

# 1 Original Mathematical Equations

Based on the excerpts from the original paper, below is a list of each mathematical equation, definition, or formula explicitly mentioned in the text and supplements describing the simulation framework.

## 1.1 Definitions and Calculated Probabilities

These formulas define the probabilities of success for individual and social learning, as well as equilibrium population fitness in the baseline model:

Description	Equation
Individual Learning Success Probability (Probability of becoming adapted when individual learning)	$\mathbf{p}_i^{\text{OK}} := (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{c}_I)\mathbf{z}_i$
Calculated Value (Using $c_I = 0.05$ and $z_i = 0.66$ )	$0.95 \times 0.66 = 0.627$
Baseline Equilibrium Fitness (Long-run equilibrium fitness when only individual learners exist)	$\mathbf{E}[\mathbf{q}^{\text{OK}}] = \mathbf{p}_i^{\text{OK}}\mathbf{s}_{\text{OK}}$
Social Learning Success Probability (Conditional probability of success when learning from an adapted agent, assuming no environment change $u$ )	$p_s^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} := P(\text{unchanged})P(\text{copied successfully}) = (1 - u) \times 1 = 0.99$
Social Learning Adaptation Probability (Probability of becoming adapted when social learning)	$\mathbf{p}_s^{\text{OK}} := (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{c}_S)\mathbf{q}^{\text{OK}}\mathbf{p}_s^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}}$
AI Social Learning Adaptation Probability (The AI's adaptation level is set to the mean adaptation status of the population)	$\mathbf{p}_{\text{AI}}^{\text{OK}} := \mathbf{q}^{\text{OK}}$
Critical Social Learning Success Probability (When an agent decides to switch to individual learning if social learning fails)	$\mathbf{p}_{\text{cs}}^{\text{OK}} = \mathbf{1} - (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_s^{\text{OK}})(\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{p}_i^{\text{OK}})$
AI Individual Learning Success Probability (The probability that the AI successfully learns individually, where $c_{\lambda_i}$ is the cost and $z_{\text{AI}}$ is the success rate)	$\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{x} \rightarrow \text{OK}}^{\text{AI}} := (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{c}_{\lambda_i})\mathbf{z}_{\text{AI}}$

Table 1: Summary of Learning Success Probabilities and Fitness Equations.

## 1.2 Numbered Equations from the Main Text and Supplement

The paper includes formal derivations of the expected fitness measures, presented both in the main body (Equations 1, 2, 3) and reiterated/derived in the supplement (Equations 4, 5).

### 1.2.1 Expected Mean Fitness Equations (Original Rogers' Paradox)

These equations describe the expected fitness measures for a network containing only individual and social learners.

- **Equation (1) / Equation (4): Expected mean fitness across all agents** → Presented as Equation (1) in Section 2.1 and derived as Equation (4) in Supplement 6

$$E[q^{\text{OK}}] = \frac{p_i^{\text{OK}} s_{\text{OK}} E[q_i]}{1 - (1 - c_S)p^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} s s_{\text{OK}} E[1 - q_i]} \quad (1, 4)$$

– Intermediate steps:

$$\begin{aligned} E[q^{\text{OK}}] &= p_i^{\text{OK}} s_{\text{OK}} E[q_i] + E[p_s^{\text{OK}}] s_{\text{OK}} E[q_s] \\ &= p_i^{\text{OK}} s_{\text{OK}} E[q_i] + (1 - c_S)p^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} s s_{\text{OK}} E[q^{\text{OK}}] E[1 - q_i] \end{aligned}$$

- **Equation (2) / Equation (5): Expected mean fitness of just social learners** → Presented as Equation (2) in Section 2.1 and derived as Equation (5) in Supplement 6

$$E[q_s^{\text{OK}}] = \frac{(1 - c_S)p^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} s s_{\text{OK}} p_i^{\text{OK}} s_{\text{OK}} E[q_i]}{1 - (1 - c_S)p^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} s s_{\text{OK}} E[1 - q_i]} \quad (2, 5)$$

– Intermediate steps:

$$\begin{aligned} E[q_s^{\text{OK}}] &= E[p_s^{\text{OK}}] s_{\text{OK}} \\ &= (1 - c_S)p^{\text{OK} \rightarrow \text{OK}} s s_{\text{OK}} E[q^{\text{OK}}] \end{aligned}$$

### 1.2.2 Expected Mean Fitness Equation (AI Rogers' Paradox)

This equation describes the expected mean fitness when individual learners, social learners (from humans), and AI social learners are present:

$$E[q^{OK}] = p_i^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_i] + E[p_s^{OK}] s_{OK} E[q_s] + E[p_{AI}^{OK}] s_{OK} E[q_{AI}] \quad (3)$$

### 1.3 Equations for Model-Centric Strategies

These formulas define the mechanics of how the AI system updates its knowledge and how individual learning is impacted by negative feedback.

