




CMSC388U

Binary Exploitation



Announcements

- How was break?
- HW 7 out soon :)
 - Due by next lecture
- How was HW6 & the midterm?
- Office hour appointments & piazza!
- Mid-semester check-in?

Any HW/Midterm Q's?

- If you disassemble a C binary, the result is...
- Which of these are valid bash syntax?
- Out of the following CVE IDs, which has the highest impact by CVSS?
 - Everyone who got this wrong said the same answer → Piazza?
- What is the IP address for <http://supersecure.store>? (Mention how you found it)
- What is the importance of a hash when dealing with forensics?
- Write an nmap scan to do OS detection on <http://fake.domain> where it does OS detection, scans ports 80, 22, and 443, and saves the output to a file.
- How is file un-deletion possible?
- What metadata does this image have? Is there perhaps a flag somewhere?

Fundamentals

**Basic x86
Assembly
Overview**

**Static and
Dynamic
Linking**

Stack & Heap

**Binary
Structure**

ASMBly

- You (hopefully) saw MIPS assembly in CMSC216
 - x86 and ARM are also very interesting
- x86
 - Primarily larger devices
 - laptops, desktops, most personal computers
 - 1500+ documented* instructions
- ARM
 - Primarily smaller devices
 - Phones, tablets, cameras, routers, etc.
- MIPS
 - Mainly embedded devices
 - security cameras, routers, etc.

```
UNAME(1)                                         User Command

NAME      uname - print system information

SYNOPSIS  uname [OPTION]...

DESCRIPTION
Print certain system information.  With no OPTION

-a, --all
        print all information, in the following order:
        -s, --kernel-name
                print the kernel name
        -n, --nodename
                print the network node hostname
        -r, --kernel-release
                print the kernel release
        -v, --kernel-version
                print the kernel version
        -m, --machine
                print the machine hardware name
        -p, --processor
                print the processor type (non-portable)
        -i, --hardware-platform
                print the hardware platform (non-portable)
        -o, --operating-system
                print the operating system
```

```
qemu-user(1)                                         Debian                                         qemu-user(1)

NAME      qemu-user - QEMU User Emulator

SYNOPSIS  qemu-user [options] program [program-arguments...]

DESCRIPTION
The qemu-user emulator can run binaries for other architectures but with the same operating
system as the current one.
```

```
user@pwr:/tmp/BINS$ uname -m
x86_64
user@pwr:/tmp/BINS$ qemu-mips ./busybox_static_mips uname -m
mips
user@pwr:/tmp/BINS$ qemu-arm ./busybox_static_arm uname -m
armv7l
user@pwr:/tmp/BINS$ qemu-mipsel ./busybox_static_mipsel uname -m
mips
user@pwr:/tmp/BINS$ qemu-x86_64 ./busybox_static_x86_64 uname -m
x86_64
```

x86 Overview

General Purpose Registers:

