Nation-Building through Transitional Justice[*]

Thomas Gautier[†]   Daniela Horta-Saenz[‡]   Gianluca Russo[§]

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Abstract

How do societies rebuild after decades of institutionalized oppression, deep trauma, and intergroup violence? We study one of the most prominent cases of transitional justice—the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)—which sought to rebuild the nation by publicly documenting and broadcasting human rights violations committed under apartheid. Using quasi-exogenous variation in exposure to live TRC broadcasts across South African suburbs, we show that the TRC fostered unity among Black South Africans while weakening interracial relations. Specifically, exposure to TRC increased ingroup cohesion among Blacks, reflected in lower interethnic violence and stronger national identity, while heightening exclusionary identities among Whites. Over time, these effects shaped social contact: TRC exposure led to greater intra-Black spatial integration and interethnic marriages, but fewer interracial marriages and greater racial segregation. Using administrative tax data, we further show that the TRC reduced the efficiency of affirmative action policies designed to redress apartheid-era discrimination. Finally, content analysis of the hearings reveals that emotional resonance across ethnic lines—rather than information transmission—was the key mechanism behind the rise of Black nation-building.

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[†]Kiel Institute for the World Economy, email:thomas.gautier@ifw-kiel.de
[‡]Norwegian School of Economics:daniela.horta-saenz@univ-amu.fr
[§]CUNEF, email:russo.gianluca.eco@gmail.com

1 Introduction

Deeply rooted societal divisions pose a significant challenge to sustained democratic development, as they erode the provision of public goods, fuel cycles of violence, and weaken state capacity (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Ray and Esteban 2017; Besley and Persson 2010). Recognizing these challenges, many countries with histories of intergroup violence and human rights violations have sought to foster nation-building as a way to build more cohesive and well-functioning societies. A widely adopted institutional response has been the creation of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs)—a form of transitional justice that uses quasi-judicial hearings to expose past injustices, construct a shared historical narrative, and lay the groundwork for social cohesion.[1] Rather than emphasizing criminal prosecution, TRCs rely on public truth-telling to reshape collective memory and promote reconciliation (Wilson et al. 2001).

Understanding whether TRCs foster nation-building is central to designing post-conflict institutions that support economic development and political stability. Countries emerging from violent transitions often pair transitional justice with policies intended to remedy the economic legacy of systemic oppression, yet the success of such policies hinges on cooperation among groups previously in conflict. If TRCs promote social cohesion, they may not only decrease violence, but also strengthen the implementation of public policies requiring cross-group cooperation. Critics, however, argue that TRCs can instead entrench divisions by heightening group salience or failing to deliver tangible justice, potentially undermining the very policies they are meant to complement. Despite these contrasting views, we have remarkably little empirical evidence on the effects of national TRCs on social cohesion and reconciliation.[2]

In this paper, we fill this gap by examining the impact of the most iconic Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: the one implemented in post-apartheid South Africa. Following the end of apartheid in 1994 and the democratic transition led by Nelson Mandela, the TRC was established in 1995 with the mandate to promote national unity and reconciliation by constructing a shared narrative of the country's past. It sought to achieve this through public hearings that brought victims and perpetrators together, during which victims recounted past abuses and perpetrators confessed to crimes in exchange for possible amnesty. Between 1996 and 2000, the commission heard more than 22,000 victim testimonies, reviewed 7,112

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[1]Between 1974 and 2009, forty truth commissions were established worldwide (Hayner 2010; Teitel 2014). The UN and leading practitioners have praised TRCs for their holistic approach (Secretary-General 2004; Boraine 2006).

[2]Cilliers et al. (2016) is, to our knowledge, the only study examining the impact of a TRC in an experimental setting in Sierra Leone and linking it to psychological well-being, prosocial behavior, and communal attitudes.

amnesty applications, and produced a multi-volume report documenting historical events and offering policy recommendations. Because the public hearings took place mainly in a few major cities and were viewed in person by only a small share of the population, a central empirical challenge is to define meaningful variation in how ordinary South Africans were exposed to the TRC.

We address this challenge by leveraging differential access to live, unfiltered radio broadcasts of TRC hearings. Soon after its inception, the commission received extensive media attention and quickly became "one of the most mediated events ever taking place in Africa" (Verdoolaege 2005). Between 1996 and 2000, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) aired the hearings live on Radio 2000. Although multiple outlets reported on the TRC, Radio 2000 was the only medium that broadcasted the proceedings in real time. Scholars of the TRC have emphasized that the emotional intensity of the testimonies was central to shaping public reactions (McEachern 2002; Cole 2010). For this reason, we focus on exposure to Radio 2000 as our measure of treatment. To reconstruct geographic variation in exposure to Radio 2000, we collect and digitize technical data on radio antennas from the International Broadcasting Authority. We then exploit the idiosyncratic interaction between signal propagation and topography to isolate variation in Radio 2000 coverage that is plausibly exogenous to receiving locations (Olken 2009; Durante et al. 2019; Russo 2024).

With this source of variation at hand, we document two key findings. First, TRC media exposure had a dual impact on nation-building: while it fostered unity among Black South Africans, it inadvertently reinforced racial entrenchment. Second, we argue that this increased racial division undermined the effectiveness of affirmative action policies requiring firms to promote racial integration.

We begin by documenting that TRC coverage had an immediate effect on ingroup cohesion among Blacks by reducing the salience of ethnic identity. Consistent with this, variation in TRC media exposure is associated with an immediate decline in violence and a sharp rise in national identification. A one standard deviation increase in Radio 2000 coverage led to a persistent 2% reduction in violence, lasting for nearly a decade after the end of the TRC. Decomposing the source of violence, we find that this decline is driven almost entirely by reductions in interethnic violence among Black South Africans.

Turning to national identity, residents of suburbs with higher TRC exposure were 2 percentage points more likely to identify as South African rather than with their ethnic group. These effects are entirely driven by Black respondents. Among White South Africans, our estimate points to a reduction of 1.5 percentage points although it is not statistically significant.

We further document that TRC exposure diminished the salience of identity differences

2

within the Black population while reinforcing a more exclusionary identity among White respondents. In particular, TRC media exposure lowered perceptions of distinctiveness among Black South Africans who became less likely to report that their group is "the best" or "very different" from others. In contrary, White respondents agreed more often with such claims, if exposed to TRC media. Taken together, these patterns suggest that TRC media fostered a more inclusive national identity among Black South Africans, combining ethnic pride with broader national belonging, whereas among Whites it reinforced a more exclusionary identity rooted in a sense of perceived separation from the rest of the population.

With the documented differential shifts in identity and violence by race, we next examine the consequences for intergroup contact and community bonds. Using data on intermarriage and segregation, we show that TRC media exposure increased contact within racial groups while reducing contact between them. Drawing on South African census records, we reconstruct changes in intermarriage both within each race (and across ethnic groups) and between Black and White South Africans. Similarly, we construct racial and ethnic segregation indexes based on a standard dissimilarity index.

Across both outcomes, we find strikingly similar patterns. On the one hand, areas more exposed to TRC media experienced greater ingroup mixing: interethnic marriages among Black South Africans increased by .6 percent, accompanied by a decline in ethnic segregation of 2 percentage points. On the other hand, TRC exposure is associated with fewer interracial marriages and higher racial segregation, by .2 percent and 3 percentage points respectively. Consistent with social identity theory, these behavioral adjustments unfolded gradually, with small estimates in 2001 and larger effects by 2011, suggesting that they were a downstream consequence of the earlier changes in identity (Shayo 2020). Importantly, we show that TRC media exposure is not correlated with changes in the demographic composition of municipalities over time, ruling out selective migration as a confounding factor.

Our results so far indicate that live TRC broadcasts on Radio 2000 fostered unity among Black South Africans while further deepening racial divides. A natural concern is that our variation may capture general exposure to Radio 2000 rather than the TRC content itself. At the time, however, Radio 2000 was not a political or news outlet: outside the hearing hours, its programming consisted almost entirely of entertainment with no ideological content. To assess this more directly, we assemble data on other media outlets that covered the TRC and construct measures of alternative TRC exposure. These outlets reported on the Commission's findings but did not broadcast the hearings live. Including these measures as controls leaves our estimates virtually unchanged, and exposure to non-live TRC coverage has no systematic effect. That other TRC-related media did not generate similar effects suggests that the live component was essential, likely because unedited testimonies conveyed

3

an emotional immediacy that edited summaries could not replicate.

We now show that the dual effect on nation-building arises because TRC media fostered reconciliation within the Black community, and that this reconciliation was rooted in the emotional force of the TRC's live hearings rather than in informational updating. These hearings were able to cut across ethnic boundaries among Black South Africans, generating a unifying effect absent in other groups.

To examine this mechanism, we link the content of TRC hearings to shifts in attitudes toward reconciliation and the work of the TRC. In July and August 2000, while the TRC was conducting its amnesty hearings, the Afrobarometer surveyed South Africans about the importance of the TRC for nation-building and about the actions required for reconciliation. This overlap allows us to estimate how same-day exposure to live hearings on radio shaped attitudes, and to exploit variation in hearing content–such as the race of the applicant– to study heterogeneous effects. Approximately half of the applicants testifying during this period were Black, often describing abuses committed against other Black South Africans from different ethnic groups, providing substantial within-Black variation.

Using this setting, we first show that the attitudinal changes among Black South Africans are consistent with intra-Black reconciliation. We present three pieces of evidence. First, Black respondents appear to have internalized the TRC's message more fully: although both Blacks and Whites became more likely to endorse symbolic gestures such as forgiveness or moving on, only Black respondents viewed the TRC as important for nation-building, and only they became more supportive of proactive measures requiring personal action. This result is in line with prior evidence linking TRC to reconciliation and prosocial behavior (Cilliers et al. 2016). Second, these attitudinal shifts occur only on days when hearings featured Black perpetrators, with little response to hearings involving White perpetrators. Crucially, the effect is not driven by ethnic matching: it persists even when the perpetrator and respondent belong to different Black ethnic groups, indicating that the TRC fostered reconciliation across ethnic lines within the Black population. Third, we show that these patterns are not explained by alternative mechanisms unrelated to reconciliation.

We next examine what drove the attitudinal changes we interpret as intra-Black reconciliation. One possibility is that the hearings conveyed new information: Black South Africans may have learned more about the systemic nature of apartheid from fellow Black perpetrators, making it easier to come to terms with past abuses committed by other Black citizens. A second possibility is that the live testimonies operated primarily through their emotional intensity, with cathartic and affectively charged accounts shaping attitudes even when they did not transmit new facts. To begin disentangling these channels, we first document that Black perpetrators used roughly twice as many violent terms as White perpetrators and dis-

played substantially more language expressing remorse and reconciliation. Their statements therefore contained more detail and richer content, which could have played a role in shaping listeners' reactions. However, such richer content could reflect either that Black applicants disclosed more information, or that their testimonies were more emotionally engaging precisely because they contained more detail.

To distinguish between these possibilities, we use the presence of apartheid crimes in a respondent's area as a proxy for baseline information and test whether attitudinal responses to TRC exposure vary with this measure. We find that the effects on attitudes toward the TRC are systematically larger in areas with more victims. This pattern suggests that live broadcasts did not primarily provide new information. Instead, in areas with greater pre-existing knowledge, the TRC's content appears to have been more salient and emotionally resonant. Taken together, the evidence indicates that emotional bonding—rather than informational updating—was the main force shaping reconciliation-oriented attitudes and, ultimately, identity formation and the broader results documented in the paper.

In the last exercise of the paper, we document that the racial divisions inadvertently created by the TRC had significant implications for the efficiency of public policy in post-apartheid South Africa. To study this, we examine South Africa's flagship policy for addressing racial inequality, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) program. The policy operates through a firm rating system that plays a central role in public procurement. Firms can improve their B-BBEE rating by implementing affirmative action measures, thereby gaining a competitive advantage in bidding for government contracts. Importantly, firms with annual sales below 10 million ZAR are exempt from compliance, whereas firms above this threshold must comply with B-BBEE requirements to remain competitive.

We exploit this threshold to test our hypothesis that the racial entrenchment and separation generated by TRC exposure reduced firms' willingness to comply with affirmative action policies aimed at promoting racial integration in the workplace. Using administrative tax records from the universe of South African firms submitting business declarations between 2008 and 2018, we document two main facts. First, we provide cross-sectional evidence that firms strategically position their revenues just below the 10 million ZAR threshold, and that this behavior is more pronounced among firms with higher TRC exposure. Second, leveraging the longitudinal dimension of the data, we show that firms in TRC-exposed areas are significantly more likely to delay growing from 9 to 10 million ZAR, while their likelihood of growth at other thresholds (for example, from 8 to 9 million or from 11 to 12 million) is indistinguishable from that of firms in non-exposed areas. These results highlight a clear channel through which social divisions can translate into economic inefficiency.

This paper relates to three broad strands of the literature. First, we contribute to work

5

on nation-building, reconciliation, and the role of institutions in shaping social cohesion and state capacity. Prior research highlights how historical trauma and intergroup divisions hinder economic development and state effectiveness (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Horowitz 1985; Herbst 2000; Esteban and Ray 1999). While truth commissions have become a common tool for addressing these legacies (Hayner 2010), little is known about their long-term societal effects. Our paper provides new evidence on the impact of a national TRC on reconciliation, social identity, and intergroup relations, as well as on the unintended consequences such processes may impose on subsequent public policies.

Second, we build on work studying how shared narratives, media exposure, and public communication shape intergroup attitudes and collective identities. This includes research on the integrative effects of shared cultural experiences (Depetris-Chauvin et al. 2020), media portrayals of conflict (Esposito et al. 2023; Ang 2023), and how propaganda or hate speech influence ethnic identification and violence (Blouin and Mukand 2018; Armand et al. 2020). We add to this literature by showing that live public truth-telling—central to the TRC process—can durably reshape intergroup relations and even affect social behaviors such as residential sorting and intermarriage.

Third, our results connect to the literature on state capacity and the implementation of public policies (Luttmer and Singhal 2014; Besley 2020; Montenbruck 2023; Qian and Tabellini 2021; Caprettini and Voth 2023). We show that persistent social divisions can undermine the effectiveness of policies that require cross-group cooperation, such as affirmative action. In this sense, our work highlights how incomplete reconciliation can constrain a state's ability to translate transitional justice into successful long-run governance.

Finally, we contribute to recent quantitative work on reconciliation and peace-building efforts.[3] Closest to us, Cilliers et al. (2016) use an experimental TRC-style intervention to study short-run reconciliation effects. We extend this literature by providing the first nation-wide evidence on the long-term consequences of a full-scale transitional justice institution across multiple domains—identity, violence, intergroup contact, and policy effectiveness—highlighting both its integrative potential and its unintended costs.

2 Historical and Institutional Background

This section briefly exposes how the apartheid fostered both racial and ethnic cleavages in South Africa and how these cleavages played out during the democratic transition. It then presents how the TRC attempted to reshape those, and the role played by the media in disseminating its message among the population at large.

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[3]See Section 5 of Rohner and Thoenig (2021).

2.1 Apartheid and The Democratic Transition

Following the National Party's (NP) electoral victory in 1948, South Africa adopted apartheid, a system of white supremacy and institutionalized racial segregation that persisted until 1994. The regime classified the population into four racial groups—Black, Coloured, Indian, and White[4]—and enforced racial separation across all domains of life. The White minority retained near-exclusive control over national political power, quality education, skilled jobs, and the majority of public resources. Coloured and Indian communities occupied intermediate positions with limited rights, often facing discrimination and barriers to full participation. Black South Africans, by contrast, were systematically excluded from political representation and denied access to essential services and economic opportunities. This system was enforced by both an enlarged internal-security apparatus and a divide-and-rule strategy that reinforced not only racial hierarchies but also deepened ethnic divisions within non-White groups.

The Reinforcement of Racial and Ethnic Identities. Apartheid laws enforced strict racial segregation, shaping where people lived, worked, whom they could marry, and where they could attend school. Black South Africans were confined to under-resourced townships, denied quality education, and subjected to pass laws and constant police surveillance, making racial boundaries pervasive in everyday life.[5]

Beyond race, apartheid policies also entrenched ethnic fragmentation among Black South Africans. The homeland system classified individuals by ethnicity and forcibly relocated them to separate territories, reinforcing the idea of distinct "nations" and undermining a unified political identity.[6] These divisions were reproduced through the education system,[7] political institutions, and urban townships populated by migrants from different homelands. This fragmentation often fueled interethnic tensions and violence, weakening collective resistance to apartheid (van der Merwe and Johnson 1997; Mamdani 2018).

The Transition Period. By the late 1970s, internal resistance to apartheid had intensified, with student protests, worker strikes, and acts of sabotage met by lethal state repression,

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[4]Indians became a distinct statutory category in 1959. According to the 1996 Census, roughly 77 percent of the population was Black, 11 percent White, 9 percent Coloured, 2 percent Indian.

[5]Group Areas Act (1950); Separate Amenities Act (1953); Bantu Education Act (1953); Immorality Act (1950); Population Registration Act (1950).

[6]Bantu Self-Government Act (1959). See Abel (2019), Eriksson (2014), and Mariotti and Fourie (2014).

[7]Separate ethnic colleges were created for Coloured, Indian, Zulu, Sotho, and Xhosa students. See Extension of University Education Act (1959).

including detention without trial and extrajudicial killings.[8] Ethnic divisions remained significant, with clashes between rival political factions leading to thousands of deaths and instances of state linked violence (Amodio and Chiovelli 2018; Evans 2024).

Despite escalating violence, secret negotiations between the ANC and the National Party began by 1987. In 1989, President F.W. de Klerk lifted the ban on opposition parties, released Nelson Mandela,[9] and signaled willingness to negotiate. These talks led to South Africa's first non-racial elections in 1994, ushering in Nelson Mandela's presidency and marking the birth of a new multi-racial and united democratic nation (Figure A.1, Panel B).

Yet, the transition left South Africa deeply fractured—socially, politically, and morally. Decades of systemic oppression and violence severely undermined interracial and interethnic unity. To confront this legacy and build a peaceful and inclusive society, Parliament established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in July 1995 to acknowledge past injustices, promote healing, and foster a shared national identity.

2.2   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The TRC's core mandate was twofold: (i) to collect and publicly document testimony from victims of human-rights abuses committed under apartheid, and (ii) to grant amnesty to perpetrators who fully disclosed their politically motivated crimes.[10] By pairing truth-seeking with amnesty, the TRC departed from purely retributive models of justice and sought to foster a shared understanding of the past without mass prosecutions.

The TRC's most salient feature was its series of public hearings, held from April 1996 through 2000. During the "Victim Hearing" phase (April 1996-mid-1998), roughly 22,000 statements were submitted, with about 10% chosen for in-person testimony in accessible venues across all nine provinces. In the "Amnesty Hearing" phase (mid-1998-2000), over 7,000 perpetrators applied (two-thirds of which being Blacks)[11], including former apartheid state agents, liberation fighters, and the white right wing. Nearly 850 ultimately received amnesty. All hearings were held in accessible venues, widely advertised through the media, and open to the public.

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[8]See Thompson and Lynn Berat (2014) for an overview of repression during the transition; Thompson (2000) for a general history of the anti-apartheid movement.

[9]Mandela was imprisoned for 27 years (1962-1990) for his role in the armed struggle against apartheid.

[10]The Commission limited its definition of gross human rights violations to acts causing physical or mental injury or death in the context of political conflict between March 1960 and May 1994, thereby excluding everyday systemic discrimination and pre-1960 abuses (TRC Final Report 1998a).

[11]We compute this share using applicants' names extracted from the TRC hearings. Details on data sources, coding procedures, and validation steps are provided in Appendix B.5.

The TRC's Transformational Role. From the outset, the TRC functioned as an unprecedented public information channel, exposing apartheid's mechanics while broadcasting a nation-building narrative. Victims recounted traumatic experiences, and amnesty seekers delivered detailed accounts of political violence. For example, testimonies revealed how the state fueled political violence within Black resistance movements, financed and sustained repressive homeland regimes, ordered targeted killings through security forces, and supported experimental fertility-control research believed to be aimed at curbing Black population growth.[12] These hearings often included graphic and emotionally charged testimonies. For example, a former officer recounted a torture method in detail: *"It was a cloth bag that would be submerged in water... Then I would pull the bag over the person's head and twist it closed around the neck, cutting off the air supply"* (TRC Final Report 1998b, Vol. 5, pp. 369).

Beyond documenting the truth, the TRC also aimed to foster reconciliation. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who chaired the Commission, infused hearings with moral and theological symbolism, opening with prayer and encouraging acts of forgiveness. For example, he explained: *"God has given us a great gift, Ubuntu... Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human... You must do what you can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire for vengeance. That's why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive"* (Mail & Guardian 1996).