#### 1.3.1 AI Update Schedule Probabilities

(Presented in Section 3.2.1, describing the expected rate of AI engaging in social learning where  $c_{\lambda s}$  is the cost of updating socially.)

$$p_{x \rightarrow q^{OK}}^{AI} := 1 - c_{\lambda s}$$

$$p_{x \rightarrow x}^{AI} := c_{\lambda s}$$

#### 1.3.2 AI Adaptation Level Update (Social Learning Cadence)

Describes the AI's adaptation level in the next timestep  $t + 1$ :

$$p_{AI}^{OK, (t+1)} = 1 - (1 - p_{x \rightarrow q^{OK}}^{AI} q^{OK}) (1 - p_{AI}^{OK, t} p_{x \rightarrow x}^{AI} (1 - u))$$

### 1.4 Equations for Negative Feedback (Deskilling)

These equations define the individual learning penalty ( $\kappa$ ) applied to human agents who learn socially from the AI system (Section 4):

$$\kappa_j^0 = 1$$

$$\kappa_j^{t+1} = 0.9 \kappa_j^t$$

$$p_{ij}^{OK} = (1 - c_i) z_i \kappa_j$$

### 1.5 Step-by-Step Mathematical Explanations

The equations presented in the original paper define the core probabilities, fitness measures, and strategic rules governing agent behavior within the dynamic simulation environment. Below is a step-by-step explanation of each mathematical equation, formula, and definition.

Equation	Meaning and Step-by-Step Explanation
<b>1. Individual Learning and Baseline Adaptation</b>	
$p_i^{OK} := (1 - c_I) z_i$	<b>Individual Learning Success Probability:</b> Defines the probability ( $p_i^{OK}$ ) that an agent becomes adapted when attempting individual learning. $c_I$ is the cost of individual learning (e.g., $c_I = 0.05$ ). $(1 - c_I)$ represents the likelihood of a successful attempt, and $z_i$ is the intrinsic success rate (e.g., $z_i = 0.66$ ). The product gives the overall adaptation probability via IL.
$E[q^{OK}] = p_i^{OK} s_{OK}$	<b>Baseline Equilibrium Fitness:</b> Gives the long-run expected mean fitness ( $E[q^{OK}]$ ) of a pure individual-learning population. It is the product of individual learning success ( $p_i^{OK}$ ) and the survival probability for adapted agents ( $s_{OK}$ ), e.g., $s_{OK} = 0.93$ .
$0.95 \times 0.66 = 0.627$	<b>Calculated Value for <math>p_i^{OK}</math>:</b> Numerical result using $c_I = 0.05$ and $z_i = 0.66$ , showing that the individual learning success probability equals 0.627.

### 2. Social Learning Probabilities

$$p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK} := P(\text{unchanged})P(\text{copied successfully}) = (1 - u) \times 1 = 0.99$$

$$p_s^{OK} := (1 - c_s)q^{OK}p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK}$$

$$p_{AI}^{OK} := q^{OK}$$

**Social Learning Success Probability (Conditional):** Probability of success when learning from an already adapted agent. Requires (1) the environment remains unchanged ( $1 - u$ , where  $u = 0.01$ ), and (2) successful copying (1).

**Social Learning Adaptation Probability (Human-Human):** Defines the probability of becoming adapted through social learning.  $c_s$  is the cost (often 0),  $q^{OK}$  is the fraction of adapted agents, and  $p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK}$  is the conditional copying success.

**AI Social Learning Adaptation Probability:** The AI's adaptation level equals the mean adaptation status of the population from the previous timestep ( $q^{OK}$ ).

