

# CCTF - Report

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## **Contents**

# 1 Overview

This report concern the two cctf laboratories:

- **Resilient CCTF:** During this ctf the main purposes were both to attack and defend a HTTP server against different type of attacks.
- **Secure CCTF:** During this ctf the main purposes were both to attack and defend a small php webapp.

It's possible to find all the scripts and file used for this exercise in this [repository](#).

## 2 Resilient Server

As already introduced in the Overview section this cctf was targeted to both offend and defend an HTTP server. Each group during the experience have access to two Deterlab experiments, in the first experiment the group will act as defenders (Blue Team) and in the second as attackers (Red Team).




Figure 1: Topology of the Resilient Server CCTF.

This image describe the topology of the laboratory, that can be subdivided in 3 areas:

- **Clients machines:** These machines will be used from the attacker team. One of the three computer will be used as the genuine client that will try to reach the server with legitimate requests with a maximum rate of 1 request every second, the attackers will use the other two machines to attack the server in order to try to deny service to the genuine client.
- **Server and Gateway:** This two machine will be used from the defender team, in the specific the server will be equipped with a webserver, that serve 10 html pages, and the gateway will be used to try to block eventual attacks.
- **Router:** This machine will connect all the machines controlled from the two groups and will be used to calculate the score.

**Attention:** The link between router and gateway is different from all the other links. In the specific the link provide 1 gb of bandwidth and allows all the client connected to the router to send the maximum amount of data allowed from the 100 mb links, and this is very suitable to launch flood attacks.

During the ctf attackers earn a points when a genuine request from the client take more than 0.5 seconds to be received, and on the contrary the point is given to the defenders group if the request is received from the client before half a second is passed.

## 2.1 Dupre

After our initial meet-up I, along with Giovanni Guadagnini, started working on milestones for the "blue task" I.E for the defense of our infrastructure and server. I mainly worked on two scripts:

- `milestone1.sh`: This script fulfill the requirements expressed in the first milestone of our blue task, which is "Develop monitoring at the server that will let you automatically check the content of HTTP requests you are getting and who is sending them". It is quite straightforward; it starts by asserting which is the right ETH to monitor on our server, by using the `ip` command in combination with a `grep` of the right ip address and a `cut` to isolate the ETH. We then launch `tcpflow` with this newly found ETH and port 80. The output is then send to a `AWK` command keeping only the source and destination address, as well as wich file was requested and its content. The output is then stored into `milestone1.txt`. This script was later reworked and replaced by `packet_inspection.sh`.
- `alternative_packets_stats.py`: This file is an alternative way of collecting data on incoming packets. This process is entirely done with the help of the `scapy` python library. Once a packet is received, we pick out the information that are interesting to us, mainly from which address this packets is coming from as well as what type of packet this is and its length. To do so, we check with flag is raised in our packet, for example SYN or ACK. We keep a count of each type of packet as well as how many come from which address. Every five seconds, a report is displayed showcasing all these information, all counts as well as our tally of IP addresses are then reset to 0. This program, despite being reactive and usefull, may suffer from slowdown when under extremely high load, this did not impact us negatively during the ctf itself.

In addition to this, several sessions were done to showcase between ourselves the advancement of our work as well as find ideas. Finally, I did some research on preventing spoofing in case of dos, leading me to the 2009 scientific paper Detecting and Preventing IP-spoofed Distributed DoS Attack by Abdulmotaleb El Saddik, which showed that considering our current configuration, this would be hard if not impossible to implement.

### 2.1.1 Results Evaluation

During the actual resilient CTF. My role was to mainly analyze packets coming from the attackers, as well as check their content and try to formulate countermeasure. The main defense I came up with was a way to block message with a length superior to what we deemed acceptable. This was quickly implemented and then removed since it had little effect on the attacks.

## 2.2 Guadagnini

The work started working by developing some milestones:

- `monitor_server.sh`: This script perform a really fast check of the server status. By sending ping and curl requests the user can easily understand if the server it's slowed down by some attacks.
- `analyze_traffic.sh`: This script launches two python programs that by using `tcpdump`, thanks to system function of `os` python module, and finally by analyzing the collected traffic, will enable the user to know with precision how many packets have passed through the gateway and also which client are sending data. This script in the end wasn't used since another version of the same script that uses only python seemed to be a bit faster.
- `flood.sh`: This is a simple script that act as a wrapper for the flooder program that will enable the user to flood an ip by specifying less parameter than usual.
- `slow_loris.py`: This script has been dowloaded it from its repository and in the first moment has only been modified to request for the pages provided from the server.

