# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
## — For Online Publication —

# A Key Descriptives

Table SI-1: Descriptive Statistics Table (Locality level)

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Right bloc vote share | 33.575 | 24.623 | 0 | 97.235 | 3724 |
| Likud vote share | 18.744 | 13.718 | 0 | 69.811 | 3724 |
| Israel Beytenu vote share | 3.867 | 4.889 | 0 | 43.241 | 2793 |
| Bait Yehudi vote share | 10.012 | 16.064 | 0 | 85.876 | 3724 |
| Shas vote share | 5.688 | 9.525 | 0 | 70.989 | 3724 |
| Kadima vote share | 17.067 | 15.378 | 0 | 64.644 | 2793 |
| Labor vote share | 24.264 | 18.971 | 0 | 81.137 | 3724 |
| Israel Hayom exposure | 24.528 | 18.137 | 0 | 54.639 | 3724 |
| Yediot 2007 exposure (instrument) | 38.659 | 6.774 | 16.367 | 50.026 | 3724 |
| Adult population (log) | 6.443 | 1.367 | 4.174 | 12.908 | 3724 |
| Distance to Tel Aviv (log) | 4.288 | 0.666 | 1.728 | 5.375 | 3724 |
| Share Ashkenazi descent | 21.766 | 11.816 | 0.2 | 70.400 | 3724 |
| Share Asia descent | 10.614 | 10.798 | 0.3 | 60.2 | 3724 |
| Percent Jewish | 97.191 | 4.68 | 45.8 | 100 | 3724 |
| Share Matriculation | 25.775 | 7.876 | 2.6 | 72.7 | 3724 |
| Pop share: 18-29 age group | 0.091 | 0.038 | 0.017 | 0.859 | 3724 |
| Pop share: 30-49 age group | 0.127 | 0.027 | 0 | 0.324 | 3724 |
| Pop share: 50-65 age group | 0.075 | 0.026 | 0 | 0.305 | 3724 |
| Pop share: 66+ age group | 0.039 | 0.026 | 0 | 0.254 | 3724 |

Figure SI-1: Israel's Media Markets (2008)




*Note:* Left panel plots the localities included within their respective media markets. The right panel heat map records exposure to *Israel Hayom* in 2008 at the media-market level.

## B Newspaper Text Analysis

In this study, we conduct an automated text analysis to quantitatively measure right-wing slant in Israeli daily newspapers. To acquire the data, we downloaded PDF versions of IH and *Yediot* issues published between 2007 and 2016 from their digital archives, and turned them into text files using optical character recognition. To identify right-wing language, we used PDFs of Israeli political party platforms from 2003 to 2013 that we manually digitized. Interestingly, and consistent with the idea that Adelson lured readers by not only reducing price but also by increasing quality, the length of IH has been steadily increasing over time (Figure SI-2)

Figure SI-2: The Length of Israel Hayom Over Time




*Note:* The figure plots the length, in characters, for 2,339 *Israel Hayom* issues published between July 30, 2007 and December 28, 2015. The length of the newspaper's issues slightly increased in length over the years. In 2010, the newspaper introduced longer weekend editions, which also increased over time.

We pre-processed the Hebrew text by cleaning the files and stemming the words. Cleaning text files includes removing stop words, conjunctions, symbols, and numbers. Stemming reduces the dimensionality of text data by combining phrases with similar meaning into one 'stem.' In English, stemming usually consists of removing word endings such as "ing" or "ly." In Hebrew, stemming is a more complicated process, as words take a variety of forms which makes the process of transforming them to their roots problematic. We used an algorithm developed by the Technion - Israel Institute of Technology (Itai and Wintner, 2008), to stem Hebrew words.

The stemming process works as follows. First, each textual file (a newspaper issue, a party platform, etc.) is processed by a tokenizer, which breaks the text into words while preserving sentence structure, and outputs the result to an XML file. Second, the tokenized files are analyzed by a morphological analyzer, which takes each token (i.e., each word) and extracts all of its possible

interpretations. Each interpretation consists of a core lexicon item – i.e., the stem of the word and part of speech possibility. The output of the morphological analyzer results in several possible stems for each word in the corpus. To decide which stem is most appropriate, we applied a preference rule which gave a higher priority to proper names and nouns, as political issues in Hebrew usually consist of these forms.[39]

We use the stemmed versions of the IH, *Yediot*, and party platform copora to generate document-term-matrices. A document-term-matrix (DTM) quantifies a body of text by counting number of times each term appears in a document. In our study, the documents are newspaper issues and the terms are two-word phrases ("bigrams"). We use bigrams because they are useful for providing context without expanding the dimensionality of the dataset too much. The output of this process is a matrix in which the rows are the newspaper issues and the columns are two-word phrases. We have a separate DTM for each newspaper, as well as for each reference text—political party platforms and positive coverage paragraphs.

## B.1 Method for Calculating Media Slant

Following **?**, we measured right-wing slant in *Israel Hayom* and *Yediot* by comparing the usage of phrases in these newspapers with their frequency in political party platforms. First, using **?** $\chi^2$ statistic, we identified the most partisan phrases: those that are most likely to appear in party platforms on the left and right. Reassuringly, right-wing phrases that received high partisanship scores generally refer to issues commonly associated with right-wing ideology, such as the Jewish nature of the state of Israel and law and order. Left-wing phrases that received a high score relate to a more diverse set of policy issues, such as education, human rights, inequality, and the environment.[40]

Second, we mapped each phrase to a measure of ideology that is derived from its frequency in party platforms. The idea is to scale partisan phrases, such that phrases appearing more frequently in right-wing platforms receive higher score. To generate the ideology score, we divide the frequency of each phrase $i$ in right-wing platforms ($k = 1, ..., R$) by the total frequency of phrase $i$ in all party platforms ($k = 1, ..., K$):

$$\phi_i = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{R} p_i}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} p_i}$$

The result is a score ($\phi_i$) ranging between 0 and 1 in which higher values reflect greater similarity with right-wing platforms.

Third, we identified these phrases in the issues of I-H and *Yediot* and calculated their frequency in different parts of the newspaper (front pages, news sections, and op-eds). To do so, we first trimmed the document-term matrices of each newspaper corpus to include only the partisan phrases identified in the first step. We multiply our trimmed document term matrices (one for each newspaper corpus), in which the rows are the issues and the columns are the partisan phrases, with a vector of the $\phi$ scores for each phrase. This results in a document-level vector giving the average right-wing slant for each newspaper issue. To make interpretation easier, we normalize this value to range between 0 and 1, where values closer to upper range reflect greater usage of right-wing language in these newspapers.

