

Giancarlo Ruffo - Università degli Studi di Torino (Italy)

Manipolazione e social media

22/6/2022 - Università del Piemonte Orientale



<http://www.di.unito.it/~ruffo>


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@giaruffo



Il ruolo dell'Intelligenza artificiale

Manipolazione e disordini informativi



1^{re} ANNÉE. — N° 5.

10 CENTIMES

Dimanche 6 Octobre 1872.

RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF :
L. FLEURY

ABONNEMENTS :
PARIS

Un an _____ 6
Six mois _____ 3 10
Trois mois _____ 2 5

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ABONNEMENTS :
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Un an _____ 8
Six mois _____ 4 50
Trois mois _____ 2 50

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10, rue du Croissant, 10
Adresse où sera remise la réclamation à M. L. Fleury
Les réclamations ne sont pas reçues

LE MONSTRE marin de Marseille, par P. KLENCK et U. LEWIS.




Niente di nuovo sotto il sole?


1: Le bugie sono più veloci

- ❖ Dataset: ~126,000 storie pubblicate su Twitter da ~3 milioni di persone più di 4,5 milioni di volte.
- ❖ Lo studio considera notizie classificate come vere o false considerando come fonte 6 organizzazioni indipendenti di 'fact-checker' con una concordanza del 95 - 98%

S.Vosoughi, D. Roy, S. Aral, [The spread of true and false news online](#), in Science, 09 mar 2018: 1146-1151



- ❖ Falsehood diffused significantly **farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly** than the truth in all categories of information



- Effects were **more pronounced for false political news** than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information.

2: Sfruttamento delle camere d'eco

- ❖ La metafora delle "camere d'eco" introdotta da Cass Sunstein nel 2001
- ❖ Gruppi di individui simili che rafforzano recipricamente il proprio punto di vista
- ❖ Molti fattori
 - ❖ omofilia (selezione & influenza)
 - ❖ bias di conferma
 - ❖ effetto Back-fire
 - ❖ effetto di ipercorrezione
 - ❖ effetto carrozzone
 - ❖ ...



polarizzazione (politica) sui social






Figure 1: The political retweet (left) and mention (right) networks, laid out using a force-directed algorithm. Node colors reflect cluster assignments (see § 3.1). Community structure is evident in the retweet network, but less so in the mention network. We show in § 3.3 that in the retweet network, the red cluster A is made of 93% right-leaning users, while the blue cluster B is made of 80% left-leaning users.


la misinformazione alimenta la polarizzazione




Users engagement correlates with the number of friends having similar consumption patterns



la misinformazione alimenta la polarizzazione




Users engagement correlates with the number
of friends having similar consumption patterns
homophily!




... e la polarizzazione rafforza la diffusione della misinformation

A data-driven percolation model of rumor spreading that demonstrates that homogeneity and polarization are the main determinants for predicting cascades' size




3. il ruolo delle emozioni nei testi




- ❖ False stories inspired **fear, disgust, and surprise** in replies, true stories inspired anticipation, sadness, joy, and trust.

- ❖ False news **more novel** than true news, which suggests that people were more likely to share novel information




The role of emotions

- ❖ Large-scale social data collected during the **Catalan referendum for independence** on October 1, 2017, consisting of nearly 4 millions Twitter posts generated by almost 1 million users;
- ❖ Two polarized groups: **Independentists** vs **Constitutionalists**
- ❖ Structural and emotional roles played by **social bots**
 - ❖ Bots act from **peripheral areas** to target **influential humans** of both groups;
 - ❖ Bots bombard Independentists with **violent contents, increasing their exposure to negative and inflammatory narratives**, and exacerbating social conflict online.



4. il ruolo dei social bot



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Home / Magazine Archive / July 2016 (Vol. 59, No. 7) / The Rise of Social Bots / Full Text

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Rise of Social Bots

By Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer, Alessandro Flammini
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 59 No. 7, Pages 96-104
10.1145/2818717
Comments (1)



**nature
COMMUNICATIONS**

Article | Open Access | Published: 20 November 2018

The spread of low-credibility content by social bots

Chengcheng Shao, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Kai-Cheng Yang, Alessandro Flammini & Filippo Menczer ✉

