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MALWARE ANALYSIS

LAB 02

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Introduction

In this lab, we focus on investigating an intrusion on a compromised Windows XP machine, utilizing a controlled environment within the SimSpace Cyber Range. We will employ both Windows FLARE VM and Kali Linux VM to conduct our investigation, leveraging a variety of tools to identify the initial intrusion vector and trace the attacker's activities. Finding, examining, malware logs and other artifacts will also be part of our objective.

Disclaimer: I started and restarted my investigation a few times. There was at least one incident where another student logged onto the affected XP device while I was going through logs and opted to close my eventviewer and all *cmd* terminal windows. Some dates, and XP machine IPs in screenshots may not exactly line up because of this.

The Incident

Survey and Initial Findings

I begin on Kali Linux and after a successful ping to the suspected machine, I scan the remote device with *nmap*. As I begin that *nmap* scan I get a Windows FLARE VM machine up and another *nmap* scan going simultaneously. Both net similar results, though Kali's would offer different contexts for some of the ports. (Lyon, n.d.)

Port 21

With *nmap* I was able to see that port 21 was open and had anonymous FTP login allowed. Using *netcat* I was able to login with *nc [ip] 21* and when prompted for user, entered anonymous followed by a blank for the password field. The files listed previously were in the FTP server directory, and I downloaded them with a *mget*. (see Appendix 1: NMAP Port 21)

These files included:

lock.bat – A simple script that would make sure the commands would not display in the command prompt window when the batch file executes, runs the rundll32.exe and user32.dll and then runs the LockWorkStation function from user32.dll to lock the computer. It then clears the command prompt screen.

```
@echo off
```

```
rundll32.exe user32.dll, LockWorkStation
```

```
cls
```

nc.exe – This is Netcat, a versatile networking tool used for creating raw TCP/UDP connections. It can be used in tasks like port scanning, creation of reverse shells, or transferring data between systems. This was left as a tool by the attacker to establish persistent backdoor access, enabling remote control of this compromised system and allowing further exploration of the network. (Buckbee, 2022)

Razor.1911.IRC – This file appears to be related to the oldest, and a well-known, software cracking group that is still active today. Internet Relay Chats used to be quite popular and were still in use ~2010. When read in strings, it is information about a cracked Sims 3 (video game) and information relating to that crack. (Skidrowcodex, n.d.)

Runasspc.exe – This is a tool that can be used to run programs with elevated privileges. Attackers would likely use this to bypass security restrictions and execute commands as an admin without needing explicit user interaction. Attackers may be using it to elevate & for use in automation of malicious scripts. (robotronic, 2024)

VNC4 – This directory contains files associated with the VNC (Virtual Network Computing) software, which allows remote desktop access to the compromised system. The presence of this can facilitate ongoing access and management, and with this would allow one to interact with the systems GUI. (RealVNC, n.d.)

Port 25

We can see that an SMTP server is open, and via our Kali Linux VM connects with *telnet [ip] 25*. From the *nmap* scan alone we see lots of valuable information, the target/system name; FARADAY as well as some commands that the server supports. We use *EHLO* to enumerate and probe the server to see what else it might give up. We got the faraday user account again. Because SMTP is not encrypted, there surely are some exploits to be had here as well. (FORTRA, n.d.) (see Appendix 2: NMAP Port 25, Appendix 3: Port 25 Telnet)

Port 80

With port 80 we see that it is an http server, a webpage. When we go to the webpage, we get an under-construction front page and the opening inspector doesn't reveal anything, so I decided to check into it further with dirb. Our dirb scan with a common word list finds 22 directories, one of which we can access in *[ip]/tsweb*. It is a remote access page, though we do not have necessary credentials. Though I have little experience in this so far, I decide to dabble with Metasploitable auxiliary tools and after the quickest search for "Microsoft iis 5.1 exploits." So, after a little more research, I ended up using Metasploit framework and confirmed that WebDAV is enabled and can be vulnerability exploited. That in combination of seeing that PUT is an available command makes me believe this was a good way in, and

while it is out of my current skills to recreate, I believe I can see the path. (Kali, 2024) (Rapid7, n.d.) (Shah, 2021) (Sany, 2024) ("KirstenS", n.d.) (see Appendix 4: NMAP Port 80, Appendix 5: Dirb & /tswab, Appendix 5: Metasploit Framework WebDAV)