This vision of reconciliation often resonated with participants. One mother who had lost her sons testified: *"I want the people who killed my sons to come forward because this is a time for reconciliation. I want to forgive them..."*. In other cases, perpetrators offered public apologies and sought forgiveness: *"I have taken this opportunity to speak the truth and express my torturing regrets... I ask for forgiveness and hope to be reconciled with everybody, to be part of a better and brighter future for South Africa."* (TRC Final Report 1998b, Vol. 5, pp. 378-391). Though not all hearings led to reconciliation, the TRC offered a platform for public expressions of contrition and forgiveness, with the potential to influence broader societal attitudes.

Importantly, the public hearings collectively created a detailed archive of apartheid's abuses, introducing new facts into public discourse and shaping both national and ethnic self-perceptions. This helped to establish a shared baseline of understanding about the past and limited the space for denial or revisionism about what apartheid was. In one hearing, for example, former President F.W. de Klerk described apartheid *"as a system that caused great suffering to millions of people."* (TRC Final Report 1998a, Vol. 1, pp. 68).

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[12]See Final Report Volume 2, chapters 2 (death-squads), 5 (homelands), 6 (fertility control), and 7 (ANC-IFP violence).

The legacy of the TRC. Today, the TRC's legacy remains contested. While it is credited with helping South Africa move beyond social divides (Van der Merwe and Chapman 2008), its fairness and focus have been widely questioned. Some families of victims challenged the constitutionality of the amnesty provisions, and the Commission faced extensive litigation, including from political parties that accused it of bias. Many White South Africans viewed the hearings as punitive, while numerous Black South Africans saw the granting of amnesty as a betrayal of justice (Hamber 1998; Verdoolaege 2005). Critics have also argued that the Commission's narrow focus on individual acts obscured apartheid's broader structural harms (Mamdani 2000), with only a few high-profile politicians appearing before the Commission. These critiques suggest that, even as the TRC sought to promote reconciliation, it may have inadvertently reinforced certain social cleavages (Wilson et al. 2001).

2.3 Radio 2000

The influence of the TRC in South Africa was largely driven by the extensive media coverage it received. This broad visibility was enabled by the public nature of most hearings and by a strategic partnership with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which played a central role in ensuring that the TRC's work reached audiences across the country.

A key decision by the SABC was to rely primarily on radio as the main channel of communication. As noted in the TRC Final Report (TRC Final Report 1998a), radio was considered the most effective medium for reaching the broadest audience due to its affordability, widespread availability, and deep penetration across rural as well as urban areas.[13] While urban households often had access to both radio and television, radio remained the dominant and most accessible medium for the majority of South Africans (see Figure A.2).

Among all radio outlets, Radio 2000 played a uniquely important role in bringing the TRC into South Africans' homes. It offered the most comprehensive coverage by broadcasting the hearings live and unfiltered. Prior to and after the TRC, Radio 2000 functioned primarily as an entertainment station with no clear political orientation. During the TRC period, however, it aired the hearings live, with real-time translation into English (TRC Final Report 1998a), making the emotional intensity and narrative depth of the process accessible to a national audience.

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[13]Television also contributed to disseminating the TRC's work. A prominent example was the weekly program *Special Report*, which summarized the week's hearings and provided interviews and investigative reporting (Verdoolaege 2005).

3   Data

This section describes our data sources and the construction of the variables used in the analysis. Depending on the exercise we carry out, our geographic unit of analysis is either the suburb or the municipality, of which we have 11,119 and 769 without missing observations respectively. Geographic boundaries change over time, hence we systematically crosswalk our data to the 1996 boundaries, our baseline census year. Appendix B provides detailed information on data sources and variable construction.

3.1   TRC Media Coverage

We obtain data on the location of all TV and radio antennas active in 1996 from the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa. For each antenna, we extract information on their exact location, height, wattage, and frequency of operation. We impute missing information on antennas' height using the average height in the country.

We employ the standard Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model to compute TV and Radio signal loss at the suburb or municipality level (ITM, Hufford 2002).[14] The main inputs of the ITM model are the transmitter's power and frequency, the distance between transmitter and receiver, and the topography of the landscape between transmitter and receiver. Using the ITM model, we compute media coverage at the suburb level by taking the strongest signal (lowest loss) associated with a particular media outlet. We then denote our treatment—TRC Media—as the lowest loss coming from the radio station Radio 2000. We redo this separately for each radio or TV outlet we are interested in studying.

The exact relationship between signal strength and reception quality is hard to define as it depends on many factors, some of which we do not observe. Data on listeners or surveys on the reception quality are unfortunately unavailable to the best of our knowledge. Hence, we follow a standard approach in the literature and rely on continuous variation in signal strength throughout the analysis (e.g. Yanagizawa-Drott 2014; Wang 2021). We express all continuous variables measuring signal quality in standard deviations. Appendix section B.1 provides further details on how we reconstruct media coverage.

3.2   Violence Data

Our main source of information on local violence is the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), which records episodes of protests, riots, strikes, and other forms of social unrest in South Africa from 1990 to 2017 (Salehyan et al. 2012). SCAD captures fewer events

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[14]To do so, we used `CloudRF`, an established firm using state-of-the-art software to compute radio coverage.

than comparable datasets, resulting in relatively sparse observations, particularly in the late 2010s. For this reason, we aggregate violence measures at the municipality level, although using suburb-level variation yields similar results. As a robustness check, we also replicate our findings using data from ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2023). However, because ACLED begins only in 1997, it does not allow us to examine pre-trends.

3.3   Individual-level Survey Data

We leverage six geocoded waves of the South African Afrobarometer surveys to measure how exposure to the TRC influenced national identity, intergroup trust, and civic engagement. The surveys were held in 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015. Each wave collected data from 1,600 to 2,400 respondents, comprising 13,052 data points. Figure A.3 presents the location of the Afrobarometer's clusters that we assign to one of the 1996 South African suburb boundaries. Here, we briefly discuss the construction of the main outcome variables used in the analysis. Appendix B.2 systematically provides details on all the variables built from Afrobarometer, including the exact wording of all the original questions.

National Identity.   We measure national identity by constructing an index based on two questions capturing the sense of attachment to a united South Africa. For the first question, we follow the nation-building literature and use the question labeled *Feeling South African* (*Feel SA*), which asks respondents how much they feel South African versus how much they feel they belong to their group (Carlitz et al. 2022; Depetris-Chauvin et al. 2020). The second question we employ, *Desire United South Africa* (*United SA*), gauges whether the respondent wishes that all groups in South Africa to be united under one nation. We construct our main independent variable by taking the average of the two respective indicators (using principal components yields identical results).[15]

3.4   Census and Ancillary Data

The Community Profiles (CP) of the 1996, 2001 and 2011 South African censuses constitute the backbone of our data construction (Statistics South Africa 1998, 2015). Both data sources provide aggregate information on the demographic characteristics of the population at the enumeration area level. From the 1996 CP, we extract our pre-determined set of controls that we use throughout our analysis, such as population size, share of Blacks, and

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[15]The precise question for *Feel SA* is: "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a [respondent's identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?" This question is missing in the first wave. The precise question for *United SA* is "It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country."

employment rate at the 1996 suburb level. Separately, we construct a set of geographic characteristics and link them to 1996 suburbs (Wessel and Smith 1996; Bishop-Taylor et al. 2019). Appendix Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics for all key outcomes and control variables used in the analysis. We then use the 2001 and 2011 waves to measure changes over time in spatial sorting and intermarriage.

Segregation. Our baseline segregation measures are dissimilarity indices in 1996, 2001, and 2011 across the different enumeration areas within the boundaries of 1996 municipalities. We calculate both a racial dissimilarity index based on the four official racial groups in the country, and an ethnic dissimilarity index based on the eleven Black ethnic groups. Because the number of enumeration areas within the boundaries of 1996 municipalities might vary across census years, we always control for the census-specific number of enumeration areas within a municipality when using segregation as an outcome variable. See Appendix B.3 for more details.

Intermarriage. To study intermarriage we rely on the 10% samples of the 1996, 2001, and 2011 individual-level censuses, which allow us to detect spouses within a household. This allows us to build indicators for whether an individual has married outside of their racial or ethnic group. The lowest level of reporting in the individual census is the municipality level. We match the 1996 and 2001 municipalities to the 2011 municipalities (of which there are 234) and work at that level. See Appendix B.4 for more details.

3.5 TRC Data

To unpack mechanisms, we use detailed data from the TRC proceedings. We obtained the full transcripts of all hearings from the TRC and the SABC Archives, which provide the date, location, names of applicants, and content of the hearings. To measure violence during apartheid, we use the TRC's victim registry, which records the date and location of politically motivated crimes from 1960 to 1994. Further details on data collection and processing are provided in Appendix B.5.

3.6 Firm-Level Data

Our firm-level analysis draws on matched employer-employee tax returns provided by the South African Revenue Service (SARS). We retrieve panel data of returns for tax years from 2013 to 2018 (National Treasury and UNU-WIDER 2021). The data comprehends information including revenues, annual sales, firm size, and industry. Firms' location in the

data is reported at the postal code level, hence we aggregate and match media coverage accordingly (Kilumelume et al. 2022).

Descriptive statistics of our firm-level sample are reported in Table A.28. In total, we observe 704 thousand firms. The average firm has an annual revenue of 41 thousand ZAR and just below 50 employees. The plurality of the firms (23%) are part of the finance and business industry, while manufacturing and retail/motor-trade are the second and third largest industry in terms of number of firms (with 13% and 11% of observations, respectively).

4   Empirical Strategy

In this section, we outline the empirical strategy used in our analysis. First, we explain how we estimate the impact of overall TRC media exposure on nation-building by comparing areas with varying access to Radio 2000's signal. Second, we argue how we combine this geographic variation in signal strength with daily variation in TRC hearings to capture shifts in South Africans' attitudes occurring around the time of the trials.

4.1   Econometric Specification for Overall TRC Media Exposure

To estimate the impact of overall TRC media exposure on nation-building, we link cross-sectional exposure to Radio 2000 signal strength to both cross-sectional and longitudinal outcome variables. In either case, to address concerns that raw signal strength may correlate with factors like urbanization or economic activity, we reconstruct exogenous variation in signal coverage driven by topographical features between transmitters and receivers (Olken 2009; Durante et al. 2019; Wang 2021; Russo 2024).

Afrobarometer   We employ a cross-sectional model to estimate the impact of TRC media exposure on outcome variables from the Afrobarometer, which we observe only in the post-period. We implement this strategy in three steps. First, using the Longley-Rice propagation model (Hufford 2002), we reconstruct the signal strength associated with Radio 2000 antennas taking into account the observed topography. Second, we simulate the same signal strength in the free space, assuming the signal travels in space in the absence of any topographical obstacle. Finally, we regress our outcomes of interest on actual Radio 2000 signal strength variation conditional on the hypothetical signal strength in the free space. Controlling for the free signal strength, the residual variation in the actual signal strength is determined by the topography the signal encounters on its way to the receiver. Equation 1 formalizes the cross-sectional specification we employ.

$$Y_{i,s,m} = \beta TRC\_media_{s,m} + \gamma TRC\_media_{s,m}^{free} + \theta X_{i,s,m} + \delta W_{s,m} + \alpha_m + \epsilon_{i,s,m} \qquad (1)$$

Where $Y_{i,s,m}$ is an outcome variable (eg national identity) for respondent i, in suburb s belonging to municipality m. Our independent variable of interest is $TRC\_media_{s,m}$, the signal strength associated with Radio 2000 antennas transmitting TRC content live during the years of TRC (1996-2000); $TRC\_media_{s,m}^{free}$ is the Radio 2000 coverage in the free space; $X_{i,m,d}$ are individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, and race; $X_{s,m}$ are suburb-level time-invariant characteristics measured at baseline like socio-economics variables from 1996 census and geographic features.[16] Accounting for a large set of geographic characteristics further ensures that our variation does not rely on local drivers of signal strength but on the topography mix between transmitters and receivers. To increase sample size we typically lump together multiple waves from the Afrobarometer while accounting for municipality by survey wave fixed effects.

We display both the actual and the conditional variation in TRC media coverage in Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, panel (a) shows that TRC media coverage is largest around the more urbanized areas, such as the Eastern Cape or in the Gauteng region, where Pretoria and Johannesburg are located. Panel (b) presents the conditional TRC media coverage after partialling out the signal in the free space and our set of geographic controls. In this case, the pattern of variation appears more idiosyncratic and less concentrated in large urban areas, suggesting that our main source of identifying variation is not systematically related to urbanization or associated confounders.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Violence To study the impact of TRC media on violence, we rely on longitudinal data from SCAD between 1990 and 2017. This allows us to carry out a difference in difference analysis which we estimate with a two-way fixed effects model.

$$Y_{m,t} = \beta TRC\_media_m \cdot \alpha_t + \delta X_{m,t} + \alpha_m + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{m,t} \qquad (2)$$

In equation 2, $Y_{m,t}$ indicates the incidence of violence (log violent events) in municipality

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[16]Our full list of controls from the census include IHS population, share Black, share White, share speaking English, share speaking Afrikaans, share speaking Zulu, share Christians, average income score, share employed, share urban, share male, share South African citizens, share aged sixty and above, share married and share manufacturing. Our geographic controls include average temperature, average rainfall, average elevation, average ruggedness, distance to closest coast, distance to closest river, distance to closest lake, and average potential agricultural productivity.

m observed at year t. Following Chen and Roth (2023), we explicitly weight the extensive margin as a 100% increase. We estimate the differential impact of TRC media exposure before and after the start of trials by interacting flexibly TRC_media_m with year dummies for all years in our data, setting 1995 as our reference year. α_m and α_t absorb unit and time effects. The vector of controls $X_{m,t}$ includes the interaction between the free signal TRC_media_m and year fixed effects to absorb its time-varying impact. We provide additional results showing that our results are robust to accounting for region by year fixed effects.

Intermarriage and Segregation   To study the relationship between TRC media, intermarriage and segregation, we leverage data from the South African census linking the 1996, 2001 and 2011 wave. When analyzing patterns of intermarriage, we rely on individual-level data and estimate the following difference-in-differences model:[17]

$$Y_{i,m,p,t} = \beta\, TRC\_media_{m,p} \cdot Post_t + \delta X_{m,p} \cdot Post_t + \alpha_{m,p} + \alpha_t + \alpha_{p,t} + \epsilon_{i,m,p,t} \qquad (3)$$

where $Y_{i,m,p,t}$ equals 1 if couple c, living in municipality m, province p at time t (1996, 2001, 2011), is interethnic or interracial. In our baseline specification, we simply interact the geographic variation in TRC media with a post-TRC dummy ($TRC\_media_m \cdot Post_t$) to estimate the impact of TRC media on changes in intermarriage patterns between 1996 2001 and 2011. The vector $X_{i,m,p,t}$ includes individual such race, gender, age and municipality controls interacted with .[18] In our baseline specification, we restrict the sample to individuals younger than 30 as this group is most likely to have formed new marital unions after the TRC period but carry out sensitivity analysis to alternative age splits.

To study segregation, we leverage a similar dataset and specification to the one we construct for intermarriage, with the exception that our outcomes are measured at the municipality-level. In this case, our outcome variable measures racial (or ethnic) segregation in municipality m, province p in year t (1996 or 2011). As discussed in section 3.4, our main index of segregation is a dissimilarity index but we provide additional evidence with indexes based on Gini index and Theil information index. The vector of controls X includes the same municipality-level controls measured at baseline as in the intermarriage analysis.

In our cross-sectional analysis, we cluster standard errors at the municipal-level, the

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[17]Since the South African census does not provide cross-wave id for matching, we harmonized our geographic unit at the 2011 municipality-level. We discuss this and other details of our dataset construction in Appendix section B.4.

[18]In this specification our municipality level controls include share of Black, White, Xhosa, Zulu and population.

administrative unit directly above suburbs, the unit of analysis. In our longitudinal analysis, we cluster standard errors at the geographic level of variation, the municipality. In either case, we present additional results on inference by clustering at a higher level of aggregation or by using standard errors that account for spatial correlation in the data (Conley 1999).

Evidence of Exogeneity. Before moving to the results of the analysis, we provide evidence that the geographic variation in TRC media coverage we reconstruct is orthogonal to a host of predetermined socio-economic characteristics at baseline. To do so, we sequentially estimate our cross-sectional model presented in Equation 1, replacing the outcome variable with the characteristics of South Africans suburbs constructed from the 1996 census, pre-period night light intensity, and pre-period incidence of violence. The geographic unit of the analysis is the suburb.

[Figure 2 about here.]

We show the results of our balancedness test in Figure 2, where we standardize both dependent (indicated on the y-axis) and independent variables. We plot estimated coefficients from a conditional model that accounts for our identification machinery: the TRC media *free* signal, 1996 IHS population, geographic controls, and municipality fixed effects.[19]

Most of the estimated coefficients are small in magnitude and are statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of significance. More importantly, we do not observe any meaningful pattern of correlation and the number of significant coefficients is entirely consistent with a natural rate of false positive. Moreover, Appendix Table A.2 shows that the variation in TRC media that generates a null impact on pre-determined observables, has a positive and significant and correlation with the likelihood of consuming radio in the first Afrobarometer wave. In sum, Figure 2 bolsters our assumption that the variation in TRC media coverage we reconstruct is systematically unrelated to important local characteristics of South African suburbs and thus is a valid source of identifying variation.

4.2 Econometric Specification for the Salience Analysis

To investigate how South Africans respond to TRC hearings, we exploit the timing of the first post-apartheid Afrobarometer wave, conducted in mid-2000 while public TRC hearings were still ongoing. This wave includes a unique module capturing public opinions on the TRC and national reconciliation. Figure A.5 illustrates the daily variation in exposure to

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[19]These same controls are the ones that we include in the first column of our Afrobarometer analysis.

TRC hearings, based on the overlap between hearing dates and Afrobarometer interviews conducted in July and August 2000.

We implement a two-way fixed effects model leveraging two sources of variation: geographic exposure to Radio 2000 signal strength and temporal variation in hearing days. Our main specification is:

$$Y_{i,s,d} = \beta\, TRC\_media_s \cdot Hearing_d + \lambda X_{i,s} + \gamma_s + \gamma_d + \epsilon_{i,s,d} \tag{4}$$

Where $Y_{i,s,d}$ gauges attitudes towards the TRC for individual i, in suburb s, on day d. TRC_media_s captures continuous cross-sectional variation in Radio 2000 signal strength across suburbs, and $Hearing_d$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if the interview occurred on a TRC hearing day. $X_{i,s}$ is a vector of respondent demographics available from Afrobarometer (age, race, gender, educational attainment, rural status). Day fixed effects γ_d account for common daily shocks, and suburb fixed effects γ_s absorb time-invariant local characteristics, including baseline signal coverage.

Our coefficient of interest, β, captures the differential effect of hearing-day exposure to the TRC among respondents in areas with stronger Radio 2000 signal. The identification assumption is that individuals exposed to Radio 2000 on hearing days are comparable, in both observable and unobservables, to those interviewed on non-hearing days or in areas with weaker signal strength.

While this assumption is not directly testable, we assess its plausibility by checking balance on pre-determined covariates. Figure A.6 presents balance tests for individual-level characteristics, age, gender, education, rural status, race, and ethnicity. We find no statistically significant differences across groups, lending support to the validity of our identification strategy. Additionally, we show that our results are unlikely to arise from spurious timing variation and instead capture meaningful variation in TRC exposure.

5   Main results

Our main finding is that TRC media exposure promoted nation-building among Black South Africans while simultaneously deepening racial entrenchment. In this section, we develop this argument in three steps. First, we show that TRC media shaped public attitudes: Black South Africans viewed the Commission's work as contributing to nation-building and expressed greater support for reconciliation efforts, in contrast to more ambivalent responses from White South Africans. Second, we find that TRC media exposure led to an initial decline in interethnic violence and a rise in national identity among Black South Africans.

Third, we document that this emerging sense of Black national unity translated, over time, into greater interethnic mixing within the Black population, but also into reduced interracial contact, reflected in fewer interracial marriages and increased residential segregation. We conclude by showing that these results are robust to a wide range of checks, including alternative variable definitions, model specifications, and falsification tests.