Nature Communications 9, Article number: 4787 (2018) | Download Citation ↴

Lo strano caso Lajello

Lo strano caso Lajello

- ❖ A simple spambot can take power in a social network

"POST ITALIA MONDO POLITICA TECNOLOGIA INTERNET SCIENZA CULTURA ECONOMIA SPORT MEDIA MODA LIBRI AUTO VIDEO Q

CARLO BLENGINO BLOG VENERDÌ 27 LUGLIO 2012

Lo strano caso Lajello

f Lajello compare in rete in una fredda mattina di fine 2009, su aNobii, il social network dedicato ai libri ed alla lettura.

t Tutto inizia al Dipartimento di Informatica dell'Università di Torino dove un gruppo di ricercatori dell'[ARCS \(Applied Research on Computational Complex System\)](#) studia i complicati link e le dinamiche che si formano nei social media e sul web. Fanno data mining sulle enormi quantità di informazioni che quotidianamente immettiamo in rete, sui social network.

Nel loro lavoro il "dimmi con chi vai e ti dirò chi sei" può declinarsi al futuro: dimmi con chi vai e ti dirò non solo chi sei, ma chi sarai domani, chi conoscerai, dove andrai nelle prossime ore, cosa comprerai e chi voterai.



Carlo Blengino
Avvocato penalista, affronta nelle aule giudiziarie il diritto delle nuove tecnologie, le questioni di copyright e di data protection. È fellow del NEXA Center for Internet & Society del Politecnico di Torino. @CBlengio su Twitter

Lo strano caso Lajello

- ❖ A simple spambot can take power in a social network
- ❖ A seed of polarization found in pre-existing network structure

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MIT Technology Review

Connectivity

How a Simple Spambot Became the Second Most Powerful Member of an Italian Social Network

The surprising story of how an experiment to automate the creation of popularity and influence became successful beyond all expectation.

by Emerging Technology from the arXiv Aug 5, 2014



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- ❖ ... also the structure changed after our experiment was run!

ilPOST

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Lo strano caso Lajello

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- ❖ A seed of polarization found in pre-existing network structure
- ❖ ... also the structure changed after our experiment was run!
- ❖ What if the real identity and motivations of Lajello were fact-checked?

iPOST ITALIA MONDO POLITICA TECNOLOGIA INTERNET SCIENZA CULTURA ECONOMIA SPORT MEDIA MODA LIBRI AUTO VIDEO

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
The spread of low-credibility content by social bots

- ❖ 14 million messages spreading 400 thousand articles on Twitter during ten months in 2016 and 2017
- ❖ Social bots played a disproportionate role in spreading articles from low-credibility sources.
- ❖ Bots amplify such content in the early spreading moments, before an article goes viral.
- ❖ They also target users with many followers through replies and mentions. Humans are vulnerable to this manipulation, resharing content posted by bots.

BotSlayer and Botometer (IU)


- ❖ **BotSlayer**: it tracks and detect potential manipulation of information spreading on Twitter

<https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/botslayer/>




- ❖ **Botometer** (formerly known as BotOrNot) :checks the activity of a Twitter account and gives it a score. Higher scores mean more bot-like activity.

<https://botometer.osome.iu.edu>




...but humans should be blamed the most



The Hype Machine

- ❖ Prevalence of fake-news and role of social bots in spreading misinformation
- ❖ Bots share **novel** fake news and retweet it broadly
- ❖ Bots **mention influential humans** incessantly
- ❖ The strategy works when influential people are fooled into sharing the content.
- ❖ **Misleading humans is the ultimate goal of any misinformation campaign**



≡



The Biden Presidency

Facts First

US Elections



THE RUSSIA INVESTIGATION

Exclusive: Putin's 'chef,' the man behind the troll factory

By Tim Lister, [Jim Sciutto](#) and Mary Ilyushina, CNN

Updated 0057 GMT (0857 HKT) October 18, 2017

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▲ Dow Jones **-1.05%** ▲ Nasdaq **-2.47%** ▲ S&P 500 **-1.63%** ▲ TSLA **+3.27%** ▲ FB **+1.36%** ▲ BABA **+6.2%**

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Elon Musk will either pay far less for Twitter or use fake accounts as an excuse to walk away, experts say

Ryan Hogg May 28, 2022, 8:00 AM



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THE RUSSIA INVESTIGATION

Exclusive: Putin's 'c...'