[39] The preference rule is as follows: Proper name > Noun > Adjective > Participle > Verb

[40] See SI Table SI-2, for a list of the top 100 partisan phrases.

Table SI-2 shows the 100 most partisan phrases identified by the ? $\chi^2$ statistic. Panel A shows phrases used more often in right-wing party platforms. Panel B shows phrases used more often in left-wing party platforms.

Table SI-2: Most Partisan Phrases from Israeli Party Platforms

| A. Phrases Used More Often by Right-Wing Parties | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| goverentment.likud | government.continue | land.israel | israel.home | environment |
| as.well | government.act | arab.country | judea.samaria | people.country |
| israel.act | research.development | country.jew | people.israel | movement.act |
| jewish.state | israel.government | safety.roads | jewish.home | woman.status |
| prime.minister | existence.state | jewish.country | continue.act | israel.movement |
| science.technology | jewish.land | young.couple | promote.status | unity.people |
| benjamin.netanyahu | establish.state | israeli.economy | organized.crime | create.space |
| israel.must | economic.growth | act.government | oslo.accords | veteran |
| government.encourage | main.rabbinate | act.establish | israel.continue | in.addition |
| core.book | situation.in | continue.expand | continue.policy | citizenship.law |
| **B. Phrases Used More Often by Left-Wing Parties** | | | | |
| labor.party | state.israel | work.promote | issue.come | promote.issue |
| education.system | israeli.society | public.transportation | human.rights | books |
| enact.law | government.head | law.enforcement | arab.settlement | cooperation |
| israeli.citizen | animals | with.disabilities | israel.state | human.resources |
| arab.population | basic.law | human.people | labor.market | increase.budget |
| government.israel | resource.allocation | minimize.gap | health.services | job |
| minimum.wage | senior.citizen | achieve.goal | formulate.plan | health.system |
| arab.citizen | healthcare.basket | labor.right | guarantee.right | live.dignity |
| equal.rights | inequality | environment.protection | quality.life | basic.right |
| next.goal | priority | social.justice | elected.knesset | school |

*Note:* The Table presents the top 100 partisan phrases identified by the ? $\chi^2$ statistic. Panel A shows phrases used more often in right-wing party platforms. Panel B shows phrases used more often in left-wing party platforms. The phrases are translated from Hebrew to English.

## B.2 Results in Tabular Form

Table SI-3 presents the average right-wing slant in the front pages of IH and *Yediot*, as well as the percent change of the difference between the newspapers. While the difference in slant was small in the first few years, by 2015, the front pages of IH had over 27 percent more right-wing content than *Yediot*.

Columns (1) and (3) in Table SI-4 present estimations from regressions of the right-wing slant and positive coverage scores on an indicator of IH. As shown visually in the article, right-leaning content and positive coverage were significantly higher in IH when compared to *Yediot*. Note that these regressions compare issues published on the same day; thus, the difference cannot be driven by differences in news items.

## B.3 Further Inspection of 'Framing Bias'

To further examine framing bias in IH and *Yediot*, we identified right-leaning and left-leaning phrases that describe the same political issues, and measured their usage in the two newspapers. Figure SI-3 shows that Jewish settlements in the West Bank tend to be described in IH with the term "Judea and Samaria" more frequently than *Yediot*, while in *Yediot* the term "settlements" is

Table SI-3: Right-Wing Slant in IH vs. *Yediot*

| Year | Mean (Yediot) | Mean (IH) | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 6.40 |
| 2009 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 8.45 |
| 2010 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 8.40 |
| 2011 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 12.04 |
| 2012 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 18.18 |
| 2013 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 25.76 |
| 2014 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 17.63 |
| 2015 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 27.62 |

*Note:* The table shows the average right-wing slant in *Israel Hayom* and *Yediot* over time, as well as the percent change in the difference in the yearly means.

Table SI-4: Right-Wing Slant and Positive Coverage in IH and *Yediot*

| | Right-wing slant | | | Positive coverage | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Front page | (2) News pages | (3) Op-Eds | (4) Front page | (5) News pages | (6) Op-Eds |
| Israel Hayom | 0.044*** | 0.021* | 0.026*** | 0.060*** | 0.032*** | −0.002 |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.007) |
| Constant | 0.276*** | 0.291*** | 0.175*** | 0.273*** | 0.306*** | 0.119*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.005) |
| Observations | 718 | 718 | 560 | 718 | 718 | 560 |
| $R^2$ | 0.018 | 0.004 | 0.022 | 0.042 | 0.010 | 0.0002 |

*Note:* The table reports estimations from linear regressions of the right-wing slant and positive coverage scores on an indicator of IH. The regressions compare issues published on the same day. The number of observations for op-eds is lower because some newspaper issues did not include op-eds. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

used more frequently than IH. The term Judea and Samaria refers to the biblical name of the West Bank region – this phrase is a commonly used by the political right in Israel. Figure SI-4 shows phrases used in the newspapers to discuss the issue of migration. We find that the term "asylum seeker" is used more frequently in *Yediot* than IH, while the opposite is the case with the use of the alternative term "infiltrator".

Figure SI-3: Slant in Reporting on Settlements




*Note:* The figure shows the average frequency of phrases used to describe Jewish settlements in the West Bank. IH tends to use the term "Judea and Samaria" more frequently than *Yediot*, while *Yediot* uses "settlements" more frequently than IH.

Figure SI-4: Slant in Reporting on Asylum Seekers




*Note:* The figure shows the average frequency of phrases used to describe asylum seekers. IH tends to use the term "invaders" more frequently than *Yediot*, while *Yediot* uses "asylum seekers" more frequently than IH.

## B.4 Issue Bias

To examine whether IH tended to emphasize in its front pages different issues as compared to *Yediot*, we estimate a structural topic model with fifteen topics. The model draws on phrase frequencies, the structure of each newspaper issue, and issue-level metadata to inductively discover topics in the newspapers' front pages (**?**). In Figure SI-5, positive coefficients reflect topics that are more frequently used in the front pages of *Yediot*, while negative coefficients reflect topics that are more prevalent in IH. The words next to each coefficient represent the top words associated with each topic.

We find that the editors of IH tend to emphasize in the front pages security-related issues, such as crime and policing (topic 3) and rocket attacks from Gaza (topic 13), while the editors of *Yediot* highlight issues related to education (topic 1) traffic accidents (topic 8), and international events such as the terror attacks in France (topic 11). It is noteworthy that domestic security threats, which have been shown to drive voting for the right in Israel (**??**), are significantly more prevalent in IH.