Port 6666/6667

The most obvious item on our list of ports, with the details including ****BACKDOOR**** and showing the tcp open, I dive right in with a *nc [ip] 6666* and we get placed right in the directory it says, C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday and just like that we are in. (see Appendix 6: NMAP Port 6666/6667, Appendix 7: Backdoor)

Port 6667 is up and running an IRC. While that is not innately malicious, it has been historically exploited by attackers to control botnets and spread malware.

Compromised Device Access

Using netcat to get in via the backdoor from the intrusion, we continue our investigation. The first commands I run are *tasklist* and *netstat -ano* to get a 'lay of the land' and see exactly what the current situation was and turned out not great with immediately recognizable malware found in poisonivy.exe as well as some other programs showing up. (Microsoft, 2023) (Microsoft, 2023) (see Appendix 8: Tasklist, Appendix 9: Netstat -ano)

Poisonivy.exe

Poisonivy is a well-known remote access trojan (RAT) that is commonly used by attackers to gain control of compromised systems. It allows the execution of commands, steal sensitive information, log keystrokes, remotely manage files and more. It typically operates silently and can give the attacker persistent access while bypassing security measures. Its presence on this machine indicates a serious security breach. This task would need to be killed immediately. Usually, it is found within system32 directory but I did a *dir C:\poisonivy.exe /s* to search the entire disk for its presence. (Trend Micro, 2012) (Microsoft, 2023)

Another issue, when running ore poisonivy.exe in pestudio, is that while pestudio confirms that it interacts directly with the system kernel, it also has a url reference from a local private IP address; 192.168.5.98 so if there were doubts about other machines on the network being compromised, it is even more likely now. (see Appendix 10: pestudio poisonivy.exe indicators, Appendix 11: pestudio poisonivy.exe libraries)

NC.exe

Between the *tasklist* and the *netstat* we can confirm that netcat is running as well, and actively listening via port 6666 -it's how we established our connection. Considering we had seen VNC4 also set up, but not currently running, we have confirmed two of at least three backdoors running.

'Recover' and Logs

From there, I begin to trapeze around the directories collecting whatever logs I can find. Within the C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles I see logs for both FTP and Web activities.

MSFTPSVC1; FTP logs

May 25th, 2010 an anonymous user connects from IP 192.168.5.99, using the allowed anonymous login with fake credentials to upload two files that are no longer present in the system (confirmed with directory searches). The session then closed.

May 26th 2010 A connection is made from the same IP and uploads another file, runasspc.exe, which will allow the attacker to elevate privileges.

July 22nd 2010 Another anonymous login, this time from 192.168.5.95, logs in before logging back out.

I believe the 7za.exe was one of the other exe's in 'disguise,' operating under the radar to dodge any potential IDS etc. while the zipped files.tar was likely the majority of what is found in C:\Inetpub\ftproot – the nc.exe, runasspc.exe etc. (see Appendix 12: FTP logs)

W3SVC1 Logs

May 26th 2010 the IP 192.168.5.99 accesses /iisstart.asp, one of the exposed directories found from my simple dirb scan, and did so successfully.

July 22nd 2010 Several GET requests are made by IP 192.168.5.95 for the file /iisstart.asp, along with attempts to get a file 'robots.txt' and /favicon.ico which returned 404 errors, as the files did not exist.

I believe that on the 26th that after previously placing a number of files, a payload was delivered to the open port 80 to activate the nc.exe and open the bindshell on port 6666. (see Appendix 13: Web logs)

‘Recovery’

At this point I was reaching some limits in log gathering, as I was unable to connect to the internet and clone some windows log files and would not be able to unmount the disk to do so either. The bad actors had changed the password, and the easiest way back into the system was to do the same. With an *net user “Daniel Faraday” DawgsAkimbo* the password was now DawgsAkimbo. I used run to get to eventviewer, and saved the Windows Application and System logs. The Security logs, we ‘mysteriously’ completely absent – I am quite sure there were some at some point but were removed by the bad actor.