The initial part has been concluded by writing the `startup.sh` script for all the machines involved the cctf:

- Blue part `startup.sh`: This script by using `ssh` will connect to the server and will automatically install the `apache2` webserver, enable `syn-cookies`, create the pages in the `/var/html/www` folder, enable the `slow-loris` mitigation for `apache2`, setup the `iptables` rules and finally upload the milestone scripts in a shared folder `/home/cctf`. Also will configure the gateway by uploading the script and configuring the `iptables` rules.

- Red part startup.sh: Through ssh will install all the packages needed and will all upload the milestone scripts on a shared folder /home/cctf in all the client machines.

In all the scripts the interface has been inserted as a parameter thanks to a sort of subscript that using the ip address of the interface was able to return the name of the interface as a result.

```
# Retrieve the name of the internal interface of the gateway machine
$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5) $
```

### 2.2.1 Strategy

Has also been developed the defense and attack strategy, that which over time have been modified according to the results obtained during the internal tests.

**Defense strategy** The first idea used was to limit the attack surface to a minimum and therefore to reduce it to a minimum and indispensable, so the iptables both on server and gateway have been used to try to block the unnecessary traffic. A white list approach has been used to allow only some kind of traffic to pass and finally reach the server, in the specific has been allowed:

- All the traffic from loopback interface.
- All the traffic generated and directed to deterlab control network (192.168.0.0/16).
- All icmp traffic between gateway and server in the network 10.1.5.0/24.
- Icmp packet generated from the external network with a maximum rate of 1 ICMP packet per second.
- The fragmented packets have been blocked to avoid fragmented attacks.
- All the incoming http traffic on port 80, and obviously the outgoing traffic generated from the server.

Finally has been specified the DROP default policy for all the iptables chains in order to block all the traffic that won't match the rules.

Rules configured in the gateway:

```
sudo iptables -F
sudo iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -f -j DROP
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d 10.1.5.2 -s 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 --dport 80
-m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -s 10.1.5.2 -d 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 --sport 80
-m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -f -j DROP
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -s 10.1.5.2
-i \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5) -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply
-o \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5) -d 10.1.5.2 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -o \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5)
-d 10.1.5.2 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -i \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5)
-s 10.1.5.2 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -d 10.1.5.2 -o \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5) -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 80 -s 10.1.5.2 -i \$(ip a | grep 10.1.5.3 | tail -c 5) -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A INPUT -i \$(ip a | grep 10.1.1.3 | tail -c 5) -d 10.1.1.3
-s 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request
-m hashlimit --hashlimit-name icmp_gw --hashlimit-mode srcip
--hashlimit 1/second --hashlimit-burst 5 -j ACCEPT
```

```

sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -o $(ip a | grep 10.1.1.3 | tail -c 5) -s 10.1.1.3
    -d 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply
    -m hashlimit --hashlimit-name icmp_gw --hashlimit-mode srcip
    --hashlimit 1/second --hashlimit-burst 5 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -i $(ip a | grep 10.1.1.3 | tail -c 5)
    -d 10.1.5.2 -s 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 -p icmp
    -m hashlimit --hashlimit-name icmp_srv --hashlimit-mode srcip
    --hashlimit 1/second --hashlimit-burst 5 --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -o $(ip a | grep 10.1.1.3 | tail -c 5) -s 10.1.5.2
    -d 10.1.2.0/24,10.1.3.0/24,10.1.4.0/24 -p icmp
    -m hashlimit --hashlimit-name icmp_srv --hashlimit-mode srcip
    --hashlimit 1/second --hashlimit-burst 5 --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -P INPUT DROP
sudo iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
sudo iptables -P FORWARD DROP

```

To protect the server against slow DoS attacks, such as slow-loris, the libapache2-mod-qos has been enabled and configured, this module basically disables the keep-alive messages when the connections in the pool are running out in order to try to keep the service online and available.

Moreover, in an attempt to reduce problems related to malicious opening of connections with the web server, the apache timeout time has been reduced from 300 seconds to 1 second which for the purpose of this competition is sufficient to keep a connection active for the time used to assign a point.