Figure SI-5: Topic Prevalence in the Front Pages of *Israel Hayom* and *Yediot* (2008-2015)




*Note:* The figure reports estimates from a Structural Topic Model with 15 topics discussed in the front pages of IH and *Yediot* between 2008 and 2016. Positive coefficients reflect topics that were more frequently discussed in the front pages of *Yediot*, while negative coefficients reflect topics that were more prevalent in the front pages of IH.

### B.5 Ideological Slant of Front Page Headline and Picture

**Headline Slant.** The textual analysis demonstrated that IH's coverage was systematically more right-leaning and pro-Netanyahu than *Yediot*. This was particularly notable in the first three pages of the newspaper. This analysis, however, does not capture the full extent of the variation in the coverage, as front page's main headline and picture have an outside presence in the framing of the day's main topic. To get a sense of whether indeed there is a difference between the newspapers on this dimension, we conducted the following exercise. First, we extracted all main headlines from IH and its chief competitor *Yediot*, as published during the six months in the run-up to the 2009 elections.[41] Taking all headers, we scrambled their order and two coders were then asked to read each of the headlines and classify whether the message was clearly tilted to the left, neutral, or clearly tilted to the right. We then combined the two sets of codings and had a third coder review instances in which the coders had opposing interpretations of the header (i.e. one left, the other right). In instances where one interpreted the header as consistent with the left (right) and the other viewed the content as neutral, we coded the headers as 'leaning' left (right). We also carried out the same exercise with the front page's main image, classifying each image by its political tilt (see online appendix for complete details on the coding procedures).

Figure SI-6 presents the distribution of the headline coding. The plurality of headers (40% and 58% in IH and *Yediot*, respectively) were coded by both coders as neutral, i.e., as a statement that did not clearly benefit or adhere to the views of one of the two political camps. Headers more consistent with leftist positions were 23 (IH) and 20 percent (*Yediot*), a statistically insignificant difference. In contrast, whereas only 22% of the headers in *Yediot* appeared to be right leaning, the corresponding figure at IH was 41% ($p$>0.01). The gap was even more notable when focusing only on headers that were unambiguously tilted to the right: 21% in IH versus 6% in *Yediot*. Clearly, front page headlines in IH are more consistent with the right's position.

## C Limited Circulation in 2008

In the first year of its operation, *Israel Hayom* printed a rather limited number of copies (250,000) and focused most of its free distribution in major junctions, shopping malls, and bus and train stations relatively close to its printing press in Tel Aviv. As the left panel of Figure SI-7 demonstrates, this induced a negative correlation between IH exposure in the six months prior to the February 2009 election, and distance to Tel Aviv. By 2010, IH put in place an elaborate circulation system that allowed it to reach all towns in the country, such that there was no longer a relationship between the newspaper exposure and distance to Tel Aviv (Figure SI-7, right panel).

Since Tel Aviv and its surrounding is more likely, on average, to support centrist and center-left parties, the limited circulation before 2010 induced a negative correlation between IH exposure and right bloc vote share, which becomes positive once accounted for propensity to read secular mainstream dailies (our study's instrument).

[41] These headers included only the issues published Sunday through Thursday, as at the time, IH did not publish a weekend edition on Fridays. To keep the comparison as tight as possible, we focus only on the 161 days in which both newspapers issued copies.

Figure SI-6: Ideological Slant of First Page Headlines




*Note:* The figure reports the ideological position of front-page headlines in the six-month period leading to the 2009 elections as coded by 'newspaper blind' research assistants.

# D Price-Ideology Tradeoff

A theoretical contribution of our study is stipulating a tradeoff between price and ideology, which underlies the exposure mechanism described herein. The idea is as follows: voters are generally averse to consuming news that is incongruent with their ideological ideal point. However, in some cases they may nonetheless consume ideologically incongruent information—and thus, perhaps update their prior views—if it is offered for a low price and/or is easily accessible. Directly testing the impact of this presumed tradeoff, however, is challenging since IH was offered at no cost throughout Israel, so there is no spatial variation in price that could be exploited for analysis purposes.

In Figure 2 we provided some indirect evidence in support of the price-ideology tradeoff, by showing that a substantial share of Israelis who identify as left-wing nonetheless read IH periodically. In this section, we aim to provide more direct evidence of this tradeoff that relies on spatial variation in IH's initial accessibility. As noted, in the post-launch period of 2008, IH focused most of its free distribution efforts in areas with many passersby (e.g., major junctions, shopping malls, bus and train stations) that were located relatively close to its printing press in Tel Aviv (SI, Section C). The idea is that in 2008, the further a locality was from Tel Aviv, the less accessible the newspaper was to potential readers (Figure SI-7, left panel). If there was no tradeoff between price/accessibility




Figure SI-7: Israel Hayom Exposure by distance to printing house in Tel Aviv. The unit of observation is the media market, with observations weighted by population.

and ideology, distance from Tel Aviv should have had the same effect on readership, irrespective of the ideological leaning of a locality. By contrast, if there is such a tradeoff, the more left-leaning a locality is, the more consequential distance to Tel aviv (our proxy for IH accessibility) should be. Indeed, as Figure SI-8 makes clear, the evidence is very much consistent with the presence of such a tradeoff. The negative relationship between distance to Tel Aviv (the location of IH's printing press) and IH exposure becomes steeper in more left-leaning locations, where support for the right-bloc is lower.

# E Empirical modeling assumptions

Below we provide evidence consistent with the assumptions underlying our pooled two-way fixed effects and first-difference regression models. We then report the IV model's first-stage and additional evidence underlying the strength of our instrument.

## E.1 Exchangeability between units

A possible concern with the pooled fixed effects (and FD) models is that they cannot fully account for the possibility that the choice of Israelis to consume *Israel Hayom* is correlated with a changing political landscape that predisposes some areas to also increasingly vote for right-wing parties. One way to explore how serious this concern may be is by testing the stability of the relationship between localities' characteristics and both (a) IH readership, and (b) voting for right bloc parties. As Figure SI-9 makes clear, there is no evidence that a demographic group has shifted to the right dramatically over time. That the relationship between localities' characteristics and IH readership, as well as with voting for right bloc parties, is constant across years, adds further confidence to the validity of the pooled fixed effects and first-difference models.

