



HBOMOX

DTC Security

Fraud Management

Piracy / Content Security Investigation Overview

10 August 2021



Agenda


DTC/FM Joint Piracy Operations Overview


- a. Popcorn Release Piracy Research Overview
- b. Account Integrity as a Contributor to Piracy

Technical Overview, Challenges, and Roadmap

Questions and Answers

We Have A Porblem.






Pirate Party Popcorn Party

Joint Piracy Operational Tooling

- Pulls of CDN and DRM Loas
- Custom Built Torrent Scraping Tooling
- Industry Watermark Detection Software
- Good Old Internet Sleuthing
- Highly Calibrated Mark 1 Eyeball







Joint Piracy Operational Goals


- Confirmation of high quality (4K/UHD) content theft with accurate timestamps and tooling familiarization for possible expansion of operations
- Independent verification of vendor reporting for content theft
- DRM functionality research and piracy operation intelligence
- Accurate timestamps of pirated release to narrow CDN and DRM log reviews
- Cool Eyepatches and Team Parrot (budget pending on 🥻



Account Integrity

Why can't we just drop user-based session based watermarks on our clients and be done with it?





June 2021 ATO and Compromise Activity

- High level of Compromised Credential and Account Takeover activity increases the likelihood that the source account of an asset was stolen or used against the account holder's knowledge
- This makes targeted legal actions accounts difficult at best, however identifying source accounts would provide valuable and specific logging as well as a pathway to increase friction on specific accounts

June KPIs

Recovered Accounts

Number of customer accounts which have been repaired including password resets and email rollbacks.



Email Notifications Sent

Emails sent to active customers only to alert them for password resets.




Login Success Rate

Indicates the percentage of traffic that legitimate (Credential stuffing activity lowers this rate)



Pirates and "popcorn" releases




Pirates and "popcorn" releases


- Wonder Woman 1984 on 2020-12-25
 - 45 min. to Full HD rip from HBO Max
- The Little Things on 2021-01-29
 - 3 min. to Full HD rip from HBO Max

NOW-TYPICAL PATTERN

FHD and UHD rips up to private torrent network within 10 minutes of HBO Max release (usually 5 minutes ... sometimes 2 minutes)



Pirates and "popcorn" releases



EXECUTIVE REPORT

Project Overview

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. engaged to assess the security of the HBO Max applications. The following report details the findings identified during the course of the engagement, which started on June 8, 2020.

Goals

- Identify any implementation flaws in the digital rights management (DRM)
- Test and document HBO Max's adherence to the content security requirements set forth by studios
- Test and recreate attacks from streaming piracy software
- · Attempt to copy DRM-protected content from CDNs
- Verify region locking is in place to prevent content from being accessed in restricted countries

FINDING COUNTS

1 Low

5 Informational

6 Total findings

SCOPE

HBO Max DRM

DATES

06/08/2020 Kickoff

06/08/2020 - 06/26/2020 Active testing

07/08/2020 Report delivery

ASSESSMENT REPORT

TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
HBO MAX CONTENT SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2020
JULY 8, 2020

Summary of Findings


The HBO Max mobile applications for iOS and Android were found to follow modern best practices for DRM implementations, and the use of FairPlay and Widevine DRM preemptively thwarted common attacks such as key interception and forced DRM downgrades for both online streaming and offline viewing. At no point in the assessment were content encryption keys exposed, and no methods were identified by which an attacker could rapidly download and decrypt protected content. Well-known screen

Content security assurance efforts to date


• DTC Security goals for content security

- Stop faster-than-runtime Ultra HD content rips
- Stop Ultra HD "screen recordings" <-> Stop faster-than-runtime Full HD content rips

Attack Surface: Content supply chain




- In order to effectively protect our content we must completely understand how content is delivered, from Distributor to Consumer.
- The DTC Security Team conducted a <u>threat model</u> across our known MSR.