**Snort** was also tried to improve defenses with some basic rules. By using the installation script present in the an older laboratory in the end Snort was installed in the gateway. Snort in particular can be very useful for thwarting some attacks but it is very harmful for flooding attacks as being single thread it does not scale very well when the number of requests rises significantly. So using Snort was very useful since was able to stop slow\_loris attack very easily but when a simple Syn flood attack was initiated, the performance collapsed causing significant delays in delivering the packets to the server and therefore to the genuine client. another problem with snort was the installation time, in fact before using the program it was necessary to wait for snort to compile and install on the system which took a long time. For the reasons outlined above snort was discarded and other techniques were sought and subsequently used.

As a result of the attacks tested, the security measures implemented were able to defend the server from slow dos attack thanks to the apache module but were vulnerable to flood attacks as a way to limit large amounts of traffic directed to the server had not yet been implemented.

From the beginning rate limiters used with Snort or iptables seemed not suitable since they were cutting off good and malicious traffic without distinction for a certain amount of time. The final idea for the defense was trying to inspect the traffic and search difference between genuine and malicious traffic, in order to let only packets that should be genuine through the gateway. Two very useful iptables option has been found and used to cut the malicious traffic. In the specific the two modules named **match-hex** and **match-string** by inspecting the content of the packets were able to identify malicious packets.

So in the end the defense, in addition to some configurations made in the server, consisted of 2 steps:

- Use tcpdump and Wireshark to collect data and search for differences or special pattern in the packets.
- Use the two iptables modules to cut the traffic identified as malicious during the previous step.

Despite the large traffic generated by flood attacks, iptables, with a limited number of rules used to filter incoming traffic, has always managed to maintain good performance and for this reason it has been used as the main part of the defense.

**Attack strategy** Defense and attack strategies were developed simultaneously, when a problem was solved a new attack that took advantage of more sophisticated methods was created and used to try to send the server out of service. This process of continuous modifications led to the modification of the attacks so that with each "iteration" each attack was better and in the specific each time the attack were modified in order that it had been

more difficult to distinguish genuine from malicious traffic.

In an attempt to optimize the score gained / lost during the attack phase, the following idea was formulated and used: if the attacks we were using weren't working or were partially working, there was no need to send the maximum requests possible and accordingly to this fact the genuine traffic could be lowered to the minimum or just simply reduced to lower the number of points opponents were earning. So following this idea the `genuine_client.sh` script was modified to change on-demand the rate of the request sent by reading a file created in the same folder, the rate could be easily modified using the script `change_rate.sh` that remotely through `ssh` was able to modify the rate value saved on the file.

In order for the `slow_loris.py` to be less recognizable, the request header has been redefined to be the same of `curl` and the content of the keep-alive requests has been randomized in order to be more difficult to detect and block.

By observing the attacks has been suggested also to use scripts or packages that were able to modify the header fields in order to make the attack packes as indistinguishable as possible from genuine traffic, for example by putting the window at the same value that is used by `curl 64240` and using modified headers as for the slow loris attack.

Finally has been discovered that while using flood attacks a single process wasn't able to generate very big amount of traffic, for example over 70000 packet per second. So accordingly to the available bandwidth of the link has been suggested to lower down the number of packets generated from a single process during flood attacks in order to make sure to take advantage of the available bandwidth with multiple processes that were concurrently generating a reasonable number of packets.

### 2.2.2 Results Evaluation

During the two cctfs by analyzing the traffic an by using the match module of iptables the defenses were able to cut a very big amount of malicious traffic.

During the first cctf, before the laboratory crashed a very big portion of the attack traffic was blocked from the gateway and it seemed that the server was able to respond to genuine requests quickly.