Attitudes Towards the TRC. We start by asking whether same-day exposure to TRC media shaped attitudes toward nation-building and reconciliation. Did South Africans tune in, did they form opinions about the TRC and the reconciliation process? Identifying such immediate reactions provides evidence on the emotional salience of the hearings, setting the stage for longer-term changes in nation-building. Ideally, one would design a survey eliciting South Africans' views on the TRC conditional on being recently exposed to a hearing. We mimic this setting by leveraging daily variation in TRC hearings around Afrobarometer interview dates, together with geographic differences in Radio 2000 coverage.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Our results—summarized in Figure 3—indicate that TRC media convinced Black South Africans that the TRC had a pivotal role in fostering nation-building in the country and it shifted their attitudes towards more proactive measures of reconciliation. In the first survey item we analyze, respondents are asked whether they believe the "TRC was important for nation-building." We find that Black respondents are 18 percent of a standard deviation more likely to agree with this statement, whereas our results on White respondents indicate a null effect. The second set of questions asks what is required to achieve reconciliation, distinguishing between symbolic actions—e.g. forgetting the past, healing memories—and proactive behaviors, such as material compensation, amnesty, or personal contributions. Here too, we find heterogeneous effects by race. Black respondents are more likely to endorse both symbolic and material forms of reconciliation, while White respondents exposed to TRC media show increased support only for symbolic gestures. A one standard deviation increase in TRC exposure is associated with a 15-18% of a standard deviation increase in support for symbolic acts among both groups. However, only Black respondents show a measurable rise—about 10% of a standard deviation—in support for material aspects of reconciliation, while the effect for Whites remains muted.

We draw two main conclusions from these results. First, same-day shifts in responses provide direct evidence that Radio 2000 broadcasts actively engaged the public with the TRC. Second, the TRC's message resonated differently across racial groups: Black South Africans expressed stronger nation-building and reconciliation commitments, whereas White

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respondents favored only symbolic gestures, such as forgiving and moving on. In the next subsection, we examine whether this divergence in attitudes translated into longer-run changes in nation-building.

5.1 Nation-Building

Violence. Promoting national unity "[...] in a spirit that transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past" was one of the core goals of the TRC (Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995). In line with this goal, we continue our analysis by examining whether TRC media helped reduce violence—arguably the most immediate and observable expression of social division. We show that exposure to TRC media led to a meaningful reduction in violent conflict, driven in particular by lower interethnic violence among Black South Africans. We find not only fewer events but also fewer deaths, indicating a substantial decrease in the intensity of animosity.

We begin by presenting an event study analysis using longitudinal data from SCAD in Figure 4. We find no evidence of differential pre-treatment trends before 1995, indicating that municipalities with varying degree of TRC media coverage had similar trajectories of violence prior to the start of the TRC exposure. During the years of the treatment (1996-2000, marked by red dashed lines), we observe a slow and noisy decline in violence. Starting from the year 2000, the last year of the TRC activity, municipalities with greater TRC media coverage experienced a more sustained reduction in violent events. On average, we estimate that one standard deviation increase in TRC media exposure led to the reduction of any violent event by 2 percent during the entire post-period., This effect persists for roughly a decade before gradually dissipating over the course of the 2010s.

[Figure 4 about here.]

We expect the TRC to influence violence primarily through a reduction of intergroup animosity. Using the nature of events registered in SCAD, we show that this is indeed the case. Table 1 presents the overall reduction in violence (2 percent reported in column 1), next to the reduction in intergroup violence (column 2) and to the decrease in violence related to other issues, such as economic grievances (column 3).[20] The results show that the overall effect is driven largely by intergroup violence: a one standard deviation increase in TRC media exposure reduces intergroup violence by 1.7 percent, compared to 1 percent for other types of violence.

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[20]SCAD records 13 different causes of violence. Among them, intergroup animosity and economic grievances are the most frequent, accounting for approximately 24% and 31% of recorded cases, respectively.

[Table 1 about here.]

Next, we examine which type of intergroup violence were most affected by TRC exposure. This distinction is important: during the final years of apartheid, violence in South Africa stemmed from both interracial conflict rooted in the legacy of apartheid and intra-Black ethnic tensions, particularly between liberation movements competing for political power in the new democracy (Amodio and Chiovelli 2018). Addressing both sources of conflict was central to the TRC's mandate.

Our results indicate that TRC media was responsible for decreasing primarily Black-on-Black violence. After identifying all violent episodes involving only Black actors, we show in Column 4 of Table 1 that TRC media decreases such type of violence by 1.5 percent, accounting for about 90% of the average treatment effect. This result suggests that TRC media did not meaningfully reduce interracial animosity, despite it still being about 30% of the total stock of pre-TRC violence, and despite the fact that in areas not reached by TRC media, interracial violence was still prevalent after the end of the TRC.

Finally, in Column 5, we assess whether the TRC media also reduced the intensity of conflict by examining the number of deaths associated with violent events. We find that a one standard deviation increase in TRC media exposure led to a 5.8% decline in conflict-related deaths, suggesting that the TRC not only reduced the incidence of violence but also helped temper its severity.

Taken together, our results on violence indicate that the TRC played a key role in pacifying the South African society in the years following the end of the TRC. The nature of the violence affected, however, suggests that the TRC may have been successful at easing inter ethnic tensions within the Black population, but had only limited impact on interracial animosity.

National Identity. We now turn to a second key dimension of nation-building: the formation of a national identity. Particularly in post-colonial settings, a stronger sense of national identity—and a correspondingly lower of ethnic salience—has been linked to well-functioning and cohesive societies (Anderson 1991; Carlitz et al. 2022). Exploiting self reported data from the Afrobarometer, we find that exposure to TRC media promoted the formation of a national identity, with the impact driven by Black South Africans.

[Table 2 about here.]

We find a positive impact of TRC media on national identity. Similarly to violence, our results are driven by Blacks and they appear right after the end of TRC. In this exercise, we

pool available survey responses (all post-period) and regress them on TRC media coverage accounting for wave by municipality fixed effects. Column 1 of Table 2 shows our sparsest specification, where we control for the TRC *free* signal and key geographic and socio-economic controls. With this specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in TRC media exposure boosts national identity by 2 percentage points. Progressively including ethnic, demographic and individual characteristics increases the magnitude of our estimate to 2.5 p.p. and raises its statistical significance to the 1% level (column 5). We investigate the heterogeneous effects by race in column 6 of Table 2. Our results show that a one standard deviation increase in TRC media boosts Black national identity by 1.7 p.p. (significant at the 5% level) whereas it reduces White national identity by 1.4 p.p. (statistically non-significant). Finally, we highlight in Table A.20 that the effects of TRC media on national identity materialized in the years following the end of the TRC and dissipated by the end of the 2000s.[21]

The previous results show that TRC media produced divergent responses across racial groups on national identity. We show that this divide extends to broader markers of identity, with evidence of exclusionary tendencies among White South Africans. Appendix Figure A.7 presents these results across four panels, using the same specification as column 6 of Table 2. The top panels show that TRC exposure increased both national and ethnic pride among Black respondents but only ethnic pride among Whites. The bottom panels reveal a similar asymmetry: Black South Africans were less likely to agree that their group is the best or very different from others, while White respondents moved in the opposite direction. Overall, while some results are not precisely estimated, TRC media appear to have fostered a more inclusive national identity among Blacks—combining ethnic pride with broader identification—whereas among Whites it reinforced a more exclusionary identity, marked by stronger ingroup pride and perceived distinctiveness from the rest of the country.

5.2 Intergroup Contact

Our results so far indicate that TRC media profoundly shaped social identity in post-apartheid South Africa. It strengthened national belonging among Black South Africans while prompting a backlash among Whites who developed a more exclusionary identity. Because identity guides behavior we next examine whether these identity shifts translated into changes in social and economic decisions (Shayo 2020). Specifically, we ask whether Black South Africans made choices consistent with their strengthened sense of national belonging, and whether Whites acted in ways consistent with their retrenchment. This section addresses

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[21]Table A.20 also suggests that our result on national identity do not depend on whether we focus on the index or the two raw variable used to construct it.

these questions by analyzing intermarriage and residential sorting, and finds results consistent with social identity theory: shifts in identity induced by the TRC reshaped marriage and residential choices. These behavioral adjustments unfolded gradually, suggesting they were a downstream consequence of earlier changes in identity.

Segregation. Residential segregation is a key indicator of social integration, reflecting how individuals choose to live in relation to perceived group boundaries. If the changes in identity and conflict documented above also shaped residential preferences, we might expect to observe increased residential mixing among Black South Africans, alongside rising racial segregation. We test this with a non-saturated two-way fixed effects model and segregation measures for 1996, 2001, and 2011 at the municipality level.

[Table 3 about here.]

We find that TRC media exposure is associated with higher levels of racial segregation and lower levels of ethnic segregation among Blacks (Table 3). Starting with segregation between races, column 1 reports that a one standard deviation increase in TRC media exposure is associated with a 2.9 p.p. rise in segregation.[22] Column 2 adds interactions between census-year fixed effects and language shares in 1996 (English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa) to capture pre-existing demographic structures that may shape segregation dynamics. Column 3, our preferred specification, further includes province times year fixed effects. The estimated effect remains positive and significant, corresponding to a 3 p.p. increase in residential racial segregation. Thus, a one-standard deviation increase in TRC exposure offsets roughly half of the nationwide decline in the national dissimilarity index declined from 1996 (0.71) to 2011 (0.66).[23]

Turning to interethnic segregation within the Black population, our most parsimonious model indicates a 3.2 percentage point reduction in the ethnic dissimilarity index in municipalities exposed to TRC media (column 4). However, as we account for initial demographic characteristics and province time trends, we estimate a smaller and non-significant reduction in ethnic segregation. Our preferred specification implies a non-significant 1.8 p.p. decrease in ethnic segregation—still meaningful in magnitude relative to national trends. Between 1996 and 2011, the ethnic dissimilarity index fell from 0.49 to 0.43; hence, a one standard deviation increase in TRC exposure corresponds to roughly one-third of the nationwide decline over this period.

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[22]Our baseline results use a dissimilarity index as the measure of segregation. We find similar results using alternative measures, such as the Gini or Theil indices (Table A.22).

[23]See Table B.29 for descriptive statistics on racial and ethnic dissimilarity index by census year.

In previous sections, we showed that the TRC had immediate effects on national identity, but that these took time to translate into sustained reductions in violence. Panel (a) of Figure A.8 reveals a similar dynamic for residential patterns. Signs of increased racial and decreased ethnic residential segregation appear as early as 2001, although the estimated effects are small and at most marginally significant. By 2011, however, TRC exposure had sizable effects on both interethnic and interracial mixing—consistent with the interpretation that behavioral change followed shifts in identity rather than preceding them.

To assess whether the rise in segregation reflects genuine changes in local mixing rather than broader demographic shifts, we examine both municipality- and suburb-level dynamics (Table A.23).[24] At the municipal level, TRC exposure had no effect on the overall share of Whites or Blacks, indicating that the results are not driven by selective emigration or large-scale population movements. At the suburb level, by contrast, TRC exposure increased the share of Whites in initially whiter suburbs and of Blacks in initially blacker ones—a clear sign of local de-mixing rather than White flight abroad. Within the Black population, exposure reduced the concentration of Xhosa and Zulu residents in their respective strongholds, consistent with a loosening of ethnic boundaries.

Overall, these findings indicate that TRC exposure reshaped residential patterns primarily through local re-sorting—reinforcing racial clustering across groups while fostering greater integration within Black communities.

Intermarriage. Our second measure of intergroup contact is intermarriage, often regarded as one of the most salient indicators of social cohesion (Gordon 1964). In South Africa, racial intermarriage was explicitly prohibited under apartheid, and as of 1996 fewer than 1% of individuals under age 30 were married to someone of a different race (Table B.29). Even within the Black population, interethnic unions were rare—around 3%—suggesting strong persistence of ethnic boundaries prior to the TRC. Following the democratic transition, these figures rose sharply: by 2011, the share of interracial marriages had doubled to about 2%, and interethnic marriages within the Black population had quadrupled to 12%. Against this backdrop, shifts in the likelihood of marrying outside one's group provide a meaningful revealed-preference measure of intergroup cohesion. We therefore test whether exposure to TRC media influenced intermarriage patterns across racial and ethnic lines over time.

Consistent with the segregation results, TRC exposure increased intermarriage within the Black population but reduced interracial marriages (Table 4).[25] Starting with interracial

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[24]Between 1996 and 2011, the average White share across municipalities declined from 15.1% to 11.6% (Table B.29).

[25]Table A.26 examines heterogeneous effects by race, showing that Black South Africans consistently display a positive and significant increase in interethnic marriage, while the effect for Whites becomes

marriage, we find that a one-standard deviation increase in TRC exposure is associated with a 0.27 p.p. decline in the likelihood of marrying outside one's racial group in our baseline specification (column 1). We sequentially add ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects to account for local and temporal heterogeneity in ethnic composition (column 2), an interaction between initial ethnic composition and year fixed effects to capture the structure of local marriage markets (column 3), and province-specific time trends (column 4). This most saturated specification shows a statistically significant 0.24 p.p. decline in interracial marriage in municipalities more exposed to TRC media.

Similarly, columns 5-8 report the results for interethnic marriage. In the fully saturated specification (Column 8), a one-standard deviation increase in TRC exposure is associated with a 0.57 p.p. increase in the likelihood of marrying someone from a different ethnicity within the same racial group. This represents 6% of the size of the overall increase of 9% in the interethnic marriage increase from 1996 to 2011. As was the case for segregation, changes in intermarriage patterns take time to adjust, with coefficients systematically larger in 2011 relative to 2001 (Figure A.8, Panel B).

[Table 4 about here.]

Taken together, our findings suggest that TRC media exposure fostered nation-building among Black South Africans, for which we show more peaceful relations, higher national identity, and, over time, higher intergroup contact as measured by intermarriage and segregation. However, we document that this comes at the cost of simultaneously reinforcing racial boundaries and a decline in interracial contact in South Africa.

5.3 Robustness Checks

In this section, we present a series of robustness checks to validate our main results. First, we show evidence that the effects are driven by exposure to the TRC broadcasts on Radio 2000, ruling out broader media effects. We then show that our findings are not driven by the endogenous placement of antennas or proximity to major urban centers. Next, we examine alternative specifications and different ways of constructing the outcome variables. Finally, we confirm that our results are robust to alternative methods for computing standard errors.

TRC Media vs General Media. We provide further evidence that our findings truly capture exposure to the live TRC broadcasts on Radio 2000, rather than a general shift in

significant and positive once controls are added, overall suggesting a broader trend toward ethnic integration across racial groups.

the South African media landscape. Although our identification exploits variation in Radio 2000's early signal coverage, other outlets also featured coverage of TRC-related topics during the same period. While these were far less prominent and did not broadcast the hearings live, their coverage could still confound our results if correlated with both Radio 2000 exposure and our outcomes. To address this concern, we reconstruct exposure to other radio and TV stations active at the time, which aired TRC-related content but not in live format.[26] As shown in Tables A.3,A.4,A.5, and A.6, our estimates remain virtually unchanged in magnitude and significance after controlling for exposure to these stations. Importantly, alternative TRC coverage has no significant effect on any outcome, except for segregation, where other radio coverage yields an opposite-signed coefficient. These findings rule out the possibility that our results capture broader media or second-order effects of exposure to the TRC.

Vicinity to Hubs. We confirm that our results are not driven by the endogenous placement of antennas or proximity to major urban centers. Although our identification already accounts for geography-specific factors and distance to transmitters through its hypothetical signal, residual spatial patterns correlated with antenna locations could still bias the estimates. To address this, we first exclude geographic units containing transmitting antennas, focusing on areas where variation in signal strength is primarily determined by topography rather than antenna placement. As shown in Tables A.7, A.8, A.9, A.11, and A.10 excluding units hosting Radio 2000, TRC-related radio or TV antennas, or any antennas at all leaves our results unchanged in both magnitude and significance. Second, we directly control for distances to the two largest urban centers (Johannesburg and Cape Town) and to each provincial capital, capturing any remaining influence of proximity to major agglomeration centers. As shown in Tables A.12, A.13, A.14, and A.15, including these controls does not alter our estimates, further ruling out the possibility that urban proximity or related unobserved factors confound our results.

Sensitivity Analysis. Next, we discuss a host of alternative specification, controls and ways to construct our main outcome variables.

– *Attitudes Towards the TRC:* We conduct a placebo exercise in which we randomly assign hearing dates across suburbs and re-estimate our baseline specification using the interaction between Radio 2000 exposure and the placebo hearing indicator. Figure A.9 shows the distribution of coefficients obtained from 1,000 random assignments. We observe that the placebo coefficients center around zero, while the actual estimate lies far in the tail of the

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[26]See Appendix B.1 for further details on these media outlets.

distribution. This confirms that the actual hearing dates contain meaningful identifying variation and that our results are unlikely to arise from random noise or spurious timing effects.

– *Violence:* Table A.17 presents alternative functional forms of violence: the logarithm of per capita events, the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS), and the probability of any violent event occurring (extensive margin). TRC media exposure continues to significantly reduce violence across all measures.[27] Table A.18 shows that our findings remain robust to additional controls, including differential trends in ex ante population size, racial composition, and economic activity, as well as province-by-year fixed effects. Finally, we show that the results hold across different data sources. While SCAD records pre-TRC conflict events, it is relatively sparse. To complement this, we use ACLED, which offers more comprehensive coverage but starts only in 1997. Using specification 1, we find that TRC media exposure significantly reduces total violence, driven mainly by the most severe events, consistent with the SCAD results, see Table A.19.

– *National Identity:* Table A.20 presents the results of estimating the impact of TRC media exposure on each survey question separately, to ensure that the results are not driven by the construction of the index. We find that the estimated effects and their dynamics closely match those in the baseline. Table A.21 then shows that our results are robust to alternative definitions and samples. Including the first survey wave —after harmonizing a comparable question on feeling South African— does not alter our findings. Results also remain unchanged when constructing the index using the first principal component, either within the baseline sample or across all waves. Finally, expanding the definition of national identity to include whether respondents want their children to identify as South African yields consistent results.

– *Residential Segregation:* Table A.22 reports results based on two alternative measures of segregation: the Gini coefficient and the Theil Index. While these indices capture segregation from distinct conceptual angles —relative dispersion and entropy— they produce results that closely align with our baseline estimates. Exposure to TRC media coverage significantly increases racial segregation, whereas the effects on ethnic segregation remain negative but statistically insignificant.

– *Intermarriage:* Table A.24 shows that the results are robust to alternative age cutoffs, with findings remaining similar to the base line when focusing on individuals younger than 35, 40, or 45. As the sample expands to include older individuals—who were more likely

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[27]Corresponding event study plots are shown in Figures A.10, A.11, and A.12. Results are also robust to discretizing our treatment and estimating it using a specification that accounts for treatment effect heterogeneity (de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfœuille 2020), see Figure A.13.

to have married earlier—the coefficient size declines mechanically. Moreover, when using women's age to define the couple's reference age, we keep observing a significant increase in interethnic marriage and a decrease in interracial marriage (Table A.25).

Alternative Inference. We conclude our sensitivity analysis by examining alternative approaches for computing standard errors. Specifically, we cluster at the transmitter level and account for spatial correlation within 75 km and 150 km (Conley 1999). Table A.27 confirms that our results remain statistically significant regardless of the standard error specification.

6 Mechanisms

We have shown that the TRC fostered nation-building among Black South Africans while increasing social distance between racial groups. We argue that this dual effect arises because reconciliation occurred only among Black South Africans, driven by the emotional engagement elicited by the TRC's live hearings.

To unpack these mechanisms, we leverage day-to-day variation in exposure to individual hearings—our closest empirical analogue to identifying immediate attitudinal shifts triggered by live TRC broadcasts and to tracing how these shifts vary with the content of the hearings. We proceed in three steps. First, in Section 6.1, we show that the nation-building effects reflect in-group reconciliation among Black respondents: positive changes in attitudes toward reconciliation occur only on days featuring hearings with Black perpetrators, with no comparable shifts among White respondents. Second, in Section 6.2, we examine what drove this reconciliation and provide evidence consistent with an emotional channel rather than a process of informational updating. Finally, in Appendix C, we rule out alternative explanations and show that the increased cohesion among Black South Africans reflects reconciliation rather than other confounding mechanisms.

6.1 TRC Fostered Reconciliation

As shown in Figure 3, exposure to the TRC significantly changed how individuals understood what is required to achieve national reconciliation. Both Blacks and Whites became more likely to recognize the importance of symbolic measures. However, only Black respondents became more likely to support material measures and amnesty. These shifts suggest that the public at large, and Black South Africans in particular, were receptive to the TRC's message and underwent a substantial attitudinal transformation.

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But did this shift in attitudes extend across racial lines, or was it primarily an in-group process? If reconciliation was experienced mainly within racial groups, this could explain why nation-building strengthened among Black South Africans while intergroup contact declined. To test this, we examine whether changes in attitudes toward reconciliation are strongest when perpetrators belong to the same race as respondents.[28]

Consistent with an in-group reconciliation mechanism, we find that Black respondents became significantly more likely to view the TRC as important for nation-building and to support both symbolic and material reconciliation measures when a hearing featured a Black perpetrator, regardless of ethnic affiliation (Figure 5).[29] Among White South Africans, we generally observe little to no reaction to TRC media exposure across most outcomes.

[Figure 5 about here.]

6.2   Unpacking Emotional and Informational Channels

Why did live, unfiltered exposure to TRC media generate such strong reconciliation responses? Two channels could explain these effects: an emotional channel and an informational channel.

