






### **Specific Cases of Alignment** Size of Primitive Data Type: ■ 1 byte (e.g., char) • no restrictions on address ■ 2 bytes (e.g., short) lowest 1 bit of address must be 0, ■ 4 bytes (e.g., int, float, char \*, etc.) • lowest 2 bits of address must be 002 ■ 8 bytes (e.g., double) • Windows (and most other OS's & instruction sets): » lowest 3 bits of address must be 0002 » lowest 2 bits of address must be 00, » i.e., treated the same as a 4-byte primitive data type ■ 12 bytes (long double) » lowest 2 bits of address must be 002 » i.e., treated the same as a 4-byte primitive data type - 19 -




































# **Byte Ordering on Alpha**

#### Little Endian



#### **Output on Alpha:**

Characters 0-7 == [0xf0,0xf1,0xf2,0xf3,0xf4,0xf5,0xf6,0xf7]
Shorts 0-3 == [0xf1f0,0xf3f2,0xf5f4,0xf7f6]
Ints 0-1 == [0xf3f2f1f0,0xf7f6f5f4]
Long 0 == [0xf7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0]

## Internet Worm and IM War

#### November, 1988

- Internet Worm attacks thousands of Internet hosts.
- How did it happen?

#### July, 1999

- 35 -

- 33 -

- Microsoft launches MSN Messenger (instant messaging system).
- Messenger clients can access popular AOL Instant Messaging Service (AIM) servers



# **Summary**

#### Arrays in C

- Contiguous allocation of memory
- Pointer to first element
- No bounds checking

#### **Compiler Optimizations**

- Compiler often turns array code into pointer code (zd2int)
- Uses addressing modes to scale array indices
- Lots of tricks to improve array indexing in loops

#### Structures

- Allocate bytes in order declared
- Pad in middle and at end to satisfy alignment

#### **Unions**

- Overlay declarations
- -34- Way to circumvent type system

# Internet Worm and IM War (cont.)

#### August 1999

- Mysteriously, Messenger clients can no longer access AIM servers.
- Microsoft and AOL begin the IM war:
  - AOL changes server to disallow Messenger clients
  - Microsoft makes changes to clients to defeat AOL changes.
  - At least 13 such skirmishes.
- How did it happen?

# The Internet Worm and AOL/Microsoft War were both based on *stack buffer overflow* exploits!

- many Unix functions do not check argument sizes.
- allows target buffers to overflow.

- 36 -

### **String Library Code** ■ Implementation of Unix function gets . No way to specify limit on number of characters to read /\* Get string from stdin \*/ char \*gets(char \*dest) int c = getc(); char \*p = dest; while (c != EOF && c != '\n') $\{$ \*p++ = c;c = getc(); $*p = ' \ 0';$ return dest; Similar problems with other Unix functions • strcpy: Copies string of arbitrary length • scanf, fscanf, sscanf, when given %s conversion specification - 37 -


```
Buffer Overflow Executions


unix>./bufdemo
Type a string:123
123


unix>./bufdemo
Type a string:12345
Segmentation Fault


unix>./bufdemo
Type a string:12345678
Segmentation Fault
```


```
Buffer Overflow Stack
                     /* Echo Line */
   Stack
   Frame
                     void echo()
  for main
                         char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
 Return Address
                         gets(buf);
                         puts(buf);
 Saved %ebp
               %ebp
            buf
   Stack
             echo:
   Frame
                                    # Save %ebp on stack
  for echo
                 pushl %ebp
                 movl %esp, %ebp
                subl $20,%esp
                                    # Allocate space on stack
                pushl %ebx
                                    # Save %ebx
                 addl $-12,%esp
                                    # Allocate space on stack
                leal -4(%ebp),%ebx # Compute buf as %ebp-4
                pushl %ebx
                                    # Push buf on stack
                call gets
                                    # Call gets
- 40 -
```











# **Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows**

Buffer overflow bugs allow remote machines to execute arbitrary code on victim machines.

#### Internet worm

- Early versions of the finger server (fingerd) used gets() to read the argument sent by the client:
  - finger droh@cs.cmu.edu
- Worm attacked fingerd server by sending phony argument:
  - finger "exploit-code padding new-return-address"
  - exploit code: executed a root shell on the victim machine with a direct TCP connection to the attacker.

- 46 -

# **Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows**

Buffer overflow bugs allow remote machines to execute arbitrary code on victim machines.

#### IM Wai

- AOL exploited existing buffer overflow bug in AIM clients
- exploit code: returned 4-byte signature (the bytes at some location in the AIM client) to server.
- When Microsoft changed code to match signature, AOL changed signature location.

**- 47 -**

### **Disclaimer**

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- 48 -