Computational Methods Problem Set 1

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January 2023

Part 1

A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of prices $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and allocations for the firm $\{k_t^d, n_t^d, y_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and the household $\{c_t, i_t, x_{t+1}, k_t^s, n_t^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that

1. Given prices $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, the allocation of the representative firm $\{k_t^d, n_t^d, y_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves

$$\pi = \max_{\{y_t, k_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t(y_t - r_t k_t - w_t n_t)$$
s.t $y_t = F(k_t, n_t) \quad \forall t \ge 0$ (F is homogeneous of degree 1)
$$y_t, k_t, n_t \ge 0$$

2. Given prices $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, the allocation of the representative household $\{c_t, i_t, x_{t+1}, k_t^s, n_t^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves

$$\max_{\{c_{t}, i_{t}, x_{t+1}, k_{t}, n_{t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} U(c_{t}, 1 - n_{t})$$
s.t
$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_{t}(c_{t} + i_{t}) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_{t}(r_{t}k_{t} + w_{t}n_{t}) + \pi$$

$$x_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)x_{t} + i_{t} = i_{t} \quad (\delta = 1) \quad \forall t \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq n_{t} \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq k_{t} \leq x_{t} \quad \forall t \geq 0$$

$$c_{t}, x_{t+1} \geq 0 \quad \forall t \geq 0$$

$$x_{0} = k_{0} \quad \text{given}$$

3. Market clearing conditions:

$$y_t = c_t + i_t$$
 (Goods market)
 $n_t^d = n_t^s$ (Labor market)
 $k_t^d = k_t^s$ (Capital Services Market)

Part 2

The social planner's problem for this economy is

$$w(\overline{k_0}) = \max_{\{c_t, k_t, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t, 1 - n_t)$$
s.t $F(k_t, n_t) = c_t + k_{t+1}$
 $c_t \ge 0, \quad k_t \ge 0, \quad 0 \le n_t \le 1$
 $k_0 \le \overline{k_0}$ given

Part 3

Since an allocation that maximizes the utility of the representative agent, subject to the technology constraint is a Pareto efficient allocation (by Bolzano - Weierstrass theorem), every Pareto efficient allocation is the solution to the social planner's problem.

Now we need to establish that the competitive equilibrium constitutes a Pareto efficient allocation. By the first welfare theorem, a competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Hence, the equilibrium allocation of consumption, capital, and labor coincides with those of the planner's.

Part 4

We can rewrite the social planner's problem as

$$w(\overline{k_0}) = \max_{\{k_{t+1}, n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(F(k_t, n_t) - k_{t+1}, 1 - n_t)$$
s.t $0 \le k_{t+1} \le F(k_t, n_t), \quad 0 \le n_t \le 1$
 $k_0 = \overline{k_0}$ given

Bellman equation:

$$v(k) = \max_{\{0 \le k' \le F(k,n),n\}} U(F(k,n) - k', 1 - n) + \beta v(k')$$

in which the state variable is k and the control variables are k' and n.

Part 5

Since the consumer does not derive utility from leisure, the optimal labor supply is n = 1. Hence, we have $F(k, n) = F(k, 1) = zk^{\alpha}$. Hence, the social planner's problem is:

$$w(\overline{k_0}) = \max_{\{c_t, k_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t)$$
s.t
$$F(k_t) = c_t + k_{t+1}$$

$$c_t \ge 0, \quad k_t \ge 0$$

$$k_0 \le \overline{k_0} \quad \text{given}$$

We have the corresponding Bellman equation:

$$v(k) = \max_{0 \le k' \le f(k)} \log(zk^{\alpha} - k') + \beta v(k')$$
(1)

Guess $v(k) = A + B\log(k)$, the FOC yields

$$\frac{-1}{zk^{\alpha} - k'} + \frac{\beta B}{k'} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow k' = \frac{\beta B z k^{\alpha}}{1 + \beta B}$$
(2)

Substitute back into (1), we have:

$$A + B\log(k) = \log(zk^{\alpha} - \frac{\beta Bzk^{\alpha}}{1 + \beta B}) + \beta(A + B\log(\frac{\beta Bzk^{\alpha}}{1 + \beta B}))$$

$$\Rightarrow A + B\log(k) = \log(zk^{\alpha}) - \log(1 + \beta B) + \beta A + \beta B\log(\frac{\beta Bz}{1 + \beta B}) + \beta B\alpha\log(k)$$

$$\Rightarrow A + B\log(k) = \log(z) - \log(1 + \beta B) + \beta A + \beta B\log(\frac{\beta Bz}{1 + \beta B}) + \alpha\log(k) + \beta B\alpha\log(k)$$

$$\Rightarrow B = \alpha + \beta B \alpha \Rightarrow B = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \beta \alpha}$$
$$\Rightarrow A = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left[\log(z(1 - \alpha\beta)) + \frac{\beta \alpha}{1 - \beta \alpha} \log(\beta \alpha z) \right]$$

Substitute B into (2), we have:

$$k' = \beta \alpha z k^{\alpha}$$

Part 6

Solve for the steady state value of capital:

$$k = \beta \alpha z k^{\alpha}$$
$$\Rightarrow k = (\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$

The steady state value of y: $y = F(k) = zk^{\alpha} = z(\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$ The steady state value of r:

$$r = F_k(k, n) = \alpha z k^{\alpha - 1} = \alpha z (\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha}} = \frac{1}{\beta}$$

The steady state value of w:


$$w = F_n(k, n) = (1 - \alpha)zk^{\alpha} = (1 - \alpha)z(\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}$$


The steady state value of c:


$$c = F(k) - k = F(k) - k = z(\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - (\beta \alpha z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$$


Part 7


(a) Capital decreases to 80 % of its steady state value











(b) Productivity increases permanently by 5%