By Tim Lister, [Jim Sciutto](#) and Mary Ilyushina, CNN

Updated 0057 GMT (0857 HKT) October 18, 2017

Il dibattito italiano sull'immigrazione (agosto 2018-luglio 2019)

Vilella, S., Lai, M., Paolotti, D., Ruffo, G. (2020). Immigration as a Divisive Topic: Clusters and Content Diffusion in the Italian Twitter Debate. Future Internet. 12. 173. <https://doi.org/10.3390/fi12100173>

Vilella, S., Semeraro, A., Paolotti, D., Ruffo, G. (2022). Measuring user engagement with low credibility media sources in a controversial online debate. EPJ Data Sci. 11, 29 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-022-00342-w>

Dati e obiettivi

- ❖ collezione di 6 M di tweet relativi al dibattito sull'immigrazione in Italia, che si è tenuto tra il 2018 ed il 2019 anche sui social - raccolti cercando per termini quanto più possibilmente neutri: "migranti", "immigrati", "immigrazione"
- ❖ Obiettivo: studiare le dinamiche di interazione
 - ❖ si formano camere d'eco?
 - ❖ ci sono gruppi riconducibili a posizioni politiche?
 - ❖ il dibattito è polarizzato?
 - ❖ quali informazioni si diffondono e come?
 - ❖ quali fonti sono usate?
 - ❖ i gruppi (comunità) si differenziano anche in virtù delle fonti usate?
 - ❖ diversi gradi di credibilità delle fonti si correlano a diversi comportamenti di fruizione dell'informazione da parte degli utenti?
 - ❖ che ruolo hanno gli account che sono (o sembrano) controllati da un bot?
 - ❖ quali sono le condizioni - tra quelle suddette - che aumentano la probabilità di successo (in termini di diffusione) di una notizia?

Figure 1. Comparison between Google Trends on '#migranti' (orange line) and volume of tweets filtered on the same keyword. The more irregular pattern in the blue line is probably due to the much higher availability of Twitter data, that helps in providing a higher resolution picture of the trend. Google queries data was available on a weekly basis only. The spikes in the data are due to the following events: (1) a NGO ship held outside of a harbour for a long time and finally let dock (August 2018), (2) the arrest of Mimmo Lucano, a City Mayor accused of favouring illegal immigration (October 2018), (3–4) a minor arrival highly covered by the news media and the International Memorial Day (January 2019), (5) seizure of the Mare Jonio NGO ship (March 2019), (6) intense month of arrivals on the Italian coasts (May 2019) and (7) arrest of the NGO ship Captain Carola Rackete.




Figure 2. Spatial distribution of the geolocated tweets (**b**) compared to the distribution of residence permits per province (**a**). Both are normalised over the number of residents per province. We can observe that the provinces that display the highest activity are Rome, Milan and Genoa. It is also clearly visible the gap in terms of Twitter activity—at least on this specific topic—between northern and southern Italy. The correlation with residence permits appears to be low (Pearson's correlation coefficient = 0.37, with p -value = 8.08×10^{-5}).




Table 3. Basic statistics of the migration debate Twitter networks.

	RT Network	Reply Network	Mention Network
Number of nodes	232,384	75,319	130,202
Number of links	2,210,242	280,318	770,505
Density	8×10^{-5}	1×10^{-4}	9×10^{-4}
Size of Giant Component	227,597	75,319	130,202
Modularity	0.48	0.44	0.25

Figure 4. Size of the communities. There is a great number of micro-communities made of only two or three nodes. The first 5 communities group together 87% of the nodes, leaving out only 29,969 nodes.




Figure 7. The graph induced by the community detection on the RT directed network, whose adjacency matrix is given in [Figure 6](#). Each super node represents a community: sizes are proportional to the number of accounts in each community. Links' directions are given clockwise.





Table 4. Table describing the communities of the RT network in terms of sizes, density, number of posts with hashtag “migranti”, top 10 nodes for in-degree centrality and top 10 most used hashtags (excluding #migranti).