Unfortunately in the second ctf the adversary team has been were very smart and managed to make the defenses to be ultra-protective. In fact, using fragmented genuine requests, which were blocked by default by the gateway, they managed to score many points as the requests to the server never arrived. One of the methods used to defend, in addition to blocking fragmented packets, was in fact to check that the DF (do not fragment) bit was not set to 1 in requests, this was typical in syn packets of flood attacks, but unfortunately it was also used from the other team to generate the genuine requests. Also by interspersing fragmented and non fragmented genuine requests they managed to "protect" their attack as it seemed that the server was working correctly.

```
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 6854K packets, 1076M bytes)
 pkts bytes target    prot opt in
 26M 2744M DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "|0200|" ALGO name bm TO 50 tcp dpt:80 flags:0x17/0x02
3110K 388M DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "|0200|" ALGO name bm FROM 30 TO 34 tcp dpt:80 flags:0x17/0x02
 14M 2196M DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match ! "|4000|" ALGO name bm TO 10 tcp dpt:80 flags:0x17/0x02
```

Figure 2: FORWARD iptables chain in gateway cctf1.

```
pkts bytes target    prot opt in
7859 1007K DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "Host: server" ALGO name bm TO 65535 tcp dpt:80
 28 8568 DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:27.0
ALGO name bm TO 65535 tcp dpt:80
384M 18G DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match ! "|4000|" ALGO name bm TO 10 tcp dpt:80 flags:0x17/0x02
34275 130M DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" ALGO name bm TO 65535 tcp
t:80
 93M 3702M DROP      tcp  --  *    STRING match "|ffff|" ALGO name kmp FROM 30 TO 34 tcp dpt:80 flags
x17/0x02
```

Figure 3: FORWARD iptables chain in gateway cctf2.

This images shows the rules added during the two ctf, as it's possible to see from the second column, the amount of dropped traffic is very big around 25 GB if we consider both the ctf.

In the specific the rules used were similar to the following:

```
# Check for window = 65535
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 --match string --algo bm --from 30 --to 34 --hex-string '|ff ff|'
-p tcp --dport 80 --syn --j DROP

# Check for DF bit not setted typical of flooder
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 --match string --algo bm --to 10 ! --hex-string '|4000|'
-p tcp --dport 80 --syn --j DROP

# Check for syn packet with malicious string in the payload
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 --match string --string "<malicious_content>"
-p tcp --dport 80 --syn --j DROP
```

Has been really useful also the option "to" and "from" of the match iptables module since they could help narrow down which portion of the package to look for the pattern or malicious content.

## 2.3 Micheli

## 2.4 Piva

# 3 Secure Server

During this second ctf the objectives were to defend and attack a small web application. The modality of the exercise are the same used during the first ctf and the topology is the same, the only difference is in the fact that within this competition syn flood attacks are not allowed.

As already stated topology and machines involved are the same as in the Resilient ctf to refresh the concepts take a look to the overview of the Resilient Server.

During this ctf, the point were earned as red team when sending malicious request the red team was able to create inconsistency in the defender database, on the contrary the blue team earned points if they managed to deny the creation of inconsistencies in the database.

## 3.1 Dupre

For this CTF, Giovanni Guadagnini quickly did most, if not nearly all, of the work concerning the defense. As such, I went ahead and started working on the Offense first and foremost. I realized the following scripts :

- spamErrors.py and spamUsers.py: These two scripts craft a request repeatedly, respectively with the end goal to produce an error and to create an user, and then send it to the server. Both of these scripts take a number of millisecond in argument, which will be the pause between sending two requests. Theses scripts quite simply start by creating a random 10 length username and password, and then send the request to the server using the request python library. For spamErrors the drop is simply something the server is not supposed to recognized, for example ERROR. For spamUsers the request is legitimate and as such the drop is register. The aim of spamUsers was to hope that the defender server was badly configured and would slow down when too many users were to be registered. The aim of spamErrors was the same.
- curlFillLogFile.py: This file craft dummy request repeatedly, both length and wait time between sending two requests are to be passed by arguments. Each request will randomly add specified length to either the user name, amount or password, the base length of these three parameter is 10. The aim of this script was to file the limited storage space of the server and make it unable to function properly and log new entries, granting use more points.

None of these scripts were used since we believed this would be considered flooding, even though we were attacked with this exact same type of spam.

- `payload.txt`: In addition to these three files, I also focused on coming up with potential payloads to use against the other group's server. I came up with the following payloads, most of them basic and simply countered. Listing all transaction, leaking a password and an username was done through simple sql injection. I also tried to register an empty user/password combo as well as an user with an empty password. I also tried to overdraft using percent and php char function in a deposit command, the logic being that we are trying to deposit a negative amount, and we are bypassing the "-" sign using these two methods. Finally I realized that the three default users all always had the same password, which we could try to take advantage by performing illegal operation on their account.