Windows Application Logs

On May 25th several LoadPerf and MSDTC entries are logged, an around 5:27pm when intrusion activities began with the FTP logs and 7za.exe was uploaded.

On July 22nd 2010 numerous Application log entries are logged.

Further more during these already confirmed active days, we have an event 4354 which occurs from misconfigured or network interruption. With the bad actor changing system files and information, this was an interruption due to that was logged I am sure. (Netsurion, n.d.) (see Appendix 14: Windows Application logs)

Windows System Logs

On both notable dates a great number of services are sent control commands (start, stop etc.) noted by event ID 7035, and otherwise the state is changed, noted by event 7036. These are very frequent as no other dates have this many logs, and I believe shows they are being manipulated by the intruder. Furthermore, a great number of time sync errors occur, which I believe is an attempt to make the activities more difficult to track. A great number of reboots occur as well, which I believe was to clear potential traces and hide other evidence.

Windows Security Logs

While noted above, there are no Windows Security logs.

VTI Logs

A Log folder found in the Inetpub directory that the attackers modified quite a bit, had no logs in it either.

Other items of note

Startup

In the startup programs there is a “startup” that makes sure that netcat is running, VNC is running, and that the lock.bat is run – effectively locking the user out in the event some sort of auto login process occurs. (VNC was not running in any of the few compromised machines I perused, it may have been killed by other students) This makes sure that someone who is unable to investigate the device would for sure be unable to use and make changes to the device. (see Appendix 18: Startup Processes)

Firewall

I am going to assume the attacker and the many changes that were made included disabling the firewall. It is completely turned off though. (see Appendix 19: Firewall)

Conclusions and Timeline

I believe that another device may already be compromised on the network, as initial connections came from x.95 and x.99 IP addresses. Otherwise I believe the FTP intrusions occurred, some sort of XSS attack, and then only light perusal and small attempts at collecting information. Figuring out the machine belonged to some ‘fancy engineering company’ led to some poor attempt to grab a “robots” file that doesn’t exist, and otherwise I think this machine was to become a poor addition to a botnet.

The investigation into the compromised XP machine revealed a serious breach facilitated through multiple open and misconfigured ports (21, 25, 80) that indicated vulnerabilities, with anonymous FTP login and the web portal taking the ‘lead’ on those vulnerabilities.

We found poisonivy and netcat which allowed for remote access and control, with vnc and netcat supposed to run at startup. The attacker utilized runasspc for privilege escalation, and we have FTP and web server logs that cross with windows logs for suspicious activities.

All of this really shows the importance of configuring ports and monitoring for unauthorized access, maintaining and enabling comprehensive logs for effective incident response and recovery.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: NMAP Port 21

```
root@kali-hunt-13:~# nmap -p- -A 172.16.3.223
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-10-10 15:35 EDT
Stats: 0:01:55 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan
Service scan Timing: About 94.12% done; ETC: 15:37 (0:00:07 remaining)
Stats: 0:02:18 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Script Scan
NSE Timing: About 97.66% done; ETC: 15:37 (0:00:00 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 172.16.3.223
Host is up (0.00037s latency).
Not shown: 65518 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
| 05-25-10  04:23PM                56 lock.bat
| 12-29-04  12:07PM                61440 nc.exe
| 05-13-10  04:12PM                3429 Razor.1911.IRC.nfo
| 05-25-10  06:03PM                77824 runasspc.exe
| 05-25-10  05:55PM                <DIR> VNC4
| ftp-syst:
|   SYST: Windows_NT
|   STAT:
| Microsoft FTP Service status:
|   Connected to 172.16.3.112
|   Logged in as IEUser@
|   TYPE: ASCII, FORM: Nonprint; STRUcture: File; transfer MODE: STREAM
|   No data connection
| End of status.
```