Figure SI-8: Assessing Price-Ideology Tradeoff




The figure shows the bivariate OLS relationship between IH readership (y-axis), and (scaled) distance to Tel-Aviv at the locality level (x-axis). The data is broken down by three quantiles (low, medium, and high) levels of support for right-bloc parties prior to *Israel Hayom*'s launch. As the figure makes clear, distance to Tel Aviv has a more negative effect on IH readership the lower the locality's propensity to support right-bloc parties is.

## E.2 Parallel Trends

One way to assess the parallel trend assumption is to compare the relationship between IH exposure and voting to the right before and after IH launch. We begin with eye balling the data in Figure SI-10: in all 7 panels the x-axis is *Israel Hayom* exposure in the six months leading to 2015 elections, while the y-axis is the right block vote share both pre-IH launch (1996, 1999, 2003 and 2006 elections), and post-IH launch (2009, 2013, and 2015).

In Figure SI-11 we report estimates of the slopes of these bivariate relations, using simple OLS regressions, weighting observations by locality's adult population and clustering standard errors at the media market level. With the exception on 2003, slopes in pre-IH period (1996, 1999 and 2006) hover around zero, while there are positive (and significantly different) in all post-IH elections.

Figure SI-9: Relationship between locality covariates and outcomes of interest overtime




The figure shows a set of bivariate regression results (point estimates and 95 percent confidence level). In the left panel we regress I-H exposure on each of the locality covariates used in the empirical analysis, separately for each election year after I-H's launch (i.e., 2009, 2013 and 2015). In the right panel, we repeat the analysis using instead as the dependent variable the locality's vote share to right-bloc parties. All regressions weight observation by the size of the locality's adult population; standard errors are clustered at the media market level.

Figure SI-11: Parallel Trends: Slopes Estimates



Figure SI-10: Parallel Trends: Bivariate Correlation



| | 2009 | 2013 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Yediot readership 2007 | 2.779** | 6.649*** | 7.717*** |
| | (0.951) | (1.040) | (0.841) |
| Share Jews | −0.004 | −0.457 | −1.493*** |
| | (0.350) | (0.366) | (0.342) |
| Share Asian descent | −1.696 | 2.229 | 2.694 |
| | (1.341) | (1.251) | (1.383) |
| Share European descent | −2.325 | 0.717 | −0.658 |
| | (1.200) | (0.990) | (1.004) |
| High-school matriculation | 1.815 | −0.030 | 0.921 |
| | (1.050) | (0.867) | (0.740) |
| Population (log) | 1.524** | −1.016 | −1.677* |
| | (0.474) | (0.543) | (0.612) |
| Distance to Tel Aviv (log) | −1.335 | 0.597 | −0.682 |
| | (0.770) | (0.559) | (0.775) |
| Pop share ages 18-2 | −0.764 | −2.697* | −2.422 |
| | (1.420) | (0.980) | (1.193) |
| Pop share ages 30-49 | 1.248 | −1.769 | −3.090* |
| | (1.025) | (1.002) | (1.107) |
| Pop share ages 50-65 | −0.129 | −0.747 | 0.330 |
| | (1.815) | (0.640) | (0.678) |
| Pop share ages 66+ | 2.335 | −0.235 | −0.495 |
| | (1.223) | (1.191) | (1.088) |
| $R^2$ | 0.500 | 0.723 | 0.740 |
| Num. obs. | 931 | 931 | 931 |
| F statistic | 8.164 | 21.933 | 17.942 |
| N Clusters | 25 | 25 | 25 |

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table SI-5: IV models: First-stage

### E.3 Instrumental Variable Strength

In Table SI-5 we report the first-stage regressions of the IV models, by election year. We then use the first-stage regressions models reported in Table SI-5 to predict the study's key input variable: IH readership (exposure). Then, we plot in Figure SI-13 the predicted versus the realized values of IH exposure. Both Table SI-5 and Figure SI-13 underscore the strength of our instrument in 2013 and 2015, but its weakness in 2009.

Table reports three separate cross-sectional OLS regressions in which the DV is *Israel Hayom* exposure, and the main independent variable is our instrument, *Yediot* readership 2007. All models include our regular pre-treatment locality-level covariates (excluded instruments), weight observations by adult population, and cluster standard errors at the media market level.

Figure SI-12: First-stage: IV Estimation




*Note:* The relationship between *Yediot* 2007 readership and IH exposure over time at the media market level, weighted by population size. The bivariate F-statistic values in 2009, 2013 and 2015 are 11, 46 and 47 respectively.

Figure SI-13: Fitted vs. Realized Israel Hayom Exposure



# F Robustness checks

In this section we report robustness checks that strengthen our confidence in the models reported in the main text.

## F.1 Two-period FD and IV Models

We first test whether our core empirical strategies (two-period FD and IV) are sensitive to variations in model specification. In Tables SI-7–SI-9, columns 1-6 report results for Two-period FD, and columns 7-12 for the IV models. We begin with testing robustness for rescaling the key independent variable, IH exposure, using inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation. See Table SI-6 for the effect of IHS IH on right bloc voting and Table SI-7 for its effect on the Likud vote share.

As discussed in the main text, one observation (Bnei Brak) is somewhat of an outlier with disproportionally low IH exposure (Bnei Brak is an ultra-orthodox city with strong norm against reading secular newspapers). Thus in Tables SI-8 and SI-9 we report similar DiD models, dropping Bnei Brak. Results are robust.

Table SI-6: Two-period FD Models (IH Logged)

| | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| IH (ihs) | 0.427 | 0.509 | 10.483*** | 6.142** | 10.612*** | 7.893** | 10.424** | 10.176 | 11.772*** | 7.764** | 12.689*** | 7.700* |
| | (2.669) | (2.193) | (2.926) | (3.054) | (3.451) | (3.852) | (4.554) | (12.529) | (2.285) | (3.602) | (3.716) | (4.570) |
| Constant | 0.190 | -29.475 | -45.283*** | -44.603** | -44.856*** | -65.698** | -38.645** | -48.759 | -50.834*** | -50.620** | -53.651*** | -64.847* |
| | (10.053) | (26.227) | (13.309) | (20.997) | (15.561) | (32.477) | (17.944) | (45.713) | (10.046) | (22.481) | (16.247) | (38.613) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.14 | 0.54 | 0.22 | 0.50 | 0.21 | 0.46 | -0.22 | 0.33 | 0.22 | 0.49 | 0.21 | 0.46 |
| N | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: right bloc vote share**. In all models our key independent variable *Israel-Hayom* exposure is transomed using inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Observations are weighted by locality's adult population, and bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$



