## 1 PS optimization

This short text explains the modification done to [1] for the group signature described in Appendix A

## 1.1 Setup

$$pp \leftarrow (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$$
 (1)

$$g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1$$
 (2)

$$(x,y) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^2, \tilde{g} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2 : (\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}) \leftarrow (\tilde{g}^x, \tilde{g}^y)$$
 (3)

$$sk = (x, y), pk = (\tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y})) \tag{4}$$

$$\mathbf{g} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2 \\ (x,y) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2, \tilde{g} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1 : (\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}) \leftarrow (\tilde{g}^x, \tilde{g}^y)$$

## 1.2 Join

$$sk_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p : (\tau, \tilde{\tau}) \leftarrow (g^{sk_i}, \tilde{Y}^{sk_i}))$$
 (5)

$$u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p : \sigma \leftarrow (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) \leftarrow (g^u, (g^x \tau^y)^u))$$
 (6)

$$gsk_i = (sk_i, \sigma, e(\sigma_1, \tilde{Y}), pk = (\tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}))$$
(7)

## 1.3 Sign

$$t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$$
 (8)

$$(\sigma_1', \sigma_2') \leftarrow (\sigma_1^t, \sigma_2^t) \tag{9}$$

$$k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p : e(\sigma_1', \tilde{Y})^k \leftarrow e(\sigma_1, \tilde{Y})^{kt}$$
 (10)

$$c \leftarrow H(\sigma_1', \sigma_2', e(\sigma_1', \tilde{Y})^k, m) \tag{11}$$

$$s \leftarrow k + c \cdot sk_i \tag{12}$$

$$\mu(m) = (\sigma_1', \sigma_2', c, s) \in (\mathbb{G}_1^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^2)$$
(13)

Here we add the G1 element  $\tilde{Y}^{-k}$  to the signature to be able to verify it with pairing check

$$\mu(m) = (\sigma_1', \sigma_2', \tilde{Y}^{-k}, c, s) \in (\mathbb{G}_1^3 \times \mathbb{Z}_p^2)$$

## 1.4 Verify

$$R \leftarrow (e(\sigma_1^{-1}, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}))^{-c} \cdot e(\sigma_1^s, \tilde{Y})$$
(14)

$$c \stackrel{?}{=} H(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, R, m) \tag{15}$$

Correctness comes from:

$$e(\sigma_1, \tilde{X} \cdot \tilde{Y}^m) = e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}) \tag{16}$$

The verification takes one pairing check and one hash check.

$$e(\tilde{X}^c \tilde{Y}^{s-k}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}^c, \sigma_2) \tag{17}$$

$$c \stackrel{?}{=} H(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \tilde{Y}^{-k}, m) \tag{18}$$

#### 1.4.1 Completeness

$$e(\tilde{X}^c \tilde{Y}^{s-k}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}^c, \sigma_2) \tag{19}$$

$$e(\tilde{X}^c \tilde{Y}^{c \cdot sk_i}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}^c, \sigma_2)$$
 (20)

$$e(\tilde{X}\tilde{Y}^{sk_i}, \sigma_1)^c \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2)^c \tag{21}$$

$$e(\tilde{X}\tilde{Y}^{sk_i}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2) \tag{22}$$

Which is a valid signature on  $sk_i$ .

#### 1.4.2 Derivation from original

From 14, we want to check:

$$e(\sigma_1, \tilde{Y})^k \stackrel{?}{=} (e(\sigma_1^{-1}, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}))^{-c} \cdot e(\sigma_1^s, \tilde{Y})$$
(23)

Exchanging the groups for signatures and public keys we have:

$$e(\tilde{Y}, \sigma_1)^k \stackrel{?}{=} (e(\tilde{X}, \sigma_1^{-1}) \cdot e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2))^{-c} \cdot e(\tilde{Y}, \sigma_1^s) \tag{24}$$

$$e(\tilde{X}, \sigma_1)^{-c} \cdot e(\tilde{Y}, \sigma_1)^k \cdot e(\tilde{Y}, \sigma_1^s)^{-1} \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2)^{-c}$$

$$(25)$$

$$e(\tilde{X}^{-c}\tilde{Y}^{k-s}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2)^{-c} \tag{26}$$

$$e(\tilde{X}^c \tilde{Y}^{s-k}, \sigma_1) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{g}^c, \sigma_2) \tag{27}$$

## 1.4.3 Cost

The on-chain verification is constrained on:

- efficiency in terms of gas
- operations with only pairing check possible, no pairing operation

It needs 3 exponentiations (scalar multiplications for ECC) and 2 multiplications (point additions for ECC), along with the hash check operation.

## 1.5 Open

$$\forall (i, \tau_i, \tilde{\tau}_i) : e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}) \cdot e(\sigma_1, \tilde{X})^{-1} \stackrel{?}{=} e(\sigma_1, \tilde{\tau}_i)$$
(28)

$$\forall (i, \tau_i, \tilde{\tau}_i) : e(\tilde{g}, \sigma_2) \cdot e(\tilde{X}, \sigma_1)^{-1} \stackrel{?}{=} e(\tilde{\tau}_i, \sigma_1)$$
(29)

# References

[1] Pointcheval, David and Sanders, Olivier LaTeX: Short randomizable signatures, Topics in Cryptology-CT-RSA 2016: The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2016, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 29-March 4, 2016, Proceedings