### 3. Expected Mean Fitness Equations (Rogers' Paradox Derivations)

$$E[q^{OK}] = \frac{p_i^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_i]}{1 - (1 - c_s) p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK} s_{OK} E[1 - q_i]}$$

$$E[q_s^{OK}] = \frac{(1 - c_s) p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK} s_{OK} p_i^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_i]}{1 - (1 - c_s) p_s^{OK \rightarrow OK} s_{OK} E[1 - q_i]}$$

$$E[q^{OK}] = p_i^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_i] + E[p_s^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_s]] + E[p_{AI}^{OK} s_{OK} E[q_{AI}]]$$

**Expected Mean Fitness (Baseline Rogers' Paradox):** Computes the expected mean fitness  $E[q^{OK}]$  when both individual and social learners exist. The numerator captures success of individual learning; the denominator reflects the dependency of social learners on individual learners generating new knowledge.

**Expected Mean Fitness of Social Learners:** Shows that social learners' fitness depends on individual learners' success. It equals  $E[q^{OK}]$  multiplied by the probability of social learning success.

**Mean Population Fitness (AI Rogers' Paradox):** The total expected fitness in equilibrium across individual, human-social, and AI-social learners, each weighted by their proportion and respective success rates.

### 4. Human-Centric Strategy: Critical Social Learning

$$p_{cs}^{OK} = 1 - (1 - p_s^{OK})(1 - p_i^{OK})$$

**Critical Social Learning Success Probability:** Defines the success probability for agents who first attempt social learning and switch to individual learning if social learning fails. Subtracts the joint failure probability of both methods from 1.

### 5. Model-Centric Strategies: AI Update Schedule and Individual Learning

$$p_{x \rightarrow q^{OK}}^{AI} := 1 - c_{\lambda s}$$

$$p_{x \rightarrow x}^{AI} := c_{\lambda s}$$

$$p_{AI}^{OK, (t+1)} = 1 - (1 - p_{x \rightarrow q^{OK}}^{AI} q^{OK})(1 - p_{AI}^{OK, t} p_{x \rightarrow x}^{AI} (1 - u))$$

$$p_{x \rightarrow OK}^{AI} := (1 - c_{\lambda i})z_{AI}$$

**AI Social Update Probability:** Probability that the AI successfully updates its adaptation state through social learning, where  $c_{\lambda s}$  is the associated cost.

**AI Self-Maintenance Probability:** Probability that the AI fails to update socially (retains its current state  $x$ ) due to cost  $c_{\lambda s}$ .

**AI Adaptation Level Update (Social Learning Cadence):** Computes the AI's adaptation at timestep  $t + 1$  based on its previous success, update probabilities, and environmental change rate  $u$ . The equation subtracts the total failure probability from 1.

**AI Individual Learning Success Probability:** Defines the probability of successful adaptation when the AI performs individual learning, with cost  $c_{\lambda i}$  and intrinsic success rate  $z_{AI}$ .

### 6. Negative Feedback Environment Model (Deskilling)

$$\kappa_j^0 = 1$$

$$\kappa_j^{t+1} = 0.9\kappa_j^t$$

$$p_{ij}^{OK} = (1 - c_i)z_i\kappa_j$$

**Initial Penalty Value:** Sets the initial value of the learning penalty ( $\kappa$ ) for any agent  $j$  to 1, meaning no penalty at the start.

**Penalty Update Rule:** After each instance of social learning from the AI, the agent's  $\kappa_j$  value is multiplied by 0.9, modeling skill degradation over time.

**Individual Learning Success Probability with Penalty:** Modifies the individual learning success probability by incorporating  $\kappa_j$ , showing that reliance on AI reduces future individual learning capability.

## 2 Updated Mathematical Definitions and Simulation Framework

The project proposal outlines significant architectural changes to the simulation environment, replacing the simple binary state with a complex, multi-state “Knowledge Map” or “Tech Tree.” Because of this shift, the original algebraic equations (which derived equilibrium fitness based on a binary adapted/unadapted state) are conceptually replaced by new metrics and simulation rules.

Below is a full list of updated mathematical definitions, equations, and simulation rules that fit the proposed project framework.

### 2.1 New Agent State and Fitness Definitions

The fundamental state representation of an agent is changed from a single binary value (adapted or not adapted,  $OK$  or  $\neg OK$ ) to a multi-dimensional state vector.

- **Agent State Vector:** The agent’s adapted status is replaced by a vector corresponding to discovered nodes on a “tech tree.” The adaptation status is thus represented by an  $n$ -dimensional vector:

$$\mathbf{s}_j(t) = [x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n]$$

where  $x_i = 1$  if node  $i$  is discovered by agent  $j$ , and 0 otherwise.