I also created a bash script to change the password of the three default users, which was then improved and included in the blue start-up script by Giovanni Guadagnini. Finally, research was done through CVEs to check if any of our applications were vulnerable to attacks that we did not find about. Most, if not all of CVEs found were taking advantage a very specific setup of our Apache server for example, since our configuration was basic, none of them applied to us.

### 3.1.1 Results Evaluation

I started the secure CTF by trying the different payload that I had crafted, seeing that none of them had any effects, I then started to monitor traffic and check the various payloads sent by our adversaries while trying to come up with a countermeasure for their attack which was rapidly filling up our log file.

## 3.2 Guadagnini

For this ctf the work started by developing fixing the `process.php` script code, of which all the decisions regarding fixes are illustrated in the next paragraph, continued with the development of the `stratup.sh` scripts, that to be fair the script are more or less the same used for the resilient ctf, there are only slight modifications related to the fact that this time the used packages are different:

- Blue `startup.sh`: Is automatically configuring the iptables of gateway and server machine to accept traffic directed to server port 80, eventual ping traffic limited to 1 operation per second from all the network of the laboratory and it's blocking all the other traffic. To conclude the script has been modified to install LAMP, apply the patch against slow loris attacks, fix the database problem by running an `.sql` file and finally by loading all the script in `/home/cctf` folder.
- Red `startup.sh`: This script is installing all the needed packages and uploading all the attack script on `/home/cctf` folder.

Finally the work ended by developing the missing milestones:

- `check_consistency_db.sh`: This script is really useful to check if the attackers are creating problems to the database integrity, in the specific two queries are executed in order to spot if some users has a negative balance and also if some transactions exists for users non registered in the system, all these two conditions should be ensured from the patches applied to the php script but also from the foreign key constraint that has been added to the database. In any case it's a good practice to check that these conditions are always in place since the adversary may have some new attacks that could not be fixed from the used implementation. During the ctf this script has been modified to monitor the number of users and transactions generated.
- `connect_to_client.sh`: This script by exploiting port forwarding capabilities of deterlab and a proxy tunnel between the client and a browser allowed the user to connect to the adversary server using one of the clients connected to the deterlab experiment, really useful to test some attacks.
- `genuine_request.sh`: This script is really simple and after performing the registration of the user in the system it keeps sending deposit and withdraw operations interspersed with one second waits, to generate genuine traffic to the adversary server.
- `basic_attack.sh`: This script tries to exploit the fact the adversary `process.php` is not patched against slow operations. The idea is really simple and it's subdivided in two parts:
  1. The script using the same account used for the `genuine_request.sh` keep running deposit and withdraw operations.



2. When some time passed and the user has a lot of transactions, the script was launched to keep requesting for balance while the `genuine_request.sh` keep doing it's work. In this way the server should slow down and some consistency problem may be generated from the high workload.

It very simple to see if the php script wasn't patched and was only needed to request for a balance page after the `genuine_request.sh` script was running for a while, if the page was really big than the attack may be possible.

- `attack.py`: This is also a very simple attack script that using a predefined list of payloads that may generate problems to the adversary implementation. Specifically, the script tries to create malicious requests by inserting payloads in the various combinations of valid and non-valid requests that are generated and sent to the server, after sending the request, before proceeding with the next try, the script shows the result code and the returned page in order for the user to evaluate if the attack was successful or not.

### 3.2.1 Strategy

As happened for the resilient ctf a strategy has been created and optimized as result of all the work done and also from the analysis of the services involved in the laboratory. In the specific, for the defense phase all the vulnerabilities identified in the php has been mitigated and also some iptables rule has been employed in both server and gateway to regulate the traffic that was able to reach the server; instead for the attack phase some really general attacks that tries to exploit the fixed vulnerabilities has been created.

**Defense phase** For the defense, the work started by applying the patch needed to secure the php script:

- **SQL injections**: The first problem fixed was relative to sql injection, in the specific the application wasn't performing any type of checks on the data before executing the query, this is really unsecure since an attacker could exploit this security problem to run whatever command he wants to run in our database and this can bring problem like data leaks and inconsistencies. So in order to fix this problem prepared statement has been implemented in all the query that used parameter, as for the next small example script:

```
$stm = $mysqli->prepare("INSERT INTO transfers (user,amount) values (?, ?)");
$stm->bind_param("si", $user, $amount);
if ($stm->execute() == false){
    closeDBandFile($stm->error); // In case of error print the error
    //and close the connection with files and mysql
}
```

Applying prepare statements the webapp is secure against this kind of attack.