Appendix 2: NMAP Port 25

```
25/tcp    open  smtp          Microsoft ESMTTP 6.0.2600.1
| smtp-commands: faraday Hello [172.16.3.16], AUTH GSSAPI NTLM LOGIN, AUTH=LOGIN, SIZE 2097152, PIPELINING, DSN, ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES, 8bitmime, BINARYMIME, C
HUNKING, VRFY, OK,
|_ This server supports the following commands: HELO EHLO STARTTLS RCPT DATA RSET MAIL QUIT HELP AUTH BDAT VRFY
| smtp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: FARADAY
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: FARADAY
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: FARADAY
|   DNS_Domain_Name: faraday
|   DNS_Computer_Name: faraday
```

Appendix 3: Port 25 Telnet

```
root@kali-hunt-13: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
root@kali-hunt-13:~# telnet 172.16.3.224 25  
Trying 172.16.3.224...  
Connected to 172.16.3.224.  
Escape character is '^]'.  
220 faraday Microsoft ESMTPL MAIL Service, Version: 6.0.2600.1 r  
0  
EHLO  
250-faraday Hello [172.16.3.112]  
250-AUTH GSSAPI NTLM LOGIN  
250-AUTH=LOGIN  
250-SIZE 2097152  
250-PIPELINING  
250-DSN  
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES  
250-8bitmime  
250-BINARYMIME  
250-CHUNKING  
250-VRFY  
250 OK  
█
```

Appendix 4: NMAP Port 80

```
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 5.1  
_ http-cookie-flags:  
_ /:  
_ ASPSESSIONIDGGQGQDKC:  
_ httponly flag not set  
_ http-methods:  
_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE COPY PROPFIND SEARCH LOCK UNLOCK DELETE PUT MOVE MKCOL PROPPATCH  
_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/5.1  
_ http-title: Under Construction  
_ http-webdav-scan:  
_ WebDAV type: Unknown  
_ Server Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2024 09:51:07 GMT  
_ Public Options: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, POST, COPY, MOVE, MKCOL, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH  
_ LOCK, UNLOCK, SEARCH  
_ Server Type: Microsoft-IIS/5.1  
_ Allowed Methods: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, COPY, PROPFIND, SEARCH, LOCK, UNLOCK
```

Appendix 5: Dirb & /tsweb

The image shows a Kali Linux terminal window and a Remote Desktop Web Connection window. The terminal window, titled 'root@kali-hunt-13: ~', displays the output of a Dirb scan on the target IP 172.16.3.224. The scan identifies several directories and files, including _vti_cnf, _vti_log, _vti_pvt, _vti_txt, global.asa, iisadmin, images, printers, and tsweb. It also lists files like admin.dll, author.dll, shtml.dll, and global.asa within these directories. The Remote Desktop Web Connection window, titled 'Remote Desktop Web Connection - Mozilla Firefox', shows the URL '172.16.3.224/tsweb/'. The window contains a form for connecting to a remote computer, with fields for Server, Size (set to Full-screen), Send logon information (unchecked), User name, and Domain. A 'Connect' button is visible at the bottom of the form.

```
root@kali-hunt-13: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_cnf (CODE:403|SIZE:3417)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_log (CODE:403|SIZE:3417)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_pvt (CODE:403|SIZE:3417)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_txt (CODE:403|SIZE:3417)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/global.asa (CODE:500|SIZE:3434)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/iisadmin (CODE:403|SIZE:3286)
==> DIRECTORY: http://172.16.3.224:80/images/
==> DIRECTORY: http://172.16.3.224:80/Images/
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/printers (CODE:401|SIZE:3634)
==> DIRECTORY: http://172.16.3.224:80/tsweb/

---- Entering directory: http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/ ----
==> DIRECTORY: http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/_vti_bin/_vti_adm/admin.dll (CODE:500|SIZE:100)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll (CODE:500|SIZE:100)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/_vti_bin/shtml.dll (CODE:500|SIZE:100)
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/_vti_bin/global.asa (CODE:500|SIZE:3434)

---- Entering directory: http://172.16.3.224:80/images/ ----
+ http://172.16.3.224:80/images/global.asa (CODE:500|SIZE:3434)

---- Entering directory: http://172.16.3.224:80/Images/ ----
```

Remote Desktop Web Connection - Mozilla Firefox

172.16.3.224/tsweb/

Most Visited Offensive Security Kali Linux Kali Docs Kali Tools Exploit-DB Aircrack-ng

Microsoft Windows

Remote Desktop Web Connection

Type the name of the remote computer you want to use, select the screen size for your connection, and then click **Connect**.

