After reading the article, “Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons,” I struggle with Parfit’s explanation of to what extent of what we believe ourselves, because his explanation does not account for the value of the brain. Parfit talks about a “range” as portions of replacements where there is a critical percentage needed to be considered either “yourself” or a replica. In the teletransportation scenario, Parfit considers this a “far end” and I would agree that a this scenario is an extreme spectrum where 100% of the cells are “replace,” which in this case, it is easier to argue that the new being is not “yourself,” but a replica that is psychologically continuous with you. However, Parfit defines “range” as a percentage of replacement, but what about the value of self in certain parts like the brain.

Many would say the brain is the definition of “you,” because it is your mind which contains the memories, experiences, and feelings. As a result, the brain would be more of “value” when defining whether the “being” is you or not. For an example, a hypothetical case, like a brain transplant, if your brain was transplanted into another body, would it still be consider a replica? I would argue that it is you despite the 10% replacement, because the brain is an essential part of what defines you. In the teletransportation machine, your brain is recreated, so it would hypothetically be psychologically continuous with you but still a replica because the physical brain is not the same. With a brain transplant, the same mind is transplanted, because all the memories, experiences, and feelings are still yours physically versus a kidney transplant or the replicate brain. Therefore, I disagree with Parfit’s range, because 10% replacement of the kidney is different from a 10% of the brain because the “self” value that belongs to each.