- **Possible XSS**: Also it was almost immediately noticed the possibility to create problems to the user exploiting the fact that on 'user' and 'pass' field of the request no checks were performed, so it was really simple to use them to execute XSS injections. This problem was fixed using `htmlspecialchars` function of php that in escape all the characters and make impossible for an attacker to exploit this issue.
- **Credential checks and security**: The original implementation of the `process.php` script wasn't checking the user credentials before executing the operations, so it was possible for an attacker to perform operations also for users that weren't present in the system. To fix this problem an authentication function has been added and used to protect the execution of malicious requests.

```
if ($choice == 'register') {
    ...
} else if ($choice == 'balance' && checkUserCredentials($user, $pass) == true) {
    ...
} else if ($choice == 'deposit' && checkUserCredentials($user, $pass) == true) {
    ...
} else if ($choice == 'withdraw' && checkUserCredentials($user, $pass) == true) {
    ...
}
```

So after the fix was possible to perform balance, deposit and withdraw, that implicitly consider that the user is present in the system, only if the user credentials provided has been verified, obviously in order to avoid useless work to the database the function that verify the user credentials is called only if the user setted all the parameter in a correct and managed to get to the operation without problems.

The second problem with the password was that in the database the password were stored in clear so possible data leak could be very dangerous for the registered users also no checks on the mininum password lenght were enforced. To fix this problem the code has beed updated to user **password\_hash** and **password\_verify** php functions and a simple check on the paramter has been added to check that the password was at least 10 characters long, in this way the user need to insert a password that is at least 10 characters long and the password are stored in the database hashed to reduce the risks. A function that checks if the password is secure could also been interesting to add to the script to enhance the security level of the password.

```
...
//user registration
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare("INSERT INTO users (user, pass) VALUES (?, ?)");
$stmt->bind_param("ss", $user, password_hash($pass, PASSWORD_DEFAULT)); // The password is stored
//in the database as the digest generated from the php function
...
/*
 * Check the user credential, in the specific retrieve the digest of the password and checks
 * it with password_verify function
 * $user Username of the user we need to check the credentials
 * $pass Password inserted
 * return outcome of the password digest check
 */
function checkUserCredentials($user, $pass){
    $stmt = $GLOBALS['mysqli']->prepare("SELECT pass FROM users WHERE user = ?");
    $stmt->bind_param("s", $user);

    if ($stmt->execute() == false){
        closeDBandFile($stmt->error); // In case of error print the error
        //and close the connection with files and mysql
    }

    $result = $stmt->get_result();
    $row = $result->fetch_array();
    if(!password_verify($pass, $row['pass'])){ // Password is check using
        //the digest verification funciton of php
        closeDBandFile("User doesn't exist in the system or the combination "+
            "user and password used is wrong, retry!");
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}
}
```

Finally for the user present in the system the password has been randomly generated and updated in the database accordingly to the new specifics.

- **Parameters check:** As already stated all the parmeter in the original version of the script were using without perform any check at all. To fix this problem some checks has been implemented especially in two point of the code:

1. At the beginning of the code some checks has been implemented to ensure the user inserted all the parameters in the request and also it was checked that the username could be stored in the user field of the database. In case the parameter that is missing is really important, like for example username or password, the execution is blocked and a message is sent to the user.

2. The second part of this checks was related to the amount parameter, in the specific the script is checking the number inserted is an integer with the **intval** php function, that converts string to integers, and also checks if it's within the limit of the database integer type. All this checks and cast operations are applied to ensure there are no problem on the execution of the query and also to provide precise error messages to the users.
- **Problem on withdraw operation:** In the original script it was possible to create inconsistencies in the database since it wasn't performing checks on the amount of money during the withdraw operations. This problem was fixed by getting from the database the amount of money of a user and by checking if the user could withdraw the amount of money inserted.

```

/*
 * Get the user balance from the database
 * $user Username of the user we need to recover the balance
 * return balance of the user
 */
function getUserBalance($user){
    $stm = $GLOBALS['mysqli']->prepare("SELECT SUM(amount)
        as amount FROM transfers where user = ? ");
    $stm->bind_param("s", $user);

    if ($stm->execute() == false){
        closeDBandFile($stm->error); // In case of error print the error
        //and close the connection with files and mysql
    }

    $result = $stm->get_result(); // Retrieve the information from the database
    $row = $result->fetch_array();
    $amount = $row['amount'];

    // If the result set is empty than set the amount to 0
    if(!$amount){
        $amount = 0;
    }

    return $amount;
}