When the connection page opens, you can add it to your Favorites

Server:

Size:

☐ Send logon information for this connection

User name:

Domain:

Appendix 5: Metasploit Framework WebDAV

```
[*] Nmap: 25/tcp open smtp Microsoft ESMTTP 6.0.2600.1
[*] Nmap: 80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 5.1
[*] Nmap: 135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
[*] Nmap: 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
[*] Nmap: 443/tcp open https?
[*] Nmap: 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows XP microsoft-ds
[*] Nmap: 1025/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
[*] Nmap: 1026/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
[*] Nmap: 5000/tcp open upnp?
[*] Nmap: 5800/tcp open vnc-http RealVNC 4.0 (resolution: 400x250; VNC TCP port: 5900)
[*] Nmap: 5900/tcp open vnc VNC (protocol 3.3; Locked out)
[*] Nmap: 1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please
fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
[*] Nmap: SF-Port5000-TCP:V=7.70%I=7%D=10/13%Time=670C25C3%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(G
[*] Nmap: SF:enericLines,1C,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(GetReque
[*] Nmap: SF:st,1C,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(RTSPRequest,1C,"H
[*] Nmap: SF:TTP/1.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(HTTPOptions,1C,"HTTP/1.1
[*] Nmap: SF:\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,1C,"HTTP/1.1\x
[*] Nmap: SF:20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n")%r(SIPOptions,1C,"HTTP/1.1\x20400\x20
[*] Nmap: SF:Bad\x20Request\r\n\r\n");
[*] Nmap: MAC Address: 00:02:B3:00:09:1F (Intel)
[*] Nmap: Service Info: Host: faraday; OSs: Windows, Windows XP; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows,
_xp
[*] Nmap: Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/s
[*] Nmap: Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 128.25 seconds
msf5 > Interrupt: use the 'exit' command to quit
msf5 > Interrupt: use the 'exit' command to quit
msf5 > Interrupt: use the 'exit' command to quit
msf5 > use auxiliary/scanner/http/webdav_scanner
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/http/webdav_scanner) > set RHOSTS 172.16.3.226
RHOSTS => 172.16.3.226
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/http/webdav_scanner) > set RPORT 80
RPORT => 80
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/http/webdav_scanner) > run
[+] 172.16.3.226 (Microsoft-IIS/5.1) has WEBDAV ENABLED
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf5 auxiliary(scanner/http/webdav_scanner) >
```

Appendix 6: NMAP Port 6666/6667

```
6666/tcp open bindshell CMD.EXE (**BACKDOOR**; Windows 5.1.2600; path: C:\Documents and Settings\D
aniel Faraday)
6667/tcp open irc
| irc-info:
| users: 2
| servers: 1
| chans: 1
| lusers: 2
| lservers: 0
| server: my.server.name
2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the fol
lowing fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
```

Appendix 7: Backdoor

```
C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\Ant_temp>nc 172.16.3.223 6666
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.

C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday>dir
dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 2009-B54C

Directory of C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday

04/29/2010  07:37 PM    <DIR>          .
04/29/2010  07:37 PM    <DIR>          ..
05/13/2010  01:33 PM    <DIR>          Desktop
04/29/2010  07:37 PM    <DIR>          Favorites
04/29/2010  07:37 PM    <DIR>          My Documents
04/29/2010  01:02 PM    <DIR>          Start Menu
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  5,665,492,992 bytes free

C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday>_
```