Table SI-7: Two-period FD Models (IH Logged)

| | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| IH (ihs) | -0.407 | 0.653 | 9.166** | 5.438 | 3.599 | 6.624** | -1.383 | 0.763 | 11.036*** | 9.101** | 2.318 | 7.786** |
| | (1.073) | (1.229) | (3.826) | (3.658) | (2.656) | (2.887) | (2.274) | (5.237) | (2.637) | (3.874) | (2.843) | (3.949) |
| Constant | 3.704 | -7.778 | -36.157** | -44.415 | -14.590 | -51.271** | 7.190 | -7.987 | -43.875*** | -58.100** | -9.458 | -56.408* |
| | (4.397) | (7.690) | (17.227) | (27.403) | (11.731) | (25.149) | (9.166) | (14.207) | (11.529) | (28.496) | (11.627) | (30.527) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.13 | 0.60 | 0.11 | 0.37 | -0.01 | 0.21 | 0.13 | 0.59 | 0.10 | 0.37 |
| N | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: Likud vote share**. In all models our key independent variable *Israel-Hayom* exposure is transomed using inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS). Observations are weighted by locality's adult population, and bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI-8: Two-period FD Models (Excl. Outlier)

| | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| IH exposure | -0.161 | -0.132 | 0.264** | 0.126 | 0.309** | 0.226 | 0.657** | 0.708 | 0.328*** | 0.192 | 0.405*** | 0.208 |
| | (0.133) | (0.106) | (0.118) | (0.106) | (0.138) | (0.141) | (0.298) | (11.800) | (0.096) | (0.130) | (0.149) | (0.199) |
| Constant | 7.776*** | -23.421 | -9.937* | -23.334 | -11.047 | -41.775 | -15.810* | -22.598 | -12.656*** | -25.075 | -15.047** | -40.799 |
| | (2.988) | (28.018) | (5.903) | (22.179) | (6.857) | (32.772) | (9.107) | (164.182) | (4.606) | (21.839) | (6.714) | (36.589) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.14 | 0.53 | 0.14 | 0.45 | 0.14 | 0.42 | -0.56 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.44 | 0.13 | 0.42 |
| N | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: right bloc vote share**. In all models reported in this table, we drop Bnei Brak. Regression models weight observations by locality's adult population. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$



Table SI-9: Two-period FD Models (Excl. Outlier)

| | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| IH exposure | -0.081* | -0.039 | 0.255* | 0.101 | 0.091 | 0.155 | -0.205** | -0.099 | 0.333*** | 0.235 | 0.040 | 0.205 |
| | (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.152) | (0.131) | (0.101) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (10.474) | (0.112) | (0.155) | (0.124) | (0.154) |
| Constant | 5.109*** | -3.126 | -6.583 | -25.125 | -2.396 | -28.846 | 8.084*** | -3.418 | -9.480* | -28.796 | -0.611 | -31.616 |
| | (1.073) | (6.940) | (7.238) | (25.413) | (4.897) | (23.929) | (2.527) | (168.799) | (5.322) | (23.868) | (4.747) | (25.700) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.03 | 0.24 | 0.10 | 0.58 | 0.07 | 0.35 | -0.04 | 0.23 | 0.09 | 0.57 | 0.06 | 0.35 |
| N | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 | 930 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: Likud party vote share**. In all models reported in this table, we drop Bnei Brak. Regression models weight observations by locality's adult population. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Next, we explore whether our findings are sensitive to the measurement of the study's key independent variable, *Israel Hayom*. In the main text IH exposure is measured as the recorded exposure in the six months prior to elections. In Tables SI-10 (DV: right bloc vote share) and SI-11 (DV: Likud party vote share), we use instead the mean cumulative exposure to Israel Hayom in the entire period between elections. For example for the February 2013 elections, we use the mean exposure in 2009-2012 as our key explanatory variable. As Tables SI-10 and SI-11 show, our findings are robust to this definition of IH exposure.

Table SI-10: Two-period FD Models (Cumulative Exposure)

| | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| IH (cumulative) | 0.300** | 0.124 | 0.320*** | 0.179 | 0.451*** | 0.294** | 0.401*** | 0.253* |
| | (0.123) | (0.107) | (0.112) | (0.148) | (0.096) | (0.146) | (0.091) | (0.135) |
| Constant | -10.802** | -23.229 | -12.093** | -37.564 | -16.178*** | -25.159 | -15.162*** | -40.346 |
| | (5.122) | (21.256) | (5.333) | (30.667) | (4.049) | (20.803) | (4.006) | (31.190) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.12 | 0.47 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 0.10 | 0.45 | 0.18 | 0.44 |
| N | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: right bloc vote share**. In all models reported in this table, *Israel Hayom* is measured as the mean exposure in the entire period between elections (instead of the six months before elections as in the main text). Regression models weight observations by locality's adult population. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table SI-11: Two-period FD Models (Cumulative Exposure)

| | **2013** | | **2015** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| IH (cumulative) | 0.215 | 0.110 | 0.072 | 0.152 | 0.418*** | 0.345** | 0.072 | 0.257** |
| | (0.151) | (0.134) | (0.086) | (0.117) | (0.112) | (0.158) | (0.075) | (0.122) |
| Constant | -4.917 | -25.307 | -2.369 | -27.731 | -11.101*** | -27.865 | -2.360 | -31.740 |
| | (5.912) | (24.251) | (3.900) | (22.505) | (4.234) | (23.645) | (2.930) | (21.817) |
| Model | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.06 | 0.58 | 0.09 | 0.35 | 0.03 | 0.56 | 0.09 | 0.33 |
| N | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 |

*Note:* **Dependent variable: Likud party vote share**. In all models reported in this table, *Israel Hayom* is measured as the mean exposure in the entire period between elections (instead of the six months before elections as in the main text). Regression models weight observations by locality's adult population. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

## F.2 First-difference (change) models

Next, we explore robustness of our results to fitting first-difference models. We disaggregate the data into three between elections periods: (a) Pre-IH launch (mean 1996-2006 elections) to 2009

period; (b) 2009-2013 period; and (c) 2013-2015 period. We then estimate the following OLS regressions separately for each period:

$$\Delta y_{ip} = \tau \Delta IH_{ip} + y_{i,t-1} + \beta X_{ip} + \epsilon_{ip} \tag{3}$$

We report results in Table SI-12. Consistent with the two-period DiD models, we find that I=H had a significant positive effect in 2013 and 2015, but not in the Feb 2009 election (when 2009 election does not account for the limited circulation in 2008).