Attack Surface : Vs. Industry Peers

- We do not have DRM in-house so rely on Google, Microsoft, and Apple's overall settings for how we license content to specific devices
 - o Bringing Widevine in-house is on HBO Max roadmap and expected later this year
- All devices go through the same authentication pathway, limiting what security controls we can use there
- Our Media Delivery architecture uses 5 separate CDNs with dynamic switching and no access control
 - This is performant but sacrifices security
 - Inconsistent levels of logging
 - No explicit authN, authZ, or access control
- No user-based or session-based watermarking.

Attack Surface : DRM Introduction




Attack Surface : DRM Introduction



Security Level	Device/Technical Differences	HBO Max Top Quality Provided	
L1	Video processing and decryption occurs all in trusted execution env. (TEE)	2160p , Dolby Atmos, etc.	Goldany S20- 9G Firetv Stick 4K Miller garbon Proech gerformen. Hould 1000 MITULE 1009 MITULE MI
L2	Video processing occurs outside TEE, decryption occurs inside		
L3	Does not have a trusted execution area (TEE) so sensitive stuff hidden in usual device memory	1080p	WEB BROWSER OLDER PHONES OLDER DEVICES

NOVEMBER 2020




```
JS content_key_decryption.js > ....
      This is where the magic happens
      var WidevineCrypto = {};
      (function() {
      // The public 2048-bit RSA key Widevine uses for Chrome devices in L3, on Windows
      WidevineCrypto.chromeRSAPublicKey =
                                                                                                                                                                                          unted, briumoveties, huld
      -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
      MIIBIjANBqkqhkiG9w@BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCqKCAQEAtdHcRBiDWMxdJyKDLTPD9OTapumVnW+9q6k3RSfUM@CESFEufZUJG
                                                                                                                                                                                                ma, hold
      aOibJklLBkd7Yfn10ndVrenMKTE1F4/6jgSrmwyv4gFQ1u8M/ThZUrAgb8pTmKfb9vrv1V8AApwVzcQg3s48eESnKjBU99Vk8-
      YrOzlde+V3U0b5FVzPcrOmaERfyuiV3h4sHGRbTCsgYVwMal07hnNmtemwt0xBuf5Juia7t1scuJyp08lI1iEsB+JZVo3Uovf
      COIDAGAB
      ----END PUBLIC KEY-----
      // The private 2048-bit RSA key Widevine uses for authenticating Chrome devices in L3, on Windows
      // Extracted by applying some mathematical tricks to Arxan's white-box algorithm
      WidevineCrypto.chromeRSAPrivateKey =
      -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
      MIIEvOIBADANBgkghkiG9w0BA0EFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBA0C10dxEGINZbF0nIoMtM8705Ngm6ZWdb72D
                                                                                                 WidevineDecryptor: Found key: 8994158f5f7c381dbd27c5bf7022163d (KID+0100b325be9f4639a79d5add80fa8f6c)
      dYHRc7Fo6JsmSUsGR3th+fU6d1Wt6cwpMTUXj/q0DmubDK/ioVDW7wz90FlSsCBvyl0Yp9v2+u/VXwACnBXNu
                                                                                                WidevineDecryptor: Found key: ede37d324da4363cedd6009a592433e8 (KID=01011abdf76a4acfbb781a8cce708698)
      ozB+02xis70V175XdQ5vkVXM9ys6ZoRF/K6NXeHiwcZFtMKyphXAxqU7uGY2a16bC3TEG5/km6Jru3Wxy4nK
                                                                                                 WidevineDecryptor: Found key: 88ffad2d235b0d97e4ee254c288b4116 (KID=0102f1161f8a40eab676d133ba6c879f)
      YCKtYe8JAgMBAAECggEAGOPDJvFCHd43PFG9qlTyylR/2CSWzigLRfhGsClfd24oDaxLVHav+YcIZRqpVkr1
                                                                                                 A4FA21D13F1D10388752078C7F1168F1:0100b325be9f4639a79d5add80fa8f6c has status 'usable'
