.), 229–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511763090.013.

Schofield, M. (2010b). "The *Laws*' Two Projects." In *Plato's* Laws*: A Critical Guide*, C. Bobonich (ed.), 12–28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511781483.002.

Schofield, M. (2013). "Friendship and Justice in the *Laws*." In *The Platonic Art of Philosophy*, G. Boys-Stones, D. El Murr, and C. Gill (eds.), 283–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/CBO9781139856010.017.

Scott, D. (2000). "Socrates and Alcibiades in the *Symposium*" *Hermathena* 168: 25–37.

Scott, D. (2007). "Eros, Philosophy, and Tyranny." In *Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat*, D. Scott (ed.), 136–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scruton, R. (1990). "In Defence of the Nation." In *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain*, 53–86. Palgrave Macmillan, London. DOI:10.1007/978-1-349-20686-5_4.

Sedley, D. (2007). "Philosophy, the Forms and the Art of Ruling". In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic, G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), 256–83. Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/CCOL0521839637.010.

Sheffield, F.C.C. (2017). "Erōs and the Pursuit of Form." In *Plato's* Symposium*: A Critical Guide*, P. Destree and Z. Giannopoulou (eds.), 125–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/9781316273166.008.

Sheffield, F.C.C. (2011). "Beyond Eros: Friendship in the *Phaedrus*." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 111: 251–73.

Sidgwick, H., (1874) (1967). *Methods of Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1995). 'Two Theories of Modernity'. *The Hastings Center Report* 25 (2): 24. DOI:10.2307/3562863.

Vlastos, G. (1981) (1999). "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato." In *Plato 2, Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*, G. Fine (ed.), 137–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Waterlow, S. (1972). "The Good of Others in Plato's 'Republic.'" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 73: 19–36.

Whiting, J.E. (1991). "Impersonal Friends." *The Monist* 74 (1): 3–29.

Wohl, V. (1999). "The Eros of Alcibiades", *Classical Antiquity* 18 (2) 349–85.