```

About the deposit, since the database is able to sum the integer and if needed automatically performs the cast to a bigger type in case the result is to big for the used type, there is no need to check if the user amount is bigger than the integer type of the database, the only limit is regarding the transactions amount that need to be within the mysql integer type limits.

- **Slow operations:** It was immediately clear that some operations with the database were very slow and could be used against the web application. In the specific two slow operations are executed when the balance operation is specified from the user and are the balance calculation and the transfers history visualization. To solve this problem two things has been added:
  - The balance has been calculated using a sql query, this is faster than getting all the results from the database and calculate the balance by summing all the rows in case the transfers are a lot, also the database should maintain good performances also if in the table are present a lot of rows. In the specific every time the balance of the user is needed the **getUserBalance** function is used.
  - The second problem has been fixed by limiting the data that a single page can visualize by implementing a simple pagination of the results, in the specific the user is limited to view 25 results per page and can easily navigate through the transactions using a navigation bar. In this way even if the user has thousands of transactions the performance should remain good, and the server should answer in short amount of time also during high workloads.

- **Database problems:** Finally the database has been fixed the problems found were related to how the database tables were created and from the user used from the php script. In the specific the first problem was that the relation between the two tables wasn't enforced, so it was possible to insert transfers of users not registered, also by inserting the foreign key constraint the engine used (MyISAM) wasn't checking the foreign key, the second problem related to the user is that the php script using the root user can access to all the tables present in the system and perform everything since all the operations are allowed to that user this is a very big problem if for some reason an attacker is able to exploit a vulnerability and use the db user at his will. The problem has been solved by:

- The table engine has been modified to InnoDB that is able to enforce foreign key constraint and finally a foreign key constraint has been added to ensure the transaction belong to an existing user.
- The principle of least privileges has been enforced to evaluate the operations needed from the php script and an user has been created accordingly. In the specific the user can only access to the ctf2 database and only SELECT and INSERT operations are allowed.

```
CREATE USER 'php_user'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED BY '|AttackersWontFindOut@';
GRANT SELECT ON ctf2.users TO 'php_user'@'localhost';
GRANT SELECT ON ctf2.transfers TO 'php_user'@'localhost';
GRANT INSERT ON ctf2.users TO 'php_user'@'localhost';
GRANT INSERT ON ctf2.transfers TO 'php_user'@'localhost';
ALTER TABLE ctf2.users MODIFY COLUMN pass char(64) NOT NULL;
ALTER TABLE ctf2.users ENGINE = InnoDB;
ALTER TABLE ctf2.transfers ENGINE = InnoDB;
ALTER TABLE ctf2.transfers ADD CONSTRAINT users_transfers_fk FOREIGN KEY (user)
REFERENCES ctf2.users(user);
```

- **File and database connection:** Thanks to Piva intuition the application after the fix automatically closes the stream with the file and the connection with the database, this is really important since during the normal usage of the php script the page will be executed concurrently from many users and since the resource are limited is a good practice to release them in a correct way to allow other process to use them.
- **Log:** Since the log original implementation was logging all the eventual parameters the user insert in the request, has been added into the php script a small section of the log part that in order to evaluate the attacks was logging only the parameter used from the php script in the specific name, surname, drop and amount.
- **Other fix:** Finally the application has been completed by arranging eventual error message and a very minimal style for the page.

To continue the defense evaluation, even if some services won't be available because of the iptables rules that will be configured in the machines, a research on the vulnerability of the used software has been performed. These are the results:

- **Apache 2.4.29:** The top 5 known vulnerabilities has a CVSSv4 score smaller than 7.3 and basically seems to be related to some modules that are configured and used from the attacker in order to try to stop the server, but since apache is being used with a very simple configuration it seems that no known vulnerability can be used to affect server. [List of known vulnerabilities](#).
- **Php 7.2.24:** Generally there are a lot of known vulnerabilities (34) for the version 7.x of php, but seems that all the vulnerability are patched before the version used from LAMPP. [List of known vulnerabilities](#).
- **Mysql 5.7.31:** The result are practically the same obtained while analyzing php known vulnerabilities. Also, we should be safe, by considering that the mysql server isn't directly accessible from outside the server, so for an eventual attacker should be very difficult to gain access to this component of the system to exploit vulnerabilities. [List of known vulnerabilities](#).

