



# Protection

# Protection

- Goals of Protection
- Principles of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Access Control
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection

# Objectives

- Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern computer system
- Explain how protection domains combined with an access matrix are used to specify the resources a process may access
- Examine capability and language-based protection systems

# Goals of Protection


- Operating system consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations.
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so.

# Principles of Protection

- Guiding principle – principle of least privilege
  - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough privilege to perform their tasks

# Domain Structure

- Access-right =  $\langle \text{object-name}, \text{rights-set} \rangle$   
where *rights-set* is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object.
- Domain = set of access-rights




# Domain Implementation (UNIX)

- System consists of 2 domains:
  - User
  - Supervisor
- UNIX
  - Domain = user-id
  - Domain switch accomplished via file system.
    - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit).
    - When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed. When execution completes user-id is reset.

# Domain Implementation (Multics)

- Let  $D_i$  and  $D_j$  be any two domain rings.
- If  $j < i \Rightarrow D_i \subseteq D_j$



Multics Rings



# Access Matrix

- View protection as a matrix (*access matrix*)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- $\text{Access}(i, j)$  is the set of operations that a process executing in  $\text{Domain}_i$  can invoke on  $\text{Object}_j$

# Access Matrix

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$	printer
$D_1$	read		read	
$D_2$				print
$D_3$		read	execute	
$D_4$	read write		read write	

Figure A

# Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain  $D_i$  tries to do “op” on object  $O_j$ , then “op” must be in the access matrix.
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection.
  - Operations to add, delete access rights.
  - Special access rights:
    - *owner of  $O_i$*
    - *copy op from  $O_i$  to  $O_j$*
    - *control –  $D_i$  can modify  $D_j$  access rights*
    - *transfer – switch from domain  $D_i$  to  $D_j$*

# Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy.
  - Mechanism
    - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules.
    - It ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced.
  - Policy
    - User dictates policy.
    - Who can access what object and in what mode.

# Implementation of Access Matrix

- Each column = Access-control list for one object  
Defines who can perform what operation.

Domain 1 = Read, Write  
Domain 2 = Read  
Domain 3 = Read

⋮

- Each Row = Capability List (like a key)  
For a given domain, what operations are allowed on each objects.

Object 1 – Read  
Object 4 – Read, Write, Execute  
Object 5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

## Access Matrix of Figure A With Domains as Objects

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$	laser printer	$D_1$	$D_2$	$D_3$	$D_4$
$D_1$	read		read			switch		
$D_2$				print			switch	switch
$D_3$		read	execute					
$D_4$	read write		read write		switch			

Figure B



# Access Matrix with *Copy* Rights

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$
$D_1$	execute		write*
$D_2$	execute	read*	execute
$D_3$	execute		

(a)

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$
$D_1$	execute		write*
$D_2$	execute	read*	execute
$D_3$	execute	read	

(b)

# Access Matrix With Owner Rights

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$
$D_1$	owner execute		write
$D_2$		read* owner	read* owner write
$D_3$	execute		
(a)			
object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$
$D_1$	owner execute		write
$D_2$		owner read* write*	read* owner write
$D_3$		write	write
(b)			




# Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

object domain	$F_1$	$F_2$	$F_3$	laser printer	$D_1$	$D_2$	$D_3$	$D_4$
$D_1$	read		read			switch		
$D_2$				print			switch	switch control
$D_3$		read	execute					
$D_4$	write		write		switch			

# Access Control

- Protection can be applied to non-file resources
- Solaris 10 provides **role-based access control** to implement least privilege
  - Privilege is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
  - Can be assigned to processes
  - Users assigned roles granting access to privileges and programs

# Role-based Access Control in Solaris 10



# Revocation of Access Rights

- *Access List* – Delete access rights from access list.
  - Simple
  - Immediate
- *Capability List* – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked.
  - Reacquisition
  - Back-pointers
  - Indirection
  - Keys

# Capability-Based Systems

- Hydra
  - Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system.
  - Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's program; system provides access protection for use of these rights.
- Cambridge CAP System
  - Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute of individual storage segments associated with object.
  - Software capability - interpretation left to the subsystem, through its protected procedures.

# Language-Based Protection

- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources.
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable.
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system.