- **rax**: “accumulator” - for math operations
 - **rbx**: “base” address for memory calculations
 - **rcx**: “counter” register for repeated operations
 - **rdx**: auxiliary “data” register for math ops
 - **rsi**: “source index” for load/copy instructions
 - **rdi**: “destination index” for store/copy instructions
 - **rbp**: “base pointer” for stack frames
 - **rsp**: “stack pointer” for operations on the stack
 - **r8-r15**: new 64 bit registers only in x86-64

```
user@pwr:~$ cat helloworld.c
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    char user_input[50];

    printf("Hello, world!\nWhat is your name? ");
    scanf("%s", user_input);

    printf("Hi, %s!\n", user_input);
}

user@pwr:~$ gcc helloworld.c -o helloworld
user@pwr:~$ ./helloworld
Hello, world!
What is your name? Vanya
Hi, Vanya!
user@pwr:~$ ./helloworld
Hello, world!
What is your name? Alden
Hi, Alden!
```

```

user@pwr:~$ gdb ./helloworld
GNU gdb (Ubuntu 9.2-0ubuntu1-20.04) 9.2
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu".
Type "show configuration" for configuration details.
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.
Find the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:
<http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.

For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./helloworld...
(No debugging symbols found in ./helloworld)
(gdb) set disassembly-flavor intel
(gdb) disass main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x0000000000000001189 <+0>:    endbr64
0x000000000000000118d <+4>:    push    rbp
0x000000000000000118e <+5>:    mov     rbp,rs
0x0000000000000001191 <+8>:    sub    rsp,0x40
0x0000000000000001195 <+12>:   mov     rax,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
0x000000000000000119e <+21>:   mov     QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],rax
0x00000000000000011a2 <+25>:   xor    eax, eax
0x00000000000000011a4 <+27>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0x8e5d]      # 0x2008
0x00000000000000011ab <+34>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x00000000000000011b0 <+39>:   call   0x1080 <printf@plt>
0x00000000000000011b5 <+44>:   lea    rax,[rbp-0x40]
0x00000000000000011b9 <+48>:   mov    rsi,rax
0x00000000000000011bc <+51>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0xe67]      # 0x202a
0x00000000000000011c3 <+58>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x00000000000000011c8 <+63>:   call   0x1090 <_soc99_scant@plt>
0x00000000000000011cd <+68>:   lea    rax,[rbp-0x40]
0x00000000000000011d1 <+72>:   mov    rsi,rax
0x00000000000000011d4 <+75>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0xe52]      # 0x202d
0x00000000000000011db <+82>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x00000000000000011e0 <+87>:   call   0x1080 <printf@plt>
0x00000000000000011e5 <+92>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x00000000000000011ea <+97>:   mov    rdx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8]
0x00000000000000011ee <+101>:  xor    rdx,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
0x00000000000000011f7 <+110>:  je    0x10fe <main+17>
0x00000000000000011f9 <+112>:  call   0x1070 <_stack_chk_fail@plt>
0x00000000000000011fe <+117>:  leave 
0x00000000000000011ff <+118>:  ret

End of assembler dump.


```

Stack & Heap

Stack (system defined memory)

TLDR: when you run a program on a linux/*NIX machine, the system allocates memory for the program to run inside of - the stack

- The stack grows down
- Typically 8MB in size (which is *usually fine*)
- Stack pointer (rsp) keeps track of top element of the stack



Heap (prog. defined memory)

TLDR: think calling malloc, free, calloc etc.


The heap grows up

No predefined size

Linking

Static

- During the linking phase of compilation, if binary is statically linked, all library modules are copied into the executable
- You know the addresses of all those library functions **before** execution



Dynamic

- The names of the external libraries are placed in the final executable - but they are referred to by multiple programs (why they're sometimes called *shared libraries*)
- Addresses of libraries is unknown before runtime


Binary Structure

Executable and Linkable Format (ELF)

- **TL;DR:** Basic *nix executables
- **ELF header:** 32 bytes, identifies the format of the file, determines **endianness**
- Table info
- Sections (data, functions, etc)
- Table 2!

Portable Executables (PE)

- **TL;DR:** Basic Windows executables
- **PE header:** DOS-stub, PE signature, COFF file header (COFF file header + optional header)
- More complicated than ELF (don't worry about it for this class)