To explore the emotional channel, we analyze the language of all perpetrator testimonies to see whether differences in content help account for the heterogeneous effects documented above. Specifically, we compute the frequency of words related to violence and reconciliation across all amnesty hearings (see Appendix B.5 for details). Figure A.16 shows that Black perpetrators used roughly twice as many violent terms as White perpetrators, suggesting their statements were more detailed and emotionally charged. They also employed more language expressing remorse and reconciliation. Moreover, Black South Africans were overrepresented among amnesty applicants—two-thirds of the total—despite the historical context suggesting a higher expected proportion of White applicants. These patterns indicate a deeper engagement by Black perpetrators with the TRC's truth-telling and reconciliatory aims, helping to explain the stronger attitudinal responses observed among Black respondents.

Interestingly, despite this greater engagement and emotional disclosure, White South Africans did not shift their attitudes in response to these hearings. This suggests that the limited responsiveness among White audiences does not stem from a lack of disclosure or

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[28]We manually coded the race and ethnicity of all amnesty applicants, see Appendix B.5 for details.

[29]To ensure these effects are not simply due to ethnic ingroup bias (e.g., a Xhosa respondent hearing a Xhosa applicant), we conduct two robustness checks. First, we exclude respondents from the largest ethnic groups– Xhosa and Zulu. Second, we retain these respondents but drop hearings featuring applicants from their same ethnic group. The results remain consistent across both checks, indicating that the observed effects reflect broader identification rather than narrow ethnic ingroup bias (see Figures A.14 and A.15).

emotional engagement on the part of Black perpetrators, but rather from a deeper sense of disconnection from the TRC process itself, highlighting the challenge of fostering inclusive nation-building in deeply divided post-conflict societies.

The informational channel, in contrast, appears less likely. TRC findings were also reported by other media, and as we have shown, only live coverage via Radio 2000 —rather than reports or summaries—produced significant effects on nation-building (see Section 5.3). This suggests that information alone cannot account for the observed attitudinal changes.

To further distinguish between these channels, we test whether TRC effects on nation-building were stronger in areas with greater prior knowledge of apartheid-era crimes. If the TRC worked mainly through information, its impact should be weaker in areas where hearings offered little new content. Conversely, if emotional engagement was central, exposure should have stronger effects where its content resonated more deeply. We proxy prior knowledge by the number of TRC-registered victims in each municipality and find that TRC exposure had stronger effects in places with more victims (Figure A.17). Taken together, these patterns suggest that emotional engagement, rather than information acquisition, was the key driver of reconciliation and nation-building among Black South Africans.

7   Public Policy

This section examines how the unintended racial divide generated by exposure to the TRC may have affected firms' compliance with post-apartheid affirmative action policies.

Despite democratization, South Africa remains among the most unequal societies in the world, with wealth and productive assets still overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of White South Africans.[30] To redress such enduring disparities, the work of the TRC was paired with an ambitious institutional agenda to dismantle the economic legacies of apartheid (TRC Final Report 2003). A central pillar of such agenda has been affirmative action legislation—most notably, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) initiative—which incentivizes firms to promote racial integration by hiring, training, and advancing historically discriminated groups.[31] Additional details on the B-BBEE policy are available in Appendix Section D.

In this section, we examine whether the racial polarization triggered by the TRC inad-

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[30]For instance, the top 10% of the population holds roughly 86% of total wealth and 60% of business assets. Black people in 2016 only held 5% of White people wealth (Mbewe and Woolard 2016; Chatterjee et al. 2022).

[31]Initially focused on Black South Africans, the B-BBEE's scope was later expanded to include all groups discriminated against under apartheid (Lindsay 2015). For a study on the effects of B-BBEE see (Brink and Orban 2025).

vertently weakened firms' willingness or capacity to comply with B-BBEE requirements. To do so, we test whether firms located in areas with greater TRC media exposure exhibited stronger bunching behavior to avoid falling under the B-BBEE compliance threshold.

7.1 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

The B-BBEE policy was originally introduced in 1993 and has been amended several times since then. Its goal is to curb racial inequalities within South African firms by promoting the economic empowerment of historically discriminated groups in the country.

At the core of the B-BBEE policy lies a framework designed to incentivize firms to promote racial inclusion in ownership, employment, and economic participation. Compliance with B-BBEE is particularly important for the public procurement process since higher B-BBEE status lead to preferential treatment in contract bidding. In turn, the overall B-BBEE status is determined by an overall score that is awarded based on how well a firm promotes racial inclusion.

Crucially, compliance requirements vary by revenue: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with annual revenues below 10 million ZAR automatically receive the highest status, while Qualifying Medium Enterprises (QMEs) with revenues between 10 and 50 million ZAR receive a baseline status—typically necessitating further action to improve their status. Large enterprises with revenues exceeding 50 million ZAR are solely assessed by their B-BBEE scorecard. This tiered structure creates significant compliance pressures at the 10 and 50 million ZAR thresholds (Lindsay 2015).

7.2 Empirical Analysis

To test whether TRC exposure decreased compliance with B-BBEE, we investigate whether firms in TRC-exposed areas are more likely to bunch just below the 10 million ZAR threshold. We focus on the 10M threshold for two reasons. First, this threshold is relevant to a much higher share of firms as compared to the 50 million ZAR threshold. Second, management decisions in larger firms with multiple plants are less likely to be influenced by local conditions such as exposure to the TRC.[32]

To conduct our bunching analysis, we use panel data from South African business tax returns, tracking firm characteristics, particularly annual revenues, from 2008 to 2018 (National Treasury and UNU-WIDER 2021).[33] We categorize firms into low- and high-TRC,

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[32]10 million ZAR are equivalent to about 560,000 2024 USD whereas 50 million ZAR to 2,800,000 2024 USD.

[33]We provide a detailed description of the data in section 3 and Data Appendix subsection B.6.

defining as low-TRC (high-TRC) firms that lie within the first (fourth) quartile of the distribution in terms of residualized TRC exposure. We analyze this data with two complementary strategies. First, we compare the relative size of the bunching among high- versus low-TRC firms by pooling together data from separate years in a cross sectional analysis (Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven 2016). Second, leveraging the longitudinal nature of the dataset, we estimate the differential likelihood of a high-TRC firm vs a low-TRC firm to grow over time from a million bin to the next (Garicano et al. 2016).

Cross-Sectional Bunching In our cross-sectional analysis, we compare the extent of bunching at the B-BBEE compliance threshold between high- and low-TRC exposure firms. Following the standard approach in the bunching literature (Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven 2016), we estimate the excess mass of firms around the threshold by fitting a smooth polynomial to the observed distribution of annual sales and computing the deviation between the fitted and observed densities. More specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$c_j = \sum_{i=0}^{p} \beta_i (z_j)^i + \sum_{i=z_-}^{i=z_+} \gamma_i 1[z_j = i] + \eta_j \tag{5}$$

where c_j is the number of firms in bin j, z_j is the revenue in bin j, $[z_-, z_+]$ is the excluded range, and p is the order of the polynomial.

In the baseline specification, we exclude observations between ZAR 9.5 million and 11 million, use a bin width of ZAR 250,000, and assign treatment intensity according to the firm's first reported zipcode. Robustness checks yield consistent results when using symmetric exclusion windows or assigning treatment based on the firm's location in a specific year.[34] We then extrapolate the fitted distribution to the excluded range and compute the difference between actual and predicted counts to obtain the excess mass of firms, measuring the size of bunching.

[Figure 6 about here.]

Figure 6 illustrates the bunching estimation for firms in areas with low and high exposure to the TRC (left and right panels, respectively). In both cases, there is a marked concentration of firms just below the 10-million-ZAR revenue threshold—where compliance with affirmative action legislation becomes mandatory—followed by a sharp drop in firm density immediately above it. However, the deviation from the counterfactual distribution

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[34]We rely on the location declared in a specific year to minimize measurement error, as later data extractions from the National Treasury contain more accurate location identifiers.

is slightly more pronounced in the high-TRC sample compared to the low-TRC sample, suggesting stronger avoidance behavior.

Quantitatively, we estimate that the excess mass below the threshold is approximately 240 firms larger in high-TRC areas than in low-TRC areas, corresponding to about 3.3% of the total number of firms in the control group's counterfactual distribution around the threshold. Figures A.18, A.19, and A.20 confirm the robustness of these findings when using a symmetric exclusion window or assigning treatment based on firms' locations in the last available year (2018).[35]

Panel Analysis   The panel dimension of the NT-SDF dataset allows us to track the evolution of firms' annual sales and estimate the probability of moving up in the revenue distribution around the 10-million-ZAR B-BBEE threshold (Garicano et al. 2016).

To examine how exposure to the TRC affects firms' growth dynamics, we estimate the following specification:

$$y_{i,t,p} = \sum_{b=b_-}^{b_+} \beta_b \cdot TRC_{i,p} \cdot 1[Revenue_{i,t,p} = b] + \gamma_i + \theta_t + X_{i,t,p} + \epsilon_{i,t,p}, \tag{6}$$

where the outcome of interest, $y_{i,t,p}$ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if firm i with postal code p grew from bin b to bin $b+1$ from year t to year $t+1$. Firm-level fixed effects $\gamma_{i,p}$ absorb any time-invariant firm characteristics, while time fixed effects θ_t absorb any time shocks that might affects all firms. The vector of controls $X_{i,t,p}$ crucially includes bin fixed effects. The vector β_b contains the coefficients of interest, which represent the bin-specific effects of exposure to TRC on the probability of growing to the next bin.

[Table 5 about here.]

Table 5 presents the results. Firms in high-TRC areas are equally likely as those in low-TRC areas to grow between 6 and 9 million ZAR in annual sales. However, once they reach the 9-million-ZAR bin, high-TRC firms are significantly less likely to cross the 10-million-ZAR threshold. Beyond this point, the likelihood of further growth again becomes statistically indistinguishable across groups. This pattern is consistent across all specifications: we estimate a reduction in growth probability of about 4.5% in the baseline which increases slightly to 5% when controlling for municipality-by-year, year-by-sales-bin, and year-by-industry fixed effects (columns 2-5).

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[35]Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap procedure in which residuals from Equation 5 are randomly reshuffled a thousand times (Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven 2016).

Taken together, these results indicate that TRC exposure is associated with strategic bunching at the threshold where affirmative action compliance becomes mandatory. Two mechanisms could account for such an effect. First, the heightened salience of race following the TRC could have reinforced taste-based discrimination. Second, reduced inter-racial contact might have increased the costs of integration, by limiting information flows and social networks across racial lines, thereby hindering firms' ability to recruit or collaborate with qualified candidates from other groups.

While we do not take a definitive stance on which mechanism dominates, our evidence suggests that the racial divisions unintentionally reinforced by the TRC amplified the distortions associated with affirmative action requirements, highlighting a tangible link through which social divisions can translate into economic inefficiency.

8 Conclusions

In this paper, we have examined the long-term impact of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) on nation-building and on the functioning of post-apartheid public policy. Leveraging exogenous spatial variation in coverage of Radio 2000—which broadcast the TRC hearings live and unfiltered—we provide the first nationwide evidence on how a large-scale transitional justice institution affected identity, violence, intergroup contact, and policy effectiveness.

Our results reveal a dual effect of the TRC. On the one hand, exposure to live TRC broadcasts fostered unity among Black South Africans. We show that areas with greater TRC exposure experienced a sizable and persistent decline in interethnic violence within the Black population, accompanied by an increase in national identification over ethnic identity. On the other hand, the same exposure inadvertently reinforced racial separation between Black and White South Africans, contributing to lower interracial marriage, higher racial segregation, and more polarized social identities.

We show that these effects originated in an intra-Black reconciliation process. Using the timing of amnesty hearings and their interaction with radio coverage, we document that Black South Africans responded most positively to testimonies of Black perpetrators—including those from different ethnic groups—consistent with interethnic reconciliation within the Black community. We further demonstrate that these responses were driven not by new information about apartheid crimes, but by the emotional intensity of the live hearings. Attitudinal effects were strongest in areas with greater pre-existing exposure to apartheid violence, suggesting that emotional salience—not informational updating—was the critical mechanism.

We also show that the heightened racial polarization between Blacks and Whites generated negative downstream consequences for the implementation of affirmative action policy. Using administrative tax records for the universe of South African firms, we document that firms in areas with higher TRC exposure were more likely to bunch just below the 10 million ZAR threshold at which B-BBEE compliance becomes binding. Panel evidence further shows that firms in high-exposure areas were less likely to grow past this threshold, while their growth patterns at other points in the revenue distribution remained unchanged. These findings indicate that persistent racial divisions reduced the state's capacity to implement a central post-apartheid policy intended to redress historical inequality.

Taken together, our results provide a nuanced assessment of the TRC. A core component of its mandate—to foster unity within the Black majority and reduce internecine conflict— was largely achieved. Yet the same process unintentionally deepened racial divisions along the country's most consequential fault line, with lasting implications for social cohesion and for the effectiveness of policies requiring cross-racial cooperation. This trade-off highlights the complex challenges of transitional justice in societies where historical cleavages overlap with deep and persistent inequalities.

As countries across the world continue to adopt TRCs—in Africa, Latin America, and beyond—our findings underscore the importance of understanding not only the direct goals of these institutions but also their unintended consequences. The South African experience suggests that the emotional power of live truth-telling can be a potent tool for healing within groups, but may fall short of bridging divides across them. Future research should explore how different social cleavages, media environments, and institutional designs shape the broader outcomes of transitional justice, and how such processes can be structured to avoid reinforcing the very fractures they seek to resolve.

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Figure 1: TRC Media Exposure, Actual and Residual

(a) TRC Media Coverage

(b) TRC Media Residual Coverage

Notes: The maps plot Radio 2000 coverage (a) and its residualized version (b), both standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. We compute media coverage using the Irregular Terrain Model (Hufford 2002) taking into account terrain topography and antenna specifications; refer to section 3.1 for a detailed explanation of how we reconstruct media variation. Localities with a lighter color (yellow) receive a stronger signal, while darker localities (purple) receive a weaker signal.

Figure 2: TRC Media Coverage Balanced on Pre-Determined

Notes: This figure presents the balance test of Radio 2000 on pre-determined suburb-level variables. Each coefficient comes from a separate estimation where we regress the outcome variable indicated on the y-axis on TRC media exposure. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized. We plot coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a specification that includes our baseline identification machinery: the TRC free signal, 1996 population, geographic characteristics, and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Appendix Figure A.4 displays the balance test comparing our source of variation with a more naive variation in TRC media.

Figure 3: Impact of TRC Media Exposure on the Commission's Work and Reconciliation

Notes: The figure plots the impact of TRC media exposure on perceptions of the Commission's work and reconciliation, using specification 4, where the treatment variable is interacted with individuals' race. The coefficients represent the marginal effects for Blacks (right-hand side) and Whites (left-hand side). The model controls for gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure 4: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Violence, Event Study

Note: This figure plots the event study of the impact of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following Chen and Roth (2023). The model includes municipality and year fixed effects. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure 5: TRC Immediate Response by Perpetrator's Race

Notes: The figure plots the impact of TRC media exposure on perceptions of the Commission's work and reconciliation by perpetrator race, based on specification 4. In this model, the treatment variable is interacted with individuals' race, and the sample is split according to whether the hearing predominantly features perpetrators of a specific race (see Appendix B.5). The coefficients show the marginal effects for Black respondents (right-hand side) and White respondents (left-hand side). Coefficients from regressions with mostly Black perpetrators are represented by circles, while those with mostly White perpetrators are represented by squares. Controls include gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level, and standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure 6: High TRC Firms Exert More Bunching Around the 10M Treshold, Alternative Samples

Note: The Figure plots the estimated bunch around the 10M threshold. The left panel presents high TRC sample, and the right panel presents low TRC sample. High and low samples correspond to the bottom and top quartiles of the conditional TRC variation, respectively. The orange line presents the polynomial fit, and the gray area presents the size of the bunch. The location of the firm is assigned as the first location declared by the firm over the years. The estimated difference (b) and standard error (se) reported above the graph. Standard error is obtained via a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 iterations.

Table 1: Impact of TRC Media Exposure Concentrated on Interethnic Conflict

Dependent Variable:	Type of Violence				
	Any	Intergroup	Other	Black Ethnic	Deaths
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.017***	−0.010***	−0.015***	−0.058***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.014)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.99	-0.97	-0.99	-0.95
Adj R²	0.51	0.16	0.54	0.12	0.18
Observations	21700	21700	21700	21700	21700

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. Column 1 reports results for the total number of violent events. Column 2 focuses on violence related to ethnic tensions. Column 3 presents results for non-ethnic violence. Column 4 focuses on violence occurring among Black South Africans, and Column 5 reports effects on the total number of casualties. All dependent variables are log-transformed, following Chen and Roth (2023), where the extensive margin is explicitly weighted as a 100% increase. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: TRC Media Boosts National Identity

Dependent Variable:	National Identity					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TRC Media	0.021**	0.023***	0.023***	0.023***	0.024***	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
TRC Media × Black						0.017**
						(0.009)
TRC Media × White						−0.014
						(0.022)
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ			✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind Demo				✓	✓	✓
Ind Ethnic					✓	✓
Race × Wave FE						✓
Race × Muni FE						✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
Adj R^2	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.09
Observations	11059	11059	11059	11059	10983	10907

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. The independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the 1996 suburb. We construct the dependent variable by taking the index of two variables: (i) whether individuals describe themselves as South African rather than identifying with other ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to create one united South African nation from all the different groups. Column 1 adds geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Column 2 adds ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Column 3 adds socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Column 4 adds individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. All regressions include baseline identification machinery: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. All controls are measured at the suburb level in 1996. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: TRC Media Exposure Increased Racial Residential Segregation

Dependent Variable:	Segregation					
	Racial			Ethnic		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TRC Media × Post	0.029***	0.029***	0.030***	−0.032***	−0.021*	−0.018
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic 1996 × Year FE		✓	✓		✓	✓
Province × Year FE			✓			✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.45	0.45	0.45
Adj R^2	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.54	0.56	0.56
Observations	2110	2110	2110	2084	2084	2084

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on residential segregation, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is a dissimilarity index. Columns 1 to 3 report racial segregation, while Columns 4 to 6 report intra-Black ethnic segregation. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as the log-number of sub-units used to calculate segregation. Additional controls are added sequentially: Columns 2 and 5 add an interaction between the share of different demographic groups (Whites, Blacks, Zulus and Xhosas) and year fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 6 include province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: TRC Reduces Interracial Marriage

Dependent Variable:	Intermarriage							
	Interracial				Interethnic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media × Post	−0.270**	−0.260**	−0.247**	−0.243**	0.546**	0.821***	0.720***	0.574***
	(0.130)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.237)	(0.206)	(0.197)	(0.153)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Province × Year FE				✓				✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.56	1.55	1.55	1.55	7.71	7.62	7.62	7.62
Adj R^2	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.11
Observations	158242	157779	157779	157779	158242	157779	157779	157779

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on intermarriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is a husband, and the sample is restricted to those under the age of 30. TRC media exposure is measured at the 2011 municipality level, of which there are 233. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the spouse belongs to the same racial group (Columns 1-4) or ethnic group (Columns 5-8), and 0 otherwise. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Columns 2 and 5 additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 6 control for the interaction between the 1996 municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 8 further include province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Bunching Below the 10M Threshold, Panel Evidence

Dependent Variable:	Likelihood Growth to the Next Million				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC × 6M	−0.00452	−0.00491	−0.00726	−0.00452	−0.00783
	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0179)	(0.0181)	(0.0179)
TRC × 7M	0.0107	0.00910	0.0150	0.00986	0.0125
	(0.0201)	(0.0201)	(0.0200)	(0.0201)	(0.0200)
TRC × 8M	0.000848	−0.00107	0.00496	0.0010	0.00229
	(0.0206)	(0.0207)	(0.0205)	(0.0206)	(0.0207)
TRC × 9M	−0.0463**	−0.0468**	−0.0493**	−0.0468**	−0.0503**
	(0.0216)	(0.0217)	(0.0214)	(0.0215)	(0.0215)
TRC × 10M	−0.00504	−0.00249	−0.00457	−0.00510	−0.00213
	(0.0208)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)
TRC × 11M	−0.0130	−0.0129	−0.00916	−0.0136	−0.00890
	(0.0227)	(0.0228)	(0.0227)	(0.0228)	(0.0230)
TRC × 12M	0.0123	0.0119	0.00983	0.0124	0.0100
	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0225)
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year by Muni FE		✓			✓
Year by Sales FE			✓		✓
Year by Industry FE				✓	✓
R^2	0.190	0.194	0.236	0.192	0.242
Observations	1,203,644	1,203,171	1,198,116	1,203,192	1,197,189

Note: This table presents the results of TRC media exposure on the likelihood of firm sales growth, using specification 6. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm moved up to the next million-revenue bin in the following year. The coefficients of interest are the interaction terms between residualized TRC coverage and revenue bin categories. Only interaction terms for bin categories ranging from 6M to 12M are displayed. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Column 2 introduces municipality-by-year fixed effects, Column 3 adds sales-by-year fixed effects, and Column 4 includes industry-by-year fixed effects. Column 5 presents the most saturated specification, including all previous controls. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A   Online Appendix (Not for publication)

A.1   Additional Figures

Figure A.1: South Africa Pre- and Post-1994

(a) South Africa: Pre-1994, Homelands   **(b)** South Africa: Post-1994, Provinces

Notes: This figure contrasts the administrative geography of South Africa before and after the end of apartheid. Panel (a) depicts the country during the apartheid era, with the "Bantustans" a quasi-self-governing homelands created to enforce ethnic and racial segregation. Panel (b) shows the new provincial structure established following the first democratic elections in 1994, in which the Bantustans were dissolved and reincorporated into a unified Republic of South Africa. Source: MATRIX, Michigan State University.