- **Survival Mapping ( $s$ ):** The original survival probability ( $s_{OK}$ ) is replaced by a function mapping the agent’s current position on the Knowledge Map to a survival probability:

$$s(\mathbf{s}_j) : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

- Different nodes (states) correspond to varying survival probabilities, defining a fitness landscape with local and global optima.

### 2.2 New Learning Mechanisms and Cost Structure

The original cost structure ( $c_I$  and  $c_S$ ) remains, but the result of successful learning is movement along the Knowledge Map rather than reaching a single “OK” state.

- **Individual Learning (IL):** Individual learning remains costly and risky.
  - Success corresponds to progression along the same branch of the Knowledge Map (incremental progress).
  - \* The success probability follows the original conceptual form:

$$p_i = (1 - c_I)z_i$$

- **Social Learning (SL):** Social learning is inexpensive ( $c_S \approx 0$ ).
  - Success corresponds to movement across branches in the Knowledge Map  $\rightarrow$  cross-pollination of knowledge from another agent.
- **AI Social Learning (AI SL):** The AI’s adaptation level is defined as the modal or mean population state:

$$\mathbf{s}_{AI}(t) = \text{mode}(\mathbf{s}_1(t), \dots, \mathbf{s}_N(t))$$

replacing the previous scalar definition  $p_{AI}^{OK} := q^{OK}$ .

### 2.3 Replacement for Expected Mean Fitness $E[q^{OK}]$

The original algebraic derivations (Equations 1–5) are invalid in an  $n$ -dimensional state environment. They are replaced by simulation-derived metrics measuring mastery, innovation, and convergence.

- **Mastery / Fitness:** *Mastery Score (Population Fitness)* — the collective understanding level, representing the mean proportion of discovered nodes across all agents:

$$\text{Mastery}(t) = \frac{1}{Nn} \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ij}(t)$$

- **Innovation / Discovery:** *Discovery Rate* — the frequency with which agents reach previously undiscovered nodes, particularly in high-risk branches:

$$D(t) = \frac{\# \text{ of new nodes discovered at } t}{n}$$

- **Speed / Convergence:** *Convergence Rate* ( $T_c$ ) — number of iterations required for the Mastery Score to stabilize or reach a critical competence threshold  $\theta$ :

$$T_c = \min\{t \mid \text{Mastery}(t) \geq \theta\}$$

- **Threshold Definition:**

$$\theta \in (0, 1)$$

defines the population's target competence level used to calculate  $T_c$ .

## 2.4 Strategy Equations

While most algebraic fitness equations are replaced by simulation metrics, key strategy rules are retained to test learning and AI update dynamics.

$$\mathbf{p}_{\text{cs}}^{\text{OK}} = 1 - (1 - p_s^{\text{OK}})(1 - p_i^{\text{OK}}) \quad (\text{Critical Social Learning Success}) \quad (1)$$

$$\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{x} \rightarrow \mathbf{q}}^{\text{AI}} = 1 - c_{\lambda s} \quad (\text{AI Social Update Probability}) \quad (2)$$

$$\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{x} \rightarrow \text{OK}}^{\text{AI}} = (1 - c_{\lambda i})z_{AI} \quad (\text{AI Individual Learning Success}) \quad (3)$$

$$\mathbf{p}_{\text{AI}}^{\text{OK},(t+1)} = 1 - (1 - p_{x \rightarrow q}^{\text{AI}} q^{\text{OK}})(1 - p_{AI}^{\text{OK},t} p_{x \rightarrow x}^{\text{AI}}(1 - u)) \quad (\text{AI Adaptation Update Rule}) \quad (4)$$

These equations are used to explore trade-offs between update frequency, discovery rate, and collective mastery.

## 2.5 Deskillling / Negative Feedback Mechanism

The explicit penalty factor  $\kappa$  from the original model is not directly included. Instead, negative feedback is implemented structurally through agent behavior on the Knowledge Map.

- **Original Mechanism:**

– Deskillling through  $\kappa$ :

$$p_{ij}^{\text{OK}} = (1 - c_i)z_i \kappa_j$$

- **Proposed Analogy:**

– Incentive-based loss of innovation:

- \* Over-reliance on the AI (which converges toward the average or modal state) pushes the population toward low-risk, low-reward branches, reducing incentive for high-risk exploration and thereby simulating a deskillling effect.