ID	Size	Internal Link Density	No. of #Migranti	Highest In-Degree Nodes (Usernames)	Top Hashtags
RT1	116,831	1.5×10^{-3}	51,639	Gad Lerner, Roberto Saviano, La Repubblica, Linkiesta, Udo Gumpel, Fabio Niccolò Zancan, jacopo iacoboni, Nello Scavo, laura boldrini.	#salvini, #diciotti, #facciamorete, #immigrazione, #seawatch, #pd, #ong, #italia, #riace, #restiamoumani
RT2	34,174	1.93×10^{-2}	62,980	Giorgia Meloni, Cesare Sacchetti, Francesca Totolo, Diego Fusaro, La Verità, ImolaOggi, Giank-deR, Claudio Perconte, Il Sofista, Antonio M. Rinaldi.	#salvini, #immigrazione, #diciotti, #seawatch, #libia, #facciamorete, #riace #lega, #portichiusi, #salvininonmollare
RT3	27,845	2.4×10^{-3}	4575	Matteo Salvini, Lega - M. Salvini Premier, Noi con Salvini, TG2, Attilio Fontana, Generazione Identitaria, Marco Morini, Cittadina Italiana, Don Alphonso, Matteo SALVINI	#salvini, #diciotti, #immigrazione, #pd, #libia, #italia, #ong, #decretosalvini, #salvininonmollare, #portichiusi
RT4	9553	3.5×10^{-3}	8887	Il Fatto Quotidiano, Danilo Toninelli, Peter Gomez, Carlo Sibilia, Movimento 5 Stelle, Franco Bechis, Andrea Franchini, Le Frasi di Osho, Elio Lannutti.	#salvini, #diciotti, #immigrazione, #pd, #facciamorete, #m5s, #seawatch, #ong, #lega, #portichiusi, #dimaio
RT5	9225	2.4×10^{-2}	6193	SkyTg24, ANSA, Tgcom24, RaiNews, Agorà Estate, Agi Agenzia Italia, Adkronos, Dagospia, Ultime Notizie, Il Messaggero.	#salvini, #diciotti, #immigrazione, #facciamorete, #allnews24, #seawatch, #dimaio, #AGI, #nonstopnews, #libia

Table A1. Number of URLs per community considered in the entropy calculation after data cleaning.

ID	Number of URLs
RT1	16,659
RT2	15,573
RT3	4386
RT4	5424
RT5	6224

User retweeting URL i :



Retweet timestamp:

Day1, 9am

Day1, 11am

Day2, 1am

Day3, 5pm

Day4, 1pm

Community of the user:

RT1


RT2



RT4


RT5


RT2

<http://www.ilpopulista.it/news/23-Novembre-2017/20733/papa-ratzinger-costretto-a-dimettersi-perche-era-contro-immigrazione-e-islam.html>














Figure 3 BotScore as a function of the entropy: each dot is a URL. BotScore and Untrustworthiness by URL are computed as the average values of the scores of the users retweeting each URL. Also, dots on the left side of the plot (lower entropy) refer to URLs that have mainly “local” diffusion, while URLs on the right (higher entropy) are spread across many different communities



(a) Filter by OPs with high BotScore (> 0.70). We can see how URLs injected by alleged bots then happen to be retweeted mostly by users with high Untrustworthiness score. The average U slightly decreases as entropy increases, suggesting that this phenomenon is partly mitigated for those URLs that go farther from the community of origin.



(b) Filter by OPs with low BotScore (≤ 0.20). This confirms the relationship between the BotScore of the OPs and the Untrustworthiness score of the retweeters. We see how, in this case, the OP's low BotScore generally corresponds to a lower average U and that, unlike in the figure above, a cluster of URLs with extremely low average U surfaced.

Figure 4 Relationship between URL entropy, Untrustworthiness and BotScore of retweeting users for URLs originally shared by OPs with high BotScore (> 0.70 - above), and low BotScore (≤ 0.20 - below)




Figure 5 **(A)** Distribution of the Untrustworthiness of the retweeters disaggregated by the BotScore of the OPs. BotScore is divided into tertiles. A shift to the right can be observed as we go up the quantile ladder, displaying once again a positive relationship between the two measures; **(B)** Relationship between Entropy, average Untrustworthiness, and BotScore of the OPs. BotScore is divided into tertiles; once again, a positive relationship between the measures involved can be observed




Figure 6 Probability of success for a URL given the BotScore of the OP. Medium entropy URLs tend, in general, to be more successful than the others, regardless of the BotScore of the OPs




Figure 7 Probability of success of a tweet given the Untrustworthiness of the OP. As seen in Fig. 6 for the BotScore, medium entropy URLs tend to dominate over the others, almost always obtaining more success. The only exception being the high entropy and low- U URLs that probably represent a core of reliable, mainstream media content that are widely diffused through the network. Evidence in this Fig. and in Fig. 6 suggests that the key for a URL to be successful is to be diffused beyond its originating community, but without getting too far from it, or better yet, without being shared in too many other communities

Discussion