Figure A.2: Frequency of Media Source Consumption

(a) Rural

(b) Urban

Notes: The graph shows the frequency of use of different media sources for rural (panel a) and urban suburbs (panel b). The data comes from the first round (2000) of the Afrobarometer survey. The exact question we employ states: "How often do you get news from the following sources?"

Figure A.3: Location of Afrobarometer Clusters

Notes: The map plots the location of Afrobarometers' clusters for waves one to six (purple dots). Boundaries in the background represent 1996 suburb boundaries.

Figure A.4: TRC Media Coverage Balance Test, Compare with Unconditional Variation

Notes: This figure plots the balance test of TRC Media on pre-determined suburb-level variables. First stage coefficient comes from Afrobarometer question on media consumption. Each coefficient comes from a separate estimation where we regress the outcome variable indicated on the y-axis on TRC media exposure. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized. We present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from two specifications: in orange we plot the results of a naive bi-variate specification; in blue we plot our baseline identification machinery: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level.

Figure A.5: TRC Media Exposure Balance Test

Notes: This figure plots the overlap between the days of June and August 2000 when Afrobarometer survey was administered and the days in which a TRC amnesty hearing was happening.

Figure A.6: TRC Media Exposure Balance Test

Notes: This figure plots the balance test for the salience analysis, using specification 4. Each coefficient comes from a separate estimation where we regress the outcome variable on the y-axis on TRC media exposure interacted with a binary variable public hearing. Standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure A.7: Heterogeneous Impact of TRC on Identity Markers by Race

(a) Proud of Being SA

(b) Proud of Your Identity

(c) *Best* Identity

(d) Identity *Very Different*

Note: These figures plot the estimated impact of TRC media exposure on exclusionary identity. Both the dependent and independent variables are standardized. The coefficients represent the interaction between TRC media exposure and race. See Table 2, Column 6 for a full description of the control variables included. The specification additionally includes race-by-wave and race-by-municipality fixed effects. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A.8: Intergroup Contact Results

(a) Segregation

(b) Intermarriage

Notes: These figures plot the estimated impact of TRC media exposure on segregation (panel a) and intermarriage (panel b). The coefficients plotted are obtained by interacting TRC media with year dummies, omitting 1996. We use the most saturated specifications in Tables 3 and 4. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

60

Figure A.9: PLACEBO ATE Salience Analysis

(a) Important for Nation Building

(b) Understand Each Other

(c) Forgive Each Other

(d) Forget the Past

(e) Healing Memories

(f) One's Contribution

(g) Material Compensation

(h) Amnesty

Notes: The figure plots the marginal effects of our salience analysis. We estimate equation (4) separately for each outcome indicated on the right-hand side and report coefficients and 95% confidence intervals by race. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized. Standard errors clustered at hearing by suburb level.

Figure A.10: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Per Capita Violence, Event Study

Note: This figure plots the event study of the impact of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the per capita number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following (Chen and Roth 2023). The model includes municipality and year fixed effects . Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A.11: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on IHS Violence, Event Study

Note: This figure plots the event study of the impact of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of conflict events at the municipality level. The model includes municipality and year fixed effects. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A.12: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on the Probability of Violence, Event Study

Note: This figure plots the event study of the impact of TRC media exposure on the probability of violence, using specification 2. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if any violent event occurred. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. The model includes municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A.13: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on the Probability of Violence, Event Study De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2024)

Note: These figures plot the event study coefficients for the impact of TRC media exposure on violence using the estimator proposed in De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille (2024). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level. TRC media exposure is discretized to equal one if a municipality's signal reception is above the mean, and zero otherwise. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure A.14: TRC Immediate Response – Without Zulu and Xhosa Individuals

Notes: The figure plots the impact of TRC media exposure on perceptions of the Commission's work and reconciliation by perpetrator race, based on specification 4. In this model, the treatment variable is interacted with individuals' race, and the sample is split according to whether the hearing predominantly features perpetrators of a specific race (see Appendix B.5). The coefficients show the marginal effects for Black respondents. Coefficients from regressions with mostly Black perpetrators are represented by circles, while those with mostly White perpetrators are represented by squares. This model restricts the sample to Black respondents who do not belong to the Zulu or Xhosa ethnic groups. Controls include gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level, and standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure A.15: TRC Immediate Response – without Zulu and Xhosa Perpetrators

Notes: The figure plots the impact of TRC media exposure on perceptions of the Commission's work and reconciliation by perpetrator race, based on specification 4. In this model, the treatment variable is interacted with individuals' race, and the sample is split according to whether the hearing predominantly features perpetrators of a specific race (see Appendix B.5). The coefficients show the marginal effects for Black respondents. Coefficients from regressions with mostly Black perpetrators are represented by circles, while those with mostly White perpetrators are represented by squares. This model restricts the sample to respondents belonging to either the Zulu or Xhosa ethnic groups and hearings featuring Black perpetrators who do not belong to these ethnicities. Controls include gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level, and standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure A.16: Predicted Theme Count per Testimony Length by Perpetrators' Race

(a) Violence

(b) Reconciliation

Notes: The figure plots the average predicted number of theme-related word per length of testimony for white and Black applicants. The model includes month-year fixed effects. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level.

Figure A.17: The Immediate Reaction to TRC Hearings by TRC Victims Presence

Notes: The figure plots the impact of TRC media exposure on perceptions of the Commission's work and reconciliation by the presence of apartheid victims, based on specification 4. In this model, the treatment variable is interacted with individuals' race, and the sample is split according to whether the hearing predominantly features perpetrators of a specific race (see Appendix B.5). The coefficients show the marginal effects for Black respondents (right-hand side) and White respondents (left-hand side). Controls include gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Confidence intervals are shown at the 95% level, and standard errors are clustered at the suburb level.

Figure A.18: High TRC Firms Exert More Bunching, 2018 Location

Note: The Figure plots the estimated bunch around the 10M threshold. The left panel presents high TRC sample, and the right panel presents low TRC sample. High and low samples correspond to the bottom and top quartiles of the conditional TRC variation, respectively. The orange line presents the polynomial fit, and the gray area presents the size of the bunch. The location of the firm is assigned as the location reported in 2018. The estimated difference (b) and standard error (se) reported above the graph. Standard error is obtained via a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 iterations.

Figure A.19: High TRC Firms Exert More Bunching, Symmetric Window and First Location

Note: The Figure plots the estimated bunch around the 10M threshold. The left panel presents high TRC sample, and the right panel presents low TRC sample. High and low samples correspond to the bottom and top quartiles of the conditional TRC variation, respectively. The orange line presents the polynomial fit, and the gray area presents the size of the bunch. The location of the firm is assigned as the first location encountered in the data. The estimated difference (b) and standard error (se) reported above the graph. Standard error is obtained via a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 iterations.

Figure A.20: High TRC Firms Exert More Bunching, Symmetric Window and 2018 Location

Note: The Figure plots the estimated bunch around the 10M threshold. The left panel presents high TRC sample, and the right panel presents low TRC sample. High and low samples correspond to the bottom and top quartiles of the conditional TRC variation, respectively. The orange line presents the polynomial fit, and the gray area presents the size of the bunch. The location of the firm is assigned as the location reported in 2018. The estimated difference (b) and standard error (se) reported above the graph. Standard error is obtained via a bootstrap procedure with 1,000 iterations.

A.2   Additional Tables

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N. Obs
Main Independent and Control Variables, Suburb Sample					
TRC Media	-56.46	19.56	-90.00	-11.46	11119
Population	3395.60	8291.91	2.00	309828.00	11119
Share Male	0.47	0.06	0.02	1.00	11119
Share Black	0.81	0.34	0.00	1.00	11119
Share White	0.11	0.26	0.00	1.00	11119
Share Christians	0.75	0.19	0.00	1.00	11119
Share English	0.07	0.18	0.00	1.00	11119
Share Afrikaans	0.11	0.26	0.00	1.00	11119
Share Zulu	0.22	0.38	0.00	1.00	11119
Share Urban	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00	11119
Share Aged 60+	0.08	0.05	0.00	0.88	11119
Share Married	0.25	0.11	0.00	1.00	11119
Share SA Citizens	0.99	0.03	0.12	1.00	11119
Share Employed	0.18	0.19	0.00	1.00	11119
Average Income Group	3.22	2.43	1.00	15.00	11119
Share Manufacturing	0.07	0.10	0.00	1.00	11119
Altitude	13.91	4.42	1.00	23.00	11119
Ruggedness	7.85	5.43	0.00	38.19	11119
Mean Temperature	18.25	1.99	11.84	22.88	11119
Mean Precipitations	725.82	204.34	61.53	1162.53	11119
Mean Agricultural Suitability	2.79	1.27	0.00	8.00	11119
Area	1.07e+08	1.11e+09	1709.66	5.14e+10	11119
Dist. River	4598.97	5354.26	0.24	58512.69	11119
Dist. Lakes	33968.55	30408.63	0.00	380199.57	11119
Dist. Coast	260200.95	224541.34	75.66	812387.85	11119
Afrobarometer Outcomes, Individual Sample					
Share Black	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00	13052
Share White	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00	13052
Share Coloured	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	13052
Female	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	13052
Age	37.85	14.10	18.00	99.00	13052
Share Rural	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00	13052
At least Primary Education	0.90	0.29	0.00	1.00	13052
At least Secondary Education	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	13052
National Identity (Index)	0.70	0.32	0.00	1.00	13052
Feel SA	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	13052
United SA	0.83	0.38	0.00	1.00	13052
Trust Justice Courts	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	13052
Trust Police	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	13052
Own Accountability	0.59	0.46	0.00	1.00	13052
Officials Accountability	0.51	0.49	0.00	1.00	8757
Interest Public	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00	13052
Discuss Politics	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00	13052
Voted Last Elections	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	10824
Community (Index)	0.24	0.34	0.00	1.00	13052
Collective Action	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00	13052
Violence Outcomes, Muni-Year Sample					
Share Violence	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	21532
Violence PC	14.80	186.85	0.00	7719.93	21532
Ethnic Violence PC	4.26	90.61	0.00	6063.94	21532

Notes: Descriptive Statistics of all the variables used in the analysis. Violence per capita outcomes are expressed in millions.

Table A.2: Pseudo First Stage

Dependent Variable:	Listen To Radio			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TRC Media	0.258*	0.281*	0.401**	
	(0.132)	(0.163)	(0.158)	
– × Black				0.479***
				(0.162)
– × White				0.263*
				(0.147)
Geographic		✓	✓	✓
Ethnic			✓	✓
Socio-Econ			✓	✓
Individual				✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Adj R^2	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10
Observations	2164	2076	2067	2067

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on listening to radio, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the 1996 suburb and the data is the first wave of the Arfobarometer survey. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent indicated to listen to radio often. Column 1 reports the baseline specification. Column 2 adds geographic characteristics. Column 3 include ethnic and socio economic controls. Column 4 adds individual controls. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: The effect of TRC Media on Violence Controlling for Alternative Media

Dependent Variable:	Log Violent Events			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.019***	−0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Radio Coverage × Post		−0.000		0.000
		(0.002)		(0.003)
TV Coverage × Post			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96
Adj R^2	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51
Observations	21700	21700	21700	21700

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following Chen and Roth (2023). Column 1 reports the baseline specification. Column 2 adds coverage of the listed SABC radio outlets that broadcasted TRC content, Column 3 adds coverage of the listed main TV stations, and Column 4 combines radio and TV coverage. All coverage measures are interacted with the post-period indicator.All regressions include municipality by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on National Identity Controlling for Alternative Media

Dependent Variable:	National Identity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TRC Media	0.024***	0.021***	0.025***	0.022***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Radio Coverage		0.008		0.008
		(0.005)		(0.005)
TV Coverage			−0.003	−0.002
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
Adj R^2	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12
Observations	10983	10983	10983	10983

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the individual. Column 1 shows the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is constructed by pooling Afrobarometer waves 1 through 6 and extracting the first principal component of two questions: (i) whether individuals identify primarily as South African rather than with an ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to build one united South African nation from all the different groups. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal for each type of media coverage, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All regressions include municipality by year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: The Impact of TRC Media Exposure on Segregation Controlling for Alternative Media

Dependent Variable:	Segregation							
	Racial				Ethnic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media × Post	0.030***	0.025***	0.029***	0.025***	−0.018	−0.025**	−0.016	−0.023*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Radio Coverage × Post		0.016**		0.016*		0.022*		0.025**
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.011)
TV Coverage × Post			0.004	0.001			−0.011	−0.017
			(0.007)	(0.008)			(0.012)	(0.012)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic 1996 × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Adj R^2	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56
Observations	2110	2110	2110	2110	2084	2084	2084	2084

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on residential segregation, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is a dissimilarity index. Columns 1 to 4 report racial segregation, while Columns 5 to 8 report intra-Black ethnic segregation. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as the number of suburbs in a municipality-year. Additional controls are added sequentially: Columns 2 and 6 include an interaction between the interaction between the IHS of population and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 7 add an interaction between the share of the White population and year fixed effects, and Columns 4 and 8 include province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: The Impact of TRC Media Exposure on Intermarriage Controlling for Alternative Media

Dependent Variable:	Intermarriage							
	Racial				Ethnic			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media × Post	−0.243**	−0.239**	−0.253**	−0.250**	0.574***	0.558***	0.542***	0.531***
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.161)
Radio Coverage × Post		−0.064		−0.068		0.235		0.224
		(0.069)		(0.069)		(0.184)		(0.185)
TV Coverage × Post			0.050	0.057			0.166	0.143
			(0.106)	(0.106)			(0.151)	(0.152)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.55	1.55	1.55	1.55	7.62	7.62	7.62	7.62
Adj R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Observations	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on intermarriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is a dissimilarity index. Columns 1 to 4 report racial segregation, while Columns 5 to 8 report intra-Black ethnic segregation. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as the number of suburbs in a municipality-year. Additional controls are added sequentially: Columns 2 and 6 include an interaction between the interaction between the IHS of population and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 7 add an interaction between the share of the White population and year fixed effects, and Columns 4 and 8 include province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.7: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on Violence Omitting Municipality with Antennas

Dependent Variable:	Violent Events				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.014***	−0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Exclude Muni with Tx					
Radio 2000		✓			
Any Radio			✓		
Any TV				✓	
Any					✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.98	-0.97	-0.98	-0.98
Adj R^2	0.51	0.49	0.51	0.34	0.35
Observations	21700	20160	18284	18116	17780

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. . The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following Chen and Roth (2023). Column 1 presents the baseline specification. Column 2 excludes municipalities with a Radio 2000 transmitter. Columns 3 to 5 sequentially exclude those with a transmitter for SABC 1, SABC 2, and SABC 3. Column 6 excludes municipalities with any antenna active during the TRC period. All regressions include municipality by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on National Identity Omitting Suburbs with Antennas

Dependent Variable:	National Identity				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media	0.024***	0.022***	0.021**	0.022***	0.021**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Exclude Suburb with Tx					
Radio 2000		✓			
Any Radio			✓		
Any Tv				✓	
Any					✓
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
Adj R^2	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.12
Observations	10983	10461	9904	9772	9670

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the individual. Column 1 shows the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is constructed by pooling Afrobarometer waves 1 through 6 and extracting the first principal component of two questions: (i) whether individuals identify primarily as South African rather than with an ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to build one united South African nation from all the different groups. Column 2 excludes municipalities with a Radio 2000 transmitter. Columns 3 to 5 sequentially exclude those with a transmitter for SABC 1, SABC 2, and SABC 3. Column 6 excludes municipalities with any antenna active during the TRC period. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.9: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Residential Segregation Omitting Municipalities with Antennas

Dependent Variable:	Racial Segregation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	0.030***	0.027***	0.025***	0.026***	0.026***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Exclude Muni with Tx					
Radio 2000		✓			
Any Radio			✓		
Any TV				✓	
Any					✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic 1996 × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.70	0.70
Adj R^2	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77
Observations	2110	1946	1746	1728	1692

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on racial residential segregation, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is a dissimilarity index. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. Column 2 excludes municipalities with a Radio 2000 transmitter. Columns 3 to 5 sequentially exclude those with a transmitter for SABC 1, SABC 2, and SABC 3. Column 6 excludes municipalities with any antenna active during the TRC period. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, an interaction between IHS of population and year fixed effects, an interaction between the share of the white population and year fixed effects, province-by-year fixed effects, as well as the number of suburbs in a municipality-year. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.10: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interracial Marriage Omitting Municipalities with Antennas

Dependent Variable:	Interracial Marriage				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	−0.243**	−0.282**	−0.277*	−0.390**	−0.389**
	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.163)	(0.160)	(0.186)
Exclude Suburb with Tx					
Radio 2000		✓			
Any Radio			✓		
Any Tv				✓	
Any					✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.55	1.60	1.40	1.32	1.30
Adj R^2	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	157779	72614	59855	56416	54995

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on interracial marriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different racial group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. Column 2 excludes municipalities with a Radio 2000 transmitter. Columns 3 to 5 sequentially exclude those with a transmitter for SABC 1, SABC 2, and SABC 3. Column 6 excludes municipalities with any antenna active during the TRC period. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects, the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects and province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.11: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interethinc Marriage Omitting Municipalities with Antennas

Dependent Variable:	Interethnic Marriage				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	0.574***	0.821***	0.880***	0.817***	0.840***
	(0.153)	(0.196)	(0.285)	(0.259)	(0.315)
Exclude Suburb with Tx					
Radio 2000		✓			
Any Radio			✓		
Any Tv				✓	
Any					✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	7.62	7.07	7.84	8.13	8.19
Adj R^2	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10
Observations	157779	72614	59855	56416	54995

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on interethinc marriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different racial group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. Column 2 excludes municipalities with a Radio 2000 transmitter. Columns 3 to 5 sequentially exclude those with a transmitter for SABC 1, SABC 2, and SABC 3. Column 6 excludes municipalities with any antenna active during the TRC period. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects, the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects and province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.12: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on Violence Controlling for Distances

Dependent Variable:	Log Violent Events				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.016***	−0.015***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Dist to Johannesburg		✓			✓
Dist to Cape Town			✓		✓
Dist to Prov Capital				✓	✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96
Adj R²	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.53	0.53
Observations	21700	21700	21700	20384	20384

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. . The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following Chen and Roth (2023). Column 1 presents the baseline specification. The subsequent columns controls for distance to major urban centers by post-period interaction: Column 2 includes distance to Johannesburg, Column 3 adds distance to Cape Town, and Column 4 adds distance to the respective provincial capital. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.13: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on National Identity Controlling for Distances

Dependent Variable:	National Identity				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***	0.026***	0.026***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Dist to Johannesburg		✓			✓
Dist to Cape Town			✓		✓
Dist to Prov Capital				✓	✓
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
Adj R^2	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12
Observations	10983	10983	10983	10983	10983

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the individual. Column 1 shows the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is constructed by pooling Afrobarometer waves 1 through 6 and extracting the first principal component of two questions: (i) whether individuals identify primarily as South African rather than with an ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to build one united South African nation from all the different groups. The subsequent columns controls for distance to major urban centers: Column 2 includes distance to Johannesburg, Column 3 adds distance to Cape Town, and Column 4 adds distance to the respective provincial capital. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.14: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Residential Segregation Controlling for Distances

Dependent Variable:	Racial Segregation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	0.032***	0.033***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Dist to Johannesburg		✓			✓
Dist to Cape Town			✓		✓
Dist to Prov Capital				✓	✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic 1996 × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.67
Adj R^2	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.78
Observations	2110	2110	2110	1969	1969

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on racial residential segregation, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. The dependent variable is a dissimilarity index. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. The subsequent columns controls for distance to major urban centers by post-period interaction: Column 2 includes distance to Johannesburg, Column 3 adds distance to Cape Town, and Column 4 adds distance to the respective provincial capital. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, an interaction between IHS of population and year fixed effects, an interaction between the share of the white population and year fixed effects, province-by-year fixed effects, as well as the number of suburbs in a municipality-year. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.15: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interracial Marriages Controlling for Distances