      Hf91+KVFk+fGdEG+3CPgKKQt34Y0uByTPCpy2i10b7F3Xng0Sicq1vG33DhYT9A/DRIjYr8Y0AVovq0VDjWq
      @GVk17YpBiB/iTpw4zBUIcaneQX3eaIfSCDHK@SCD6IRF7kl+u0RzvWqiWlGzpdG2B96uyP4hd3WoPcZntM7
                                                                                                 A4FA21D13F1D10388752078C7F1168F1:01011abdf76a4acfbb781a8cce708698 has status 'usable'
      HqDPduIm4hEAZf6sQLd8Fe6ywM4p9K0EVx7YPaFxQHFSqIiWXswildPJl8Cq5cM2EyMU1tdn5xaR4VIDk8e2
                                                                                                 A4FA21D13F1D10388752078C7F1168F1:0102f1161f8a40eab676d133ba6c879f has status 'output-restricted'
      IhlLdcYp5Kx1J3mwINSS094ShwKBgQDavJvF+c8AINfCaMocUX8knXz+xCwdP438GoPQCHa1rUj5bZ3qn3XM
                                                                                               DevTools failed to load SourceMap: Could not load content for https://play.hbomax.com/is/app.is.map: HTTI
      Zo40F7IUedFB558588yAg7RiPhN2V0C8LRdDh5ognFufjafF82y9d+/czCrVIG43D+K02j4F7wKBgDg/HZWF
      iVilOcZAvXOMTA5LMn013ExeE2m8MdxaRJyeiUOKnrmisFYHuvNXM9gh0PtKIgABmA200G728SX5LHd/RRJq
                                               O Tomer 4 months ago Ln 1 Col 1 Spaces: 4
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• DTC Security goals for content security

Stop faster-than-runtime Ultra HD content rips
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Determine compromised decryption keys (device system ID) so Widevine* can revoke










^{*} Once we have Widevine DRM in-house, we could downgrade or otherwise handle more granularly than full key revocation

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





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
Warner/Media

Attack Surface: Logging and data around content consumption







Attack Surface: Logging and data around content consumption



Attack Surface: Logging and data around content consumption



Black Hat Asia 2021 exploit



- blackhat.com page
- Slides link (PDF)
- Whitepaperlink (PDF)

Steps forward

• Widevine DRM in-house

- Act on specific device IDs, i.e. limit quality of Qualcomm exploit-affected devices
 - Anything suspicious in the future

User Level based watermarking pilot

- Identify accounts that are the source of leaked content to perform targeted analytics on content thieves.
- Allows for future action against repeat offenders and increased friction on accounts with weak security

Continue other product security and fraud measures

o All connects together, i.e. login attacks degrade integrity of "who" an account is

Questions?










(BACKUP)

Popcorn Release Joint Piracy Operations







RUNTIME: 2 h 12 min

IMECUT-torrent-16453214.html [WARNING] config.execution.do_downloads is TRUE but no magnet link to download.

ID: 50559768

Time: Thu, 05 Aug 2021 23:46:03 GMT

Title: The.Suicide.Squad.2021.2160p.HMAX.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.Atmos.DV.MP4.x26

Provider : ThePirateBay

Seeds/Peers : 0/0

ed&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.coppersurfer.tk%3A6969%2Fannounce&tr=udp%3A%2F%2F9.rar bg.to%3A2920%2Fannounce&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.opentrackr.org%3A1337&tr=udp%3A%2 F%2Ftracker.internetwarriors.net%3A1337%2Fannounce&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.leeche

Fannounce&tr=udp%3A%2F%2Ftracker.cyberia.is%3A6969%2Fannounce

[INFO] Adding torrent to your Transmission torrent client...

Our Data Structure is a Tangled Web 🕷 🁚

To make any sense of a specific user's behavior on our service using one of a series of key indicators, we have to perform a complex series of joins and backflips to get to actionable account information*

[Something about systematizing account behavior detection goes here]