# 3 Formal Definitions and Equations

## 3.1 Agent State and Fitness Definitions

The fundamental definitions for agents and fitness are formalized as follows:

### 3.1.1 Agent State Vector

Each agent  $j$ 's knowledge is defined by a state vector  $K_j(t) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ .

### 3.1.2 General Fitness Function

Survival probability is defined as a function of the agent's knowledge state:

$$P(\text{survival} \mid K_j(t)) = V(K_j). \quad (5)$$

### 3.1.3 Low-Risk Fitness Landscape

Defined by linear growth, modeling a local optimum:

$$V_{\text{Low-Risk}}(d) = s_0 + \delta \cdot d \quad (6)$$

where  $d$  is the depth along the branch.

### 3.1.4 High-Risk Fitness Landscape (Simplified)

Defined using a sigmoid function for stable, interpretable dynamics (slow initial growth, eventual saturation at  $V_{\max}$ ):

$$V_{\text{High-Risk}}(d) = \frac{V_{\max}}{1 + e^{-\gamma(d-d_0)}}. \quad (7)$$

The original design used a logarithmic function,  $V_{\text{High-Risk}}(d) = s_0 + \beta \cdot \log(1 + d)$ .

## 3.2 Learning Rules

The learning rules define how agents update their state vector  $K_j(t)$ .

### 3.2.1 Incremental Individual Learning (IL)

Advances the agent one step along its current branch ( $e_i$ ):

$$K_j(t+1) = K_j(t) + e_i. \quad (8)$$

### 3.2.2 Exploratory Individual Learning (IL)

Allows agents to switch branches with probability  $p_e$  at any depth, resetting progress in the new branch:

$$K_j(t+1) = \begin{cases} \text{reset to High-Risk node 0,} & \text{if exploration occurs,} \\ K_j(t) + e_i, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

### 3.2.3 Social Learning (SL) Bias

Agents copy a peer's knowledge state (subgraph) with a prestige/success bias, originally formalized using exponential weighting on fitness:

$$P(\text{copy } K_{\text{peer}}) \propto e^{\alpha \cdot V(K_{\text{peer}})}. \quad (10)$$

The proposal suggests simplifying this to a rank-based rule.

### 3.2.4 AI Learning (AI)

The AI aggregates population states. The original plan was to compute the modal state; a simplified implementation suggests reinforcing the dominant branch by comparing mean depths ( $\bar{d}_{\text{Low}}$  vs.  $\bar{d}_{\text{High}}$ ):

$$K_{AI}(t) = \text{mode}\{K_1(t), K_2(t), \dots, K_N(t)\}. \quad (11)$$

## 3.3 Simulation Metrics

The new metrics (which replace the original algebraic fitness derivations) are formalized as follows:

### 3.3.1 Mastery Score ( $Q_M$ )

The mean population fitness, replacing  $E[q^{OK}]$ :

$$Q_M(t) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N V(K_j(t)). \quad (12)$$

### 3.3.2 Convergence Time ( $T_c$ )

The time required for the Mastery Score to exceed a threshold ( $\theta$ ):

$$T_c = \min\{t : Q_M(t) \geq \theta\}. \quad (13)$$

### 3.3.3 Discovery Rate ( $R_D$ ) (Streamlined)

The number of new node visits per timestep (to avoid costly set operations):

$$R_D(t) = \frac{1}{\Delta t} \sum_{j=1}^N \mathbf{1}[K_j(t) \notin \mathcal{D}_{t-1}] \quad (14)$$

where  $\mathcal{D}_{t-1}$  is the set of all previously visited nodes. The original definition was

$$R_D = \frac{\Delta \left| \bigcup_j K_j(t) \right|}{\Delta t}.$$

### 3.4 Deskillling (Mechanistic Implementation)

The mechanistic implementation of deskillling, Incentive-Based Loss of Innovation (the population is channeled away from the necessary exploration, leading to stagnation at a local minimum), is confirmed by the design choices, particularly the AI's focus on the majority state combined with the existence of the Low-Risk plateau. The design ensures that if the average depth ( $\bar{d}$ ) favors the Low-Risk branch, the AI will reinforce that choice, which is the core structural mechanism causing the stagnation (analogous to deskillling).