Dependent Variable:	Interracial Marriage				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media $\times$ Post	-0.243**	-0.243**	-0.238**	-0.299***	-0.274**
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Dist to Johannesburg		$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$
Dist to Cape Town			$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$
Dist to Prov Capital				$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Muni FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Ethnicity $\times$ Muni FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Ethnicity $\times$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Sh. Ethnic $\times$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Province $\times$ Year FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.55	1.55	1.55	1.55	1.55
Adj R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Observations	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on interracial marriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different racial group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. The subsequent columns controls for distance to major urban centers by post-period interaction: Column 2 includes distance to Johannesburg, Column 3 adds distance to Cape Town, and Column 4 adds distance to the respective provincial capital. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects, the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects and province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.16: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interethnic Marriages Controlling for Distances

Dependent Variable:	Interethnic Marriage				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	0.574***	0.565***	0.578***	0.613***	0.654***
	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Dist to Johannesburg		✓			✓
Dist to Cape Town			✓		✓
Dist to Prov Capital				✓	✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	7.62	7.62	7.62	7.62	7.62
Adj R^2	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Observations	157779	157779	157779	157779	157779

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on interethnic marriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different ethnic group and 0 otherwise. Column 1 presents the baseline specification. The subsequent columns controls for distance to major urban centers by post-period interaction: Column 2 includes distance to Johannesburg, Column 3 adds distance to Cape Town, and Column 4 adds distance to the respective provincial capital. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects, the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects and province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.17: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on Different Transformations of Violence

Dependent Variable:	Violent Events			
	Baseline (1)	Per Capita (2)	IHS (3)	Probability (4)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.047***	−0.017***	−0.010***
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.90	0.03	0.02
Adj R^2	0.51	0.42	0.52	0.33
Observations	21700	21700	21700	21700

Note: This table reports the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on various transformations of violent events, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the municipality in 1996. Column 1 presents the baseline results. Column 2 uses as the dependent variable the logarithmic transformation of the per capita number of violent events. Column 3 uses the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the total number of conflict events at the municipality level. Column 4 uses a binary indicator equal to one if any violent event occurred. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.18: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on Violence – Additional Controls

Dependent Variable:	Violent Events				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TRC Media × Post	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.010**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Population 1996 × Year		✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. White 1996 × Year			✓	✓	✓
Sh. Employed 1996 × Year				✓	✓
Province × Year FE					✓
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96	-0.96
Adj R^2	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.53
Observations	21700	21700	21700	21700	21700

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on violence, using specification 2. The unit of observation is the municipality in 1996. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of conflict events at the municipality level, with the transformation weighted to treat the extensive margin as a 100% increase, following Chen and Roth (2023). Column 1 reports the baseline results. Column 2 adds an interaction between the share of the white population and year fixed effects. Column 3 includes district-specific linear trends, and Column 4 adds province-specific trends. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.19: The effect of TRC Media Exposure on Violence – Using ACLED

Dependent Variable:	Type of Violence			
	Total (1)	Violent (2)	Mobs (3)	Deaths (4)
TRC Media	−0.005***	−0.001**	−0.003***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Basic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	-0.98	-1.00	-0.99	-1.00
Adj R^2	0.09	0.04	0.07	0.05
Observations	289016	289016	289016	289016

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on violence, using the ACLED dataset. The unit of observation is the suburb in 1996. Column 1 reports results for the total number of conflict events. Column 2 focuses on violent events, and Column 3 focuses in organized violent events or mob violence. Column 4 focuses the total number of casualties. All the dependent variables are log-transformed, following Chen and Roth (2023), where the extensive margin is explicitly weighted as a 100% increase. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.20: The Dynamics of the Impact of TRC Media Exposure on National Identity

Dependent Variable:	National identity		Feel SA		United SA	
Time Period	2000s	2010s	2000s	2010s	2000s	2010s
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TRC Media × Black	0.050***	0.006	0.055*	0.008	0.035**	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)
TRC Media × White	0.010	−0.030	−0.009	−0.047	0.062	−0.013
	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.069)	(0.093)	(0.065)	(0.074)
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind Demo	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ind Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave × Race FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.73	0.68	0.63	0.54	0.83	0.83
Adj R^2	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.05
Observations	4340	6520	4340	6520	6408	6520

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the individual. Column 1 shows the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is constructed by pooling Afrobarometer waves 1 through 6 and extracting the first principal component of two questions: (i) whether individuals identify primarily as South African rather than with an ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to build one united South African nation from all the different groups. Column 2 excludes Afrobarometer wave 1. Column 3 replaces the principal component with the mean of the two questions. Column 4 reports results using only the first question, and Column 5 uses only the second. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. .

Table A.21: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Different Measures of National Identity

Dependent Variable:	Baseline National Identity Index				National Identity Index w/ Child SA			
Transformation:	Baseline Index (1)	with 1st wave (2)	PCA (3)	PCA with 1st wave (4)	Baseline Index (5)	with 1st wave (6)	PCA (7)	PCA with 1st wave (8)
TRC Media	0.074***	0.075***	0.072***	0.076***	0.076***	0.073***	0.065**	0.063**
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.70	0.68	0.01	0.01	0.76	0.74	0.01	0.01
Adj R^2	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.11
Observations	10983	13049	10983	13049	10983	13049	10983	13049

Note: This table presents the estimated effect of TRC media exposure on national identity, using specification 1. Both dependent and independent variables are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The unit of observation is the individual. Column 1 shows the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is constructed by pooling Afrobarometer waves 1 through 6 and extracting the first principal component of two questions: (i) whether individuals identify primarily as South African rather than with an ethnic group, and (ii) whether it is desirable to build one united South African nation from all the different groups. Column 2 excludes Afrobarometer wave 1. Column 3 replaces the principal component with the mean of the two questions. Column 4 reports results using only the first question, and Column 5 uses only the second. All regressions control for the following suburb-level characteristics measured in 1996. Basic controls: free signal, IHS of population, share of the White population, share of employed individuals, area, area squared, altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, ruggedness squared and municipality-by-wave fixed effects. Geographic controls: average yearly temperature, average yearly rainfall, average agricultural suitability, distance to the coast, distance to inland water, and their squared terms. Ethnic controls: share of English speakers, share of Afrikaans speakers, share of Zulu speakers, and share of the Black population. Socio-economic controls: average income score, share of urban population, share of married individuals, share of Christians, and share of the population aged over 60. Individual-level controls: gender, race, age, age squared, rural residency, and highest educational attainment. Municipality by year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.22: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Different Measures of Residential Segregation

Dependent Variable:	Segregation					
	Racial			Ethnic		
	D	G	H	D	G	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TRC Media × Post	0.029***	0.029***	0.034***	−0.018	−0.018	−0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population 1996 × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. White 1996 × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.68	0.76	0.44	0.45	0.54	0.22
Adj R^2	0.77	0.76	0.77	0.56	0.60	0.54
Observations	2110	2110	2110	2084	2084	2084

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on different measures of residential sorting, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the 1996 municipality. Columns 1 and 4 use the dissimilarity index (D) as the dependent variable, as the baseline results of Table 3. Columns 2 and 5 use the Gini index (G), while Columns 3 and 6 use the Theil Information Index (H) as the dependent variable. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, an interaction between IHS of population and year fixed effects, an interaction between the share of the white population and year fixed effects, province-by-year fixed effects, as well as the number of suburbs in a municipality-year. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.23: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Residential Sorting

Dependent Variable:	Share					
	White (1)	Black (2)	White (3)	Black (4)	Xhosa (5)	Zulu (6)
TRC Media × Post	0.002	−0.001	−0.002**	−0.021**	−0.000	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.001)
... × % White 1996			0.055***			
			(0.017)			
... × % Black 1996				0.025**		
				(0.011)		
... × % Xhosa 1996					−0.002	
					(0.005)	
... × % Zulu 1996						−0.015***
						(0.006)
Suburb FE	✓	✓				
Muni FE			✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.13	0.62	0.11	0.81	0.25	0.22
Adj R^2	0.88	0.97	0.92	0.94	0.98	0.99
Observations	2202	2202	20178	20178	20178	20178

Note: The first two columns of the table replicate the last specification presented in Table 3 using the share of whites or blacks as the outcome. The following columns use the same specification but the unit of analysis is the suburb instead of the municipality, and only data from 1996 and 2011 is used. Column 3 uses the share of White residents as the dependent variable. Column 4, the share of Black residents. Column 5, the share of Xhosa residents. and Column 6, the share of Zulu residents. The table reports the coefficient for the interaction between TRC media exposure and the post-TRC period dummy, as well as its interaction with the initial share of White, Black, Xhosa, and Zulu residents in 1996 at the suburb level. Columns 1 and 2 include municipality fixed effects, while the remaining columns include suburb fixed effects. All regressions include year fixed effects, an interaction between the share of different ethnic groups in 1996 and year fixed effects, and province time year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.24: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interethnic Marriage by Age Cohort

Dependent Variable:				Intermarriage				
		Interracial				Interethnic		
Cohort	≤ 30	≤ 35	≤ 40	≤ 45	≤ 30	≤ 35	≤ 40	≤ 45
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media $\times$ Post	-0.243^{**}	-0.153^{**}	-0.129^{**}	-0.111^{**}	0.574^{***}	0.398^{***}	0.333^{***}	0.308^{***}
	(0.106)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.153)	(0.128)	(0.110)	(0.102)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity $\times$ Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province $\times$ Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.55	1.39	1.30	1.23	7.62	7.03	6.49	6.11
Adj R^2	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Observations	157779	321350	501573	663976	157779	321350	501573	663976

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on intermarriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different racial group (Columns 1-4) or ethnic group (Columns 5-8), and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 5 present the baseline results. Columns 2 and 6 restrict the sample to individuals under the age of 35. Columns 3 and 7 restrict the sample to those under 40. Columns 4 and 8 restrict the sample to those under 45. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, age, and age squared. Additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects, the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects and province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.25: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interracial Marriage (Spouse Controls))

Dependent Variable:				Intermarriage				
		Race				Ethnic		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media × Post	−0.125	−0.165**	−0.131*	−0.104	0.554**	0.783***	0.567**	0.280**
	(0.105)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.238)	(0.265)	(0.221)	(0.135)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Province × Year FE				✓				✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	7.36	7.30	7.30	7.30
Adj R^2	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.10
Observations	291452	290992	290992	290992	291452	290992	290992	290992

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on intermarriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual, and the sample is restricted to women under the age of 30. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.26: The Effect of TRC Media Exposure on Interethnic Marriage by Race

Dependent Variable:	Interethnic Marriage							
	Black				White			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TRC Media × Post	0.798***	1.060***	0.851***	0.506**	0.362	0.356	0.103	0.738**
	(0.236)	(0.288)	(0.294)	(0.202)	(0.294)	(0.316)	(0.321)	(0.320)
Muni FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Muni FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Ethnicity × Year FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Sh. Ethnic × Year FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Province × Year FE				✓				✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	9.53	9.40	9.40	9.40	4.97	4.82	4.82	4.82
Adj R^2	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	107339	106933	106933	106933	29450	29288	29288	29288

Note: This table presents the estimated effects of TRC media exposure on interethnic marriage, using specification 3. The unit of observation is the individual, and the sample is restricted to those under the age of 30. TRC media exposure is measured at the municipality level. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 100 if the individual's spouse belongs to a different ethnic group and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 to 4 reports the results for Black individuals and Columns 5 to 8 for White individuals. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects, as well as controls for race, gender, age, and age squared. Columns 2 and 5 additionally include ethnic-by-municipality and ethnic-by-year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 6 control for the interaction between the municipality-level share of English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and Xhosa speakers and year fixed effects. Columns 4 and 8 further include province-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.27: Robustness to Alternative Inference Procedures

Dep. var.	Estimate (1)	Baseline (2)	HAK 75 (3)	HAK 150 (4)
Afrobarometer outcomes				
1. national identity (ATE)	.099	.0327***	.029***	.0257***
2. national identity (blacks)	.0684	.0334**	.0382*	.0285**
3. national identity (whites)	.0312	.0994	.0708	.0619
4. own group best (blacks)	-.0686	.1422	.	.0451
5. own group best (whites)	.2258	.1568	.2076	.2233
6. own group different (blacks)	-.2154	.0768***	.0869**	.0931**
7. own group different (whites)	.1985	.0852**	.0778**	.085**
Sorting outcomes				
8. racial sorting	.0377	.0072***	.0077***	.0058***
9. ethnic sorting	-.0191	.0153	.0132	.0091**
Violence				
10. total	-.0107	.0056*	.0052**	.0046**
11. total ethnic	-.0117	.0051**	.0058**	.0047**
12. total non-ethnic	-.0044	.0043	.0037	.0039
13. total ethnic black	-.0093	.0038**	.0048*	.0032***
14. total deaths	-.0317	.0136**	.016**	.0086***

Note: This table shows that our main results are robust to alternative inference procedures. Each row presents the results from a separate regression, and displays the coefficient on confidence interval of the baseline specification in columns 1 and 2. The following two columns present alternative standard errors obtained when allowing for arbitrary spatial autocorrelation across units (Conley 1999). We allow spatial correlation within a bandwidth of both 75 kilometers (column 3) and 150 kilometers (column 4). Row 1 replicates our result on national identity presented in column 4 of Table 2. Rows 2-7 replicate the race-specific effects on identity presented in Figure A.7. Rows 8-9 replicate the results on residential segregation presented in the most saturated specifications of Table 3. Rows 10-14 replicate the results on violence presented in Table 1. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.28: NT-SDF Firms - Descriptive Statistics

	Low TRC			High TRC		
	N. Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	N. Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Firm Variables						
Sales (in M Rands)	180,651	33.87	665.7	172,873	45.39	795.0
Number of Employees	181,039	43.29	926.1	173,214	54.25	779.9
Share of women among employees	181,039	0.411	0.316	173,214	0.404	0.312
Average wage (1000s Rands)	180,195	119,504	163,202	172,598	130,131	276,800
Agriculture	181,039	0.0234	0.151	173,214	0.0205	0.142
Manufacturing	181,039	0.117	0.322	173,214	0.115	0.319
Construction	181,039	0.104	0.306	173,214	0.101	0.302
Retail	181,039	0.0951	0.293	173,214	0.0907	0.287
Retail Motortrade	181,039	0.132	0.338	173,214	0.132	0.338
Wholetrade	181,039	0.0592	0.236	173,214	0.0548	0.228
IT	181,039	0.0384	0.192	173,214	0.0446	0.207
Transport/Communication	181,039	0.0788	0.269	173,214	0.0886	0.284
Finance/Business	181,039	0.237	0.425	173,214	0.235	0.424
Socio-Econonomic Variables						
IHS Population	181,039	9.948	1.236	173,214	10.02	1.740
Share Black	181,039	0.300	0.271	173,214	0.345	0.317
Share White	181,039	0.570	0.310	173,214	0.528	0.337
Share Male	181,039	0.493	0.0329	173,214	0.498	0.0622
Share Christians	181,039	0.727	0.125	173,214	0.718	0.143
Share Zulu Speaker	181,039	0.0891	0.188	173,214	0.109	0.166
Share English Speaker	181,039	0.335	0.228	173,214	0.320	0.228
Share Afrikaaner Speaker	181,039	0.351	0.248	173,214	0.325	0.286
Share Urban	181,039	0.944	0.210	173,214	0.945	0.202
Share SA Citizen	181,039	0.967	0.0286	173,214	0.964	0.0343
Share Aged 60+	181,039	0.0954	0.0521	173,214	0.106	0.0644
Share Married	181,039	0.395	0.0954	173,214	0.383	0.102
Unemployment Rate	181,039	0.115	0.133	173,214	0.129	0.132
Share Manufacturing	181,039	0.116	0.0563	173,214	0.112	0.0763

Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of firms in the NT-SDF employer-employee matched panel tax dataset. The first three columns present descriptive statistics in the low TRC quartile, while the last three columns focus on firms in the high TRC quartile.

B Data Appendix

In this section we provide further details on data construction.

B.1 Media Coverage

We compute signal coverage using the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) for all media outlets that broadcast TRC proceedings. This includes our main media outlet, *Radio 2000*, as well as the weekly TRC coverage provided by other stations: Lesedi (Sesotho), Ukhozi (isiZulu), Umhlobo Wenene (isiXhosa), Thobela (Sepedi), Ikwekwezi (Ndebele), Motsweding (Setswana), Munghana Lonene (Xitsonga), Ligwalagwala (SiSwati), and Radio Sonder Grense (Afrikaans). We also include television coverage from SABC 1, 2, and 3, which aired regular TRC segments (Cole 2010, p. 198).

To generate these coverage, we rely on CloudRF, a software platform for radio propagation modeling. CloudRF allows us to implement the ITM model using two sets of inputs. The first consists of the technical characteristics of each antenna—coordinates, height, power, and broadcast frequency—sourced from the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa; when station-specific information was missing, we used national averages. The second set captures the region's topography, including hills and mountainous terrain that shape signal strength (Crabtree and Kern 2018). Parameters were tuned to the South African context following guidance from CloudRF engineers. Figure B.21 provides an example of the radio coverage reach from a transmitter located in Kimberly. For each antenna, we generated high-resolution coverage data at 90-meter resolution, and we used GIS software to aggregate the signal coverage from the raster data to suburbs by calculating the mean coverage.

Figure B.21: Example radio coverage output

(a) Gray scale raster output

(b) Raster to vector output

Notes: This figure illustrates an example of the ITM radio coverage output for an antenna located in Kimberly. Panel A displays the original raster output at a 90-meter resolution, capturing the fine-grained signal coverage distribution. Panel B presents the vectorized version of the raster, where differences in coverage after adjusting for topographic characteristics are more clearly observed. Areas shaded in dark purple represent lower coverage, while yellow tones indicate regions with higher signal reception.

B.2 Afrobarometer

National Identity   We perform a principal component analysis on two categories of questions: (i) Feeling South African, where we harmonized two related questions due to the unavailability of a consistent question across all waves:

- For wave 1: 'You feel much stronger ties to [identity group] than to other South Africans?' (1 = strongly disagree or disagree; 0 = otherwise).

- For waves 2 to 6: 'Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a [identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?' (1 = South African; 0 = otherwise).

(ii) Wanting a united society, which is derived from the question:

- For waves 1 to 6: 'It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.' (1 = strongly agree or agree; 0 = otherwise).

Intergroup Trust   We use the following question, which was only available for wave three:

- 'How much do you trust each of the following types of people: South Africans from other ethnic groups?' (1= I trust them a lot or I trust them somewhat; 0= otherwise).

Trust towards institutions From waves 1 to 6 we use the following questions:

- Courts: 'How much of the time can you trust the courts of law' (1= just about always or Most of the time; 0= otherwise).

- Police: 'How much of the time can you trust the police?' (1= just about always or Most of the time; 0= otherwise).

Accountability For accountability of ordinary individuals we harmonized across waves the following questions:

- We create an average of the following questions for waves 1 to 3: What if a person like yourself committed a serious crime? (1= very likely or likely; 0= otherwise)
  - 'How likely is it that the police would catch and charge them?'
  - 'How likely is it that a court of law would convict them?'
  - 'How likely is it that the Receiver of Revenue would find out and penalize them?'

- From wave 4 to 6: 'Do ordinary people who break the law go unpunished?' (1= never or rarely; 0= otherwise)

For accountability of top officials, we harmonized the following questions from wave three onwards, as this was the first wave in which the question became available:

- We create an average of the following questions for wave 3:
  - 'How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a top government official committed a serious crime?' (1= very likely or likely; 0= otherwise)
  - 'How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a top official did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned?' (1= very likely or likely; 0= otherwise)

- From waves 4 to 6: 'Do officials who commit crimes go unpunished?' (1= never or rarely; 0= otherwise)

Civic Engagement

- Discuss Politics, from waves 1 to 6: ' When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matter?' (1= frequently or occasionally; 0= otherwise)

- Interest Public, from waves 1 to 6: 'Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?' (1= most of the time or some of the time; 0= otherwise).

- Voted from waves 1 and 3 to 6: With regard to the most recent, [national election], which statement is true for you?' (1= you voted in the elections; 0= otherwise).

- Collective Action, from waves 1 to 6: 'Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation?' (1= yes; 0= otherwise).

- Community, from waves 1 to 6: We perform a principal component analysis on two questions:
  - 'Attend group concerned with local matters?' (1= a few times or often; 0= otherwise).
  - 'Attend a community development or self-help association?' (1= a few times or often; 0= otherwise).

Role of the TRC For questions related to the TRC, we rely on the first wave of the Afrobarometer, as it is the only wave that contains this type of question.