Table SI-12: First-difference Models (by Election Year)

| | **2009** | | **2013** | | **2015** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Δ IH exposure | -0.050 | -0.050 | 0.011 | 0.049* | 0.162** | 0.103** |
| | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.062) | (0.041) |
| Right bloc (lagged) | | 0.207*** | | -0.275*** | | 0.295*** |
| | | (0.051) | | (0.050) | | (0.054) |
| Constant | -28.999* | -28.999* | 1.711 | -5.714 | -13.757 | -5.837 |
| | (15.851) | (15.851) | (4.192) | (5.563) | (9.289) | (5.513) |
| Covariates | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Lag DV | no | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R2 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.52 | 0.31 | 0.46 |
| N | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 | 931 |

*Note:* **DV: right block vote share**. First-difference regressions, by election year. Regression models weight observations by locality's adult population. Standard errors are clustered at the media market. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

## F.3 Spatial Regressions and Spatial Autocorrelation

We now check for the presence of spatial patterns in the predictive performance of our models. If a model more consistently overpredicts or underpredicts for a group of observations sharing similar geographic characteristics, the residuals of the model are correlated, suggesting the presence of a confounder that the model is not taking into account. If the model consistently overpredicts or underpredicts among observations of neighboring spatial location, the residuals can be said to possess spatial autocorrelation, which indicates that there is some information embedded in the geographic pattern which is not being captured by the model. Spatial autocorrelation in residuals violates the assumptions of OLS model. A failure to capture this information in the model can thus lead to biased estimations.

Our units of observation for this exercise are the 25 media markets; contiguous geographies at which media exposure levels are measured. If the data contains spatially patterned information not captured by the model, the natural solution is to add to the model a variable that would contain this confounding information. Common ways of doing this include converting the OLS regression into a spatial lag or spatial error regression models.

### F.3.1 Overview of Process

In practice, testing and correcting for spatial autocorrelation follows a fairly standard procedure. The first step is to define what the spatial relationship between the observations is, i.e. which

observations are closer to one another. Second, the original OLS model is tested to see if spatial autocorrelation is present in the residuals, via the computation of a Moran's I statistic. If spatial autocorrelation is not present, the model is accepted as is, and none of the following steps are necessary. If spatial autocorrelation is present, then a spatial lag model can be fit and its residuals' tested for spatial autocorrelation. If spatial autocorrelation is not present in these residuals, then further steps may be disregarded and the analysis may proceed with a spatial lag model. If spatial autocorrelation persists in the residuals of the spatial lag model, then a spatial error model may be attempted, using the residuals of the original regression, and its results duly tested for spatial autocorrelation. Further methods may be attempted should this fail; however, the trial and error procedure is the same.

In this analysis, we define neighbors based on contiguity (shared border). Specifically, we use *Queen contiguity* (meaning that two media markets which touch at so much as a single point along their boundaries are considered neighbors), and contiguity is only measured to the first degree (there is no significance given to indirect "neighbor of neighbor" relationships). As can be seen in Figure SI-1, some media markets only have a single neighbor, while others have as many as 6.

With neighbors defined, we then proceed to test our initial OLS regressions for spatial autocorrelation. Our original OLS regressions are a set of regressions varying on dependent variables, inclusion of covariates, and election-year. Due to concerns about the suitability of this method to panel data, this analysis is only performed on the two-period DiD cross-sectional regressions, which are central to this study.

The test used for spatial autocorrelation is the Moran's I statistic, which indicates the level of spatially autocorrelation found in a set of values of varying geographical distance to one another. Moran's I tests the null hypothesis, i.e. that there is no spatial autocorrelation. The definition of geographical distance, i.e. the distance weighting matrix used, is the same as that used on computing spatial lagged values of treatment variables and of residuals for use in spatial lag and spatial error models. To test for spatial autocorrelation in the performance of a model, Moran's I is computed upon the residuals of the model using the distance weighting matrix. The p-value of the Moran's I statistic is of particular relevance. If the p-value is acceptably low, then there is a low chance of making a mistake if we reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation. If the p-value is not acceptably low, then the chance of making a mistake is too high, and we stick with the null hypothesis that there is no spatial autocorrelation. The acceptable limit for p-values is subjective and varies according to researcher preference.

Following convention, we further track the significance of the treatment variable throughout the different iterations of models. For each model, we also report the value of the coefficient of the treatment variable, i.e. the extent to which the dependent variable changes in response to a one-unit change in exposure to IH exposure. The significance of this coefficient is indicated through asterisks presented with the coefficients according to the index provided with each table.

### F.3.2 Spatial Analysis Results

Cross Sectional DiD regressions for years 2013 and 2015 are tested in Table SI-13. We find evidence of spatial autocorrelation in most base models (those including only the treatment variable, *Israel Hayom* exposure). While adding a spatial lag alone does little to remove spatial autocorrelation from the remaining models, adding the specified selection of covariates successfully account for spatial autocorrelation. Adding the spatial error component on top of covariates further decreases the probability of spatial autocorrelation in all models.

Table SI-14 presents the magnitude and significance of *Israel Hayom* exposure variable in each of the above regressions. IH exposure is more significant in predicting values for some years and

Table SI-13: P values of Moran's I for Regressions

| | Likud 2013 | Likud 2015 | Right bloc 2013 | Right bloc 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| With Covariates | 0.416 | 0.507 | 0.582 | 0.583 |
| Spatial Lag | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Spatial Lag with Covariates | 0.424 | 0.525 | 0.661 | 0.610 |
| Spatial Error with Covariates | 0.821 | 0.913 | 0.890 | 0.861 |

dependent variables; however, some common strands emerge. The direction of the effect of this variable is consistently positive, suggesting that vote share for both Likud and the parties included within right bloc always increases with exposure to *Israel Hayom*. In addition, with the exception several spatial lag regressions, the coefficient for the treatment variable is significant in all regression models.

Table SI-14: The Magnitude and Significance of Exposure to *Israel Hayom*

| | Likud 2013 | Likud 2015 | Right bloc 2013 | Right bloc 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | 0.225* | 0.252* | 0.037 | 0.298* |
| With Covariates | 0.366** | 0.298** | 0.223* | 0.331* |
| Spatial Lag | 0.237. | 0.25* | 0.083 | 0.289. |
| Spatial Lag with Covariates | 0.375** | 0.297** | 0.264* | 0.329* |
| Spatial Error with Covariates | 0.338** | 0.286** | 0.212* | 0.315* |

On the whole, the above analysis suggests that for years and dependent variables, spatial autocorrelation can be corrected for through the inclusion of covariates, or through the use of a spatial error model with covariates. For all models, correcting for spatial autocorrelation does not result in the coefficient of the treatment variable becoming insignificant.