Appendix 8: Tasklist

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday\Desktop>tasklist
tasklist
```

Image Name	PID	Session Name	Session#	Mem Usage
System Idle Process	0	Console	0	20 K
System	4	Console	0	220 K
smss.exe	748	Console	0	384 K
csrss.exe	796	Console	0	3,632 K
winlogon.exe	820	Console	0	4,528 K
services.exe	864	Console	0	2,960 K
lsass.exe	876	Console	0	5,108 K
vmacthlp.exe	1064	Console	0	2,164 K
svchost.exe	1092	Console	0	3,920 K
svchost.exe	1344	Console	0	15,884 K
svchost.exe	1608	Console	0	2,696 K
svchost.exe	1648	Console	0	3,272 K
spoolsv.exe	1776	Console	0	4,212 K
explorer.exe	336	Console	0	10,500 K
jusched.exe	488	Console	0	3,376 K
poisonivy.exe	500	Console	0	1,120 K
vmtoolsd.exe	508	Console	0	7,492 K
msmsgs.exe	516	Console	0	1,468 K
soffice.exe	528	Console	0	1,812 K
soffice.bin	576	Console	0	45,968 K
nc.exe	592	Console	0	1,512 K
winvnc4.exe	600	Console	0	2,664 K
cmd.exe	608	Console	0	1,076 K
inetinfo.exe	928	Console	0	12,120 K
jqs.exe	1060	Console	0	1,612 K
VGAuthService.exe	1204	Console	0	8,564 K
vmtoolsd.exe	1332	Console	0	12,204 K
rundll32.exe	1488	Console	0	3,200 K
wmiprvse.exe	1872	Console	0	8,188 K
rundll32.exe	3312	Console	0	4,212 K
dllhost.exe	3564	Console	0	6,344 K
dllhost.exe	1196	Console	0	6,184 K
davcdtdata.exe	4076	Console	0	1,000 K
msdtc.exe	3440	Console	0	3,640 K
ntvdm.exe	2680	Console	0	3,816 K
logon.scr	2860	Console	0	1,184 K
cmd.exe	3524	Console	0	1,208 K
tasklist.exe	1832	Console	0	2,612 K

Appendix 9: Netstat -ano

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Daniel Faraday\Desktop>netstat -ano  
netstat -ano
```

Active Connections

Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID
TCP	0.0.0.0:21	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	928
TCP	0.0.0.0:25	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	928
TCP	0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	928
TCP	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1092
TCP	0.0.0.0:443	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	928
TCP	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4
TCP	0.0.0.0:1025	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1344
TCP	0.0.0.0:1032	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	928
TCP	0.0.0.0:1484	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	3440
TCP	0.0.0.0:4400	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1120
TCP	0.0.0.0:5000	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1648
TCP	0.0.0.0:5800	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	600
TCP	0.0.0.0:5900	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	600
TCP	10.10.0.228:139	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4
TCP	172.16.3.223:139	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4
TCP	172.16.3.223:666	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	1112
TCP	172.16.3.223:6666	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	592
TCP	172.16.3.223:6666	172.16.3.17:30609	ESTABLISHED	592
UDP	0.0.0.0:135	*:*		1092
UDP	0.0.0.0:445	*:*		4
UDP	0.0.0.0:500	*:*		876
UDP	0.0.0.0:1033	*:*		1608
UDP	0.0.0.0:1034	*:*		928
UDP	0.0.0.0:1039	*:*		1608
UDP	0.0.0.0:1040	*:*		1344
UDP	0.0.0.0:3456	*:*		928
UDP	10.10.0.228:123	*:*		1344
UDP	10.10.0.228:137	*:*		4
UDP	10.10.0.228:138	*:*		4
UDP	10.10.0.228:1900	*:*		1648
UDP	127.0.0.1:123	*:*		1344
UDP	127.0.0.1:1029	*:*		1340
UDP	127.0.0.1:1900	*:*		1648
UDP	127.0.0.1:46789	*:*		1120
UDP	172.16.3.223:123	*:*		1344
UDP	172.16.3.223:137	*:*		4
UDP	172.16.3.223:138	*:*		4
UDP	172.16.3.223:1900	*:*		1648