- Successful reparations: 'How well would you say the government is handling the reparations to people identified as victims by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?' (1= very well, fairly well; 0= otherwise).

- Important for Nation Building: Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements, 'TRC was important for building a united South African nation'. (1= strongly agree or agree; 0= otherwise).

- Soft reconciliation: We perform a principal component analysis on four questions. Please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree with these statements (1= strongly agree or agree; 0= otherwise)
  - Reconciliation requires that South Africans understand one another better
  - National Reconciliation requires that people forgive one another
  - National Reconciliation requires forgetting the past
  - National Reconciliation requires the healing of memories

- Material compensation: 'National reconciliation requires material compensation for victims of apartheid' (1= strongly agree or agree; 0= otherwise).

- Amnesty: 'National reconciliation requires amnesty as provided by the TRC' (1= strongly agree or agree; 0= otherwise).

- One's contribution: 'It is my responsibility as a citizen to contribute to the process of reconciliation' (1= strongly agree or agree; 0= otherwise).

B.3 Residential Mixing and Segregation

We measure residential segregation using data from the 1996, 2001, and 2011 population censuses. The analysis combines the 1996 and 2011 community profile datasets and the full individual-level 2001 census, harmonized to a consistent municipal geography.

B.3.1 Geographies and Spatial Harmonization.

1996 census. The 1996 community profiles report population counts at the *enumeration area* (EA) level, corresponding to roughly 83,000 small units nationwide. Each EA is linked to both a suburb and a 1996 municipal identifier (812 municipalities in total). We use these identifiers to compute population shares by racial group (Black, White, Coloured, Asian/Indian) at the placename level, and to aggregate segregation measures at the 1996 municipality level.

2001 census. The 2001 census provides data at a similar fine scale but with a different spatial hierarchy. Because shapefiles for the 2001 small areas are unavailable, we aggregate the data to the *small place* (SP) level, for which shapefiles and geographic centroids exist. We then assign each 2001 SP to a 1996 municipality based on the spatial location of its centroid relative to 1996 municipal boundaries.

2011 census. The 2011 community profiles are available at the *small area layer* (SAL) level, of which there are approximately 84,000 units. We spatially match each 2011 SAL to 1996 geographies (suburb and municipality) using a centroid-based spatial join. Each 2011 small area is therefore assigned to the 1996 municipality that contains its centroid.

These procedures yield a consistent panel of 812 municipalities, each subdivided into roughly 83,000 subunits in every census wave, allowing direct comparison of segregation levels across 1996, 2001, and 2011.

B.3.2 Segregation Measures.

For each census year, we compute segregation indices at the 1996 municipal level using the smallest available geographic units (EA in 1996, SP in 2001, and SAL in 2011). We construct three standard measures:

1. the *dissimilarity index* (our baseline measure),

2. the *Gini index*, and

3. the *Theil information index*.

All results are robust to the choice of segregation measure. Because the precision of segregation estimates depends mechanically on the number of subunits used, we control in all regressions for the log number of subunits within each municipality-year.

B.3.3   Groups and Definitions.

For racial segregation, we consistently use the same four population categories available in all censuses: Black, Coloured, Asian/Indian, and White, excluding the residual "Other" category. For *interethnic segregation*, we use all reported mother-tongue groups (held constant across census years) excluding Sign Language and the English and Afrikaans groups, as our interest lies in linguistic segregation *within* the Black population.

B.3.4   Additional Outcomes.

To better interpret changes in segregation, we compute population composition indicators—namely the shares of Black, White, Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaans-speaking, and English-speaking residents—at both the suburb and municipal levels. These variables allow us to relate movements in segregation indices to demographic and linguistic shifts within and across municipalities.

B.3.5   Descriptive Statistics.

Table B.29 reports average levels of racial and interethnic segregation, as well as the share of White residents, by census year. Racial segregation remains high but declines gradually between 1996 and 2011. Interethnic segregation within the Black population decreases more sharply, reflecting rising linguistic integration. The share of White residents also falls over time, consistent with differential migration and demographic growth patterns.

Table B.29: Segregation and White Population Share by Census Year

Census Year	Dissimilarity Index		Share White (%)
	Racial	Interethnic	
1996	0.719	0.494	15.16
2001	0.671	0.421	12.73
2011	0.660	0.430	11.65

Notes: Each observation corresponds to a 1996 municipality. Segregation indices are computed using the dissimilarity index based on the smallest available geographic units in each census (EAs in 1996, SPs in 2001, SALs in 2011). Interethnic segregation excludes English and Afrikaans speakers and captures linguistic segregation within the Black population. The last column reports the average share of White residents across municipalities (in percent).

B.4 Intermarriage

We construct a dataset at the couple level using the 10% public-use samples from the 1996, 2001, and 2011 South African censuses. Each census is originally at the individual level and identifies individuals within households. We use household composition and reported relationships to link individuals into couples, as detailed below.

Identifying Couples

2001 and 2011 Censuses. Both the 2001 and 2011 censuses include a variable reporting the line number of the respondent's spouse within the household. We keep individuals who are married (civil/religious), married traditionally, or living together as partners, and then identify as a couple those pairs of individuals who reciprocally report each other as spouses. Cases in which only one individual reports the other as a spouse are discarded.

1996 Census. Because the 1996 census does not report spouse line numbers, couples must be reconstructed from household composition. We proceed in three steps.

1. First, we restrict the sample to individuals who are married (civil/religious), married traditionally, or living together as partners, and we consider only opposite-sex individuals sharing the same marital status.

2. Second, within each household, we identify potential spouse pairs based on their reported relationship to the household head. We give priority to clear *Head/Spouse-of-head* pairs when both roles are present. When no such pair exists, we allow plausible non-head couples-for example, adult household members whose relationship categories make cohabitation credible (such as a direct relative living with a non-relative or in-law). To reduce spurious pairings, we keep only pairs with an age difference of 30 years or less.

3. Third, when a given individual has multiple plausible partners within the same household, we assign that individual to their *best partner*, defined as the candidate with (i) the most plausible relationship configuration (Head-Spouse pairs ranked highest) and (ii) the smallest age difference. We then retain only *mutual-best* matches–that is, pairs where each individual also selects the other as their best partner.

This procedure recovers both canonical Head-Spouse pairs (96% of all identified couples and 89% of all identified couples in our 18-30 reference sample) and plausible non-head couples while minimizing false matches. It yields internally consistent couple identifiers for the 1996 census comparable in structure to the explicit spouse-link variables available in 2001 and 2011.

Couple-Level Restrictions. Across all censuses, we retain only opposite-sex couples. We define an *interracial couple* as one in which the two spouses belong to different racial groups (Black, White, Coloured, or Indian/Asian). We define an *interethnic couple* as one in which the two spouses report different mother tongues, but only if they belong to the same racial

group. We set the interethnic indicator to zero for all interracial couples, ensuring that the two measures are orthogonal by construction. For example, an English-speaking White and an Afrikaans-speaking White form an interethnic couple, while an English-speaking White and an English-speaking Black form an interracial (but not interethnic) couple.

Geographic Harmonization

The 1996 and 2001 censuses report geographic identifiers at the level of the 1996 municipal district (MD), of which there are 353. The 2011 census reports geography at the 2011 municipality (MN) level, of which there are 234. We match 1996 MDs to 2011 MNs based on geographic overlap and assign each 1996 MD to the 2011 MN covering the largest share of its area.

Construction of Regression Sample

All regressions using intermarriage outcomes are estimated at the couple level. Because the censuses do not report age at marriage, we control for cohort effects using the spouses' current ages. We retain both husband's and wife's demographic characteristics (age, race, and mother tongue) in the dataset. Whenever a control variable must be defined at the couple level (e.g., when filtering on age or including age, race, or language controls), we use the husband's values by default. Results are robust to using the wife's characteristics instead. To focus on newly or recently formed couples and to avoid compositional biases from mortality or long-term stable marriages, the main analysis sample is restricted to couples where the husband is between 18 and 30 years old in a given census. Results are robust to alternative age cutoffs.

Descriptive Statistics

Table B.30 reports the prevalence of interracial and interethnic marriages by census year, among couples with husbands aged 18–30. Both forms of intermarriage were extremely rare in 1996, reflecting the legacy of apartheid-era restrictions that prohibited interracial marriage and indirectly constrained interethnic marriage through residential segregation into racially and ethnically homogeneous homelands and townships. The following fifteen years saw a steady increase in both interracial and, especially, interethnic unions.

Table B.30: Prevalence of Interracial and Interethnic Marriage by Census Year

Census Year	Interracial		Interethnic		N
	Mean (%)	Std. Dev.	Mean (%)	Std. Dev.	
1996	0.94	9.65	3.16	17.49	48,026
2001	1.54	12.32	6.60	24.83	48,513
2011	2.05	14.18	12.14	32.66	61,703

Notes: Sample restricted to opposite-sex couples where the husband is aged 18–30. Interethnic couples are defined only within racial groups; interracial and interethnic measures are orthogonal by construction.

B.5 TRC Data

B.5.1 Public Hearings

We collected the complete transcripts of all hearings from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission website and the South African Broadcasting Corporation Archives. These sources provide detailed information on the date, location, and content of each hearing.

To examine the extent to which hearings contained detailed and graphic information, we constructed a dictionary with two thematic categories: Violence and Reconciliation. The Violence category is intended to proxy the level of detail and truth revealed during the hearings, while the Reconciliation category aims to capture references to forgiveness by victims and repentance by perpetrators. The dictionaries are defined as follows:

Violence = ['abduct', 'assault', 'attack', 'arrest', 'arm', 'bomb', 'blood', 'bullet', 'burn', 'crime', 'crimin', 'dead', 'death', 'detain', 'detent', 'elimin', 'execut', 'fight', 'firearm', 'forc', 'gun', 'gunshot', 'harm', 'hurt', 'injur', 'interrog', 'kill', 'murder', 'shoot', 'suffer', 'terror', 'tortur', 'violenc', 'war']

Reconciliation = ['accord', 'agreement', 'admit', 'apolog', 'apologis', 'commit', 'truth', 'confess', 'cooper', 'justic', 'peac', 'reconcili', 'accept', 'excus', 'guilti']

We then measured the frequency of these terms as the number of occurrences per 1,000 words of transcript, allowing for comparisons across hearings of different lengths. Figure B.22 presents the distribution of these categories by hearing type over time. Interestingly, despite the different roles of victims and amnesty applicants, both types of hearings display relatively similar levels of emotional intensity and openness.

Figure B.22: Prevalence of Reconciliation and Violence Terms in TRC Hearings Over Time

(a) Reconciliation


(b) Violence

Notes: The figure shows the frequency of terms related to reconciliation and violence in TRC hearings over time, expressed per 1,000 words of transcript.

Applicant's Race and Ethnicity. We extracted the names of all amnesty applicants in order to infer their race and ethnicity. To construct this inference, we digitized a dictionary of South African names: *Jabulani* by Phumzile Simelane Kaumba, and complemented it with information from Behind the Name, a database that documents the etymology, origin, and history of first names for a wide range of countries. This process yielded approximately 12,622 unique names linked to race and ethnic categories.

For the sample of amnesty applicants, we manually coded race using applicants' first names, surnames, and, when necessary, the content of the hearings, resulting in classifications for 1,177 applicants. In addition, we implemented a dictionary-based fuzzy matching procedure using the Jaro-Winkler distance metric, which accounts for spelling variations and minor typographical inconsistencies when linking applicants' names to the reference dictionary. Validation of this approach indicates that the dictionary-based matches correctly identified race in approximately 70% of cases. Most discrepancies arose in cases where a name was strongly associated with one racial group (e.g., a first name predominantly used among white South Africans) while the surname was associated with another group (e.g., a predominantly Black surname). Due to the lack of comprehensive surname dictionaries, we were unable to extend the dictionary-based match to surnames. For ethnicity, we rely exclusively on the dictionary-based matches. Given previous validation exercises, it is very likely that names are correctly classified. To the extent that measurement error exists, it is unlikely to be systematic.

Based on these classifications, we find that among applicants who proceeded to public hearings, approximately 67% were Black (Figure B.23, Panel A). However, when considering the number of hearings, White applicants accounted for 43% of them, suggesting that, on average, each White applicant participated in more hearings (Panel B). In terms of ethnicity, most applicants belong to the Zulu group (42%), followed by Tswana (22%), Xhosa (15%), Sotho (15%), and Ndebele (6%) (Panel C).

Figure B.23: Distribution of Applicants and Hearings by Race

(a) Number of Hearings by Race of Applicant

(b) Number of Applicants by Race

(c) Number of Black Applicants by Ethnicity

*Notes*: Panel (a) shows the total number of amnesty applicants by race, while Panel (b) shows the total number of hearings associated with each race. The difference between the panels reflects the applicant may appear several hearings. Panel (c) shows the total number of black applicants by ethnicity.

Public Hearings Jun-Agust 2000. For our econometric analysis, we restrict the sample to amnesty hearings that overlapped with the first wave of Afrobarometer, as discussed in Section 6. This restriction yields 25 hearings and 61 applicants who provided statements before the Commission regarding their past wrongdoing. For this subsample, we manually extracted the race of each victim from the transcripts.

Figure B.24 shows that, among these hearings, approximately 40% involved Black applicants and 60% involved White applicants. In both groups, the majority of the violence described during the hearings was perpetrated against Black victims. Specifically, Black-on-Black violence was reported in 75% of hearings involving Black applicants, whereas White-on-Black violence occurred in 89% of hearings involving White applicants. These patterns highlight that, regardless of the applicant's race, the testimonies primarily document violence against Black victims, reflecting the broader historical context of apartheid-era abuses.

Figure B.24: Applicants and Victims by Race

Notes: The figure shows the number of applicants in amnesty hearings overlapping with the first wave of Afrobarometer, broken down by the applicant's race and the race of the victims described.

In Table B.31, we provide a detailed summary of the perpetrators from the 25 hearings used in our empirical analysis. This includes the hearing ID, applicants' names, their race, and the race of their victims. Additionally, Table B.32 presents a summary of the main crimes and motives discussed during these hearings, offering an overview of the content and context of this sample.

Table B.31: Descriptive Statistics Amnesty Applicants Jun-August 2000

ID	Date	Applicant's Name	Applicant's Race	Victims' Race	URL
1	2000-07-06	Nicolaas Jacobus Janse Van Rensburg	white	black	Link
1	2000-07-06	Christiaan Siebert Rorich	white	black	Link
1	2000-07-06	Paul Jacobus Van Dyk	white	black	Link
1	2000-07-06	William Basil Hattingh	white	black	Link
1	2000-07-06	Wybrand Andreas Lodewickus Du Toit	white	black	Link
2	2000-07-07	Eugene Alexander De Kock	white	black	Link
2	2000-07-07	Isak Daniel Bosch	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	Johannes Albertus Steyn	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	Philip Rudolf Crause	white	black	Link

4	2000-07-10	Johannes Albertus Steyn	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	Wickus Johannes Loots	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	Rudi Crause	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	Christoffel Johannes Du Preez Smit	white	black	Link
4	2000-07-10	S H Schutte	white	black	Link
3	2000-07-10	Jerry Vusumsi Richardson	black	NA	Link
6	2000-07-11	Willem Frederick Schoon	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	Martin J Naude	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	Johannes Christoffel Meyer	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	J C Coetzee	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	Johan H Le Roux	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	Eugene Alexander De Kock	white	black	Link
6	2000-07-11	Wickus Johannes Loots	white	black	Link
5	2000-07-11	Jerry Vusumsi Richardson	black	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	Philip Rudolf Crause	white	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	Frik Crause	white	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	Johannes Albertus Steyn	white	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	Willem Helm Johannes Coetzee	white	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	Anton Pretorius	white	black	Link
7	2000-07-12	A M Heystek	white	black	Link
8	2000-07-12	Paul Jacobus Van Dyk	white	black	Link
8	2000-07-12	Cornelius Johannes Botha	white	black	Link
8	2000-07-12	Isak Daniel Bosch	white	black	Link
8	2000-07-12	Butana Almond Nofomela	black	black	Link
9	2000-07-13	Tshepo Stanley Buhali	black	black	Link
10	2000-07-13	Butana Almond Nofomela	black	black	Link
11	2000-07-17	Mzwandile L Ndaba	black	black	Link
11	2000-07-17	Charles M Dieta	white	black	Link
12	2000-07-18	Samuel Mandenkosi Mandlazi	black	black	Link
12	2000-07-18	Moruti Edmond Noosi	black	black	Link
14	2000-07-19	John Thabo Sphambo	black	black	Link
14	2000-07-19	Mathedi Samuel Mangena	black	black	Link
14	2000-07-19	Mzwandile A Damoyi	black	black	Link
13	2000-07-19	Simon Mogopo Radebe	black	black	Link
15	2000-07-23	Eugene Alexander De Kock	white	black	Link
16	2000-07-24	Phila Martin Dolo	black	white	Link
16	2000-07-24	Pitso George Makume	black	black	Link
18	2000-07-25	Thaledi Ephraim Mfalapitsa	black	black	Link
17	2000-07-25	Philip Nambo Masilo	black	white	Link
17	2000-07-25	Patrick Thapelo Maseko	black	black	Link
19	2000-07-26	Vontjie Mzimkhulu Moti	black	civilians	Link
20	2000-07-27	Vontjie Mzimkhulu Moti	black	civilians	Link
20	2000-07-27	George Nkosinati Thwala	black	black	Link
20	2000-07-27	Martin Mphatla Rampomane	black	black	Link
22	2000-07-31	Shaun Mark Callaghan	white	black	Link
21	2000-07-31	Sydney Patrick Kunene	black	black	Link
21	2000-07-31	Damien Michael De Lange	white	white	Link

21	2000-07-31	Ian Hugh Robertson	white	white	Link
21	2000-07-31	Susan Catherine De Lange	white	white	Link
21	2000-07-31	Johan Maboeti Shabangu	black	black	Link
23	2000-08-01	Ronald Kasrils	white	white	Link
24	2000-08-03	Motlane Atasius Mphoreng	black	white	Link
25	2000-08-04	Simon Kaka Ngubeni	black	white	Link

Table B.32: Summary Amnesty Hearings Jun-August 2000

ID	Date	Summary
1	2000-07-06	Crimes committed include unlawful shootings, torture, and mutilation of prisoners, justified by soldiers as following orders in a chaotic military base environment. Illegal transportation of potentially illicit materials was carried out without disclosure to the driver, implicating a cover-up. Unlawful delivery of firearms was done under orders, with the deliverer unaware of the contents. Acts of violence like pouring boiling water and cutting body parts occurred in an uncontrolled setting driven by cultural and ethnic factors. The shooting of injured individuals was rationalized as humanitarian or following orders not to take prisoners. The murder of severely wounded individuals was framed as a preemptive humanitarian act. Inaction during three murders was attributed to feeling powerless to intervene. Other segments discuss procedural matters without clear crimes or motives stated.
2	2000-07-07	The crimes committed involved a series of covert operations by a group led by Mr. de Kock, recruiting individuals with military backgrounds like Mr. Kentane for missions in neighboring states. These operations included planned assassinations and attacks on members of the ANC and PAC, aiming to neutralize them through recruitment or killing. The motives behind these actions were to subdue anti-apartheid movements and eliminate opposition. Crimes included the provision of illegal weapons, murders of ANC members, theft of vehicles, possession of firearms, and attacks on houses resulting in deaths. Motives ranged from financial gain to disrupting opposition activities. The crimes were part of a broader strategy to combat perceived enemies during a time of political conflict, with support from authorities to carry out covert missions.

ID	Date	Summary
4	2000-07-10	The crimes committed involved conspiracy, murder, and assassination allegations by Security Police and Special Forces in Botswana. Motives were rooted in apartheid-era operational objectives, with Security Police providing information for these operations. The crimes related to ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe activities, including armed actions and arms possession in 1985 and 1988, justified as part of the anti-apartheid struggle. Specific crimes included the conspiracy to eliminate ANC members, resulting in the targeted killing of individuals like Nkadimeng and Molefe. The Defence Force carried out murders and bombings, targeting perceived threats to South Africa's security. Collaboration between Police and Defence Force led to the planned killings, with Security Police providing intelligence for these actions. The crimes were justified within military operational strategies and the need to manage external threats to South Africa.
3	2000-07-10	The transcript lacks explicit details on the crimes committed by the accused or their motives. It mainly discusses procedural matters related to a hearing and logistical arrangements for transporting the individual. As a result, no specific information on the crimes or motives can be discerned from the document.
6	2000-07-11	The crimes committed include an unauthorized attack on a house in Botswana, targeting Nat Serache and his wife, resulting in potential injuries. The motives were rooted in addressing perceived threats related to anti-apartheid activities and involved the management and support of terrorist activities by a safehouse for MK members. The crimes also encompass conspiracy to commit murder, malicious damage to property, and defeating the ends of justice by not reporting incidents. The assaults on individuals and the failure of police officers to report crimes constitute further offenses. Motives for these crimes include addressing security concerns, eliminating perceived threats to national security, and seeking legal protection through amnesty applications. Delays in providing necessary documents for hearings were highlighted, impacting the fairness of proceedings due to inadequate preparation time.
5	2000-07-11	The text discusses crimes potentially committed by an individual referred to as Mr. Richardson, focusing on his mental fitness for legal proceedings. Mr. Richardson underwent a psychiatric assessment, possibly related to past political violence or violations. The crimes mentioned include murder, with implications of stress and anxiety affecting his mental state. The assessments aimed to determine his criminal responsibility and the impact of his mental state at the time of the alleged crime. The text also hints at a potential political motive behind the crimes, with references to Mr. Richardson's psychological state influencing his behavior. The segment does not explicitly detail the crimes committed but focuses on evaluating his mental health and intelligence for trial proceedings.