64 bit

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Signature 0x544D							
DOS Header							(0x3C) Pointer to PE Header
DOS STUB							
0x0000	Signature 0x04500000	Machine	#NumberOfSections				
0x0008	TimeDateStamp	PointerToSymbolTable	(deprecated)				
0x0010	# NumberOfSymbolTable (deprecated)	SizeOfOptionalHeader	Characteristics				
0x0018	Magic	MajorLinker Version	MinorLinker Version	SizeOfCode (sum of all sections)			
0x0020				SizeOfInitializedData	SizeOfUninitializedData		
0x0028	AddressOfEntryPoint (RVA)			BaseOfCode (RVA)			
0x0030	BaseOfData (RVA)			ImageBase			
0x0038	SectionAlignment			FileAlignment			
0x0040	MajorOperating SystemVersion	MajorOperating SystemVersion	MinorOperating SystemVersion	MajorImage Version	MinorImage Version		
0x0048	MinorSubsystem Version	MinorSubsystem Version		Win32VersionValue (zeros filled)			
0x0050	SizeOfImage			SizeOfHeaders			
0x0058	CheckSum			Subsystem	DllCharacteristics		
0x0060	SizeOfStackReserve			SizeOfStackCommit			
0x0068	SizeOfHeapReserve			SizeOfHeapCommit			
0x0070	LoaderFlags (zeros filled)			# NumberOfRvaAndSizes			
	ExportTable (RVA)			SizeOfExportTable			
	ImportTable (RVA)			SizeOfImportTable			
	ResourceTable (RVA)			SizeOfResourceTable			
	ExceptionTable (RVA)			SizeOfExceptionTable			
	CertificateTable (RVA)			SizeOfCertificateTable			
	BaseRelocationTable (RVA)			SizeOfBaseRelocationTable			
	Debug (RVA)			SizeOfDebug			
	GlobalPtr (RVA)	00	00	00	00		
	TLSTable (RVA)			SizeOfTLSTable			
	LoadConfigTable (RVA)			SizeOfLoadConfigTable			
	BoundImport (RVA)			SizeOfBoundImport			
	ImportAddressTable (RVA)			SizeOfImportAddressTable			
	DelayImportDescriptor (RVA)			SizeOfDelayImportDescriptor			
	CLRRuntimeHeader (RVA)			SizeOfCLRRuntimeHeader			
00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
				Name			
				VirtualSize	VirtualAddress (RVA)		
				SizeOfRawData	PointerToRawData		
				PointerToRelocations	PointerToLineNumbers		
				NumberOfRelocations	NumberOfLineNumbers		Characteristics

Endiness

- **Big-endian:** stores the **most significant byte of a word** (small collection of bytes) at the smallest memory address and the least significant byte at the largest
- **Little-endian:** Stores the least-significant byte at the smallest address
- **Bi-endianness:** Some crazy architectures (e.g ARM) use a setup that allows for switching between BE and LE
- <https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/>



What is Binary Exploitation?

- Binary Exploitation
 - Taking **advantage** of errors/vulnerabilities in compiled code (binaries) with the purpose of realizing **unintended behavior** (RCE, memory leaks, etc)
- Goals:
 - Code execution
 - Leaking sensitive info
 - Privilege escalation
 - Keygen

Command Injection, The Sequel

- Unsanitized user input
 - A.k.a. untrusted/unchecked/etc.
- We talked about exec()/subprocess/etc. in other languages
 - With C, we care about `system()` !
- Recap: C programs can execute other programs with `system()`
 - You did this in CMSC216
- `system(arg_with_user_input); // Can lead to code execution`

```
user@pwr:~$ ./inject
What do you want to ls? /tmp/example
Your input: ls -t /tmp/example
a b c d e f file1 file2 g
user@pwr:~$ ./inject
What do you want to ls? /tmp/example;whoami
Your input: ls -t /tmp/example;whoami
a b c d e f file1 file2 g
user
user@pwr:~$ cat inject.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int custom_ls(char *);

int main() {
    char cmd[50] ="ls -t ";
    char user_input[50];

    printf("What do you want to ls? ");
    scanf("%s", user_input);

    strcat(cmd, user_input);
    printf("Your input: %s\n", cmd);

    system(cmd); /* 🔥 This is fine 🔥 */
}
```

Format Strings

- Remember `printf()` and `scanf()` syntax?
 - Generally can format like:
 - `printf("My var is: %s!\n", my_variable);`
 - But also...
 - `printf("This is a string!\n");`
 - What if...
 - `printf(my_variable); //?`
- What if `my_variable` contains format strings?
 - `%s` for strings
 - `%x` for hexadecimal
 - `%d` for integers

```
user@pwr:~$ ./format
What do you want me to say? test
test
user@pwr:~$ ./format
What do you want me to say? %x%x%x
a00
user@pwr:~$
```

```
ser@pwr:~$ cat format.c
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    volatile char user_input[50];
    volatile char secret[25] = "You can't print me!";

    printf("What do you want me to say? ");
    scanf("%s", user_input);

    printf(user_input); /* 🔥 This is fine 🔥 */
    printf("\n");

ser@pwr:~$ gcc ./format.c -o format -w -fno-stack-protector
ser@pwr:~$ ./format
What do you want me to say? TEST
EST
ser@pwr:~$ ./format
What do you want me to say? %$llx%7llx%6llx%5llx%4llx%3llx
656d20746e6972782074276e16320756f597ca0
ser@pwr:~$ echo "21656d20746e6972782074276e16320756f597ca0" | xxd -r -p # hex to ascii
m tnirp t'nac uoy!+user@pwr:~$
ser@pwr:~$ # wrong endianness but :)
```

