# Bank capital and capital regulation

title-page

Jaromir Benes <u>jaromir.benes@gimm.institute</u>
Tomas Motl <u>tomas.motl@gimm.institute</u>

GIMM-NBR Macroprudential Modeling Workshop Kigali, July 2023

Workshop repository:

https://github.com/gimm-institute/july-2023-rwanda-workshop.git

### Overview

### **Bank capital**

- Balance sheet capital accumulation
- Internal and external capital flows
- Regulatory capital

### Internal and external capital flows

- Components of period profit/loss
- External flows


### Capital adequacy and bank behavior

- Regulatory capital
- Target capital levels

### Feedback to bank lending

- Regulatory capital shortfall
- Nonlinear cost of bank capital

# Bank capital accumulation



### Bank capital accumulation

$$bk_t = bk_{t-1} + prof_t + xcf_t$$

- $bk_t$  is bank capital (balance sheet capital)
- $prof_t$  is an internal flow of capital (retained profit or loss, PnL) recorded on the closing balance of the balance sheets at t-1 and credit events throughout t
- $xcf_t$  is an external flow of capital throughout t: dividends paid out (–), new equity issuance (+), equity withdrawals by parents (–), recapitalization flows (+), etc.

### Internal capital flows (Period profit/loss)

#### Components of period profit/loss

- Interest income on loans (by segments)
- Income on other assets
- Interest expense on non-equity liabilities (by currency of denomination)
- Provisioning and write-offs
- Exchange rate valuation
- Other net income (proxy for fees, commissions, labor costs, etc.)

$$egin{split} prof_t &= \sum r l_{t-1}^k \left( l p_t^{0k} + l n c_t^{0 \, k} 
ight) \ &+ \ ron a_{t-1} \ on a_{t-1} \ &- \ r d_{t-1}^{ ext{lcy}} \, d_t^{\, 0 \, ext{lcy}} - r d_{t-1}^{ ext{fcy}} \, d_t^{\, 0 \, ext{fcy}} \ &- \ \sum \left( a_t^k - a_{t-1}^k + w_t^k 
ight) \ &+ \ \sum l_{t-1}^k \left( j_t - 1 
ight) \, - \ d_{t-1}^{ ext{fcy}} \left( rac{e_t}{e_{t-1}} - 1 
ight) \ &+ \ c_1 \cdot t n a_{t-1} \end{split}$$

### External capital flows

#### Switch between two extreme cases

- $c_1 \rightarrow 0$  External capital flows do not respond to fluctuations in capital adequacy ratio. Bank owners do not adjust external flows (e.g. dividends) based on the current profit/loss at all.
- $c_1 o 1$  External capital flows bring capital adequacy ratio to its target level at all times. Bank owners adjust external flows (e.g. cut dividends, add capital) to always ensure  $car_t = car_t^{\rm tar}$ .

$$(1-c_1)\left(\left[rac{xcf}{bk}
ight]_t-\left[rac{xcf}{bk}
ight]_{ ext{ss}}
ight)-c_1\left(car_t-car_t^{ ext{tar}}
ight)=0$$

### Regulatory capital and CAR

- Balance sheet capital,  $bk_t$ , and regulatory capital,  $bg_t$ , differ in their definitions and reporting standards
- Either use a mechanical reconciliation process (as is here) or model the details of the differences

### Regulatory capital

$$bg_t = \left[rac{bg}{bk}
ight]_t bk_t$$

#### Standard capital adequacy ratio

$$car_t = rac{bg_t}{riskw_t \cdot [(l_t - a_t) + ona_t]}$$

•  $riskw_t$  is the effective average risk weight, an exogenous variable

### Comfort (target) levels of CAR

In equilibrium (steady state), banks target a comfort level of CAR

$$egin{aligned} car_t^{ ext{tar}} &\longrightarrow car_t^{ ext{tar}} \ car_t^{ ext{tar}} &= car_t^{ ext{min}} + car_t^{ ext{exc}} \end{aligned}$$

#### where

- ullet  $car_t^{\min}$  is the regulatory minimum including regulatory buffers
- $car_t^{
  m exc}$  is the excess capital target above the regulatory minimum targeted by banks. Banks are motivated to hold excess capital to avoid approaching regulatory minimum in case of unexpected adverse shocks.

### Feedback to bank lending

#### Capital adequacy risk surcharge


Negative shocks can push the the actual CAR  $car_t$  below the optimal level  $car^{tar}$ . If  $car_t$  approaches regulatory minimum  $car_t^{\min}$ , capital shortfall triggers increase in capital adequacy risk surcharge  $rx_t$ . The surcharge is added to the lending rates as the bank attempts to increase profitability as well as reduce lending to shrink its balance sheet.

- ullet  $car_t^{
  m tar}$  Tighter lending conditions: Increase spreads, reduce leverage
- ullet  $car_t > car_t^{
  m tar}$  Lax lending conditions: Reduce spreads, expand balance sheets

## Functional form of risk surcharge

The risk surcharge is a non-linear function of the distance to regulatory capital shortfall (distance to  $car_t^{\min}$ )

$$rx_t = \underline{rx} + \left(\overline{rx} - \underline{rx}
ight)igg[1 + \exp{-rac{car_t - car_t^{\min} - \mu}{\sigma}}igg]^{-\exp{
u}}$$



| Parameter        | Meaning   |
|------------------|---|
| $\mu$            | Location parameter: moves the curve left or right                   |
| $\sigma$         | Scale parameter: makes the curve steeper/flatter                    |
| ν                | Shape parameter: makes the curve asymmetric, heavy left/heavy right |
| $\underline{r}x$ | Lower bound   |

| Parameter       | Meaning     |
|-----------------|-------------|
| $\overline{r}x$ | Upper bound |