**Fully homomorphic encryption**

CS4796: Joint Senior Honours Project

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

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**Abstract**

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# 1 Introduction

# 2 Mathematical Preliminaries

Throughout this work some basic concepts will be used, the most important of which will be given below.

**Definition 2.1.** Strings over an alphabet: Let $A$ be a finite set of symbols, called an **alphabet** the strings over $A$ denoted $A^*$ is the set of all finite length sequences of symbols from $A$, including $\epsilon$, the empty string. Formally:

$$A^* = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}} A^n.$$

Here $\epsilon = () \in A^0$, the empty tuple. When talking about strings from $A^*$, instead of $s = (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n) \in A^*$, we will just write $a_1 a_2 \ldots a_n$.

A natural property of strings is their length, i.e. the number of symbols they are composed of. Thus, let $|\cdot| : A \mapsto \mathbb{N} \cup \{0\}$ be defined as

$$\forall s \in A^* \quad |s| = n \Leftrightarrow s \in A^n$$

A natural operation on strings is concatentaion. Formally, let $A$ be an alphabet. Then, let $+ : A^* \times A^* \mapsto A^*$, such that

$$\forall s_1 = a_1 \ldots a_n, s_2 = b_1 \ldots b_m \in A^*. \quad s_1 + s_2 = a_1 \ldots a_n b_1 \ldots b_m \in A^*.$$

**Definition 2.2.** Group: Let $G$ be a set and $\circ : G \times G \mapsto G$ a binary operation on $G$. Then we will say that $(G, \circ)$ is a group if the following axioms hold:

- **G1:** $\forall a, b, c \in G$ we have $(a \circ b) \circ c = a \circ (b \circ c)$. (associativity)
- **G2:** $\exists e \in G. \forall a \in G$ we have $e \circ a = a \circ e = a$. (existence of an identity)
  It is easy to show that if such an element $e$ exists, then it is unique. We will call this unique element the **identity** of $G$.
- **G3:** $\forall a \in G \exists a^{-1} \in G$ such that $a \circ a^{-1} = a^{-1} \circ a = e$. (existence of inverses)
  It is easy to show that if this axiom holds then for every $a$ the corresponding $a^{-1}$ is unique. We will call this unique element the **inverse** of $a$.

If $G$ is finite, we call $(G, \circ)$ a **finite group**.

**Definition 2.3.** Big-O notation: Let $f, g : \mathbb{N} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ be functions. Then we will write

$$f(n) = \mathcal{O}(g(n)) \quad \text{(and say } f \text{ is of order big oh of } g)$$

if and only if

$$\exists M \in \mathbb{R}. \exists N \in \mathbb{N}. \quad \forall n \geq N \Rightarrow |f(n)| \leq M|g(n)|.$$

Intuitively, this means that $f$ grows **at most** as fast as $g$.

# 3 A Very Brief History of Ciphers

The history of ciphers goes back at least 2000 years. We will now examine the cipher now named after Julius Ceasar, who used the following method to obfuscate his correspondance for his adversaries:

**Ceasar Cipher** : Take the message (written using symbols from the Latin alphabet) that we wish to obfuscate. Replace each symbol with the one that comes 3 places after it in the alphabet. For letters at the end where we could not shift, we "wrap around" to the beginning of the alphabet and carry on counting from there. For example

$$\textit{Alea iacta est} \quad \rightarrow \quad \textit{Dohd mdfzd hxz.}$$

To decrypt a message, we simply shift backwards by 3 positions, e.g.

$$\textit{Zhqm, zmgm, zmgm} \quad \rightarrow \quad \textit{Veni, vidi, vici.}$$

We can further generalise this concept to arrive at the definiton of *shift ciphers*, where instead of the fixing the shift to 3, we pick a key $k \in \mathbb{N}$, and we then shift $k$ places forward (and backwards). With shift ciphers in mind, we now formally defined some key concepts that will be used throughout this work.