Finally to complete the analysis some test with a network fuzzer has been performed. In the specific [wfuzz](#) has been used and by using `apache.txt` and `sql_inj.txt` wordlist some test has been performed to ensure the implemented security measures were strong enough.

```
wfuzz -c -w /home/giovanni/Scaricati/wfuzz/wordlist/vulns/apache.txt
"http://localhost:8080/process.php?user=FUZZ&pass=FUZZ&amount=FUZZ&drop=FUZZ"
```

```
wfuzz -c -w /home/giovanni/Scaricati/wfuzz/wordlist/vulns/apache.txt
"http://localhost:8080/process.php?user=test1&pass=test1test1test1&amount=FUZZ&drop=deposit"
```

```
wfuzz -c -w /home/giovanni/Scaricati/wfuzz/wordlist/vulns/apache.txt
"http://localhost:8080/process.php?user=test1&pass=test1test1test1&amount=FUZZ&drop=withdraw"
```


These are some of the command that has been executed to test the security of the php script, all the test performed gave negative results and the application seemed to answer well. It's possible to find more information on the recon phase in the files contained in the repo.

A possible use of Snort was evaluated but finally discarded since the protection provided by the iptables rules and its match-string module allowed to effectively protect the webapp

**Attack phase** As happened for the resilient ctf the attacks has been created trying to exploit vulnerabilities found in the original implementation, for this reason attack script as `basic_attack.sh` and `attack.py` has been created. To be fair it was difficult to create original attacks that deviate from exploiting slow operations or sql injections and it was also very difficult to exploit volumetric attacks increasing the number of requests since basically we were allowed to send 1 request per second from each client. It was also difficult to create other exploit because the used software seemed to be secure against known vulnerabilities and if the traffic was well managed from the adversary firewall was really difficult to reach the machines and eventual vulnerable services.

### 3.2.2 Results Evaluation

As for the first ctf I personally enjoyed the experience, overall during the ctf the implemented defense held up really good to the received attacks in fact from the monitoring software I didn't noticed consistency problem and the server seemed to be up and fast for all the duration ctf. I noticed the adversary tried to run a really basic version of slow loris that I blocked with an iptables rules since the keep-alive messages contained a recognizable string. I also noticed they tried to exploit remote code execution with a remote shellcode that didn't worked and also they tried with sqlinjection. Most of the time they tried to create users in the system in fact they managed to create more than 60000 users.



(a) Server response time from monitoring software. (b) Database status from monitoring software.

Figure 4: These two images represent the system status at the end of the ctf.

To be fair after 1 hour and half our disk was full because the log file reached 11GB of dimension, this seemed to be my fault since in the `process.php` script I was using the same file for the normal logs and also the original version of the log but also seems to be a consequence of the adversary red team script that was generating too much traffic, the monitoring software detected 1955 packet in 5 seconds and I think the very high number of request ended up in creating a very big log file.

In retrospect I think that in addition to the applied changes I would have implemented, as suggested during the debriefing, a sort of filter to limit the creation of malicious users by checking for the presence of special characters or something similar also I would have liked to have snort with some rules to detect some attacks.

```
Report:
We have received 1955 packets in the last five seconds
732 SYN packets , total length 54168
956 DATA packets , total length 240506
0 UDP packets , total length 0
Packets received come from:
Source: 10.1.3.2, nb packets: 476, length packets: 48190
Source: 10.1.4.2, nb packets: 507, length packets: 50841
Source: 10.1.2.2, nb packets: 428, length packets: 48840
Source: 10.1.5.3, nb packets: 3, length packets: 198
Source: 10.1.5.2, nb packets: 541, length packets: 174227
```

Figure 5: Traffic data collected in 5 seconds.

As far as the attack phase is concerned, our attacks have not had a great effect, and what has created problems for the opposing blue team seems to have been an incorrect configuration.

### 3.3 Micheli

### 3.4 Piva