# G Threats to Identification

We address the likely endogenous relationship between IH readership and political orientation using an instrumental variable approach. The use of the instrument generated results that are largely consistent with the regression analyses that use instead a direct measure of IH exposure. Below, we discuss and address two potential concerns with our instrumental variable design.

First, a key concern with the use of any instrument is a possible violation of the exclusion restriction assumption. Notably, our study's instrument—exposure to *Yediot* in the period before the launch of IH—is positively correlated with the level of *Yediot*'s readership in subsequent years. The concern is that if *Yediot* shifted its news coverage rightwards during the years we analyze, perhaps due to the competition posed by IH, then our instrument may be capturing the direct effect of *Yediot's* coverage rather than that of IH.

Reassuringly, we do not find evidence that *Yediot* shifted it's coverage to the right following the launch of IH. As shown above in Figure 4 (left panel), starting in 2009, while the front pages of IH began displaying significantly higher levels of right-leaning slant, the content of *Yediot* exhibited no such pattern. Furthermore, we find a similar flat trend in *Yediot*'s reporting over time when analyzing the sentiment of the coverage of Netanyahu and the Likud party rather than the right bloc as a whole. That we do not find evidence of rightward shift in *Yediot*'s coverage in response to IH's rise reduces concerns of violation of the exclusion restriction.

Nonetheless, we test formally how big needs to be (an hypothetical) violation of the exclusion restriction for the effect of IH on voting to be no different than zero. Using **?** 'union of confidence interval' sensitivity analysis method, we relax the exclusion restriction assumption and show that only when the size of the direct effect of *Yediot* on the right bloc's vote share is about 2/3 of the effect of IH, our main results are no longer significant (SI, Figure SI-14). We believe that an effect size this large is highly unlikely given the difference between IH's right slant and that of its main competitor.

Figure SI-14: Sensitivity Analysis




*Note:* Figure explores the robustness of the instrumental variables analysis reported in the main text in Table 5. Here we use one of the methods suggested by Conley et al. (2012): the union of confidence intervals. The basic idea of Conley et al. (2012) is to relax the exclusion restriction assumption and ask how big needs to be the direct effect of the instrument (*Yediot* exposure in 2007) on the DV (right bloc or Likud vote share), for us to conclude that the endogenous variable (IH) has no effect.

Second, our instrument may simply be capturing the level of attentiveness to the news. Consider the possibility that real-world events during the period in question were more compatible with a right-wing world view—for example, due to further deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations or increased regional instability following the Arab Spring. In this case, higher exposure to the news would likely lead to a larger shift in support for the right, irrespective of the specific media outlet which people used to consume news.

To address this possibility, we examine whether an alternative instrument for IH readership, one which captures news attentiveness (rather than likelihood of exposure to IH) produces similar results. Instead of relying solely on *Yediot* readership, in the alternative instrument we include exposure to all national dailies: *Maariv, Haaretz, Makor Rishon, Calacalist, Globes*, and *Jerusalem Post*. Using this alternative instrument, we do not find a significant IH effect on right bloc voting (Table SI-15). This suggests that our main instrument is not simply capturing attentiveness to the news.

Our difference-in-difference estimation must assume parallel trends; namely, that IH readership exposure is unrelated to a long-term rightward trend in the population. Above we have shown graphical evidence of the parallel trend assumption (Figure SI-11). Addressing more formally possible violation of the parallel trend assumption, we run two simple Placebo tests: assigning

Table SI-15: Does IH simply Capture Attentiveness?

| | **Right bloc** | | **Likud** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| IH exposure | -0.602 | -1.563 | -0.140 | -1.085 |
| | (0.682) | (1.089) | (0.391) | (0.710) |
| Constant | 17.127 | 4.276 | 12.513 | 3.743 |
| | (19.877) | (32.737) | (12.195) | (20.992) |
| Base DV | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Covariates | no | yes | no | yes |
| R2 | 0.61 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.24 |
| N | 3724 | 3724 | 3724 | 3724 |

*Note:* DV: right bloc vote share. The regressions models reported herein are pooled IV, using the proxy of attentiveness instead of the IV used in the paper ( *Yediot 2007* readership)

first IH exposure in the six months before the 2009 election to the equivalent period before the 2006 elections (1-lag), and then repeating the process with the 2013 level of exposure (2-lag). As Table SI-16 makes clear, in both cases, IH exposure in 2009 and 2013 are not positively correlated with right-bloc vote in 2006, suggesting the long-term right shift trend is not stronger in locales with higher levels of IH exposure.

Table SI-16: Placebo Test

| | **Right Bloc** | | **Likud** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| IH exposure (1-lag) | -0.247*** | | -0.111 | |
| | (0.078) | | (0.070) | |
| IH exposure (2-lag) | | 0.060 | | -0.080*** |
| | | (0.063) | | (0.031) |
| Constant | 35.522*** | 32.968*** | 21.878*** | 22.561*** |
| | (0.996) | (1.737) | (0.494) | (0.707) |
| lag structure | 1-year | 2-years | 1-year | 2-years |
| R2 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| N | 3724 | 3724 | 3724 | 3724 |

*Note:* Using only elections in the period prior to IH's launch (1996, 1999, 2003 and 2006), we report the results of two-way fixed effects models as in equation 1. In columns 1-2 the DV is right bloc vote share and in columns 3-4 the DV is the Likud vote share. In columns 1 and 3, we assign prior to the 2006 election, IH exposure level in 2009, and in columns 2 and 4, we assign prior to 2006 election the 2013 exposure level.

Finally, to be valid, the instrument should be exogenous, and ideally – random conditional on observables. In Figure SI-15 we show the relationship between *Yediot* readership in the first half of 2007 and the set of pre-IH covariates.

Figure SI-15: Correlates of Yediot Readership at the Locality Level




DV: Yediot readership in the first half of 2007. All input variables have been standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation unity. Thus the coefficient represent the association between a one standard deviation increase in each input covariate on locality's *Yediot* readership in percentage points, holding all other covariates at their mean value. We use an OLS model with adult population weights and standard errors that are clustered at the media market level.