**Definition 3.1.** Cipher: Let $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{Enc}}, \mathcal{K}_{\texttt{Dec}}$ be alphabets. We will refer to $\mathcal{M}$ as the **message space** and to $\mathcal{C}$ as the **cipher space**. A cipher $C$ over $\mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{K}_{\texttt{Enc}}$ and $\mathcal{K}_{\texttt{Dec}}$ is a tuple $(\texttt{Gen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$, where

- $\texttt{Gen}$ is the **key generation algorithm**, which outputs a key $(k_{\texttt{Enc}}, k_{\texttt{Dec}}) \in (\mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Enc}} \times \mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Dec}})$, chosen according to some distribution. We refer to the set $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Enc}} \times \mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Dec}}$ of all possible outputs of $\texttt{Gen}$ as the **key space** of $C$. If for all outputs there is a polynomial time function $f$ such that $f(k_{\texttt{Enc}}) = k_{\texttt{Dec}}$, then we call $C$ a **symmetric cipher** and instead of the tuple we just write $k$. Otherwise we call $C$ an **asymmetric cipher**. Since $\texttt{Gen}$ is usually a probabilistic algorithm, we will denote generating its output by $k \leftarrow \texttt{Gen}$ instead of $k = \texttt{Gen}$ to emphasize the randomised nature of the function.
- $\texttt{Enc} : \mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Enc}} \times \mathcal{M} \mapsto \mathcal{C}$ is the **encryption algorithm**, which takes a encryption key $k$ and a message $m$ and outputs its encoding $c$. We will often refer to the message as the **plaintext** and to the encrypted message as **ciphertext**.

  **Note:** $\texttt{Enc}$ is not necessarily deterministic. When it is probabilistic, we will write $c \leftarrow \texttt{Enc}_k(m)$ instead of $c = \texttt{Enc}_k(m)$.
- $\texttt{Dec} : \mathcal{K}^*_{\texttt{Dec}} \times \mathcal{C} \mapsto \mathcal{M}$ is the **decryption algorithm**, which takes some decryption key $k$ and some ciphertext $c$ and outputs its corresponding plaintext $m$.

  **Note:** $\texttt{Dec}$ is **always** deterministic (otherwise the scheme could never be assumed to be correct).

Finally, we require the correctness of $C$, concretely

$$\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall (k, k') \in \mathcal{K}. \quad \texttt{Dec}(k', \texttt{Enc}(k, m)) = m,$$

i.e. that the cipher does not change its contents.

**Equivalences of alphabets** Consider any alphabet $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots m_n\}$. It will be often convenient to consider the encoding of such an alphabet as something that may be studied and manipulated more easily. Formally, by an encoding we mean a bijection $f$ between our alphabet and some other set, where calculating values of $f$ and $f^{-1}$ can both be done in polynomial time. Such an encoding may be using ASCII for characters of the English alphabet or associating some symbols with the elements of $\mathbb{Z}_n$. If there is such a bijection between two alphabets, since one can be efficiently transformed into the other, we will consider them equivalent.

**Example** Let us now revisit shift ciphers. In this case, for a set of $n$ symbols, it will be easier to consider the encoding as elements of the additive group $\mathbb{Z}_n$. First, it is easy to see that we are dealing with a symmetric cipher, and since a shift by $k$ and any $k + xn, x \in \mathbb{N}$ is going to be the same, $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_n$. Then,

- `Gen`: `Gen` is uniformly picking an element from $\mathbb{Z}_n$.
- `Enc`: We note that if we relabel our symbols to their indices (i.e. $m_i \to i$), then we can express our encryption function as
$$\texttt{Enc}(k, i) = i + k \mod n.$$
- `Dec`: Similarly, performing the above relabeling, we get
$$\texttt{Dec}(k, i) = i - k \mod n.$$

Now, checking the correctness of $C_{shift}$: Let $k, m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$

$$\texttt{Dec}(k, \texttt{Enc}(k, m)) = m + k \mod n - k \mod n = m + k - k \mod n = m \mod n = m.$$

Since $k$ and $m$ were arbitrary, it holds $\forall m, k \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

**Kerckhoffs' principle** Throughout the history of cryptography it has become evident that one must not rely on the assumption that the adversary cannot obtain every detail about one's cryptosystem. This lead to the following important guiding principle in the design of new schemes:

> The security of a scheme must rely in the key and not the scheme.