ID	Date	Summary
7	2000-07-12	The crimes committed involved a series of incidents related to political violence during the apartheid era in South Africa. Members of the African National Congress's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), were involved in planning and executing operations against perceived threats to their cause. These actions included the assassination attempt on a prominent ANC Commander, the use of explosives to target individuals, unauthorized surveillance, and the explosion of a vehicle at a hospital in Botswana resulting in casualties. Motives for these crimes were rooted in the political struggle against apartheid, with the perpetrators justifying their actions as necessary for national security and counter-insurgency efforts. The crimes included conspiracy to commit murder, damage to property, abduction, assault, and illegal detention, all within the context of a violent and volatile period in the region's history.
8	2000-07-12	The crimes committed in the testimonies include murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, defeating the ends of justice, and perjury. The motives behind these crimes were instructions from a superior to eliminate individuals, along with a desire to protect a fellow officer. The crimes involved planned ambushes, shootings, and covert operations aimed at abducting and eliminating perceived threats. The context suggests a military or organizational framework where directives to kill were accepted as necessary actions to achieve political objectives. Justifications for the crimes were based on operational directives and a broader agenda of targeting specific individuals deemed as adversaries. The actions of the accused involved immediate lethal responses to perceived threats, attempts to conceal their actions, and deceptive communication within a structured group context.
9	2000-07-13	Multiple crimes were committed in Meadowlands in January 1988, including the bombing of municipal offices, ambushes on police vehicles, and armed attacks on law enforcement. Motivated by political resistance against eviction tactics and perceived intimidation by the police, individuals targeted police facilities to support the community and assert control over their area. Perpetrators armed with AK-47 rifles and pistols carried out planned attacks on police vehicles and stations, resulting in injuries to officers and informants. The crimes involved firing weapons at police vehicles with the intent to harm occupants, demonstrating premeditated aggression. Perpetrators aimed to show vulnerability of security forces and resist authorities, with some crimes involving unlawful possession of explosives and firearms. Testimonies revealed a lack of initial disclosure, later clarified due to misunderstanding of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's objectives.

ID	Date	Summary
10	2000-07-13	Multiple crimes were committed, including planned assassinations, unlawful shootings, and illegal transportation of individuals and weapons. The crimes were carried out by a group of individuals, possibly involving law enforcement or state agents, in a context of political or civil unrest. Motives for the crimes included eliminating threats or witnesses, self-defense claims, and armed resistance against oppressive regimes. The crimes involved shootings, possession of firearms, and mistreatment of detainees, with attempts to conceal actions and evade accountability. The individuals involved showed a lack of regard for the victims' well-being, focusing solely on carrying out the criminal acts. The context of the crimes suggests a coordinated effort among the perpetrators, with a clear intent to engage in violent activities for political or operational purposes.
11	2000-07-17	The testimonies detail various crimes committed, including assaults, unlawful arrests, physical assaults, detentions, torture, and coercive interrogation tactics. Motives for these crimes appear rooted in political agendas, such as protecting organizations from infiltration, countering threats, and extracting confessions. The context suggests a tumultuous period marked by political tensions, struggles against apartheid, and the need for control and secrecy within factions. The testimonies also mention administrative discrepancies regarding amnesty applications and confusion over procedural issues related to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Justifications for the crimes include the perceived necessity of certain measures, even if they deviated from official policies, with some actions being tacitly approved by higher-ranking individuals. The crimes were carried out by individuals within ANC structures, indicating a broader political context for the offenses.
12	2000-07-18	The accused, Mr. Mpungose, was wrongfully detained and subjected to interrogation due to suspicions of being a police informant against ANC members. The crimes committed against him include assault, coercion, physical violence, torture, and unlawful detention. Motives for these crimes were rooted in suspicions of betrayal and espionage, with perpetrators seeking control, security, and information. Mr. Mpungose faced physical abuse, coercion to admit false accusations, and mistreatment in various locations, including Chongele Farm and Angola. The context of political violence and power struggles, along with the fear for safety amid political turmoil, played a significant role in the crimes committed. The perpetrators aimed to intimidate, manipulate, and maintain dominance over Mr. Mpungose through violence and coercion.

ID	Date	Summary
14	2000-07-19	The crimes committed include mutiny, assault, theft, possession of prohibited items, wrongful imprisonment, and assault. The mutiny involved efforts to arrest mutineers during an emergency situation. Assaults were committed for discipline, personal grudges, and maintaining order during a crisis or war. Theft and possession of prohibited items were influenced by infiltrators exploiting vulnerable individuals for illicit gain. Wrongful imprisonment and death occurred due to political motives to protect the organization. Assaults were also politically motivated to maintain order within the organization and defend against opposition. The assaults and wrongful imprisonment were driven by the need to address unrest, complaints, and maintain discipline within the organization, with some incidents resulting in tragic outcomes like death and grievous bodily harm.
13	2000-07-19	The crimes committed in this case include abduction, potential extrajudicial killing, illegal possession of firearms, unlawful detainment, concealment of individuals in a safe-house, and potentially false imprisonment. These actions were carried out by members of the police force, including Mr. Radebe, in the context of state-sponsored violence during the apartheid era. Motives for these crimes were rooted in political repression, anti-insurgency efforts, and the perceived need to gather intelligence on organizations like the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The crimes were justified as part of efforts to disrupt these organizations' operations and suppress political opponents, following orders from higher-ranking officials within the police force.
15	2000-07-23	The accused, implicated in training "askaris" during the apartheid era, committed crimes including murder, conspiracy to commit murder, illegal possession of firearms, and perjury. These actions were strategically aimed at countering ANC members and preserving state security. Specific incidents involved stabbing an activist in Swaziland, shooting an ANC member at a restaurant, and misleading the Harms Commission about cross-border attacks. Motives for these crimes were politically driven, with a focus on neutralizing perceived threats and obstructing justice to protect higher-ranking officials. The context suggests a broader conflict against the ANC, with the accused considering them as terrorists and aiming to prevent their infiltration into South Africa.

ID	Date	Summary
16	2000-07-24	The crimes committed by the accused individuals, including Phila Martin Dolo and APLA members, involved armed struggle against the apartheid government in South Africa. These actions targeted members of the South African Defence Force, police, and individuals associated with the regime. Specific crimes included an ambush in Eikenhof resulting in three deaths, an attack on a vehicle occupied by Settler School children and parents, and assaults on police officers at Diepkloof. Motives behind these crimes were rooted in opposition to the apartheid system, a desire for territorial expansion for liberation efforts, and a belief that apartheid supporters were criminals. The crimes were justified as part of a guerrilla warfare strategy to dismantle the oppressive regime and reclaim land for the African population. Confessions were allegedly extracted through torture, implicating wrongful convictions of ANC members. The actions were driven by a perceived need for self-determination, resistance against apartheid, and disillusionment with the ANC's suspension of armed activities.
18	2000-07-25	The crimes committed include murder, assassination, assault, torture, illegal transportation of weapons, and false arrests within the context of the African National Congress (ANC) during the anti-apartheid struggle. Motives for these actions were often tied to political affiliations and loyalty to the ANC, with individuals following orders from higher officials like Joe Modise and Keith Mokoape. Justifications for the crimes varied, from maintaining security within the organization to extracting information or addressing internal dissent. The crimes were carried out to support the ANC's fight against apartheid, involving military operations, reconnaissance, and efforts to maintain operational capability. The perpetrators often acted under the guise of security reasons or following orders from the ANC's command structure, demonstrating a complex interplay of loyalty, political motives, and control within the organization.
17	2000-07-25	Multiple crimes were committed by the accused, including murder, robbery, assault, and attempted burglary. The crimes were motivated by directives from leaders of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African People's Liberation Army (APLA) to fund their organizations through criminal activities. The accused believed in the political ideologies of these groups, justifying their violent actions as part of the anti-apartheid struggle and a response to historical injustices. The crimes involved targeting white individuals, with specific instructions to kill, rob, or assault them. The accused followed orders from their leaders, such as Joshua Ghatle and Solomon Dlamini, to carry out these acts as tests of loyalty and commitment to the organizations. The motives behind the crimes were rooted in political beliefs, financial gain for the organizations, and a desire to challenge systemic oppression through violent means.

ID	Date	Summary
19	2000-07-26	The crimes committed by the accused individuals involved armed robbery, attempted theft, impersonation of Fidelity Guards employees, unlawful possession and use of vehicles and uniforms, and collaboration with criminal elements. Motives for these crimes included financial gain, recruitment efforts for APLA membership, and a perceived revolutionary struggle against economic injustices. The crimes were carried out with the intention of obtaining large sums of money, reclaiming stolen property, and seeking restitution for past wrongs related to land dispossession. The incidents also involved violent confrontations with law enforcement, resulting in casualties. The accused justified their actions as politically motivated responses to historical injustices and economic hardships faced by their community.
20	2000-07-27	The crimes committed by the accused involve multiple instances of car theft, armed robberies at various locations, and misappropriation of funds during a robbery at a bottle store. The accused rationalized the car thefts as "repossession" and claimed they were carried out under the direction of a figure associated with APLA. Motives for the crimes included political motivations, coercion by law enforcement, and adherence to directives from APLA and PAC. The accused denied personal gain from the thefts and robberies, stating they were part of group activities. The crimes were framed within a context of political conflict and organized crime, with the accused emphasizing their involvement in liberation movements and armed struggle against apartheid.
22	2000-07-31	The accused, seeking amnesty, committed various crimes including murder, attempted murder, assault, and grievous bodily harm at Katlehong Hospital and during military service in the South African Defence Force. Motives cited include inadequate training, political aspirations, and military objectives. Acts of violence like torture and murder were carried out in the context of interrogations to serve political parties' interests. In one instance, failing to transport a woman for cancer treatment resulted in her death, driven by a desire to maintain military secrecy. The murder and torture of SWAPO members were justified by military objectives and financial incentives. Actions were initially believed to protect South Africa but later revealed to align with supporting Angolan leader Savimbi's interests, causing disillusionment among conscripts.
21	2000-07-31	Multiple crimes were committed, including damage to property through arson attacks on a lounge, shopping complex, and a car. These acts were part of a military combat operation by an underground operative associated with the African National Congress (ANC), aimed at intimidating perceived collaborators or opponents in the context of the apartheid regime. Motives included instilling fear to discourage opposition to government actions, particularly targeting individuals involved in the electoral process. Perpetrators believed that intimidating political figures and disrupting local government structures would advance their anti-apartheid struggle. The crimes involved targeted violence, property damage, and intimidation tactics to dissuade electoral participation, with the ultimate goal of destabilizing the apartheid system. The escalation of violence led to fatal consequences, including looting and a shooting incident resulting in deaths.

ID	Date	Summary
23	2000-08-01	The crimes committed by a unit of Umkhonto weSizwe included explosions at a communications tower and a military bus, targeting personnel and institutions associated with the apartheid regime. These actions were politically motivated, part of the liberation struggle against apartheid, and aimed at weakening the oppressive system. The perpetrators, acting under command, believed collateral damage was necessary to achieve their goals. The crimes involved bombings by the Brooderstroom Cell, targeting members of the South African Defence Force, Police, or Security Services. The motive was to eliminate enemy personnel to hasten the end of apartheid, with efforts made to minimize civilian harm. The use of explosive devices in attacks aimed at specific entities while avoiding civilian casualties was justified as necessary in the struggle against apartheid.
24	2000-08-03	Multiple crimes were committed, including the murder of a security guard in Orlando East in 1986. The motive behind these acts was politically driven, with the accused being part of organizations fighting against the apartheid regime. The crimes involved illegal acquisition of weapons, planned assassinations, armed attacks on security guards, and armed confrontations with the intent to disarm guards. The attackers believed in using violence to achieve liberation and targeted private sector companies supporting the government. The crimes were part of a broader political strategy, with specific roles assigned by commanders. Justifications included self-defense, undermining government support, and following orders to disarm guards. The attackers sought amnesty, citing political motives and the need for legal forgiveness for their actions.
25	2000-08-04	The accused, referred to as Mr. Ngubeni, committed a series of crimes including murder, attempted murder, attempted escape, possession of a hand grenade, torture, wrongful imprisonment, and planned killings. These actions were allegedly carried out in the context of defending the community during a turbulent period and resisting alleged torture and coercion by law enforcement. The crimes were politically motivated, with Mr. Ngubeni claiming to be targeted by a group known as the Third Force and facing state-sanctioned harassment. The involvement of criminal elements within law enforcement and the prison system was also highlighted, indicating exploitation of the political landscape for personal or institutional gain. The accused justified his actions as self-defense and resistance against political repression, aiming to maintain control over political activists and combat violence from opposing groups.

B.5.2 Violence under apartheid

We obtained data from the South African Broadcasting Corporation Archives, which contain the TRC's register of victims of politically motivated crimes. This register compiles statements collected nationwide, in which victims or their families provided detailed accounts of killings, assaults, and other forms of politically motivated violence through written or oral submissions to regional TRC offices. Victims could submit statements in any of South Africa's official languages, making the process widely accessible. The TRC actively publicized the opportunity to come forward, but lo-

gistical challenges—including reaching remote rural areas and overcoming mistrust of authorities—likely limited participation. Despite these barriers, over 21,000 statements were collected, covering roughly 28,750 individual victims. Later, the Human Rights Violations Committee invited roughly 10% of registered victims to testify in public hearings (TRC Final Report 1998a, Vol. 1, Ch. 6).

From this registry, we are able to obtain the location of each incident (city or province, depending on transcript detail) and the date, which may be precise to the day or only the year, depending on the available records.

B.6 Data from SARS

The panel includes firms from 2008 to 2018, constructed from two types of forms submitted by firms: corporate income tax declarations (CIT) and personal income tax forms submitted on behalf of employees. We extract firms' revenue from the CIT, and infer their location from the IRP5 forms. Importantly, firms are not required to directly report their location. However, employees must indicate their firm's postal code on their tax declaration (IRP5). We assign a firm's location based on the postal code associated with the largest total wage expenditure, according to the IRP5 forms, in the most recent year the firm appears in the panel.

In addition to revenue and location, we observe the number of employees, the proportion of female employees, the average wage, and the firm's industry code. Table A.28 presents descriptive statistics for our firm-level sample, which includes 704,000 firms. The average firm has an annual revenue of 41,000 Rands and employs just under 50 people. The largest industry by firm count is finance and business (23%), followed by manufacturing (13%) and retail/motor trade (11%). Firms in the lowest quartile of TRC exposure residual tend to be smaller than those in the highest quartile, employing around 20% fewer workers and generating 33% less revenue.

C   Alternative Mechanisms

We now rule out alternative explanations for our findings that do not rely on reconciliation.

   –*Traditional elites.* One possibility is that TRC exposure weakened the authority of traditional leaders, shifting Black South Africans' political allegiance from ethnic brokers to national institutions. Rising national identity would then reflect a change in leadership preferences rather than reconciliation. However, TRC exposure does not affect trust in traditional leaders, likelihood of contacting them, or perceptions of corruption (Table C.33, columns 1-3), casting doubt on this mechanism.

   – *Liberal values.* Another possibility is that broadcasts promoted liberal civic ideals–such as individual rights, the rule of law, or free expression–that encouraged more inclusive forms of identity. We find no effect of TRC exposure on attitudes toward democracy, views on authority and dissent, or support for free speech (columns 4-6), suggesting that value transmission is not the main driver.

   –*Institutional trust.* A third possibility is that TRC exposure shifted perceptions of state legitimacy: increasing trust in the post-apartheid state among Blacks but decreasing it among Whites who viewed the TRC as biased. Yet we find no effect on beliefs about group-based discrimination, perceived equality before the law, or trust in the ruling party (columns 7-9). This rules out a trust-based mechanism.

   –*Rule of law.* Finally, we examine whether the TRC affected trust in judicial institutions. We do find a decline in trust in courts and police—especially among Whites (columns 10-11)—but these effects arise gradually and appear to be part of the longer-run social separation we document elsewhere, rather than an immediate response to the hearings. Moreover, perceptions of fairness and judicial authority remain unchanged (Columns 8-9, 12), leaving little scope for this channel.

Table C.33: Alternative Mechanisms

Dependent Variable:	Traditional Leader			Liberal Democracy			Legitimacy			Trust Judiciary		
	Trust	Contact	Corrupt	Best	Authority	Free Speech	Trust Party	Unfair	Unequal	Courts	Police	Final Say
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
TRC Media × Black	−0.036	−0.058	−0.005	−0.009	0.057	−0.009	0.028	0.048	−0.020	−0.024	0.017	−0.040
	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.039)
TRC Media × White	−0.118	−0.095	0.174	−0.077	0.079	0.036	−0.023	0.104	0.042	−0.110**	−0.051	−0.023
	(0.088)	(0.059)	(0.155)	(0.075)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.071)
Basic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ethnic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio-Econ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Muni × Wave FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.32	0.13	0.21	0.64	0.29	0.75	0.48	0.22	0.49	0.56	0.43	0.73
Adj R^2	0.12	0.10	-0.05	0.06	0.01	-0.00	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.04
Observations	6634	8813	2194	13052	4391	4391	10985	13052	10985	13052	13052	10985

Note: This table presents results on additional outcomes from Afrobarometer for the long-run analysis. The dependent variables are: whether the respondent trusts traditional leader (column 1), has contacted a traditional leader in the past 12 months (column 2), thinks traditional leaders are corrupt (column 3), whether democracy is the best political system (column 4), whether respect for authority is more important than questioning the actions of leaders (column 5), freedom of expression is more important than government being allowed to suppress expression (column 6), trust toward ruling party (column 7), own group is often treated unfairly treated (column 8), people are often treated unequally by the law (column 9), the respondent trusts courts (column 10) and the police (column 11), and whether courts should have the final say in some matters (column 12). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level. Statistical significance represented by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

In this section, we provide a more comprehensive picture of the history and legislation of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment.

The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) policy, introduced initially as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in 1993, was implemented to promote the economic participation of historically disadvantaged groups in South Africa. This policy was designed to address deep-seated racial inequalities by fostering Black ownership, management, and employment in the South African economy. One of its key components is a rating system that evaluates firms based on their performance across various dimensions of empowerment. The resulting B-BBEE scores directly affect a company's ability to engage in public sector procurement, incentivizing them to actively work towards reducing racial disparities within their operations.

Under B-BBEE, firms are evaluated according to a scorecard that includes criteria such as Black ownership, employment equity, skills development, enterprise and supplier development, and socioeconomic development. Points are awarded based on how well a firm meets these criteria, with the cumulative score determining its overall B-BBEE status. This status is crucial in the public procurement process: firms with higher B-BBEE ratings are afforded preferential treatment, increasing their chances of securing contracts. Moreover, firms with strong B-BBEE scores are also more attractive business partners for other companies seeking to improve their procurement recognition levels. The policy, thus, is supposed to create chain effects, encouraging widespread compliance with B-BBEE principles across industries.

The impact of B-BBEE compliance varies significantly based on a firm's size, with the policy categorizing businesses into three distinct groups. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), defined as those with an annual revenue below 10 million ZAR, are automatically granted the highest B-BBEE status, exempting them from the stringent requirements placed on larger businesses. Qualifying Medium Enterprises (QMEs) with revenues between 10 and 50 million ZAR are awarded a medium B-BBEE status by default. However, they have the opportunity to improve their status if they reach a B-BBEE score higher than the one assigned by default. For large enterprises with revenues exceeding 50 million ZAR, their B-BBEE status is determined entirely by their score on the B-BBEE scorecard. This tiered approach creates notable thresholds at the 10 and 50 million ZAR revenue mark, beyond which firms face stricter obligations and more pressure to improve their B-BBEE compliance. Consequently, this policy introduces significant discontinuities in compliance incentives as firms grow in size.

We focus on the 10 million ZAR threshold for two main reasons. First, this threshold is relevant to a much higher share of firms than the 50 million ZAR threshold. Second, management decisions in larger firms with multiple plants are less likely to be influenced by local conditions such as exposure to the TRC.