Buffer Overflow (BoF)

- Stack-based
 - Statically allocated buffers (e.g. `char buf[15];`) are limited by the allocation
 - What happens when we go past this limit?
 - Depending on the function, you can read/write into “random” data
 - Or... other values on the stack >:)
 - Heap based
 - Heap BoF Guide




EXHIBIT 10.2 A normal stack and a stack with a buffer overflow.

https://www.mkdynmics.net/current_projects/computer_security/Basic_Linux_exploits.html

Anti-RE


- Stripped binaries
 - Smaller, but no debug symbols
 - Code obfuscation
 - Making code harder to read and understand
 - VM detection
 - Debugger Detection

<https://hackaday.com/2020/07/10/mmm-obfuscated-shell-donuts/>


```
const detectVM = () => {
  // TODO future for now no VM detection on Mac OS X
  if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
    return;
  }
}
```

Binary Protections

- Stack canaries
 - Within the stack, trigger a failsafe if overwritten (e.g. by BoF)
- Stack memory protections
 - NX (No eXecute)
 - RELRO (RELocation Read Only)
- ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)
 - Randomly positions the base address of an executable and the positions of binary components...



```
user@pwr:~$ gcc ./format.c -o format
./format.c: In function 'main':
./format.c:13:10: warning: passing argument 1 of 'printf' discards 'volatile' qualifier from pointer
  13 |   printf(user_input); /* 🔥 This is fine 🔥 */
      |   ^
In file included from ./format.c:1:
/usr/include/stdio.h:332:43: note: expected 'const char * restrict' but argument is of type 'volatile
  332 |   extern int printf (const char * __restrict __format, ...);
      |   ^
./format.c:13:10: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
  13 |   printf(user_input); /* 🔥 This is fine 🔥 */
      |   ^
user@pwr:~$ gcc ./format.c -o format -w
user@pwr:~$ ./format
What do you want me to say? %xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx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```




checksec

- Is a program that allows you to check which binary protections are enabled on a particular binary
- <https://github.com/slimm609/checksec.sh>
- `checksec --file={binary files}`

```
alden@ubuntu:~/programming/ctfs/picoctf2021/binary-gauntlet-1$ checksec --file=gauntlet1
RELRO           STACK CANARY      NX          PIE          RPATH      RUNPATH      Symbols      FORTIFY Fortified      Fortifiable FILE
Partial RELRO  No canary found  NX disabled  No PIE      No RPATH  No RUNPATH  67 Symbols  No        0            3      gauntlet1
```

More Advanced Bugs

- NOP slide
 - If you don't know where program execution (the instruction pointer) will go
 - Sliiiiide down to the payload with "No-OPeration"s
- GOT
 - "Global Offset Table" in ELF
 - Stores function locations
 - Can overwrite entries to point to attacker code
- Ret2libc & ROP
 - [ROP guide](#)
 - [ret2libc guide](#)



Resources & Tools

- Tools
 - GDB (& pwngdb)
 - Pwntools
 - Ghidra
- Resources
 - [ghidraninja/stacksmashing](#) on YT
 - [Liveoverflow](#) on YT
 - [ctf101.org](#)
 - [exploit.education](#)

For next time...

- Homework 7 will be released asap :)
 - We recommend starting a little early
- If you are confused, don't be afraid to:
 - Schedule office hours (over Piazza)
 - Make public or private Piazza posts