# 4 Perfect Security

In order for us to be able to analyse our schemes, we must have two well defined notions: what does it mean that a scheme is *secure* and how *powerful* is the adversary who wishes to break our scheme.

**The adversary** We will start from a rather paranoid, but very useful perspective: we will assume that the adversary has unbounded computational power. This means that we will have to fend off attacks that may involve computing arbitrary *decidable* functions, no matter how long they take to calculate. Also, by Kerckhoff's principle we assume that the adversary has perfect knowledge of both our encryption and decryption functions.

**Security** We will also impose a very stringent constraint on what we consider secure.

**Definition 4.1.** Perfect Security We say that a scheme $\Pi$ is perfectly secure if

$$\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, c, c' \in \mathcal{C}. \quad \mathbb{P}(M = m \,|\, C = c) = \mathbb{P}(M = m \,|\, C = c').$$

**Indistinguishability** We will require that given any ciphertext and a uniformly random string from the cipher alphabet, the adversary cannot *distinguish* the two strings whatsoever. To formalise this, we will first need to define a **security experiment**:

Let $\Pi = (\texttt{Gen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ be a scheme, and $\mathcal{A}$ be any adversary. Then, we will define $\texttt{Expr}^{\texttt{eav}}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}$ generates two messages $m_0$ and $m_1$ from the message space $\mathcal{M}$.
2. A random bit $b$ is chosen from $\{0, 1\}$.
3. Put $k = \texttt{Gen}()$ and $c = \texttt{Enc}_k(m_b)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ is given $c$, and outputs $b' = \{0, 1\}$
5. The experiment outputs 1 if $b = b'$ and write $\texttt{Expr}^{\texttt{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1$, and 0 otherwise. If the output is 1, we say that $\mathcal{A}$ **succeeds**.

Now, we are ready for our first definition of security:

**Definition 4.2.** Perfect Indistinguishability We say that a scheme $\Pi$ is perfectly indistinguishable iff for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$

$$\mathbb{P}(\texttt{Expr}^{\texttt{eav}}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi} = 1) = \frac{1}{2}.$$

**Theorem 4.1.** *A scheme $\Pi$ is perfectly secure if and only if it is perfectly indistinguishable.*

*Proof.* haha □

**Theorem 4.2.** *A necessary condition for a scheme $\Pi = (\texttt{Gen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ to be perfectly secure, is that $|\mathcal{K}| \geq |\mathcal{M}|$.*

*Proof.* Assume $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$. We will show that this implies that perfect security is broken.
The idea is to use the fact that if we are able to brute-force search through all the keys, we will learn some information about the keys and the messages.

For every $c \in \mathcal{C}$, let $\mathcal{M}_c = \{m \,|\, m = \texttt{Dec}_k(c) k \in \mathcal{K}\}$. Note, that since $\texttt{Dec}$ is a function, $|\mathcal{M}_c| \leq |K|$, as $\texttt{Dec}$ may map two ciphertexts to the same plaintext for two different keys, but it can never map a ciphertext to two different plaintexts for the same key. Hence, $\mathcal{M}_c \subset \mathcal{M}$ and in particular $\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c \neq \emptyset$.
Now, fix $c \in \mathcal{C}$, and pick $m \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_c$. Since by definition $c$ cannot map to $m$, we have $\mathbb{P}(M = m|C = c) = 0$. But then

$$\mathbb{P}(M = m) \neq 0 = \mathbb{P}(M = m|C = c)$$

which violates perfect security, so our initial assumption must be false. □

# 5 Computational Security

# 6 Public-Key Crypto Schemes

## 6.1 Euler's Theorem

## 6.2 An Example: RSA

# 7 Homomorphic Crypto Schemes

## 7.1 Definition

# 8 Paillier Encryption

Paillier encryption is an additively homomorphic crypto scheme, that operates over $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$ where $N = pq$ for some $p, q$ primes. In particular, it takes advantage of the fact that $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2} \simeq \mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.

# 9 Fully Homomorphic Encryption

## 9.1 Lattices

## 9.2 GGH

## 9.3 Dr Craig Gentry's Scheme