Appendix 10: pestudio poisonivy.exe indicators

pestudio 8.99 - Malware Initial Assessment - www.winitor.com [c:\users\administrator\documents\ant_temp\poisonivy.exe]

xml-id	indicator (15)	detail	level
1434	The file references a URL pattern	url: 192.168.5.98	1
1431	The count of strings is suspicious	count: 43	1
1485	The count of libraries is suspicious	count: 1	1
1265	The count of imported functions is suspicious	count: 1	1
1215	The file-ratio of the section(s) has been determined	ratio: 92.86%	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: utility	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: registry	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: url-pattern	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: password	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: file	3
1633	The file references string(s) tagged as hint	type: size	3
1634	The file references a function group	type: execution	3
1109	The file opts for Code Integrity (CI) a software security defense	status: no	4
1232	The file contains resource(s)	status: no	4
1040	The file contains a digital Certificate	status: no	4

Appendix 11: pestudio poisonivy.exe libraries

pestudio 8.99 - Malware Initial Assessment - www.winitor.com [c:\users\administrator\documents\ant_temp\poisonivy.exe]

library (1)	blacklist (0)	type (1)	imports (1)	description
kernel32.dll	-	implicit	1	Windows NT BASE API Client DLL

Appendix 12: FTP logs

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\MSFTPSVC1>type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100525.log
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100525.log
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.1
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2010-05-25 23:28:18
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status
23:28:18 192.168.5.99 [1]USER Anonymous 331
23:28:20 192.168.5.99 [1]PASS fake@fake.com 230
23:28:30 192.168.5.99 [1]created files.tar 226
23:28:41 192.168.5.99 [1]created 7za.exe 226
23:28:43 192.168.5.99 [1]QUIT - 226

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\MSFTPSVC1>type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100526.log
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100526.log
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.1
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2010-05-26 00:03:08
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status
00:03:08 192.168.5.99 [2]USER Anonymous 331
00:03:10 192.168.5.99 [2]PASS fake@fake.com 230
00:03:25 192.168.5.99 [2]created runasspc.exe 226
00:03:26 192.168.5.99 [2]QUIT - 226

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\MSFTPSVC1>type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100722.log
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\MSFTPSVC1\ex100722.log
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.1
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2010-07-22 23:03:54
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 [2]USER anonymous 331
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 [2]PASS IEUser@ 230
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 [3]USER anonymous 331
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 [3]PASS IEUser@ 230
```

Appendix 13: Web logs

```
Directory of C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\W3SVC1

10/10/2024  06:54 PM    <DIR>          .
10/10/2024  06:54 PM    <DIR>          ..
05/25/2010  06:17 PM                197 ex100526.log
07/22/2010  05:06 PM                419 ex100722.log
10/10/2024  06:54 PM            65,536 ex241011.log
              3 File(s)            66,152 bytes
              2 Dir(s)  5,667,741,696 bytes free

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\W3SVC1>type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex100526.log
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex100526.log
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.1
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2010-05-26 00:14:55
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status
00:14:55 192.168.5.99 GET /iisstart.asp 200

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\W3SVC1>type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex100722.log
type C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\W3SVC1\ex100722.log
#Software: Microsoft Internet Information Services 5.1
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2010-07-22 23:02:43
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status
23:02:43 192.168.5.95 GET /iisstart.asp 200
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 GET /iisstart.asp 200
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 GET /robots.txt 404
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 GET /iisstart.asp 200
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 GET /favicon.ico 404
23:03:54 192.168.5.95 GET /iisstart.asp 200