# H Implied Persuasion Rate

We employ the method developed by **?** for calculating the media outlet's persuasion effect (see **?** for a more detailed explanation). The method implies the the following equation:

$$f = 100 * (IH - Effect/MeanExposure) * (1/NonRightBlock) \quad (4)$$

To obtain the persuasion rate for the three elections we study, we use the coefficient of the IH effect obtained in the most demanding pooled regression (Table 2, Panel A column 3, b=0.013). In addition, we use the mean rates reported in the descriptive statistics table for IH exposure (0.245), and share of voters not of the right bloc (0.673). Inserting these figures in the equation yields an implied persuasion rate of 0.079%. This magnitude is comparable to the median effect size established in recent studies of media effects on voting. For example, citedellavigna2010persuasion review the findings from 13 recent studies of media effects, and find an average persuasion rate of 10.1% and a median rate of 11.5%. Over the three elections periods we analyze, IH's average persuasion rate falls just shy of these figures.

# I Mechanism

In this section, we report results for additional analysis that pertain to two possible mechanisms accounting for the positive effect of IH exposure on right bloc vote share: (a) mobilization, and (b) persuasion.

## I.1 Mobilization mechanism: conditional IH effect on turnout

Table SI-17: DV: Turnout

| | **Left localities** | | **Centerist localities** | | **Right localities** | | **All localities** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| IH exposure | -0.009 | -0.010 | -0.033 | 0.018 | 0.015 | 0.008 | -0.021 | 0.011 |
| | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.019) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 75.984*** | 71.284*** | 68.083*** | 66.242*** | 65.939*** | 41.322** | 67.878*** | 69.644*** |
| | (1.351) | (15.371) | (1.141) | (14.702) | (1.413) | (19.612) | (1.019) | (15.781) |
| Sample | Left | Left | Center | Center | Right | Right | Pooled | Pooled |
| Covariates | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| R2 | 0.89 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.97 |
| N | 1244 | 1244 | 1240 | 1240 | 1240 | 1240 | 3724 | 3724 |

*Note:* DV: turnout at the locality level. All models herein are two-way fixed effects (equation 1). $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

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## I.2 Persuasion: The Israel National Election Studies (INES)

The main goal of the Israel National Election Studies (INES) project is to investigate voting patterns, public opinion, and political participation in Israel. Starting in 1969, INES has been conducting pre-election surveys based using national representatives samples. Surveys, which are conducted

just prior to Knesset elections, use a different sample across rounds. Key to our needs, INES surveys address a wide range of substantive themes including partisanship; left vs. right positions; and perceptions and evaluations of the major parties and candidates.

Table SI-18: **INES: Evaluation of Netanyahu**

| | **Index** | **Support 1-10** | **Leader** | **Trustworthy** | **Patriotic** | **Deal maker** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| IH exposure | -0.062** | -0.040 | -0.034 | -0.018** | -0.024 | -0.033* |
| | (0.028) | (0.087) | (0.022) | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.017) |
| Post | 0.054 | 1.247*** | 0.045** | 0.005 | -0.000 | 0.007 |
| | (0.035) | (0.087) | (0.021) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.027) |
| IH × Post | 0.093** | 0.183** | 0.064*** | 0.017 | 0.055*** | 0.074** |
| | (0.043) | (0.084) | (0.021) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.030) |
| Constant | -0.359*** | 3.775*** | 0.552*** | 0.071* | 0.085 | 0.439*** |
| | (0.127) | (0.410) | (0.042) | (0.036) | (0.072) | (0.056) |
| R2 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| N | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 |

*Notes*: **Evaluation of Netanyahu**. Difference-in-difference regressions. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors at the media market area level and include weights proportional to the number of survey respondents from each Israeli locality. *Support 1-10* (column 2) capture respondents general rating of Binyamin Netanyahu on a 10 points scale, whereby higher values indicate a better score; *Leader*, *Trustworthy*, *Patriotic*, *Deal maker* capture leadership qualities that were presented to respondents along a list of Israeli politicians. These variables are binary, receiving a value of 1 when the respondent indicated Netanyahu to be the leader with the highest level of that quality, and zero otherwise. Finally, *index* is a weighted summary index of the above variables with mean zero and standard deviation equals one. p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table SI-19: **INES: Right-left Position and Attitudes**

| | **Index** | **Peace** | **Goals** | **Violence** | **Two-States** | **Talks** | **Settlements** | **Right scale** | **Gov Intervention** | **Socialism** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| IH exposure | -0.153** | -0.024 | -0.026 | -0.051 | -0.028 | -0.106*** | -0.101* | -0.225 | 0.014 | 0.007 |
| | (0.069) | (0.023) | (0.036) | (0.038) | (0.060) | (0.032) | (0.054) | (0.196) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| Post | -0.126* | 0.029 | 0.105** | -0.160*** | 0.044 | -0.058* | -0.344*** | 0.407** | 0.513*** | 0.086*** |
| | (0.064) | (0.031) | (0.039) | (0.040) | (0.060) | (0.030) | (0.057) | (0.152) | (0.016) | (0.017) |
| IH × Post | 0.196** | 0.056** | 0.039 | -0.006 | 0.064 | 0.135*** | 0.182*** | 0.440* | 0.004 | -0.003 |
| | (0.073) | (0.024) | (0.036) | (0.046) | (0.059) | (0.030) | (0.062) | (0.223) | (0.019) | (0.015) |
| Constant | -0.301* | 0.642*** | 0.653*** | 3.291*** | 2.283*** | 1.814*** | 2.437*** | 4.527*** | 0.136* | 0.665*** |
| | (0.164) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.170) | (0.116) | (0.081) | (0.126) | (0.295) | (0.066) | (0.048) |
| R2 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 0.06 |
| N | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2736 | 2588 |

*Notes*: **Right Attitudes** (higher values indicate a position that is more Hawkish / right). Difference-in-difference regressions. In all models, we cluster standard errors at the media-market area level and include weights proportional to the number of survey respondents from each Israeli locality. *Peace* (column 2) is a binary variable indicating that the respondent believes that peace with Palestinians is not possible; *Goals* indicates a belief that Palestinians' ultimate goal is to destroy the state of Israel; *Violence* is a four point scale measuring the extent to which respondents are concerned with Arab violence; *Two-States* is a four point scale measuring opposing to a Two-States solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; *Talks* is a four point scale measuring opposing to resuming peace talks with the Palestinian Authority; *Settlements* is a four point scale measuring level of disagreement to return territories in the West Bank as part of a peace deal; *Right scale* measures right-left self placement on a 10 points scale. *Index* is a weighted summary index of the above variables. Importantly, the outcomes in columns 9 (support for increased government involvement in the economy) and column 10 (support social vs. market based solutions) are placebo outcomes that are not part of the Hawkish positions index.
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01