C:\WINDOWS\system32\Logfiles\W3SVC1>_
```


Appendix 14: Windows Application logs

Event Viewer								
File Action View Help								
Event Viewer (Local)								
Application 165 event(s)								
Type	Date	Time	Source	Category	Event	User	Computer	
Information	7/22/2010	5:02:41 PM	MSDTC	TM	4097	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	3:01:11 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	3:01:00 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	2:45:17 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	2:45:05 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:27:35 PM	Windows Product Activ...	None	1006	N/A	FARADAY	
Warning	7/22/2010	1:12:42 PM	Windows Product Activ...	None	1011	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:12:27 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:12:17 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:10:47 PM	Windows Product Activ...	None	1002	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:05:53 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:05:52 PM	LoadPerf	None	1001	N/A	FARADAY	
Warning	7/22/2010	1:04:00 PM	Windows Product Activ...	None	1011	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:03:35 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:03:28 PM	Windows Product Activ...	None	1012	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:03:28 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:53 PM	MSDTC	TM	4097	N/A	FARADAY	
Warning	5/25/2010	6:14:34 PM	EventSystem	(52)	4354	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:25 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:18 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:13:21 PM	vmtools	None	108	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:06:09 PM	vmtools	None	105	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:05:58 PM	EAPOL	None	2001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:04:51 PM	MSDTC	SVC	4111	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:29:30 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:29:30 PM	LoadPerf	None	1001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:43 PM	LoadPerf	None	1001	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:42 PM	FrontPage 4.0	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:41 PM	FrontPage 4.0	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:41 PM	FrontPage 4.0	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:33 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:33 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:26 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:21 PM	MSDTC	TM	4097	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:17 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:17 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:13 PM	LoadPerf	None	1000	N/A	FARADAY	

Appendix 15: Windows System Logs (1/3)


Event Viewer								
File Action View Help								
<div> <div>Event Viewer (Local)</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Application Security System </div>								
System 685 event(s)								
Type	Date	Time	Source	Category	Event	User	Computer	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:15:05 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:15:05 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:14:45 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:14:45 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:10 PM	vmdebug	None	5	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:16 PM	eventlog	None	6005	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:14:16 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:13:22 PM	eventlog	None	6006	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:12:04 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:12:01 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:55 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:55 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:52 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:52 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:50 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:50 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:50 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:48 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:11:48 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:07:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:07:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:07:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:07:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:06:50 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:06:50 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:06:31 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	5/25/2010	6:06:31 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:05:46 PM	vmdebug	None	5	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:05:57 PM	eventlog	None	6005	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:05:57 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:04:52 PM	eventlog	None	6006	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:04:11 PM	USER32	None	1074	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:59:22 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:59:22 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:48 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:48 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:48 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:45 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:41 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:40 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:27 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:27 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:26 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:26 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:21 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:20 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:19 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:19 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:19 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:19 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:18 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:18 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:15 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	5:27:14 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	

Appendix 16: Windows System Logs (2/3)

Event Viewer								
File Action View Help								
Event Viewer (Local)								
System 685 event(s)								
Type	Date	Time	Source	Category	Event	User	Computer	
Information	7/22/2010	1:28:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:28:30 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:28:07 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:28:07 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:14:34 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:13:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:13:07 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:13:07 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:12:47 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:12:47 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:12:13 PM	vmdebug	None	5	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:12:15 PM	eventlog	None	6005	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:12:15 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:05:53 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	Daniel Faraday	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:04:38 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:04:16 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:04:16 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:03:56 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY	
Error	7/22/2010	1:03:56 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:03:09 PM	vmdebug	None	5	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:03:26 PM	eventlog	None	6005	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	7/22/2010	1:03:26 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:17:51 PM	eventlog	None	6006	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:16:39 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	
Information	5/25/2010	6:15:51 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY	

System 685 event(s)									
Type	Date	Time	Source	Category	Event	User	Computer		
Information	7/26/2010	4:14:16 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	5:06:40 PM	eventlog	None	6006	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	5:03:55 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	5:03:55 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	5:02:41 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	5:02:41 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	5:02:40 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	5:02:40 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:05:45 PM	Tcpip	None	4199	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:05:45 PM	Application Popup	None	26	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:05:39 PM	Application Popup	None	26	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:05:39 PM	Tcpip	None	4199	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:05:37 PM	Application Popup	None	26	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:05:37 PM	Tcpip	None	4199	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:03:19 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:02:32 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:01:52 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:01:52 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:01:32 PM	W32Time	None	29	N/A	FARADAY		
Error	7/22/2010	3:01:32 PM	W32Time	None	17	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:00:56 PM	vmdebug	None	5	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:00:58 PM	eventlog	None	6005	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	3:00:58 PM	eventlog	None	6009	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:47:31 PM	eventlog	None	6006	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:47:26 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7035	SYSTEM	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager	None	7036	N/A	FARADAY		
Information	7/22/2010	2:46:16 PM	Service Control Manager						

Appendix 18: Startup Processes



Appendix 19: Firewall

